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Culture and Character Education: Problems of Interpretation in a Multicultural

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ARTICLES

Culture and Character Education: Problems of

Interpretation in a Multicultural Society

John Chambers Christopher

Montana State University

Tamara Nelson
Bozeman, Montana

Mark D. Nelson
Montana State University

Abstract
In response to a growing perception that America’s youth
lack the necessary values to grow and develop into adult-
hood in a socially healthy manner, character education
has emerged as a rapidly growing proactive approach that
serves to develop good character among young people.
The authors examine several of the virtues thought to
underlie good character from Character Counts!, a popu-
lar character education program, and emphasize the cul-
tural complexities involved when promoting character
education in a pluralistic society.

CULTURE AND CHARACTER EDUCATION: PROBLEMS OF

INTERPRETATION IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY
Character education is a rapidly-growing and heatedly debated
movement in the fields of education, religion, and even politics.
According to Lickona (1993), the 1990’s heralded in the beginning of a
new character education movement that “restores ‘good character’ to
its historical place as the central desirable outcome of the school’s
moral enterprise” (p. 7). This outburst of interest and activity seems to
be in part a response to the common perception that there is a crisis
among the youth of the United States as exemplified by violence in the
schools and on the streets, increasing disrespect for others, teen sui-
cides, widespread drug use, teen pregnancies, and a steadily growing
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82 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

materialism and sense of entitlement. Sandel (1996) claims that the

“anxiety of the age” is the “fear that, individually and collectively, we
are losing control of the forces that govern our lives” and sense that,
“from family to neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of commu-
nity is unraveling around us” (p. 3). These apprehensions, combined
with the powerful influence of the media, have contributed to a grow-
ing demand for the public schools to address the situation (Ryan &
Lickona, 1987; Lanke, Wood & Gettleman, 1991; Lickona, 1993).
Character educators believe that by teaching the virtues thought to
underlie good character they can take a proactive and preventive
stance towards the problems of youth.
The most successful and influential of the character education pro-
grams, Character Counts!, was founded by the Joseph and Edna
Josephson Institute of Ethics, following the Aspen Declaration on
Character Education in 1992. The Declaration was a consensus estab-
lished by a group of educators, youth leaders, and ethicists that charac-
ter is based on “Six Pillars” or virtues or pillars: trustworthiness,
respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship. Adopted by
hundreds of cities, Character Counts! has developed a variety of struc-
tured, pre-planned projects and programs ranging from clubs for chil-
dren to two-day community forums designed to bring about a
consensus on values. A central presupposition in character education
programs is that the virtues that form good character are universal.
Character Counts! contends the Six Pillars represent a basic core of
values that “transcend cultural, religious, and socioeconomic differ-
ences” and can be “taught at home, in the classroom and at the office
without offending political, racial, religious, gender, or socioeconomic
sensibilities” (www.charactercounts.org).
Because character education deals with the cultivation of values and
virtues, we believe it should be of vital interest to all members of soci-
ety. By considering how Character Counts! attempts to deal with the
challenge of promoting universal values in a multicultural society, we
believe we can gain insights that are applicable to other activities that
are value-laden, including psychotherapy, school counseling,
psychoeducational guidance curricula, and the new efforts to promote
a positive psychology (Seligman, 2002).
Character education attempts to shape the moral visions within
which the next generation becomes socialized and enculturated. By
moral visions, we are referring to collective understandings of what the
self is and how the self should be in the world. Moral visions operate as
interpretive frameworks that implicitly structure and orient our lives
by providing an understanding of the good life and the good or ideal
person (see Christopher, 1996, 1999, 2001; Richardson, Fowers, &
Guignon, 1999; Taylor, 1988, 1989). From this interpretive or herme-
neutic perspective, all cultural practices and institutions, including
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Culture and Character Education 83

character education, are formed against such a backdrop of meaning

and implicit understanding of the good life. There can be no value-
neutrality in these matters.
Within the schools, as Lasley and Biddle (1996) point out, “Whether
teachers admit it or not, they are significant value transmitters within
the classroom” (1996, p. 158). If regular teaching involves the transmis-
sion of values, then character education which explicitly teaches values
would seem to involve a double level of transmission. At one level are
the virtues that are being intentionally espoused and promoted in the
character education programs. However, at another level, values are
transmitted by particular character educators, often without conscious
intent. These are values that are usually implicit and taken for granted.
Moreover, they are inescapable. If this is true, then it raises questions
about the claim of Character Counts! that the virtues transcend cul-
tural, religious, and socioeconomic differences.
The success or failure of character education hinges on the challenge
of defining and teaching universal values in a pluralistic and multicul-
tural society. In the remainder of this article, we develop a hermeneu-
tic analysis of the values and assumptions underlying Character
Counts! This analysis raises concerns about the implicit values and
assumptions in the definitions of the virtues in character education.
Finally, we suggest that the perspective on moral visions worked out in
recent years by hermeneutic thinkers and interpretive social scientists
(Christopher, 1996; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Taylor,
1989) can provide needed guidance in dealing with the dilemmas
involved in teaching moral values in a multicultural society.

