Steam Explosion in Ammonia Plant

W.K. (Bill) Taylor, P. Eng

Saskferco Products Inc.
P.O. Box 39
Belle Plaine, Saskatchewan
Canada S0G 0G0

J.K. (Kelly) Thomas, Ph. D.

Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants
3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100
San Antonio, Texas
USA 78218-3024

Synopsis Original flowsheet rates were 1500 te/d ammonia

and 2000 te/d urea. As a result of plant expansions and

T he Saskferco ammonia plant experienced a

“relatively” minor steam explosion in the
steam superheater coils during plant start-
up. The damage resulted in a 3-day shutdown. The
lengthy troubleshooting effort and the root causes are
debottlenecks, production rates now average about
1950 te/d ammonia and 2900 te/d urea.

described in the paper. A steam explosion can be de-
scribed as the violent and sudden vaporization of water
when it hits a very hot surface. As the name says, the
water explodes into steam. Further discussion is given
in the paper.
Introduction
Saskferco Products Inc. operates an ammonia plant,
a urea plant, and related facilities at its Belle Plaine site,
located between Regina and Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan,
Canada. The ammonia plant is of Uhde design, and the
urea plant is based on Stamicarbon technology. Uhde
(Dortmund, Germany) constructed the site and first
production was in 1992.
Process Description
A simplified sketch of the reforming section of the
plant under discussion is shown in Fig. 1. Process gas
from the secondary reformer enters the process gas
cooler where it is cooled by generating high pressure
steam. The process gas continues on to the steam su-
perheater 3E2 where it is further cooled while super-
heating the steam just generated. A damper at the bot-
tom of this superheater can bypass some gas thus
increasing the gas temperature exit the superheater.
The process gas then proceeds to the high temperature
shift converter, while the steam is further superheated in
convection bank coils E05 and E04 before continuing
on to the steam system.

