KINGDON FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION

PROBLEM STREAM
The increased attention to an issue or a major event can release the problem stream. The
identification of such an issue or event is the first step to the Kingdon’s three stream model. A
lot of problems prevailed in the post-independence/ pre green revolution India, they channelled
this problem stream into indicating a need for a reform in the agriculture sector or maybe trying
to inhibit it. It all starts with the lack of an aggressive mode of agriculture which resulted in a lot
of food shortage in the country. This led to India importing a lot of products from the rest of the
world, like wheat from the USA. As their agreements for trade of food grains collapsed, it gave a
spotlight to all that is wrong with agriculture in India.

1) In India, the agriculture production is under the administration of the state government,
but the accountability of it is under the Central government’s agriculture ministry. So if there
is success, it’s lauded to the State but in case of a failure, the Agriculture minister is under
scrutiny.

2) Unlike other industries, pricing and technology was not considered important to boost
the agricultural production. The revolution being capital intensive, for installing irrigation,
pesticides, fertilizers and the high yield variety of crops, which was not possible unless the
investors say a positive returns to their capital which would mean to allot a remunerative
price, whereas India didn’t want to allot a lot of money to this.

3) Not only the technological growth, there was a lack of central bodies that would work
towards agricultural development. For example, there was no body to regulate the prices of
crops in India. This led to a large non-uniformity in the prices. There was also a lack of a
body that specialized in the research for agricultural research which would seem necessary
for new and more efficient work ways.

4) There were a lot of problems with the implementation of the Green revolution movement
which was brought out by all the opposing parties or the ministers trying to play the devil’s
advocate. Some of them being, the lack of capital investment, the resultant increase in
inequality between the rich and the poor farmers, overuse of fertilizers, etc. One major issue
which came out was the sceptical thought of Indian farmers not wanting to move away from
their traditional means of cultivation and wanting to continue to do things in an inefficient
manner, not wanting to move to newer means which could lead to higher productivity.

SOLUTION STREAM

1) Compulsory purchase from the market at Fixed Prices

This proposal would not necessarily be financially viable, given that the government would be
procuring the produce at fixed prices. If the price set were too high, it would have severe
implications for the budget and fiscal deficit. Hence, it would not be viable from this perspective,
although it might have been feasible to apply. Although the issue arises in the other three
factors, this policy would not be well taken by the public, since they would be forced to comply
with the fixed price set. Moreover, the plan would not make sense since it would depress prices
and hence lead to the discouragement of enhancing productivity and total production. Therefore
this solution would not be optimal. Lastly, it also received opposition and resistance on the
political front.

2) Land reforms

This policy proposal had severe resistance on all front except the financial standpoint. It was
arduous to apply and to a great extent, infeasible to implement. The public acceptability of the
policy is highly debatable, and lastly, it also did not bode well with all concerned political bodies
for a plethora of reasons. Hence it resulted in nothing more than the abolition of ‘Zamindari’ and
‘absentee landholding’.

3) Efficient pricing and improved technology

Both of the above-mentioned points are interconnected. In order to deploy improved technology,
the farmers would need to become relatively more profitable. For enabling enhanced
profitability, the prices would have to experience an upward revision. This would lead to
inflation, without much increase in output in the short run. Additionally, it would now cause a
bigger dent in the government budget. Hence, at the time, it seemed infeasible on all fronts.

4) High Yielding Variety of Seeds and fertiliser utilisation

This was by far, one of the best policies proposed and to a great extent, utilised in the field of
food and agriculture. It was the driving factor of the Green revolution. Initially, due to varied
opinions, it faced several challenges on various fronts. There was immense resistance put
forward by farmers that did not believe or were sceptical about this practice. Many were also of
the opinion that it would compromise the soil quality. Due to this reason, along with other
politics, it also faced harsh criticism on the political front. Although, it was the policy option that
was the most viable from a technical and financial standpoint and it enabled a substantial
expansion of agricultural output, which would through a chain of processes stabilises prices and
drive growth by allowing a freer fiscal position. Hence it was the most efficient option available.

POLITICAL STREAM

The political environment in the country, preceding the policies that realized the Indian
Green Revolution was spearheaded by the key management of C Subramaniam- the food
and agriculture minister who instigated the policy change. The shift in the political wind
was caused by the change of leadership from Nehru to Lal Bahadur Shastri. The ideologies
held by the government of Shastri were influenced by his grasp of the prominence of
agriculture, preconditioned affiliation for the rural masses and the overstated Congress
party's continuing operative veracities. Shastri displayed his hand at politics ‘at its best’ as
he made decisions that paved way for the transformed methodology for growth and
development stratagems along with and brought about substantial policymaking that
triggered agronomic changes; all while maintaining a minimal projection of them.

