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The Self as violent Other: The problem of defining the

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Article  in  The Journal of analytical psychology · August 2002

DOI: 10.1111/1465-5922.00331 · Source: PubMed

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Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2002, 47, 437–458

The Self as violent Other:

the problem of defining the self
Lucy Huskinson, Colchester, UK

Abstract: This paper identifies the problem of arriving at a solid definition of C. G. Jung’s
notion of the Self, and seeks its resolution. The author first demonstrates how this prob-
lem is articulated by scholars of Jungian theory by showing that they have ultimately
depended upon ‘limited’ definitions of the Self, where the Self is no more than a tran-
scendental postulate, a simple derivative from the internal structure of Jungian
argument. She then determines the reason for the problem by arguing that there can
never be a complete definition of the Self for it encompasses that which is unconscious
and is thus irreducible to ego-comprehension. By using a method of philosophical
analysis (in the guise of Levinas) the author will show that through the Self’s very need
to evade comprehension the Self is essentially comprehended as an overpowering and
violent entity. The author will argue that the Self as a force of violence is crucial to its
definition, and scholars must not ignore the Self as numinous experience in favour of
passive functionality. She will thus argue that through the adoption of a Levinasian
critique, the Self can be defined and justified outside of the internally self-consistent
system from which it is conventionally derived.

Key words: comprehension, creation, destruction, numinous, otherness, Self-experience,

submission, symbol.

Introduction
This paper is concerned with the notion of the Self, which is perhaps the
principal notion in C. G. Jung’s conception of the psyche. The Self is attributed
with greatness because it forms ‘the innermost nucleus of the psyche’ (Jung 1964,
p. 196) and provides meaning for life: ‘… for it is the completest expression of
that fateful combination we call individuality’ (Jung 1928, para. 404). But the
Self is much more than a fundamental structure of argument or necessary
invention to hold the rest of Jungian theory together, it is an affective experi-
ence that can bring destruction and transformation to all that was hitherto
considered secure and fundamental to ego-consciousness. The definition of
the Self as ‘numinous’ experience is a far cry from the notion of a rational
function, and scholars of Jung have depended more on the Self as a function,
as a passive transcendental postulate, than on Otto’s affective ‘idea of the
holy’ (1917). Although excessive use of the concept of the numinous will

0021–8774/2002/4703/437 © 2002, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
438 Lucy Huskinson

inevitably divest it of effective meaning, it is important to acknowledge that

this idea is at the very core of the meaning of the Self. Those scholars that do
not acknowledge the Self as an immediate experience of ‘awefulness’ (ibid.,
chap. IV, 1), ‘overpoweringness’ (ibid., chap. IV, 2), ‘urgency’ (ibid., chap. IV,
3) or, in my terms, ‘violence’, are guilty, as Jung found the Christians before
them, of a one-sidedness that neglects the dark side of the Self.
The term ‘violence’ is used in this paper to describe the experience of the ego
in its encounter with the Self. That is, the ego is exposed to the creative forces
of the Self that seek to destroy the inferior ego-orientation with its tendency to
prejudice in order to create a more affluent and well-balanced ego-orientation.
The creativity of the Self therefore constitutes a primordial experience of the
‘visionary’ mode of artistic creation1; that is, a Dionysian violence2 in which
the ego is effectively torn apart in order to be born anew. The ‘violence’ of the
Self in this context is therefore not malign, as it is not wholly destructive3: it
does not seek to eradicate all ego-consciousness, but seeks the ego’s continual
improvement by disrupting its misguided orientations. Violence therefore
describes the destruction necessary to initiate the vital creative process of indi-
viduation, and the Self is ‘violent’ because it is experienced as an overwhelm-
ing force that violates the self-containment of the ego, and forces the ego, often
against its will, into a new identity.

1
Jung distinguishes between two types of artistic creation, the psychological and the visionary.
About the visionary type he writes: ‘It is a primordial experience which surpasses man’s
understanding and to which in his weakness he may easily succumb. The very enormity of the
experience gives it its value and its shattering impact. Sublime, pregnant with meaning, yet
chilling the blood with its strangeness, it arises from timeless depths; glamorous, daemonic, and
grotesque, it bursts asunder our human standards of value and aesthetic form, a terrifying tangle
of eternal chaos …’ (Jung 1930/1950, para. 141).
Edward Edinger in Encounter with the Self. A Jungian Commentary on William Blake’s
Illustrations of the Book of Job (1986), also argues that the experience of the Self is a dangerous
primordial experience of artistic creation (pp. 11–12). Edinger argues that ‘the Job story is an
archetypal image which pictures a certain typical encounter between the ego and the Self. This
typical encounter may be called the Job archetype. The chief features of the Job archetype are: 1)
an encounter between the ego and the Greater Personality (God, Angel, Superior Being); 2) a
wound or suffering of the ego as a result of the encounter; 3) the perseverance of the ego which
endures the ordeal and persists in scrutinizing the experience in search of its meaning; and 4) a
divine revelation by which the ego is rewarded with some insight into the transpersonal psyche’
(p. 11). In terms of Edinger’s scheme this paper will expound upon features 2) and 3).
2
Dionysus is often associated with creativity as the continuous cycle of violent death and rebirth.
This is explained mythologically in the story of his birth from the incestuous coupling between
Zeus and his daughter Persephone, his horrific murder and mutilation by the Titans, and his rebirth
through Zeus and Semele. The notion of Dionysian creation is fundamental to the philosophy of
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), and to his notion of the Übermensch, which he describes as:
‘Dionysus torn into pieces … a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn and return again from
destruction’ (Nietzsche 1883–8, The Will to Power, Aphorism. 1052). But it has also been used
to describe the Self, (cf. footnote 9), most notably by Paul Bishop in The Dionysian Self, 1995.
3
However, as I will argue later, the violence of the Self can be construed as malignant and wholly
destructive when a weak ego becomes inflated and identified with the Self.
The Self as violent Other 439

Definitions of the Self that are derived from its role as a necessary postulate
within Jung’s model of the psyche
As I will later argue, the Self is Other4 and as such it fails to comprise a
complete systematic theory, only partial representative elements of the whole
can be examined. It may be for this reason that scholars of Jung have tended
to be selective in their examination of Jungian theory and refer to different
elements of the role of the Self as the principal aspect of the archetype. Thus,
Humbert regards the Self primarily as an ethical postulate. He writes: ‘If you
were to ask what the self signifies for me, I should reply that it is, above
all, the inner voice which tells me frequently and precisely how I am to live’
(Humbert 1980, p. 38). Indeed, Jung describes the Self as a high moral
instinct, in religious terms as the ‘will of God’ (Jung 1951, para. 49), and as
an inner ‘absolute which one must learn how to handle correctly’ (ibid., para.
51). The Self, as a God-image, provides the individual with an ethical
challenge to confront his projections and resolve the issues that confront him
from within. Samuels also talks of this religious challenge; he writes:
The self involves the potential to become whole or, experientially, to ‘feel’ whole –
a part of feeling whole is feeling a sense of purpose, of sensing a goal. Part of whole-
ness is to feel that life makes sense and of having an inclination to do something
about it when it does not, thus, to have a religious capacity.

