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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 22, Number 4, October

1984, pp. 393-421 (Article)

3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1984.0058

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 The Classification of Goods
in Plato's Republic
NICHOLAS WHITE

A T R E P U B L I C 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a , the b e g i n n i n g o f his a r g u m e n t that it is b e t t e r to be

j u s t t h a n unjust, Plato p r e s e n t s a classification o f kinds o f g o o d t h a t will f i g u r e
in his discussion. It is a tripartite classification, d e r i v e d f r o m a m o r e basic
bipartite contrast. T h e bipartite c o n t r a s t has o f t e n s e e m e d to h a v e an equiva-
lent in m o d e r n t e r m s , the distinction b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d f o r its o w n sake o r
g o o d f o r itself, a n d w h a t is g o o d f o r the sake o f its causal c o n s e q u e n c e s . ' T h e
tripartite classification b a s e d on this contrast, as the m o d e r n i z i n g i n t e r p r e t a -
tion holds, is b e t w e e n (a) things that are g o o d f o r t h e i r o w n sake b u t not f o r
their c o n s e q u e n c e s , (b) things that a r e g o o d b o t h f o r their o w n sake a n d f o r
their c o n s e q u e n c e s , a n d (c) things that a r e g o o d not for their o w n sake b u t
only f o r t h e i r consequences. Plato's thesis would be that justice belongs in
category (b).
S o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s , h o w e v e r , h a v e seen r e a s o n to think that the bipar-
tite contrast, o n which the tripartite classification is based, is not the m o d e r n
o n e b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d f o r its o w n sake a n d w h a t is g o o d f o r its conse-
quences, b u t s o m e o t h e r distinction. T h e i r c h i e f r e a s o n is that w h e n Plato
a r g u e s that justice is g o o d " f o r its o w n sake," he a d d u c e s w h a t s e e m to b e
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f justice, such as h a p p i n e s s a n d pleasure. T h e s e c o m m e n t a -
tors i n f e r t h a t despite what o t h e r s take to be the f o r c e o f 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a , Plato
really intends a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n things that a r e g o o d f o r o n e kind o f conse-
quence, i n c l u d i n g h a p p i n e s s a n d pleasure, a n d things that a r e g o o d f o r

1 The association with the modern distinction has been aided by the assimilation of Plato's
contrast to Aristotle's distinction at E.N. lo96b13--16, which is closer to the modern distinction,
but not, I would argue, identical with it. There are similar distinctions in Stoic ethics: see, e.g.,
Diogenes Laertius 7.96, lO7, and Cicero, De Finibu~ 3.56. For some other distinctions in Plato
among types of goods, and related points, see esp. Gorg. 467c-468e, 5o6c-d; Euthyd. 278e-
279a, ~81d; Phileb. 66asqq.; Legg. 631bsqq., 697bsqq.

[393]
394 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT ~984
another kind of consequence. Interpreters of this school of thought, who are
in a minority, include Grote and Sachs.'
Although I think that this school of thought is fundamentally correct,
particularly in resisting the natural tendency to interpret Plato's contrast in
m o d e r n terms, I think that this exegetical problem can be substantially clari-
fied by including some considerations not heretofore discussed, which give
us understanding of Plato's distinction not hindered by anachronistic as-
sumptions about the conceptual tools with which he was working.
In the discussions of this passage, it seems not to have emerged that by
the unreflective use of the word "consequence" in both translations and
interpretations, Plato's readers have almost universally come to accept un-
thinkingly an assumption plainly needing examination, the assumption that
Plato is operating with a m o d e r n notion of causal consequence. For I feel
quite sure that without some special warning this is what the word "conse-
quence" brings to the minds of most readers, even specialists in Plato. 3 On
reflection, however, one realizes that this assumption not only needs exami-
nation, but may well be false, and false in a way that materially affects the
interpretation of the Republic including the problem of reconciling 357 a -
358a with the ensuing argument. I suggest that, especially given the exis-
tence of that problem, we look at the language of the passage, and see
whether we can elucidate it in the light of other things that Plato says about
causal notions. I think that we can.
T h e resulting account of Plato's distinction falls roughly within the school
of thought according to which Plato contrasts two kinds of "consequences"
for which a thing may be called good or be welcome, but it takes the re-
quired notions of consequencehood from the repertoire of concepts pro-
vided by Plato himself. This provides what I think is a more natural inter-
pretation of the Republic as a whole than is otherwise possible. T h e closest
approach to this attempt thus to interpret Plato in Platonic terms has been
made by Kirwan, who uses the notion of a "formal cause. TM His account has
the great virtue of not using a modern, post-Humean notion of causation,
but still seems to me to fall short of what we need, since the notion of a

2 See George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, new ed. (London 1888), 117;
M. B. Foster, "A Mistake of Plato's in the Republic," Mind, 46 0937), 386-93, who makes but
then rejects such a suggestion, and David Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," Philosophical
Review, 72 (z963), z4z-58, reprinted in Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato 2 (Garden City, 1972), 3 5 - 5 t (to
be cited in the latter pagination). Scholars adopting the modernizing interpretation are legion.
3 I have not been able to discover an examination of the question how the terms apobai-
nonta (357b6), gignesthai apo tinos ( 3 5 7 c t - 2 , d l - 2 , 358a2, b6, 366e5), and apobainein apo tinos
(367c6) should be translated or interpreted, or of the usage of these and similar expressions
(such as ekbainein) in Plato.
4 Christopher Kirwan, "Glaucon's Challenge," Phronesis, lo (1965), 162-73, esp. 171-73.
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF G O O D S 395

formal cause is Aristotelian rather than Platonic (even though Aristotle attrib-
utes it to Plato), and since its application to the relevant views of Plato is not
at all straightforward. It is better, I think, to try to use Platonic materials.
I shall proceed as follows. First I shall examine some other views about
the classification o f goods at Rep. 357a-358a, particularly the views o f Mab-
bott and Irwin, who adopt a different approach to the problem of reconcil-
ing that passage with the subsequent argument of the Republic. Next I shall
adduce a miscellany of problems for straightforwardly identifying the bipar-
tite distinction with the m o d e r n distinction between what is good for its own
sake and what is good for its consequences. After that I shall focus on the
issues having to do with Plato's notion o f a cause, and shall try to argue as
follows. First, when Plato claims that justice is good "for its own sake," much
of his language seems at first sight explicitly causal. Second, there is no
reason to take this language as inadvertently used. Third, this causal lan-
guage corresponds to language that he uses when treating his notion of
cause or aition. T h a t notion, as we shall see, involves the idea of a "causal"
conection that is neither the idea of a logical or defnitional connection, nor
any H u m e a n or post-Humean idea o f a connection that can be established
simply on the basis o f empirical observation, but rather can be best described
vaguely, if a single phrase is required, as a kind o f non-empirical but syn-
thetic necessary connection. Fourth, the idea of this sort of connection fits
what he has to say in the Republic about the connection between justice and
happiness. We can thus say that in his view, justice causes happiness in the
soul of a person, provided we make clear that "causes" here is taken in its
Platonic sense. Fifth--and following a line of thought suggested by Grote
and Sachs--when Plato says that justice is good "for its own sake," he has in
mind the idea that justice, in some sense by itself and without other factors,
causes its possessor to be happy, in that Platonic sense of "causes." Sixth, the
terms that are usually translated "consequences" in Rep. 357a-358a are not
regular terms for causal consequence, either in Greek or in Platonic usage,
and their function here is not to indicate goodness of causal consequences by
contrast to intrinsic goodness. Instead, they indicate a different sort of Pla-
tonic causal connection contrasted with the one that justice by itself bears to
happiness, a connection that involves the joint operation of justice and other
auxiliary factors, which Plato elsewhere subsumes u n d e r the label synaition.
My conclusion will be that when interpreted not through the anachronism of
the m o d e r n distinction between being good for its own sake and being good
for its consequences, but instead by means of the relevant causal notions that
we should expect him to be using, what Plato is arguing about justice is, in
h/s terms, first, that acting by itself out o f its own capacity, it causes happi-
ness in the soul of its possessor, and is welcome on that account, and, second,
396 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2~:4 OCT 198 4

that acting in conjunction with certain other surrounding circumstances, it

produces certain other things that are also welcome.
When we consider the problem of reconciling 357a-B58a with the rest of
the Republic, other reactions are possible beside the one that I shall argue for.
One is simply to accept the idea that although Plato announces that he will
show that justice is good for its own sake, in our terms, he actually argues that
it is good for certain consequences, happiness and pleasure. 5 One can then try
to explain why he should have done this. T h e other reaction, advocated in
different versions by Mabbott and Irwin, is to say that the bipartite contrast in
357a-358a is indeed the m o d e r n one, but that there is no inconcinnity,
because when we correctly understand what Plato means by '~ustice" and by
"happiness," we can see that in arguing that if a person is just then he will be
happy, Plato is not arguing that justice is good for one of its consequences, but
is really arguing that it is good for its own sake. Mabbott's version of this view
says that Plato actually identifies the condition of a person's soul that he calls
'justice" with the condition of a person's soul that he calls "happiness," so
that in arguing that one possesses happiness if one possesses justice, one
really is arguing e0 ipso that justice is good for its own sake. 6 Irwin's strat-
5 This was done by M. B. Foster, "A Mistake of Plato's." who did not himself accept the way
a r o u n d the problem that I referred to in n.2. For discussion, See Kirwan, "Glaucon's Chal-
lenge," 164-67. It seems to me that Kirwan shows convincingly that we cannot simply cut off
357a-358a from 358b-368c, and treat the former as an aberration. T h e verbal connections
between the two are simply to O close for that. Glaucon gives the division of goods in 357a-358a.
He then immediately continues and amplifies his challenge to Socrates to show that justice is a
good "for its own sake," so that his part of the challenge occupies 357a-362c. Adeimantus then
takes up the theme, and puts the challenge in 357a-368c, making clear (362e4, 3 6 7 c - d with
357 b, 367 e with 358b) that he intends to be putting just the same challenge that Glaucon put. So
there is no reason to say that Plato intends a shift in the content of the issue being posed, either
at 358b or at 362d. Cf. n. 16.
6 See J. D. Mabbott, "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?" reprinted in a revised version in
Vlastos, ed., Plato 2: 57-65, esp. 6o. T h e original version appeared in Mind, N.S. 46 0937),
468-74. Actually, it is a little difficult to know just how to formulate Mabbott's interpretation.
Sometimes he is willing to write as t h o u g h it were all right to say that justice and happiness are
identical, and that this is why Plato can praise justice "for its own sake" by saying that the just
person is happy (62-63). At other times, however, he seems to suggest that "happiness" should
be reserved as a term referring to a consequence of justice (62), as he takes "pleasure" to do so
(64). When he does this, he holds that to show that justice is good for its own sake, Plato does
not identify a property u n d e r some other independently understood label (such as "happiness")
and show that if a person is just then he has that property, but simply exhibits t h r o u g h complex
description what justice allegedly is (i.e., a kind of harmony), and allows the reader to "see" that
it is good (61-62). Although this is a n interesting idea, it is doubtful whether it works, since
after all the "exhibiting" of what justice is is done by a description ("such-and-such a kind of
harmony," in effect) not synonymous with '~justice," and so it can be argued that justice is being
shown to be good because if one is just then one has the distinct property expressed by that
description. But even if we accepted that this idea would work, there is still good reason to deny
that Plato does in fact use it, on the straightforward ground that, as I argue in the text, he does
not in fact identifyjustice and harmony.
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF G O O D S 397
egy is different. He does not think that Plato identifies justice and happi-
ness, but holds that Plato regards justice as in a sense a definitional compo-
nent part of happiness, in such a sense that when he argues that if one is
just then one is happy, he is thereby really supporting a claim that justice is
good for itself. 7
So we have three reactions available to relate the classification of goods to
the ensuing arguments of the Republic: (1) accept the idea that there is a lack
of fit, and perhaps try to explain why it occurs, (2) try to interpret the
classification differently from the usual m o d e r n way, so as to make the
classification and the argument fit, and (3) make the classificaiton and the
argument fit by interpreting Plato's notions of justice and happiness in such
a way that, in arguing that the just person is happy, Plato will be arguing
that justice is good for its own sake, in the m o d e r n sense. As I have indi-
cated, I shall advocate a version of the second reaction, whose leading idea is
that the classification of goods is best explained with an eye to Plato's own
notions of causation and consequence. I shall simply leave the first reaction
in silence, with the thought that it is inferior to any account that ascribes to
Plato's line some reasonable degree of coherence.
Mabbott's and Irwin's versions of the third reaction have much more
plausibility, to my mind, than the first reaction does, but they seem to me
still to have serious disadvantages as accounts of Plato's meaning. The main
difficulty with both of them is that neither seems to be supported by any
statement by Plato of his own position. According to Mabbott, Plato takes
both justice and happiness in an individual, as they appear in Book 4, to be
simply a h a r m o n y of the parts of the soul with each other, and so in effect to
be identical. 8 But even if one takes Book 4 to have the place in Plato's
argument that Mabbott ascribes to it (later I shall try to make clear the
grounds for denying this), it does not seem to me that Plato's language

