SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
EO No. 209 – “FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES”
Signed into law by Pres. Corazon C. Aquino on July
6, 1987.
Reason and objective of the code:
 Almost 4 decades have passed since the
adoption of the CC;
 Experience under said code as well as
pervasive changes and developments have
necessitated revision of its provisions on
marriage and family relations to bring them
closer to Filipino customs, values and ideals
and reflect contemporary trends and
conditions;
 There is a need to implement policies
embodied in the new Constitution that
strengthen marriage and the family as
basic social institutions and ensure
equality between men and women.
EO No 277 was signed by Pres Aquino on July 17,
1987. This EO was subjected to further amendments
and modifications specifically referring to Arts 26,36
and 39.
 The FC took effect on August 3, 1988.
 RA No 6809 was passed by congress on Oct 20,
1989 and approved by Pres Aquino. It took
effect Dec 18, 1989. It amended Title X of the
FC dealing with emancipation and the age of
majority.
TITLE I – MARRIAGE
CHAPTER 1: REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
ART 1: MARRIAGE is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with the law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
JURISPRUDENCE:
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-
PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON VS. GLAXO
WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R NO.
162994, SEPT 17, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995.
Tecson signed a contract of employment which
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship
by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses
a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If
management perceives a conflict of interest or a
potential conflict between such relationship and the
employee’s employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a "transfer to another department in
a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months
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Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s
products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. He entered into a romantic relationship with
Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo.
Even before they got married, Tecson received
several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his
relationship with Bettsy might engender.
After the marriage, Tecson’s superiors informed him
that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he
and Bettsy should decide which one of them would
resign from their jobs, although they told him that
they wanted to retain him as much as possible
because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the
company policy. He explained that Astra, was
planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug
company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra.
Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk
division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk
division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. His application was denied in view of
Glaxo’s "least-movement-possible" policy.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area but he defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings,
Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued
samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also
not included in product conferences regarding such
products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the
grievance machinery level, they submitted the
matter for voluntary arbitration. 
ISSUES: WON THE POLICY PROHIBITING
EMPLOYEES FROM MARRYING
EMPLOYEES OF ANY COMPETITOR
COMPANY IS VALID.
HELD:
Yes. Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from
having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and
other confidential programs and information from
competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the
company.
Glaxo’s right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth.20 
In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave
Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of
interest brought about by his relationship with
Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial
stage, Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo constantly
reminded him about its effects on his employment
with the company and on the company’s interests.
After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to
resolve the conflict by either resigning from the
company or asking his wife to resign from Astra.
Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its
employ because of his satisfactory performance and
suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her
company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his
repeated requests for more time to resolve the
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conflict of interest. When the problem could not be
resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was
constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area
different from that handled by his wife for Astra.
Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area
where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was
included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly,
the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness
and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
JURISPRUDENCE
STAR PAPER V. SIMBOL GR NO. 164774,
APRIL 14, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE
ONGSITCO &SEBASTIAN CHUA, petitioners, vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA
& LORNA E. ESTRELLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a
corporation engaged in trading — principally of
paper products.
The evidence for the petitioners showed that
respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda
N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella)
were all regular employees of the company.
Simbol was employed by the company, he met
Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company,
whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco
(Manager of the Personnel and Administration
Department) advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign
pursuant to their company policy. Thereafter, Simbol
resigned. The same also happened to Comia.
On the other hand, Estrella met Luisito Zuñiga
(Zuñiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that
Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign.
Respondents offer a different version of their
dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not
resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign
in view of an illegal company policy. As to
respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a
relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who
misrepresented himself as a married but separated
man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that
he was not separated. Thus, she severed her
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the
company policy. Still, the company made her resign.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorney's fees. They averred that the aforementioned
company policy is illegal and contravenes Article
136 of the Labor Code.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission
affirmed the decision. However, The Court of
Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE: WON the subject company policy is
violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage
and the family of employees.
HELD: YES. The 1987 constitution states our policy
towards the protection of labor under Arts. 2 (18),
and 13(3). Likewise, the Civil Code protects labor
under ARTS 1700-1702. ART 136 of the Labor Code
also offers the most comprehensive piece of
legislation protecting Labor.
The court said that in our jurisdiction, there is no
express prohibition on marital discrimination.
However, there are 20 statutes in the US prohibiting
marital discrimination. Some state courts have been
confronted with the issue of whether no-spouse
policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital
status and sex discrimination. These courts also
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find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for
failure of the employer to present any evidence of
business necessity other than the general perception
that spouses in the same workplace might adversely
affect the business. They hold that the absence of
such bona fide occupational qualification
invalidates a rule denying employment to one
spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.
Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a
distinction based on marital status and there is no
better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer
may not discriminate against an employee based on
the identity of the employee's spouse. This
is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
The court did not find reasonable business
necessity in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that respondents were hired after they were found
fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma
Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section,
could be detrimental to its business operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment
will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a
Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who
married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter
machine.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less
efficient.
If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based
on an unproven presumption of a perceived
danger at the expense of an employee's right to
security of tenure.
JURISPRUDENCE
PT&T v. NLRC 272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
Petitioner PT&T invoked the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
That employee, private respondent Grace de
Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was
her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in
its company policies.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as
a reliever. Under the Reliever Agreement which she
signed her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period.
Private respondent was once more asked to join
petitioner company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job
application form she indicated in the portion for
civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier.
Its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M.
Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum
dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the company's policy of not
accepting married women for employment.
Private respondent stated that she was not aware of
PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time,
and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her
true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent
was dismissed from the company
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ISSUE: WON EMPLOYER'S POLICY OF NOT
ACCEPTING FOR WORK ANY WOMAN
WORKER WHO CONTRACTS MARRIAGE IS
VALID.
HELD: No.
Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed
private respondent from employment on account
of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that
her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the company's policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman
employee must remain unmarried could be
justified as a "bona fide occupational
qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same,
but not on the ground of a general principle, such as
the desirability of spreading work in the workplace.
A requirement of that nature would be valid
provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance, that
the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may
deem convenient, the same should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and
public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman
of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that
by all accounts inheres in the individual as an
intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions that they may deem convenient,
the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
It may even be said that petitioner's policy against
legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a
policy against marriage followed by petitioner
PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation.
JURISPRUDENCE
ALEJANRO ESTRADA, vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR [A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.]
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253,
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an
investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, for living with a man not
her husband, and having borne a child within this
live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor
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is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered
the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she
started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when
her husband was still alive but living with another
woman.
But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, respondent asserted that their
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation. For Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Declaration allows members of the congregation
who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter
into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the
resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries
where divorce is allowed.
The Solicitor General, quoting the Constitution and
the Family Code, argues that marriage and the
family are so crucial to the stability and peace of
the nation that the conjugal arrangement embraced
in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness should
not be recognized or given effect, as "it is utterly
destructive of the avowed institutions of marriage and
the family for it reduces to a mockery these legally
exalted and socially significant institutions which in
their purity demand respect and dignity.
The Solicitor General also argued against
respondent's religious freedom on the basis of
morality, i.e. , that "the conjugal arrangement of
respondent and her live-in partner should not be
condoned because adulterous relationships are
constantly frowned upon by society"; and "that
State laws on marriage, which are moral in nature,
take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and
practices of any church, religious sect or
denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs
and practices should not be permitted to override
laws relating to public policy such as those of
marriage."
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
EXEMPTION.
HELD: Our Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had
was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized
standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,"
the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that
benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Even assuming that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, i.e. , it has chosen a way
to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as
little as possible on religious liberties.
Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove
this element of the test.
Other than the two documents offered which
established the sincerity of respondent's religious
belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal
arrangement within respondent's congregation, no
iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are
bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such
evidence to show that the means the state adopted in
pursuing this compelling interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.
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Thus, in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor's conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms — including religious
freedom — may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld
must be so compelling that its violation will erode
the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
JURISPRUDENCE
ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-
appellant , vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-
appellee. [G.R. No. 11263. November 2, 1916.]
FACTS:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila
and immediately thereafter established their residence
at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived
together for about a month, thereafter plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents.
That the defendant, one month after he had
contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts;
that the plaintiff refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation. Which refusals of the
plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induced him
to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries
upon her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable
by any means to induce the defendant to desist from
his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her,
she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take
refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUE: WON the husband may be compelled to pay
support to his wife.
HELD: Yes. Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the
instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband
is not one of them.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the
part of the husband to support his wife.
This obligation is founded not so much on the
express or implied terms of the contract of marriage
as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital
concern to the state itself that the law will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful
acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the
parental home.
A judgment for separate maintenance is not due
and payable either as damages or as a penalty;
nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling
for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign.
This is done from necessity and with a view to
preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife;
as where the husband makes so base demands upon
his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
the pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred
and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger
policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far
only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be
considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair
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the marriage contract or for any purpose place the
wife in the situation of a feme sole (divorced | A
woman without a husband).
NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF
MARRIAGE:
 Marriage, while from its very nature a
sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most
civilized nations, a civil contract, and
usually regulated by law. Upon it society
may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations
and duties, with which government is
necessarily required to deal. (Reynolds v.
US, 98 US 145, 25 L. Ed. 144)
 Marriage is something more than a mere
contract. The consent of the parties is of
course essential to its existence, but when
the contract to marry is executed by the
marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other
contracts may be modified, restricted, or
enlarged, or entirely released upon the
consent of the parties. Not so with marriage.
The relation once formed, the law steps in
and holds the parties to various obligations
and liabilities. It is an institution in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation
of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor
progress. (Maynard v. Hill, 125 US 190, 8 S.
Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654)
 It is not a contract within the meaning of
the clause of the Constitution which
prohibits the impairing of the obligation
of contracts. It is rather a social relation
like that of a parent and a child, the
obligations of which arise not from the
consent of concurring minds, but are the
creation of the law itself, a relation the most
important, as affecting the happiness of
individuals, the first step from barbarism to
incipient civilization, the purest tie of social
life, and the true basis of human progress.
(Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483)
 The marital relation, unlike ordinary
contractual relations, is regarded by the laws
as the basis of the social organization. The
preservation of that relation is deemed
essential to public welfares. (Hood v.
Roleson, 125 Ark. 30, 187 SW 1059)
 MARRIAGE as a special contract cannot be
restricted by discriminatory policies of
private individuals or corporations.
In PH Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC,
82 SCAD 747, 272 SCRA 596, where a company’s
policy disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage, the SC invalidated such
policy as it not only runs afoul of the constitutional
provision on equal protection but also on the
fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
 Marriage not an ordinary contract is
highlighted in the ff:
ART 350, RPC provides that the penalty of prison
correctional in its medium and maximum period
shall be imposed upon any person who, not having
committed bigamy which is separately penalized
under ART 349, RPC, shall contract marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment.
Secs. 37 – 45 of the Marriage Law of 1929 (ACT no
3631) providing for the criminal penalties for erring
persons who are authorized to solemnize a marriage
are the only remaining provisions in the said law
which have not been repealed by any law, including
the Family Code.
MAIL ORDER BRIDE
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 Marriage is vested with public interest
such that the legislature has even enacted a
law making it a criminal offense for any
person, natural or juridical, association, club
or any entity to commit, directly or
indirectly, any of the following acts:
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN.
 Under RA No 9208, the ANTI Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003, the following acts
are considered trafficking:
MARRIAGE BETWEEN RAPIST AND RAPED
VICTIM:
As a special contract, a subsequent valid marriage of
the offender and the offended party in the crime of
rape likewise extinguishes the criminal action or the
penalty imposed for rape.
 In case the victim is already married and it is
the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty, provided that the
crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the
marriage is VOID AB INITIO (ART 266-
C RPC, AS AMENDED BY RA NO 8353)
MARRIAGE AS A STATUS
 Marriage creates a social status or relation
between the contracting parties in which not
only they but the State as well are interested
and involves a personal union of those
participating in it of a character unknown to
any other human relations, and having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution.
 Marriage is one of the cases of double
status, in that the status therein involves
and affects two persons. One is married,
never in abstract or a vacuum, but always, to
somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on
the marriage status of a person necessarily
reflects upon the status of another and the
relation between them.
 Hence, in a case where the parties, prior to
the civil marriage ceremony, agreed that the
said civil marriage was not to be considered
valid and binding until after the celebration
of a religious marriage ceremony, it was
held that a case for annulment based on the
non fulfillment of the said condition cannot
prosper.
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MARRIAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
 The right to marry is a recognized
fundamental human right under international
law.
 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the members of the UN
including the PH specifically provides in
ART 16 thereof that men and women of
full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the
right to marry and “to found a family.”
They are entitled to equal rights as to
marriage, during marriage and after its
dissolution. It further provides that marriage
shall be entered into only with the free and
full consent of the intending parties. It
declares that the family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the
State.
 The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights signed by the
PH – Article 10 thereof provides
declarations similar to those enunciated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which the Republic of the
PH signed likewise specifically provides in
ART 23 thereof the same provisions on
family and marriage stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
 The 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides in its Declaration of Principles
and State Policies that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations (ART II Sec 2 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
 The PH Constitution provides that “the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution” (Sec
12, ART 2).
 Marriage is a relationship of the highest
importance. The constitution further
provides a separate ART 15 exclusively
dealing with the family. It provides that the
state recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development (Sec 1, ART
15).
 Marriage according to the Constitution, is an
inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State (Sec 2 ART 15).
 It has likewise been authoritatively stated
that the “right to marry, establish a home
and bring up children is a central part of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”
(Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 373, 54 L. Ed.
618)
 The right to enter into a marriage has also
been regarded as within the ambit of the
constitutional right of association. And, once
married, a couple has a right to privacy
which is protected against all undue and
unwarranted government intrusion.
 The constitutional provisions on
marriage, however, do not imply that the
legislature cannot enact a law allowing
absolute divorce. The legislature has the
plenary power to decide what sort of
situations allowing absolute divorce may be
recognized within the limits allowed by the
constitution.
 While a lawful marriage seeks to create a
permanent union between man and woman,
it does not shed the spouses’ integrity or
their privacy as individuals.
In Zulueta v. CA, 253 SCRA 699, where a wife, to get
evidence of infidelity in a case for legal separation
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
she filed against her husband, ransacked his office
and forcibly took documents and letters of the
husband addressed to his paramour, the SC ruled that
the wife cannot use the said documents and letters as
evidence because they were obtained in violation of
the husband’s constitutional right to privacy.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MARRIAGE
 The constitution itself however does not
establish the parameters of state protection
to marriage and the family, as it remains
the province of the legislature to define all
legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect
it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the
same.
 With the enactment of the Family Code, this
has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. (ONG vs ONG GR NO 153206)
 There are 3 parties to every civil
marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties
assume new relations to each other and the
state touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death.
 The relations, duties, obligations and
consequences flowing from the marriage
contract are so important to the peace and
welfare of society as to have placed it under
the control of special municipal regulations,
independent of the will of the parties, and it
has always been the subject of legislative
control.(Maynard vs. Hill 125 US 190, 8 S.
CT. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654)
 Not only is the state concerned with the
validity of marriage per se but also with the
sustainability and maintenance of a
harmonious and healthy family life brought
about by such marriage.
 It is a generally accepted doctrine that the
legislature may impose such restrictions
upon marital relation as the laws of God and
the laws of propriety and morality and social
order demand, provided, such regulations
are not prohibitory. (State v. Walker, 36
Kan. 297)
 Legislative regulation of marriage must,
however, not contravene the mandates of
the Constitution. It must not violate for
instance the “equal protection clause” by
forbidding certain types of marriages on the
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
basis of race or political inclinations.
(LOVING vs. Virginia, 388 US 1, 18 L. Ed.
2d, 1010)
 By legislation, marriage can be made a
statutory basis for limiting one’s capacity to
act or for affecting one’s right to acquire
property.
 If a person attests the execution of a last will
and testament, to whose spouse a devise or
legacy is given by such will, such devise or
legacy shall, so far only as concerns such
spouse or anyone claiming under such
spouse, be void, unless there are three other
competent witnesses to such will (Art 823,
CC). In this case, the fact of marriage of the
witness in a will to the devisee or legatee
shall render void the gratuitous disposition
of a real property in favor of the devisee-
spouse or a personal property in favor of the
legatee-spouse, unless there are 3 other
witnesses.
 Also, according to ART 874, CC, an
absolute condition not to contract a first or
subsequent marriage made in a last will and
testament on an instituted voluntary heir,
legatee, or devisee shall be considered as not
written unless such condition has been
imposed on the widow or widower by the
deceased spouse, or by the latter’s
ascendants or descendants. It must be
pointed out that, in case the heir, legatee, or
devisee falls under the exception, the
contravention of such a condition in a will
imposed on them will nevertheless not make
the marriage void but will only make
ineffective the grant, devise or legacy.
 Reference case: Capin-Cadiz v. Brent
Hospital
PROPERTY RELATIONS
 Under the New Family Code, the nature,
consequence, and incidents of marriage as a
social institution are governed by law and
not subject to stipulations EXCEPT for
property relations which may be fixed in a
marriage settlement executed prior to the
marriage ceremony.
 However, marriage settlements must not
contravene the mandatory provisions of
the new Family Code. As the law
mandates, marriage settlements must be
within the limits provided by the Family
Code.
 For instance, while persons who intend to
marry can stipulate in their marriage
settlement that the property regime that will
govern their marriage shall be the conjugal
partnership property arrangement, they
cannot provide any stipulation, whether
express or implied that the commencement
of such property regime shall be at anytime
other than at the precise moment that the
marriage was celebrated. If they do so:
ART 107, FC in relation to ART 88 statutorily makes
such stipulation void.
ART 77, FC provides that the marriage settlement
and any modification thereof shall be in writing
signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage.
Any modification after the marriage must be
approved by the courts and must be made only in
accordance and in the instances provided for in ART
76.
Other limitations are set out in the FC.
LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY OF
MARRIAGE
 The requisites for a valid marriage are
provided for by law. In determining the
validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the
law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
 The principle that the validity of a marriage
is determined by the law effective at the
time of the celebration of the marriage is
further highlighted by the fact that, as a
general rule, the nature of the marriage
already celebrated cannot be changed by a
subsequent amendment to the law.
Under the 1950 CC, a marriage between stepbrother
and stepsister was void. Such a marriage is not
anymore prohibited under the new FC.
The effectivity of the new FC does not affect the void
nature of a marriage between stepbrother and
stepsister solemnized during the effectivity of the
1950 CC. it remains void or nullifable considering
that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law
enforced at the time of the marriage ceremony.
Also, in the FC, there is now a new provision, ART
53, which considered a subsequent marriage void if,
before contracting the same, the former spouses, in
violation of ART 52 failed, among others, to
liquidate their property of the previous marriage after
the finality of a nullity or annulment decree and to
deliver the presumptive legitime of their children.
This does not exist in 1950 CC, and therefore cannot
be availed of by a person, who, after obtaining a
decree nullifying or annulling his previous marriage,
wants to again nullify his subsequent marriage on the
basis that such subsequent marriage which has been
entered into prior to the effectivity of the FC does not
comply with the requirement relative to the delivery
of the presumptive legitime of his children in the first
marriage.
MISTAKE IN IDENTITY
THIS was an instance of fraud which constituted a
ground to make a marriage annullable (Valid until
Terminated) under the CC. In the FC, such a
MISTAKE IN IDENTITY is a ground to declare a
marriage void from the beginning. The effectivity if
the FC does not affect the annullable nature of those
marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the FC
where “mistake in identity” is involved. The
annullable nature of such a marriage is not IPSO
JURE converted into a marriage which is void AB
INITIO upon the implementation of the FC.
The new FC does not likewise expressly provide that
marriages such as those contracted as a result of
MISTAKE IN IDENTITY become automatically
void upon the effectivity of the new FC just because
the same amended the CC by making MISTAKE IN
IDENTITY a ground to declare a marriage void from
the beginning and not anymore a legal basis for
annulment. An express validation or invalidation
provision is important because any ambiguity or
doubt in the law should follow the general rule that
marriages are governed by the law enforced at the
time of their celebration and any interpretation of the
law must always be made upholding the validity of a
marriage.
While RT 256 of FC provides that the law shall have
a retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the CC and other laws, this retroactivity clause is a
general one and does not expressly and directly
validate a previously void marriage under the CC.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