(Samuels 1985, p. 91)

In support of his claim about a religious capacity Samuels cites Jung as saying:
‘The self, though on the one hand simple, is on the other hand an extremely
composite thing, a “conglomerate soul’’’ (Jung 1950, para. 634). Hubback in
‘The dynamic self’ (1998), takes a different stance on the Self and suggests
that the Self is principally associated not with its capacity to motivate but
with that very movement it also inspires. Hubback thus focuses on the Self’s
propensity to action and dynamism, an interpretation that takes us away from
the structural interpretation of the Self as symbolic imagery. She notes that
Jung’s descriptions of the Self in Aion culminate in ‘numerous nouns and verbs
(powerful ones) containing the elements of energy and psychological action’.
She proceeds to list these in their chronological order as follows:
‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ (para. 43), ‘discrimination’ (para. 44), ‘energetic
tension’ (para. 53), ‘confronts’ (para. 59), ‘affected’ (para. 61), ‘relate’ (para. 65). In

4
Indeed, R. Papadopoulos, in his paper ‘Jung and the concept of the Other’ (1984/
1991), examines the development of the notion of the Other throughout Jung’s work and
concludes that: ‘Having achieved a direct contact with the Self, Jung had experientially completed
his search for the Other’ (p. 80). Papadopoulos defines the Self as ‘the higher Other’, ‘the ultimate
form of the Other, the higher Anticipated Whole Other’ (pp. 80, 84, 86, 88). The unconscious
Other is perhaps most associated with the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition and its structuralist
approach to language and the subject; this paper is, however, not a discussion of Lacanian
thought.
440 Lucy Huskinson

the later chapter ‘The Structure and Dynamics of the Self’ there are: the self ‘a dynamic
process’ (para. 411), ‘move’ (para. 413) and ‘Sooner or later nuclear physics and the
psychology of the unconscious will draw closer together as both of them … push
forward into transcendental territory’ (para. 412) …

(Hubback, 1998, p. 279; Hubback’s italics)

These elements of ‘energy and psychological action’ culminate in the notion

of the Self as the unification of opposite forces, the great struggle to harness
the energy created through contradictions. Jung writes: ‘… there is no energy
unless there is a tension of opposites … Life is born only of the spark
of opposites’ (Jung 1917/1926/1943, para. 78), and: ‘In the end we have to
acknowledge that the self is a complexio oppositorum precisely because there
can be no reality without polarity’ (Jung 1951a, para. 423). Indeed, Redfearn,
in ‘The self and individuation’ (1977) regards the Self as ‘the meeting place
of opposites’ (p. 139) and, as such, Jung’s notion of the Self ‘goes straight to
the heart of the matters of the ultimate source of psychic energy, the trans-
formation of this energy, and the inspiring effect of symbols … [it is] the ultimate
symbol, or the symbol of the symbolic or creative process’ (p. 140).
By taking Jungian theory as a self-justified premiss and the Self as a
necessary postulate of this premiss it is clear that the Self can be easily defined.
Such definitions are made secure as long as the premiss upon which they are
derived is also secure. However, this does not mean that these internally
consistent definitions of the Self are free from dispute. Indeed, Fordham brings
to light an apparent contradiction between two definitions of the Self that
have developed. These are: the Self as totality and the Self as archetype
(Fordham 1985, pp. 20–4). Fordham begins by examining the concept of Self
as a totality, which he maintains first makes an appearance in Psychological
Types (1921), where Jung discriminates between the ego and the Self and
states that the Self is ‘… the subject of my total psyche which also includes the
unconscious. In this sense the self would be an ideal entity which embraces the
ego’ (p. 20). Fordham notes significant implications of this, for ‘if the self is
the whole psyche, then it cannot be observed intrapsychically since the ego is
contained in it as a part and cannot function as an observer. It is only when
some part of the ego stands separate from or only participates up to a point in
the rest of the whole that data about the self can be collected’ (1985, p. 21).
Next Fordham examines the concept of the Self as an archetype, which
contradicts the totality thesis. Here he quotes Jung as stating that the Self is
‘the real organizing principle of the unconscious, the quaternity, or squared
circle of the self’ (Jung 1951b, para. 318), and again refers to places where Jung
defines or implies that the Self is the archetype of order, whose special function
is to balance and pattern the other archetypes (Jung 1944; 1942/1954, para. 433;
1958, paras. 624 & 805). Fordham makes clear that the archetype thesis
does not contradict the fundamental notion from the totality thesis: that the
Self is unknowable, for the archetype itself is purely unconscious. What it does
The Self as violent Other 441

contradict in the totality thesis is the fact that if the Self is the totality of the
psyche including all the archetypes, how can it also be one of these archetypes?
Furthermore, as an archetype, the Self cannot be the totality (for Jung states
that the ego and the archetypes are to be distinguished) and neither can it
ever be experienced (since it excludes the ego which is the agency of perception
and is itself structured by the Self). Nevertheless, the symbolic images which
represent the Self in consciousness are clearly archetypal and therefore
presumably structured by the archetype which they represent, that is, the
archetype of the Self. By way of conclusion Fordham conceives the Self not as
an archetype, but ‘beyond’ archetypes and ego, which are then seen as arising
out of or ‘deintegrating’ from the Self; furthermore, he suggests that a distinc-
tion in terminology be made so that the term Self would only be used to refer
to a psychic totality, otherwise the term ‘central archetype of order’ would be
preferred (Fordham 1973). In accordance with this view, Jung himself rewrote
his definition of the Self (Jung 1921, paras. 789–91), taking into account this
apparent contradiction and emphasizing the Self as a special transcendental
concept (Samuels 1985, p. 106). This new definition strengthens the notion of
the Self as a totality, but its transcendental element also enables the Self to
function as the archetype of unity.
By way of further response and possible resolution to this seeming paradox,
Jacoby, in ‘Reflections on Heinz Kohut’s concept of narcissism’ (1981),
feels that although there may be a logical contradiction in this, there is no
experiential contradiction in seeing the Self both as part of the totality and as
the totality itself. Furthermore, Colman, in ‘Models of the self’ (2000), defines
the Self as a process which views the Self as both totality and archetype,
as both an organizing principle and that which is organized. Colman main-
tains that there is no principle or archetypal structure which is anyway
separate from that which it is organizing, the structure is inherent in itself.
Thus he regards the Self as both a tendency towards organization (the process
of individuation) and the structure of that organization (the Self as archetype).
‘In other words, the psyche is self-structuring and the name for that process is
the self’ (p. 14). Colman continues to say that an artificial paradox is created
when we are inclined to isolate elements of thought into ‘contents’ so that the
‘Self-as-archetype’ becomes a ‘content’ ‘within’ the ‘psyche-as-the-total-self’.
If instead we ‘think of the self as the process of the psyche, this paradox
disappears’ (ibid.).
These definitions of the Self provide little insight into Jungian theory as they
are merely derivative of it; that is, we know that the Self is the ‘reconciliation
of opposites’ because the Self is the ultimate goal of the psyche (Jung 1928,
para. 404), and the psyche, by its very nature, seeks equilibrium within its
conflicting material (Jung 1934, para. 330). However, it is when inconsistency
is found between these derivative definitions that real insight into Jungian
theory can be revealed. Fordham’s discussions on the inconsistency of Self as
totality and Self as archetype are regarded as showing insight for they have
442 Lucy Huskinson

highlighted the need for further understandings of the Self and have encouraged
sharper definitions of the Self from both Jung himself and others.