7 See T e r e n c e Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford 1977), esp. 188-89, 216-17, 257, with
179, 184-85, 326. It might seem that Irwin's interpretation could be immediately rejected, on
the ground to say that A is good for its own sake is obviously different from saying that it is
good for the sake of some nonidentical thing, B, even if A is part of B. In other words, it could
be thought that Irwin is guilty of confusing what C. I. Lewis called intrinsic and contributory
goodness (see his Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSaile 1946), Chs. 12, 14, 16). T h e reason
why these are different sorts of goodness is roughly that if A is good because of some B of
which it is a part, it may be that what makes A good is not its own presence in B, or not simply
that, but r a t h e r the other components of B, or the particular way that they are combined with A
in B. (A good deal depends on whether one accepts what Moore called the Doctrine of Organic
Unities, according to which the intrinsic goodness of a whole is not necessarily the sum of the
intrinsic goodnesses of its parts.) Now although I think Irwin may have failed to keep these
notions distinct, I am not sure that he did, and I do not think that the interpretation of Plato
hinges on the point. See below with n.11.
8 See Mabbott, 6 o - 6 2 , with n.6 supra.
398 . J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT i984
allows the identification that Mabbott sees in it. No one, I think, would assert
that Plato makes the identification explicitly himself. In addition, he seems
to me always to talk as though justice and happiness are characteristics
clearly distinguishable from each other. Nor do I think that in his view
justice is identified simply with the "harmony" of the parts o f the soul with
each other. For one thing, the language of "harmony" and the like is asso-
ciated far more closely with the virtue of s6phrosyn~ or moderation than
with justice (443e2, 442clo, 43Ie8, 43~a6-9). Plato does employ an abstract
notion of a soul's being harmonious or unified and without strife (e.g., at
443el), and it is possible that he would identify this state with happiness
(though we shall later, p. ooo, see reasons for questioning this view). But his
unity or freedom from strife has several different aspects (as I shall put it
for the time being), which are never treated as identical. One aspect o f the
unity is that each part "agrees" about what part should rule: this is modera-
tion (44~Clo-d3). Another aspect o f it is that each part "does its own" and
refrains from adopting the roles of the other parts: this is justice ( 4 4 3 d l - 3 ,
443blff.). It is certainly imaginable that someone might wish to say that
these characteristics are in some sense identical, though the identification
would have to be supported by a r g u m e n t and specification o f what kind of
identity was in question. But there do not seem to me to be grounds for
saying that Plato did this.
Irwin's account of the relation between justice and happiness is not sub-
ject to this difficulty, since he does not take justice to be identical with
happiness but rather to be a "component" of it, but for other reasons I do
not think that his account can be adequate. In the first place, to the extent
that the matter can be settled by a direct examination of the straightforward
sense of Plato's words, it seems to me a considerable difficulty for Irwin's
interpretation that Plato never says, either in so many words or in words
even close to them, that justice is a component of happiness. In the second
place, to the extent that Irwin is not arguing in this direct way from Plato's
actual statements, but thinks his interpretation expresses the only coherent
idea that could lie behind Plato's actual statements, it seems to me that he is
mistaken. For I think, and shall try to show, that there is another, stronger
way of explaining the line of thought behind Plato's words. 9
Let me consider the second reason first. According to Irwin, "Glaucon
wants an account of justice to show that it is good in itself apart from its
c o n s e q u e n c e s . . , and contributes to the just man's happiness." T h e inference
that Irwin immediately draws is this: "These two demands make justice a
9 I also think that there is considerablt obscurity in Irwin's use o f the notion o f a "compo-
nent" (see n. 11 inf.), but in what follows I try to go by what seems to me the general drift o f his
account.
 CLASSIFICATION OF G O O D S 399
c o m p o n e n t o f happiness; for its instrumental benefits are ruled out o f the
a r g u m e n t . It must be the s u p r e m e c o m p o n e n t o f happiness, so that a n y o n e
who is just is thereby h a p p i e r t h a n a n y o n e who is not. '''~ T h e first difficulty
here is that, as I shall try to show later, Plato's language in 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a does not
allow us to take it as a fixed point, for purposes o f interpretation, that he is
ruling "instrumental benefits" or "consequences" out o f the a r g u m e n t . T o use
these notions without a r g u m e n t , especially as a d a t u m , is unjustifiably to
presuppose that Plato is operating with causal notions that may not at all be
what he has in mind. Aside f r o m this problem, however, the chief difficulty
for Irwin's indirect a r g u m e n t is this. F r o m the claim that Plato is not praising
justice for its consequences (in o u r sense), but that he is saying that justice
"contributes" to the just man's happiness, Irwin seems to infer that Plato must
m e a n that justice is a " c o m p o n e n t " o f happiness in the following sense, that
"neither can be adequately defined without the o t h e r . " " T h a t is, he takes
" c o m p o n e n t " to m e a n here "logical or definitional c o m p o n e n t . " But now if
this is so, it seems clear that the inference is faulty. For it tacitly assumes that if
justice "contributes" to happiness, but consequences in o u r sense o f the word
are ruled out, t h e n there is no alternative but to take the connection o f justice
to happiness as definitional. But this assumption seems false, given that there
are other ideas that Plato could have had about the connection between justice
and happiness. A n d in fact what I shall try to show in the rest o f this p a p e r is

1o Irwin, 188. See also 188-89, ~16.

11 Irwin, 189. It seems fairly clear t h e r e that Irwin's notion o f a c o m p o n e n t is, as I have
s u p p o s e d , the notion o f s o m e t h i n g that is m e n t i o n e d essentially, in some sense, in the definition
o f s o m e t h i n g else. Irwin's use o f "contributing" in the passage q u o t e d f r o m 188, and his citation
o f four passages after that use (367c5-d5, 3 6 8 b 6 - 7 , 3 5 8 c 2 - 6 , 3 6 1 c 3 - d 3 ) suggests that he
thinks that the notion o f a c o m p o n e n t that he uses does a p p e a r in the text, but I cannot see that
that is the case. (Irwin o f course rightly objects, o n 255, to assuming that seemingly causal words
in the text really express causation, but as will a p p e a r below, I hold that they do not e x p r e s s
causation in o u r sense, a n d a l t h o u g h I d o hold that they express causation in Plato's sense, I d o
my best to a r g u e for the claim.)
What seems to m e a relatively severe difficulty in Irwin's use o f the notion o f a " c o m p o n e n t "
occurs in his claim that for Plato justice is the " s u p r e m e " c o m p o n e n t o f happiness, "so that
a n y o n e who is just is thereby h a p p i e r than a n y o n e who is not." It is unclear to m e both what
notion o f " c o m p o n e n t " Irwin is using, and what he m e a n s by a " s u p r e m e " c o m p o n e n t . F r o m
188-89, it looks as t h o u g h for A to be a c o m p o n e n t o f B, it is necessary and sufficient that a
r e f e r e n c e to A m u s t in some sense occur essentially in the definition o f B; but on the o t h e r
h a n d Irwin also says that neither justice nor h a p p i n e s s "can be adequately d e f i n e d without the
other" 0 8 9 ) , which would have the c o n s e q u e n c e , o n the interpretation o f " c o m p o n e n t " just
suggested, that each is a c o m p o n e n t o f the o t h e r (if this entailed that they are identical, as it
might, t h e n Irwin's view would t u r n out to be the same as Mabbott's, it appears). W h a t "su-
p r e m e " m e a n s is left less clear. It is evident that o n Irwin's view, if A is the s u p r e m e c o m p o n e n t
o f B, t h e n a n y o n e who has A m u s t have B to a g r e a t e r d e g r e e t h a n a n y o n e who does n o t have A
(188). If this could be m a d e out, it m i g h t answer the objection I have m a d e in n. 7. But b e y o n d
the bare s t a t e m e n t o f this s u p p o s e d implication, the notion o f s u p r e m a c y is left u n e x p l a i n e d , as
is any way o f allowing us to check Plato's text to see if it occurs there.
400 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT 1984
that, f r o m the best indication that Plato's own l a n g u a g e a f f o r d s us, he i n d e e d
has a view a b o u t that c o n n e c t i o n that is d i f f e r e n t f r o m b o t h o f the two alterna-
tives to which Irwin limits himself.
O n c e the difficulties in Irwin's indirect a r g u m e n t are seen, it is easy to see
the force o f the p r o b l e m s posed f o r his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by Plato's wording.
Plato does not use words like " c o m p o n e n t , " "include," o r the like, to express
a c o n n e c t i o n between justice a n d happiness. Even m o r e striking, h e n e v e r
says, o r seems to m e to c o m e close to saying, that the definition o f justice is
i n c l u d e d in the definition o f happiness, o r vice versa. N o w h e r e in the Repub-
lic, so far as I can see, is t h e r e any indication at all o f this sort o f relation
involving definitions. Rather, as I shall try to show, his l a n g u a g e s u p p o r t s a
quite d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to which the link b e t w e e n justice
and happiness is, t h o u g h a necessary one, not based o n definitions. In a
sentence, t h e r e is in Plato's view a n o t h e r kind o f necessary c o n n e c t i o n dis-
tinct f r o m b o t h causal c o n n e c t i o n s in o u r m o d e r n sense, a n d definitional
connections in Irwin's sense. I shall even suggest that this sort o f c o n n e c t i o n
yields an account o f the Republic that upholds, at least as well as Irwin's way,
o n e o f Irwin's most valuable observations a b o u t the work.
B e f o r e I leave Mabbott's a n d Irwin's accounts for the time being, I must
deal with a n o t h e r issue relevant to t h e m both, c o n c e r n i g the relation be-
tween Plato's a r g u m e n t in B o o k 4 a n d his a r g u m e n t in Books 8 - 9. Both
Mabbott a n d Irwin, with some o t h e r i n t e r p r e t e r s , hold that the a r g u m e n t s in
these two parts o f the work are separate f r o m each o t h e r in a way that they
seem to m e not to be. A l t h o u g h I am not sure how far Irwin follows Mabbott
in this r e g a r d , Mabbott's motivation for this division o f the a r g u m e n t is
clear. Mabbott thinks, as we have seen, that w h e n Plato says that justice is
g o o d o n the g r o u n d that the j u s t p e r s o n is h a p p y , he is saying that justice is
g o o d f o r its own sake, because he views justice a n d happiness as identical.
But it a p p e a r s that at least m u c h o f the a r g u m e n t in B o o k 9, which is
p r e p a r e d for by the catalogue o f d i f f e r e n t types o f city a n d personality in
B o o k 8, is m e a n t in part to s u p p o r t the thesis that the life o f the just p e r s o n
is m o r e pleasant t h a n that o f the unjust person, l~ But Mabbott holds, not
implausibly, that Plato c a n n o t have t h o u g h t that justice was identical with
pleasure. T h e r e f o r e , Mabbott c a n n o t think that the a r g u m e n t o f Books 8 - 9
is m e a n t to d e f e n d the claim that justice is g o o d for its own sake. H e con-
cludes that it must be m e a n t to show that justice is g o o d for its consequences.
In this he has recently b e e n followed by Annas. ~3 Irwin does not, I think,
evidently a g r e e with Mabbott o n this point, but he too treats Books 4 a n d 8 -

