Daf Ditty Yevamot 24: Legislating Motive

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MISHNA: One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite
maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and
she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions
against him.

But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do
not require him to divorce her. With regard to one who is suspected of illicit relations with a
married woman and they, the judges of the court, removed her from her husband, i.e., required
them to divorce due to this, even if the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently married
her, he must divorce her.

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GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who is suspected of relations with a gentile woman who
later converted may never marry her. This implies that she is, however, a convert, although it
appears that she converted only in order that he might marry her.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: Both a man who converted for the sake of
a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of a man, and similarly, one who
converted for the sake of the king’s table, so that he could serve in a prestigious capacity, or for

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the sake of Solomon’s servants, who were also considered prestigious, in all of these cases they
are not converts; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya.

As Rabbi Neḥemya would say: With regard to converts by lions, i.e., forced converts such as
the Samaritans [Kutim] described in II Kings (17:24–25); and converts who convert based on their
dreams; and converts of the time of Mordecai and Esther described in the verse,

,‫ִﬠיר ָוִﬠיר‬-‫ְמִדיָנה וְּמִדיָנה וְּבָכל‬-‫יז וְּבָכל‬ 17 And in every province, and in every city, whithersoever
,‫ ְוָדתוֹ ַמִגּיַﬠ‬i‫ַהֶמֶּל‬-‫ְמקוֹם ֲאֶשׁר ְדַּבר‬ the king's commandment and his decree came, the Jews had
;‫ ִמְשֶׁתּה ְויוֹם טוֹב‬,‫ִשְׂמָחה ְוָשׂשׂוֹן ַל ְיּהוִּדים‬ gladness and joy, a feast and a good day. And many from
‫ָנַפל‬-‫ִכּי‬--‫ ִמְתַיֲהִדים‬,‫ְוַרִבּים ֵמַﬠֵמּי ָהָאֶרץ‬ among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of
.‫ ֲﬠֵליֶהם‬,‫ַה ְיּהוִּדים‬-‫ַפַּחד‬ the Jews was fallen upon them.
Est 8:17

“And many from among the peoples of the land became Jews; for the fear of the Jews was fallen
upon them” ; all of these are not converts until they are converted at this present time.

The Gemara clarifies the meaning of the words: Could it enter your mind to say only at this
present time? Since he mentioned the converts of Mordecai and Esther, who were deceased before
Rabbi Neḥemya made this statement, he therefore cannot possibly mean this phrase literally.
Rather, say: Like at this present time, when the Jewish people are in exile and there is no material
benefit to conversion.

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Returning to the question above: How could a woman who converted for the sake of a man be
considered a true convert? The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita
that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance
with the statement of the one who says that they are all converts.

The Gemara asks: If so, why is one suspected of relations with such a woman not permitted to
enter into marriage with her ab initio as well? The Gemara answers: The reason for the prohibition
is due to the following statement of Rav Asi. As Rav Asi said with regard to such cases:

,‫ ִﬠְקּשׁוּת ֶפּה; וְּלזוּת ְשָׂפַת ִים‬,…‫ כד ָהֵסר ִמְמּ‬24 Put away from thee a froward mouth, and perverse
.‫ַה ְרֵחק ִמֶמָּךּ‬ lips put far from thee.
Prov 4:24

“Put away from yourself a twisted mouth, and perverse lips put far from you”: If they were to
marry, they would give substance to the prior suspicions.

Summary

Introduction1

Our mishnah gives a general rule about yibbum and then begins to discuss a different issue, namely
one who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him.

The commandment to perform yibbum is upon the oldest brother. If a younger brother
preempted him [by performing yibbum], he has acquired [a wife]. If a man is suspected of
[having relations] with a slave and then she was freed, or with a non-Jewish woman who then
converted, he must not marry her. If, however, he did marry her they do not take her away
from him. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a married woman, and then [in
1
https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.24b.2?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-
_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&p2=Mishnah_Yevamot.2.8&ven2=William_Davidson_Edition_-
_English&vhe2=Torat_Emet_357&lang2=bi&w2=English%20Explanation%20of%20Mishnah&lang3=en

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consequence] she was taken away from her husband, even though he married her, he must
divorce her.

Any brother of the deceased husband may perform yibbum or halitzah. However, the first option
is supposed to go to the oldest remaining brother. If, contrary to what is supposed to happen, a
younger brother does perform yibbum, the yibbum is valid and she is his wife. We will learn more
about this in chapter four, mishnah five.

The three parts of this section all deal with a man who is suspected of having relations with a
woman who is forbidden to him. In the first part, he is suspected of having relations with either a
slave or a non-Jew. Both of these women are prohibited to him. Subsequently, the slave is freed
(thereby becoming a fully Jewish woman), and the non-Jewish woman converts to Judaism. In
their current state both women are permitted to him. Nevertheless, he is not allowed to marry them.

There are two reasons given for this. One, so that people will not confirm the original rumor that
he had relations with a woman forbidden to him. Two, so that people won’t say that she only
converted in order to marry him.

In contrast, if he is suspected of having an affair with a married woman, and then she is forced to
separate from her husband, and the suspected adulterer marries her, the court imposes a divorce.
Adultery is a much more serious crime than relations with non-Jews and therefore just a suspicion
that he had adultery with her, rules out all future marriages. Note that this rule is ultimately meant
to protect marriages. A man whose wife has had adultery can no longer remained married to her.
To prevent a situation whereby she sets her eyes on another man and forces her husband to divorce
her by committing adultery, the rabbis permanently forbade her to the adulterer. .

Sibling Order; Conversion; Divorce Via Suspicion2

Amud (a) focuses on the importance of birth order in yibum. The eldest, not the firstborn, is
obligated in yibum. If for some reason he is unable to take the yevama in marriage, the obligation
falls to the next eldest, and so on. However, if a younger brother should wish to participate in
yibum, that marriage is valid. The rabbis speak about reasons for these halachot, including
inheritance laws and related verses.

Amud (b) takes us on a tangent that apparently will last to the end of this Perek. First, they speak
of converts. Are Canaanite slaves who are freed and Gentile women allowed to be married to
Jewish men? If those men were suspected of illicit relations with those women before the
conversion, they are not supposed to marry. But does conversion mean anything if a person is
converting for love? Sharing their arguments and their proof texts, the rabbis teach us that they
are concerns that after love fades, love for Judaism could fade as well, and idol worship could be
introduced to Jewish homes. They also teach that outside of Israel, conversion is meaningful: there

2
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/10/

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is no benefit to conversion in the diaspora. The rabbis remind us that conversion was not allowed
when Solomon's successes or when David's strength defined Judaism. People should convert for
"pure" reasons: the love of G-d and mitzvot.

On a related note, the rabbis want to understand when a woman should be divorced from her
husband. They speak about suspicion: when a married woman is suspected of an illicit sexual
relationship, she should be divorced. Their examples of such suspicion include witnesses - and
arriving home to see a peddler leaving while one's wife is dressing from her undergarments into
her clothing. Even if the woman in question is divorced from her husband, she should not be
remarried to her adulterous partner.

The rabbis are more lenient regarding these questions than with many other questions. If a woman
has children, should she really be forced to divorce? If people are suspicious about an illicit affair
and the couple ends up marrying despite the decree that they should not marry, is it really necessary
to end that marriage? Looking for loopholes and alternate interpretations, the rabbis leave much
leeway for courts and individuals to create restorative alternatives to harsh sentences.

We ask these same questions today regarding conversion and justice following infidelity. Who is
a Jew? Does it matter if someone converts for love? When should people divorce? When can
their actions be frowned upon but ultimately forgiven - at least enough to allow them continued
communal involvement? The fact that our rabbis were more flexible regarding some of these
questions suggests to me that these circumstances occurred frequently; in nuanced
circumstances. Where is this flexibility when it comes to other issues of identity and sexual
behaviors?

PERMITTING AN "ACHOS ZEKUKASO"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara discusses the case of the Mishnah later (26a) of four brothers, two of whom married
sisters and then died childless. The two surviving brothers must do Chalitzah with the two sisters;
they may not do Yibum. Neither brother may do Yibum with the first sister because she is "Achos
Zekukaso," the sister of a woman with whom he needs to do Yibum.

After the first brother does Chalitzah with the first sister, why is the second brother still prohibited
from doing Yibum with the second sister? Since the first sister has already done Chalitzah, there
is no more Zikah with that sister and the second sister is no longer an "Achos Zekukaso" to the
second brother!

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yevamos/insites/ye-dt-024.htm

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RASHI explains that the reason why the second sister may not do Yibum is based on the rule that
once she became prohibited for one moment, she remains prohibited forever ("Ne'esrah"). What
made her prohibited for one moment?

Rashi mentions two possible reasons for why she was prohibited for one moment. The first reason
is that the Mishnah maintains "Yesh Zikah," and thus the Zikah which requires the first brother to
do Chalitzah with the first sister renders the second sister prohibited to the second brother (as well
as to the first) as "Achos Zekukaso." Alternatively, the prohibition against forfeiting the Mitzvah
of Yibum ("Isur Bitul Mitzvas Yevamim") prohibits her, because when both sisters fall to Yibum
neither brother is able to do Yibum lest he forfeit the Mitzvah of Yibum of the other sister in the
event that the other brother dies before he does Yibum. Thus, even after Chalitzah is done with
one of the sisters, the other sister remains prohibited to the second brother (because of the return
of the Isur of "Eshes Ach") since she was prohibited for one moment.

In contrast, in the case of the Mishnah earlier (23b) in which only one of the two sisters who fell
to Yibum is the real Yevamah (and the other was not married to the deceased brother at all and
does not need Yibum), Rashi writes that once one brother does Chalitzah with one of the sisters,
the second brother may do Yibum with the second sister because she was not prohibited in the first
place. If she is not the real Yevamah, she cannot become prohibited (since she has no connection
at all to any of the brothers), and if she is the real Yevamah, she was permitted to the brothers all
along (we just did not know it).
Rashi's explanation implies that in the case of four brothers (26a), even when one brother does
Chalitzah the Zikah to the other brothers is not retroactively removed. If the Chalitzah would
remove the Zikah retroactively, the second brother would not be prohibited to the second sister in
the first place since, retroactively, she was not an "Achos Zekukaso" (the first sister's Chalitzah
with the first brother shows that she was Zekukah only to the first brother and not to the second,
and thus her sister was never the sister of someone who was Zekukah to the second brother).
Rather, the Zikah is not removed until the moment at which one brother does Chalitzah; until that
time, there was a Zikah to all of the brothers and it is not removed retroactively.

This is also evident from the words of Rashi in the end of the Mishnah. Rashi there writes that in
a case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," in which the two brothers of the deceased man both did Yibum with
the two sisters (when they were not permitted to do so because of the Safek Isur involved),
b'Di'eved they are permitted to remain married. This is because after the first brother did Yibum,
one of the two women fulfilled the Mitzvah of Yibum and her Zikah to the other brother was
removed; consequently, the second sister is not forbidden to that brother as "Achos Zekukaso."
Rashi adds, "Isura d'Avad Avad" -- even though he transgressed an Isur (of marrying "Achos
Zekukaso"), the act is already done. If the Zikah is removed retroactively, Rashi should not call
the act an Isur at all; the first sister (who did Yibum with the first brother) was never Zekukah to
the second brother and thus her sister was completely permitted to him!

The words of Rashi here are difficult to reconcile with the words of Rashi earlier in the Mishnah
(DH Ein Motzi'in). Rashi there writes that when two brothers do Yibum with two sisters, when the
second one does Yibum he removes the Zikah and the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" from the first
brother retroactively, such that the first brother was never Zekukah to the second woman (and thus
when he did Yibum with the first sister, he did not transgress the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso"). Rashi

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clearly says that the Zikah is removed retroactively. If he means that the Zikah is merely removed
from the point of Yibum onwards (and until that point she was considered Zekukah to each
brother), why should her Yibum (or Chalitzah) permit her sister to marry the other brother? The
other brother should be prohibited to her, just as a man who was once married to a woman and
divorced her remains prohibited to her sisters (the marriage bond that once existed between the
man and the woman is not removed retroactively).