The Self beyond theory

In this paper I will attempt to define the Self away from the implications of its
role as a necessary postulate in Jung’s model of the psyche. I will use the
method of a philosophical critique to provide justification for the concept
outside of the internally self-consistent system in which it is conventionally
derived. A Levinasian5 critique has proved useful in the evaluation of the
premisses of Jungian analysis (see: L. Huskinson 20006), and in this paper I will
extend this approach to show why we can never arrive at a complete definition
of the Self and how there is indeed no such concrete theory of the Self. And
yet in the very act of the Self’s refusal to permit its comprehension I will infer
and recover the essential character of the Self that has often been neglected,
thereby reuniting the Self with its darker side. Thus through its very need to
evade comprehension I will show that the Self is essentially comprehended as
an overpowering and violent entity. That is, the Self is ‘violent’ because it
violates the boundaries of ego-consciousness; it must interrupt and effectively
destroy the self-containment of the ego in order to express its hitherto uncon-
scious meaning and creative capacity. The notion of the Self as violence is a
significant notion, and, as I will show, a notion that cannot be neglected, for
it is defined through the only definite characteristic of the Self that has hitherto
been secured, i.e., through the fact that it is unknowable.
A critique of the notion of the Self using arguments that are not solely
derived from Jungian theory would also provide insight into Jungian theory
for it would remove the concept from its self-justifying framework and would

5
Levinas introduced phenomenology into France in the 1930s after studying with Husserl and
Heidegger, who profoundly influenced his thought. In his major work Totality and Infinity
(1969) he attempts to determine an ethical ‘face-to-face’ relation with the Other, which whilst
immediate and singular remains wholly transcendent. In his examination of such a possibility
Levinas arrives at the ‘limits of phenomenology’; which leads him to criticize many philosophers
for their preoccupation with ontology. Levinas wants to escape from the traditional concern with
ontology; he is interested not in the relationship between Being and beings but with that which
lies outside totality or Being, with the religious or ‘ethical’ relationship with the Other. For a
thorough and lucid explanation of Levinas’ key ideas see: Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction
(1996).
6
In ‘The Relation of Non-Relation: The Interaction of Opposites, Compensation, and Teleology
in C. G. Jung’s Model of the Psyche’ a Levinasian critique is used to show that the two elements
of opposition and compensation do in fact complement one another in the overall efficient
workings of the psyche despite their apparent logical discrepancy. That is, despite the fact that in
abstract and ontological terms, opposites, in their very essence, cannot be compensated and
reconciled, neither can they be united to a mutual whole in the realization of the totalized psyche.
For Opposites are defined as such because they are absolutely and inherently incommensurable
and to say they can merge and interact is to introduce similarity between them and thus to deny
their essential contrast.
The Self as violent Other 443

examine it from a more objective perspective. The philosophical critique that

I will use will arrive at a definition of the Self as an entity of violence; it will
also provide further confirmation and an external justification for some of the
derivative definitions of the Self that have been made.
We know that Jung formulated his concept of the Self primarily from
eastern mysticism which frequently refers to notions of totality (Jung 1951c,
para. 350), and from out of his concept of the ‘transcendent function’7 (Jung
1916/1957, para. 189), but we do not have a substantial and precise theory of
the Self, because Jung did not develop one. In ‘The undiscovered self’,
he swiftly states that ‘Since self-knowledge is a matter of getting to know the
individual facts, theories are of very little help’ (Jung 1957, para. 493). We
know that the Self is the ordering and unifying centre of the total psyche, and
that whilst the ego is the centre of the conscious personality, the Self is the
centre of both the conscious and unconscious personalities (Jung 1936, para.
44), but this description leads only to an inadequate and limited analysis of
Selfhood. This is because the Self is only partly capable of being perceived
directly in consciousness as its totality encompasses every psychic manifesta-
tion, including those unconscious processes that remain ineffable and forever
out of reach to ego comprehension and understanding.8 A rigorous and rational
theory based on empirical data is thus irrelevant in the depiction of the Self,
not simply because the Self is a concept of individuality but because the Self,
as a composition of unconscious elements, cannot be reduced to the limits of
intellectual knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is thus inadequate for express-
ing the wholeness of the Self; scientific discourse relies too heavily on abstract
theorizing about strictly defined data and seeks to exclude the symbolic meta-
phors through which the unconscious finds expression. Indeed Jung writes:
The Self is experienced as having a value quality attached to it, namely its feeling
tone. This indicates the degree to which the subject is affected by the process or how
much it means to him … In psychology one possesses nothing unless one has experi-
enced it in reality … a purely intellectual insight is not enough.

(Jung 1951, para. 61)

7
The transcendent function is part of the symbol-forming aspect of the unconscious which
possesses a purposive tendency to hold both conscious and unconscious together (Jung 1916/
1957, para. 132). It is thus a process that unites oppositions thereby creating a synthesis and
dynamism within the psyche allowing it movement to progress towards its goal: the realization of
the Self, the ultimate psychic balance where all oppositions are resolved. In 1916 Jung writes: ‘The
shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites.
The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living
third thing … a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a
new level of being, a new situation’ (Jung 1916/1957, para. 189). This ‘living third thing’ and ‘new
level of being’, in which culminates the unification of opposites, is the Self.
8
Indeed, Aion, the title of Jung’s Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self (1951, CW 9ii),
refers to the transcendent aspect of the Self, for it is taken from the ancient religion of Mithraism
in which ‘Aion’ is the name of the god that rules over the astrological calendar and thus over time
itself.
444 Lucy Huskinson

Trying to explain the Self is thus akin to explaining God. God, or the abstract
idea of God, is not understood through rational thought or empirical sense
data, God is found through metaphors and symbols, as a force primarily to be
experienced rather than to be understood on a reductive level of intellect:
… you cannot say anything definite about it [the Self] because it is greater than you.
You can only stammer as if in the presence of a greater one. And you are right if you
stammer and are embarrassed, not finding suitable terms or analogies. Then you do
justice to it.