12 Cf. the warning about the formulation of Mabbott's interpretation in n.6.

13 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981), esp. 168-69.
 CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS 40~

9 as t h o u g h t h e y c o n t a i n e d s e p a r a t e a r g u m e n t s , n o t e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
e a c h o t h e r ? 4 I w o u l d h o l d , by c o n t r a s t , t h a t P l a t o i n t e n d s to b e c o n s t r u c t i n g
a s i n g l e , u n i f i e d a r g u m e n t r u n n i n g f r o m B o o k 2 t h r o u g h B o o k 9, f o r t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t j u s t i c e is (in a s e n s e still to b e e x p l a i n e d ) " g o o d f o r its o w n
sake." I w o u l d also h o l d t h a t at n o p o i n t i n t h e m i d d l e , u n t i l t h e e n d o f B o o k
9, d o e s h e e i t h e r p r o d u c e , o r e v e n c l a i m to h a v e p r o d u c e d , a c o m p l e t e
a r g u m e n t f o r t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n , t h o u g h o f c o u r s e h e f r e q u e n t l y e n u n c i a t e s it
a n d i n d i c a t e s t h a t h e b e l i v e s it. '5
T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s w h y it s e e m s to m e m i s t a k e n to d i v i d e u p t h e
a r g u m e n t o f t h e Republic a l o n g t h e l i n e s s u g g e s t e d by M a b b o t t . O n e o f t h e
s t r o n g e s t is t h a t i n B o o k l o , 6 1 ~ a - d , P l a t o r e f e r s as c l e a r l y as h e p o s s i b l y
c o u l d to t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y p a s s a g e , 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a , w h e r e h e h a d p r o m i s e d to
s h o w t h a t j u s t i c e is g o o d b o t h " f o r its o w n sake" a n d " f o r its c o n s e q u e n c e s , "
a n d i n d i c a t e s as c l e a r l y as I t h i n k h e c o u l d t h a t , h a v i n g t h u s f a r p r a i s e d
j u s t i c e f o r itself, h e is n o w a b o u t to p r a i s e it f o r its c o n s e q u e n c e s . I d o n o t
t h i n k t h a t t h e r e is a n y way o f r e a d i n g this p a s s a g e d i f f e r e n t l y , a n d t h e r e s u l t
s e e m s to m e to b e t h a t we m u s t t r e a t all o f B o o k s a - 9 as p a r t o f his a t t e m p t
to s h o w t h a t j u s t i c e is g o o d " f o r its o w n sake" ( w h a t e v e r we e v e n t u a l l y t a k e
t h a t to m e a n ) . '6 A s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r n o t d i v i d i n g u p t h e Republic i n M a b -

14 See esp. Irwin, 23off., 336-37 , Kirwan, "Giaucon's Challenge," also argues against sepa-
rating Books 4 and 8 - 9 in Mabbott's way.
15 For a general account of the argument of the Republic along these lines, see my Compan-
ion to Plato'sRepublic (Indianapolis 1979), esp. t37, 148, 222-23.
16 Annas, Plato's Republic (348-49) holds that in Book 2, Plato divides up the consequences
of justice into two types, deals with one of them in Books 8 - 9, and deals with the other in Book
ao (cf. 67-70. There seems to me no reason, however, to hold that such a division of conse-
quences is present in either Book 2 or Book lo. In spite of Annas (67), it seems to me that
367c-d indicates that Adeimantus is simply restating Glaucon's challenge, not stating a newer
and more difficult one. It seems clear from Plato's wording in 367c5- 7 with 357b5-6 that
Adeimantus is there associating himself with Glaucon's division of goods, and nothing is said in
367d4 ft. to indicate that "reputations and rewards" (doxaiand misthoi)are somehow being put in
a separate category from the other apobainonta referred to in c6. Nor is there any sign in
61abl--5 of a division of consequences. There are two reasons, I suspect, why one might be
tempted by Annas' account. One is the fear that there might be no other way of reconciling the
division of goods in 357a-358a with the argument of the rest of the work (see Annas, 65-67). I
shall try to show that that is not so.
The other reason is simple embarrassment with Plato's claims in 612ff., on behalf of the
claim that justice is good for its "rewards," etc., an embarrassment that Annas feels acutely
(348ff.). I feel it too but would voice two cautions. First, if this is what Plato said, and we have
no reason to think he was not serious (as Annas does not, 346, 348), then we had better not, as
historians of ancient philosophy, try to downplay it in our construal of his overall argument. So
we must simply take 612ff. as giving the part of the argument that 357a-358a prepares for
under the label "consequences" (given, of course, a proper understanding of that term, still to
be offered). Second, there is a way, which I can only adumbrate here, of showing a serious point
in the otherwise seemingly weak argument of 612ff. On the one hand, the rewards of justice
that come from a reputation among men for being just, it seems to me utterly obvious, cannot
402 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:4 OCT t984
b o t t ' s w a y is t h a t , i n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t B o o k 9 i n t r o d u c e s the notion of
pleasure in a w a y t h a t B o o k 4 d o e s n o t , t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n w h a t t h e t w o
b o o k s a r g u e is b y n o m e a n s as g r e a t as M a b b o t t s u g g e s t s , a n d i n f a c t it s e e m s
to me that they are taken by Plato to be arguing--though they present
different stages of the argument--for just the same conclusion, o r at t h e
least for conclusions that Plato does not intend here to differentiate from on
a n o t h e r . '7 F o r i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , P l a t o d o e s a r g u e in B o o k 9 t h a t t h e j u s t
person will h a v e m o r e happiness than the unjust person, and indeed puts
this argument side by side with arguments that the just person will h a v e
more pleasure than the unjust person, as t h o u g h there were no difference
between t h e t w o t h e s e s t h a t is r e l e v a n t t o his c u r r e n t aims. In the second
place, although Mabbott relies on saying that justice and happiness are both
identical with psychic harmony, his s e p a r a t i o n of the arguments of Books 4

have been offered by Plato in all' seriousness. He knows perfectly well, from Thrasymachus in
Book 1 and Callicles in the Gorgias, as well as his own remarks about the treatment of tyrants in
tragic poetry (576e-577b, 568a-b), that many people think that a reputation for injustice brings
great rewards. Not that this point is uncontroversial: Glaucon and Adeimantus, as well as
Protagoras in the Protagoras (323b), say that people who are unjust are much better off pretend-
ing to be just. But it cannot have failed to be obvious to Plato that the point could not be carried
by the flat assertions in 612da-d, e-614a ( missed this point in my Companion, 262). It seems to
me clear that as far as these parts of the argument are concerned, Plato is not trying to construct
a substntial argument himself, but is really leaving this issue to others (to Homer and Hesoid in
612b2, and to generally accepted likelihood or eikos in 612e2- 3 and 613b9 ), just as it was
indicated by Adeimantus that he could (367d4-edO. I take it, however, that in spite of the
conjectural nature of the myth of Er, clearly indicated in 614b2- 3, he thinks that its point must
be treated seriously, as a serious possibility (62 tb-d),just as he thinks the same about the partly,
similar myth at the end of the Gorgias. But the reason why he can take the myth seriously is a
subtle one. The rewards that a soul encounters in the afterlife are not like those given on the
basis of reputation in life, but differ from them in the important respect that they are based on
the true character of the soul. Even more important, they are also in a crucial respect chosen by
the soul for itself, in the sense that each soul chooses the kind of life that it will lead in the next
incarnation (617-21, esp. 619c ). Moreover, the reward or punishment turns out to be, not
something like money or sheer fame, but precisely to live the life that accords with the character
of one's soul, i.e., with one's own character (see my Companion, 265). So I think--although this
idea needs considerable elaboration--that Plato takes the point of the myth to be a deep one, in
spite of its conjectural nature. Hence, I would be inclined to hold that under serious examina-
tion, this part of the argument in Book lO contains something of philosophical interest. So for
this reason too I think we can in conscience treat Book lo as offering the second part of what is
indicated in 357a-358a, the argument that justice is welcome for its "consequences." In this
case, it is the continuation of the harmonious condition of soul that it produces (parallel to the
continuation of pleasure, which is said at 357b7-8 to be the only thing that results from
harmless pleasures; cf. inf., n.43 ).
J 7 By saying that he does not mean to differentiate them from one another, I mean what I
shall say briefly toward the end of this paper, that he does not attempt in the Republic to explain
the relation between happiness, fulfillment of desire, and pleasure (see 417), and so does not
attempt in Book 9 to explain the relation between saying that justice brings happiness, saying
that it allows one's desires to be fulfilled in a harmonious way, and saying that it brings pleasure.
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF GOODS 403

