University of St.

Andrews
Scots Philosophical Association

Pleasure and Goodness in Plato's Philebus

Author(s): Neil Cooper
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 18, No. 70 (Jan., 1968), pp. 12-15
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218024
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12

PLEASURE AND GOODNESS IN PLATO'S PHILEBUS

BY NEIL COOPER

It was Plato's main aim in the Philebus to show that the words ' ple
and ' good' are not two names for one and the same thing and that 9p
has a higher rank among Goods than pleasure has. As his logical and o
logical armoury (ErTpa pCXE Phil. 23b 8), he makes use of the Pythag
concepts of the Limit and the Unlimited. I shall try in this paper t
construct this armoury and the argument for which he employs it, to
some light on the moral philosophy of the Philebus by exhibiting its gene
neglected connection with the Politicus, and to uncover the ethical mo
which led Plato to reconstrue the meaning of the word 'good' in a p
sophically provocative manner.
First, Plato's terminology requires some comment. Plato's wa
saying that something is a matter of degree is to say that " it admit
More and Less" (8XETra TO ,a7Xov Kii f-rrov). Plato believes that he
talking about things rather than words and his classification in the Ph
is quite explicitly of TrrvT-a -r vwv ovra (23c 3). However, the validi
Plato's argument is in no way affected by the ontological commitmen
his theory. If we employ " semantic ascent ", as indeed Plato someti
does himself, and paraphrase talk about things in terms of talk about wor
the validity of the argument remains unaffected by translation to a h
semantic level.
Secondly, in order to discuss Plato's work we must make a classificatio
for ourselves. The Greeks were very interested in pairs of opposites, bu
in modern times their pioneer work has been largely neglected. Pairs o
opposites may be divided into three classes. There are pairs of opposites
which are mutually exclusive and do not admit of any comparison, for
example, 'odd' and 'even' as applied to numbers. We can call these
" either/or " terms. The second class is of pairs of opposites both of whic
admit of comparison, 'hot' and 'cold', for example. We use these pair
of opposites to divide up scales, scales being ordered by a transitive asym
metrical relation of the form ' being R-er than '. Therefore, as Plato noticed
(Politicus 283d 10,) these scale-words are implicitly comparative. It
thus no accident that Plato talks indifferently of the Greater and Smalle
or (as in Politicus 283c 8) of the Great and Small, referring by means o
these words to the whole scale, namely, Size.
The third class of pairs of opposites I shall call the class of " asymmetrical
pairs ", for example, ' straight' and ' crooked ', 'perfect' and ' imperfec
' right' and 'wrong'. It is usually the case that one member of the pair
admits of comparison while the other does not; the first member in each

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 PLEASURE AND GOODNESS IN PLATO'S PHILEBUS 13

case represents a limit, it is what Sapir (Philosophy of Sci

ing ") once called a " polar " word. Nothing can be less cr
is perfectly straight nor less wrong than what is perfec
speaking the first member cannot admit of comparison, but
member often does, a sense can be given to the compar
first member by interpreting it as the converse of the
of the second. Hence a sense can be given to such expressions
' more perfect ' and so on.
Let us now examine Plato's classification. He divides all
into (1) -rO wTpas, the limit, (2) -rTO arEpov, the unlimited,
the two (23c-d), and (4) the cause of the mixture. When w
ature or, as Plato would have said, the Hot and Cold, we
the whole scale and not some definite point on it, and t
belongs to class (2), the Unlimited. On the other hand, a
40?F. is a definite point on a scale and so belongs to class
definiteness here is the number 40, which is not a point on a
fore belongs to class (1). But the temperature 98.4?F. is no
temperature, it is the right or normal temperature for t
is a mixture or combination of a special kind. Things like
harmony are brought into being not just by any combina
OrrwEpov, but by "the right combination" (25e 7, &pa on
-r TOUTcOV 6pOi' KotVCovia -rTv iytIiaS pUaiv Ey?VVr'acv ;)
pression Plato is making it quite clear that there are rig
and wrong combinations, although oddly enough this dist
by most of the commentators. But if we have a look at th
language used in this part of the dialogue, we can confirm th
Thus in 26a7 a right combination is said to take away -rO
Kal TcmEIpov where rTO wroAX Aifav, " the much too much "
class of -rT arrepov. Again, earlier (24c 6 ff.) Plato appear
way to make a distinction (pointed out by R. G. Bury
Plato (1897), p. 40n), between -rTO wrC6v and TrO pTrpov, b
quantity and the right definite quantity or due measure.
has just said "They must be very much so, Socrates " (K
IoKpacrrs); Socrates pounces on this innocent word "
"That's a good answer and reminds me that this express
that you have just uttered, and 'slightly', too, have the
' more ' and 'less '. When they are present in a thing the
to be of a definite quantity, but always introduce into e
the character of being 'very much' so-and-so as compare
ately' so-and-so, or the other way round. They bring ab
the less and obliterate definite quantity. For, as we were
if they didn't obliterate definite quantity, but permitted it a
(acur6 rE Kal T-O pTplov) to find a place where 'more an
much and slightly' reside, these latter would find them
of their own quarters ". (The above is substantially Hackf