2004 3 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 BFW (boiler feedwater) is preheated by exchangers
4E2 and 4E1 enroute to the steam drum. The attem-
perators 3TIC-37 and 3TIC-33 are used to spray BFW
into the superheated steam for temperature control.
These attemperators are supplied with BFW via a small
line directly from the pump discharge.
The Incident
On October 21, 2002, a reformer tube failed and the
plant was shutdown to cap and remove the tube. This
work took about 9 hours and the plant was started up.1
On start-up it was found that the superheater 3E2
was not superheating. The plant had to be shutdown
again. It was decided that the most likely fault was in
the control damper at the bottom, on the gas side. Ves-
sel entry was made and a broken stem on the damper
was repaired. This was, as we subsequently discovered,
not the problem. Upon re-start the superheater was still
not doing any heat exchange. The plant was shutdown
again and vessel entry made to the top section of the
superheater on the steam side.
It was discovered that the top of the internal can in
the superheater had blown off. An attemperator nozzle
was also found inside the damaged can and this was
quickly identified as the nozzle from attemperator
3TIC-37. This was surprising as this attemperator is
downstream from the superheater and is at a much
lower elevation. The nozzle had become a projectile
and entered the can with sufficient velocity to dent the
side wall. Fig. 2 is a sketch of the internals of the su-
perheater 3E2 and shows the flight of the projectile.
The photos in Fig. 3 show the projectile, the route it
took, and the damaged top of the internal can.
The damage was repaired and the plant re-started.
Total outage was about 6 days, of which 3 days was
due to the superheater incident, 1 day for the reformer
tube, and about 2 days for a seized steam valve.
1 - At this stage in the plant history, the reformer tubes
were getting old and failures were becoming more frequent.
In the 7 months prior to this incident, there were 3 separate
failures. In each case, the outage was between 14 to 16
hours, ammonia to ammonia. In an Uhde reformer the tubes
are capped outside the furnace; at the pigtail at the top and at
the tube to manifold connection beneath the furnace. It takes
about 2 hours to shutdown and prepare for the job, about 4
hours to remove the tube and cap, and about 10 hours to re-
start and achieve ammonia production. The tubes are re-
moved “hot”, and the furnace stays relatively hot, thus reduc-
ing start-up time.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
It was clear that something had occurred during the
start-up on October 21, but what? Nothing unusual was
reported at the time. If only the internal can on the su-
perheater had been damaged, we might not have de-
voted so much attention to the investigation. But since
the attemperator nozzle was found inside the can, the
mystery deepened. What had made a nozzle weighing
2.4 kg travel 30 m backwards in a steam pipe, go
around five 90° elbows, rise vertically 6 m, and then
strike the internal can with such force that it dented the
steel plate? The flight of this projectile was not easy to
explain.
The Investigation
Saskferco wanted to know the cause of the incident
in order to prevent a recurrence. At the time of the in-
cident there was a leak in one of the syn loop boilers,
which leaked syn gas into the steam system. Proce-
dures were in place to prevent contamination of the
steam system with hydrogen, or contamination of the
syn loop with steam or boiler water during shutdown
conditions. Had these procedures worked, or was this
the cause of the incident? These, and several other
theories, were under consideration.
Physical Evidence
The attemperator nozzle (projectile) weighs 2.4 kg.
It traveled backwards (process-wise) through a total of
30 m of 10” high pressure steam pipe. Along this route
it went around five 90° bends and vertically upwards 6
m. It struck the steel plate inside the superheater can
with enough force to dent it. The cross-sectional area
of this projectile was only 8.8% of that of the steam
pipe (hence it was hard to visualize a gas explosion
causing the incident). The top plates of the internal su-
perheater can were deformed and dislodged.
History Modules & Process Trending
Most of the investigation of this incident consisted
of plotting and analyzing process trends in order to un-
derstand the behavior of key parameters leading up to
and following the incident. A brief description of the
process trending technology and the upgrades is in-
cluded here.
The control system for the plant is a Honeywell
TDC 3000 system. Upon plant start-up in 1992 it in-
cluded both standard History modules and a PC net-
work based system called PCNM (PC Network Man-
4 2004
ager). The PCNM system was not used for direct proc-
ess control – it was intended to be used by technical
staff for process monitoring, troubleshooting, etc. Dur-
ing the first 5 years of plant operation, this system was
upgraded to increase the History module size. But this
system was somewhat unwieldy to use and was proba-