and 9 would seem to rely on holding that the latter book must not use the
notion of psychic harmony, for the purpose of the argument, in the same
way as the former book. But is seems to me that if we compare Book 4,
444c-445b with the conclusion of Book 9, especially 5 9 1 a - d (long after
Plato has introduced the notion of pleasure), it becomes implausible to hold
that the consideration advanced in the later book is different from the one
advanced in the earlier. In the later passage, so far as I can see, we have
exactly the same appeal to the h a r m o n y of the soul that we have in the
earlier one (see esp. 591c-d3 with 443d-e), and moreover the same allusion
to the similarity of the just condition o f the soul to the healthy condition of
the body (591b6 with 444c-e). In view of this, there seems little g r o u n d for
distinguishing as Mabbott does between the thesis argued for in Book 4 and
the thesis argued for in Book 9-
It has often been thought, even by commentators who believe that both
Book 4 and Books 8 - - 9 are arguing for the same thesis, that they are giving
two quite distinct arguments for it, and this interpretation is often d e f e n d e d
by appeal to the end of Book 4, where it is held that Plato says explicitly that
he has completed an argument for saying that justice is good. In another
place, however, I have argued that this is not the case, and that the end of
Book 4 contains neither a complete a r g u m e n t that justice is good, nor the
claim that such a complete a r g u m e n t has been given, and that the contrary
conclusion is based on a straightforward misreading of what Plato says. 's In
my view, Book 4 merely says that certain preliminaries being now out o f the
way, particularly the explanation of what justice and injustice are, and of
how they are related to just and unjust action, he can undertake in earnest to
argue that justice is better than injustice. 'y The conclusion of this argument,
I believe, is reached at the end of Book 9- For my purposes just now,
however, it is sufficient to see merely that the thesis argued for in Book 9 is
not distinguished by Plato from the thesis argued for in Book 4, not neces-
sarily that (as I have just said) the a r g u m e n t of the later book is merely a
continuation of the beginning o f the a r g u m e n t in the earlier book. Thus we
must take both the proposition that justice brings happiness and the proposi-
tion that justice brings pleasure as parts of Plato's support for the claim that
justice is good "for its own sake."
T h o u g h I shall return later to Irwin's and Mabbott's views, I wish now to
18 Shorey, I think, rightly sees lad locum, in his translation of the Republic (London 1937
and 1935) ] that Plato is not ending an argument for the goodness of justice at the end o f Book
4, but merely recording the end of one stage o f a single argument. For a detailed treatment o f
this issue, see my paper, "The Ruler's Choice," forthcoming in the Archly fftr Geschichte der
Philosophie.
19 See my Companion, as well as infra, 414 o f the present essay, where I try to explain
further how Book 9 adds to what Plato has said in Book 4.
404 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT 1984
begin setting the stage for the version o f the reaction that I believe to be
correct. T h i s version is d i f f e r e n t f r o m the ones h i t h e r t o p r o p o s e d . Earlier
ones have involved h o l d i n g that, r a t h e r t h a n distinguishing b e t w e e n things
g o o d for their own sake a n d things that are g o o d for their consequences, in
r o u g h l y the way in which we now do, Plato is actually distinguishing b e t w e e n
things that are g o o d f o r two d i f f e r e n t sorts o f consequences, i.e., causal
c o n s e q u e n c e s in o u r sense. For e x a m p l e , it has b e e n suggested by Foster that
Plato is distinguishing b e t w e e n " n a t u r a l " a n d "artificial" consequences, and
by Sachs that he is distinguishing b e t w e e n c o n s e q u e n c e s b r o u g h t a b o u t by a
thing "all by itself" a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s that it brings a b o u t along with certain
o t h e r circumstances. Sach's view seems to m e closest to the t r u t h , b u t it
requires an i m p o r t a n t qualification that I shall now explain. ~~
T h e crucial difficulty o f c o u r s e is that a l t h o u g h these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by
implication i m p u t e to Plato a n o t i o n o f causal c o n s e q u e n c e by very like the
H u m e a n ones now c u r r e n t , t h e r e is in fact n o r e a s o n to believe that he ever
o p e r a t e d with that notion, o r that he would have b e e n disposed to d e p l o y it
in the p r e s e n t connection. It is well k n o w n that w h e n he explicitly e x a m i n e d
the notion o f aitia o r aition (usually translated "cause"), particularly in the
Phaedo, the result was an e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n o t i o n significantly d i f f e r e n t f r o m
the now c u r r e n t notions o f a cause. A m o n g the d i f f e r e n c e s that might be
n o t e d , the most i m p o r t a n t f o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s is o n e rightly e m p h a s i z e d by
Vlastos, 2' that Plato does not, unlike most m o d e r n s , insist that a cause a n d
an e f f e c t (or their a p p r o p r i a t e descriptions) be logically i n d e p e n d e n t o f each
other. I shall r e t u r n to this point. Given that Plato n e v e r recognizes n o r
explicitly uses the m o d e r n n o t i o n o f cause, it seems to m e implausible to
suppose that he would h e r e say a n y t h i n g that requires a firm grasp o f it. For
him to m a k e a clear use o f the distinction b e t w e e n being g o o d for itself a n d
being g o o d f o r its consequences, and t h e n in the entire r e m a i n d e r o f his
works, even in places w h e r e attention to that n o t i o n o f c o n s e q u e n c e would
be at least as apposite as it is in Republic 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a , as in the Phaedo a n d the
Timaeus, n e v e r to have so m u c h as m e n t i o n e d it, seems to me very unlikely.
Equally improbable, I think, is the idea that he was distinguishing between
two d i f f e r e n t sorts o f c o n s e q u e n c e s in the relevant m o d e r n sense. B o t h o f
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the classifiction o f goods in the Republic p r e s u p p o s e
recognition o f a m o d e r n n o t i o n o f causal c o n s e q u e n c e that he simply does
not exhibit.

20 In my Companion to Plato's Republic (79) I followed Sach's interpretation, without seeing

the necessity of the qualification.
21 Gregory Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo," of which a corrected version, to
be cited here, appears in Vlastos, ed., Plato i (Garden City 197o), 13~-66; see esp. 134ff. The
original version appeared in the PhilosophicalReview, 78 (1969), 291-3~ 5.
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF G O O D S 405

Once this is realized, the obvious next step is to suppose that if he was
using notions here that are causal in any sense at all, they ought to be closer
to the notions that he does develop when he treats terms like aition. We shall
see that this hypothesis is confirmed by what he says. Thus we shall gain an
interpretation of the classification of goods that suits the tools that he had at
hand rather than m o d e r n ones.
Before I do that, however, I want to reinforce the thought that even
without attention to the differences between Plato's notion of causation and
ours, the formulation of the division in 357a-358a resists at least straightfor-
ward application of the modernizing interpretation in other ways as well.
First, there is a terminological point that is almost universally neglected,
but that can easily be set straight. Contrary to almost unanimous scholarly
usage, Plato does not in fact use the notion of something's being good for its
own sake, or good for the sake of its consequences, at all. The distinction that
he uses is between goods that we "welcome" (aspazesthai) or "prize" (agapan)
or "accept" (dexc~thai echein) for one thing or another. This fact takes on
various different kinds of importance in different connections. First, he is
not drawing a distinction, as Aristotle later did, between different senses o f
the word "good," nor between different concepts of goodness, but between
different types of good things. He is not saying, for example, that sometimes
when we use the word "good" we mean by it "good for its own sake," while
at other times we mean "good for its consequences." He is saying that of all
the things that are called "good," in one single sense, some are welcomed for
one thing and some for another. This of course leaves him free, later on in
the Republic, to posit a single Form of the Good, without having to worry
about a need to posit different Forms, corresponding to different senses of
the word "good." A second point of importance is that he is drawing his
distinction in terms of certain attitudes, of welcoming and prizing and the
like, that we take or ought to take toward certain things, so that the distinc-
tion becomes an overtly intensional one (though the phrase "for the sake of"
is itself already implicitly intensional). But since we are not going to enter
into either of these issues here, I simply note the terminological point for the
sake of accuracy. Now that it is noted, however, I shall feel free for conve-
nience to use the phrases "good for its own sake," "good for its conse-
quences," and the like, taking them as manners of speaking.
Next we should take up some interesting difficulties in Plato's formula-
tion of the tripartite classification. Without now pressing the question what
he means by the expressions "for its own sake" and "for its consequences,"
but with account taken of the point just made, we can say that his classifica-
tion is this: (a) goods that we welcome for their own sake, not aiming at their
consequences (357b5-6), (b) goods that we welcome for their own sake and
406 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~2:4 OCT i984
for their consequences (Cl-2), and (c) goods that we would not choose to
have for their own sake, but for the sake of their consequences (c8-d~). T h e
problems arise concerning how precise we are to take this formulation to be,
and concerning the relations of the three categories to each other. In the
first place, it is not clear whether Plato intends the classification to be ex-
haustive of types of goods. He never says that it is. On the other hand, when
Glaucon asks Socrates at 357d4 which category he places justice in, the
implication seems to be that Glaucon at least thinks that it must belong in
one of them. In the second place, it is not at all clear that the classification is
sensitive to the various possibilities of mixed cases. What would Plato say, for
example, of the possibility that a thing might be partly welcomed for its own
sake and partly unwelcome for its own sake? Would he regard such a thing
as impossible, or would he say that class (a) is meant to include things that
are o n b a l a n c e welcome for their own sake? Also puzzling is the question what
he would say about things that have mixed consequences. Would he say that
category (c) contains the things some but not all of whose consequences we
would welcome for themselves? Or does this category contain only things
whose consequences are wholly welcome, or at least none o f them unwel-
come? A similar question arises with regard to category (b). Are we to take
this category to include things that have entirely welcome consequences, or
does it include things with some welcome or at least neutral consequences?
Some of these questions have implications for Plato's views about justice.
In particular, if category (b) includes things whose consequences are all
welcome, then that would imply that in placing justice there, he is saying that
n o n e 6f its consequences is ever unwelcome. On the surface, at any rate, this
would seem to be a rather extreme position, though I think that in fact Plato
may be advocating it? 2 On the other hand, it (b) includes things that, while
being welcomed for their own sake, have consequences that are welcomed
merely on balance, then that is compatible with holding that a thing in this
92 I say, "may," but still there are some indications, which I can treat only in passing here.
For one thing, the Gorgi~ is extraordinarily uncompromising about the benefits o f justice, and
even if it is not so febrile in tone, the Republic hardly indicates any explicit reservations that one
might have about belng just (though Irwin, 326, may be right that the Rep. is more careful on
this matter than the Gorg.). But the crucial points are these. First, given the sense of "cause" that
Plato is concerned with, which I shall try to explain below, Plato's saying that justice causes
happiness and does not cause anything bad would be compatible with his denying that it is
necessary that if one is just, then one is happy. The point would simply be that any unhappiness
that a just person might suffer would not be caused by the justice. Even this, however, seems
extreme until one notices a second point. To us it seems that being just could easily cause one to
be unhappy, if, for instance (to adapt an example that Plato uses in Book 6, 489-97), being just
caused someone who disliked just people to try to give the just person a corrupting education
and so make his soul unjust. I suspect that Plato would not count this, however, as a case in
which justice itself, by itself caused the bad state of the soul, and it is not clear that he would
even have counted it a contributing cause or synaition (see infra, 420-2 l).
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF GOODS 407
category has c o n s e q u e n c e s that are u n w e l c o m e o n m a n y counts, t h o u g h not
quite as u n w e l c o m e as its o t h e r consequences are welcome. I f this were so,
t h e n in placing justice in this category, Plato would be leaving o p e n the
possibility that it does have a great m a n y very u n w e l c o m e consequences,
t h o u g h not e n o u g h to overbalance the welcomeness o f its o t h e r conse-
quences. I f Plato does i n d e e d i n t e n d his thesis a b o u t justice to be compatible
with this possibility, he has certainly not d o n e m u c h in the Republic to m a k e
the fact clear, t h o u g h o f c o u r s e it would have been rhetorically unwise for
him to d o so.
P e r h a p s some o f Plato's lack o f explicitness o f these matters is the result
o f what may seem to us a limitation o n his way o f thinking a b o u t causal
connections. T h e cases o f such connections that he discusses explicitly d o not
involve ramified a n d multifarious effects. Usually he thinks o f instances in
which o n e thing causes a n o t h e r , o r in which it is possible to think o f a linear
series o f causes a n d effects. H e does not a t t e n d to cases in which it may be
necessary to think o f s o m e t h i n g as having a whole b r a n c h i n g multiplicity o f
effects, some o f which may be quite r e m o t e f r o m , a n d have no intuitively
obvious c o n n e c t i o n with, both o t h e r effects and original cause. For e x a m p l e ,
he does not discuss the kinds o f cases that act-utilitarians have f r e q u e n t l y
had to c o p e with, so as to m e a s u r e the utilities o f all the various effects o f a
single action, m a n y o f which will be r e m o t e f r o m each o t h e r in space as well
as time. T h e s e are o f course the kinds o f cases that m a d e M o o r e say that an
attribution o f extrinsic goodness to a thing could n e v e r be certain. 2~ It is not
that Plato could not o r did not think o f such cases. It is just that they seem to
have c o m e less readily to m i n d for him, and so he could construct his
classification o f goods without giving t h e m explicit attention.
But o u r main line o f inquiry, to which I now r e t u r n , involves d i f f e r e n t
issues a b o u t Plato's t r e a t m e n t o f causation. T h e f o r e g o i n g r e m a r k s m e r e l y
serve to show that his classification o f goods is not the s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d thing
that i n t e r p r e t e r s sometimes m a k e o f it. Let us now look m o r e closely at the
chief d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n his causal notions and ours, and repercussions
they have o n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the classification.