Moreover, the Gemara earlier (17b) teaches that when a man betrothed (with Kidushin) the sister
of his Yevamah (his "Achos Zekukaso"), he is instructed to wait until his brother does Yibum with
the Yevamah. Once Yibum is done, the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" is removed because the
Yevamah is no longer Zekukah to the first brother. The Gemara there clearly teaches that once
Yibum is done, no Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" remains. It must be that the Zikah is uprooted
retroactively.

Why, then, does Rashi here write that the reason why the second woman is prohibited to the second
brother is that she became prohibited for one moment and thus remains so forever? Why is the
Zikah not removed retroactively?

(a) Perhaps the Zikah indeed is removed retroactively, as Rashi writes earlier (23b). Why, then,
does Rashi write in the end of the Mishnah that one of the brothers transgressed an Isur ("Isura
d'Avad Avad") when he did Yibum with one of the sisters before the other brother did Chalitzah
with the other sister, if the Zikah is removed retroactively when Chalitzah is done? At the moment
the brother did Yibum, he had no way of knowing that his brother definitely would do Chalitzah
or Yibum with the second sister and thereby uproot her Zikah retroactively (in case she was the
real Yevamah). At the time he lived with the first sister, she was "Achos Zekukaso" even though
the Zikah indeed was later uprooted retroactively, because his act -- at the moment that he did it -
- was forbidden.

Also, in the case of the four brothers (26a), Rashi writes that each Yevamah was "Ne'esrah" for
one moment because of the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso." Although the Isur is removed once the
second brother does Chalitzah, at the time the first brother does Yibum (before the other brother
does Chalitzah) his act is forbidden because he had no way of knowing that his brother would do
Chalitzah. The Safek is not merely what the reality is (i.e. which sister is the real Yevamah), but
what will occur in the future. (This dichotomy is more easily understood according to the opinion
of "Ein Bereirah" -- when the status of an object is unknown at the present time, a future occurrence
cannot determine its status retroactively. The uncertain status of the woman with whom the first
brother did Yibum cannot be clarified based on the future event of the second brother doing
Chalitzah with her sister. This case is not similar to the case in the Mishnah earlier (23b) in which
the doubt is merely which woman was married to the deceased brother, where the only missing
information is information which presently exists in the world but is unknown, in contrast to
information which will come about only when a future event occurs.)

(b) The RASHASH suggests that the word "l'Mafrei'a" ("retroactively") in Rashi (on 23b) is an
error. Rashi does not mean that the Zikah is removed retroactively, but rather that the Isur is
removed only from the time of Yibum or Chalitzah. She became "Ne'esrah" for one moment

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because there was Zikah before the Yibum was done. That is why Rashi says that the brother
transgressed an Isur at the moment he did Yibum with her.

The Rashash does not address the question of why "Achos Zekukaso" is permitted once the second
brother does Yibum or Chalitzah with the other sister. The answer may be that the Chachamim
compare "Achos Zekukaso" after the Zekukah does Chalitzah (and the Isur of Zikah is removed)
to an "Achos Ishto" after the death of the wife -- in which case the surviving sister is permitted,
and not to an "Achos Ishto" after the divorce of the wife. In the case of an "Achos Ishto" after the
divorce of the wife, it is the action of the husband which removes the Ishus, the bond of marriage,
from his wife (the first sister). When it is his action that removes it, the Torah does not permit him
to marry the woman's sisters. In contrast, in the case of the husband's death it is not the action of
the husband that removes the Ishus from his wife, the first sister. Similarly, when the second
brother does Yibum or Chalitzah with his Zekukah, it is not the action of the remaining brother
that removes the Zikah between him and the Yevamah. Therefore, the case of "Achos Zekukaso"
is comparable to a case of an "Achos Ishto" after the death of the man's wife, the first sister, in
which case the second sister is permitted to him. (According to this logic,
the mother or daughter of all of the Zekukos will be prohibited to all of the brothers even after one
brother does Yibum or Chalitzah.)

RASHI'S EXPLANATION FOR THE GEMARA'S CONTRADICTION

The Gemara points out a contradiction between Mishnayos. The Mishnah here (23b) discusses a
case of a man who betrothed (with Kidushin) one of two sisters and forgot (or did not know) which
one. If the man dies childless and has two brothers, one brother does Chalitzah with one woman,
and the other brother may do Yibum with the other woman. The Mishnah adds that if, b'Di'eved,
the two brothers did Yibum with both of the sisters before they asked Beis Din what they should
do ("Kadmu v'Kansu"), they are permitted to remain married ("Ein Motzi'in").

The Mishnah later (26a), however, discusses a case of four brothers, two of whom married sisters
and then died childless. The two surviving brothers must do Chalitzah with the two sisters; they
may not do Yibum. The Mishnah adds that if, b'Di'eved, the two brothers did Yibum with the
sisters before they asked Beis Din what they should do ("Kadmu v'Kansu"), they are not permitted
to remain married but must divorce their wives ("Yotzi'u").

There seem to be two points of contradiction between the two Mishnayos. The first difference is
that the Mishnah here permits the second brother to do Yibum after the first brother does Chalitzah,
while the Mishnah later does not permit the second brother to do Yibum. The second difference is
that the Mishnah here says that if, b'Di'eved, both brothers did Yibum, "Ein Motzi'in" -- they do
not have to divorce their wives, while the Mishnah later says that b'Di'eved they do have to divorce
their wives ("Yotzi'u"). Does the Gemara's question address the contradiction with regard to the
first Halachah (what the brothers should do l'Chatchilah) or with regard to the second Halachah
(what the brothers should do b'Di'eved)?

RASHI's words are unclear. He seems to give two different explanations for the Gemara's
contradiction. Rashi first writes (DH 23b, DH Mai Shena) that the Gemara's question is from the
second Halachah of "Kadmu v'Kansu." However, in his next comment (DH Choltzos v'Lo

10
Misyabmos) he writes that the Gemara's question is from the first Halachah -- the Mishnah here
says that the second brother may do Yibum, while the Mishnah later permits neither brother to do
Yibum.

(From the tone of the Gemara itself it seems more likely that the question is from the first Halachah
of the Mishnah. The Gemara does not even quote the second part of the Mishnah of "Kadmu
v'Kansu Ein Motzi'in," as TOSFOS asks in DH u'Mai Shena.)

Rashi also seems to contradict his words when he explains the answer of the Gemara (24a). The
Gemara answers that in the Mishnah later, in the case of the four brothers the Yevamos are
prohibited to each brother either because of "Yesh Zikah" (and thus each one is "Achos Zekukaso")
or because of "Bitul Mitzvas Yevamim." In contrast, the prohibition of the sisters in the case of
the Mishnah here is a Safek Isur, since each sister might be the Yevamah or the sister of the
Yevamah.

Rashi (24a, DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar) first explains the answer of the Gemara according to
the second way he explains the contradiction (that the first Mishnah permits the second brother to
do Yibum, while the second Mishnah prohibits both brothers from doing Yibum). Rashi explains
that the Mishnah later prohibits Yibum because even after one brother does Chalitzah with one of
the sisters, the second sister remains forbidden to the second brother because of the principle,
"Ne'esrah Sha'ah Achas" -- as long as there was one moment during which she was forbidden to
him, she remains forbidden forever. In contrast, in the case of the Mishnah here there is no
prohibition of "Ne'esrah" because the second sister -- if she was not the real Yevamah -- was never
married to the deceased brother and was never forbidden; she was neither a Yevamah nor a Tzarah
of the Yevamah.

However, Rashi continues and explains that the Gemara's answer means that in the Mishnah here,
if, b'Di'eved, the brothers already married the sisters, the reason why they may stay married is that
each brother may claim that his wife is the real Yevamah. In contrast, in the case of the four
brothers, it is known for certain that at least the first brother who did Yibum transgressed the Isur
of "Achos Zekukaso."

This answer, as Rashi explains it, addresses the contradiction between the two Mishnayos in a case
of "Kadmu v'Kansu" -- the Gemara's question according to Rashi's first explanation. If Rashi
understands that the Gemara's question was from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu" (the b'Di'eved
situation) and that its answer addresses the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," why does he mention the
point of "Ne'esrah" which prohibits the brothers from doing Yibum l'Chatchilah?
(RITVA, RASHASH)

Rashi seems to contradict himself in another place as well. In his explanation of the Gemara's
answer, Rashi explains that the Gemara's question is from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu": the
Mishnah here permits them to stay married b'Di'eved, while the Mishnah later requires them to
divorce. The Gemara answers that in the case of the Mishnah here, the brothers who did Yibum
did not transgress any definite Isur.

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However, in the end of his explanation on the Mishnah, Rashi gives a different reason for why
they may stay married if, b'Di'eved, they both did Yibum with the two sisters. Rashi writes that
not only was each brother's act merely a Safek Isur, but even if the first brother did marry the
"Achos Zekukaso" and not the real Yevamah, nevertheless when the second brother does Yibum
he removes the Zikah from the first brother (retroactively) so that the first brother's wife is not
considered "Achos Zekukaso." Neither sister can be called "Achos Zekukaso" (not even out of
doubt) once both did Yibum and all Zikah was removed retroactively.

This is not true in the case of the four brothers. Even after the second brother does Yibum, the first
brother's wife remains forbidden to him because of "Ne'esrah" -- at one moment in the past she
was definitely forbidden to him (when they fell to Yibum, she was definitely his "Achos
Zekukaso"). In the case of the Mishnah here, however, it becomes revealed that each sister was
never forbidden even for a moment: if one woman is the real Yevamah, then she was always
permitted, and if her sister is the real Yevamah, then the first was never married to the deceased
brother nor is she the sister of a woman who is Zekukah to Yibum, because the second brother
removed that Zikah when he did Yibum! (See TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER.)

Moreover, what advantage does each way of understanding the Gemara's question and answer
have over the other way?
It is clear from TOSFOS and the other Rishonim that in their edition of Rashi, Rashi explains that
the question of the Gemara is from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," the b'Di'eved situation.
Apparently, Rashi at a later time retracted his original explanation and added a new explanation to
his commentary. Both explanations were included in our edition of Rashi. (See Appendix to
Insights to Maseches Eruvin, where this phenomenon in the text of Rashi is discussed.)

According to Rashi's original explanation (23b), the question of the Gemara is from the case of
"Kadmu v'Kansu," as the Rishonim quote Rashi. Rashi in the answer of the Gemara also writes (at
the end of DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar) that the Gemara answers its question when it says that in the
case of the Mishnah the Isur is only a Safek Isur, while in the case of the Mishnah later the Isur is
a definite Isur. (This is also the intention of Rashi later, 28a, DH b'Shlama.)

At a later time, Rashi retracted his first explanation and wrote the other comments (23b, DH
Choltzos v'Lo Misyabmos, until the word "Hilkach" in the end of DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar on 24a).
Rashi added a sentence (from the words "v'Iy Nami") in the end of his commentary on the Mishnah,
as well as a sentence (from the words "v'Leis Lei" until the words "Su Lo Mishtaryah") in his
explanation later (27b, DH Mesah Rishonah).

Why did Rashi originally understand that the Gemara's question was from the case of "Kadmu
v'Kansu," the b'Di'eved case mentioned in the Mishnah, if the Gemara does not even quote those
words from the Mishnah?

The RITVA and RASHBA explain that Rashi found the Gemara's answer inconsistent with its
question. Rashi had two difficulties with the Gemara if the Gemara's question was why none of
the brothers (in the Mishnah on 26a) may do Yibum l'Chatchilah. Did the Gemara know that there
is such a concept of "Ne'esrah" when it asked its question, or did it not know of such an Isur? If it
did not know of the Isur of "Ne'esrah," then what is the Gemara's answer? The Gemara, in its

12
answer, cannot mean that there is an Isur of "Ne'esrah" in the case of the Mishnah later (the way
Rashi explains the answer in his first explanation, in DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar), because the Gemara
would not need to add in its answer that in the Mishnah here "perhaps each one [can claim that he]
will get the right sister (the one who is the real Yevamah)." Even if one gets the wrong sister there
is no Isur of "Ne'esrah," and thus each brother is permitted to remain married to the woman with
whom he did Yibum, whether she is the real Yevamah or whether she is the Yevamah's sister.