Moreover, void marriages can never be ratified.

Though a marriage is void, vested rights can be

acquired from such a relationship like those which
may refer to property relationships and, therefore, a
clear and direct legislative mandate to validate a void
marriage must expressly be enacted if the legislature
really intends such a curative measure.

Thus, where the FC allows the filing of a petition to

declare a marriage void even if the ground was not ART. 2 – No marriage shall be valid, unless these
statutorily provided as a basis for a void marriage essential requisites are present:
under the CC. Prior to its amendment, ART 39 of the
FC clearly provides that in cases of marriages 1] Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
celebrated before the effectivity of the FC and falling must be a male and a female; and
under the said Code’s ART 36, which makes a 2] Consent freely given in the presence of the
marriage void because either or both of the solemnizing officer.
contracting spouses are psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligation, an action
or a defense to declare the marriage void shall
prescribe in 10 years after the effectivity of the FC.

This means that a spouse who, prior to the effectivity

of the FC on Aug. 3, 1988, got married to an JURISPRUDENCE
individual who is psychologically incapacitated under
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ART 36, may file a case to declare such marriage
void under the said article of the new FC despite the v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN  [G.R. NO.
fact that such ground did not exist as a legal basis for 166676, September 12, 2008]
nullity of marriage at the time his or her marriage
was celebrated when the CC was in effect. Later, RA
No 8533 amended ART 39 by deleting the FACTS: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
prescriptive period of 10 years. Hence, if the ground Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
for nullity is ART 36, there is no more prescriptive Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
period whether or not the marriage has been Laguna.
celebrated before or after Aug 3, 1988.

She alleged that she was registered as a female in the

Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances
as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be
changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and
presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's
condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally and she has two sex organs -
female and male. He testified that this condition is
very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondent's condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her. The RTC granted respondent's
petition
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female
to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH.
HELD: NO.
Respondent has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere
with what he was born with.
And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent's development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
The court gave respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out.
In other words, the court respected respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103,
this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.
The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent's change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit
in respondent's change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male. WHEREFORE, the
Republic's petition is DENIED.
ART 3 – The formal requisites of marriage are:
1] Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2] A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
3] A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ART. 4 – The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in ART 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable as provided in ART 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
ART. 5 – Any male or female of the age of 18 years
or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in ARTS 37 and 38, may contract
marriage.
ART. 6 – No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained
in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by
the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in ARTICULO MORTIS,
when the party at the point of death is unable to sign
the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one
of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of
said party, which fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer.
LEGAL CAPACITY
Under the new FC, the marrying age is 18 years old
and above.
If any of the parties is below 18 years of age, the
marriage is void even if the consent of the parents
has been previously obtained.
The contracting parties must not be related to each
other in the manner provided for in ART 37, which
refers to incestuous marriages, and ART 38 which
refers to void marriages for reasons of public policy.
Legal capacity to marry must likewise have reference
to ART 39, CC stating that capacity to act is, among
others, limited by family relations. Hence, an already
married person cannot marry again unless his or her
previous marriage has been nullified or annulled or
his or her case falls under the “valid bigamous
marriage” provided for in ART 41, FC.
CONTRACTING PARTIES MUST BE OF
DIFFERENT SEX
Marriage is a union founded on the distinction of sex.
The law likewise provides that the contracting parties
must be a male and a female.
This particular requirement appears to be for
emphasis purposes only for even in its absence, the
phrase “contracting parties” could not have included
within its ambit persons of the same sex.
This is evidenced by the fact that the New FC as well
as the CC are replete with words of heterosexual
import such as “husband and wife”, “man and
woman” and “father and mother”. In fact, the very
first article of the FC explicitly provides that
marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman.
EFFECT OF SEX CHANGE
Gay marriages are definitely not covered within the
purview of the ART 2 of the FC.
The emerging issue of transsexuals and intersexuals
gender identities have called the attention of the SC
in the cases of:
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
 Silverio v. Republic GR NO 174689, Oct
22, 2007
 Republic v. Cagandahan GR NO 166676
Sept 12, 2008
When should the gender identity of a contracting
party to a marriage be determined: at the time of his
or her birth or at the time when he or she decides to
enter into marriage?
From a human rights perspective which espouses a
non-discriminatory and more inclusive interpretation,
it would seem that a man or a woman should be
considered as such at the time of the marriage when
the parties themselves assert their own gender
identities.
CONSENT
The requirements of consent are:
a) Freely given and
b) The same must be made in the presence of
the solemnizing officer.
The child shall have the prerogative of choosing his
or her future spouse. Parents should not force or
unduly influence him or her to marry a person he or
she has not freely chosen (ART 57, PD 603).
The total absence of consent makes the marriage
VOID AB INITIO. However, consent in marriage
obtained through FRAUD, FORCE,
INTIMIDATION, OR UNDUE INFLUENCE makes
such marriage merely annullable or voidable (valid
until annulled). The vitiated manner by which such
consent is obtained merely renders defective such
consent.
Together with the mandatory requirement under ART
6 of the FC that the contracting parties must be
personally present during the solemnization of
marriage, this requirement prohibits proxy-
marriages in the PH.
AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER
The solemnizing officer may be any one of those
enumerated in ART 7, FC. It must be observed that
it is not the presence or absence of the solemnizing
officer which constitutes the formal requirement
but it is the absence or presence of the authority of
such solemnizing officer.
 ART 7 also provides the limits of their
authority and the elements or requirements
for such authority to fully vest on the
solemnizer.
 Under the new Local Government Code
which took effect on Jan 1, 1992 – the
mayor of a city or municipality is
empowered to solemnize a marriage, any
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding (Chapter 3, ART 1, Sec 444
of the 1991 LGC)
 The authority of the officer or clergyman
shown to have performed a marriage
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ceremony will be presumed in the absence
of any showing to the contrary. (Goshen v.
Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 10 Am. Dec. 121)
 This is accordance with the rule that where a
marriage ceremony is shown, every
presumption will be indulged that it was
legally performed. (Gaines v. New
Orleans, 18 US 950)
 The solemnizing officer is not duty bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license
has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license
has been issued by the competent official,
and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether
the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law (People v. Janssen, 54
Phil 176)
 However, under ART 29 in relation to ART
27 & 28, FC providing the cases where the
contracting parties are legally excused from
obtaining a marriage license because one of
them is in the point of death or there is no
means of transportation to go to the local
civil registrar as their places of residence are
far, the solemnizing officer must undertake
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and
the absence of legal impediment to marry.
 Similarly, under ART 34 of the FC,
providing that persons living together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years without
the benefit of marriage may contract a valid
marriage even in the absence of a marriage
license, the solemnizing officer, in such
situation, is duty bound to ascertain the
qualifications of the contracting parties.
 Criminal penalties are imposable against a
person who solemnizes a marriage without
authority:
o Sec. 38 of the Marriage Law of
1929 (ACT no 3613)
o ART 352, RPC
 Criminal Liability likewise attaches to any
person, who not being authorized to
solemnize marriage, shall publicly
advertise himself, by means of signs or
placards placed on his residence or office
or through the newspapers, as authorized
to solemnize marriage.
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE
Must be issued by the local civil registrar of the
place where the marriage application was filed.
Is valid for 120 days from the date of issue and is
effective in any part of the Philippines.
The date of issue is the date of signing of the
marriage license by the local civil registrar.
Not effective if it will be used as the marriage license
to be able to solemnize a marriage abroad.
The other requirements for the issuance of a marriage
license are merely directory in the sense that their
non-observance is a mere irregularity which will
not render a marriage null and void or even
annullable.
Hence, if the marriage license is issued in a place
wherein the contracting parties do not reside and a
marriage is performed on the basis of such marriage
license, such marriage is still valid. (People v.
Janssen)
 The fact that a party to whom the license is
issued is represented therein by a name other
than his true name or had his name spelled
wrongly will not invalidate a marriage
solemnized on the authority of such license.
 The commission of perjury or deception on the
part of the contracting parties as to their age in
order to avoid the statutory requirement of
parental consent is not a cause to invalidate the
marriage obtained through such marriage license.
(Payne vs. Payne, 298 F. 970)
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
 The fact that one of the contracting parties did
not disclose his or her prior marriage and
divorce in the application as required by statute;
or falsely stated that he or she had not been
previously married; or misrepresented his or her
residence; or falsely swore that he or she was not
under guardianship; or forged her or his mother’s
consent to the marriage, will not justify a judicial
declaration that marriages performed on the basis
of marriage licenses procured through such acts
are nullities.
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
 Wedding ceremony – an occasion worth reliving
in the succeeding years. (Go v. CA GR No
114791 May 29, 1997)
 The FC only recognizes ceremonial marriages –
marriages which are solemnized by persons
duly authorized by the state.
 The FC does not generally prescribe any
particular form of a marriage ceremony.
However, the minimum requirement imposed by
law is that the contracting parties appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of
legal age.
 An exchange of vows can be presumed to have
been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the
very purpose of the wedding is to exchange vows
of marital commitment. (Balogbog v. CA GR NO
83598, March 7, 1997)
 Declaration of consent
o Need not be vocally expressed.
o It can be shown by other
manifestations or signs of approval
and consent.
o May signify by whatever ceremony
their whim, taste or religious belief may
select.
o It is the agreement itself, and not the
form in which it is couched, which
constitutes the contract.
o The words used and the manner by
which the ceremony was performed are
mere evidence of a present intention
and agreement to marry of the parties.
A marriage is valid where a man and a woman
appeared before a justice of the peace and there
signed a statement setting forth that they had agreed
to marry each other and asked the justice of the peace
to solemnize the marriage and thereafter another
document was signed by them, by the justice, and by
two witnesses, stating that the man and woman
appeared before the justice and ratified all that was
contained in the preceding instrument and insisted
upon the marriage and, after the signing of these
documents, the justice announced to the man and the
woman that they were married. (Martinez v. Tan 12
Phil 731)
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