Individualism and Moral Values

In recent years, a number of important writings have appeared that
critically evaluate the extent to which “individualism” or “liberalism
individualism” as a moral and political outlook pervades American
culture (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985;
Etzioni, 1996; Sampson, 1977; Sandel, 1996.) At the core of this indi-
vidualist moral vision is the notion that individuals and groups should
be free to define the good life for themselves, without interference
from others or the state, constrained only by their obligation to respect
the liberty of others to do the same. Many critics of individualism
argue that while individualism incorporates a worthy emphasis on indi-
vidual freedom and human rights, it neglects the importance of lasting
social ties and responsibilities to one another and the common good
(Bell, 1978; Sandel, 1996). One of the most important criticisms made
of this moral vision is that it seems to be too “thin” or morally insuffi-
cient to inspire the civic engagement needed to sustain even its own
worthy core values of respect for the dignity and rights of all individu-
als (Sarason, 1986; Selznick, 1992).
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84 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

Philip Selznick (1992) aptly summarizes this problematic feature of

the moral sensibility of modern individualism. Such a sensibility, Selz-
nick contends, brings benefits of greater individual freedom, increased
equality of opportunity, efficiency and accountability, and the rule of
law, but does so at the price of what he calls “cultural attenuation,” the
diminishing of “symbolic experiences that create and sustain the
organic unities of social life.” In his view, there has been a “movement
away from densely textured structures of meaning to less concrete,
more abstract forms of expression and relatedness” (p. 6). This move-
ment “may contribute to civilization—to technical excellence and an
impersonal morality—but not to the mainsprings of culture and iden-
tity“ (p. 6). The price to be paid for “cultural attenuation” becomes
clearer with the passage of time. As Selznick puts it, “modernity, espe-
cially in its early stages, is marked by an enlargement of individual
autonomy, competence, and self-assertion. In time, however, a strong,
resourceful self confronts a weakened cultural context; still later, self-
hood itself becomes problematic” (p. 8).
To put this matter another way, modern liberal individualism seems
to be embroiled in the paradox of advocating a thoroughgoing neutral-
ity toward all values as a way of promoting certain values, namely, lib-
erty, tolerance, and human rights. In the liberal individualist view, the
principles of justice are purely formal; justice is strictly procedural so
that no one can define the good life for anyone else. Yet commitment
to human dignity and rights sketch out a way of life that really is taken
by its advocates to be morally superior or good in itself. However, we
must ask what can prevent that principles neutrality toward all notions
of the good life from extending to those basic values of liberty and
human dignity as well, undermining their crucial convincingness as ide-
als and making it impossible to defend them rationally in ethical and
political discussion (Kolakowski, 1986; Sandel, 1996; Sarason, 1986)?
Also, it has been suggested that the insistent characterization of human
action and motivation as exclusively self-interested, as modern individ-
ualism has always has tended to do as a way of undermining dogma-
tism, is problematic. It may amount to throwing out the baby with the
bath water, to demoting or discarding all substantive moral ideals in
order to get rid of bad moral ideals.
Character education programs have a long history in the United
States (Likona, 1993; Nash, 1997). In part the waxing and waning of
character education over the years is due to its tenuous position within
an American cultural landscape in which freedom is often pitted
against community and authority (cf., MacIntyre, 1984; Ricouer,
1973). The result is what Richardson (1989) described as an “excruciat-
ing either-or” for “anyone concerned with making sense out of moral
values or ideals.”
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Culture and Character Education 85

One may locate such values or ideals in the ‘objective’

realm, but this seems arbitrary and smacks of dogmatism.
Or one may treat them as “merely ‘subjective’ and revis-
able products of custom and habit, but this appears to
undermine most people’s very conceptions of morality.
(p. 305)
The belief that the virtues taught to form good character are universal
involves the proponents of character education in the vexing dilemmas
and paradoxes of modern liberal individualism. If the virtues are not
universal, then character education will necessarily amount to a
privileging of particular moral visions or particular cultural ideals con-
cerning what is a good or mature person, and will conflict sharply with
the anti-authoritarianism and emancipatory ethos of American society.
However, to proclaim them as universal seems to many people to be
presumptuous as well, and to run afoul of that same profoundly anti-
authoritarian sensibility. The danger is that under the guise of univer-
sality is a particular view of the good life and justice that is not
embraced by many different cultures past and present. We fear that
unless this cultural dilemma is fully taken into account, the current
generation of character education programs will be caught in the same
bind.