The second problem which Rashi had with the Gemara's answer, if the Gemara's question was
from the first Halachah of the Mishnah (of doing Yibum l'Chatchilah), was as follows. Rashi
originally maintained that the prohibition against forfeiting the Mitzvah of Yibum ("Isur Bitul
Mitzvas Yevamim") does not remain in force after Zikah is removed. (This Isur is not one which
prohibits the act between that man and that woman, but it is an "external" Isur intended merely to
prevent the forfeiting of a different Mitzvah of Yibum.) Since the Gemara in its answer equates
the opinion of "Yesh Zikah" and the opinion of "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim," it cannot be
saying that the woman is forbidden in the case of the four brothers because of "Ne'esrah" because
the Gemara cannot invoke such a principle ("Ne'esrah") according to the opinion of "Asur l'Vatel
Mitzvas Yevamim." The Gemara's answer must mean something else -- that in the case of the four
brothers, the Chachamim decreed that the brothers should not arrange that one does Chalitzah, and
another do Yibum, because they might reverse the order and thereby violate a definite Isur (of
"Achos Zekukaso" or "Bitul Mitzvas Yibum").

Why, according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah," does the Gemara not simply answer
that in the case of the four brothers, each woman was "Ne'esrah" at one point in time? The Gemara
does not need to rely on the Gezeirah, according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah"! It
must be that the Gemara never had a question according to the opinion of "Yesh Zikah" because it
knew that there is an Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" which prevents the brothers from doing Yibum.
Why, then, does the Gemara ask its question ambiguously, without specifying that the question is
only according to the opinion that maintains "Ein Zikah"? Moreover, why in its answer does the
Gemara make any mention of the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah"?

These questions motivated Rashi to explain that the question of the Gemara is from the second
part of the Mishnah, the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu." Accordingly, the Gemara always knew that in
the case of the Mishnah later (26a) the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" prevents the brothers from doing
Yibum l'Chatchilah, and its only question was why, in the case of the Mishnah here, may the
brothers stay married b'Di'eved, while in the case of the Mishnah later they must divorce their
wives. To this the Gemara answers that in the case of the Mishnah later the brothers committed a
definite Isur, while here they did only a Safek Isur.

After further consideration, Rashi became dissatisfied with this explanation of the Gemara's
question. He reasoned that the question cannot be from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu" because there
is an obvious difference between the Mishnah here and the Mishnah later in a situation of "Kadmu
v'Kansu." In the case of the Mishnah here, no Isur exists after the brothers marry the sisters. In the
case of the Mishnah later, an Isur still exists after the brothers marry the sisters. Accordingly, the
Gemara would not need to answer that one Mishnah (26a) is a case of a definite Isur, and the other
Mishnah (here) is a case of a Safek Isur. The Gemara could have simply answered lfcggygdx1`dd

13
 aawthat in the case of the Mishnah here, the Zikah is removed completely, and the brothers
no longer transgress any Isur by being married to the women!

Rashi therefore revised his explanation and wrote that the Gemara in its question did not know of
the Isur of "Ne'esrah," and it answers that there is an Isur of "Ne'esrah" not only according to the
opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah" but even according to the opinion that maintains that one may
not forfeit the Mitzvah of Yibum. When the Gemara adds that in the case of the Mishnah here,
perhaps each brother gets the right woman, its intention is to answer a different question entirely:
even if there is no Isur to do Chalitzah first and then do Yibum (because there is no problem of
"Ne'esrah"), it should still be Asur d'Rabanan for the second brother to do Yibum because perhaps
the brothers might reverse the order and do Yibum first and then Chalitzah (in which case the first
brother will transgress the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" if the woman with whom he does Yibum is
not the real Yevamah). To this question the Gemara answers that even if the brothers mistakenly
reverse the order, there will be only a Safek Isur of "Achos Zekukaso," and a Safek Isur is not a
valid reason for the Chachamim to prohibit doing Chalitzah and then Yibum due to a concern that
the brothers will reverse the order.

Rashi later (27b) points out that this understanding seems to contradict the words of Rav (27b)
who says that the Isur of "Ne'esrah" does not apply in the case of two sisters who fall to one brother.
If, according to the opinion that maintains "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim," the rule of "Ne'esrah"
cannot apply (because the Isur of "Bitul Mitzvas Yibum" is not strong enough to give her the status
of Asur for one moment), then Rav might follow that opinion (see Tosfos 27b, DH Aval).
However, according to Rashi's second way of explaining the Gemara, the Gemara concludes that
"Ne'esrah" always applies, even according to the opinion that maintains "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas
Yevamim." It must be that Rav there argues with the Gemara here.

WHO DOES YIBUM -- THE "BECHOR" OR THE "GADOL" OF THE

BROTHERS?

The Gemara says that the Mitzvah of Yibum is upon the oldest brother of the deceased husband.
If he declines to do Yibum, Beis Din asks a younger brother. If none of the younger brothers want
to do Yibum, Beis Din forces the oldest brother to do Yibum.

The Gemara derives that the Mitzvah of Yibum is upon the oldest brother from the verse,
"v'Hayah ha'Bechor" (Devarim 25:6). The Gemara asks that perhaps the verse teaches that the
Mitzvah of Yibum applies only when there is a Bechor (firstborn son), and it does not apply at all
when there is no Bechor. What is the source that Yibum applies even when the oldest brother is
not a Bechor?

The Gemara answers that the verse teaches that "just as the Bechorah of the Bechor causes him [to
have the Mitzvah of Yibum], so, too, the seniority of the oldest son causes him [to have the Mitzvah
of Yibum]."

The Gemara's answer is difficult to understand. A Bechor is special not because he is the oldest
but because he is the firstborn. A number of unique laws apply exclusively to a Bechor and not to

14
a brother who happens to be the oldest of the siblings (such as Pidyon ha'Ben and the right to
inherit a double portion). Why does the Gemara assert that the oldest son is special like a Bechor?

The RASHBA explains that as far as Yibum is concerned, it is clear that the Gemara rejects its
original assumption that a Bechor is unique by virtue of the fact that he is the firstborn. As far as
Yibum is concerned, the fact that a brother is the firstborn is not relevant; it makes no difference
whether he is the Bechor or he is the oldest. What is relevant is the brother's age. If he is the oldest
son, the Mitzvah of Yibum falls on his shoulders first. The age makes a difference because it is
appropriate for the oldest brother to take responsibility for the deceased brother's family. If he
shirks his responsibility, it falls to the younger brothers.

(When the Gemara says that "the Bechorah of the Bechor causes him [to have the Mitzvah of
Yibum]," it refers to his age and means that the fact that he is the oldest -- and not the fact that he
is the firstborn -- causes him to have the Mitzvah of Yibum.)

IMPURE MOTIVES
The Gemara discusses the validity of the conversion of a Nochri who seeks to become Jewish only
to receive the benefits that a Jew receives. It is clear that even according to the opinion that an
insincere conversion is valid, Beis Din may not accept such a convert l'Chatchilah
(see SHULCHAN ARUCH 268:12).

This ruling seems to conflict with the conduct of Hillel. The Gemara in Shabbos (31a) relates that
a Nochri once learned of the honor afforded to the Kohen Gadol. He came to Hillel and requested
that he be converted so that he could become a Kohen Gadol. Hillel converted him and told him
to go learn the laws of Kehunah Gedolah.

Why did Hillel accept the convert if the Gemara here forbids accepting an insincere convert?

(a) The MAHARSHA in Shabbos explains that Hillel did not actually convert the Nochri upon
request. Rather, Hillel told the Nochri to go learn the laws of Kehunah Gedolah before he
converted. Even after he discovered that he could not become a Kohen Gadol, he still desired to
become Jewish, and thus Hillel converted him.

However, this answer raises another problem. Why was Hillel allowed to teach Torah to a Nochri
before he converted? The Gemara in Chagigah (13a) rules that one may not teach Torah to a
Nochri. Similarly, the Gemara in Sanhedrin (59a) states that a Nochri who learns Torah is Chayav
Misah. The Maharsha answers that for purposes of conversion, one is permitted to teach Torah to
a Nochri.

(b) TOSFOS here suggests that Hillel saw that the Nochri was sincere and that he would convert
even if he could not become a Kohen Gadol, and therefore he converted him.

15
REBBI AKIVA EIGER points out that the words of Tosfos refute the assertion of the Maharsha
that one may teach Torah to a Nochri for purposes of conversion. Tosfos implies that Hillel "took
a chance" by converting the Nochri without immutable evidence that he was sincere. Accordingly,
Tosfos understands that Hillel did not teach the laws of Kehunah Gedolah to the Nochri before he
converted, for had he taught the Nochri those laws, he would have known beyond a doubt that the
Nochri's motivation was sincere. Hillel deliberately waited until after he converted the Nochri in
order to teach Torah to him.

Converting From a Desire to Marry

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:

It is well-known that Judaism does not actively proselytize, and even when prospective converts
approach the beit din (the Jewish court), they are first discouraged from converting. Only after
being told of the difficulties of life as a member of the Jewish community will the convert be
accepted, once we are convinced that their desire to become a Jew is sincere.

The Mishna on our daf discusses a not uncommon (but problematic) reason for conversion – a
desire to marry. The Mishna teaches that someone who has a relationship with a non-Jewish
woman should not marry her after she converts. Apparently, there is a concern that the conversion
may have been done for the wrong reasons, which we would like to discourage. Nevertheless, if
he does marry her, we do not obligate him to divorce her.

The Gemara points out that although we are uncomfortable with the idea that a convert will marry
a person with whom he or she had a prior relationship, the Mishna appears to accept the conversion
as valid. This is a clear rejection of the position that if a person converts because they see material
advantages to being a member of the Jewish community (see, for example, Megillat Esther 8:17)
their conversion is invalid.

The Nimukei Yosef and others explain that conversion is acceptable even if it was done for the
wrong reasons because we assume that the person who converts truly accepts the requirements
willingly, even if the process that brought them to convert was suspect. From the Rambam it
appears that it is more of a technical question, and once a person has converted, we accept their
present status quo state as a Jew.

The Gemara concludes by bringing a baraita that teaches that during the time that King David and
King Solomon ruled, converts were not accepted, nor will they be in the days of the Messiah.

16
In our daf we find the interesting sugya of geirus sheloh l’shem shomayim, conversions done for
ulterior purposes.4

The Tannaim disputed if they are valid, and the Gemara concludes that they are. The big question
on this is, why is it valid, if it wasn’t done intending to join the Jewish faith? The Rishonim and
Achronim discussed this at length.

The Ritva maintains that although done for some personal gain, we assume they accepted Judaism
sincerely. On the other hand, the Hagahos Mordechai (Daf 47) demands that we see them carrying
out the mitzvos. If not, they are not valid converts. The Rambam seems to be a middle ground. In
Hilchos Issurei Biyah (13:14-17) he elaborates on the conversion process: When a non-Jew
approaches us to convert, we must first investigate his or her reasons for converting.

Only if we establish that their intentions are pure do we proceed to the next stage of informing
them about the severity of mitzvos and aveiros. “If they accept and don’t give up, and we see they
turn away [from their former religion] out of love, we accept them.”

The Rambam explains that the wives of Shlomo Hamelech and Shimshon, although converted
before they married them, did so only to achieve personal gains and that is why they eventually
showed their true colors. They worshipped idols and built shrines for them, and Shimshon’s wife
betrayed him.