parties in the presence of the representative

of the state, namely the solemnizing officer,
While the law provides that the declaration shall be
which constitutes the contract. At the most,
contained in the marriage certificate, the marriage
such inadequacy as to the witnesses, is
certificate itself is not an essential nor formal
merely an irregularity not enough to
requirement of marriage. Failure to sign a marriage
invalidate a marriage.
certificate or absence of the marriage certificate itself
 The law and public policy favor matrimony.
does not render the marriage void nor annullable.
Every intendment of the law leans toward
(Madridejo v. De Leon 55 Phil1)
legalizing matrimony, as it is the basis of
human society throughout the civilized
world. (Perido v. Perido 63 SCRA 97)
WITNESSES IN A MARRIAGE CEREMONY
 The SC appears to lean in favor of the view
 As part of the marriage ceremony which that absence of witnesses is merely an
is a formal requirement: irregularity which will not render a marriage
 There must be no less than two witnesses of void.
legal age in attendance.
 There can be no marriage ceremony to
speak if the two witnesses of legal age are Common-law MARRIAGES NOT
absent. RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES
 In the absence of any of the formal A COMMON – LAW marriage is a non-ceremonial
requirements of a marriage, will make the or informal marriage by agreement, entered into
marriage void. by a man and a woman having capacity to marry,
 It can be justifiably argued that the absence ordinarily without compliance with such statutory
of two witnesses of legal age in a marriage formalities as those pertaining to marriage
ceremony is merely an irregularity in the licenses. (In Re: Zimmick, 76 NE2D 902)
said formal requirement which, according to
ART 4, shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible
Such agreement must be coupled by consummation,
for the irregularity shall be civilly,
which includes at least cohabitation as husband and
criminally, and administratively liable.
wife, and reputation in such a way that the public
 It can be validly explained that while there
will recognize the marital status. (Huard v. Mcteigh,
were no witnesses of legal age or there was
39 ALR 528)
only 1 witness of legal age or there were
witnesses but not of legal age, there was still
a marriage ceremony that was performed
This is because the CC and the FC expressly and
where the principal contracting parties and
mandatorily provide that the intervention in a valid
the solemnizing officer were present but
marriage ceremony of an ecclesiastical or civil
only that it was deficient by the absence of
functionary authorized by the state to solemnize
the required witnesses of legal age.
marriage constitutes one of indispensable requisites
 In short, a marriage ceremony, though
for a valid marriage in the PH.
inadequate, was not strictly absent so as
to consider the marriage void under ART
4, FC. Besides, in marriage, it is the
agreement itself of the principal contracting
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

Spouses – in the CC, and FC, refers only to husband together as husband and wife for at
and wife lawfully married according to PH law and least five years.
not to common-law marriages. o Marriage solemnized by a person
without authority to solemnize a
Husband and Wife – refers to parties who are
marriage provided that either one
lawfully married unless the law provides otherwise.
of the parties believed in good faith
that such solemnizer had the
proper authority (ART 35(2)).
ABSENCE, DEFECT, IRREGULARITIES IN
 Defects in the essential requirements of
ESSENTIAL AND FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
marriage make the marriage annullable or
Generally, absence of any of the essential or formal voidable.
requirements of a marriage renders such marriage  Irregularities in the formal requisites do not
null and void. affect the validity of the marriage. Except
when the contracting parties 18 years or
 Marriage license which has already expired over but below 21 did not obtain the consent
is not valid of their parents as provided for in ART 14
 Marriage by way of jest is likewise void FC, any irregularity in the formal requisites
because there is no genuine consent on the does not even render the marriage
part of both contracting parties. voidable or annullable.
 Marriage by proxy is void because of the  Reference case: Republic vs. Albios GR No
absence of the essential requisite that 198780, October 16, 2013 – the SC ruled
consent freely given must be made in the that, though, motivated by improper
presence of the solemnizing officer and the intentions, a marriage solemnized for a
absence of the formal requisite that the financial consideration is valid and not in
contracting parties must personally declare jest.
before the solemnizing officer that they take
each other as husband and wife.
 Exceptions are provided by law. Thus,
absence of a marriage license does not
affect the validity of a marriage if the
situation falls under Chapter 2, Title I of the
FC. These are:
o Marriages in ARTICULO
MORTIS;
o Marriages of two contracting
parties living in places where there
are no means of transportation to
enable them to appear personally
before the local civil registrar;
o Marriages among Muslims and Such marriage solemnized by the judge in such an
among other ethnic cultural irregular manner, however, does not invalidate the
minorities performed in accordance marriage because a marriage contract is not a formal
with their practices; requirement of a valid marriage.
o Marriages of couples without any
impediment to get married living
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

Irregularities which do not affect the validity of this case cannot file a case to compel the person
marriage: who has breached such promise to enter into the
marriage contract.
1. Absence of 2 witnesses of legal age during
 In Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648, it was held
the marriage ceremony;
that:
2. Absence of a marriage certificate;
3. Marriage solemnized in a place other than
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in church, chapel, or temple, or
in the office of the consul-general, consul, or
vice-consul;
4. Issuance of marriage license in city or
municipality not the residence of either of
the contracting parties;
5. Unsworn application for a marriage license;
6. Failure of the contracting parties to present
original birth certificate or baptismal Jurisprudence
certificate to the local civil registrar who
EUGENIO SR. V. VELEZ 185 SCRA 425
likewise failed to ask for the same;
7. Failure of the contracting parties between FACTS:
the ages of 18 and 21to exhibit consent of
Vitaliana Vargas' siblings, filed on Sept 27, 1988 a
parents or persons having legal charge of
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC alleging
them to the local civil registrar;
that Vitaliana was forcibly taken and confined by
8. Failure of the contracting parties between
respondent. At that time the petition was filed, the
the ages of 21 and 25 to exhibit advice of
siblings were unaware that their sister, Vitaliana was
parents to local civil registrar;
already dead.
9. Failure to undergo marriage counseling;
10. Failure of the local civil registrar to post the Respondent court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
required notices; but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner
11. Issuance of marriage license despite absence refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana to the
of publication or prior to the completion of respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be
the 10-day period for publication; the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
12. Failure of the contracting parties to pay the according to petitioner, he had already obtained a
prescribed fees for the marriage license; burial permit authorizing the burial.
13. Failure of the person solemnizing the
marriage to send copies of the marriage Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart
certificate to the local civil registrar; failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence
14. Failure of the local civil registrar to enter the on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband,
applications for marriage licenses filed with petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.
him in the registry book in the order in Two (2) orders were then issued by respondent court,
which they were received. directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY parlor in and its autopsy.

Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana

 Mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
only on 28 September 1988, the siblings alleged that
actionable wrong. Hence, the aggrieved party in
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with
their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305
and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended
that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the
legal custodians of the dead body of their sister
Vitaliana.
The respondent court then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of
burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
award. Since there was no surviving spouse,
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a
common law spouse, the latter being himself legally
married to another woman.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification;
hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the
rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's
brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
ISSUE: WON Respondent was the rightful custodian
of the body
RULING: No.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common
law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses.
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another
who are husband and wife de facto.
But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner
vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse
to her, in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime. Custody of the dead body
of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Jurisprudence
JUVY N. COSCA ET. AL VS. JUDGE LUCIO
PALAYPAYON, JR.
FACTS:
Complainants are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk
II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents are respectively the Presiding Judge
and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint FILED, respondents
were charged among others with the following
offense: Illegal Solemnization of marriage.
Complainants allege that respondent judge
solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, some couples were able to
get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the
absence of a marriage license.
As a consequence, their marriage contracts did
not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had
to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were
not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant
Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts,
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages
involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that
the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the
civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage
license and executing their marriage contract, a copy
of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the
other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
marriage contracts were not signed by him and they
did not contain the date and place of marriage; that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody
of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but
that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and
practice have been that before the contracting
parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in
order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the
task of preparing the marriage contract, to already
let the parties and their witnesses sign their
marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay
and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been
solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four
(4) times everyday.
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is
highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be
first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that
they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2)
witnesses before they are supposed to sign their
marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge
Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure
before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown
by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya
and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared
that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been
to let the contracting parties and their witnesses
sign the marriage contract only after Judge
Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage.
The recommendation with respect to the
administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent
judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with
respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to
heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as herein
before narrated in detail, approximate such serious
degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require
a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of
P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Palaypayon, Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with.
JURISPRUDENCE
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER VS. FRANCISCO
VELEZ (1964)
FACTS:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer,
following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 2, 1954, Velez left a note saying that
he will have to postpone the wedding since his
mother oppose it. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor
was he heard from again. Beatriz sue for damages.
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition
of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff's causeof action, his
failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having
been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances
beyond his control".
In support of his "motion for new trial and
reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is
no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
ISSUE: WON the defendant is liable for damages for
Breach of Promise to Marry.
HELD: YES.
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued.
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to- be's
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8).
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received. And then, with but two days before the
wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,
simply left a note. But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise
to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out
of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs, for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
 Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church
or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or
religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case
mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a
chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter,
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the
case provided in Article 10. (56a)
JURISPRUDENCE
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO VS. JUDGE
HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY
FACTS:
The complainant in this administrative case is the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has
submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge
that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in
the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within
his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent
judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years.
With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member
of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and
that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized
by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar. The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but
merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen
years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling
in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned
nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby
giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the
aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason
for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
ISSUE: WON the joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
the presumptive death
HELD: The SC did not agree.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to
comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.
Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a
marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its
exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent
judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle
underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may
be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will
not invalidate the marriage.
However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds
for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have
acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
law.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends,
in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
JURISPRUDENCE
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
FACTS:
Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law. Petitioner alleged that the
respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized her marriage
to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without
the requisite marriage license and at the place
outside of his jurisdiction. They lived together as
husband and wife on the strength of this marriage
until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit
the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving
the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started
the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When
he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity
for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to
him in the afternoon of that same day. When they
failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be
delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He
attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered
by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that
petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its report
and recommendation, found the respondent judge
guilty of the charges made. He was recommended to
be fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ISSUE:
WON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR SOLEMNIZING A
MARRIAGE WITHOUT A DULY ISSUED
MARRIAGE LICENSE AND FOR DOING SO
OUTSIDE HIS TERRITOIAL JURISDICTION.
HELD:
According to the Supreme Court, the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge was limited to
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur was contrary to law and should
subject him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent should also be faulted for solemnizing
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
The respondent judge was fined by the Supreme
Court in the amount of P5,000.00, with stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
AUTHORIZED SOLEMNIZERS OF
MARRIAGE
The state being an interested party, its consent is
essential to every marriage.
Art. 7 defines the limits and scope of the authority
granted to the solemnizers. Hence, if they fail to
comply with any of the requisites mandated by law
for them to validly solemnize a marriage, such a
marriage is generally void on the ground of
absence of a formal requirement which is
authority of the solemnizing officer.
JUDGES
Can solemnize marriage only within their court’s
jurisdiction. Except the jurisdiction of (national in
scope):
 Court of Tax Appeals
 Sandiganbayan
 The Court of Appeals
 The Supreme Court
Must be incumbent and not retired.
 If a marriage is solemnized by a judge of
the RTC, MTC or Municipal Court beyond
his jurisdiction, there is absence of a
formal requisite in such a marriage,
namely, the authority of the solemnizing
officer. Hence, the marriage is void unless
either of the parties believed in good faith
that such solemnizing officer has authority
to conduct such marriage.
It is highly irregular for a judge to collect fees for the
ceremony. It is reprehensible. By such act, a judge
cheapens his or her noble office as well as the entire
judiciary in the eyes of the public. (Dysico v.
Dacumos)
PRIEST, RABBI, IMAM OR MINISTER OF
ANY CHURCH OR REIGIOUS SECT
4 ESSENTIAL REQUISITES TO VALIDLY
SOLEMNIZE A MARRIAGE. HE/SHE:
1. Must be DULY authorized by his or her
church or religious sect;
2. Must act within the limits of the written
authority granted to him or her by the
church or religious sect;
3. Must be registered with the civil registrar
general; and
4. At least one of the contracting parties whose
marriage he or she is to solemnize belongs
to his or her church or religious sect.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

The written authority granted to a priest by his sect 6. The contracting parties, whether members of
may impose a limitation as to the place where he the armed forces or civilians, must be within
could solemnize a marriage. the zone of military operation.