Character Counts!: A Focused Discussion

As a case in point of these dilemmas, we examine one of the more
visible prepackaged programs of character education, Character
Counts! Character Counts! maintains that character rests on six pri-
mary pillars or virtues (trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fair-
ness, caring, and citizenship). Because of the limitations of space, we
will examine three of the pillars (caring, respect, and responsibility)
that we see as particularly relevant to psychologists and counselors.

Caring
Caring is broadly defined in the Character Counts! literature as con-
cern for others and charity. Concern for others includes being compas-
sionate, empathetic, kind, loving, and considerate; being thankful and
expressing gratitude for what people do for you; forgiving others for
their shortcomings; and not being mean, cruel, or insensitive. Charity
requires being altruistic, giving money, time, support and comfort with-
out strings attached for the sake of making someone else’s life better,
not for praise or gratitude; and helping people in need (Character
Counts!, 1997). Let us consider the way in which this definition of car-
ing presupposes a particular moral vision or cultural interpretation
about the self and the good life.
What should be cared about? Caring if not a universal value is surely
close to being universal. One would be hard pressed to find cultures in
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86 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

which some form of caring is not advocated. Indeed, the German her-
meneutic philosopher Heidegger (1962) sees caring as central to the
human condition. From his perspective, our lives are “structures of
care.” If Heidegger is correct, then the crucial issue is not whether or
not we care, but what in fact we care about.
The definition of caring in Character Counts! emphasizes caring
about others with little mention of at least two other forms of caring:
care for the self and care for the environment. Caring is defined solely
in reference to others; there is no mention of caring about the self or
nature. In influential ethical traditions both Western and non-Western,
care of the self and its flourishing has been viewed as central to ethics
(e.g., Aristotle’s eudaimonism, Confucius’s self-cultivation, Ayn
Rand’s (1964) “virtue of selfishness” and more recently Foucault’s
(1989) “care of the self”). Other ethical positions such as deep ecology
(Naess, 1990; Skolimowski, 1981), Taoism (Munro, 1985), and most of
Native American spirituality (Peat, 1994) consider our relationship to
the environment, our ability to care about nature, as being a primary
ethical responsibility. If Character Counts! is to make the claim that it
is promoting universal virtues, then it would seem at a minimum it
would need to be teaching an understanding of caring that in some
fashion includes all these different interpretations of what we should
care about.
Why Care? The motivation for caring is intricately bound up with
our sense of ourself or our sense of identity. As Taylor keenly
observes, “Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and
morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” (1989, p. 3).
Character Counts! seem to presuppose a particular notion of caring
that is rooted in the Western cultural tradition, specifically more mod-
ern versions of this tradition such as the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
In the Kantian view of ethics, which has been highly influential in
shaping Western psychological theories of moral development (Camp-
bell & Christopher, 1996a, 1996b; Campbell, Christopher & Bickhard,
2002), morality is always an other-regarding proposition; concern for
the self is regarded as a practical but not a moral issue. This sharp
distinction between others and the self, which is not found in many
ethical traditions appears to be directly related to the Western dualistic
and individualistic presuppositions that form what Taylor (1985) terms
the modern identity. Western culture emphasizes an atomistic view of
the self as an individual apart from others. The individual tends to be
cut adrift from a meaningful cosmos that traditionally subordinated the
individual’s life to some larger telos or vision of the good life, good
society, and good person (Berger, 1979; MacIntyre, 1984; Richardson,
Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). This metaphysical dualism that separates
the self from both others and the world is reinforced by an ethical
dualism that splits facts and values. The end result tends to be a view of
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Culture and Character Education 87