bly not adequate to troubleshoot the incident in ques-
tion.
In 1998, the PCNM was replaced by the new Hon-
eywell Uniformance system, featuring new and up-
graded servers and the PHD (Plant Historical Data) and
TDC Viewer systems. This upgrade allowed Saskferco
to increase the tag count in the history database by a
factor of 8, and to reduce the scan time by a factor of 4
on average. The system is user friendly and allows ar-
chived data to be displayed in process graphic form, or
in a process trend (graph) form. Some of these trends
are included with this paper. PHD was an indispensa-
ble tool for the troubleshooting of this incident.
The Role of Baker Engineering and Risk
Consultants
The expertise of Baker Engineering and Risk Con-
sultants, Inc. (BakerRisk) was sought to assist with the
investigation. As world-renowned experts in the field
of fires, explosions, and accident investigations, it was
felt that their experience would be very helpful. It was
agreed that the role of BakerRisk would be on a “low
priority” basis since Saskferco was not in a rush to find
the answer and only wanted to determine the cause so
as to prevent a recurrence. The nature of BakerRisk’s
business is that they can be called away at a moment’s
notice to deal with “real” explosions, so that this ar-
rangement served the interests of both parties and
worked well. BakerRisk communicated with Saskferco
staff by e-mail, fax, and phone and did not have to
make a site visit. BakerRisk was responsible for evalu-
ating the projectile motion and impact physics, evaluat-
ing the energy of various explosion scenarios, and as-
sisting in determining a credible scenario based on their
experience.
It should be noted that this investigation was not as
extensive as would be carried out if plant staff were in-
jured, large capital or business interruption expenses
were incurred, or significant regulatory or civil litiga-
tion actions resulted from the event. Rather, the pur-
pose of this investigation was to determine the most
likely cause solely in order to allow the plant to take
preventative actions aimed at preventing a similar event
from occurring in the future. A more economical and
2004
focused approach was therefore adopted, which was
consistent with the aim of the investigation.
Causes Ruled Out
The scope of this paper does not allow for a de-
tailed review of what did not cause the incident. The
following scenarios were evaluated and determined not
to be the cause:
A/ A fuel-air explosion in the steam pipe. The in-
cident was not caused by syn gas leaking into
the steam system and exploding.
B/ Any incident involving the leak test of the re-
former fuel system, or over firing upon start-
up.
Trends, Events and Other Evidence
The sequence of events was as follows:
08:00 Plant shutdown. During the day, the boiler
3D1 was depressured, and the BFW pump was
used intermittently to maintain level in the
drum.
15:07 Triconex (computer safety shutdown system)
downloaded. No equipment operating.
16:55 Fans start.
17:03 Successful leak test of reformer fuel system.
17:27 BFW pump starts.
17:35 INCIDENT (although not recognized at the
time). As shown in Fig. 4, there is a reverse
flow spike at the steam drum on 3FI-8, a spike
in temperature exit 3E2 superheater, and a
spike in pressure on the steam drum.
These times were all determined from the PHD
trends.
The incident therefore occurred at 17:35, 8 minutes
after the start of the BFW pump (a detail that would
later prove to be significant). Other trends confirmed
that there was a pressure and flow surge out the main
steam vent. Yet no witness observed this or heard the
impact of the projectile in the superheater 3E2.
BFW was added to the steam drum several times
during the day. The trends indicated that the level ex-
ceeded the 100% mark several times and for a consider-
able period. At the same time, as shown in Fig 5, the
3E2 superheater exit was quenched from 182°C down
to 129°C. This indicated that the superheater as well as
the steam drum had been filled with water and that the
water ran down the superheater exit pipe. The tempera-
ture trends at the convection bank superheater coils also
showed that all temperatures had been quenched to just
5 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
above 100°C prior to the incident, indicating the pres-
ence of water.
A plant operator stated during the investigation that
he drained water between coils E04 and E05 an hour or
so prior to the incident. This is standard procedure and,
while the draining of some steam condensate would be
expected, on this occasion he reported that the drain ran
full bore for half an hour. This would drain the leg be-
tween the coils. Based on the operator’s report it is
clear that coil E05 had been flooded (and perhaps all or
part of E04) and confirms the presence of water as indi-
cated by the temperature readings. It is not possible to
drain the coils since they are vertical. See Fig. 7
Based on these observations, it was concluded that
the drum, superheater, and coil E05 (and probably
E04), had been filled with water.
Problems had previously been encountered with at-