However, the Rambam concludes, if one did become a ger for external purposes, he is a Jew, a
Yisroel mumar (apostate). These three sources in the Rishonim have been debated by the
Achronim down to our times!

Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzeski in his Achiezer (Vol. 3:26) was asked about the following geirus
case. A Jewish man got married to a non-Jew r”l in America, and then came to Europe, requesting
that his wife be converted. The writer noted that if the Rabbis were to refuse, the couple would
probably go to a Reform Rabbi, who would do a conversion not halachically acceptable.

Rav Grodzeski gave his approval for the geirus, basing it on a landmark teshuva of the Rambam.
Although conversion for purposes of marriage is not allowed, in extenuating circumstances it may
be permitted. These include if they threaten to leave the faith entirely, or in times of war and

4
https://res.cloudinary.com/ouinternal/image/upload/v1594990793/outorah%20pdf/Yevamos_024_EnglishTopicsonChoveres.pdf

17
upheaval. In this case, where they were already together, the conversion was not “in order to get
married” – they already were! – but simply to improve the situation. And even though it seemed
apparent she wouldn’t keep the mitzvos, there was not an explicit resolution of defiance.

However, the Dvar Avraham (Vol. 3:28) took issue with his hetter. The Ritva we quoted does say
that geirim probably will accept Yiddishkeit earnestly, but the paradigm for his concept is the
sugya of “telyuhu v’zavin,” when someone is coerced to sell his item. There, explains the Dvar
Avraham, the circumstances are such that the seller knows he can’t do anything about it (the buyer
is too influential or powerful to fight with him), and so he sells it in a permanent way. But by
geirus, there is no pressure to keep the mitzvos, in our day and age!

Perhaps in earlier generations, when Jewish courts enforced kiyum hamitzvos, we could assume
geirim would do them. Today is vastly different, so there is no basis to assume acceptance of the
mitzvos – and the geirus is not valid.

Teshuvos Imrei Yosher (Siman 176) refuted the other sevara, that they were already married so it
was not considered sheloh l’shem shomayim. The fact that the man wanted her converted
obviously indicated that he would gain by it: he could live with his wife in propriety. That, too, is
an ulterior motive!

Rabbi Moshe Feinstein penned a letter while still rav in Europe stating emphatically that unless
one accepts to fulfill the mitzvos, geirus is totally invalid. Even if he says he accepts but we
understand he is lying, it is not a geirus (Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:157). In another teshuva (Even
Ha’ezer 4:7) he cites the Rambam’s opinion that if geirus was done, even if kabalas mitzvos wasn’t
ascertained, it stands b’dieved.

(The story there was also of a gentile woman married to a Jew, and after her conversion she
seemed to keep the Torah until some years later when she threw off all vestiges of Judaism. The
question was if the husband needed to give her a get, or was the conversion never valid? Rav
Moshe ruled that it was, and he must give her a get.)

One last teshuva is from the Minchas Yitzchak, who was sought out by the Rabbi of Buenos Aries,
who bemoaned the spiritual situation there, where many Jews were marrying non-Jews. Could
geirus be done for them to at least solve that problem, or is the fact that they were totally irreligious
preclude it?

The Minchas Yitzchak mentions differing opinions about the propriety of converting people who
will certainly not keep the Torah. Although they will be punished for their aveiros, at least
eventually they could enter Gan Eden. On the other hand, for the husband, it is more severe to be
married to a Jewess and not adhere to family purity, than to be married to a goy.

In this case, though, he dismisses the advantages of geirus, because without an honest kabalas
mitzvos it is not a geirus. Tosfos implies as such when he explains that Kusim are not real geirim
since they were worshipping idols all the while – and even though they said they would do the
mitzvos! Unfortunately, he could not procure a hetter (Vol. 6:107).

18
The Mordechai writes that even at times when converts are not accepted, if the convert is especially
determined, he or she may be allowed to join our ranks.5

The proof for this is found in Sanhedrin (99b), where Timna, the common-law wife of Elifaz (the
son of Eisav), wanted to convert to be Jewish. She approached Avraham, but he shunned her. She
asked for guidance from Yitzchok and Yaakov, but they also denied her request.

She finally decided to agree to be a common-law wife to Elifaz, figuring that it was better to be a
maid to the Jewish enclave, even at the expense of losing the aristocratic status she maintained
among other nations.

The Gemara then makes a startling observation: Eventually, the descendant of this union was
Amalek (see Bereshis 36:12), the sinister symbol of cruelty and anarchy, the arch-enemy of the
Jews. We see that it was not proper for this woman to be denied her yearning.

If a person cares to this extent to convert, he should be accepted, and if not, the result might be an
enemy of the Jewish people. Based upon this insight, Toras Aharon (Parashas Yisro) explains the
Gemara (Zevachim 116a) which teaches that according to one opinion, Yisro came to convert after
hearing about the battle with Amalek. The question is clear. Yisro had heard about the parting of
the waters of Yam Suf, and of the miracles of Egypt, as the verse states (Shemos 18:1).

Were none of these other miracles impressive enough to convince Yisro to come to convert? We
can say, however, that the truth is that it was the wonderful miracles of the exodus which convinced
him to come to convert. However, Yisro was concerned that his gestures would be turned down.
The Jews were enjoying direct divine protection, and, as such, any efforts of converts to join their
ranks would be suspect.

When Yisro heard about the battle of Amalek, this reminded him that a convert will be accepted
if he comes with a tenacious intensity, which was the lesson learned from the episode of Timna,
the mother of Amalek. He knew, therefore, that his efforts would not be in vain, and this is why
he came at this point.

Someone suspected of cohabiting with a non-Jewish woman, and she converted to Judaism, he
may not marry her but if he did we do not require him to divorce her.

5
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yevamos%20024.pdf

19
Rishonim disagree about the reason one who was suspected of cohabiting with a non-Jewish
woman is not permitted to marry her even if she converts to Judaism. According to Rashi (1) the
concern is that if he marries her after her conversion it appears to confirm the suspicion that he
was cohabiting with a non-Jew. The implication of Rashi’s explanation is that the couple would
be required to divorce if there was confirmation that this couple had relations.

Other Rishonim (2) disagree and maintain that the couple would not be required to divorce even
if there was confirmation that the couple had relations before her conversion, and the reason they
should not marry is that her conversion is suspect that it was done for ulterior motives.

There was once a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman who had a civil marriage and then
approached a Beis Din to convert her to Judaism. The Beis Din inquired of Rav Chaim Ozer
Grodzinski (3), the Achiezer, whether they could convert this woman and if they could, would it
be permitted for the couple to marry.

Achiezer responded that seemingly it should be prohibited to convert this woman because of the
Rishonim who are suspicious that her conversion was done for ulterior motives. One could even
suggest that although Rashi offers a different interpretation of the Gemara, nevertheless, he would
agree that a person should not be converted if there is a suspicion that the conversion was done for
ulterior motives.

Achiezer proceeds to cite the opinion of Rav Chaim of Sanz (4), the Divrei Chaim, who was asked
a similar question. Although his initial inclination was to prohibit the man from marrying this
woman, in his final analysis he refrained from issuing a definitive ruling. The reason was that the
man in that case threatened to remain with that woman even if they would not grant him permission
to marry, and Divrei Chaim entertained the possibility that he should be allowed to marry her to
prevent him from violating a greater prohibition.

Accordingly, Achiezer concluded that although the couple should not be given permission to marry
in his case if they are already married it would not be required to force them to divorce.

The Divrei Torah of Munkacz, zt”l, would make use of a story to explain a possible meaning of
the many times that Rav Sheshes said about his mentor, Rav: “When Rav was asleep he said this
teaching.”

20
“The Arizal was known for his deep and penetrating analysis of every mitzvah, custom, and verse
of the Torah. He revealed a very rich and complex level of interpretation. In actual fact, despite
their greatness, neither the Beis Yosef, zt”l, nor the Alshich, zt”l, merited to study the inner secrets
of the Torah with the Arizal. Their souls simply did not require this particular rectification. When
they insisted on coming to the shiur over the objection of the Arizal that this level of Torah was
not what their neshamos needed, they would fall asleep!

Clearly, not all people need to learn nistar for their rectification, and a mere aptitude for the study
was not enough to become a student of the Arizal. A tremendous amount of yiras shomayim and
a great knowledge of the revealed levels of Torah were prerequisites for this distinction.
Furthermore, the Arizal (and Rav Chaim Vital, zt”l) only accepted students who displayed sterling
integrity.

One of these students came to the home of the Arizal one Shabbos afternoon, but when he saw that
his teacher was still taking his customary Shabbos rest he decided to withdraw. Just then, the
student noticed that his teacher’s lips were moving. He approached his revered master and bent
over to hear if he could grasp the meaning of his teacher’s words.

At this point, the Arizal awoke and said, “When I sleep, I grasp very deep secrets. It would literally
take me years to teach you what I learned just now in my sleep!” The Divrei Torah concluded,
“This is what Rav Sheshes means. ‘My master must have uttered this while asleep. Perhaps it
doesn’t mean what its plain meaning seems to indicate.’

There is no chutzpah in this statement at all! This is especially true according to the opinion that
Rav was Rebbi Abba, who wrote the Zohar HaKadosh. Rav Sheshes was hinting that this statement
of Rav was really divrei Kabbalah and was not a statement about the revealed Torah at all!”

Priority sibling.
RABBI ELLIOT GOLDBERG WRITES:6

As we know, when a man dies childless, his brother becomes obligated to enter into a levirate
marriage with his widow with the goal of producing a child through whom the deceased brother’s
lineage can live on. But what happens when the man has more than one brother? Does the
obligation for yibbum fall equally to them all or is there a system by which a particular brother is
selected for the role?

The Torah verse from which levirate marriage is derived makes no distinction among the surviving
brothers. Deuteronomy 25:5-6 states: “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies, and he has
no child … the wife’s brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his
wife and consummate the levirate marriage. And it shall be that the firstborn that she bears shall
be established in the name of his dead brother and his name will not be blotted out of Israel.”

6
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/yevamot-24/

21
On our daf, we have a mishnah that says differently:

It is a mitzvah for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage, but if a younger brother
consummated the levirate marriage first, he acquires (the yevama as his wife).

According to the mishnah, the obligation of yibbum falls to the eldest brother. But if another
brother acts first, his actions fulfill the requirements for yibbum.

How does the mishnah get here from the Torah verse, which says nothing about the elder brother
taking priority? The Gemara brings a beraita that explains it:

The sages taught: “And it shall be that the firstborn,” from here they derive that the mitzvah
to consummate the levirate marriage is upon the eldest brother.

Instead of reading the reference to “the firstborn” in Deuteronomy as referring to the child, the
beraita connects it to the previous verse, which mentions the widow’s brother-in-law. Who shall
be the yavam? The one that is firstborn — i.e. the eldest brother. The biblical verse thus becomes
a prooftext for the statement in the mishnah.

The beraita continues reading the verse this way:

“He shall be established in the name of his dead brother” — to inheritance.

The beraita goes on to read the phrase “he shall be established” as referring not to the child who
will carry on the name of the dead brother, but to the surviving brother who becomes the yavam
and inherits the estate of his dead sibling. But if the purpose of a levirate marriage is to establish a
legacy for a man who dies childless, wouldn’t it make more sense for the child to inherit the
property of the deceased? Why would it be assigned to the brother?

There may be a practical reason for this: At the moment when the man dies, there is no child to
take ownership of his property. If yibbum were not a factor — for example, if the dead brother’s
children predeceased him — the brother’s estate would be divided equally amongst his siblings.
But when yibbum is a factor, as the beraita indicates, the estate is inherited by the yavam.

The yavam might also be given the brother’s inheritance because by engaging in levirate marriage,
he now has the obligation to support his new wife and the children they bear. Further, if the levirate
marriage does produce a child, the father can choose to pass along the inherited property to the
child who bears his brother’s name. So if a particular brother is assigned to be the yavam, it makes
some sense to assign him his brother’s assets as well.