the individual as inherently alone and separate—neither metaphysi-

cally nor ethically connected or obligated to anything beyond the
boundaries of the skin. As articulated by Hobbes (1651/1964), human
reality in its most naked form consists of self-interested individuals
who have no notion of the good apart from their own desires. Life
becomes “essentially the business of individual self-interest” (Sullivan,
1986, p. 61).
Within such a perspective it makes sense that caring for the self is
not problematic; since the self is the primary reality, caring for it, or
self-interest, is second nature. It is harder to uncover reasons for the
individual to care about others or nature for they are pictured as
outside the self. The self is set over and against others and nature, and
nature itself is commonly treated as arena to exercise control and mas-
tery (Taylor, 1985).
In many collectivist cultures, in contrast, the self is interdependent,
considered a part of others and inseparable from the social context and
often from nature or the cosmos. Indeed, the Japanese word for self,
jibun, literally means “self part,” implying that the self by itself is not
the basic unit of identity (Rosenberger, 1992). As Markus and
Kitayama (1991) observe:
in some cultures, at least, on certain occasions, the indi-
vidual, in the sense of a set of significant inner attributes
of the person, may cease to be the primary unit of con-
sciousness. Instead, the sense of belongingness to a social
relation may become so strong that it makes better sense
to think of the relation as the functional unit of conscious
reflection. (p.226)
If the self can be construed and interpreted differently among different
cultural groups, then what are the implications for these differences in
self-understanding for the virtue of caring? One implication may be
that the nature of caring covaries with the subject’s sense of identity.
In much of Western culture, the purpose of morality is to socialize
the inherently asocial individual. Lasley and Biddle (1996) give voice
to this view and insist as an antidote that children must be taught the
value of selflessness. They claim “unless schools become more pur-
poseful in the transmission of values that enhanced [sic] extra-
centeredness, students will fill the vacuum with self-defined, self-refer-
ential values” (p. 162). In character education programs, altruism,
charity, prosocial behavior, and caring for others thus helps to offset
the self-interest that is seen as primary in our nature.
In contrast, students raised in more collectivistically oriented homes
and communities may not think of caring for others as an activity that
is altruistic and potentially in conflict with their own self-interest.
Indeed, caring for others may be simultaneously caring for the self as
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88 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

the identity of these students often does not stop at the boundary of
their skin, but extends to include others within it. Sharp distinctions
about what is self-interest and what is moral concern for others may
not exist, or at least in the same configuration that it does for white,
middle class American students. A consequence may be that in collec-
tivistic societies the neglected areas of expressing care may not concern
others as much as themselves (Smith, Christopher, & Turk-Smith,
2000).
Not surprisingly, caring for Americans is a risky proposition. We are
required to find a delicate balance between caring too much and caring
too little. On the one hand, we believe as with programs like Character
Counts! that we need to teach students to care to offset our innate
selfishness or indifference to others. On the other hand, caring too
much is also problematic. We fear in our culture the possibility of los-
ing oneself while caring for others. Our contemporary notion of
codependency, widely bandied about in mental health circles, may use-
fully point to valid clinical phenomena but also exemplifies this ten-
dency and assumes that the self should be autonomous and self-
contained (Christopher, 1996; Greenberg, 1994). American culture
demands that we be autonomous, competitive, and compassionate all
at the same time. It is questionable whether other cultural groups find
this balance to be so problematic or difficult to maintain. Thus, teach-
ing caring as a solely other-regarding capacity may not address the
indigenous needs of these other groups. In addition, American stu-
dents may not need only to consider caring for others but to rethink
the overly sharp distinction between self and others or self and nature
that we often assume to be the case.
How do we care? Culture also seems to impact the interpretation of
what it means to care (once the object of care has been delimited). For
instance, it may be a universal value that the elderly or dying are cared
for in all societies. But across societies there are emic ways of doing so
based on different interpretations of what this type of caring entails.
For example, van der Post (as cited in Kahn, 1991) tells of the Bush-
men who leave their elderly to die. While this initially may seem uncar-
ing, if not cruel, to those of us reared in Western culture, the nomadic
Bushmen must keep moving for survival. The elderly are left behind
when they can no longer keep up the pace and thus jeopardize the
whole tribe. Before leaving the elderly person, the tribe conducts cere-
monies and dances of honor and respect, a temporary shelter, and
enough food for a few days.
The typical response in the United States would be to hospitalize the
person, to put the patient on all possible life support systems or, at a
minimum, painkillers which often render the patient’s last days semi-
conscious (and may result in tremendous financial hardship for the sur-
viving family members). The Bushmen’s style seems to indicate an
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Culture and Character Education 89

acceptance of the cycles of life and death as part of the human experi-
ence. This example illustrates how much cultural variation can exist in
the form that caring takes even when facing a universal dimension of
human existence and obligation, namely death and honoring and car-
ing for the dying. By analyzing the nature and expression of caring it
becomes evident that interpretation is always at play. It is the interpre-
tation of what caring means that makes Jack Kevorkian’s deeds appear
as murder to some Americans and mercy killing to others. Interpreta-
tion is required and inevitable in different cultural contexts and shapes
our understanding of who or what we care about, how we should care,
why we should care, and when and where we should care.