SHIP CAPTAIN AND AIRPLANE CHIEF If the chaplain is present, he must be the one who
should solemnize the marriage. The chaplain’s
To validly solemnize a marriage, the following
authority to solemnize proceeds from ART 7(2).
requisites must concur:
Hence, if the chaplain cannot comply with ART 7(2),
1. The marriage must be in ARTICULO then it is as if he is absent as he cannot solemnize a
MORTIS (at least one of the parties is at the marriage, in which case, the military commander
point of death); can solemnize the marriage.
2. The marriage must be between passengers
or crew members; and
3. Generally, the ship must be at sea or the CONSUL-GENERAL, CONSUL, OR VICE
plane must be in flight. CONSUL

An assistant pilot has no authority to solemnize a Heads of consular posts are divided into 4 classes:
marriage. If the airplane chief dies during the trip,
1. Consul-general;
the assistant pilot who assumes command of the
2. Consul;
airplane cannot solemnize a marriage as there is no
3. vice-consul;
law allowing such assumption of authority for the
4. Consul agents
purpose of solemnizing a marriage.

Such marriage can be solemnized during stopovers at  Only the first three are expressly authorized
ports of call . by the FC to solemnize marriage.
 They can solemnize marriage abroad only
when the contracting parties are both
Filipino citizens.
 They act not only as a solemnizer of a
marriage but also perform the duties of the
local civil registrar, such as the issuance of a
marriage license.
MILITARY COMMANDER
 A marriage between a Filipino and a
To validly solemnize a marriage, the following foreigner abroad solemnized by a PH consul
requisites must concur: appears to be void. However, by way of
exception, if the marriage between the
1. He or she must be a military commander
foreigner and the Filipino citizen abroad
of a unit;
solemnized by a PH CONSUL assigned in
2. He or she must be a commissioned officer;
that country is recognized as valid in the
3. A chaplain must be assigned to such unit;
host country, then such marriage shall be
4. The said chaplain must be absent at the time
considered valid in the PH. This is pursuant
of the marriage;
to ART 26, FC.
5. The marriage must be one in ARTICULO
 THEY have no authority to solemnize a
MORTIS;
marriage within the territory of the PH.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

MAYOR Its non-observance will not invalidate a marriage but

can subject the person or persons who cause the
 The mayor of a city or municipality is now
violation to civil, criminal or administrative liability.
empowered to solemnize a marriage, any
provision of law to the contrary Exceptions to the rule on venue are provided by
notwithstanding. law:
 When the mayor is temporarily
 Marriages contracted in articulo mortis or in
incapacitated to perform his duties for
a remote place in accordance with ART 29
physical or legal reasons, the vice mayor or
of the FC; and
the highest ranking sangguniang bayan
 Marriages where both parties request a
member shall automatically exercise the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case
powers and perform the duties of the local
the marriage may be solemnized at a house
chief executive concerned.
or place designated by the parties at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Good faith of parties

 Under ART 35(2), if the marriage was

ART 9 – A marriage license shall be issued by the
solemnized by a person not legally
local civil registrar of the city or municipality where
authorized to solemnize a marriage and
either contracting party habitually resides, except in
either of the contracting parties believed in
marriages where no license is required in accordance
good faith that such solemnizing officer had
with Chapter 2 of this title.
such authority, then the marriage shall be
considered as valid.

PLACE OF ISSUE

ART 8 – The marriage shall be solemnized publicly  If the contracting parties obtain a marriage
in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the license in a place other than the place where
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the either of them reside, it is merely an
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case irregularity which will not render null and
may be, and not elsewhere, except in the cases of void the marriage celebrated on the basis of
marriages contracted at the point of death or in such license.
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both of the parties request the
ART 10 – Marriages between Filipino citizens
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general,
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the
designated by them in a sworn statement to that
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and
effect.
the duties of the local civil registrar and of the
solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
VENUE:

ART 8 is directory in nature.

CONSULAR OFFICIALS
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
The marriage ceremony shall be in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines because ART 17 of the
CC pertinently provides that when contracts, among
others, are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
ART 11 – Where a marriage license is required, each
of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
1] Full name of the contracting parties;
2] Place of birth;
3] Age and date of birth;
4] Civil status;
5] If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
6] Present residence and citizenships;
7] Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
8] Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
9] Full name, residence and citizenship of the
mother; and
10] Full name, residence and citizenship of the
guardian or person having charge, in case the
contracting parties has neither father nor mother and
is under the age of 21 years.
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be
required to exhibit their residence certificate in any
formality in connection with the securing of the
marriage license.
PURPOSE OF DOCUMENTARY
REQUIREMENTS:
 It is the concern of the state to make
marriages the secure and stable institution
they should be.
 In this regard, proper documents must be
maintained to serve as proofs for their
existence.
 Mainly, the task of seeing to it that these
documentary proofs are accomplished is
addressed to the local civil registrar to
secure publicity and to require a record to
be made of marriages contracted.
 It is also the purpose of these statutes to
discourage deception and seduction,
prevent illicit intercourse under the guise
of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the
status of parties who live together as man
and wife, by providing competent evidence
of the marriage.
 The record required to be made also
furnishes evidence of the status and
legitimacy of the offspring of the marriage.
MARRIAGE APPLICATION
 A marriage application can be obtained by
anybody. Once it is signed and sworn to by
the parties and thereafter filed, the local civil
registrar has no choice but to accept the
application and process the same up to the
time of the issuance of the marriage license.
If the local civil registrar has knowledge
of some legal impediment, he or she
cannot discontinue processing the
application. He must only note down the
legal impediments in the application and
thereafter issue the marriage license
unless otherwise stopped by the court.
ART 12 – The local civil registrar, upon receiving
such application, shall require the presentation of the
original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the
baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or
copies of such document duly attested by the persons
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

having custody of the original. These certificates or
certified copies of the documents required by this
article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from
the documentary stamp tax. The signature and
official title of the person issuing the certificate shall
be sufficient proof of its authenticity.
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage. In case the death certificate
cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit
setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual
status and the name and date of death of the deceased
spouse.

If either the contracting parties is unable to produce

his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified
ART 14 – In case either or both of the contracting
copy of either because of destruction or loss of the
parties, not having been emancipated by a previous
original, or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party
marriage, are between the ages of 18 and 21, they
or of any other person that such birth or baptismal
shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
certificate has not yet been received though the same
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent
has been required of the person having custody
to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving
thereof at least 15 days prior to the date of
parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be
current residence certificate or an instrument drawn
manifested in writing by the interested party who
up and sworn to before the local civil registrar
personally appears before the proper local civil
concerned or any public official authorized to
registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the
administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the
presence of two witnesses and attested before any
sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age,
official authorized by law to administer oaths. The
setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship
personal manifestation shall be recorded in both
of such contracting party and his or her parents, if
applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if
known, and the place and date of birth of such party.
one is executed instead, shall be attached to said
The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be
application.
preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of
good reputation in the province or the locality.

The presentation of the birth or baptismal certificate NO EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.

shall not be required if the parents of the contracting
parties appear personally before the local civil
registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of
the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the
application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by
merely looking at the applicants upon their personally
appearing before him, be convinced that either or
both of them have the required age.
 There is no more emancipation by marriage
under the FC. Emancipation is attained if
the child reaches the age of 18 years (ART
234 as amended by RA No 6809).
PARENTAL CONSENT

 The reference in ART 14 of the FC to

ART 13 – In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
 Nevertheless, the contracting parties
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
contracting parties “not having been
emancipated by a previous marriage” has
been accordingly repealed and is now of no
legal consequence.
between 18 and above but below 21 years of
age must still obtain the consent of the
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
parents as this is required under the second
paragraph of ART 236 of the FC. Non-
compliance with this requirement,
however, does not make the marriage
invalid or void but merely annullable which
means that the marriage is valid until
annulled.
 It is well-settled that the effect of statutes
forbidding the issuance of marriage licenses
without such consent is not to render such
marriages void when solemnized without the
required consent, the statute being
regarded as directory only, in the absence
of any provision declaring such marriages
absolutely void. (18 RCL, citing Browning
v. Browning, 89 Kan 98)
 Parental consent required of parties between
the ages of 18 and above but below 21 does
not add anything to the legal capacity of the
said contracting parties as the law itself
declared that people 18 years and above can
legally and validly contract marriage. The
required parental consent provision
simply means that the said contracting
parties “may not be licensed to marry
upon their own consent alone, but that
the consent of their parents must be
added thereto; lack of such consent,
however, does not affect the validity of a
marriage, but only subjects those who have
neglected to acquire it to the penalties of
the law. (Cushman v. Cushman, 80 Was.
615)
 Preference is given to the father to give
consent. If he cannot give consent, the
mother, surviving parent or guardian or
persons having legal charge of them in the
order mentioned shall give the consent. It
must be remembered, however, that if any of
the contracting parties is below 18, the
marriage is void regardless of the
existence or non-existence of the consent
of the parents.
 The age of consent of the contracting parties
is the age at which persons are considered in
law to be capable of entering into the
marriage relation, it is to be distinguished
from the age below 18 in which the consent
of the parents or guardian may be required
by marriage. In this respect, parental consent
may be considered as one of the statutory
requirements for marriage, not owing to the
capacity of the parties, but only to the
formalities of a lawful marriage under the
statute.
 It must be noted, however, that in the FC,
parental consent is needed in relation to the
procurement of a formal requisite, namely, a
valid marriage license (ART 14) and,
therefore, the absence of such parental
consent should only be considered as an
irregularity in a formal requirement
which, pursuant to ART 4 of the FC, should
not affect the validity of a marriage.
 However, under ART 45(1) of the FC,
absence of the required parental consent
makes the marriage annullable which
means that it is valid up to the time it is
judicially terminated. In this sense, the legal
effect of the non-procurement of parental
consent, though dealing with a formal
requisite of a valid marriage license, is the
same as in the case where there is a defect in
an essential requirement. In both instances,
the marriage shall be voidable or annullable
under ART 45 of the FC.
ART 15 – Any contracting party between the ages of
21 and 25 shall be obliged to ask their parents or
guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If
they do not obtain such advice, or if it be
unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued
till after three months following the completion of the
publication of the application therefor. A sworn
statement by the contracting parties to the effect
that such advice has been sought, together with the
written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the
application for marriage license. Should the parents
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall
be stated in the sworn statement.
ART 16 – In the cases where parental consent or
parental advice is needed, the party or parties
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the
preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a
priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize
marriage under ART 7 of this Code or a marriage
counselor duly accredited by the proper government
agency to the effect that the contracting parties have
undergone marriage counselling. Failure to attach
said certificate or marriage counselling shall
suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
period of 3 months from the completion of the
publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period shall
subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the
marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need
parental consent or parental advice, the other party
must be present at the counseling referred to in
the preceding paragraph.
PARENTAL ADVICE
Absence of parental advice does not affect the
marriage. It does not even make the marriage
annullable, as non-advise is not a ground for
annulment provided for in ART 45 of the FC. While
it is not an essential nor a formal requirement under
ARTS 2 and 3
Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a
notice which shall contain the full names and
residences of the applicants for a marriage license
and other data given in the applications. The notice
shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin
board outside the office of the local civil registrar
located in a conspicuous place within the building
and accessible to the general public. This notice
shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued
after the completion of the period of publication.
(63a)
 
DUTY OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
After receiving the filled-out marriage application,
shall post a notice to inform everybody of the
impending marriage.
This notice shall be posted for 10 consecutive days
on a bulletin board outside the office of the local
civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within
the building and accessible to the general public.
The notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof.
The marriage license shall be issued after the
completion of the period of publication.
 However, if the contracting parties between
the ages of 21 and 25 do not obtain the
advice of the parents or if such advice is
unfavorable, the local civil registrar shall
not issue the marriage license till after 3
months following the completion of the
publication of the application therefor.
 If, the marriage license is issued within the
said within the said three months and the
contracting parties were able to get married
on the basis of such marriage license, the
said marriage is completely valid. It is not
even annullable.
 In case where parental consent (contracting
parties between the ages of 18 and above
but below 21) or parental advice is needed,
the failure of the parties to attach to the
marriage application a certification that
they have undergone marriage counseling
provided for in ART 16, FC shall suspend
the issuance of the marriage license for a
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
period of three months from the completion
of the publication of the application.
 Issuance of the marriage license within the
prohibited period shall subject the issuing
officer to administrative sanctions but shall
not affect the validity of the marriage.
Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for marriage
license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after
the completion of the period of publication, unless
ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own
instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee
shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding
bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a)
 
Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the
payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations
before the issuance of the marriage license. No other
sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of
any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall,
however, be issued free of charge to indigent
parties, that is those who have no visible means of
income or whose income is insufficient for their
subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by
their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)
 
INVESTIGATIVE POWER OF LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR AND COURT INTERVENTION
The law does not restrain the local civil registrar from
investigating any impediment on the part of the
contracting parties, but the local civil registrar is
only generally prohibited from withholding the
marriage license despite the legal impediment
because the purpose of ART 18 is to eliminate any
opportunity for extortion and considering the
observations obtained from the National Census and
statistics Office by the Civil Code and FC laws
committees that giving much leeway to the local civil
registrar could be a source of graft.
Only court intervention directing the non-issuance
of the marriage license can empower the local civil
registrar to validly refuse to issue said license.
If despite an injunction order from the court, the local
civil registrar nevertheless issues a marriage license
and a marriage is solemnized on the basis of such
license, the marriage will still be valid. The
issuance of the license despite the restraining order
can be considered only as an irregularity in the
formal requisite of a valid marriage license which
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR
TWO of the few provisions of the Marriage Law of
1929 which have not yet been repealed –
Sec. 37 – Influencing parties in religious respects
Sec. 38 – illegal issuance or refusal of license.
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of
the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty
days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed
automatically canceled at the expiration of the said
period if the contracting parties have not made use of
it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold
characters on the face of every license issued.
(65a)
 
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting
parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be
obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials.
 