temperator 3TIC-37. It is possible that the nozzle (pro-
jectile) had come off some time before the incident and
sat in the pipe until it became the projectile. With the
nozzle disconnected, the control valve would still close
and not leak BFW into the system. At the time of the
incident, 3TIC-37 did not work well and the BFW sup-
ply to it was probably blocked in. 3TIC-33 was not
blocked in. During the day of the incident, both control
valves remained closed.
The Mystery and the Explanation
The equipment had been filled with water, but this
does not explain the incident. As the flue gas tempera-
tures increased after the fans started at 16:55 the water
should have boiled off. At the time of the incident, the
flue gas temperature at coils E04 and E05 was in the
range 330°C to 350°C.
In fact, on several occasions the plant has deliber-
ately started up with the superheater 3E2 full of water.
During inspection on a turnaround, the superheater
tubes are filled with cold demin water in order to cool
the hot steel for vessel entry and to ensure proper func-
tioning of the inspection probe. Upon subsequent start-
up, this water evaporates without incident (although
these are single U-tubes, a perhaps significant detail
compared to the multiple U-tubes in coils E04 and
E05). The fact that coil E05 and perhaps E04 were now
filled with water would not have been interpreted as a
major issue.
The theories now focused on a steam explosion, or
water hammer event. Saskferco staff calculated that the
3E2 internal can would fail at a differential pressure of
approximately 700 KPa (100 psi). BakerRisk estimated
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
that the projectile velocity was in the range 20 to 70 m/s
when it hit the side of the internal can. Their view was
that it was swept along by a slug of water, which would
compress air and vapor ahead of it thus blowing the lid
off the top of the can before the projectile arrived. The
slug of water would be propelled by the rapid vaporiza-
tion of water (i.e. a steam explosion) in coils E04 and/or
E05. A relatively small volume of water had to be in-
troduced into coil E04 or E05 in order to cause the
steam explosion (i.e. the initiating event). It is noted
that vaporizing water results in a factor of about 100
volume increase at 200°C.
The final piece of the puzzle was discovered several
months after this incident, during a plant start-up in
February 2003. Pressure spikes of up to 1.05 MPa (150
psi) were observed on the steam main. The frequency
of these spikes was every 15 to 20 minutes. At the
steam drum, the pressure spikes were up to 0.8 MPa
(115 psi) and with the same frequency. Since this was
suspicious and perhaps indicative of water being pre-
sent in the coils, the shift supervisor went to the attem-
perator control valve 3TIC-33 located between coils
E04 and E05 to investigate. He could tell from the noise
and the pipe movement that something unusual was oc-
curring. He could tell that BFW was leaking into the
process at a high rate even though the control valve was
closed. He blocked in the BFW to 3TIC-33 After he
closed the block valve, the pressure and temperature
spikes stopped. This demonstrated that the 3TIC-33 at-
temperator was leaking BFW into the process even
though the control valve was closed (and was doing the
same thing during the October 21st incident). Figure 6
shows these pressure and temperature spikes. They
start shortly after the BFW pump starts and continue
until 3TIC-33 BFW is blocked in.
Operating personnel were aware that the 3TIC-33
attemperator was leaking. But the BFW supply was not
blocked in because the attemperator might have to be
put into service quickly. When the plant is operating,
the differential pressure between the BFW pump dis-
charge and the steam main is only about 1.0 MPa (145
psi). Any leakage under this condition would be small
and would be easily handled by the full steam flow.
But during start-up, after the main BFW pump is
started, this differential pressure is about 16.4 MPa
(2400 psi). Under this condition, the leakage into the
superheater coils would be about 4 times higher, and
there would be little or no steam flow. The conse-
quence of this leak, especially under shutdown or start-
up conditions, was not recognized at the time.
6 2004
 It is then clear that the initiating event on October
21st was BFW leaking by 3TIC-33 and filling the pipe
leg between coils E04 and E05. The volume of this leg
is 0.7 m3. A leak of BFW into the process of at least
5.3 m3/hr (23 GPM) for 8 minutes was required as the
incident occurred 8 minutes after start of the BFW
pump.
The scenario for the steam explosion is as shown
below:
1. steam drum was overfilled, including
steam superheater 3E2 and coil E05 and
perhaps E04
2. leg between coils E04 and E05 was
drained
3. BFW pump was started
4. 3TIC-33 attemperator leaked badly
As soon as the BFW pump was started the high
pressure BFW leaked by 3TIC-33 for 8 minutes, filled
the leg, then overflowed into coils E04 and E05. The
water contacted the hot steel and rapidly vaporized.
This pushed water in the bottom of the coil over to the