Responsibility
This virtue is defined as knowing and doing one’s duty, acknowledg-
ing and meeting legal and moral obligations; being accountable,
accepting responsibility for the consequences of one’s choices which
involves thinking about the consequences on oneself and others before
acting; and setting a good example. Responsibility also means pursuing
excellence, working hard, and making all one does worthy of pride;
exhibiting self-control by taking charge of one’s own life, setting realis-
tic goals, keeping a positive outlook, and being prudent and self-disci-
plined with one’s health, emotions, time and money; being rational,
acting out of reason, not anger, revenge or fear as well as being self-
reliant, managing one’s life so as not to be dependent on others. (Char-
acter Counts! 1997).
Why be responsible? Cultural differences influence the motivation to
be responsible. Research on achievement motivation, which could be
thought of as a form of responsibility, notes significant cross-cultural
variation. For instance, both Chinese and American students may
strive for entrance into a prestigious university; but the American stu-
dent is more likely to be motivated by a desire to increase their per-
sonal status while the Chinese student is more likely to be concerned
about enhancing family social status, satisfying a sense of indebtedness
to parents (Matsumoto, 1996; Spence, 1985). Similarly, self-reliance, a
stereotypically American value, is even more highly embraced by
Taiwanese students than American students; however, for Taiwanese
students being self-reliant is important both as a prerequisite to being
able to help others and to avoid being a drain on others (Christopher,
1992).
The Character Counts! definition of responsibility carries the conno-
tation of “standing on one’s own two feet.” Phrases such as “self-con-
trol, taking charge, self-reliant, managing one’s life, working hard,
pursuing excellence, and self-disciplined” call forth Weber’s (1958)
analysis of the Protestant work ethic and Bellah, et al.’s (1985) analysis
of the manager prototype in American culture. The American myth of
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90 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

our forefathers as rugged individuals, obscures the fact according to

Coontz (1992) that people did indeed help one another and could not
have survived without sharing and assistance. In Colonial America, for
example, borrowing and lending among neighbors was not only a part
of life, but “being under obligation to others and having favors owed
was the mark of a successful person” (Coontz, 1992, p. 71).
Responsibility in collectivist cultures is frequently associated with
the idea of reciprocity. Matsumoto (1996) notes that members of inter-
dependent societies “strive to meet or even create duties, obligations,
and social responsibilities” (p. 40) in order to focus on their interde-
pendence. The Japanese express this with words such as amaru, asking
another for goodwill or indulgence and amae, meaning a desire, expec-
tation, reliance upon the goodwill and indulgence of another (Coontz,
1992; Doi, 1973, Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Responsibility to others is
often a way of cementing the social ties that are the matrix of one’s
identity.
Character Counts! encourages the student to “Make all that you do
worthy of pride.” It is implied though this phrase that students can be
motivated if they see that the self and its behavior are potential recipi-
ents of pride. It is questionable however that such a motivation would
be effective with students from a collectivist background. For instance,
how would this fit with some Asian cultures in which one should be
“self-effacing” or “self-abnegating” and instead allow one’s family and
associates to extol one’s virtues and accomplishments? (Bond, 1986).
Moreover, within Western cultural history pride has received mixed
reviews; pride is a virtue for Greeks like Aristotle, but often a vice
within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Curiously pride seems to be again
a self-contained virtue in contrast to honor which is based in the evalu-
ation by a larger community (Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 1973).
To whom should one be responsible? As with caring responsibility
seems to be centered around the self as separate from society. Unlike
the virtue of caring, which is defined solely with respect to others,
responsibility is defined in a purely asocial manner. The responsible
person cultivates responsibility as a kind of quality or trait that is culti-
vated internally and not closely tied to particular social contexts. In
sharp contrast, traditional Confucian Chinese society established rules
of conduct that codified the responsibility one owed and was due. Con-
fucian ethics begins with filial piety, the duty and responsibility the son
has for his father, and from this relationship builds the five relation-
ships that are to guide human conduct. In contrast, the asocial defini-
tion proffered by Character Counts! seems to provide little guidance in
how we think about our responsibility to others. This omission seems
to presuppose that responsibility to others is not a problem area for
character education. In other words, the purpose of character educa-
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Culture and Character Education 91

tion in this domain concentrates on addressing limitations in students’

ability to accept responsibility for themselves.
While many of the characteristics that comprise responsibility in
Character Counts! would be found in other cultures, what is perhaps
unique is the attempt to define these issues in a very general way, with-
out specifying their context or application. Responsibility is treated as
a virtue or quality that is good in and of itself. In this way responsibility
complements the procedural view of justice that underlies American
society (Sandel, 1996) in which Justice should be blind to those who
come before her. Character Counts! seems to potentially gloss over the
difficult questions of application. These include: What are the limits of
responsibility? How do we handle conflicting loyalties for our respon-
sibility? When does our responsibility to our self take precedence over
our responsibility to our employer or our nation? Different cultures
based on different moral visions may answer all these questions in
partly different ways.