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 14 NEIL COOPER

(Plato's Examination of Ple

One may infer from this,
only have a definite quant
quantity; not only is each a
tically, not only are 'hea
are favourably evaluative p
which produces the right d
cause of the combination o
is the right one it is the f
Now on the face of it o
mitted the More and Less and thus were in the class of the Unlimited. On
a purely grammatical criterion this would seem to be the case, since w
talk of 'better' and 'worse'. Were Plato to admit this, he would be un-
able to show that 'good' and 'pleasant' belonged to different ontological
and logical pigeon-holes. Plato has, however, strong reasons for refusing to
place 'good' in the class of the Unlimited. Here we can get help from the
Politicus. In this dialogue Plato reverts (283c-287b) to the topic of due
measure (T6 p-Trpov). One must not only measure things against one an-
other, but whether one is dealing with words or with real things, one must
measure them against " the nature of due measure " (TrV T-ro pETrpiov pUCv),
against a standard, and see whether they fall short of it or exceed it, and
it is in this that bad men and good men differ from one another (ev c6 Ka
SltappouoVal P&uAora ipoov oi -r KaCKo Kcl oi &yaOoi). The problem which
lies behind these brief remarks of Plato's can, I think, be reconstructed in
the following way. If 'good' and 'bad' were scale-words like other scale-
words, 'long' and 'short' for example, then the difference between the
good and the bad would appear to be arbitrary. What is called "long " is
called "long " relative to what is short (283d 11). We talk of long worms
as opposed to short worms, and we mean by 'a long worm' a worm which
is longer than the average worm or longer than the majority of worms. But
if we adopted similar criteria for the meaning of the expression ' good man ',
the consequences would be disastrous for a monistic view of morality. For
if when we refer to a man as a " good man " we mean a man who is inclined
to conduct himself better than the average or better than the majority, we
make our moral standards dependent on the contingent characters of men,
we accommodate our standards to the mediocrity or even the rascality of
the average or the majority. If we only compared things with one another
in respect of greater or less, if all comparison were purely relative, then
this would be the end of all knowledge and morality, it would destroy both
the ordinary -rTXvat and TrOAITIK. To use Plato's own words (in Taylor's
translation (London, 1961) with slight modifications): "Now this theory
will make an end of the arts and all their productions; in particular it will
do away with statesmanship (woAITIK6)--the subject of our present en-
quiries-and with the weaving we have used as an illustration. In all such
occupations excess of due measure and defect from it are treated not as

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 PLEASURE AND GOODNESS IN PLATO'S PHILEBUS 15

non-existent but as real difficulties to be avoided; in fact, it i

them and observing due measure that these arts produce all g
things ". The existence of a standard, a pco-ov or prTpiov ag
things can be measured or assessed as good or bad is thus tak
to be a necessary condition of the possibility of any knowledg
non-moral. What is good is what conforms to the standard,
is what deviates from it either in the direction of excess or in the direction
of defect. What is good, then, is a mean between extremes, and 'good'
and 'bad' are to be interpreted as an asymmetrical pair like 'right' and
'wrong'. The path of righteousness is too straight and narrow to admit
of degrees. If morality and knowledge are to be possible, we have, according
to Plato, to fly in the teeth of the surface grammar of the word 'good'
and reconstrue it as a polar word.
If this interpretation of Plato's Philebus and Politicus is accepted, then
the main lines of his argument in the Philebus become clear. The character-
istic of being good belongs to the class of the Limit, like the numbers 40
and 98.4 in the earlier example. Particular things such as the human body
are mixtures of the Limit and the Unlimited, they are at definite points on
a scale; particular good things such as the human body in a state of health
are the right mixtures of the Limit and the Unlimited, they are at the right
points on a scale. If we now consider Pleasure in general, we can see that
it fails to satisfy the necessary condition of being a good thing, namely
having some of the Limit mixed in it. For since Pleasure in general is a
whole scale, it cannot be a definite point or at a definite point on the scale,
and a fortiori it cannot be the right point or at the right point on the scale,
and so Pleasure as such cannot be a good thing. It is because Plato is using
an a fortiori kind of argument that he does not need to emphasize the dis-
tinction between a definite quantity (Tr6 roaotv) and due meaure or the right
definite quantity (T6 P-rplov). For in the Philebus, unlike the Politicus, the
distinction between the two is not essential to the argument. It is sufficient
for him to show that a good thing must have an element of the Limit in it,
must be at a definite point on a scale, a condition which is never satisfied
by Pleasure in general. Pleasure and Goodness are thus necessarily distinct,
but this does not exclude the possibility of good pleasures. There are, of
course, definite points on the pleasure-scale and there is such a thing as
the proper amount of pleasure. The pleasures (63e5) which accompany
virtue, health and temperance, these pleasures Plato is ready to include
in the mixture which constitutes the Good Life. The quasi-Benthamite
Calculus of Pleasures expounded in the Protagoras (356a1-357b4) and ex-
plicitly rejected in the Phaedo (69a-b) merely involves the measurement of
pleasures against one another instead of against a standard, and is therefore
incapable of determining the right amount of pleasure. This can only be
done by pp6vrcnas.

University of Dundee.

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