23 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge 19o3), 22-23. To j u d g e by 357a7-8 (cf. n.16,

adfin.), Plato thought that some things might have virtually no effects. This is a difficult claim to
accept on at least many modern views, which tend to be highly sensitive to the idea that any
state or event might enter somehow into the standing conditions for some other event, and so in
that Sense be part o f its causal background. But Plato wrote u n d e r a conception that was much
more hospitable to a picture of the world as made up of a set of often i n d e p e n d e n t causal
chains that sometimes, so to speak, came into contact with each other. One can see this sort o f
view at work, for example, in Plato's views as interpreted by Glenn R. Morrow, "Necessity and
Persuasion in Plato's Tima~us," Philosophical Review, 59 (195), 147-6o, reprinted in R. E. Allen,
ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York 1965) , 421-37. Cf. inf., n.49.
408 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT 1984
The claims for which I shall now argue are the ones laid out in summary
form above (395-96). I shall discuss the causal language that Plato uses in
connection with the claim that justice is good "for its own sake," and then
argue that there is no reason to see it as a slip (4o8-1o). T h e n 1 shall link
that language with his notion of an aition or cause, as involving a kind o f
synthetic but non-empirical necessary connection, and explain how this no-
tion fits his view in the Republic about the relation of justice to happiness and
pleasure, so that we can interpret his view as holding that justice causes a
person to be happy and to have pleasure, in his own sense of "causes" ( 4 t o -
17). T h e n I shall turn to the words usually translated by "consequence" in
Rep. 357a-358a, and explain the notion that seems to me to be involved
there, a notion that also figures, although it is never clearly spelled out, in
his other discussions of causation (417-21).
First, then, we should look at his use of seemingly causal language in his
description of the relation between justice and happiness, or more generally
in his explanation of the way in which a thing can be a good "for its own
sake." In the speech of Adeimantus in 362d-367 e, which seems intended as
an amplification of the posing of the issue by Glaucon in 357a-362c, such
language is frequent in the context of a request that Socrates praise justice
"for its own sake." Adeimantus asks Socrates to say what justice itself"does"
(367e3, poiousa . . . aut~ di' haut~n, and also in 367b4). He asks what it
"wreaks" by its own power in the soul of someone who possesses it (366e5-6,
t~i hautou dynamei ti drai, t~i tou echontos psych~i enon). He asks to be shown how
justice "itself through itself (aut~ di' haut~n) profits (onin~sin) its possessor,
and how injustice harms him (blaptei)" (367d3-4). In his speech, Glaucon too
asks whether justice "profits" as much as injustice (36oc8, lystelein), as well as
what "power" justice has "of itself" in the soul (tina echei dynamin, 358b5;
compare with dynamei in Adeimantus' remarks in 366e5-6, cited just above).
And at the conclusion of his argument at the end of Book 9, in addition to
citing the pleasantness of the just person's life, Plato speaks of the way in
which justice "profits" its possessor (lysitelein, 589a6), while denying that
injustice does so (588b3, e 3 - 5, 59ta6, l o - b l ) . It is sometimes suggested that
these passages should be discounted, on the ground that they occur, not in
the original formulation of the classification of goods in 357a-358a, but in
the subsequent amplification of the issue, particularly by Adeimantus, not by
Glaucon, who is the one who sets the problem in the first place. This seems
to me a weak line to take. In the first place, we have seen that the causal
language occurs in Glaucon's remarks. In the second place, Adeimantus
explicitly alludes to Glaucon's initial formulation when he gives his own,
using the causal language that we have just seen (367c5-e5, esp. c 5 - 7, which
clearly refers back to Glaucon's remarks in 357a-358a). Third, Glaucon's
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF GOODS 409

introduction of language suggesting some kind of causality occurs immedi-

ately after his initial formulation of the division, namely, in 358b, not in
some later section of his speech, when he might be thought to have strayed
or shifted from his original idea. Given all o f these facts, we have to attribute
extraordinary carelessness and confusion to Plato, if we think that in 357 a -
358a he meant to use our notion of "good for itself," and then within a page
slipped into using the notion of something that is good because of what it
"does" in a certain sort of way. T h e r e seems to me to be no question, then,
that in interpreting 357a-358a, we cannot detach it from the whole of
357a-368b, and therefore when we ask what Plato meant by saying that a
thing is good "for itself," we cannot ignore the fact that in explaining this
himself, he is willing to offer as an explanation facts about what the thing
"does," and the like. 24
Moreover, there is additional reason within 357a-358a itself to think that
when Plato was drawing his distinction between two ways in which a thing
may be good, which is the basis of his tripartite division, he is unlikely to
have meant one side of the contrast to be the notion of something that is
good apart from anything that could be properly called a consequence. At
357c5-da, he marks off his third class of goods, which are traditionally
taken to be things that are good only "for their consequences." As we have
already seen, however, the third class actually contains, not things that are
good for their consequences but that might be neutral "in themselves," but
things that "for themselves" we would not accept, or, choose to have" (c8). 25
But these things are also explicitly described as "irksome" or "toilsome,"
epipona (c3), and the examples given are exercising, being treated by a physi-
cian when ill, and medical practice and other forms of money-making. This
seems to me a very peculiar description, if Plato's point is that such things
are welcome "for their own sake" in the modern sense. The word epipona
much more readily suggests the pain or even inconvenience associated, in
what seems like a somehow causal way, with the things in question. But if
this is what "for their own sake" (auta... heaut6n heneka) means here, there is

94 Kirwan and Irwin, 225, 325-26, offer other ways of dealing with this language, but, as I
have said, I think that they are less closely connected with what Plato is likely to have meant by
it.
25 I say, "accept, or choose to have," noncommittally, because it is uncertain how the
phrase dechesthai echein should be translated. Dechesthai usually means, "to receive," in the sense
of "to be willing to have," so that its negation might seem to mean, "not to be willing to have," in
the sense o f "to be unwilling to have." On the other hand, sometimes dechesthai seems to have a
more "active" sense, something like "want" (as in the phrase, sphodra dechesthai, at Legg. 842a), in
which case the negation might seem to carry the sense o f denying that a person was in this more
active state of wanting. Although I have not made a study o f the matter, I suspect that ou
dechesthai usually means, "to be unwilling" (so it was interpreted by whoever was responsible for
the gloss--if gloss it be---anachoim~n for apodechoim~n at 367d5).
41o JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~2:4 OCT 1984
n o r e a s o n to t h i n k t h a t w h e n Plato uses it o f t h i n g s t h a t a r e g o o d o r w e l c o m e
heaut6n heneka, in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f his classification o f g o o d s , h e m u s t be
u s i n g it to m e a n " g o o d f o r its o w n sake" in o u r sense. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e a r e o n
e x t r e m e l y w e a k g r o u n d if we h o l d , simply b e c a u s e h e uses a p h r a s e t r a d i t i o n -
ally t r a n s l a t e d by t h a t p h r a s e , t h a t t h e n o t i o n h e has in m i n d is t h e o n e t h a t
we use it to e x p r e s s . W h e n h e g o e s o n to say, as we h a v e s e e n h i m d o i n g ,
t h a t a t h i n g m a y be g o o d " f o r itself" o n g r o u n d s o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t it " d o e s , "
we h a v e n o a n t e c e d e n t r e a s o n to say t h a t t h e r e is a n y i n c o n s i s t e n c y in his
terminology.
R a t h e r t h a n trying, t h e n , to r e g a r d his use o f c a u s a l - s e e m i n g t e r m s like
" d o e s " as a slip o r fafon de parler, it is b e t t e r to p u t aside t h e a n a c h r o n i s t i c
m o t i v a t i o n f o r d o i n g so, a n d to l o o k seriously at h o w h e is likely to b e u s i n g
t h a t l a n g u a g e . T h i s step b r i n g s us to t h e c e n t r a l p a r t o f the a r g u m e n t f o r t h e
present interpretation.
First o f all, t h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n in his t e r m i n o l o g y to look to his d i s c u s s i o n
o f c a u s a t i o n , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y his n o t i o n o f a n aition, f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n o f his
l a n g u a g e h e r e in t h e Republic. F o r in two places h e e m p h a t i c a l l y a n d explicitly
links t h e w o r d " d o , " poiein, with t h e n o t i o n o f aitia o r aition. I n t h e Hippias
Major, at 296e, it is said t h a t t h e t h i n g t h a t d o e s o r m a k e s , topoioun, is t h e s a m e
t h i n g as the "cause," the aition. A n d in t h e m o r e e x t e n d e d a n d explicit discus-
sion in t h e Philebus, at 26e, he a g a i n says t h a t t h e poioun a n d t h e aition a r e t h e
same, a n d t h a t t h e poioun d i f f e r s o n l y in n a m e f r o m aitia. T h e r e a r e n o signs
o f a n y d i v e r g e n t usage, o r a n y t h i n g else t h a t w o u l d s h o w this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f
the poioun a n d t h e aition to be a b e r r a n t . M o r e o v e r , t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is p r e s e n t
in his l a n g u a g e in t h e Phaedo, in t h e p a s s a g e a b o u t aition w h i c h we a r e a b o u t to
discuss. F o r at 1 o o d 4 - 6 , Plato allows us to say, as e q u i v a l e n t to s a y i n g t h a t t h e
F o r m o f t h e B e a u t i f u l is t h e aitia o f b e a u t i f u l sensible objects' b e i n g b e a u t i f u l ,
t h a t t h e F o r m " m a k e s " (poiei) t h e m b e a u t i f u l ? 6

26 It seems to me that Vlastos, 146-47, makes too much of the contrast between a "causal"
and a "logical" use of the word "makes," a contrast that Plato shows no sign of acknowledging.
Likewise N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford 1951), 146-47; and simi-
larly Alexander Nehamas, "Predication and Forms of Opposites in the Phaedo," Review of Meta-
physics, 26 (1972-73), 461-91, at 491, n.35, between "logical" and "physical" accounts. This is
not to deny that some of his uses of "makes" are ones that we might, on modern philosophical
grounds, think are better classified as "logical" than as "causal." (Nor is it to deny that, as
Vlastos says 044, nn. 38-39), Aristotle's criticism of Plato is somewhat off the mark, or at least
uncharitable). On the other hand, I do not mean to indicate acceptance of Cornford's view
(Plato and Parmenides [London 1939]; 77f.), discussed by Vlastos, 149, n.46, that Plato's language
might conceivably be "expressly designed" to leave an unresolved ambiguity as between these
two meanings of "makes." Rather, I see no reason to think that Plato recognizes the distinction
(or indeed that he would accept it if it were put to him). See inf.
Contrary to what some interpreters appear to suggest, (a) the class of causal explanations in
the modern sense is not coextensive with the class of explanations of particular events, and (b)
 CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS 4 t t

T h e n e x t step is to look at r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s o f Plato's discussion o f aition.