Respect
Character Counts! defines respect as following the Golden Rule, dis-
playing tolerance and acceptance, being nonviolent, and extending
courtesy. Persons of good character are asked to treat others as they
themselves want to be treated; to respect the dignity, privacy, and free-
dom of everyone; to value and honor all people, no matter what they
can do for or to you; to respect others’ property; to respect the auton-
omy of others, but tell them what they should know to make good
choices about their own lives. In further clarifying tolerance and
acceptance, the guidelines say that one should judge others on their
character, abilities, and conduct without regard to race, religion, gen-
der, where they live, how they dress or the amount of money they
have; be tolerant, respectful and accepting of those who are different
from you; listen to others and try to understand their points of view
(Character Counts!, 1997).
Who or what is respected? This definition of respect reverberates
with the tones of modern liberal individualism which has its roots in
the 17th century European Enlightenment. Prior to that time, in the
Western world, the individual essentially belonged to the King and the
Church (Ullmann, 1966). Respect did not accrue simply from being an
individual; respect was accorded by one’s conduct and role in the social
and cosmological order (Berger, 1979). With the social, political, and
religious upheavals of the 18th century, the individual was granted a
new degree of status and prestige buttressed by the belief that all indi-
viduals had dignity and should be respected (Lukes, 1973). More
recently, the discourses of multiculturalism and what is sometimes
more or less disparagingly called “political correctness” treat respect as
a type of natural right (Fowers & Richardson, 1996).
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92 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

This relatively new understanding of self-contained individuals as

inherently worthy of respect has not been universally adopted. For
instance, many Americans were shocked to discover during the Iran
hostage affair, that many Muslims felt that tolerance, acceptance, and
respect should not be extended universally. Indeed, to tolerate, accept,
or respect American culture would be seen as sign of moral laxity; fun-
damentalist interpretations of Islamic morality often demand strenu-
ous opposition to those very qualities of tolerance, acceptance, and
respect that are so central to Western democracies and to the Charac-
ter Counts! program. To bring the example closer to home, many
Christian fundamentalists believe they would be committing a sin by
respecting ways of life or social practices that they deem morally offen-
sive. To fundamentalists, whether Islamic or Christian, respect, toler-
ance, and acceptance are the rewards of having moral character and
not rights due to a person simply because he or she exists.
The Character Counts! definition does not address whether there
are limits to respect. In the United States, respect is commonly
described as something “earned”; at the same time, all people are
thought to deserve respect. In contrast, in the traditional Chinese con-
cept of filial piety there is almost no limit to the respect and obedience
that children owe their parents (King & Bond, 1985). How do charac-
ter educators deal with topics such as respect that engender so much
cultural confusion and variation?

Conflict of Virtues
An additional challenge for character educators is the fact that con-
flicts may occur among the virtues. According to Kaplan (1995):
there is no consensus on the nature of character to guide
us, and even if there were a catalog of common values,
how would we figure out which ones are relevant in a
given situation, and how would such a list help us with
conflicts among those values? (p. 361)
The problem for character educators is that in an ethnically diverse
classroom, all students might conceivably agree that each virtue is
essential. However, the universal presence of a virtue should not be
confused with its necessary predominance in the hierarchy of values
within a specific culture. While there are a “diversity of goods” within
and across societies (Taylor, 1985; cf., Den Uyl, 1991), there is no rea-
son to assume that these goods are everywhere ranked the same.
Respect, for instance, has clearly become less valued in the West in
comparison to autonomy and freedom. Smith, Turk-Smith, and Chris-
topher (1998) found that some student groups such as the Turkish and
the Belaun in Micronesia regarded respect as the most essential char-
acteristic of the good person, while American students ranked respect
the 35th most important. In today’s culturally diverse classrooms there
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Culture and Character Education 93

will likely be significantly different beliefs among the students about

which virtue should take precedence when virtues conflict.
Character educators must recognize that conflict can and often does
exist both between virtues and within virtues. As discussed, our sense
of what it means to be responsible in a particular situation may readily
conflict with our sense of what it means to be respectful. But in addi-
tion, there can be tension in how we interpret a specific virtue; we may
have different understandings of what it means to be responsible in a
given situation or to whom we are responsible. As a case in point,
those contemplating divorce are often torn by the conflict between
their sense of responsibility to their family with their sense of responsi-
bility to themselves (Doherty, 1995). Consequently, the primary dan-
ger in character education is the failure to recognize the interpretive
frameworks that human beings necessarily carry into all situations.
This is especially critical to recognize when cultural differences are
involved. If the instructor is unaware of the cultural contexts of inter-
pretation she or he might see some students’ responses as better, more
insightful, and even more virtuous, than others. These concerns are far
from speculation. Michaels (1991), in her research on “sharing time” in
kindergarten classrooms, observed a “dismantling” of the storytelling
told by minority children when the teacher and child operated with
different ethnic outlooks. The differences in students’ responses may
be grounded in different moral visions and call for further or subtler
interpretation and understanding before trustworthy judgments can be
made.