Although the beraita’s reading of the biblical text may seem forced, the system it establishes
provides clarity and direction for a situation not clearly addressed by the biblical verses.

22
Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:7

I have previously explained that Massechet Yevamot contains much material about conversion,
and given this, I would like to make reference to a teaching from the Beraita about Jewish
conversion policy found in our daf (Yevamot 24b) where we are taught that ‫אין מקבלים גרים לימות‬
‫‘ – המשיח‬conversions won’t be performed in the Messianic era’ (i.e. when Jews will not be
persecuted), and ‫‘ – כיוצא בו‬similarly’, ‫‘ – לא קבלו גרים לא בימי דוד ולא בימי שלמה‬conversions weren’t
performed either in the time of David or Solomon’s reign’ (i.e. when the Jewish people were strong
and could overcome their enemies).

And what is the reason for this conversion policy? It is seemingly due to two reasons, which –
though they don’t necessarily manifest themselves together – are both fundamental demands for a
convert: sincerity, and loyalty.

In terms of ‘sincerity’, our Gemara expresses concern that when life seems attractive as a Jew then
some non-Jews may be attracted to convert even though they don’t sincerely want to be Jewish.
Interestingly, we have a tradition that when the many miracles that we recount on Seder night were
wrought on the Jewish people, Moshe made the decision to allow a large group of Egyptians to
covert to Judaism (to become what is known as the ‘Erev Rav’). However, we are later taught that
it was the Erev Rav who led the efforts to build the Golden Calf, which is why – as the Or HaChaim
explains (in his commentary on Shemot 32:10) – God chided Moshe, “your people, whom you
brought out of Egypt, are acting ruinously” (Shemot 32:7). Given all this, it was decided that to
avoid the repeat of past mistakes, conversions wouldn’t be performed when life looks good for a
Jew such as during the reign of David, Solomon and in the Messianic Era.

However, there is a second reason for this policy relating to ‘loyalty’, which is that being a Jew
isn’t just about being proud of Jews and Judaism when things are going well and when Jews are
not being persecuted, but also about standing by Jews and Judaism when things are tough and
when your brethren are being persecuted. As Rav Soloveitchik explains, ‘The Jew who believes
in Knesset Israel is the Jew who lives as part of it wherever it is and is willing to give his life for
it, feels its pain, rejoice with it, fights in its wars, groans at its defeats and celebrates its victories’
(On Repentance p. 62)8.

Yet there is a difference between these two reasons, because while both are demands of a convert,
and while the former doesn’t apply in its strictest sense to a Jew from birth, nevertheless, and as
emphasized by Rav Soloveitchik, the latter does.

7
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com
8
First Maggid Edition, 2017 Maggid Books An imprint of Koren Publishers Jerusalem Ltd. ed Pinchas Peli

23
RAV CHAIM NAVON WRITES:9

In recent years, following the massive aliya from the former Soviet Union, an aliya that
included many non-Jews in its ranks, conversion has become a real and acute problem. There is a
serious disagreement between the religious and the non-religious communities, and even within
the religious community itself, regarding the degree to which we should be stringent about the
conversion process. The disagreement focuses on Halakha's requirement of kabbalat ha-mitzvot,
acceptance of the Torah's commandments.

The conversion process requires that the prospective proselyte accept upon himself observance of
the mitzvot; if he fails to do so, his conversion is invalid. In this lecture we shall deal with the
proselyte's obligation to accept the mitzvot, both ideally (lekhatchila) and after the fact (bedi'eved).

ACCEPTANCE OF THE MITZVOT

Acceptance of the mitzvot as a requirement for conversion follows from the Gemara
in Yebamot:

9
https://etzion.org.il/en/halakha/yoreh-deah/topics-yoreh-deah/acceptance-mitzvot-requirement-conversion

24
 It follows from this Gemara that the prospective proselyte is twice informed about
acceptance of the mitzvot: once when he first comes to become a proselyte, in order to examine
how well he understands the significance of joining the Jewish people and how prepared he is to
do so; and a second time when he immerses in a mikve, as part of the conversion process itself.

The Gemara in Bekhorot says that if the prospective proselyte refuses to accept some of
the mitzvot, he cannot become a proselyte:

We see then that, at least lekhatchila, acceptance of the mitzvot is an indispensable

requirement for conversion. What, however, is the law bedi'eved, if a person already underwent
the conversion process, but failed to accept upon himself observance of the mitzvot? Let us open
the discussion with what the Rambam says on this issue:

Do not think that Shimshon, the savior of Israel, or Shelomo, the king of Israel, who was
called 'the beloved of God,' married foreign, gentile women. Rather, the truth of the matter
is as follows: The proper procedure is that when a male or female convert comes to
convert, we check him to see if perhaps he has come to join the religion because of money
that he will receive or for a certain position that he will attain, or because of fear. If he is
a man, we check him to see if he desired a certain Jewish woman, and if she is a woman,
we check to see if perhaps she desired a man among Jewish men. If no ulterior motive is
found, we inform them of the weight of the yoke of Torah and the burden involved in its
performance among the masses, in order that they will renege. If they accepted and did

25
 not retreat, and we saw them return [from idolatry] with love, we accept them, as it says,
"She saw how determined she was to go with her, and she ceased to argue with her."
Therefore, the court did not accept converts throughout the period of David and Shelomo:
during the time of David - lest they returned out of fear; during the time of Shelomo - lest
they returned because of the kingship and the goodness and greatness with which Israel
lived, for whoever returns from idolatry for any of the vanities of the world is not among
the righteous converts. Nevertheless, there were many converts who converted during the
period of David and Shelomo before untrained [courts]. The High Court was suspicious
of them: they did not reject them, as they had, after all, immersed [for purposes of
conversion], nor did they embrace them until they would see what would eventually
happen."[2]

Since Shelomo converted women and married them, and Shimshon, too, converted
[women] and married [them], and it was known that these [women] returned [from
idolatry] only for a specific motive, and they were not converted by the authorization of
the court, Scripture considered them gentiles who remained forbidden [for a Jew to
marry]. What more, the way they turned out proved their initial motives, for they
worshipped their gods and built for themselves private altars, and Scripture considered
him [Shelomo] as having himself built them, as it says: "Then did Shelomo construct an
altar."

A convert who was not checked or was not informed of the commandments and their
punishment and was circumcised and immersed in the presence of three standard judges
is a convert, even if it becomes known that he converted for some ulterior motive. Since
he was circumcised and immersed, he is divested of the status of gentiles, and we are
suspicious of him until his righteousness is affirmed.[3] Even if he again worships idols,
he is like a Jewish apostate whose betrothals are valid and whose lost items there is
a mitzva to return. Since he immersed, he becomes the same as a Jew. Shimshon and
Shelomo therefore kept their wives even though their true nature was revealed.

For this reason the Sages have said: Converts are difficult for Israel like a plague of
leprosy. For most of them return for some ulterior motive, and deceive Israel, and it is
difficult to separate from them after they have converted. (Rambam, Hilkhot Issurei
Bi'a 13:14-18)

Some of the Rambam's commentators have understood from what he says here
that, bedi'eved, acceptance of the mitzvot is not an indispensable requirement for conversion.[4] It
may perhaps be suggested that, according to the Rambam, acceptance of the mitzvot is not an
element of the conversion process itself, but only a preparatory stage, intended to test the
proselyte's motivation. Other authorities have understood that, even according to the Rambam,
acceptance of the mitzvot is indispensable. What is not necessary, bedi'eved, is offering the
proselyte detailed information and explanation regarding the mitzvot.[5]

In any event, other Rishonim have explicitly ruled that acceptance of the mitzvot is indeed
an indispensable requirement for conversion. Thus writes the Shulchan Arukh:

26
 In actual practice, more recent authorities have been inclined to rule that acceptance of
the mitzvot is an indispensable requirement for conversion. Rav Goren relied on this ruling even
when it led to a leniency. He ruled that a certain set of siblings were not to be
considered mamzerim, because their father, who claimed to be a convert, had never properly
accepted the mitzvot, and so he was not a Jew.

Mention should be made of a sole dissenting opinion of Rav Uziel, who went as far as to
say that acceptance of the mitzvot is not required even lekhatchila (lekhatchila, the prospective
proselyte must be informed about the mitzvot, but he is not required to accept their observance):

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN "ACCEPTANCE OF THE MITZVOT?"

We have seen above that if a proselyte accepts that he will observe all the mitzvot except
for one, this is not regarded as a valid acceptance of the mitzvot.[7] Responsa Achi'ezer limits the
application of this law:

Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses the case of a woman who at the time of her conversion had
considered the possibility of working on an upcoming Yom Tov, for fear that otherwise she would
be fired. He too presents a similar argument:

27
 The Iggerot Moshe has another novel position regarding conversion. In the course of a
discussion regarding a woman who underwent conversion before a Conservative court, the Iggerot
Moshe writes as follows:

According to the Iggerot Moshe, the essence of accepting the yoke of the mitzvot is the
desire "to be like all the Jews" – that is, "to be a good Jew." If the proselyte believes that even a
good Jew is not required to observe all the mitzvot, there is no deficiency in his acceptance of
the mitzvot. Clearly, however, this argument cannot stand on its own; it is brought merely as a
supporting argument in a bedi'eved situation.

The Seridei Esh relates to the case of a Jew who had been living with a non-Jewess by way
of a civil marriage, and now his wife wishes to convert. While he is inclined to be stringent,
the Seridei Esh writes that such a case should be regarded as a situation of great need [she'at ha-
dechak], and there are authorities upon whom to rely for leniency, under certain conditions:

28
"THOUGHTS OF THE HEART"

Yet another acute issue that arises in this context is that of "thoughts of the heart." What is
the law in the case of a proselyte who proclaims his intention to observe the mitzvot, but in his
heart does not really intend to do so? The Gemara states that even if it becomes clear that a
proselyte had converted for some ulterior motive, his conversion is nevertheless valid:

It would seem that we should conclude from this passage that we do not consider the
ulterior motives of proselytes who convert for some other reason and have no intention of
observing the mitzvot. For our part, if they have undergone the process of conversion, they are
regarded, bedi'eved, as full-fledged Jews. The author of Responsa Bet Yitzchak, however, writes
differently:

According to the Bet Yitzchak, the Gemara is dealing with the case of a proselyte who
converts for some ulterior motive, but once he converts fully intends to observe the mitzvot. But if
at the time of his conversion, the proselyte knows that he has no intention of observing the mitzvot,
his conversion has no validity whatsoever. And indeed, on the theoretical level, it is very easy to
distinguish between the motivation for conversion and the question whether the proselyte accepts
upon himself to observe the mitzvot.

29
 There is, however, another novelty in the position of the Bet Yitzchak, namely, that the rule
that "thoughts of the heart are of no consequence" does not apply to conversion. This is by no
means necessary. Thus, even if the Gemara in Yevamot does not prove that bedi'eved, even if a
proselyte had no inner intention to observe the mitzvot, his conversion is nevertheless valid - there
is still room for leniency based on the principle that "thoughts of the heart are of no consequence."
Indeed, many authorities, including R. Kook, reject this novel position of the Bet Yitzchak:

According to this understanding, there is room for great leniency on the practical level in
cases where the proselyte declares that it is his intention to observe the mitzvot, even if it is later
proven that he had lied. This, however, is only true when the proselyte's reservations about
observing the mitzvot fall into the category of "thoughts of the heart." There are, however, cases
where it is clear that he is lying, and in our "clear assessment" (umdena demukhach), he has no
intention to observe the mitzvot. In such a case, the Iggerot Moshe rules that his conversion is
invalid:

However, R. David Tzvi Hoffmann classified a similar case as "thoughts of the heart" that
have no legal consequence. He was dealing with a case of a non-Jewess who had married a kohen,
and now wishes to convert. The question arose whether she may be accepted as a convert, when
we know that she will continue to live with the kohen, to whom she is forbidden:

When R. Goren was asked about a proselyte who wished to live in a secular kibbutz, he
sent his representatives to examine whether it was technically possible for the proselyte to obtain
kosher food and observe the mitzvot on the kibbutz.