It s e e m s to m e t h a t Vlastos is c o r r e c t in saying, in his discussion o f the
Phaedo, t h a t Plato t h e r e assimilates the kind o f necessity by which the n u m -
b e r t h r e e is o d d with the k i n d by which fire heats. *~ Vlastos speaks o f this as
a " r e d u c t i o n o f physical to logical necessity. ''.8 T h i s is s o m e w h a t m i s l e a d i n g
to m o d e r n ears, which m a y take the t e r m "logical" h e r e to suggest e i t h e r a
p u r e l y syntactic notion, o r m o r e b r o a d l y s o m e t h i n g including semantics in
the T a r s k i a n sense, o r the like. It is p r o b a b l y b e t t e r to say that f o r Plato,
t h e r e is no distinction such as the m o r e r e c e n t o n e b e t w e e n physical a n d
logical necessity, o r b e t w e e n physical a n d logical connections, a n d to a d d
that f o r Plato, the necessity by which fire heats is thus r e g a r d e d as b e i n g as
s t r o n g a necessity as t h e r e is, a n d established, j u s t like the necessity by which
t h r e e is o d d , by relations a m o n g the F o r m s . 29
Vlastos also takes it to be t h e r e f o r e i m p r o p e r to translate aition by
"cause," b u t I think that this is to attach too n a r r o w a sense to the English
word. T h a t w o r d is really m u c h b r o a d e r t h a n m i g h t b e s u g g e s t e d by r e c e n t
philosophical discussions, which are o n the whole strongly influenced by
H u m e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f causation.
T h e kind o f causation t h a t is r e l e v a n t to o u r discussion is illustrated by
Plato's claim in the Phaedo t h a t fire is the cause o f things' b e i n g hot, a n d that
snow is the cause o f t h e i r b e i n g cold. F o r this s e e m s to m e the closest parallel
to his claim in the Republic that justice in o n e ' s soul m a k e s o n e h a p p y o r
m a k e s o n e ' s life pleasant. I n the Phaedo, fire's c a u s i n g h e a t is " m e t a p h y s i c a l , "
as Vlastos says, in t h e sense t h a t it is to be e x p l a i n e d by the fact that two
Forms, fire a n d heat, stand in a certain relation to each other. It could also
be said to be "logical," in the sense that the a p p r e h e n s i o n o f the fact, o r at
least o f the c e r t a i n t y o f the fact, that fire heats things is a p p a r e n t l y to be
gained, n o t simply by t h e e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n o f the c o n j u n c t i o n o f occur-
rences o f fire with o c c u r r e n c e s o f heat, b u t by an o p e r a t i o n o f the m i n d that
it is in principle i n d e p e n d e n t , in s o m e sense, o f the o p e r a t i o n o f the sense

Plato does not claim to be limiting himself only to explanations of generally describable states of
affairs. As for (a): there can be a causal explanation of why wax melts when heated (e.g., a
derivation of a causal law from a more general one), not just of why this particular piece of wax
melts when it is heated. As for (b): Plato repeatedly suggests explanations of particular instances
(e.g., 1o2e3-4, 1ola6), though it would require a lengthy account to set forth the relation in
Plato's thinking between universal statements about Forms and explanations of particular states
and events.
27 Vlastos, 16o-66.
28 Ibid., 162.
29 See Vlastos, 147-48, where he seems to me not to go far enough in saying that for
Plato, "logical statements presuppose metaphysical ones." In Plato's view, there is no "logical"
necessity attaching to any statement (or the fact that it expresses) that is anything more than the
"metaphysical" necessity can attach to statements about Forms.
412 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 4 OCT t984
(although it is also o f t e n aided o r p r o m p t e d by them). 3~ But in o t h e r senses
it is a p p a r e n t l y not "logical." For o n e thing, the claim that fire heats is not
r e g a r d e d by Plato as simply a r e p o r t o f o r claim a b o u t the usage o f expres-
sions by some c o m m u n i t y o f speakers o f some language. N o r is it, certainly,
r e g a r d e d simply as a syntactic claim, to the effect that, say, "Fire does not
heat" is not a w e l l - f o r m e d sentence o f some language. But in a third sense
too it also is not simply a "logical" claim. It is not a claim that Plato holds can
only be s u p p o r t e d by, o r must be shown to follow f r o m , a logos o r definition
of some particular thing. N o r does Plato hold that if A causes B, that can only
be because o n e o f t h e m is a p a r t o f the o t h e r , in the sense o f being, as
Aristotle might say, a part o f the definition o f the other.
It is clear e n o u g h in the Phaedo that Plato does not think that all statements
o f causation, in his sense, are s u p p o r t e d only by definitions, or that if A is the
cause o f B, t h e n o n e must be i n c l u d e d in the definition o f the other. W h e n h e
says, for e x a m p l e , that fire can be the cause o f heat, he n e v e r maintains that
this is so because heat is p a r t o f the definition o f fire, or vice versa, a n d f o r
that m a t t e r h e n e v e r even claims that h e a t / s p a r t o f the definition o f fire. (In
fact, he n e v e r claims even that evenness is p a r t o f the definition o f two, o r that
oddness is part o f the definition o f three). T h e same applies to o t h e r e x a m p l e s
o f this sort o f aitia, cold a n d snow, fever a n d sickness, soul a n d life. M o r e o v e r
his l a n g u a g e clearly suggests that in these cases o f o n e thing's being the cause
o f a n o t h e r , the effect is some additional, non-identical thing beside the cause
that the cause "brings on" with it. W h e n he says that fire "brings on" heat, h e
is certainly not using a w o r d that naturally suggests that the latter is a defini-
tional part o f the f o r m e r , a n d in the initial e x p l a n a t i o n o f the relation in
l o 3 e 2 - 5, he stipulates that f o r this relation to hold, the latter must be non-
identical (allo, ouk eheino) with the f o r m e r .
T h i s is o f c o u r s e not to d e n y that in Plato's view, fire necessarily brings o n
heat with it, o r that in some sense it "entails" it (to use a t e r m that Vlastos
applies here). 3' T h e point is that for Plato here, t h e r e are necessary connec-

3~ See, e.g., my Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis 1976), 64-66, 73-74, though
there is a difficulty noted by Norman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London 1962), 34ff.
(cf. my Plato's Theory of Knowledge 85, n.47).
31 Vlastos, 159. Nehamas and Gallop take a different view of Plato's doctrine in the Phaedo.
(See David Gallop, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford 1975), esp. 198, 9o8-o9, and Nehamas 4 8 8 - 9 I. Plato
uses "fire" there to stand neither for a Form not for an "immanent" Form but for a "concrete
substance." T h o u g h I have no space to argue the issue here, my own view agrees with Vlastos.
However, my point about the nature o f Platonic causation, and the kind o f "entailment" asso-
ciated with it, stands perfectly well, mutatis mutanclis, on the other interpretation of "fire." Even
if fire is taken to be a "concrete substance" (though I think that there are problems about what
that means here), the "bringing on" o f heat by fire is still a synthetic necessary connection.
(Gallop frequently uses the term "conceptual" in his account of Plato's argument---e.g., 199-
2oo--and perhaps he thinks that the connection is an analytic one, but I do not believe that
Plato can have thought so.)
 CLASSIFICATION OF G O O D S 4~3
tions o f this sort, "entailments" if you like, that are not given only in defini-
tions, a n d that d o not hold only between a d e f i n i e n d u m and its definitions,
but which are n o less necessary for that. A n d the f u r t h e r point is that Plato
expresses these connections by means o f the expressions aition and poiein.
T h e r e is, o f course, a tradition o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Plato, suggested by a
few passages a n d also p r o m p t e d by some views o f Aristotle's, according to
which all t r u e statements a b o u t Forms, and all statements r e p r e s e n t i n g
knowledge, are s o m e h o w deducible f r o m definitions o f Forms, and can be
fully justified only when those definitions are known. It seems to me that
this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n gains only a t e n u o u s f o o t h o l d in Plato's texts, and ex-
presses an idea that he only flirted with at most and n e v e r m u c h devel-
oped. 3~ (It is o f course to be distinguished f r o m the idea that b e f o r e o n e
can know a b o u t interconnections between things, o n e must be able to iden-
tify t h e m by definitions, i.e., that definitions are a necessary condition o f
o t h e r knowledge, as o p p o s e d to the claim that they are sufficient d e d u c -
tively to establish o t h e r knowledge). At any rate, if he ever did hold out the
h o p e that a definition o f a thing would entail, a n d would be r e q u i r e d to
support, all o t h e r knowledge a b o u t it, it is certain f r o m the Phaedo that he
is not insisting on that view w h e n be makes statements about aitiai. Causes
can safely be said to be causes in the absence o f any statement o f a defini-
tion, and n e i t h e r a cause n o r an effect has to be established, in o r d e r to be
so called, to be a part o f the defintions o f the other. T h e same, it seems
clear, is true in the Republic.
So we are best o f f thinking o f the Phaedo as saying that if A is the cause o f
B, t h e r e is a kind o f non-definitional necessary c o n n e c t i o n between them. I
do not claim to be able to explain this notion at all fully, 33 but I think that it
is clear e n o u g h for o u r p u r p o s e s f r o m the examples that we have seen. N e x t
we shall see how the idea is applied in Plato's view o f justice and happiness.
W h e n Plato has A d e i m a n t u s ask what justice itself does in a person's soul,
and answers that if one is just t h e n o n e possesses happiness and pleasure, it
seems to m e that he has in mind the kind o f picture o f causality that he
e x p o u n d e d in the Phaedo, a n d is thinking that the relation between justice
and the happiness and pleasure it p r o d u c e s is the sort o f synthetic necessary
connection we have just seen. T h i s seems to me the most reasonable way o f
accounting f o r the causal-seeming language in the Republic, and the links
between that language and the t e r m i n o l o g y o f aitia in o t h e r works.
O n e virtue o f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that it is t r u e to a fact a b o u t Plato's

32 See my Plato on Knowledge and Reality, 12, 38, 1 0 2 , 114, n.61.

33 I m e a n that I can give n e i t h e r an a d e q u a t e philosophical account o f it, n o r a full account
of everything that Plato says relevant to it. For the latter we would need an extensive discussion
of various aspects o f Plato's causal language.
414 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:4 OCT ~984

a r g u m e n t in the Republic which I r w i n has stressed, namely, that Plato does

not t h e r e write as t h o u g h the c o n n e c t i o n between justice a n d h a p p i n e s s is
simply an empirically observable c o n j u n c t i o n o f two characteristics. As I r w i n
emphasizes, Plato does not h e r e indicate that we have an observable criterion
for which p e o p l e are just, a n d a n o t h e r f o r which p e o p l e are h a p p y , a n d that
w h e n we empirically investigate the o c c u r r e n c e o f these two characteristics,
we find that it just so h a p p e n s that they o c c u r t o g e t h e r in a way that licenses
us to say that the f o r m e r causes the latter. T h a t would o f course be an
oversimplification o f H u m e a n a n d p o s t - H u m e a n views o f causation, but the
p o i n t is that Plato's p r o c e d u r e in the Republic does not seem to be a n y t h i n g
like what o n e would expect if he conceived his investigation as such notions
o f causation suggest. O n the o t h e r h a n d , as I have said earlier, his p r o c e d u r e
also is not o n e o f giving a definition o f justice a n d happiness a n d t h e n g o i n g
on to d e m o n s t r a t e some sort o f logical relation between the two concepts
that m i g h t justify saying that, in a logical sense, being j u s t makes o n e
happy) 4
I f we e x a m i n e what the relation between justice a n d happiness is por-
trayed as being, then it seems to m e that we can see why Plato t h o u g h t that it
lay w h e r e the Phaedo makes us e x p e c t to see it, s o m e w h e r e between a p u r e l y
empirical c o n n e c t i o n a n d a definitionally established one. This e x a m i n a t i o n
will r e q u i r e some attention to the relation b e t w e e n what Plato says in B o o k 4
a b o u t justice, a n d what he says in B o o k 9 a b o u t the reason for the conclusion
that the just p e r s o n is h a p p y . I have already claimed that B o o k 9 presents a
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the a r g u m e n t b e g u n but not c o m p l e t e d in B o o k 4 (4o3) 9 It
will be c o n v e n i e n t here to raise the question what B o o k 9 adds to B o o k 4 in
o r d e r to reach that conclusion. I will now a r g u e that w h e n we see what it
adds, we shall be able to see m o r e clearly the synthetic, necessary c o n n e c t i o n
between justice a n d happiness that Plato thinks o f as causal in the sense o f
the Phaedo.
B o o k 4 presents justice in the soul as the condition in which each o f the