next high and hot section of the coil, vaporizing more
water, etc. (The flue gas temperature is 330°C to
350°C). The coil arrangement is shown in Fig. 7. A
steam explosion resulted. A slug of water was blown
backwards towards the superheater, picking up the
3TIC-37 nozzle (projectile) on the way and carrying it
upwards and into the superheater. The compressed air
or steam pushed ahead of the slug overpressured the in-
ternal can and caused it to fail. (Since the steam vent
had been open all day and we were at the initial phase
of start-up and not yet generating steam it is possible
that air was in the pipe. Process trends also showed that
a surge of air, steam or water was blown forward and
out the steam vent 3PIC-11.)
With some hindsight and a detailed review of proc-
ess trends (which cannot be presented here) it appears
that 3TIC-33 was leaking water into the superheater
coils during the afternoon of the October 21 incident
(i.e. whenever the BFW pump was on). Most of the
water came from the overflow of the steam drum but
the leakage through 3TIC-33 was a contributing factor
to flooding of the coils, and was the initiating factor for
the incident.
The Root Causes of the Incident
It usually requires more than one cause for an inci-
dent and this is the case for this incident.
2004
1. The BFW Preheater 4E1 was known to be
leaking. This is on the BFW line on the
way to the 3D1 steam drum. As the BFW
pump is shutdown and the pressure is re-
duced, the boiler water flows backwards
out of the steam drum and through the leak
in 4E1. This makes it much harder to
maintain a proper level in the steam drum.
The plant operators must start and stop the
pump and control drum level manually as
the plant is cooling down.
2. The check valve on the steam drum may
have allowed the boiler water to leak back-
wards out of the drum.
3. A mistake was made and the steam drum
was overfilled.
4. The attemperator 3TIC-33 was leaking
badly.
These are the causes or contributing factors for the
incident to occur. Failure to maintain valves has been a
frequent cause of accidents reported at this symposium
and that was also the case here.
What Exactly Is A Steam Explosion?
As mentioned, a steam explosion is the violent and
sudden vaporization of water when it hits a very hot
surface. On a very small and personal scale, if you sit
in a sauna and pour a half cup of water on the hot rocks,
then you have a very small steam explosion which will
very rapidly transfer the heat from the rocks throughout
the sauna. At atmospheric pressure, the volume in-
crease from water to steam is a factor of 1600.
On an industrial scale, the consequences can be
very serious. In discussions with colleagues in the steel
industry, it became apparent that a steam explosion in a
steel making furnace is a very real threat. All it takes is
a block of ice in the scrap steel. As the scrap is charged
to the furnace containing molten steel at 1500°C you
can imagine what happens if that block of ice is carried
under the surface – molten steel is sprayed out of the
furnace. This type of incident has injured many work-
ers. Similarly, dumping hot slag onto a puddle of rain
water can have disastrous results.
The author has found only one reference to steam
explosions in the literature (although in a rather limited
search) and this occurred in the steel industry. The ac-
cident occurred in England in 1975. Molten iron at
1500°C was run out of a blast furnace and into a closed
ladle or torpedo type railway car. About 2 or 3 tonnes
7 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
of water then leaked into the torpedo and rested on top dents such as described here, and to improve safety in
of the crust of iron and slag which forms above the our plants.
molten iron. When the torpedo was moved the water It is likely that we and other plants have “gotten
then came into direct contact with the molten iron and away” with the presence of smaller water slugs in the
vaporized with explosive violence. Ninety tonnes of coils on other occasions. Hopefully, this incident will
molten metal was blown out of the torpedo. This acci- forewarn others in the industry to prevent water from
dent cost eleven men their lives. entering the process where it does not belong, to recog-
In a chemical plant, a steam explosion can occur in nize the symptoms when it does enter, and to take cor-
a distillation column, if for example wash water from rective action.
the top of the column can somehow fall to the bottom
and contact the hot bottoms during a start-up or shut-
down. Severe damage to column internals can result.
Vacuum towers are particularly susceptible as under
vacuum conditions the volume increase from water to
steam can be a factor if 20,000 instead of the above-
mentioned 1600. Other scenarios can be imagined. For
example, connecting a water hose to hot equipment dur-
ing a shutdown.
If you ask industrial workers, engineers, etc, what a
steam explosion is, some will know but many will not.
It does not appear to be a well recognized safety threat
in our industry. Hopefully, this paper will increase the
awareness in our industry.