Conclusion
In our analysis of Character Counts! we suggested five main points.
First, the meaning of specific virtues is always dependent upon inter-
pretation. Second, the interpretation of the meaning of specific virtues
or values depends upon particular background contexts of understand-
ings, contexts with moral visions that presuppose particular notions of
the self and of the good life. Third, individualism, the folk psychology
and ideology of American society, is the background context that
shapes a great many of our interpretations of specific virtues. Fourth,
while some of these virtues may approach being universal there is a
difference between the presence of a virtue in a culture and its relative
importance and ranking. Fifth, much of the struggle in moral conflicts
is not about the absence of virtues or how to apply a virtue to a specific
situation. Rather, it concerns conflicts between virtues that occur when
different virtues inevitably compete for preeminence and call forth a
different ethical stance from us.
Much of psychological theory, research, and practice relies upon
explicit or implicit notions of psychological well-being (Christopher,
1996, 1999). Theories of well-being, developmental theories, as well as
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94 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

counseling theories more generally, rely on culturally constructed

visions of the good life and the good person. As such, notions of well-
being and assumptions about what is therapeutic for specific clients are
subject to the same kinds of problems we have raised regarding charac-
ter education.
These points lead to profoundly troubling questions: if values, vir-
tues, and notions of well-being aren’t universally agreed upon, then
aren’t we left with ethical and moral relativism? And if everything is
relative then how can we properly be in the business of teaching vir-
tues or promoting well-being? (Christopher, 1996, 2001; Richardson et
al, 1999). Our own prejudice is that it is valuable to teach virtues in
character education and to embrace moral responsibility (Doherty,
1994) in psychological praxis but that to do so honestly requires us to
embrace a path that is “beyond objectivism and relativism” (Bernstein,
1983). In other words, we can no longer approach values as simply
objectively true and universally held—we know too much about other
cultural to ignore the diversity of values. On the other hand, we do not
have to remain mired in a relativism that prevents us from being able
to take a stand on the kind of issues that character education was
intended to address.
Hermeneutic thinkers suggest that a certain kind of dialogue lies at
the heart of ethical understanding and offers a way beyond objectivism
and relativism (Gadamer, 1975; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1991;
cf., Nash, 1997). Such dialogue consists in a kind of interplay between
what we might call conviction and openness. To do this we must, at
times, allow ourselves to be profoundly, non-defensively open to the
understandings, interpretations, and convictions of others, especially
when they appear different. Genuine understanding takes the form of
what Gadamer (1975) calls a “fusion of horizons.” This fusion of hori-
zons results from an effort to understand the perspectives, motives,
and subtle background of meanings of others, be that one’s neighbor,
the past, or another culture. One tries to see how it is that others could
take themselves seriously in the way they do, how they live as if their
approach or outlook is true. Often this leads to a fresh perspective on
one’s own belief and motives and can engender a more critical stance
towards the status quo. In Gadamer’s view, this dialogical stance is
actually the most authentic way of relating to others, a profound kind
of I-Thou relationship.
From this perspective, the variance in the meaning of a virtue such
as caring does not mean that we are faced with incommensurable dif-
ferences that reduce us to silence and impotence, as some contempo-
rary postmodern or social constructionist theorists insist (Guignon,
1991). Rather, these differences can be discussed, debated, and negoti-
ated. For example, while human beings may express great differences
in what they care about, we are also bound together by the fact that we
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Culture and Character Education 95

do care about our lives and we structure them around our understand-
ing of the good life. This common condition of caring can provide a
meeting ground for any dialogue about what it means to care at a par-
ticular time, in a particular context. Hermeneutic dialogue offers char-
acter educators and psychologists a way of taking their own convictions
and those of their students or clients seriously while remaining deeply
open to learning from the diversity of cultural and moral viewpoints
that are increasingly present in today’s multicultural society.