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries
shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein
required, submit an affidavit stating the
circumstances showing such capacity to contract
marriage. (66a)
 
CERTIFICATE OR AFFIDAVIT OF LEGAL
CAPACITY
Citizens of any foreign country may contract
marriage in the PH. They have to secure marriage
license in the PH. Before such license is issued, the
have to submit a certificate of legal capacity.
A certificate of legal capacity is necessary because
the PH, in so far as marriage is concerned, adheres
to the national law of the contracting parties with
respect to their legal capacity to contract marriage.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties
shall declare that they take each other as husband and
wife, shall also state:
 
(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting
party;
 
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the
marriage;
 
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued
according to law, except in marriage provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title;
 
(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have
secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;
 
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have
complied with the legal requirement regarding
parental advice in appropriate cases; and
 
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage
settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage
certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit
of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in place other than
those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)
 
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage is a presumption which is considered
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by evidence.
This presumption of legality is said to be one of the
strongest known to the law, especially where the
legitimacy of the children is involved, for the law
presumes morality and not immorality; marriage and
not concubinage; legitimacy and not bastardy.
The presumption against strength through the lapse of
time.
PROOF MARRIAGE
When the question as to whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind..
But the primary or best evidence of a marriage is
the marriage contract or the marriage certificate.
A mere photocopy of a marriage certificate is a
worthless piece of paper.
if such photocopy emanated from the local civil
registrar and duly certified by the local civil
registrar as an authentic copy of the records in his
office, such certified copy is admissible as evidence.
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil
registrar to prepare the documents required by this
Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties
without any charge in both cases. The documents and
affidavits filed in connection with applications for
marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax. (n)
 
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter
all applications for marriage licenses filed with him
in a registry book strictly in the order in which the
same are received. He shall record in said book the
names of the applicants, the date on which the
marriage license was issued, and such other data as
may be necessary. (n)
EFFECT OF DUTY OF LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR
 any certification issued by him or her in
connection with any matter involving the
marriage of any particular individual within
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

his or her jurisdiction is given high
probative value.
 Thus, absence any circumstance of
suspicion, a certification of the local civil
registrar of the non-existence any marriage
license of the alleged spouses is enough to
prove that the marriage is void due to the
absence of a formal requirement, namely a
valid marriage license.
MARRIAGE REGISTER
The office of the local civil registrar keeps a marriage
register of all persons married in its locality.
quoted, the truth being, according to them, that
proper liquidation had been regularly made of the
business of the partnership and Tee Hoon used to
receive his just share until his death, as a result of
which the partnership was dissolved and what
corresponded to him were all given to his wife and
children. Defendant also commented that plaintiff
had already executed a quitclaim.
The trial court rendered its judgement and on the
latter part of the decision, it was stated that plaintiff
and Po Chuan were married at the Philippine
Independent Church of Cebu City.

In the marriage register, there shall be entered the

 Full name and address of each contracting ISSUE:
parties;
 Their ages; WON there was a competent evidence as to the
 The place and date of the solemnization of marriage of plaintiff and Po Chuan.
the marriage;
 The names and addresses of the witnesses;
 The full name
 Address HELD:
 Relationship with the contracting party/ies
It will be observed that the court's conclusion about
of the person/s who gave their consent to
the supposed marriage of plaintiff to the deceased
marriage, and the full name, title, and
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan is contrary to the weight
address of the person who solemnized the
of the evidence brought before it during the trial
marriage.
and the pre-trial.

Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage

JURISPRUDENCE
must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
While a marriage may also be proved by other
ANTONIO LIM TANHU et.al. petitioners, vs.
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, as
first be satisfactorily explained.
Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN
PUT, respondents .
Surely, the certification of the person who
allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of
FACTS:
the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its
non-production is first presented to the court.
Claiming to be the widow of Po Chuan, a partner
in the Glory Commercial Co., plaintiff (Tan Put –
Private Respondent) charged the six defendants
(petitioners) with having conspired in
In the case at bar, the purported certification issued
misappropriating for their own benefits the profits
by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine
and assets of said partnership.
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no
Defendants denied plaintiff's allegation and claimed
showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract
that she was only a common-law wife of the
and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of
deceased. And that the legitimate wife of tee Hoon
said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second
Lim Po Chuan was Ang Siok Tin, still living and
assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by
with whom he had four (4) legitimate children, all
law, since it is not part of the functions of his office.
presently residing in Hongkong. The defendant also
Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the
denied the allegations of fraud and conversion
same is hearsay.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Now, as against such flimsy evidence of plaintiff, the
court had before it, two documents of great weight
belying the pretended marriage. SC refered to (1)
Exhibit LL, the income tax return of the deceased
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating that the name
of his wife was Ang Siok Tin and (2) the quitclaim,
Annex A of the answer, wherein plaintiff Tan Put
stated that she had been living with the deceased
without benefit of marriage and that she was his
"common-law wife". Surely, these two documents
are far more reliable than all the evidence of the
plaintiff put together.
And when it is borne in mind that in addition to all
these considerations, there are mentioned and
discussed in the memorandum of petitioners (1) the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
and (2) a similar certification of the Apostolic Prefect
of the Philippine Independent Church, Parish of Sto.
Nino, Cebu City, that their respective official records
corresponding to December 1949 to December 1950
do not show any marriage between Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan and Tan Put, neither of which certifications
have been impugned by respondent until now, it
stands to reason that plaintiff's claim of marriage is
really unfounded.
Indeed, not only does this document prove that
plaintiffs relation to the deceased was that of a
common-law wife but that they had settled their
property interests with the payment to her of
P40,000. In the light of all these circumstances, We
find no alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put's
allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan has not been satisfactorily established and
that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
convincingly shows that her relation with said
deceased was that of a common-law wife and
furthermore, that all her claims against the company
and its surviving partners as well as those against the
estate of the deceased have already been settled and
paid.
JURISPRUDENCE
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division)
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua lived with private respondent
Florita A. Vallejo without the benefit of marriage
from 1970 up to 1981. The couple had two
illegitimate children. Roberto died intestate on 28
May 1992 in Davao City. On 2 July 1992,
respondent Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City a petition entitled "In re:
Petition for Declaration of Heirship, Guardianship
over the Persons and Properties of minors Robert
Rafson Alonso and Rudyard Pride Alonso, all
surnamed Chua and issuance of Letters of
Administration."
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua,
representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
Chua, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground of improper venue.
The trial court issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that
Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the
motion to dismiss not having proven her status as
wife of the decedent.
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19,
1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua
presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation
that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that
the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his
death.
Exh.'1' was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage
contract between the movant and the petitioner. This
cannot be admitted in evidence on the
ground of the timely objection of the counsels for
petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy
or authenticated copy which the
movant cannot produce.
Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition
presented the following: a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such
marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged
person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that
he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
Exhibit '2' through '18' consist among others of
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a
resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from
1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City;
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in
Davao City where the status of the decedent was
stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying
that he was married and his residence was Davao
City.
Petitioner through counsels, objected to the
admission in evidence of Exhibits '2' through '18' if
the purpose is to establish the truth of the
alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the
marriage contract. They do not object to the
admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show
that Davao City was the business residence of the
decedent.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had sufficient evidence to
prove that a marriage existed.
HELD: No.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to
establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent.
The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which
the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of
Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other
similar documents cannot prove marriage especially
so when the petitioner has submitted a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the
alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the
marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged
marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file
the subject motion to dismiss.
The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat
copy of the marriage certificate which she presented,
this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence.
JURISPRUDENCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner ,
vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO,
respondents.
This case originated from a petition filed by private
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. As ground therefor, Castro claims that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior .to the
solemnization of their marriage.
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin
F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name
of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as
husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971,
when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19,
1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to
follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order
her marital status before leaving for the States.
She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E.
Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage.
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil
registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefor. She affixed her signature
only on the marriage contract on
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the
above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license.
Respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of
the trial court. It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and
void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the subject marriage contract.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that
the certification issued by the civil registrar that
marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever
issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had
no part in the procurement of the subject marriage
license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are
insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to
Edwin F. Cardenas.
HELD:
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being
one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void
ab initio.
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local
civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty,
inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of
the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.
 
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (17a)
 