30
 Since it is technically possible, we cannot apply the principle of anan sahadi – we are
witnesses, since there is no absolute certainty that she is lying.[10]10

FOOTNOTES:
[1] Rashi explains that since financial considerations are very important to a non-Jew, the prospective proselyte may decide not to
convert when he hears that he will have to give the various gifts to the poor.
[2] In light of what he says in the continuation, this should perhaps be understood to mean that we do not embrace them, but
nevertheless they are regarded as Jews.
[3] Here too we may interpret "we are suspicious of him" to mean, not that we invalidate his conversion bedi'eved, but that we
examine him to see whether he is a good Jew, without this having any ramifications regarding the validity of his conversion. This
does have ramifications regarding his credibility regarding forbidden foods, and the like. See Respona Da'at Kohen, no. 153.
[4] See, for example, Maggid Mishne, ad loc., halakha 17.
[5] Responsa Chemdat Shelomo, Yore De'a, no. 29, letter 22; Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Yore De'a, I, no. 159. The author
of Chemdat Shelomo writes that, according to the Rambam, immersion in a mikve before a rabbinic court for the purpose of
conversion constitutes implicit acceptance of the mitzvot. The Iggerot Moshe understands that the wives of Shelomo and Shimshon
returned to their idol worship only much later, and so their later conduct proved nothing about their original intentions. This is not
true regarding a proselyte who immediately turns to idol worship, in which case the conversion is invalid (Iggerot Moshe, Yore
De'a, III, no. 108).
[6] Afterwards, the Shulchan Arukh also cites the words of the Rambam, a fact that supports the Acharonim who understood that
the Rambam agrees that acceptance of the mitzvot is an indispensable requirement for conversion, even bedi'eved.
[7] The Acharonim disagree about such a case whether or not the conversion is valid bedi'eved. See: Techumin XIX, p. 120.
[8] See what he says in Iggerot Moshe, Yore De'a, III, no. 106.
[9] Later in the passage, it is stated explicitly that this allowance is bedi'eved, but lekhatchila, they should not be accepted as
converts in such a case.
[10] R. Yisrael Rosen, Techumin XXIII, p. 200.

10
Translated by David Strauss

31
 Conversion to Judaism – How difficult should it be?

Yoel Keren writes:11

Over the past few weeks, we’ve heard a lot of chatter about conversion to Judaism.

If I had a nickel for every time I’ve heard “But conversion has always been a long,
difficult process” or “A convert is supposed to be turned down three times”, I’d have…well, at
least a handful of nickels.

While I’m not necessarily knocking the idea of being stringent with prospective converts these
days (you’ll see why later), I definitely take issue with the rewriting of Jewish history and halachic
sources.

If one examines the primary sources of Jewish law, he will not find a long, complicated process
designed to test the fortitude and seriousness of the candidate. Quite the contrary, the Talmudh
Bavli in Yevamoth 47 describes the conversion process as follows:

That’s pretty much it. That’s conversion as our sages knew it.

The Rishonim and Shulhan Arukh simply restate these laws with little more than minor
clarifications, such as explaining that the witnesses for a female convert step in momentarily to
see that she has immersed and then turn away. We also see a few additional strictures, such as

11
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/conversion-to-judaism-how-difficult-should-it-be/

32
checking up on a prospective convert to see if there may be an ulterior motive (love, financial gain,
etc). But for the most part, the talmudic law is left intact.

If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that the process described above bears little
resemblance to the system we have today. Claiming otherwise is intellectually dishonest and dulls
the crown of the Torah.

While we can’t go around claiming “This is how it’s always been done!”, I’m also not advocating
that we go back to how it “was” done. I’m not so sure we should be conducting conversions in the
manner described by the Talmudh. You see, these rules were formulated in a time of terrible
persecution for the Jewish people, especially in the land of Israel, when the risk of insincerity and
ulterior motive was negligble.

Today our situation is vastly different. Today, the Jewish people are squarely in the midst of
redemption. We have a beautiful country with a vibrant economy, a free society and a strong
military. This new reality provides a motive for insencere conversions, especially when dealing
with prospective converts from economically depressed and/or war-ravaged countries.

For the first time since antiquity, the Jewish people have something of value to nations of the
world. Conversion is the key to Israel and for many, Israel is the key to a better life.

This was recognized by our sages and is mentioned in several sources (among them TB Yevamoth
24b) where we see that “Converts will not be accepted in the days of Mashiah. Likewise, converts
were not accepted in the days of David, nor in the days of Shlomo.”

When looking at the sources together with historical and current realities, the
picture becomes clear. In times of persecution, the conversion process can be much more relaxed.
In Messianic times, the process will be stopped completely. In our day, which is neither the former
nor the latter, but is in the midst of the redemptive process, there is ample justification for stricter
testing of potential converts to determine motive (within the bounds of reason and common sense).

This position may sound callous (especially coming from a convert like myself), but it is a natural
byproduct of the Jewish people becoming more than a mere faith or ethnicity. We are a nation
again and we are on our way up. That’s a good thing.

33
 A Great P'shat

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:12

All great pieces of literature can be understood on multiple levels, over multiple time periods, and
by a variety of cultures. There is no greater piece of literature than the Bible: "Turn it and turn it,
as all is in it" (Avot 5:22). We read, reread, and then read it again as we seek to deepen our
understanding of this wonderful text. We begin our study of Torah by seeking to understand
its p'shat. "Ein hamikra yotze midei p'shuto (Yevamot 24a), the text never loses its plain meaning",
is a most fundamental principle of Biblical interpretation[1].
As crucial as p'shat is to our proper understanding of the text, it is not enough. We must not only
read and reread the Torah; we must learn how to 'read between the lines', what in rabbinical
literature is called derash, the seeking of additional layers of meaning hidden within the text. These
additional layers of interpretation form the basis of Talmudic discussion, and are the bread and
butter of Jewish law, little of which is spelled out in the text. One example will suffice for now.
While the Torah tells us to guard the Shabbat, it never tells us what such guarding might entail.
Based on the proximity of the laws of Shabbat to the construction of the Mishkan, our Sages
derived that it is those activities necessary in the construction of the Mishkan[2]--numbering 39--
which are forbidden on Shabbat (Shabbat 49b). Furthermore, the "juxtaposition"
of shamor and zachor, the obligations to guard and remember the Shabbat--which our tradition
teaches was said by G-d in one utterance (Rosh Hashanah 27a)--teaches that all who are obligated
to keep Shabbat are obligated to remember it (Brachot 20b). As the mitzvah of zachor[3] is the
basis of the obligation to recite kiddush, the concurrent utterance of zachor and shamor teach that
a women's obligation in kiddush is the same as a men.

12
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/yevamot-24-a-great-pshat

34
Reading between the lines takes a lifetime to master, and different Sages read those 'in-between
spaces' differently. The most widely accepted tools to help read between the lines are the 13
hermeneutical principles of Rabbi Yishmael (which ironically does not include s'mochim, the
technique used for deriving the melachot of Shabbat). So important are these derashot that Rabbi
Cahana noted, "By the time I was eighteen years old, I had studied the entire Talmud, yet I did not
know that ein hamkira yotze midei pshuto[4] until today" (Shabbat 63a).
Every rule has an exception, and so it is by p'shat. "And the firstborn son shall bear the name of
his dead brother, so that his name shall not be erased from Israel" (Devarim 25:6). The Torah quite
clearly spells out that the purpose of yibum is to perpetuate the name of the deceased. Thus, it
makes perfect sense that the Torah commands that the firstborn [male] child of the couple married
through yibum shall bear the name of his uncle, a most fitting memorial to his father's deceased
brother. There is, however, one problem. Despite what the p'shat of the Chumash teaches, our
Sages assert that the mother and father can give the baby any name they like. We follow only
the derash of this verse, that the "firstborn" refers to the oldest of the surviving brothers of the
deceased, who should be the one to do yibum (Yevamot 24a).
Why the p'shat is ignored in this instance is left unexplained. Perhaps the following is a worthwhile
approach: Given the option of chalitzah, yibum is a tremendous display of respect to the deceased.
And it is the eldest brother--especially in Biblical times--who is expected to take on this
responsibility[5]. But just as it would be unbecoming for a young couple marrying after the death
of a spouse to observe the Yahrzeit of the first spouse, so is the case by yibum. Naming a child
after the first husband is an extra reminder of the death of the first husband and serves little
purpose. Others can always name their children after the deceased. When it comes to sensitivity
towards others, even the p'shat of the Biblical text may at times be ignored[6].
[1] The exact meaning of the term p'shat is not easily translatable and is not to be confused with the literal meaning of the text.
Often, the literal meaning is far removed from p'shat, though often p'shatis exactly that. Rashi will often note p'shuto
k'masmao, that the p'shat is the literal meaning of the text, something that indicates that another interpretation was possible and
that often, p'shuto is not k'mashmao.
[2] There is a most interesting debate as to whether we derive the 39 prohibited activities, melachot, from the construction of the
Mishkan or from the operation of the Mishkan. While there is little practical difference between these views, they represent differing
perspectives on the melachot. The construction of the Mishkan did not override Shabbat, while its operation continued as usual on
Shabbat.
[3] While zachor literally translates as "remember", in Biblical Hebrew, the word zachor means "to mention"; hence, the obligation
to recite kiddush (Pesachim 106a). "Remembering" Amalek (Devarim 25:17) requires the recitation of biblical text. The best way
to remember something is by saying it aloud.
[4] Many today follow this "original" approach, often ignoring the p'shuto shel mikra. One of the exciting developments of "Torah
Eretz Yisrael" is the refocus on p'shat as a crucial tool in our understanding of Torah.

[5] If the eldest refuses, then the younger brothers are asked to do yibum. If they too refuse, we insist the eldest either
do yibum or chalitzah.
[6] A similar notion exists where when dealing with a sotah (see Bamidbar, chapter 5); we erase portions of the Torah to try and
bring peace to a home (Shabbat 116a).

35
 What would Maimonides do, as Supreme Court untangles

conversion knots
Bench set to rule whether to accept independent conversions, which may have strong implications
for Liberal Jewish movements in Israel

AMANDA BORSCHEL-DAN writes:13

13
https://www.timesofisrael.com/what-would-maimonides-do-as-supreme-court-untangles-conversion-knots/

36
 Head of Itim Rabbi Seth Farber and Supreme Court petitioner Martina
Ragacova at the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, June 30, 2015

When an Israeli state attorney begins quoting the 12th century sage Maimonides during a hearing
in the state’s secular Supreme Court, the lines between religion and state may be just a bit blurry.

After nine years on the docket, Martina Ragacova’s petition to have her Orthodox conversion
recognized by the State of Israel was heard by nine Supreme Court judges on Tuesday. Joined by
two other petitioners from 2011, the 2006 Ragacova case is complicated, and has many potential
far-reaching consequences.

Ragacova, who lives in Prague today, became halachically Jewish after undergoing an Orthodox
conversion in the ultra-Orthodox Israeli city Bnei Brak through the religious court of Rabbi Nissim
Kurelitz. Kurelitz, who heads one of the most respected religious courts in the haredi Jewish world,
has converted dozens of individuals in his private religious court who are today not recognized by
the State of Israel as Jews.

These conversions are “kosher” according to Jewish law. Maimonides wrote very leniently about
conversion in a statement in his Jewish law code Mishneh Torah (which was ratified by the
Shulhan Aruch and became a basis of Orthodox Jewish law today) that “a convert whose intentions
were not checked nor who was informed about the commandments and their punishment but was
circumcised and immersed in front of three laymen: he is a convert.”

Indeed, state’s attorney Yochi Genesin cited Maimonides during the hearing Tuesday, and agreed
that any three “simple people,” usually translated as laymen, can form a religious court. However,
because of this leniency, said Genesin, the state must avoid recognizing private conversions,
essentially making a “slippery slope” argument in support of maintaining the state’s legal
monopoly on Orthodox conversion in Israel.