Implications
In this article we have considered the problem character educators
face in trying to promote certain values in a pluralistic society and have
suggested that this problem exists at the heart of much psychological
practice (Christopher, 1996, 2001; Doherty, 1994). A number of writers
have argued that many of the questions, conflicts, and choices faced by
therapy clients are partly or essentially moral issues (e.g., Cushman,
1990; Doherty, 1994; London, 1986; Lowe, 1969; Richardson et al,
1999). Psychologists and counselors now function as “secular priests”
or “new moral authorities” (Lowe, 1969) who not only influence cli-
ents’ behavior but also their moral outlook. Becoming aware of this
inescapable moral dimension to psychological practice is a crucial first
step. The second step is being willing to accept the moral responsibility
entailed in our roles as practioners. Doherty (1994) suggests we should
recognize that we are “moral consultants” (Doherty, 1994, p. 17).
However, our willingness to accept this moral responsibility needs to
be tempered by the humility that comes from realizing that our own
understanding is always finite, shaped by our own cultural and histori-
cal context. Consciousness of our embeddedness in “horizons” of
understanding leads to the need for a third step: developing a critical
stance towards ourselves and our own deepest values and assumptions.
Such a critical stance can be engendered by engaging in hermeneutic
dialogue and being open to the existence of other horizons of under-
standing, other moral visions.
Gadamer (1975) devised the phrase effective historical consciousness
to capture a dynamic process whereby both the past shapes and guides
the outlook and understandings that we have in the present and that
the present helps to shape how the past makes sense. As we have seen,
our current understanding of virtues such as caring and respect rely on
interpretations that have a history. Effective history reminds us that
our normal ways of making sense of the world, of understanding for
instance what it means to care and when caring is called for, is based
upon particular interpretations that are historically rooted in Western
culture. Other societies or ethnic groups will understand virtues differ-
ently based on the history of interpretation found within their own cul-
ture. Effective historical consciousness is a mode of awareness that
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96 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003

encourages us to remain mindful that our ways of behaving, thinking,

and feeling are rooted in historical traditions. We believe it is necessary
for teachers of character education, as they teach about particular vir-
tues, to be sensitive to how history shapes us and we shape history in
turn through our interpretations and choices. Moreover, we believe
that ideally, it is “effective historical consciousness” itself, or what Ale-
jandro (1993) calls “hermeneutic-historical consciousness,” even
though those terms would never be used, that should be taught to
children.
Failing to realize how our own outlook and even intuitions are situ-
ated in culture and history can lead to three problems. First, we are
susceptible to what cross-cultural psychologists call “imposed etics:”
mistakenly assuming that we know what is universal about human
beings and interpreting others’ behavior from this erroneous assump-
tion (Berry 1969, 1989). Second, we can potentially “perpetuate the
status quo” by failing to consider how our own values and assumptions
may serve to support and reinforce certain socio-policial injustices,
such as blaming the victim (Prilleltensky, 1989). Third, we may be
“perpetuating the problem in the cure” (Cushman,1990) by failing to
recognize that it may be our particular interpretation of certain virtues
and values that contributes to the type of social and psychological
problems counseling is intended to address. For instance, in promoting
a certain understanding of responsibility we may be also promoting an
individualistic outlook that, in addition to its strengths, may also con-
tribute to the alienation and loosening community bonds that brings
people into counseling.
There are no simple techniques, guidelines, or steps to resolve these
problems. Moral philosophy has struggled since the seventeenth cen-
tury to put ethics on a secure foundation. However, success in estab-
lishing a sound footing remains elusive (MacIntyre, 1984). The only
solution may be that we have to get our hands dirty and immerse our-
selves in the value conflicts that inevitably arise in psychological prac-
tice and character education. Perhaps some consolation comes from
remembering that for Aristotle (1981) the master virtue was phronesis
or practical wisdom. Practical wisdom allows us to take a general sense
of the meaning of courage, caring, or responsibility and draw out its
implications for action in particular contexts. We may know the gen-
eral ideal of courage, but sometimes courage means to stand and fight,
sometimes to flee to fight another day. Practical wisdom is the ability
to assess such situations and discern the best possible stance. Practical
wisdom in this sense can help us grapple with the complexity of moral
dilemmas without being overwhelmed by them. It can aid us in sorting
through the often competing demands that different virtues, frequently
simultaneously, make on us. In the end what may be most salient is not
a unified position regarding values but a very human process affirming
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Culture and Character Education 97

MacIntyre’s (1984) dictum that “the good life for [humans] is the life
spent in seeking for the good life for [humans]” (p. 219).
No doubt some psychologists and character educators already grasp
these problems and in their own way make use of this kind of dialogue
and search for moral wisdom. However, in making these issues explicit
we hope to enrich activities that promote the good life, whether they
be character education or psychology, by shedding additional light on
their enormous challenges and refining our understanding to meet
them.

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