Observing his former triumphs in various domains of work down south in Tamil Nadu, Lal
Bahadur Shastri reached out to C Subramaniam to ascend to the position of Central minister
for food and agriculture. The decision turned out to be prolific as, despite the suspicions of
it being an inimical decision to bring catastrophe to his record and image, he acceded to
his role impeccably signing on various substantial reforms in the agricultural sector in India
that led to its build-up. The restructuring of the Agricultural Ministry, appointing
Sivaraman to the rank of Agricultural Secretary while eliminating the previously existing
position; all indicated that C Subramaniam was evidently onto a policy revamping track,
further supported by his pronouncement to industrialize agriculture and import a high
variety of seeds.

Amidst scientist’s researches pointing out that the major interest groups of traditional
methods and equipment using farmers, C Subramanian chaired a panel of dignitaries and
experts that comprised of agronomic administration, scientists in the field, and economists,
who projected the apprehension of these generational farmers in adopting the advanced and
novel methodologies in cultivation and farming. They were also troubled by the dilemma
of if the agriculturalists would be able to imitate the yields engendered in an exceedingly
controlled environment. Additional qualms were raised by sociologists who were
concerned with the possible discrimination that would be delivered against minor farmers,
thereby aiding in the already mountain tall heap of inequalities they faced major majorly
due to incomplete land reforms.

Amongst all of this, the political environment was stirred by the oppositional party in the
parliament party disparaging C Subramaniam for his irrational neoteric methodology that
by their claims, would cause a rise in the country’s reliance on the United states for input
relief and explicitly accused C Subramaniam of deliberately acting in favor of the United
States. However, Shastri gave assurance to compensate for any farmer incurred losses,
which aided in garnering their support by resolving any concerns. Furthermore, the change
in the political scene as Indira Gandhi took over, C Subramaniam was included in her
'kitchen cabinet’ as she provided additional energy to policy transformation with her reform
supportive ideologies.
THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

DURATION WHEN THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WAS CLOSED

The inconsistencies which kept the window of opportunity shut basically widened when C.
Subramanian, the impetus of the policy change, had lost the 1967 general elections. Even when
he was the minister of Food and Agriculture, one of the biggest constraints of policy
implementation is the virtual distance between the state governments and the central
government as Agriculture was a state subject and the central government is crucially
dependent upon the state.

India was then an under developed economy which was highly reliant on Agriculture. Therefore,
each policy change had to be scrutinized carefully through various lenses, especially through
the financial viability lens. However, the policy changes were thought to be brought through
various aspects such as ‘compulsory purchase at fixed prices’, ‘Efficient pricing and technology’
were projected to have significant impact on the government's budget and cause serious
implications on fiscal deficit. The aspect of land reforms brought in through the Developmental
Economics angle never had any financial implication but was highly infeasible.

Other than the policy standpoints, the other stumbling block was from the political purview. The
very own financial ministry was critical about the financial viability of the policy augmentation.
Furthermore, even the idea of ICAR (Indian Council of Agriculture Research) ran into opposition
from members of parliament. Nevertheless, the intrinsic view of holding of the Agriculture
Ministry as Waterloo for many ministers put C. Subramanian himself In a hesitant spot.

THE OPENING OF THE WINDOW AND THE IMPLEMENTATION

The success of the Green Revolution can be attributed to the timely execution of the policy. The
policy entrepreneurs made sure that the implementation took place at the time when all the
three streams, viz. the problem, the solution, and the political aligned appropriately to open the
window of opportunity. The reading talks about the experiences of three key policy
entrepreneurs vis a vis the Green Revolution. They are:

i) C. Subramaniam (political): The food and agriculture minister who initiated the scheme

ii) B. Sivaraman (bureaucratic): The agricultural secretary

iii) John Lewis (foreign support along with the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation): Head of the
USAID India mission
These entrepreneurs, along with the other key players, with their rich imagination, persistence
and connections linked the three streams of the Kingdon framework to pull India out of the crisis
of food shortage by the timely action. Thus one can rightly say that the Green Revolution was
one of the best policy implementations undertaken by India. Now, tet us look at the reasons for
the same.

Firstly, there was a clarity of narration regarding the policy which was effectively communicated
with the relevant stakeholders. From the beginning, C. Subramaniam was clear about
increasing the procurement prices of the agricultural good so that the farmers are more
incentivised. This will also lead to the transformation of the industry in such a way that the
farmers will be encouraged to produce more to earn profits as well as make the nation self-
sufficient.