34 This is not to support all that Irwin says about the Republic, nor about the relation of the
Republic to Plato's earlier projects in ethics. But note how limited is the disagreement entailed by
my earlier rejection of Irwin's account of Plato's praise of justice. What I deny is simply that
justice's producing happiness arises, in the way that Irwin apparently holds that it does (188-
89), from the relation between their respective definitions. I would not deny that in Plato's view,
the knowledge that the just person is happier than the unjust requires investigating what justice
is and what happiness is, and I agree in particular with a point often stressed by Irwin, that in
the Republic Plato does not think he can presuppose, at the start of the argument, complete
agreement on a prior understanding of what happiness is. (Whether this marks a difference
between the Republicand the early dialogues is another question. So too is the question whether
we can equate happiness and good in the Republic, as I think Irwin seems to believe, while I do
not. I have of course not attempted to specify all of the things that Plato believes we welcome
"for their own sake" in the sense of the Republic.)
 C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF GOODS 415

parts of the soul performs its own natural function, and no part encroaches
on the natural function of any other part. He also shows how this condition,
like the other conditions that he identifies with the three other virtues, can
be seen as an aspect, so to speak, of a kind of unity of the soul and harmony
and lack of strife among its parts. In discussing Mabbott's view earlier, we
saw that Plato does not think of the h a r m o n y as identical with the perfor-
mance by each part of its function and its function alone; rather, the har-
mony is a more abstract condition that supervenes on the other condition
along with the other virtues. But neither the harmony of parts, viewed
abstractly as simply harmony of parts, nor the performance by each part o f
its function and its function alone, is all there is to happiness as it is con-
strued at the end of the a r g u m e n t in Book 9.
What is added to the discussion in Book 9, and is employed crucially in
the argument, is the fact that each of the parts o f the soul has (1) its own
desires or appetitions (the notion of desire here is very general, and includes
the appetitions o f reason as well as those of the lower parts of the soul), 35
and (2) its own pleasures consequent on the satisfaction of those desires.
Although these two things are glanced at occasionally throughout the Repub-
lic, they are not given explicit attention, and their role in the argument is not
made clear, until Books 8 - 9 and particularly the latter part of Book 9. What
Books 8 - 9 argue for is not simply a connection between the performance by
each part of its function and some generalized harmony of parts, but a
connection between the performance by each part of its function and, spe-
cifically, a certain kind of balance of desires and of pleasures resulting from their
satisfaction. Plato is not saying merely that if the parts of your soul perform
their functions, then your soul will be in a harmonious condition. He is
saying that if you are just in that sense, then your desire and pleasures will
be harmonized in such a way that (in addition perhaps to other features) the
desires of one part will not block the desires of other parts from their
natural fulfillment, and the pleasures of one part will neither be squelched
nor be allowed to grow beyond their natural levels so as to interfere with
pleasures of the other parts.
We can put the point by saying that the happiness that Plato explains is
not simply the general condition of any c o m p o u n d entity whose parts can act
either in harmony or in disharmony, but the specific condition of harmony
of an entity whose parts have both desires and pleasures. This seems to me a
not unreasonable view of happiness (which is not to say that it is correct).
Certainly it seems a more reasonable view than the idea that happiness is
35 As is well known, Plato uses the word epithymia sometimes for the desires o f only the
lowest part of the soul, and sometimes more generally for the desires of any part o f the soul,
even the reason (see, e.g., my Companion to Plato's Republic, 226).
416 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~2:4 OCT 1984
simply h a r m o n y o f parts o f w h a t e v e r sort, which seems obviously too b r o a d .
T h u s it seems to m e that B o o k 9 does a d d s o m e t h i n g to the point o f B o o k 4
that n e e d e d to be a d d e d , a n d that the a r g u m e n t o f B o o k 4 is o n philosophi-
cal g r o u n d s quite clearly i n c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t it. a6
A b r i e f w o r d s h o u l d be said by the way a b o u t the relation between desire
a n d pleasure as p r e s e n t e d in B o o k 9, a n d the relation there b e t w e e n the
happiness a n d the pleasure c o n t a i n e d in the j u s t p e r s o n ' s life. I d o not think
that Plato spelled o u t these relations in the Republic, a n d I d o u b t that he felt
that he h a d fully t h o u g h t t h e m t h r o u g h . (Rather, I think that the Philebus was
his later a t t e m p t to d o so). At o n e d i s c o n c e r t i n g p o i n t in B o o k 9, at the
b e g i n n i n g o f the second o f t h r e e a r g u m e n t s t h e r e given for the superiority o f
the just p e r s o n ' s life (58od), he s u d d e n l y a n d without e x p l a n a t i o n switches
f r o m saying that the just p e r s o n h a s the greatest happiness to say that he has
the greatest pleasure. A l t h o u g h I a m not certain I see what he h a d in m i n d
here, I suspect that it was that t h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
happiness, the satisfaction o f desire, a n d pleasure, b u t he either h a d n o t
w o r k e d o u t o r did not feel able h e r e to e x p o u n d that connection. So he left it
u n d e v e l o p e d for the time being, t h i n k i n g that his p r e s e n t a r g u m e n t c o u l d be
carried o n without it. 37
So Plato's main substantive claim a b o u t the c o n n e c t i o n o f justice a n d
happiness is this: if you are just, in the sense that each o f the parts o f y o u r
soul p e r f o r m s its own n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n a n d that function alone, 3s t h e n they
will be so a r r a n g e d that their desires a n d pleasures will be balanced o r
h a r m o n i z e d in the m a n n e r indicated. It seems to me that this c o n n e c t i o n can
plausibly be t h o u g h t o f as, in Plato's view, c o n f o r m i n g to the p a t t e r n that we
have seen laid d o w n in the Phaedo for a certain kind o f causation. O n e
i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t is the link in each p a r t b e t w e e n what it is capable n a t u r -

36 Irwin tends to see the differences between Book 4 and Books 8- 9 as raising conflicts
within Plato's own position, and as indicating some lack of continuity in his argument (226-33) .
I think that many of the points that Irwin raises are genuine difficulties for Plato, both for the
continuity of the argument and even for the consistency of the two sections of the Republic. But
since there seems to me good reason to think that Plato intended the argument to be continuous
(and consistent), my effort here is to highlight that aspect of it.
37 Here again (cf. previous note) I think that Irwin, 338-39, is uncharitable to Plato's
attempts to link the various parts of his exposition coherently together. For although there is
indeed a break in Plato's line of argument at 58oc9, as Irwin notes (338), I think that Plato did
intend a connection, the general nature of which I aim to bring out.
38 Let me emphasize the phrase, "and that function alone." Commentators frequently
write as though all that were involved were the performance by each part of its own task,
without recording the fact that the nonperformance of the tasks of other parts is equally
important. Of course, because Plato thinks that a thing cannot perform more than one function
well (a principle applied to citizens at 369e-37oc), he thinks that the optimum performance of a
thing's own function necessarily excludes its performance, to any degree, of the function of
something else.
 CLASSIFICATION OF G O O D S 417

ally of doing and what it desires to do and gains pleasure from doing. For
example, the reason is able to think, in a broad sense, and it both desires and
enjoys thinking. Its capacity to think, alone or best among all the parts of the
soul, determines its natural function. Its desire to think, on the other hand,
and the fact that it gains pleasure from thinking, determine an element of the
overall happiness and pleasure of the soul. Plato's claim is that the part that
has a certain capacity needed for an activity both desires and enjoys the
exercise of that capacity. T h e other side of the coin is that either inhibiting
or exaggerating the performance of the natural function of a part will ad-
versely affect the enjoyment that it gains, and may also adversely affect its
desire to perform its function. 39 Now what kind of connection is involved
here? As before, I do not think that Plato had fully expounded it, but it
seems clear that he thought of it neither as definitional nor as purely a
matter of empirical observation. That a certain element of the soul, for
example, generally desires and enjoys the exercise of what it has a preemi-
nent capacity for seems to me most likely to be regarded by Plato as the sort
of necessity that we saw before, the sort that links fire with heating and snow
with cooling. And it seems to me that the same is true of the connection,
within the soul as a whole, between these two conditions: the performance
by all parts of their respective functions and the balance of desires and
satisfactions discussed in Book 9.
If this is correct, then his view of the way in which being just "makes" one
happy conforms to his picture of causation as it emerges in the Phaedo. It in-
volves neither logical nor definitional necessity nor a H u m e a n or other empir-
ical notion of causation, but a synthetic non-empirical necessary connection. 4~
But this still does not give us a complete explanation of the classification
of goods, because it does not explain the other element in it, the notion of a
thing's being good for its "consequences." We must now consider that.
39 It is i m p o r t a n t that in Plato's view, e x a g g e r a t e d p e r f o r m a n c e o f natural function, w h e r e
that is possible, is just as deleterious to the condition o f a soul as is insufficient p e r f o r m a n c e .
Such cases would be, e.g., excessive indulgence o f bodily appetites, since those appetites do in
Plato's view have a natural function (see, e.g., my Companion to Plato's Republic, 2 1 9 - 2 o , 232 ). T o
my mind, it is uncertain w h e t h e r Plato thinks that the reason's function is capable o f exagger-
ated p e r f o r m a n c e . T o j u d g e by the fact that the rulers would like to philosophize even when
they must rule the city (519-~1, 5 4 o - 4 1 ) , it a p p e a r s that one part o f it is so capable, at least
u n d e r certain circumstances.
4 ~ Let m e touch briefly on a philosophical point. I would by no m e a n s rule out the idea
that some m o d e r n notions o f causation do in fact involve some notion o f a n o n - e m p i r i c a l ,
synthetic necessary connection. I f u n d e r H u m e a n influence we take causal statements to be
d e p e n d e n t s o m e h o w on universal statements o f regularities, e.g., on a d e d u c t i v e - n o m o l o g i c a l
model o f causal explanation, it seems as t h o u g h we still have to distinguish the accidental
universal regularities (e.g., "Every coin in my pocket is a dime") f r o m lawlike regularities, a n d
p e r h a p s even these f r o m explanatory lawlike regularities. Not all philosophers who are as
" H u m e a n " as this believe that these distinctions can be m a d e on purely empirical g r o u n d s , or
on g r o u n d s that are purely "linguistic."
418 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 4 OCT ~984
J u s t as t h e r e is no a n t e c e d e n t r e a s o n to think that by such phrases as
heautou heneka, Plato m u s t m e a n "(good) for its own sake" in a m o d e r n sense,
so too t h e r e is no a n t e c e d e n t r e a s o n to think that by the words usually
translated "consequences" in this passage, he must m e a n what we generally
m e a n by that word. H e r e we have a n o t h e r case, it seems to me, in which
anachronistic assumptions i n t e r f e r e with o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e first such
w o r d that h e uses, apobainonta (in ton apobainonton ephiemenoi c o n t r a s t e d with
hautou heneka at 3 5 7 b 5 - 6 ) , in fact does not in G r e e k m e a n "consequences."
T h e participle, like the finite f o r m s o f the verb, can i n d e e d be used with a
preposition like apo followed by a substantive, in a way that includes a causal
c o n n e c t i o n o f some sort (as it is used by A d e i m a n t u s at 367c6, a n d also at
such places as Protag. 327c2). But the word is not, particularly in its absolute
uses without preposition a n d substantive, a r e g u l a r G r e e k word for "conse-
quences" o r "effects" o r "results." T h e best single translation o f the v e r b
apobainein by itself is probably s o m e t h i n g like "to t u r n out. ''4~ Sometimes, like
the nominalization, eventus, o f its Latin equivalent evenire, it can be used
simply o f s o m e t h i n g that " h a p p e n s , " an "event." But f r e q u e n t l y - - b y far the
most c o m m o n use in P l a t o - - i t suggests an event which, t h o u g h not necessar-
ily a surprise, h a d to be awaited to be k n o w n o f with certainty. We see this
meaning, f o r example, in the f a m o u s tag at the e n d o f some o f the Euripi-
d e a n plays (toiond' apeb~ tode pragma). N o t to know pos apob~setai is simply not
to know "how it will t u r n out." T h e t e r m does not by itself express causal
c o n n e c t i o n as such, and without e x p l a n a t i o n does not carry the sense o f the
causal as o p p o s e d to s o m e t h i n g non-causal. 4~
But not only does the G r e e k w o r d fail to carry o f itself the m e a n i n g
"consequence," Plato n e v e r t u r n s it into a technical o r semi-technical t e r m
with that m e a n i n g , a n d in fact does not use it at all in c o n n e c t i o n with his
discussions o f causation a n d related matters. W h e n he wants a t e r m correla-
tive with aition to m e a n " c o n s e q u e n c e " or "effect," he uses such s e e m i n g
makeshifts as to douleuon aitiai (Phileb. 2 7 a 8 - 9 ) , or, if the c o n t e x t makes the
idea clear, such words as gignomenon o r poioumenon (27al, p r e p a r e d by the
e x p l a n a t i o n in 2 6 e 2 - 4 ) . T h e r e is not the slightest sign that he r e g a r d e d the
word apobainonta as availahle to him to express the n o t i o n o f consequences.
Likewise, t h e r e is no sign that he t h o u g h t o f it as describing the conse-
quences o f a thing as o p p o s e d to the thing itself.
41 Little-Scott-Jones makes much too much o f a "causal" sense of the word. T h o u g h there
certainly are uses of it for a straightforward causal connection, many uses labeled causal actually
express relations that include a causal element, but are not simply expressive of causation as
such. (See also s.v. ekbainein.)
42 A good illustration in English might be the word "emerge." The word often is used for
connections that, while including more than the mere idea of causation, include a causal ele-
ment, as when one says that a communique emerged from the negotiations.
 CLASSIFICATION OF G O O D S 419