37
There are two issues at stake in the petition: whether conversions in Israel completed through
independent conversion courts outside of the state’s Conversion Authority should be recognized
by the Interior Ministry, and whether those without legal status as residents of Israel, who today
cannot gain citizenship through the Law of Return, may convert in Israel and subsequently petition
for citizenship.

In the case of those individuals who converted through Kurelitz’s Bnei Brak court, which strictly
adheres to Jewish law, the situation is almost a Catch-22: They were rejected from the state’s
conversion program because they lacked legal resident status. But once they become halachically
Jewish, unlike other Jews who convert abroad — including through the Reform and Conservative
movements — they are not eligible to gain citizenship under the Law of Return.

Rabbi Seth Farber heads the nonprofit Itim which help immigrants navigate the state’s religious
bureaucracy. His organization has been working with Ragacova for the past seven years. In a
conversation with The Times of Israel immediately following the hearing, Farber said that until
now, since the Knesset had ostensibly been working on the issue of local conversion courts, the
judges have been putting off this hearing.

Today, said Farber, the issue of conversion courts is no longer on the Knesset’s roster and the
judges have taken up the challenge. After today’s hearing Farber predicts that the court will rule
that in the absence of a law, independent courts can be created, but the Interior Ministry must
create criteria for regulating who is eligible for immigration.

Lawyer Nicole Maor represented the Reform and Conservative movements as a respondent to the
petition at the court’s request. Speaking with The Times of Israel while driving home from the
hearing, Maor explained that Liberal Jewish movements in Israel are already converting those who
have immigrated to Israel through the Law of Return. Their conversions, like those of the
independent Orthodox conversions, are not recognized by the chief rabbinate for life-cyle
purposes, but the Liberal movements do not convert those without legal resident status.

Although she disagrees, the state, said Maor, argues that the same legal question arises in whether
to accept these private Liberal conversion courts. The Reform and Conservative movements,

38
however, would be happy to have their conversions overseen and recognized by the state’s
Conversion Authority, said Maor.

‘We’d be happy to have a state conversion — as long as it recognized all streams of Judaism’
“There is a conversion authority which allows people to convert in Israel, but that conversion
authority is only for Orthodox conversions. We have asked the state many times to have a non-
Orthodox program within the state authority. We’d be happy to have a state conversion — as long
as it recognized all streams of Judaism,” said Maor.

According to Maor, the arguments basically came down to the question of regulation, so that
potential converts in Israel aren’t taking advantage of the conversion to get residency status.

There have been several cases in the past that may feed the state’s fears that some may have ulterior
motives in their conversions. Earlier in June, the Supreme Court heard a case in which the
immigration petition of a Bolivian man who converted in Argentina in a recognized Conservative
community was rejected by the Interior Ministry. The man, the state said, had lived in Israel under
illegal circumstances, and had recently married a Christian woman (his third wife since living in
Israel).

Because of his illegal stays in Israel, and several previous attempts to become a citizen through his
previous wives’ status, the court rejected his petition and said that although his conversion was
from a recognized court, his motivations for conversion were questionable.

Interestingly, however, the same Maimonides cited by state’s attorney Genesin addresses this
question of motives.

“Even if we know that he is converting for an ulterior motive, if he was circumcised and immersed
he is no longer considered a gentile, although we are suspicious of him until his righteousness
becomes apparent,” the sage writes in his Mishneh Torah legal code.

39
 Natalie Portman and husband Benjamin Millepied
at the Vanity Fair Oscar Party, 2012

Converting for Love (Like Natalie Portman’s Husband)?

The Talmud Forbids It.
Talmudic Rabbis regulated not just actions but reputations, and left a legacy we debate and
refute to this day

Adam Kirsch writes:14

The most common reason why people convert to Judaism today, I would guess, is because they
want to marry a Jewish spouse. Such conversions are a sign of the amazing acceptance that Judaism
enjoys in America, compared to the stigma it labored under for most of Western history. For a
Christian to marry a Jew in medieval Europe meant stigmatization, isolation, perhaps even
violence, as it does in many parts of the Muslim world today. For us, it is simply a personal choice,
even a laudable demonstration of spousal loyalty. It was surprising to learn in this week’s Daf
Yomi reading, then, that according to the Talmud, converting out of love is actually forbidden.
“Both a man who converted for the sake of a woman and a woman who converted for the sake of
a man,” we read in Yevamot 24b, “they are not converts.” (The Koren Talmud’s notes make clear,
however, that this is not how conversions are actually regulated in practice today; as often, the law
has evolved significantly since the Talmud was written.)

The Talmud’s logic seems to be that conversion must not be undertaken for the sake of any
personal advantage or reward, but strictly out of belief in the truth of Judaism. That is why the

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rabbis list converting for love alongside other kinds of compromised conversions, such as “one
who converted for the sake of the king’s table”—that is, in order to receive financial support or
career advancement from a Jewish government.

The same holds true of those who convert to escape punishment. In the Second Book of Kings, for
instance, we read that after the conquest of the Kingdom of Israel and the exile of the Ten Tribes,
the king of Assyria imported new peoples—known as Samaritans, or in Hebrew Kutim—to
populate the land. Because these new arrivals didn’t know the right way to worship God, he sent
flocks of lions to attack them. Not until they learned from a priest what God required did the lions
leave them alone. The Talmud insists, however, that the Kutim who embraced Judaism out of fear
of lions were not true converts. Neither were the Persians who converted from fear of the vengeful
Jews who were turned loose on them at the end of the Book of Esther.

All these people, the rabbis say, “are not converts unless they are converted again at this time.”
Here the Gemara makes an obvious objection: Surely those Samaritans and Persians couldn’t be
reconverted “at this time,” since they lived centuries earlier. “Rather, say: Like at this time,” the
Gemara clarifies: That is, at a time of Diaspora and Jewish weakness, when joining the Jewish
people entails risks and no rewards. Only under those circumstances is it clear that a convert is
embracing Judaism for the sake of heaven, rather than hope of benefit. For this reason, “they did
not accept converts in the days of David or in the days of Solomon,” at a time when the Israelite
kingdom was rich and powerful, and becoming Jewish might be considered a desirable change.
Nor will converts be accepted “in the days of the Messiah,” when Jewish glory and power are
restored.

How does this discussion of converts find a place in Tractate Yevamot, which deals with the laws
of levirate marriage? The connection can be found in the mishna on Yevamot 22a, where the rabbis
explain the legal status of different types of children. The obligation for a man to marry his dead
brother’s widow—his sister-in-law or yevama—only applies if the brother has died without
producing children. The levirate marriage is meant to produce offspring that will legally and
spiritually be considered the dead man’s heirs. That is why a widow who is an aylonit—incapable
of bearing children—is not subject to this obligation. The same holds true, we learned this week,
if the dead man was a eunuch, since he would have remained childless even if he had lived.

If the dead man has produced children, it would seem the levirate obligation is canceled. But, the
Talmud explains, there are different categories of children. Those produced in legal wedlock are
of course legitimate, and they invalidate the levirate obligation. But what about if the dead man
had children outside of his marriage, or by rape, or through a legally forbidden relationship such
as incest? Do those children also count as offspring for the purposes of the levirate obligation? The
answer, the mishna says, is yes: “Anyone who has a child of any kind, that child exempts his
father’s wife from levirate marriage.” Even a mamzer, an illegitimate child, “is his child in all
respects,” including the fifth-commandment obligation to honor his father: “And that child is liable
to receive capital punishment if he strikes his father or curses him.”

There are only two types of offspring who are not legally considered true children: “a child born
from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman.” The Talmud goes on to explore the
reasons for this rule. Why should it be worse for a Jewish man to marry a gentile woman than to

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marry a Jewish woman who is forbidden to him by the laws of incest? Why is the offspring of the
latter relationship, though a mamzer, considered a true child, while the offspring of the former
relationship is not considered a child at all? The reason, the Gemara suggests, is that a forbidden
woman is forbidden only to one specific man—say, because she is his wife’s sister—but she is
permitted to marry any other Jew. A gentile, on the other hand, cannot enter into marriage with
any Jew at all.

But in fact, the Gemara goes on to counter, there is a way for a gentile woman to become
marriageable: All she has to do is convert to Judaism. Doesn’t this mean that she is legally akin to
other forbidden women, who are not forbidden forever and always, but only under certain
conditions? But the rabbis deny the parallel. “When she converts, she is a different body,” they
say: Conversion creates a new legal person, who did not exist before. It is only this new person
who is marriageable, not the old, gentile version of her who has ceased to exist.

Thus when a Jewish man has children with a gentile woman, they are considered not his children
at all, but only hers: “Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son, but your son from a
gentile woman is not called your son, but her son.” The same does not hold true, however, if the
genders are reversed. The Koren Talmud’s notes cite the Shulkhan Arukh, a later, authoritative
code of Jewish law, to this effect: The child of a gentile father and a Jewish mother is Jewish. Here
we can see that Jewishness is inherited matrilineally, so that it is the religion of the mother that
counts.

But this is not the end of the discussion. It would be easy to imagine a case where a Jewish man
fell in love with a gentile woman and then she converted in order to marry him; or where a man
fell in love with a Canaanite slave and then set her free so they could be together. But in Yevamot
24b, the mishna rules that such marriages are invalid: If a man is once suspected of an illicit sexual
relationship with such a woman, he cannot marry her later on, because such a marriage would
retroactively confirm the suspicion that he had sinned. Still, the law is not overly harsh, since “if
he did marry her, the judges of the court do not remove her from him.” This is one of several places
in Yevamot where the rabbis have made a distinction between marriages that are legally allowed
and marriages that are tolerated in fact. The rabbis seem to have been too humane, or too pragmatic,
to go around breaking up consensual marriages on technical legal grounds.

The same leniency does not apply, however, to cases of adultery. Say a married woman is widely
suspected of having an affair with another man and then divorces her husband and marries the
putative lover. In this case, the rabbis say, judges must intervene to separate them, since their
marriage seems to confirm the rumors that they had previously had an adulterous relationship. In
this situation, rumor is taken to have probative value. Indeed, the rabbis even offer a definition for
when a rumor is widespread enough to be taken seriously: “At what point is it considered to be a
persistent rumor? Abaye said: My mother told me: A rumor in the city lasts a day and a half.”
However, a rumor can be dismissed entirely if there is reason to think it was started maliciously,
by a person’s enemies. All this sounds strange from the perspective of American law, where
hearsay is strictly forbidden as evidence. But then, the rabbis were in the business of regulating
not just actions but reputations—particularly women’s reputations.

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 May a Conversion Obtained Through Deceit Be Annulled?
RABBI STEVEN SALTZMAN writes:15

An answer to these questions must take into consideration the notion of intentionality within the
conversion process. Can the prospective convert's intentions nullify a conversion when those
intentions are flawed or fraudulent?

Let us, however, begin our inquiry by trying to ascertain, if possible, the precise point in the
conversion process when a Gentile becomes a Jew. Once we have determined the ritual(s) or act(s)
which transforms the Gentile into a Jew, then we can investigate the importance of intentionality
in that specific ritual or act. Rabbi Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus), Rabbi Joshua (ben I:Iananiah) and the
Rabbis attempt to identify the crucial, determinative ritual or act of conversion.

There are three candidates: (1) The acceptance of Torah and mitzvot: (2) the act of circumcision:
(3) the ritual of immersion in a mikveh. The following braissa is taken from Yevamot 46a. 1

15
https://rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19861990/saltzman_deceit.pdf

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 Testing Boundaries: Jewish Conversion and Cultural Fluidity in
Medieval Europe, c. 1200-1391

Paola Tartakoff writes:16

16
Speculum , JULY 2015, Vol. 90, No. 3 (JULY 2015), pp. 728-762

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References:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43577434.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A460f8de28c64d53232277e9688bd59ea&ab_segment
s=&origin=

Simha Goldin writes:17

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https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt18mvnct.12?seq=1

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 Conversion and History
Reading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic

The past is never dead. It is not even past.

