應用賽局理論 學號

110 秋
作業四解答 姓名
繳交期限：111/1/3

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1. (20 points) Watson Chapter 24: Exercises 2

Solution:

(a)
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Solution:

(b)
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2. (5 points) Watson Chapter 26: Exercises 6

Solution: (LL’, U).

3. (10 points) Watson Chapter 26: Exercises 7

Solution:

(a)

(b) (BA’, Y).

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4. (15 points) Watson Chapter 26: Exercises 10

Solution:

(a) For firm 1, ∂u

∂q1
1
= x − 2q1 − q2 ≡ 0 implies q1 = [x − q2 ]/2. So BR1H = 8−q2
2
and
BR1H = 4−q 2
2
.
For firm 2, Eu2 = [x̄ − q¯1 − q2 ]q2 = [6 − q¯1 − q2 ]q2 , where x̄ is the expected value
of x, and q¯1 = [q1H + q1L ]/2. Solving for player 2’s first‐order condition yields
12−q1H −q1L
∂Eu2
∂q2
= 6 − q¯1 − 2q2 ≡ 0, which implies BR2 (q1H , q1L ) = 4
.

(b) Solving the system of equations above yields q1H∗ = 3, q1L∗ = 1, and q2∗ = 2.

1 = [8 − 3 − 2]3 = 9 and u1 = [4 − 1 − 2]1 = 1. So firm

(c) Payoffs for firm 1 are uH L

1’s expected payoff is 2 9 + 2 1 = 5. Firm 2’s expected payoff is 21 [8 − 3 − 2]2 +

1 1
1
2
[4 − 1 − 2]2 = 4 = 5. Thus, firm 1’s information does give it an advantage.
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5. (15 points) Watson Chapter 27: Exercises 4

Solution:

(a) Colin wins and pays 82.

(b) Colin wins and pays 82 (or 82 plus a very small number).

(c) The seller should set the reserve price at 92. Colin wins and pays 92.

6. (10 points) Watson Chapter 27: Exercises 6

Solution: Let bi be the player i’s bid, then player i’s expected payoff is
(√ )
( ) b i
vi · p bi > kvj2 − bi = vi p > v j − bi
k
√
bi
= vi − bi
k

F.O.C
1 vi √ v2
√ − 1 = 0 ⇒ vi = 2 kbi ⇒ bi = i
2 kbi 4k
1
We know bi should be kvi2 , so 4k
= k, and since k > 0, we know that k = 1/2.
Therefore, the equilibrium bidding strategy for player i is bi (vi ) = vi2 /2.
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7. (25 points) Watson Chapter 27: Exercises 8

Solution:

(a) Clearly, if p < 200, then John would never trade, so neither player will trade in
equilibrium. Consider two cases for p between 200 and 1, 000.
First, suppose 600 ≤ p ≤ 1, 000. In this case, Jessica will not trade if her signal
is x2 = 200, because she then knows that 600 is the most the stock could be
worth. John therefore knows that Jessica would only be willing to trade if her
signal is 1, 000. However, if John’s signal is 1, 000 and he offers to trade, then
the trade could occur only when v = 1, 000, in which case he would have been
better off not trading. Realizing this, Jessica deduces that John would only
be willing to trade if x1 = 200, but then she never has an interest in trading.
Thus, the only equilibrium has both players choosing “not,” regardless of their
types. Similar reasoning establishes that trade never occurs in the case of p <
600 either. Thus, trade never occurs in equilibrium. Notably, we reached this
conclusion by tracing the implications of common knowledge of rationality
(rationalizability), so the result does not rely on equilibrium.

(b) It is not possible for trade to occur in equilibrium with positive prob‐ ability.
This may seem strange compared to what we observe about real stock markets,
where trade is usually vigorous. In the real world, players may lack common
knowledge of the fundamentals or each other’s rationality, trade may occur
due to liquidity needs, and there may be differences in owners’ abilities to run
firms.
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Solution:

(c) Intuitively, the equilibrium strategies can be represented by numbers x1 and x2 ,

where John trades if and only if x1 ≤ x1 and Jessica trades if and only if x2 ≥ x2 .
For John, trade yields an expected payoff of
∫ x2 ∫ 1000
(1/2)(x1 + x2 )F2 (x2 )dx2 + pF2 (x2 )dx2 − 1
100 x2

Not trading yields ∫ 1000

(1/2)(x1 + x2 )F2 (x2 )dx2
100

Simplifying, we see that John’s trade payoff is greater than is his no‐trade payoff
when ∫ 1000
[p − (1/2)(x1 + x2 )]F2 (x2 )dx2 ≥ 1. (1)
x2

For Jessica, trade implies an expected payoff of

∫ x1
[(1/2)(x1 + x2 ) − p]F1 (x1 )dx1 − 1
100

No trade gives her a payoff of zero. Simplifying, she prefers trade when
∫ x1
[(1/2)(x1 + x2 ) − p]F1 (x1 )dx1 ≥ 1. (2)
100

By the definitions of x1 and x2 , (1) holds for all x1 ≤ x1 and (2) holds for all
x2 ≥ x2 . Integrating (1) over x1 < x1 yields
∫ x1 ∫ 1000 ∫ x1
[p − (1/2)(x1 + x2 )]F2 (x2 )F1 (x1 )dx2 dx1 ≥ F1 (x1 )dx1
100 x2 100

Integrating (2) over x2 > x2 yields

∫ x1 ∫ 1000 ∫ 1000
[(1/2)(x1 + x2 ) − p]F2 (x2 )F1 (x1 )dx2 dx1 ≥ F2 (x2 )dx2
100 x2 x2

These inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously, unless trade never oc‐

curs in equilibrium—so that x1 is less than 100 and x2 exceeds 1, 000, implying
that all of the integrals in these expressions equal zero.