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
VALIDATION PROVISION
 The Family Code expressly provides that,
except for marriages prohibited under
Articles 35(1) (4) (5) and (6), 36, 37, and 38,
marriages solemnized abroad and which are
valid there as such are recognized as valid
here.
 General rule: the Philippines follows the
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS rule – that a
marriage formally valid when celebrated is
valid everywhere.
A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY
 The legal effect which may be given by one
state to the marriage laws of another state is
merely because of comity or because
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
public policy and justice demand the
recognition of such laws, and no state is
bound by comity to give effect in its courts
to laws which are repugnant to its own laws
and policy.
 Hence, marriages without a license
solemnized abroad, and proxy marriages
abroad shall be valid in the PH if such
marriages are valid in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where
they are solemnized. Likewise foreign
marriages solemnized by a professor of
law shall be valid in the PH if legally valid
in the country where they were
celebrated. If, however, the foreign
marriage is to be solemnized inside the
Philippine Consulate abroad, such marriage
must observe the forms and solemnities
established by Philippine laws (ART 17,
CC)
 EXCEPTIONS:
Under the FC, if either or both contracting parties are
Filipinos and they are below 18 years of age, their
marriage solemnized abroad will not be recognized in
the PH as valid even if the marriage is valid in the
place where it has been solemnized. Our law clearly
adheres to the rule that the marrying capacity of
the contracting parties is governed by the national
law of that party, which is the Philippine law.
Article 15, CC provides that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, conditions, and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. In the
Philippines, persons below 18 years of age are not
legally capacitated to marry. Article 26 of the FC
and Article 15 of the CC express the “extra-
territorial effect of the exception”. Article 17 (3) ,
CC provides that prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy, and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
If one is a Filipino and another an alien whose
national laws capacitate persons below 18 years of
age to marry, the FC does not seem to give a precise
solution. Art 35(1), which is made an exception to the
comity provision, provides that a marriage is void ab
initio if contracted by any party below 18 years of
age. The law addressed to any party. It does not
distinguish whether one of the parties is a PH citizen
or a foreigner. Hence, the law can be construed as a
blanket exception that should apply likewise to a
situation where the foreign spouse is below 18 years
of age. With respect to legal capacity, the PH
follows the nationality rule, and hence, should
accord respect to the laws of the country insofar
as the legal capacity to marry of the foreigner is
concerned. The better rule is that the exception
under ART 26 referring to ART 35(1) should be
construed as referring to a situation where the
marriage abroad is between a Filipino and a Filipina
and not between a Filipino or Filipina and an alien
married in the alien’s state where he or she (alien),
though below 18 years of age, is capacitated to
marry.
Bigamous and Polygamous marriages, though
valid abroad, shall likewise not be recognized in the
PH.
Art 41, FC – a Bigamous marriage may be
recognized. This occurs when, before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, one of the
spouses had been absent for 4 consecutive years, or 2
consecutive years in cases where there is danger of
death, and the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. The
spouse present thereafter obtains a judicial
declaration of presumptive death and subsequently
marries again. The second marriage is valid
without prejudice to the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
Marriage abroad where there is mistake of
identity of the other contracting party is also not
recognized in the PH. Even if the one who
committed the mistake was the foreigner spouse.
If a spouse is able to annul or to declare as null and
void his or her marriage but failed to record the
judicial decree with the local civil registrar, to
partition and distribute their properties and to deliver
the presumptive legitime of their children, any
subsequent marriage of either spouses shall be void.
This is provided for under ART 53 in relation to Art
52 of the FC. If the said spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage abroad without undertaking the
aforementioned requirement, the said marriage shall
not likewise be recognized.
A marriage by a Filipino to a person who is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations abroad, even if valid in
the foreign country where it has been solemnized,
shall not be considered valid here. If the Filipino is
himself the person who is psychologically
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
incapacitated, such marriage is likewise considered
void here in the PH.
Marriages between ascendants and descendants of
any degree as well as between brothers and sisters,
whether of the full or half blood are likewise not
considered as valid here even if such marriages were
allowed in the country where they were celebrated.
These marriages are void as they are incestuous.
Marriages declared void under the PH laws for
being against public policy will not be recognized
even if such marriages are not against public policy
or not illegal in the country where said marriages
were solemnized . Marriages considered as going
against public policy are those exclusively
enumerated in ART 38 of the FC.
ARE COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES
OBTAINED ABROAD BY FILIPINOS VALID
IN THE PH?
 Art 26 does not specifically include
common-law marriages contracted by
Filipinos abroad as one of the exceptions to
the general rule that marriages solemnized
abroad is generally valid here in the PH if
valid where they were solemnized.
 Solemnization refers to or implies a
ceremonial marriage and not one which was
“contracted” or merely performed by way
of a mere agreement of the parties, such as
in cases of a common law marriage. Indeed,
the formality, namely, the solemnization,
inherent in a ceremonial marriage is what
primarily distinguishes it from a common
law marriage.
 Solemnized and contracted are not entirely
the same. Solemnization has a narrower
meaning. Contracted is broader and may
include as one of its modes the process of
solemnization.
 Purpose of enactments requiring the
solemnization of marriage before an
authorized persons:
o To protect the parties to the
marriage contracts in the rights
flowing therefrom; and
o To protect their offspring.
o A solemn record is made to which
recourse may be had when the
rights and obligations of the
husband or wife arising form the
marriage are in issue.
o Interest of third parties in dealing
with either of the contracting
parties, subsequent to marriage,
thus protected.
o Other advantages of a formal
recorded ceremony might be cited,
but those just adverted to will
suffice in considering the
intendment of the provisions in
question.
SAME SEX MARRIAGE OF FILIPINOS
ABROAD INVALID
Public policy mandates that only a man and a
woman can marry each other.
This limitation will follow the Filipino anywhere in
the world.
PROOF OF FOREIGN MARRIAGE
To establish a valid marriage pursuant to the comity
provision of ART 26, it is necessary to prove the
foreign law as a question of fact and then to prove
the celebration of marriage pursuant thereto by
convincing evidence.
The presumption arises on proof of a marriage in
another jurisdiction, that such marriage was
performed in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction.
If such law of the other state is not pleaded nor
proved and for the purpose of determining the
validity of a marriage in the said state, the laws of
such state in the absence of proof to the contrary, will
be presumed by the Court to be the same as the
laws of its own state.
Prior to 1991, SC held that the burden of proof to
show the fact of marriage and the foreign marital law
is upon the one who asserts the validity of the
marriage celebrated abroad.
In 1991, SC held that considering that in case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family and every intendment of the law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, “he who asserts that
the marriage is NOT VALID under our law bears the
burden of proof to present the foreign law.” This case
therefore, shifted the burden of proof from the one
who asserts the validity of a marriage to the one
assailing the validity of the marriage.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Is not recognized in the PH. Hence, if the contracting
parties who are citizens of the PH get validly married
in the PH or anywhere in the world, their status, in
so far as the PH is concerned, as married persons
follow them anywhere in the world. They can only
sever their relationship as husband and wife if anyone
of them has a cause of action to declare the marriage
void or to annul the marriage. Divorce initiated in the
Philippines is not provided as a remedy under the FC
and the Rules of Court.
Generally, states recognize divorces of aliens
obtained in other states as a matter of international
comity. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the PH, provided, they are
valid according to their national law. The foreign
marital law and the divorce decree must be duly
proven and cannot be taken judicial notice of. Our
civil law adheres to the nationality rule on the matter
of status or legal capacity of a person. This means
that as to a person’s status or legal capacity, the law
of the country of the person shall determine such
status or legal capacity.
BOTH FOREIGNER AND FILIPINO CAN FILE
FOREIGN DIVORCE [ART 26(2)]
The 2nd paragraph of ART 26 of the FC provides the
recognition in the PH of a particular absolute divorce
obtained in another country. Hence, where a valid
marriage is celebrated, either in the PH or abroad,
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner and,
subsequently the foreigner – spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad capacitating him or her to remarry
under PH law. The foreigner may be a former
Filipino who at the time of the divorce is not a
Filipino anymore. The Filipino can likewise obtain
the foreign divorce decree which can be recognized
in the Philippines.
The provision does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle found in ART 15 is not
absolute and unbending rule.
Requisites:
 There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner;
 A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
To be recognized, a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment must be filed in the PH. Absent a
valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Ph.
Under Sec 24 Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by:
 An official publication thereof or
 A copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must be accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the PH , with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized PH
embassy or consular officials stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer.
FOREIGNER FILING PETITION FOR
RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE
Whether ART 26 (2) extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
No. the alien spouse can claim NO right under this
provision of the FC as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
VOID AND VOIDABLE FOREIGN
MARRIAGES
Where a Filipino contracts a foreign marriage which
is null and void under the laws of the state where it
has been solemnized, such marriage shall likewise be
null and void in the Philippines.
Filipino’s foreign marriage which is invalid under the
laws where such marriage has been solemnized but
which would have been valid had such marriage been
celebrated in the PH, is likewise invalid in the PH.
JURISPRUDENCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III[2005]
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court declared that respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married
Lady Myros M. Villanueva. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
HELD:
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998
case of Quita v. Court of Appeals . In Quita , the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of
obiter dictum , that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
The Legislative intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted
to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as
an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of
competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. Accordingly, for his plea
to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent's bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only
be made properly upon respondent's submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July
4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
JURISPRUDENCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARELYNTANEDO MANALO [2018]
FACTS:
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of
divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
That petitioner is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage
Contract;
That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December6, 2011 was
rendered by the Japanese Court;
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was
scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted
were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the
petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-
27, 2012, February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-
12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her
former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the
petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code.
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code ) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained
makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: WON art 26 IS APPLICABLE TO A
Filipino citizen WHO INITIATED THE DIVORCE
PROCEEDING ABROAD AGAINST HER
FOREIGN SPOUSE.
HELD: The Supreme Court rule in affirmative.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the Civil Code, is not an absolute rule.
In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto.
Jurisprudence already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, respectively.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country.
The SC cannot yet write finis to the controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and
enforce the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine
courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of
divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in
this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as
a written act of the foreign court. As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the
OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still
be proved. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo,
the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
JURISPRUDENCE
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO vs.
RYOJI * MORISONO and LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, [2018]
FACTS:
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji
Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8,
2009. Thereafter, they lived together in Japan one (1)
year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a
child.
She and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement"
before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City,
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Japan, which was eventually approved and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho- Ku, Nagoya City,
Japan on July 1, 2012.
She filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji before the
RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her
former husband in her passport and for her to be able
to marry again.
In a Decision dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied
Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be
recognized in the Philippines — provided that such
decree is valid according to the national law of the
alien — the same does not find application when it
was the Filipino spouse, i.e. , petitioner, who
procured the same.
Invoking the nationality principle provided under
Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26
(2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since
petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do
not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she
herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the
Philippines; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.
HELD: NO.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows
that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her
foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction
was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly
initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do.
In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered
nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the
grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to
prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity
with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably,
the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are
questions which require an examination of various
factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is
warranted.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction
can be summed up as follows:
first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute
divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same;
second , consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino
citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad;
third , an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws; and
fourth , in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
It is the 4th rule that Luzviminda invoked in this case
which is encapsulated in ART 26(2) of the Family
Code.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by
our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to
his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or
her national law.
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees
obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and
an alien citizen may already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the
party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree — presumably the Filipino citizen —
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
JURISPRUDENCE
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES [2020]
FACTS:
Cynthia A. Galapon, a Filipina, and Noh Shik Park, a
South Korean national, got married in the City of
Manila, Philippines on [February 27, 2012].
Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and
ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in
South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on
[July 16, 2012] by the Cheongju Local Court,
[Cynthia] filed before the [RTC] a Petition for the
Judicial Recognition of a Foreign
Divorce[(Recognition Petition)].
During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon
[(Abigail)], [Cynthia's] sister and attorney-in-fact,
testified in court. Abigail identified and affirmed her
Judicial Affidavit, including the contents thereof and
her signature thereon. Furthermore, Abigail averred
that [Cynthia] could not personally testify because
the latter's Korean visa expired upon her divorce with
Park. Nevertheless, Abigail [alleged that she] has
personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the
[Recognition] Petition and claimed, among other
things, that Park intended to marry his former
girlfriend [and that Cynthia] was forced to agree to
the divorce because Park made a threat to her life x x
x.
On July 3, 2015, the RTC issued a Decision
granting the Recognition Petition.
OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration The
arguments therein, as summarized by the RTC, are as
follows:
Absolute divorce is not allowed in this jurisdiction.
Considering that the divorce x x x was obtained not
by the alien spouse alone but by both spouses, x x x
[Cynthia] is not qualified to avail of the benefits
provided by [Article] 26 of the Family Code. 9
(Italics Supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
RTC through its Resolution 10 dated March 17,
2016.
On February 27, 2017, the CA issued the assailed
Decision granting the OSG's appeal. The CA held
that the divorce decree in question cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is
concerned since it was obtained by mutual
agreement.
ISSUE: WON ART 26 IS APPLICABLE FOR
FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE OBTAINED BY
MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
HELD: YES.
The controversy is centered on the interpretation of
Article 26 (2) as applied to divorce decrees obtained
jointly by the foreign spouse and Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article
26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the
divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse;
(ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign
spouse; and
(iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a
divorce decree by mutual agreement under the
laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the
evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance
of said divorce decree and the governing national law
of her husband Park was not put in issue.
As confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree
obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia's
conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26 (2)
and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.
By virtue of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code and the Certification of the Cheongju Local
Court dated July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A.
Galapon is declared capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Chapter 2. Marriages Exempted from License
Requirement
 
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting
parties are at the point of death, the marriage may
be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license
and shall remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives. (72a)
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
 
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located
that there is no means of transportation to enable such
party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
 
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two
preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state
in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar
or any other person legally authorized to administer
oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying
the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personally before the local civil registrar and
that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain
the ages and relationship of the contracting parties
and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
(72a)
 
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the
last preceding article, together with the legible copy
of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person
solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of
the municipality where it was performed within the
period of thirty days after the performance of the
marriage. (75a)
 
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be solemnized
by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only
while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but
also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
 
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a
commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority
to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between
persons within the zone of military operation,
whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
(74a)
 
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among
members of the ethnic cultural communities may be
performed validly without the necessity of marriage
license, provided they are solemnized in accordance
with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
 
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage. (76a)
 
EXEMPTION FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE
Articles 27, 28, 31, 32, 33 and 34 ARE situations
where the contracting parties need not obtain a
marriage license prior to getting validly married.
These are exceptions to the formal requirement of a
valid marriage license.
Except for Muslims, the various ethnic groups in the
PH and the contracting parties referred to in the said
articles must comply with all other essential and
formal requirements provided under ART 2 and 3 of
the FC.
FAR AREAS: a sacred institution like marriage
should always be encouraged. Without this
provision, illicit relationships may proliferate only
because the parties could not get a marriage license
with really no fault on their part.
SOLEMNIZING OFFICERS UNDER ART 7 AND
THE MAYOR.
 Empowered to act as the solemnizer of a
marriage even without a valid marriage
license if either or both of the contracting
parties are at the point of death. The
marriage will remain valid even if the ailing
party subsequently survives.
 CHIEF PILOT AND SHIP CAPTAINS
MAY solemnize only marriages in articulo mortis
while the plane is in flight or the ship is at sea and
even during the stopovers at ports of call. They can
only solemnize marriages only among their
passengers and crew members.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
 MILITARY COMMANDER
Marriage in Articulo Mortis only;
He/she must be a commissioned officer – rank should
start from a 2nd Lieutenant, ensign and above;
Must be a commander of a unit – any subdivision
(regiment, battalion etc). of an army;
May solemnize only in marriage articulo mortis and
in the absence of the chaplain;
Marriage must be solemnized within the zone of
military operation and during such military operation;
Contracting parties may either be members of the
armed forces or civilians.
 MUSLIMS AND ETHIC GROUPS
UNDER the CC, for as long as the marriages of
ethnic groups, pagans and Muslims were performed
in accordance with their customs, rites and practices,
such marriages were considered valid. (ART 78, CC)
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(law governing the law on persons and family
relations among MUSLIMS)
FC expressly provides that the Muslims and ethnic
groups are exempted only from procuring a marriage
license for as long as the marriage will be solemnized
in accordance with their customs, rites and practices.
RA NO 6766 – Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region ART 10 Sec 2: Marriages
solemnized between or among members of the
indigenous tribal group or cultural community in
accordance with the indigenous customary laws of
the place shall be valid, and the dissolution thereof in
accordance with these laws shall be recognized.
However, as to other ethnic groups in the PH, they
are still governed by the FC, as they do not have a
separate law like the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the PH for the Muslims or the Organic act
of Cordillera Autonomous Region.
 COHABITATION FOR 5 YEARS
Their living together as husband and wife must be
observed that their living together as husband and
wife must meet two distinct conditions:
 They must live as such for at least 5 years
characterized by exclusivity and continuity
that is unbroken; and
 They must be without any legal impediment
to marry each other. (Refer only to the time
of the actual marriage celebration)
Note: The essential and formal requirements for a
valid marriage must be present only at the
celebration of the marriage and not at any other
point in time.
Under this exception, the contracting parties shall
state the fact of their cohabitation for at least 5 years
and the absence of any legal impediment to marry
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage. The failure of the
solemnizing officer to investigate shall not
invalidate the marriage.
DIRECTORY REQUIREMENTS
 The procedure laid down in ARTS 29 and
30 of the FC relative to the duties of the
solemnizing officer with respect to the
affidavit he or she has to execute is merely
directory in character. Non observance of
the requirements will not render the
marriage void or annullable.
JURISPRUDENCE
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian
ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., vs. NORMA
BAYADOG
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Bayadog got married without
any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
The lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
WON Petitioners can initiate an action for annulment
of marriage on behalf of their deceased father.
Held: YES.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
assailed decision of the trial court.
The Court ruled that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
According to the Court, it can not be said that
Pepito and respondent have lived with each other
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife."
The Court also ruled that petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void because a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned
even after the death of either party.
JURISPRUDENCE
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE
ROQUE R SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan [2001]
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
FACTS:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that she was the lawful wife of
the late David Manzano and that Four children were
born out of that marriage.
On 22 March 1993, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, claimed in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating
his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction.
In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article
34 of the Family Code.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between
the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that
they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other];
and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment
to their marriage.
ISSUE: WON all the requisites are present for a
marriage license not to be required.
HELD:
Not all of these requirements are present in the case
at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
"separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.
In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known
that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage.
And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzano's and Payao's subsisting previous marriage,
as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before
him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are
not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint
Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are
legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could
not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the
law excuses no one" has special application to judges,
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative
that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles. And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court
Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
JURISPRUDENCE
JUVY N. COSCA ET. AL VS. JUDGE LUCIO
PALAYPAYON, JR.
FACTS:
Complainants are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents are respectively the Presiding Judge
and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint FILED, respondents
were charged among others with the following
offense: Illegal Solemnization of marriage.
Complainants allege that respondent judge
solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license.
Thus, some couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license.
As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed
with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon
Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called
the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but
the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the
marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code,
hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement.
ISSUE: WON the marriage between Abellano and
Edralin is void for lack of the essential requirement
of valid marriage license.
HELD: Yes.
The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
The recommendation with respect to the
administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent
judge should, therefore, be modified. For
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
one, with respect to the charge of illegal
solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had
not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's
concern for the institution of marriage and the legal
effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged
as herein before narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence
in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require
a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of
P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with.
JURISPRUDENCE
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL.
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO
MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUIN[1992]
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26,
1953. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
contracted three (3) marriages.
With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on
November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children.
With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot
a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May
8, 1910.
With his third wife, Felipa Velasco, they got married
sometime in 1930 and had three children.
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain
properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried. These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the
Muntinlupa Estate.
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his
first and second marriages, all surnamed Mariategui
and all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the Muntinlupa Estate.
Thereafter, the land registration court issued a decree
ordering the registration of the lot and an OCT was
issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs.
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the
subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to
163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title
were issued to the respective parties.
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third
marriage with Felipa Velasco filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that subject Lot
together with other lots were owned by their common
father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the
adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated
December 2, 1967.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The
plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
on the ground that the trial court committed an error
in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo
Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully
married and in holding (that) they (appellants) are
not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby
divesting them of their inheritance.
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including
appellants as entitled to equal shares in the estate of
Lupo Mariategui.
ISSUE: WON a marriage between LUPO and Felipa
(3rd wife) could be presumed.
HELD:
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to
have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This
fact is based on the declaration communicated by
Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when
(his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to get
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig,
Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband
and wife, and were known in the community to be
such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a
child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with
great favor. So much so that once a man and a
woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the
presumption of their being married must be admitted
as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra)
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
JURISPRUDENCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT [2008]
FACTS:
On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married
at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,
also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both
of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. He contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her
by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached
them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him. Reluctantly, he signed
the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying
on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When
he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy
of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's
allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of
their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990.
On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since
Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6 The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to
him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8
dismissing the Complaint.
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between
Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid.
foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The Court of
Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate
court observed that the circumstances constituting
fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under
Article 86 14 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not
fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman
must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself.
ISSUE: WON the marriage between Jose and Felisa
is valid.
HELD: No.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the
Civil Code governs their union. ART 53, CC:
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It is
not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that
"they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other." One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.
To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five year period
computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the
years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