—William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun

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Ryan Szpiech writes:18

The Dream of Rabbi Abner

There was once a Jew who, well into his adult life, began to think deeply about the trials of his
people. One day, he entered a synagogue and, with lamentation and bitterness in his heart, began
to pray, "Lord God, I beg you, have mercy on our trials. What is the cause of your anger and fury
against your people, the sheep of your pasture? Why will the nations say, 'Where is their God?'
Lord, hear now my prayer and my cries, and illuminate your desolate sanctuary. Have mercy on
your people Israel." And with great heaviness of heart, exhausted from the burden he had taken
upon himself, this Jew grew tired, fell asleep in the synagogue, and began to dream.

In his dream he met a great man who said to him, "Why do you sleep? Understand my words and
pay attention: The Jews are in such long exile because of their insanity and their ignorance, and
because they lack a righteous teacher in whom they may know the truth." When he awoke from
his dream, he began to scour the Bible and books of religion and philosophy for explanations to
his questions, but he only grew more doubtful and confused, and vowed to remain steadfast in the
faith of his forefathers and not to pay heed to the doubts in his heart. Yet his tribulations and doubts
persisted, and his dreams did not stop.

A few years later, after spending the day fasting, he had another dream in which the same man
appeared and scolded him angrily. The man ordered the Jew "to arise from his sleep," telling him,
"You are responsible for the sins of all of the Jews and their children and future generations."
Miraculously, as he said this, the great man-made crosses appear all over his clothing. The Jew
awoke, and after dreaming this same dream repeatedly over many nights, he finally vowed to
convert to Christianity and to write a book in defense of his new faith.

Such is the story told by the Castilian Jew Abner of Burgos (ca. 1265/70-ca. 1347), known after
his conversion as Alfonso of Valladolid or Master Alfonso (Maestre Alfonso), in the opening of
his lengthy anti-Jewish polemic, Teacher of Righteousness (Moreh ?edek), composed in Hebrew
in the early 1320s. The text, which survives only in a contemporary Castilian translation under the
title Mostrador de justicia, is one of the longest anti-Jewish works written in the Middle Ages,
comparable to the enormous Dagger of Faith (Pugio fidei) from 1278 by the Dominican Ramon
Martí (Raimundus Martinus). Unlike Martí's Dagger, however, Abner/Alfonso's Teacher is
written from a first-person perspective that begins with a narrative account of the author's
conversion.

Who was this sorrowful Jew, dreaming of crosses in a synagogue? A variety of sources, including
archival documents and polemical treatises written by Jews and Christians, confirm the existence
of a real person named Abner of Burgos who did become a Christian around 1320, took the new
name Alfonso of Valladolid, and wrote a series of anti-Jewish works in Hebrew, including
the Teacher. Was Abner/Alfonso, the double-named author of this first-person account, the same
man who in the text prayed and dreamed and converted? It seems obvious that the author was also

18
https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/toc/15053_toc.html

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the character in his first-person narrative, and at first blush there is no reason to doubt that this
conversion account describes the author's experience. There is, however, virtually no information
to be found about the real conversion of the author, Abner/Alfonso himself, beyond what can be
gleaned from his autobiographical account. We must assume that it happened as he narrates it.

Or must we? Behind the composition of his book, we might imagine that there is the experience
of the real author that led to the actual event of his conversion, which we know must have occurred
shortly before the account of it was composed. Are we correct, therefore, in seeing the elements
of this conversion narrative as representations, perhaps embellished but accurate nonetheless, of
actual events as well?

The great historian of Iberian Jewry, Yitzhak Baer, who maintained a lifelong interest in
Abner/Alfonso, believed we are. After summarizing the same account given above, he remarks,
"Abner wrestled in spirit for some twenty-five years until (shortly before the year 1321) he
announced his profession of the Christian faith."1 Historians like Baer can date the
public announcement of his new faith and consider it as a historical fact (although since we know
of no one else who was there to hear such an announcement and tell of it, even this depends on
Abner/Alfonso's own testimony to a good degree), but Abner/Alfonso's feelings before his
conversion are more problematic.

We only know that he "wrestled in spirit for some twenty-five years," as Baer says, because
Abner/Alfonso himself tells us he did, and he constructed his story to be read as part of his attack
on his former faith. Although one can verify through later evidence external to the text that
Abner/Alfonso was a real person who did profess Christianity, the process of that conversion is
available only through the account by the author himself written after the fact. Perhaps the author
Abner/Alfonso did indeed "wrestle in spirit" (whatever this might mean) just as his character did,
but his autobiographical testimony can only tell us about the struggles of his fictional counterpart.
As Karl Morrison insists in his study of medieval conversion, one must distinguish between the
experience of conversion, the "thing felt," and the document written about it, the "thing made."

This book studies the "thing made" to represent conversion in a variety of medieval works that
discuss religious belief and identity, in particular polemical works directed against other religions.
In exploring the contours of that "thing made," I consider not only its form and content but also its
placement within, and in relation to, other texts. Although my focus is mainly on deliberately
constructed accounts like Abner/Alfonso's, the study includes other sources, such as examples of
religious polemic and disputation as well as historiography and exegesis. I focus on medieval
Christian texts, principally from the twelfth century to the fifteenth, but also consider the late
antique paradigms on which those texts were modeled, and I contextualize the developments in
those stories by comparing them to contemporary narratives of conversion to Judaism and Islam
as well. While this broad view includes material from across the Mediterranean, as well as from
farther north and east, it focuses on the Western Mediterranean as a center around which there
circulated competing and complementary currents of belief in the three Abrahamic religions,
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The central question I aim to address is what place such first-person stories had in the discourse of
religious apology and polemic. Although I focus heavily on Christian sources, I ask the same

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question of treatises from all three Abrahamic religions: Why did polemical writers tell these
stories? What connection did a writer like Abner/Alfonso see between his story and his theological
criticism of Judaism? How would a Jewish reader of this Hebrew text understand such a personal
narrative? Most important, how did such stories convey meaning as stories? In pursuing these
questions, this book attempts to provide a new, interdisciplinary perspective on medieval writing
about religious dispute by viewing it through the lens of literary studies.

By including examples from such separate historical moments and places of origin, I do not at all
mean to blur the essential differences that define them or to suggest an absolute homogeneity of
either thought or purpose across languages, religions, or historical periods. I do, however, wish to
signal a coherence of understanding and of written form that constituted the backbone of various
overlapping or intersecting traditions of representation. Interpreting late medieval scenes such as
those embedded within Abner/Alfonso's dreams through the lens of late antique and early medieval
depictions of conversion will not only offer a wider historical scope in understanding conversion,
but will, I hope, lead us to rethink what we (as postmedieval readers) mean by the term religious
conversion and to redraw, or at least challenge, the generic boundaries between the archival,
doctrinal, and narrative sources that represent it. As these boundaries change, so also the
disciplinary boundaries between history, religious studies, and literary criticism might need to be
adjusted in accord with new insights.

I have deliberately used Abner/Alfonso's story, a confession embedded within an anti-Jewish

treatise, to raise theoretical and conceptual questions about the nature of individual identity and
belief, not to provide definitive answers to them, but as a way to adumbrate the premises on which
the arguments of this book are based: that there is a fundamental connection between conversion
stories and medieval polemical writing, and that even though these stories are patterned on the
model of Christian hagiography (saints' Lives), the analysis of conversion narratives found in
disputational texts requires a different set of critical tools than conversion accounts in other forms
of historical and devotional writing. As I will show, the connection between conversion and
polemic is most evident in their shared arguments concerning individual and collective identity,
arguments that, in turn, share a fundamentally narrative structure. By narrative, I mean not merely,
in Gerald Prince's definition, "the representation of events or changes in states of affairs," but more
specifically H. Porter Abbott's words: "the representation of events, consisting
of story and narrative discourse," in which "story is an event or sequence of events (the action);
and narrative discourse is those events as represented." By narrative structure, I imply the
sequence of events as represented in language according to a coherent but not necessarily
chronological order and unity, one that unfolds from scene to action to effect and that is enhanced
through repetition and retelling. Robert Alter calls this, in the context of biblical prose, the
"narrative continuum," which he defines clearly as "a coherent unfolding story in which the
meaning of earlier data is progressively, even systematically, revealed or enriched by the addition
of subsequent data."

In stressing their shared structure and form, I am not only to signal the admittedly obvious
connection between conversion stories and polemical argument (the very representation of
conversion through narrative is, in the Middle Ages, a form of religious apologetic, an aggressive
way to define and defend one's beliefs). Taking this connection as given, this book has three main
goals, each tied to the core arguments I defend in the remainder of this introduction. The first goal

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is to consider the place of conversion narratives in religious dispute, to ask why and how the form
of conversion stories serves to express their polemical intentions. In attempting to answer this
question, I argue that narrative serves as a fitting vehicle for medieval Christian arguments because
both the individual conversion story and the general polemical ideas are expressions of a shared
understanding of Christian history.

My second goal is to explore the reasons for the renewed importance of stories of conversion in
Christian arguments beginning in the twelfth century. In particular, I hope to show the place of
conversion stories among the various aspects of Christian disputational writing that began to
change in the twelfth century, aspects that also included an increasing use of philosophy, a new
focus on non-Christian Scriptures, and a heightened interest in the original languages of those
sources. I argue that conversion stories, as expressions of sacred history, also become a basis for
authoritative proof offered in light of this evolving definition of Christian auctoritas.

Third, I aim to contextualize the changing importance of conversion accounts in Christian texts by
comparing them to a few parallel examples from Jewish and Muslim traditions. In Christian
writing, the natural conflation of conversion with apology points to the fundamental narrative
structure underlying Christian conceptions of religious identity and difference within the
framework of salvation history. The question emerges, in considering contemporary examples
from Jewish and Muslim traditions, whether the same structure holds beyond a Christian
framework. In comparing Christian, Muslim, and Jewish texts, I argue that narratives of conversion
play a more prominent role in Christian polemics than they do in Muslim and Jewish treatises
because they more fittingly reflect Christian notions of revelation, salvation, and time.

Rereading Medieval Conversion

The close link between apologetic writing and conversion narrative develops in late antiquity in a
unique way in Christianity. The development of antipagan and anti-Jewish texts from the earliest
written documents in Christianity (the New Testament letters of Paul of Tarsus) becomes at the
same time a development of the rhetoric of narrating conversion. Starting with this connection
allows us to see conversion not, or not only, as a type of experience among believers but as a
category of discourse alongside other basic categories of Christian expression such as polemic and,
even more broadly, biblical exegesis. As it evolves, writing about conversion does not develop in
isolation as an independent sort of "life writing" (or ego document) and even less as a subgenre of
historiography. Instead, it constitutes part of the debate about a variety of theological and doctrinal
problems in Christian thought, problems that, with few exceptions, give way to defensive and
offensive rhetoric as well. Conversion narratives in medieval apologetic sources combine inward-
looking apology and outward-looking polemic not through autobiography or historiography, but
through what can be better described as a combination of hagiography and heresiography, an
allegorization of the life of an individual believer combined with a defensive reflection on the
boundaries of acceptable belief.

The predominance of heresiological concerns is especially evident in early representations of

conversion such as those of the early apologist Justin Martyr (100-165), in which conversion is
merely one concept in the construction of a nascent vocabulary of anti-Judaism. Similarly, as Nock
has noted, the description by the ex-pagan convert Arnobius (d. ca. 330) of his "having been led

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into the paths of truth [in vias veritatis inductus]" is couched in a scathing vilification of pagan
ideas. Even the famous narration of the conversion of Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in
his Confessions, hailed so often as a foundational moment of modern autobiography, can also be
understood as part of his larger offensive against Manichaeism, a project evident in most of his
key texts from the 390s and culminating a few years after the Confessions in his monumental anti-
Manichaean treatise Against Faustus. In most of the examples that follow, the narrating of
conversion points less to individual experience than to community standards of belief.

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