Discussion & Conclusion

The steam explosion incident cost Saskferco only
about 3 days of downtime plus some relatively minor
repair costs. But the incident demonstrates, with the
flight of the projectile, the tremendous forces that are at
work in our plants, even under very “mild” process
conditions as during the early stage of the start-up in
question. It is possible that you can “get away” with
introducing water at a later, hotter stage of start-up as
long as it is carried away by the steam flow. Introduc-
ing water during the initial phase of start-up, when there
is no steam flow, or when the plant is in a colder condi-
tion, may represent the worst case. Regardless, it is
never a good thing to have water where it does not be-
long.
It is relatively easy to overfill a steam drum. As
shown in Fig 8, the normal operating level is 82% full.
The void space is only 18%. And while steam drums
have multiple low level alarms and trips, there is only
one high level alarm on the drum. So, under shutdown
or start-up conditions when the level is being controlled
manually, there is only a small margin of error before
an overflow condition exists.
The modern process trending tools now available
allow for detailed troubleshooting after the event. Such
tools, if used properly, can be used to investigate inci-

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 8 2004

 3TI 3TI 3TI
25 CONVECTION BANK 24 23
112"

EO5 EO4

FLUE
GAS

4E2 4E1 3TI 3TI

BFW PUMPS 3TI 3TI
(LEAK) 38 37 34 33

10"

3FI 3TI
8 49
CLOSED OPEN
HP STEAM 12" 10"
3TIC-37 3TIC-33

PROCESS AIR
FLIGHT OF
PROJECTILE

3PI 3PIC
10 11
STEAM 3FI
VENT
SUPERHEATER 10
3E2

STEAM DRUM
3D1 3PIC-11
SECONDARY
REFORMER

CLOSED
FROM PRIMARY PROCESS GAS COOLER TO HIGH
REFORMER TEMP SHIFT

STEAM
SYSTEM

Figure 1 - PROCESS DESCRIPTION & SIMPLIFIED P&ID

PLATES BLOWN UP
INTERNAL CAN ALL BOLTS SHEARED

FLIGHT OF
PROJECTILE

10" PIPE

FROM
STEAM
DRUM
3D1

U-TUBES

TO COILS
IMPACT EO5 & EO4

Figure 2 - 3E2 SUPERHEATER INTERNALS

2004 9 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Figure 3A – PROJECTILE Figure 3B - PROJECTILE START POINT

Figure 3C - ROUTE OF PROJECTILE Figure 3D - 3E2 - TOP OF INTERNAL CAN

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 10 2004

 Figure 4 - The Incident
10/21/2002 16:30:00 10/21/2002 18:30:00
20.00
200.00
2.00

Reverse Flow Spike at Steam Drum at 17:35

Temperature Spike at 3E2 Superheater

(+36°C in 2 min)

Pressure Spike at Steam Drum (0.27 MPa)

0.00
100.00
0.00
** #1 (A) 3FI8.PV STEAM FLOW FROM 3D001
** #2 (A) 3TIC49.PV SUPERHEATED STEAM TEMPERATURE EX 3E2
** #3 (A) 3PI10.PV STEAM DRUM 03D001 PRESSURE

Figure 5 - Superheater Temperatures

10/21/2002 08:00:00 10/21/2002 18:00:00
600.00
600.00
600.00

Boiling in Coil
Quench Events

0.00
0.00
0.00
** #1 (A) 3TIC49.PV SUPERHEATED STEAM TEMPERATURE EX 3E2
** #2 (A) 3TI38.PV COIL E05 INLET TEMPERATURE
** #3 (A) 3TIC37.PV COIL E05 EXIT TEMPERATURE

Figure 6 - Feb 2003 Clues

2/22/2003 00:00:00 2/22/2003 05:00:00
5.00
500.00
20.00 BFW Pressure 17 MPa

BFW to 3TIC33 Blocked In

15°C Temperature Spikes

0.00
0.00 1.0 MPa Pressure Spikes
0.00
** #1 (A) 3PIC11.PV STEAM PRESSURE
** #2 (A) 3TI34.PV COIL E04 INLET TEMPERATURE
** #3 (A) 82PI3.PV BFW PRESSURE

2004 11 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 OUT TO IN FROM
STEAM SYSTEM 3E2
COIL COIL CONVECTION
EO4 EO5 BANK

3TI 3TI
34 37

FLUE
4.9m

GAS

3TV
33

BFW

GRADE VOLUME OF EXTERNAL LEG = 0.7m3

Figure 7 - COIL E04 & E05 ARRANGEMENT

700

NORMAL LEVEL
82%
650

2700
1350

Figure 8 - STEAM DRUM 3D1 - NORMAL LEVEL

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 12 2004