(Jung 1934–9, p. 432)

The Self as infinite Other

The experience of the Self is an affective experience of immense proportion
(Jung 1951, para. 53). The Self is Other to the ego, it is unconscious, it is an
experience of the ‘not-me’ in the me, a religious experience, an experience of
infinity. Levinas takes up these ideas in Totality and Infinity (1969).
The central aim of Levinas’ work is to define the ego in Cartesian terms as
a subject that exists in relation to infinity, and is founded by that relation
rather than destroyed by it. In the third of his Meditations (1641), Descartes
questions whether or not the subject can regard itself as the author of all the
ideas it contains. Descartes argues that an effect is not greater than its cause,
and from this premiss he concludes that the subject cannot be the author of any
idea that is greater or more perfect than itself. The idea of God is such an idea:
it cannot have been conceived independently of the subject. Thus, according
to Descartes, belief in God can be justified on the basis of the subject’s exist-
ence: the Cartesian subject sees itself as subject by reference to the non-self.
Levinas adapts the Cartesian argument to show that the ego is not primary but
is dependent on the Other (the Self) for its constitution. Levinas thus wants to
undermine the ontological authority of Western thought which is essentially
an egology that asserts the primacy of the ego, the Same, the subject or Being.
In Western philosophy the infinite Other is acknowledged only in order to be
suppressed or possessed by the ego, it thus claims that the totality of the ego
is without flaw and is all-encompassing, and that the subject receives nothing
and learns nothing that it does not know or cannot possess. Levinas entitles
his book ‘Totality and Infinity’ and not ‘Totality or Infinity’ to express the
break with ontology and the preservation of both Same and Other. It is for
this reason that Descartes’ Third Meditation occupies a significant place in
Totality and Infinity and why the Levinasian model provides a significant
parallel to that of Jung: all three provide a model of the subject existing in
relation to that which is infinite (the Cartesian ‘God’, the Levinasian ‘Other’,
and the Jungian ‘Self’), and founded by that relation rather than destroyed by
it. The Levinasian model of ‘Same’ and ‘Other’ can therefore provide insight
into the Jungian model of ‘ego’ and ‘Self’; indeed, it will show that the Self is
The Self as violent Other 445

principally an overpowering violent entity and thus the definition of the Self
as ‘numinous’ should not be neglected by scholars of Jungian theory.
In Totality and Infinity Levinas expresses the idea that the Self is Other to
the ego for the contradictory elements of ‘Same’ (ego) and ‘Other’ (Self) can
never exist as a totality in union. The Same exists because the Other is irrecon-
cilable with it, otherwise both Same and Other would be part of a greater
totality or whole which would invade and invalidate their separateness.
Levinas therefore paradoxically says they are related as a ‘relation without
relation’ (ibid., pp. 79–80). It is a relation because an encounter does take
place; but it is ‘without relation’ because that encounter does not establish any
understanding: the Other remains resolutely Other. This does not invalidate
the Jungian interpretation where the Self encompasses the ego in a totality for
the ego remains at all times an element separate from it; if the ego was to be
identified with the Self inflation would result (Jung 1951, para. 44). The
Levinasian discourse continues to parallel that of Jung and thereby offers
insight into the nature of the Self. In his text Levinas proceeds by stating that
the encounter between the Same and Other is essentially of a violent nature.
He writes: ‘Violence consists in welcoming a being to which it is inadequate’
(Levinas 1969, p. 25). The encounter with the Other causes the Same to realize
its impotence; it creates a surplus value of infinity within the Same which then
disrupts the totality and self-containment of the Same. The Same simply
cannot integrate the Other and is thus reconditioned by it: ‘The I loses its hold
before the absolutely Other … (it) can no longer be powerful’ (ibid., p. 17).
The Other therefore overturns the very egoism of the individual and puts
consciousness into question; consciousness must answer to the Other and
must realize that it is not in total possession of the world (ibid., p. 173). Jung
describes this encounter with the unconscious Other as a wounding:
Whoever has suffered once from an intrusion of the unconscious has at least a scar
if not an open wound. His wholeness, as he understood it, the wholeness of his ego
personality, has been badly damaged, for it became obvious he was not alone; some-
thing which he did not control was in the same house with him, and that is of course
wounding to the pride of the ego personality, a fatal blow to his own monarchy.
(Jung 1934–9, p. 1233)

The individual must, therefore, ethically acknowledge that he is a being of

both consciousness and unconsciousness, of Same and Other. Experience
of the unconscious directly affects the conscious ego of the individual; the
ego remains but is reformulated by the damage created by the ethical demand
placed on it in the presence of the Other. Jung himself warns of this potential
danger many times. According to Jung, individuation, the process that leads to
the Self and the eventual balance and unification of conscious and unconscious
attitudes, is often experienced as dangerous and violent. Jung writes:
… the rediscovered unconscious often has a really dangerous effect on the ego … In
the same way that the ego suppressed the unconscious before, a liberated unconscious
446 Lucy Huskinson

can thrust the ego aside and overwhelm it. There is a danger of the ego losing its
head, so to speak, that it will not be able to defend itself against the pressure of
affective factors.

(Jung 1916/1957, para. 183).

The danger and pressure arises because the individual must incorporate into
his conscious attitude characteristics of a contrary nature that have previously
been unconscious within him; these may appear alien or even morally repre-
hensible to him. The rebirth of the ego ‘into’ the Self is a powerful numinous
experience that is both dangerous and violent.9 The Self forces the ego to
realize its impotence and through its affects it inflicts a radical change in the
attitude of the ego. The ego is no longer situated within its own petty and
oversensitive personal world, as it was prior to individuation, rather, the ego
of the individuated being now participates freely in the wider world of object-
ive interests. It sheds its limited subjectivity for ‘a consciousness detached from
the world’, i.e., an experience of objectivity, an experience that is ‘detached
from painful as well as from joyful events … [and] an attitude that is beyond
the reach of emotional entanglements and violent shocks’ (Jung 1929, paras.
67–8). But it is only through the violent Other and
only through extreme pain [that] you experience yourself; you believe then that you
are a unit. Before that, you can imagine that you are anybody … you are not neces-
sarily yourself. Afterwards when you have undergone this extraordinary experience
of the self, there are no illusions any longer. You know exactly who you are.

(Jung 1934–9, p. 449)

The Self, as the unknowable Other, appears as a violent entity to ego-consciousness

but it is not wholly destructive. The Self does not seek to eradicate all ego-
consciousness for ego and Self are of equal importance, indeed ‘unconscious
compensation is only effective when it co-operates with an integral conscious-
ness. Assimilation is never a question of “this or that”, but always of “this and
9
The rebirth of the ego ‘into’ the Self as a dangerous and violent experience is also expressed by
Jung in his alchemical works as a significant stage of transformation in the alchemical process.
Thus, the final and highest stage of the alchemical process, which corresponds to the realization of
the Self, is called the rubedo, and this is symbolically expressed as the rebirth of the king, born to
himself and his mother in their incestuous marriage (cf. the ‘Dionysian Self’, footnote 2: Dionysus
is born from the incestuous coupling between Zeus and his daughter Persephone). The king, in
alchemical symbolism, represents the ego (Jung 1945/1954, para. 471), he is considered to be
imperfect, old and obsolete (ibid., para. 368; 1955–6, para. 169; 1955–6a, para. 427), and must
die so that he can be reborn in a complete form. But, what I want to emphasize here is that before
this rebirth can occur (and thus before the Self can be realized), the king (and thus the ego) must
undergo various sufferings and fatalities. The king must thus experience ‘immersion in the
[queen’s] bath or in the sea [the unconscious overwhelming the ego], dissolution and decompo-
sition, extinction of his light [his power and domination over all] in the darkness, incineration in
the fire, and renewal out of chaos’. These symbols of ‘violence’, Jung tells us, ‘are derived by the
alchemists from the dissolution of the ‘matter’ in acids, from the roasting of ores, the expulsion of
sulphur or mercury, the reduction of metallic oxides, and so forth’ (Jung 1945/1954, para. 468).
The Self as violent Other 447

that”’ (Jung 1934, para. 338). Thus, the Self cannot ‘kill’ the ego, for the ego
is the Self’s ‘feet’ (Jung 1934–9, p. 978). Nevertheless, the Self ‘makes terrible
demands’ (ibid.) upon the inferior ego as it attempts to balance its prejudiced
orientation. Such demands constitute a violence that effectively destroys the
previous ego-orientation, thereby disabling the ego as an effective regulating
centre of the personality and imposing upon it a new and enriched orientation,
one that can satisfy the Self’s demand. Thus, through the act of destruction
comes creation. Indeed, Jung writes:
… the invisible things cannot come into being without torture and destruction for
the collective man … you always kill and destroy in order to bring something new
into existence. Whatever you do, if it is of any importance, also means destruction.
(Jung 1934–9, p. 614)