T h e w o r d apogignomenon, a n d f o r m s o f gignesthai with apo and a substan-

tive, which also a p p e a r in 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a b e g i n n i n g at 3 5 7 a c l - 9 , c o m e closer to
being s t a n d a r d expressions for "consequences," but they too fail to carry the
sense in a definite e n o u g h way to give the usual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the passage
any a n t e c e d e n t likelihood. A l t h o u g h gignesthai apo X can certainly be used to
m e a n "result f r o m X" o r the like, it can also be used in a m u c h v a g u e r way,
without any specifically causal suggestion, to m e a n s o m e t h i n g like " c o m e
f r o m X." But again, just as G r e e k usage by itself fails to bestow any clearly
causal sense o n the expression, so too Plato n e v e r uses it in his explicit
discussions o f causation, n o r gives apogignomena the specific m e a n i n g o f a
"consequence," n o r avails himself o f it when, as in the Phaedo or the Timaeus
or the Philebus, he had a use for such a piece o f terminology. M o r e o v e r the
preposition that h e a p p r o p r i a t e s for an explicitly causal connection, as at
Phaedo 99a8, 9 6 a 9 - 1 o , e 2 - 4 , is not apo but r a t h e r dia (e.g., Phaedo 9 6 a 9 - 1 o ,
e 2 - 4 , 99a8, Phileb. a6e3), t h o u g h sometimes we also see ek (Phileb. 27a11). 43
T h e point is not that these expressions c a n n o t carry the sense o f causal
consequence, o r o t h e r meanings including some causal aspect. It is r a t h e r
that they n e i t h e r s t a n d a r d l y d o so in Greek, n o r are t u r n e d by Plato into
terms that he could b r i n g f o r w a r d without special explanation, in a passage
like 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a , to indicate the contrast between the causal consequences o f a
thing a n d s o m e t h i n g else. I f he had wished to express this contrast, he
would have to have p r o v i d e d explanation, in terms o f the o t h e r expressions
in his vocabulary that d o m o r e plainly carry the requisite meanings.
We are t h e r e f o r e now f r e e f r o m the idea that the s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d sense
o f the G r e e k expressions in 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a must by itself incline us to see t h e r e
the m o d e r n distinction between what is g o o d for its own sake and what is
good for its consequences, a n d we have seen that what Plato labels g o o d " f o r
its own sake" can he so o n g r o u n d s o f what it does o r causes, not in a m o r e
m o d e r n sense o r in a logical o r definitional sense, but in the sense given by
Plato's own account o f aitia. But t h e n what is the o t h e r e l e m e n t o f the con-
trast? W h a t are apobainonta a n d apogignomena ?

43 T h e relation in 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a between the use o f d/a and the use o f apo is interesting a n d
somewhat confusing. I am not sure to what extent Plato t h o u g h t it t h r o u g h . In most cases h e r e
(e.g., 357c3, 358al, 2, 6), it seems to m e a n "because of" not in a causal sense, but in the sense o f
"for the reason of," t h o u g h o f course we can hardly be confident that Plato recognized the
relevant philosophical distinction b e t w e e n reasons and causes. (Some would say that the Phaedo
at least partially r e p u d i a t e s it, in a d o p t i n g a certain sort o f "teleological" notion o f cause, at least
before ~oob; Gallop, ad loc., seems to m e clearly right in h o l d i n g that Plato does not t h e r e insist
that all causes must be "teleological.") Its m e a n i n g at 358a 5 is unclear, as is its relation to heneka,
ib/d. (I would not be surprised if dia doxan were a gloss, t h o u g h otherwise it must modify
eudokimeseOn (heneka) r a t h e r than being parallel to it, since in the latter case it would s e e m
r e d u n d a n t . ) At 367d3 it is p r e s u m a b l y causal. I think that it is also causal at 357b8; cf. n.16, ad
fin.
420 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2~: 4 OCT 198 4
I d o n o t think that the answer to this question can be completely certain,
for the simple r e a s o n that, as we have seen, Plato does not m a k e these terms
p a r t o f his technical or semitechnical vocabulary, or use t h e m in contexts
e m p l o y i n g such vocabulary in a way that would enable us to i n t e r p r e t t h e m
precisely. W e are t h e r e f o r e obliged to p r o c e e d indirectly, by l o o k i n g for
some notion that he e m p l o y s in a way that seems, even t h o u g h he does not
say so explicitly, to fit his use o f these notions in Rep. 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 a a n d the
o t h e r relevant parts o f the work. I o f f e r the following as the most likely
e x p l a n a t i o n that I have been able to discover.
As ! indicated earlier (395), it seems to me that the best account, which
takes o f f f r o m a suggestion by Sachs, is that Plato is distinguishing between
what justice causes, in the Platonic sense, all by itself, a n d certain o t h e r
things that e m e r g e (to use this t e r m first in a very v a g u e way) f r o m it in
c o n j u n c t i o n with o t h e r factors. 44 By its o w n capacity (dynamis, 366e5; cf.
588b8), justice causes h a p p i n e s s a n d pleasure in the soul. But w h e n it occurs
in c o n j u n c t i o n with certain o t h e r factors, such as the r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e i n g
just, t h e r e e m e r g e such additional things as wealth, public h o n o r s , a n d so
forth. T h e point o f the contrast is that the h a p p i n e s s is p r o d u c e d without
the collaboration o f the s u r r o u n d i n g circumstances as factors, whereas
wealth a n d public h o n o r s o c c u r only if o t h e r factors are at work too. It
seems to me that this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n fits both 3 5 7 a - 3 5 8 c a n d the rest o f the
Republic (see esp. 5 7 6 e - 5 7 7 b with 612b, 6 1 2 e - 6 1 4 a ), which give us j u s t such
a contrast.
I f we think a b o u t the contrast in this way, we can see J~hat it fits with
a n o t h e r part o f Plato's exposition o f causation, namely, his notion o f a "con-
tributing cause" o r synaition, as it is called at Timaeus 46d i (cf. symmetaitia, e6),
which is also described at Phaedo 9 9 b 3 - 4 , by contrast to an aition, as "that
without which the aition w o u l d not ever be an aition." A l t h o u g h he n e v e r
spells o u t this idea, he seems to t h i n k that w h e n a cause acts to p r o d u c e a
result, at least sometimes t h e r e are o t h e r factors p r e s e n t that for some rea-
son do not deserve to be singled o u t as aitia, but at the same time play a
necessary role in the o p e r a t i o n o f the cause. 45 I n the Phaedo, Socrates' b o n e s

44 See Sachs, 38-42. On my use of "emerge" see supra, n.42.

45 1 do not think that it is at all clear whether he thinks that there must always be synaitia
present for an aition to work. Phaedo. 99b and Tim. 46dsqq. seem to me noncommittal on the
issue. One might ask, for example, whether he would hold that the soul is the synaition of
.justice's producing happiness in it. I do not think that he developed his causal notions far
enough to answer such questions. There is, however, considerable food for thought on these
matters in the scholarly discussions of the problem of disorderly motion in the Timaeus; see esp.
Morrow, "Necessity and Persuasion," the papers by Vlastos printed with it in Allen, ed., Studies,
and Harold Cherniss, "The Sources of Evil According to Plato," Vlastos, ed., Plato i, 244-58,
originally in Proceedings of the American PhilosophicalSociety, 98 (1954), 23-3o.
 CLASSIFICATION OF G O O D S 421

and sinews, and perhaps also their condition, have this status (99a-b). Al-
though many things about the cooperation of aitia and synaitia remain ob-
scure (one of them being whether the combination of the appropriate aition
and synaitia in all cases necessitates some unique result), the picture of such
collaborative causation seems to fit well with the description that Plato gives
us the way in which justice along with certain circumstances produces such
goods as honors and wealth. There too justice is singled out, but it is clear
that the circumstances are essential for the effect to occur.
The notion of joint or collaborative causation receives no serious discus-
sion by Plato, and so it is not surprising that the notion used here in the
Republic should be handled cursorily. T h e cases that do arise treated entirely
in passing and without explanation, as at Rep. 443 e, where the word synaper-
gazesthai is used to indicate the way in which external actions of a person,
together with the wisdom that oversees them can cooperate to produce har-
mony in the soul. Similarly cursory uses of the term synaitios appear at Gorg.
519 b and Polit. 281c, 287b. As the Phaedo shows us, Plato was much more
interested in the idea of picking out a single factor as the cause of an effect
than in trying to analyze the workings of more complicated causal relations.
Thus he concentrates on cases which he can treat, with some degree of
plausibility, as involving a one-to-one correlation of a certain type of cause
and a certain type of effect. 46 T h e Republic offers one such case, the way in
which justice by itself produces happiness in the soul, but deals with the
more complicated workings of justice only as a side issue.
I think that the foregoing provides a coherent account of the classifica-
tion of goods, avoiding anachronism and u n d u e modernizing assumptions,
while still revealing in Plato's text a distinction that remains philosophically
interesting, even if it is not the one with which we generally operate. Further
examination of it, of course, would require a more thorough investigation of
Plato's causal notions than I have undertaken here, and on that much re-
mains to be done. I hope that whatever mistakes I have made in applying
the idea, I have at least shown that this aspect of Plato's treatment of goods
cannot be adequately understood without an examination of the causal no-
tions that figure in them.

The University of Michigan

4 6 Cf. supra, n.2 3.