party was involved at any time within the five years

— and continuity that is unbroken. ART. 35
 Below 18 years of age even with consent
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The  Solemnized by any person not legally
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 authorized
o Unless either or both parties
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
believed in good faith that the
declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa solemnizing officer had the legal
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without authority to do so.
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.  Solemnized without a license
o Except those covered by the
preceding chapter
Chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages  Bigamous or polygamous marriages not
  falling under ART 41
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from  Mistake of identity
the beginning:  Subsequent marriages that are void under
  Art 53.
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen
years of age even with the consent of parents or ART 36 – psychologically incapacitated
guardians; ART 37 – incestuous marriage
  ART 38 - against public policy
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally ART 40 – absolute nullity
authorized to perform marriages unless such ART 41 – presumptive death
marriages were contracted with either or both parties ART 44 – subsequent marriage
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer ART 53 IN REL. TO ART 52 - partition and
had the legal authority to do so; distribution of legitimes
 
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter; Only marriages declared void by the legislature
  should be treated as such. There can be no other void
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not marriages outside of those specifically provided by
falling under Article 41; law.
 
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one Thus, in the absence of any grounds to consider a
contracting party as to the identity of the other; and marriage void, a court appointed guardian and his or
  her ward can marry each other and likewise
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under stepbrothers and stepsisters can validly marry each
Article 53. other.
 
The grounds for a void marriage may co-exist in one
case.
NOTES:
A petition for declaration of nullity, without any
Void Marriages other incidental prayers like support, deals with only
one cause of action which is the nullity of marriage.
Not valid from inception; void ab initio

RULE: ART 4, FC declares that absence of any of VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
the essential or formal requirements for a valid
marriage as provided for in ARTS 2 and 3 makes a VOID VOIDABLE
marriage void. having never to have valid until otherwise
taken place and cannot declared by the Court
be the source of rights
can never be ratified Can be ratified or
EXCEPTIONS: confirmed by free
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

cohabitation or
prescription
can be attacked cannot be assailed
collaterally collaterally except in a
direct proceeding
can be questioned even can be assailed only
after death of either during the lifetime of
party the parties and not after
the death of either in
which case the parties
and their offspring will
be left as if the
marriage had been
perfectly valid
action or defense is action prescribes
imprescriptible
any proper party may only the parties or those
attack designated by law may
attack
no legal effects except Property regime
those declared by law governing voidable
concerning the marriages is generally
properties of the alleged conjugal partnership (or
spouses, regarding co- absolute community)
ownership or ownership and the children
through actual joint conceived before its
contribution, and its annulment are
effect on the children legitimate. (Ninal v.
born to such void Bayadog)
marriages.
Exceptions:
1. Article 35(2) – parties believed in good faith
2. Article 41 – Bigamous marriage
Under Art 41, the present spouse may validly marry
again if he/she:
1. Has a well founded belied that his or her
spouse is death;
2. Procures a judicial declaration of
presumptive death; and
3. At the time of the subsequent marriage
ceremony, is in good faith together with the
subsequent spouse, otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be considered
void in accordance with Art 44
In these two exceptions, the good faith even of only
one of the contracting parties shall make the marriage
valid. To be void, both of the contracting parties must
be in bad faith.
Equitable Doctrine of Unclean Hands
 Where the court should not grant relief to
the wrongdoer is not a rule as applied in
nullity actions because it is merely judge-
made and has no statutory basis.
BAD FAITH AS AFFECTING PROPERTY
RELATION
 Good faith and bad faith of one of the
parties at the time of the marriage are
material to determine the disposition of
properties in a void marriage.

Gen Rule: in a void marriage, the property regime is

WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF A SPOUSE FILED A
PETITION FOR NULLITY BASED ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, DENIED,
AND FILED ANOTHER PETITION BASED ON
THE ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE LICENSE.
WOULD THE ACTION PROSPER?
No. It will not prosper. In Mallion v. Alcantara, the
SC dismissed the subsequent case on the ground that
the petitioner violated the rule on splitting-a-case of
action, that the rule on res judicata applied and that
the petitioner waived the defect.
BAD FAITH OR GOOD FAITH IN VOID
MARRIAGES
Gen. Rule: good faith and bad faith are immaterial in
determining whether a marriage is null and void.
one of co-ownership.
In the disposition of the co-ownership at the time of
liquidation, whether one of the parties is in bad faith
is a basic consideration.
Hence, when only one of the parties to a void
marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children.
In case of default of, or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of
the cohabitation.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
This rule applies to all void marriages except to a
subsequent void marriage due to the failure of a party
to get a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage pursuant to ART 40, FC.
COLLATERAL AND DIRECT ATTACK
General Rule: a void marriage can be collaterally
attacked.
This means that the nullity of a marriage can be
arrested even if it is not the main or principal issue of
a case and that no previous judicial declaration of
nullity is required by law with respect to any other
matter where the issue of the voidness of a marriage
is pertinent or material, either directly or indirectly,
e.g. In an inheritance case, it is important to show
that certain children should get less inheritance
because they are illegitimate due to void marriage of
the decedent with their mother, any proof to show the
nullity of the marriage can be presented in court.
There is no need to produce a judicial declaration of
nullity to prove that the marriage is void. Evidence
other than a judicial decision declaring the said
marriage void can be presented to show the nullity of
the marriage.
e.g. in a case for support, the lower court can make a
declaration that the marriage was void to determine
the rights of the child to be supported.
Direct attack –
 filing a case precisely putting forth as
principal issue the nullity of the marriage. It
is a suit precisely filed to assail the validity
of a marriage or to assert the nullity of a
marriage for the Court to issue the proper
judicial declaration.
 Only the husband or the wife can file a case
for declaration of nullity.
Three cases where a direct attack, not a collateral
attack, on the nullity of a marriage must first be
undertaken so that the proper effects provided by law
can appropriately apply:
1. ART 40, FC which provides that “the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgement
declaring such marriage void” – this means
that, if a person has a void marriage and he
or she wants to remarry, he or she must first
file a civil case precisely to obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage before he or she can remarry. – For
purposes of remarriage, the only acceptable
proof to show the voidness of the first
marriage is a judicial declaration issued by
the Court directly stating that the first
marriage is null and void.
2. Where a direct attack is necessary has been
alluded to by the SC in Niñal vs. Bayadog,
when it said that for the purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial declaration of nullity
is necessary.
3. ART 50, FC in relation to ART 43(3) and in
ART 86(1) of the FC.
e.g. Thus, if a donor desires to revoke a donation
propter nuptias (in consideration of marriage) given
to one or both of the married couple on the ground
that the marriage is void, it is important that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage must first be
obtained. It is not enough that the marriage is void
pursuant to law.
There must first be a civil suit filed by either of the
parties in the void marriage to have the marriage
judicially declared null and void. The existence of a
valid judicial declaration of nullity will give the
donor the cause of action to revoke the donation
(ART 86(1)) or to consider the donation as revoked
by operation of law.
JURISPRUDENCE
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GINA LAO-TSOI [1997]
FACTS:
Wife of petitioner filed a petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming Tsoi filed a petition but was denied by the
lower court and the appellate court.
In 1988, petitioner and private respondent got
married. After the celebration of marriage, they
proceeded to the house of petitioner’s mother, they
slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life but contrary to
private respondent’s expectations that as newlyweds
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
they were supposed to consummate, the petitioner
just went to bed, slept on one side, turned his back
and went to sleep. Nothing happened that night. The
same thing happened on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th nights.
They went to Baguio to have their honeymoon in
private but petitioner invited his and private
respondent’s mother, an uncle, and nephew. They
stayed in Baguio for 4 days but during this period,
nothing happened since the petitioner avoided her.
They slept in the same room and the same bed for
almost a year but there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse. Private Respondent said that she did not
even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see
hers.
They submitted themselves for medical examination
and the results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy while that of her husband’s
examination was kept confidential. While no
medicine was prescribed to her, the doctor prescribed
medication for her husband which was also kept
confidential.
Private respondent claimed that the petitioner is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, the defendant married
her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status and publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man.
Petitioner admitted that since their marriage until
their separation, there was no sexual contact between
them because his wife always avoided him. He is
claimed that his wife filed the case because she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother and that he will consummate
their marriage.
Petitioner submitted himself to a physical
examination and his external genital was examined
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent.
The medical report stated that there was no evidence
of impotency and he is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman despite the soft erection.
ISSUE: WON THE ALLEGED REFUSAL OF
BOTH PARTIES TO HAVE SEX WITH EACH
OTHER CONSTITUTES PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
HELD: YES. The senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Where the ground of psychological incapacity under
ART 36 was invoked to nullify a marriage and where
evidence showed that the spouses did not engage in
sexual intercourse but there was no finding as to who,
between the husband and the wife, refused to have
sexual intercourse, the SC ruled that such absence of
a finding as to the one who refused to have sex is
immaterial because the action to declare a marriage
void may be filed by either party, even the
psychologically incapacitated one.
It also appeared that there was absence of empathy
between petitioner and private respondent. That is —
a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
appellate court and denied the petition for lack of
merit.
JURISPRUDENCE
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-FactMOISES R.
AVERA[1993]
FACTS:
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo.
They were married on November 29, 1976,unknown
to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina
dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid
and still existing. She came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela
Paz sued them for bigamy.
She has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used
to come to the Philippines only when she would avail
of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by
her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present,
he has been unemployed and completely dependent
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000 which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto.
She discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this
and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera
as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties;
he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact.
The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties;
their marriage be declared null and void and of no
force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at
the time of their void marriage and such properties be
placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the petition stated no cause of action the marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of
its nullity is therefore superfluous and unnecessary.
The lower court and appellate court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON a judicial decree is necessary to
establish invalidity of a void marriage.
HELD: Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense.
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation
of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latter's
presumptive legitimes.
In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.
JURISPRUDENCE
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian
ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO
NIÑAL, JR. vs. NORMA BAYADOG ,
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. [PEPITO KILLED HIS WIFE]
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
The lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
WON Petitioners can initiate an action for annulment
of marriage on behalf of their deceased father.
Held: YES.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
assailed decision of the trial court.
The Court ruled that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
According to the Court, it can not be said that
Pepito and respondent have lived with each other
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife."
The Court also ruled that petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void because a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned
even after the death of either party.
GOOD FAITH MARRIAGE
If the marriage were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so when in fact
he or she has none, then the marriage shall be
considered valid.
Good faith is clearly addressed to the contracting
parties and not the solemnizing officer.
Good faith that will validate the marriage refers to
only one formal requisite: authority of the
solemnizing officer.
Putative marriage – is applied to matrimonial union
which has been solemnized in due form and good
faith on the part of one or of both parties but which
by reason of some legal infirmity is either void or
voidable. The essential basis of such marriage is the
belief that it is valid.
Putative marriage vs. Good faith marriage – both
marriages not founded on the actual marriage or the
ceremonial marriage, but on the reasonable belief by
one or both of the parties that they were honestly
married and that the solemnizing officer had
authority, when in fact he had none.
Good faith when used in connection with putative
marriage, means an honest and reasonable belief that
the marriage was valid at its inception and that no
legal impediment exists to impair its validity.
Good faith will validate the marriage because the
situation is a mistake of fact which is excusable.
VOID UNDER ART 53
for persons whose marriages have been annulled or
declared null and void to be able to validly marry
again, they must undertake the liquidation, partition,
and distribution of their properties, if any, and, only
in proper cases, the delivery of the children’s
presumptive legitimes and thereafter all these
requirements, including the decree of annulment or
nullity, should be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and the registries of property. Non-
compliance with these requirements will render any
subsequent marriage void.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
NOTES:
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
The law does not define what psychological
incapacity is and therefore, the determination is left
solely with the courts on a case-to-case basis.
Determination of psychological incapacity “depends
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts”
Insanity can be a good indicator of psychological
incapacity, but it is not a pre-requisite for the
existence of the ground for nullity under ART 36.
Psychological Incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations, must be present at the time of the
marriage ceremony, but can be manifested later on
during the marriage. It is considered a ground to
nullify a marriage. Such a marriage cannot be cured
by cohabitation considering that it is void, and,
therefore, ratification cannot apply.
PROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Psychological incapacity is psychosomatic and deals
with a state of mind and thus, can only be proven by
indicators or external manifestations of the person
claimed to be psychologically incapacitated. These
indicators must be clearly alleged in the complaint
filed in court.
Indicators of psychological incapacity to perform
the essential marital obligation:
 Insanity;
 Failure to comply with the rights, duties, and
obligations relative to their parental
authority over their children;
 The fear of a wife, who is afraid of children,
to engage in sexual intercourse is an
indicator of psychological incapacity;
 Unreasonable attachment by the spouse to
his or her family or to the spouse’s friends
or barkada such that the importance and
devotion which should be given to his or her
own spouse and children are subordinated to
the said attachment;
 Actual breakdown of family life
characterized by separation of husband and
wife;
 Separation or abandonment alone is not
conclusive proof of Psychological
Incapacity;
 Sexual Infidelity or living an adulterous life
does not automatically prove psychological
incapacity;
 Mere isolated idiosyncrasies of a spouse are
not themselves manifestations of
psychological incapacity;
 Incompatibility and irreconcilable
differences are not enough, the totality of the
marriage life as affected by the gross
irresponsibility and utter disregard by the
subject spouse toward family life as
manifested by his or her actions must be
taken into consideration
Psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
By the very nature of ART 36, courts, despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
The court may or may not accept the testimony of the
psychologist or psychiatrist because the decision
must be based on the totality of the evidence.
Nevertheless, the testimony of an expert witness, if
credible and if consistent with the totality of the
evidence, which is also credible, must be given great
weight.
JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES
In Republic vs. CA and Molina, the SC enumerated
the guidelines in invoking and proving psychological
incapacity under ART 36:
1] the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2] the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be:
a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts
d. clearly explained in the decision
ART 36, FC requires that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
3] the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
4] such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5] such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
6] the essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by ARTS 68 to 71 of the FC as regards the
husband and wife as well as ARTS 220-221 and 225
of FC in regard to parents and their children.
7] interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
8] the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
DAMAGES
 In case involving psychological incapacity,
the SC disallowed the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees on the ground that the very
nature of psychological incapacity which is
non-cognizance of one’s essential marital
obligation at the time of the marriage
ceremony, negates bad faith, which is an
essential element in awarding moral
damages, in contracting the marriage.
Consequently, no award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees can also be
made in the absence of a showing of bad
faith.
JURISPRUDENCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner ,
vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents. [1997]
[THE CASE WHICH LAID DOWN SPECIFIC
GUIDELINES IN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ART 36, FC.]
FACTS:
On August 16, 1990, private respondent Roridel
Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
The Molinas got married in 1985 and begot a son.
After a year of marriage, Roridel alleged that
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest about their finances. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila and since then Roridel
had been the sole breadwinner of the family. The
couple had a very intense quarrel which resulted for
their relationship to be estranged. Roridel left Manila
and lived with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left
and abandoned them.
Reynaldo filed his answer and admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to Roridel’s strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends, refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals, and Roridel’s failure to run
the household and handle their finances
Roridel submitted the following evidence while
Reynaldo did not present any:
 Her and her friends testimony
 Testimony of the social worker
 Testimony of a psychiatrist
The trial court rendered judgement declaring the
marriage void. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: WON OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING
PERSONALITIES IS EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
HELD:
NO. In the present case, there is no clear showing to
the court that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity.
It appeared to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed
that she and her husband could not get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity
of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
In the instant case and applying the doctrine in the
case of LEOUEL SANTOS, the Supreme Court
ruled to grant the petition. The marriage of Roridel
and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts in
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae.
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.
JURISPRUDENCE
ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, petitioner , vs.
MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, respondent . [2021]
FACTS:
Mario. Thereafter, Mario proposed and Rosanna
agreed to marry him in December of that year.
While they were together, prior to their marriage,
Rosanna noticed that there were times when Mario
would be unaccounted for a whole night or an entire
day. He also kept postponing his trip back to Italy.
Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship to get
back to a Taiwanese national who had cheated on his
friend in a business deal. Thereafter, Mario quit his
job in Italy, and she noticed that he always went out
at night and would come back at dawn alone or with
his friends. He also had difficulty managing his
finances. Mario would allegedly be extremely
irritable and moody, causing Rosanna to have
second thoughts about marrying him. However,
she was already pregnant. The parties eventually
married in December of 1995.