The violence of the Self is, however, malignant and wholly destructive to the
ego that is inflated and is identified with the Self. In this case the argument
above does not apply, for the ego is too weak to be ‘the Self’s feet’ and destruc-
tion does not imply creation. Inflation both enlarges the ego to the extent that
it is almost extinguished (Jung 1946, para. 472), and denies conscious inte-
gration of the shadow (that deflationary experience) (Jung 1934–9, pp. 702–3),
thereby making the individual capable of great violence and destructiveness
towards his fellow neighbour. Moreover, by identifying with the Self the ego
can no longer experience the Self as Other (cf. Jung 1934–9, p. 1174). The ego
has therefore effectively cut itself off from the vital regulating powers which
the Self possesses, for according to Jung, creative processes are not generated
by the ego, they originate from outside of it, that is, from the Other (Jung
1934–9, p. 61; cf. p. 675). The inflated ego escapes that ‘violence’ of the Self
that imposes upon the ego its productive growth and rebirth, for its identi-
fication with the Self means that the ego fails to be overwhelmed and violated
by its essential ‘Otherness’. However, this does not mean that the ego remains
self-contained and, in Levinasian terms, ‘in total possession of the world’; the
Self is still affective and violent, but without its faculty to create (i.e., without
its prima materia: the strong enough ego). Thus, the inflated ego will be
overwhelmed and effectively destroyed (and ‘dismembered’; Jung 1934–9,
pp. 703–4) by the violent Self, with no potential for further development and
rebirth. I am arguing here that the Otherness of the Self is crucial to the
development of the ego and its on-going process of individuation; it is the Self
as Other that inspires the sense of ‘awe-fulness’ and destruction necessary for
the process of creation that ensues.10

10
Renos Papadopoulos, in ‘Jung and the concept of the Other’ (1984/1991), also argues that the
Other encourages individual growth. He writes: ‘Therefore the problematic of the Other which
Jung embarked on in an attempt to isolate and identify the Other gradually grew to reveal the
whole dialectical process of the individual’s striving at the Self. Like the Wittgensteinian ladder,
this problematic provides the necessary steps of the earlier formulations’ (p. 88).
448 Lucy Huskinson

Symbols protect the ego from further violence from the Other
On the one hand, the ego cannot escape from the violent Self and it must try
to accept its rebirth (Jung 1951, para. 51). On the other hand, the ego
cannot understand the Self; hence it must try to ground its experience of the
Other in some kind of framework to which it can relate. Both the rational
functions of thinking and feeling are required to secure this kind of
understanding (ibid., para. 52), but this is difficult to achieve (ibid., para.
58) and takes a being that has already achieved a sufficient degree of
individuation to have developed both capacities. If the ego does not try to
accept its rebirth and tries instead to ignore the experience of the Other or
tries to explain the experience away as illusion or reduce it to the level of the
intellect, it will instead have to deal with the consequential onslaught of
‘insanity’ (Jung 1929, para. 53), and ‘in a word, to destructive mass
psychoses’ (ibid., para. 52). Thus, the Self initiates destruction to enable it to
create a more affluent ego and it initiates further destruction if the ego fails
to acknowledge its reformulation. When the ego is at a loss to understand, the
psyche spontaneously produces a symbol. This symbolic framework enables
the ego to relate to the unconscious experiences within it and protects it from
the onslaught of insanity that would otherwise overcome it: ‘You see, by
means of a symbol, such dangers can be accepted: one can submit to them,
digest them. Otherwise … it is a very dangerous situation: one is exposed
without protection to the onslaught of the unconscious’ (Jung 1934–9,
p. 1249). When this symbol makes its appearance, the balance between the
ego and the unconscious is restored. The presence of such symbols thus
provides an empirical grounding for Jung’s ‘theory’ of the Self, for although
‘wholeness’ seems at first sight to be nothing but an abstract idea (like anima
and animus), it is nevertheless empirical in so far as it is anticipated by
the psyche in the form of ‘spontaneous or autonomous symbols’ (Jung 1929,
para. 59). An empirical grounding, however, does not necessarily mean
that Jung is on his way to establishing an objective theory of the Self
that can be tested and qualified, this is because these Self-symbols (or tran-
scendent functions) remain numinous; they are the archetypal images
of the unknown archetypal Self. Thus, these symbols are clothed within a
finite image that is accessible to the ego, an image that is subjectively defined
by that ego according to its response to the a priori archetype and according
to its conscious attitude11 (Jung 1951c, para. 355), but the true essence
behind this clothing can never be attained and therefore can never be
encapsulated within an objective testable theory. The symbols are not
the actual Self, they are merely approximations representing states of relative
wholeness or ‘Self-ness’, they can never be complete totality or wholeness in

11
The features of the Self-symbol will therefore change as the conscious attitude changes
The Self as violent Other 449

itself.12 It is impossible to arrive at the archetype-in-itself; this can only be

experienced with the subsequent symbol created to express its effects, and
there are an infinite number of symbols to choose from. Such limitless uses in
which the Self is conveyed suggests to me that the Self is perhaps not such an
unbroken and coherent entity as is often thought; its many different façades
causes it to blend even further into oblivion. Thus, it is not a theoretical
statement that refers to images as the Self but a metaphorical statement, a
finite expression of something infinite.
Symbols have a subjective power; they can therefore be effective for one
individual but merely appear as a sign for another. Likewise, from an objective
level, one symbol is only as appropriate as the next.13 The subjective power

12
This is further explained by Fordham whom I noted earlier as saying: ‘if the self is the whole
psyche, then it cannot be observed intrapsychically since the ego is contained in it as a part and
cannot function as an observer. It is only when some part of the ego stands separate from or only
participates up to a point in the rest of the whole that data about the self can be collected’
(Fordham 1985, p. 21). The symbol is a finite image of something infinite, thus it is grounded in
both the ego and the Self and must therefore ‘stand separate’ from the essence of wholeness itself
if it is to communicate the experience of the Self to the ego.
13
Indeed, the subjective power of analogies of the Self is aptly demonstrated in the discourse
between Redfearn and Booth in the Journal of Analytical Psychology, 1990, vol. 35. The
disagreement between the two scholars revolves around the analogy Redfearn uses to describe the
notions of the many ‘selves’, the many feelings of ‘I’, implemented across the psychoanalytic
traditions, and thus also for the notion of the Jungian ‘Self’. Booth first tries to enlarge Redfearn’s
analogy to include further connotations of the Self which he feels have been ignored, and then
offers a different analogy, which he personally feels more appropriately encapsulates the notion
of the Self. Thus, In My Self, My Many Selves (1985) Redfearn uses an analogy of the theatre to
provide a general model of the self/Self, he writes: ‘This “I” migrates hither and thither to various
locations in the total personality, like the spotlight at a theatre picking out first one actor then
another, or, even more pertinently, like a pilgrim on his journey of life visiting one place, then
another, in his universe … I call these various actors in ourselves “sub-personalities”’ (p. xii).
Booth, however, in ‘A Suggested Analogy for the Elusive Self’ (1990) argues against this analogy.
He states that words such as ‘theatre’ and ‘pilgrim’ are ‘loaded words’ and as such these word
connotations ‘point our understanding in certain directions’ (p. 335). Booth says that it
specifically ‘leaves open the question of governance: who is providing the integration – is there a
“personality” co-ordinating the activities of the sub-personalities? Or, if the “feeling of I” as
“pilgrim” merely visits “places” in the self, what authority does it carry as a visitor, or find there
as it “arrives”?’ (p. 336). Booth then proceeds to offer his own analogy of the self/Self, that of a
‘committee of the whole’ which, like Booth’s criticism of Redfearn’s analogy, is guilty of using
loaded words. Thus Booth’s ‘committee’ has innumerable members who each have equal
authority and can ‘seize the floor at any time’, thereby taking the position of the ‘I’ with the other
parts of the self acting as ‘aides or advisers’. Booth regards his own subjective analogy to be more
appropriate for expressing the objective self/Self than Redfearn’s. However, Redfearn quickly
responds to Booth maintaining that the analogy of the committee is no better than that of the
theatre; he writes: ‘His picture … strikes me as one way in which the self and the sub-personalities
of the self interact. But of course it is only one way … If we remember that the “sub-personalities”
are meant to denote the archetypal as well as the complex figures, then the notion of a
committee seems hardly more adequate than the picture of a company of actors’ (ibid., p. 339,
italics added).
450 Lucy Huskinson

of symbols means that they must be experienced on a personal level if they are
to promote growth within the individual and enrich his personality, and, as
we have seen, an intellectual theory or classification of these symbols will
therefore achieve little. Jung, however, is intent on making more out of his
‘empirical theory’ (Jung 1951, para. 59) to the extent that he is guilty of
objectifying the subjective by predetermining what is personal by giving
specific examples and an overall schematization of Self-imagery. Jung thus tries
to establish a concrete theory of one aspect of the Self, a theory of its objective
symbolic form; he tries the very thing he maintains should not be done, and
attempts that which is ‘of very little help’ (Jung 1957, para. 493) and that
which ‘is not enough’ (Jung 1951, para. 61). He states that the Self will appear
in dreams as an
elephant, horse, bull, bear, white and black birds, fishes, and snakes … tortoises,
snails, spiders, and beetles. The principal plant symbols are the flower and the tree.
Of the inorganic products, the commonest are the mountain and the lake.

(Jung 1951c, para. 356)

Here Jung is limiting Self-symbols to rigid, perhaps merely personal, examples,

and consequently fails to acknowledge the subjective rule of symbolism where
such a specific image of an elephant or a snail may not necessarily express to
every individual the presence of the Self. It would be more appropriate for Jung
to express his ‘theory’ with such abstract statements as: ‘Since the defining
feature of the self as a totality is that it is infinitely greater than the ego, any
symbol which is greater than the individual may be a symbol of the total self’
(Jung 1942/1948); and: ‘ … the self can appear in all shapes from the highest
to the lowest, inasmuch as they transcend the scope of the ego personality
in the manner of a daimonion’ (Jung 1951c, para. 356). These statements are
detailed and yet flexible enough to be applicable to every subjective symbolic
formulation of the Self.
Jung is content to give many examples of Self-symbols which can be found
mostly within Aion (Jung 1951). Edinger dramatically summarizes these
images and themes of the Self as follows:
Such themes as wholeness, totality, the union of opposites, the central generative
point, the world navel, the axis of the universe, the creative point where God and
man meet, the point where transpersonal energies flow into personal life, eternity as
opposed to the temporal flux, incorruptibility, the inorganic united paradoxically
with the organic, protective structures capable of bringing order out of chaos, the

Booth’s later responds: ‘Dr. Redfearn’s generous acknowledgement that the committee analogy
might show one way in which parts of the self interact, gives about as much recognition as one
analogist can hope for from another’ (ibid., p. 341, italics added). The subjective power of
symbolic imagery is at play here. Both scholars are more content to uphold their own analogy,
and any attempt to persuade and communicate their analogy to another requires a great deal of
justification. No one symbol can be universally accepted because symbols are subjectively
determined.
The Self as violent Other 451

transformation of energy, the elixir of life – all refer to the Self, the central source of
life energy, the fountain of our being which is most simply described as God.

(Edinger 1972, p. 4)

The God-image and the mandala sacred circle are the two most prominent
Self-images to fascinate Jung. The former led Jung to his somewhat contro-
versial response to the problem of theodicy by explaining God in terms of
completion rather than perfection, of thus harbouring an evil shadow side: for
Christ, as a Self-symbol represents a personality greater than the average
individual (Jung 1942/1954, para. 414), but to be a fuller symbol of integra-
tion and unity Christ must be linked with the Antichrist, to convey evil as well
as good. And the latter led Jung to his experience and discovery of the Self, for
through the drawing of these mandalas every morning in 1918–1919 he came
to realize that they are ‘cryptograms concerning the state of the Self’ (Jung
1961, p. 221), an illustration of his inner situation at that time. In these man-
dalas he saw his whole being actively at work and through them he acquired
a living, working conception of the Self, for every circumambulation is a
version in miniature of the individuation process. These principal Self-symbols
serve to protect the ego from the overwhelming destructive nature of the Self.
In terms of the God-image Jung writes that in the Old Testament the fear of
God is the very first principle.14 Thus, as the Self is identified with the God-
image, it follows that the Self too must be feared, and yet Jung notes that such
fear of God is overcompensated in the New Testament by the idea that God
is love and one must not be afraid of Him. He thereby highlights the fact that
as God is both love and terror, the Self too is capable of magnificent creation
as well as destruction (Jung 1934–9, p. 128). Likewise, the mandala is a symbol
of a protective circle, a symbol with an eternal boundary, which would, in
Levinasian terms, enable the ego to contain the ‘surplus value of infinity’ (the
Self) and thus attempt to reduce the violence brought about with the encounter
of the unconscious Other, and ‘to prevent the ‘outflowing’ and to protect the
unity of consciousness from being burst asunder by the unconscious’ (Jung
1929, para. 47).