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L.

Rosanna taught him to run Design & Construction
Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995 at
matrix, the firm that she had set up before she
the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati
married him. Mario continued with his emotional
City. On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma.
immaturity, irresponsibility, and psychological
Samantha, the only child of the parties. The family
imbalance. He would go out for several days and
lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with
once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and
Rosanna's parents living in the other half of the
sleep for days. He was also hyper-active late at night.
duplex.

Rosanna confronted him and Mario admitted of

In 2000, the couple separated. Rosanna kept the sole
using Marijuana. He promised to stop but he did not
custody of their daughter.
keep his promise.
In 2001, Mario filed a custody before the RTC.

In 2003, Rosanna filed a petition for declaration of

The day after she gave birth, Mario left her, knowing
nullity of her marriage claiming that Mario was
that she could not move until the effects of the spinal
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
anesthesia had worn off. When she was discharged,
essential marital obligations to her.
Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought
everyone was out to attack him and at time would
hide their daughter from those he thought were out to
Rosanna met Mario in 1975, they lost contact with
hurt them.
each other and reconnected in 1995 when Mario
sought out Rosanna through their friends. Mario then
courted Rosanna and she eventually fell in love with
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

Mario also took large cash advances. She only sister, and the written statement that Mario provided
learned of the numerous cash advances when the firm with Seagulls– she diagnosed him with narcissistic
could no longer pay the worker’s salaries. antisolar personality disorder and substance abuse
disorder with psychotic features. And his narcissistic
Rosanna eventually left him but Mario followed them
antisocial disorder personality disorder found to be
and pleaded for another chance. Later, packets of
grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable,
shabu was found among Mario’s belongings.
allegedly rendered Mario psychological incapacitated
Their daughter had dengue but even when the child to comply with his essential marital obligations to
vomited, Mario would ignore the ill child. She drove Rosanna.
him out of the house but after a few days he returned
and pleaded for another chance.
Mario countered that it was Rosanna who was
Mario used up his supplementary credit card and
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
made purchases. He was found with travel
essential marital obligations.
documents, cash and checklist of EU countries with
their visa requirements for entry for a child. He was
brought by his siblings in Medical City for
He claimed that he worked overseas and while on
detoxification. The doctors suggested for him to
vacation in the PH, he reconnected with Rosanna.
admitted in a rehabilitation facility but the siblings
And, when he resigned from Italy to work in Canada,
defied the order.
Rosanna told him that she’s pregnant and was
planning to abort. He believed her because she
allegedly had an abortion in 1991. To prevent her
Rosanna closed her company and decided to have a
from aborting he proposed to her.
duplex built. Mario asked for a small room be built as
their daughters playroom. Mario was found with their
daughter in that room which is full of smoke but did
He also claimed that during a fight, Rosanna would
not smell of cigarettes, Mario relapsed into his drug
box and kick him whenever they argued. He would
use.
leave the house to keep his cool.

Rosanna petitioned for her husband to be admitted at

That Rosanna became uncontrollable as she would
the NBI Treatment and Rehab Center and eventually
bang her head on tables, doors, walls and would even
at the Seagulls Flight Foundation, but Mario escaped
inflict corporal punishment on their daughter.
from the latter.

That he worked to support the family and because of

These events according to Rosanna showed Mario’s
his hard work that they were able to pay their loan
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
and save money for the construction of their conjugal
marital obligations to her. To prove his psychological
home.
incapacity, she presented a physician-psychiatrist, as
expert witness. The expert witness declared that
Rosanna is psychological capacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations. As for Mario, since That he always went home and never slept out except
she did not interview him personally, she relied on that one time when he and Rosanna had a big fight.
the testimonies of Rosanna, Ma. Samantha Rosanna’s
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
That he was a good father such that when Ma
Samantha was confined, he took care of her. He
would also spend quality time with his daughter.
That he used up the credit limits when he was drove
out because he had no cash but he allegedly paid it
back.
That he had the small room constructed to protect
their daughter from construction dust and debris.
That he wasn’t a threat to Rosanna and their
daughter.
Mario prayed that the trial court nullify the marriage
due to her psychological incapacity and that the
properties they ahd acquired during their cohabitation
be divided equally between them. He also prayed for
the custody of their daughter.
The trial court voided the marriage and awarded the
custody to Rosanna with Mario having visitation
rights. As to the duplex, the court declared Rosanna
as its sole and absolute owner including the parcel of
land on which it was built.
On appeal, the CA found the expert witness’
psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be
UNSCIENTIFIC AND UNRELIABLE since she
diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The CA
declared the marriage valid and subsisting.
The supreme court appointed amici curiae and the
amici curiae submitted their amicus briefs.
ISSUES:
1) WON the guidelines for deciding cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity, as laid down in
MOLINA violate the right to liberty, personal
autonomy and human dignity of the Filipinos;
2) WON as characterized in SANTOS,
psychological incapacity has juridical
antecedence and its root cause medically or
clinically identifiable at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. If it is so
identifiable, then:
a) Should it be grounded on a particular
psychological illness;
b) may it be established without a
psychological assessment or clinical
diagnosis;
c) may it be established on the basis of
testimonial evidence attesting to the
behavioral pattern of the spouse with the
psychological incapacity during the
marriage;
3) Whether or not, as characterized in Santos,
psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If
it is, must it be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable to warrant a
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code;
4) Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code is
violative of the separation of Church and State;
5) Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's
psychological incapacity is competent evidence
if it is solely based on collateral information
from the other spouse;
6) Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal
separation precludes a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of one or both of the
spouses;
7) Whether or not psychological incapacity may be
relative to each couple.
HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition.
With clear and convincing evidence, Rosanna proved
that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
comply with his essential marital obligations to her.
Their marriage is void ab initio.
The answer to the issues presented were:
In Molina, the court laid down the guidelines for
interpreting ART 36. The guidelines were:
1] the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2] the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be a) medically or clinically identified b) alleged in
the complaint c) sufficiently proven by experts and d)
clearly explained in the decision.
3] the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
4] such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5] such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligation of marriage.
6] The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7] Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Fam ily Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law.
The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent
cases. Since Molina's promulgation in 1997 until
2008, only Antonio v. Reyes was found to have
satisfied all the requirements of Molina. Antonio
involved a wife whose pathological lying rendered
her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.
Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting
from the application of the Molina guidelines, this
Court pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te v. Yu-
Te that the Molina guidelines worked like a "strait-
jacket" in which psychological incapacity cases are
forced to fit.
1] The first Molina guideline reiterates the
fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a
claim must prove it. Specifically, in psychological
incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who proves
the existence of psychological incapacity need not be
given by an expert. Molina , however, is silent on
what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases.
While there is opinion that a nullity case under
Article 36 is like any civil case that requires
preponderance of evidence, we now hold that the
plaintiff spouse must prove his or her case with clear
and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof
that requires more than preponderant evidence but
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2] To recall, the term "psychological incapacity" was
first defined by this Court in Santos as a "mental (not
physical) incapacity" to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The term was confined to "the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage." This
characterization became the basis of the second
Molina guideline, where parties to a nullity case are
required to present evidence of the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. In particular, this root
cause must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts.
To comply with the second Molina guideline,
psychologists, and psychiatrists, when serving as
expert witnesses, have been forced to assign a
personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly
psychologically incapacitated spouse. This cruelty
could not have been the intent of the Code
Committee.
It took time before this Court, in the 2000 case of
Marcos v. Marcos , declared that "a medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to." Instead, as this Court said, "the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)
For this reason, this Court was inconsistent in
requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity
cases. Not all cases promulgated after Marcos
required
the totality of evidence rule. Even as recent as 2019,
this Court dismissed a nullity case because "[t]he root
cause of [the respondent spouse's] alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts[.]"
In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically
abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological
incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a
personality disorder that must be proven through
expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the
durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality,
called "personality structure," which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
undermines the family. The spouse's personality
structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and, more important, to comply with his
or her essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality Ordinary
witnesses who have been present in the life of the
spouses before the latter contracted marriage may
testify on behaviors that they have consistently
observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors
are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to
assume the essential marital obligations.
Furthermore, there will be no need to label a person
as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of
nullity. A psychologically incapacitated person need
not be shamed and pathologized for what could have
been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate
partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees
through rose-colored glasses. A person's
psychological incapacity to fulfill his or her marital
obligations should not be at the expense of one's
dignity, because it could very well be that he or she
did not know that the incapacity existed in the first
place.
3] Reading together the deliberations of the Code
Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina we
hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated
in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in
the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third
Molina guideline is amended accordingly This means
that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with
respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a
situation where the couple's respective personality
structures
are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only
result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n
undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a
present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive
spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that
there is indeed a psychological anomaly or
incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."
With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained,
not in the sense that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness,
but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are
excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be
mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill
will." In other words, it must be shown that the
incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause.
The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending
before secular courts is retained.
The above discussions notwithstanding, canonical
decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not
binding on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to
only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular
marriage, but ultimately, the elements of declaration
of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by
the judge.
Summary:
To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of
clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of
understanding and concomitant compliance with
one's essential marital obligations due to psychic
causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be
medically or clinically identified; hence, expert
opinion is not required.
As an explicit requirement of the law, the
psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality
structure, one that was formed before the parties
 SBCA MIDTERMS EXAM REVIEWER | Asares, Christine (ES)

married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a

genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove
psychological incapacity, a party must present clear
and convincing evidence of its existence.

In Santos, the SC refused to void the marriage after

outlining the history of the provision and defining
the term “psychological incapacity.”

xxx

That in all things God may be glorified

Ut In Omnibus Glorificetur Dei