Conclusion: the violent Self as experience

A satisfactory definition of the Self can never be arrived at. When one tries
to seek a definition of the Self one is trying to intellectualize the Other and
to reduce that which is unconscious and infinite into the finite terms of con-
sciousness. This cannot be done, it is an abuse of the Levinasian ethic, which
stipulates that Other and Same must relate but in a such way that no notion
14
Jung is quoted as saying: ‘God is the name by which I designate all things which cross my path
violently and recklessly, all things which upset my subjective views, plans and intentions and
change the course of my life for better or worse’ (Interview in Good Housekeeping Magazine,
December 1961; cited in Edinger 1986, p. 32, footnote 14).
452 Lucy Huskinson

of similarity or familiarity can ever take place. I have tried in this paper to
show that this ethical relation cannot be neglected and that when a complete
definition of the Self is still sought, the Self will react in an overpowering way
against the attempt to reduce it to intellectual terms. That is, the Self will always
evade the ego’s grasp and it is this supremacy over the ego’s control that causes
a wounding to the ego (Jung 1934–9, p. 1233), for the ego is forced to realize
its impotence and is forced to step down from its governing position of being
in total possession of the world (Levinas 1969, p. 173). Thus the very fact that
a complete definition of the Self cannot be obtained is an expression of the
supremacy of the Self, the violence that it inflicts in us, and the realization of
our impotence. The Self evades us and by doing so undermines our authority
and wounds our pride.
The Self is therefore an elusive entity, one that is defined by infinity and that
which remains irreducible to intellectual terms. It is essentially a transcen-
dental postulate ‘which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allow
of scientific proof’ (Jung 1950, para. 405). But this postulate serves only to
formulate and link together the processes that have already been empirically
established. If the Self was available for an intellectual encounter Jung believes
it could be understood without much difficulty ‘for the world-wide pronounce-
ments about the God within us and above us, about Christ and the corpus
mysticum, the personal and suprapersonal atman, etc., are all formulations
that can easily be mastered by the philosophic intellect’ (Jung 1951, para. 60).
The intellect promotes the illusion that one can be in possession of the Self and
can master and manipulate it accordingly,
but actually one has acquired nothing more than its name, despite the age-old
prejudice that the name magically represents the thing, and that it is sufficient to
pronounce the name in order to posit the thing’s existence … the intellectual ‘grasp’
of a psychological fact produces no more than a concept of it, and that concept is no
more than a name, a ‘flatus vocis’.

(ibid.)

In terms of an intellectual theory, the Self is simply the ‘name’ given to that
which is unfathomable in the psyche, a metaphysical concept, but this is inap-
propriate for Jung. According to Jung, the Self is a concept or postulate that
is grounded neither in metaphysical speculation nor faith, rather the Self is a
concept that is experienced.15

15
According to Martin Buber, however, there can be no experience of an autonomous Self/God
within Jung’s psychological model. The subject cannot experience the essential ‘I-Thou’
relationship with the Self/God because, as a function of the unconscious, it is a content within the
subject. Buber is therefore critical of Jung for psychologizing God and for preventing the
possibility of having a genuine experience of the Other. For a lucid and detailed account of Jung’s
polemic with Martin Buber on this matter, see: Barbara D. Stephens, ‘The Martin Buber–Carl
Jung disputations: protecting the sacred in the battle for the boundaries of analytical psychology’,
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 46, 455–91.
The Self as violent Other 453

The definitions of the Self that I outlined at the start of this paper derive the
concept from the Self’s role as a necessary postulate within Jungian theory,
each one therefore defines the Self as an entity that can be experienced. Thus,
Humbert defines the experience of the Self as an ethical ‘inner voice which tells
me frequently and precisely how I am to live’ (Humbert 1980, p. 38) and
Samuels describes the experience of ‘feeling whole’ (Samuels 1985, p. 91).
Hubback defines the Self as a ‘dynamic’ experience, with a feeling for
‘energetic action’ (Hubback 1998, p. 279) and Redfearn discusses the Self’s
‘inspiring effect’ (Redfearn 1977, p. 140). The model of the Self that I have
arrived at through using arguments that are not solely derived from Jungian
theory confirms each of these definitions. Thus, the Self as a ‘violent infinite
Other’ ethically calls consciousness into question and forces the ego to answer
to the Self by forcing it to acknowledge the Self as a higher authority. The ego
certainly experiences the Self as ‘dynamic’ and ‘energetic’ in the wounding it
experiences from the Self, and the ego will come to acknowledge the Self’s
‘inspiring effect’ in its acts of creation through destruction when the ego
acknowledges its rebirth. The reborn ego will also experience the ‘feeling of
wholeness’ of the Self for it is only through the violence of the Self and ‘only
through extreme pain [that] you experience yourself; you believe then that you
are a unit … ’ (Jung 1934–9, p. 978, italics mine). The Levinasian critique that
I have used therefore provides further confirmation and an external justifica-
tion for some of the derivative definitions of the Self that have been made.
This technique has also arrived at a secure part-definition (only a part-
definition because the whole cannot be determined) of the Self away from the
implications of its role as a necessary postulate in Jung’s model of the psyche.
Although this paper has extensively argued that it is impossible to arrive at
a complete intellectual theory of the Self it has also argued that through its
very need to evade comprehension the Self is essentially comprehended as an
overpowering and violent entity. Further knowledge of the Self, outside of its
role within Jungian theory, cannot be determined, and as such the concept of
the Self does not comprise a satisfactorily rigorous and thorough intellectual
theory. The Self, in intellectual terms, remains no more than a name, and I
have merely given it the names of ‘infinity’ and ‘violence’. However, as an
entity to be experienced the Self is very much alive; the Self cannot be reduced
to intellectual terms as it will always evade the ego’s grasp but it does relate to
the ego in a ‘relation of non-relation’ (Levinas 1969, pp. 79–80) and is thereby
experienced as a numinous quality.
Jung believes that the concept of the Self belongs to the realm of experience
rather than the realm of the intellect; he thus believes that an adequate picture
of the Self can indeed be formed but only on the basis of a thorough ‘experi-
ence’ of it: ‘Just as the concept arose out of an experience of reality, so it can
be elucidated only by further experience’ (Jung 1951, para. 63). But is Jung
correct to say that the concept of the Self is turned into fact simply because it
arose from experience and is elucidated by further experience? Plaut remains
454 Lucy Huskinson

uncertain, for ‘such understanding drives one to the very edge of sanity. If
Jung’s vision arose from that very place in his mind (as we have reason to believe),
small wonder that it makes us anxious too’ (Plaut 1985, p. 248). However,
Plaut is resigned to acknowledge other scientifically ‘approved’ theories that
make use of such ‘mad-driving’ paradoxes as quantum physics, where the facts
depend ultimately upon the act of observation. Nevertheless, Colman (2000)
once again saves Jung from potential flaw and takes the argument of experi-
ence a step further by concluding that: ‘The self is not an experience and it
certainly is not a content of experience, but rather it is the taste of experience,
its quality. The self is not subjectivity but the condition by which subjectivity
is possible. It is not myself, nor the experience of myself but the very possibility
of my having self-experience’ (ibid., p. 15). The Self, in Levinasian terms, is
thus not just the Other that questions the authority of the Same (the ego) but
it is also the very ‘encounter’ itself between the two elements of Other and
Same, it is the ‘third thing’ (Jung 1916/1957, para. 189), it is a thing of infinity
that unites the two. That is, the Self is that dangerous and violent ‘relation of
non-relation’ that enables the individual to have a more complete understand-
ing of himself. Danger and violence provide ‘the very possibility of my having
self-experience’ for if the ego is to develop according to the hidden teleological
plan of the psyche, it must acknowledge and interact with the violent Self.

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Tento článek sleduje otázku uspokojivé definice bytostného Já v pojetí C. G. Junga a

hledá její řešení. Autorka nejprve ukazuje, jak se s tímto problémem vypořádali
jungiánští badatelé a ukazuje, že jejich pojetí se v zásadě spolehla na ‘omezené’ definice
bytostného Já. V nich již bytostné Já není transcendetálním postulátem, ale spíše
jednoduchou odvozeninou vnitřní struktury jungiánské teorie. Autorka pak hledá
puvod
° tohoto problému a vysvĕtluje, že nemu° že vzniknout úplná definice bytostného
Já, které zahrnuje nevědomé obsahy, a nelze je tedy redukovat směrem k chápání já.
Použitím metody fiilosofické analýzy (v Levinasovĕ pojetí) autorka ukazuje, že právě
kvu° li potřebě bytostného Já vzpírat se pochopení je bytostné Já esenciálně vnímáno
jako přemáhající a divoká entita. Autorka tvrdí, že pro definici bytostného Já je jeho
kvalita divoké síly rozhodující. Badatelé nesmí ve prospěch pasivní funkcionality
přehlížet bytostné Já jako numinosní zážitek. Dokazuje, že přijetím Levinasovy kritiky
mu° že bytostné Já získat definici a oprávnění i mimo vnitřní systém, který je kolem něj
zbudován a ze kterého se obvykle odvozuje.

Cet article considère la difficulté qu’il y a à arriver à une définition solide de la notion
du soi chez Jung et cherche un moyen de résoudre cette question. L’auteur montre tout
d’abord que ce problème s’articule sur le fait que les chercheurs qui ont étudié la théorie
jungienne se sont basés fondamentalement sur des définitions ‘limitées’ du soi, dans
lesquelles celui-ci n’est rien de plus qu’un postulat de transcendence dérivant simple-
ment de la position jungienne relative à la structure interne. Elle pointe ensuite comme
The Self as violent Other 455

cause du problème, le fait qu’une définition complète du soi n’est jamais possible, dans
la mesure où le soi inclut ce qui est inconscient et est par conséquent inappréhendable
par la compréhension du moi. En utilisant une méthode d’analyse philosophique (à la
manière de Levinas) l’auteur montre que du fait même du besoin du soi d’échapper
à la compréhension, ce dernier est essentiellement perçu comme une entité violente et
surpuissante. L’auteur avance que cette perception du soi en tant que force de violence
est cruciale pour sa définition, et que les chercheurs qui étudient Jung ne doivent pas
ignorer la dimension numineuse de l’expérience du soi, au profit de la description d’une
fonctionalité passive. Elle montre qu’en adoptant une critique du type de celle de
Levinas, le soi peut être défini et son existence justifiée en dehors du système d’auto-
cohérence interne, à partir duquel l’idée du soi est généralement pensée.

Diese Arbeit bezeichnet das Problem eine solide Definition von C. G. Jungs Selbst-
begriff erhalten zu können und versucht eine Lösung dieses Problems. Die Autorin zeigt
zunächst, wie dieses Problem von verschiedenen Autoren über Jungianische Theorie
zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, indem sie zeigt, wie diese letztlich sich auf ‘begrenzte’
Definitionen des Selbst abhängig gemacht haben, wo das Selbst nicht mehr als ein
transzendentales Postulat, eine einfache Ableitung aus der inneren Struktur Jungianischer
Lehre darstellt. Sie beschreibt dann den Grund des Problems, indem sie argumentiert,
daß es niemals eine vollständige Definition des Selbst geben kann, da es dasjenige umfaßt,
was unbewußt ist, und daher nicht auf Ich-Verständlichkeit reduzierbar ist. Indem
sie eine Methode der philosophischen Analyse verwendet (im Gefolge von Levinas)
zeigt die Autorin, daß gerade aufgrund des speziellen Bedürfnisses des Selbst, sich dem
Verständnis zu entziehen, das Selbst wesentlich als überwältigende und gewalttätige
Einheit verstanden wird. Die Autorin argumentiert, daß das Selbst als gewalttätige
Macht wesentlich zu seiner Definition gehört, und daß Autoren das Selbst als numinose
Erfahrung nicht zugunsten von passiver Funktionalität ignorieren dürfen. Sie argu-
mentiert daher, daß durch die Levinas’sche Kritik das Selbst außerhalb des internen
selbstgenügsamen Systems definiert und gerechtfertigt werden kann, in welchem es in
der Regel abgeleitet wird.

Questo lavoro pone il problema di giungere a una solida definizione della nozione di
C. G. Jung del Sè, e ne ricerca una soluzione. L’autrice dapprima dimostra come questo
problema venga articolato dagli studiosi della teoria junghiana, mostrando come essi
in ultima analisi dipendano da nozioni ‘limitate’ del Sè, laddove il Sè non è che un
postulato trascendentale, un semplice derivato dalla struttura interna del discorso
junghiano. Specifica poi le ragioni per porre il problema, sostenendo che non può mai
esserci una completa definizione del Sè, poichè esso abbraccia ciò che è inconscio ed
è quindi irriducibile ad una comprensione egoica. Usando poi un metodo di analisi
filosofica (alla stregua di Levinas), l’autrice mostrerà che proprio per la intrinseca
necessità del Sè di evadere la comprensione, il Sè viene considerato essenzialmente come
un’entità violenta e strapotente. L’autrice sosterrà che considerare il Sè come forza
violenta è cruciale alla sua definizione e gli studiosi non devono ignorare il Sè come
esperienza numinosa a favore di una funzionalità passiva. Sosterrà poi che adottando
una critica Levinasiana, si può definire e giustificare il Sè al di fuori del sistema interno
in sè consistente dal quale viene convenzionalmente derivato.
456 Lucy Huskinson

Este papel identifica el problema para logara una sólida definición de la noción de
C. G. Jung del Self, y busca su solución. La autora demuestra en primer lugar como
articulan este problema los estudiosos de la teoría Junguiana por medio de mostrar
que ellos dependen de limitadas definiciones del Self, donde el Self no es mas que un
postulado trascendental, un simple derivado de la estructura interna del argumento
Junguiano. Ella entonces determina la razón del problema argumentando que nunca
podrá haber una definición completa del Self debidoi a que este acompaña a aquello
que es inconsciente y por tanto irreductible a la comprensión del Ego. Usando el método
de análisis filosófico (en la forma de Levinas) la autora demostrará como a través de la
necesidad del Self de evadir su comprensión el Self es comprendido como una entidad
esencialmente poderosa y violenta. La autora argumentará que el Self como una fuerza
de violencia es crucial para su definición, y los estudiosos no deben ignorar que el Self
como una experiencia numinosa para favorecer una funcionalidad pasiva. Ella por
tanto argumentará como a través la crítica Levinasiana, el Self puede ser definido y
justificado fuera del sistema interno de Self-consistencia de donde se deriva conven-
cionalmente.

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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr Roderick Main for drawing my attention to the
particular characteristics of Otto’s notion of the numinous and for his general
meticulous comments.

[MS first received June 2001; final version February 2002]

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