Daf Ditty Chagigah 16: Zugot controversies

‫ ַﬠל ר ֹאשׁ‬,‫ד ְוָסַמ) ָידוֹ‬ 4 And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the
‫ ְלַכֵפּר‬,‫ָהֹעָלה; ְו ִנ ְרָצה לוֹ‬ burnt-offering; and it shall be accepted for him to
.‫ָﬠָליו‬ make atonement for him.
Lev 1:4

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MISHNA: Yosei ben Yo’ezer says not to place one’s hands on offerings before slaughtering
them on a Festival because this is considered performing labor with an animal on a Festival. His
colleague,

Yosef ben Yoḥanan, says to place them;

Yehoshua ben Peraḥya says not to place them;
Nitai HaArbeli says to place them;
Yehuda ben Tabbai says not to place them;
Shimon ben Shataḥ says to place them;
Shemaya says to place them;
Avtalyon says not to place them.
Hillel and Menaḥem did not disagree with regard to this issue.
Menaḥem departed from his post, and Shammai entered in his stead.
Shammai says not to place them;
Hillel says to place them.

The first members of each pair served as Nasi, and their counterparts served as deputy Nasi.

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GEMARA: The Sages taught: Three of the first pairs who say not to place hands and two of
the last pairs who say to place hands served as Nasi, and their counterparts served as deputy
Nasi; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say the opposite: Yehuda ben
Tabbai was deputy Nasi and Shimon ben Shataḥ was the Nasi.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught in a baraita: Rabbi
Yehuda ben Tabbai said: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not kill a
conspiring witness. This means that Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai sentenced a conspiring witness to
death, in order to counter the views of the Sadducees, who would say: Conspiring witnesses
are not executed unless the sentenced one has been executed. Their views opposed the
traditional view, which maintains that conspiring witnesses are executed only if the one sentenced
by their testimony has not yet been executed.

Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if you did
not shed innocent blood, as the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless they
are both found to be conspirators; if only one is found to be a conspirator, he is not executed.
And they are not flogged if they are liable to such a penalty, unless they are both found to be
conspirators. And if they testified falsely that someone owed money, they do not pay money
unless they are both found to be conspirators.

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Hearing this, Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon himself not to rule on any matter
of law unless he was in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ, as he realized he could not rely on
his own judgment.

The baraita further relates: All of Yehuda ben Tabbai’s days, he would prostrate himself on
the grave of that executed individual, to request forgiveness, and his voice was heard weeping.
The people thought that it was the voice of that executed person, rising from his grave. Yehuda
ben Tabbai said to them: It is my voice, and you shall know that it is so, for tomorrow, i.e.,
sometime in the future, he will die, and his voice will no longer be heard. Yehuda ben Tabbai
was referring to himself, but he did not want to mention something negative about himself in direct
terms.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This provides no conclusive proof that the voice was
not that of the executed man, as perhaps ben Tabbai appeased the executed individual in the
World-to-Come. Or, alternatively, the latter may have prosecuted him by the law of Heaven, and
that is why his voice can no longer be heard.

Summary

Yose ben Yoezer says that [on a festival] the laying of the hands [on the head of a sacrifice] may
not be performed. Yosef ben Johanan says that it may be performed.
Joshua ben Perahia says that it may not be performed. Nittai the Arbelite says that it may be
performed.

Judah ben Tabai says that it may not be performed. Shimon ben Shetah says that it may be
performed.

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Shamayah says that it may be performed. Avtalyon says that it may not be performed.
Hillel and Menahem did not dispute.

Menahem went out, Shammai entered.

Shammai says that it may not be performed. Hillel says that it may be performed.

The former [of each] pair were patriarchs, and the latter were heads of the court.

Our mishnah is possibly the most unique mishnah in the entire Mishnah. It contains a debate about
whether or not a person can lay their hands on a sacrifice on Yom Tov, the first and last days of a
festival. According to Leviticus 1:4 and other parallel verses, when a person brings a sacrifice he
lays his hands, or leans, on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. On Yom Tov it is forbidden to use
an animal and leaning on an animal is considered to be use of an animal.

Therefore, the question could be asked, can one lean on the sacrificial animal on Yom Tov, or
must he do so the day before?

What is unique about our mishnah is that there are five pairs (zugot) of sages, each from a different
generation, who debated this issue. The sages here are early sages who lived during the Second
Temple period, from the beginning of the Hasmonean period until close to the beginning of the
millennium. They might even be called proto-sages, or proto-rabbis.

With one exception, all of these sages are found in Avot 1:4-10, where each transmits a moral
exhortation. The final clause of the mishnah determines that of each pair the first was the patriarch
and the second was the head of the court. As far as I know, there are no other mishnayot that have
this structure in which the same debate being repeated generation after generation.

The fact that they debate specifically this issue is significant. We know that ancient Jews argued a
lot about the laws of Yom Tov and Shabbat and that the Pharisees tended to be more lenient than
the other two main sects, the Essenes, and the Sadducees. This seems to be the trend in this mishnah
as well Hillel allows one to lean on the animal, whereas Shammai does not.

Section four: Note that the mishnah switches order here. In all three previous pairs, the first said
that it may not be performed, whereas the second said that it should be performed. It seems that
there may have been some historical switch at this period, where the position of the patriarch
changed.

Section five: Little is known about Menahem from rabbinic literature, except that he seems to have
separated from the fold. Josephus, Antiquities 15:10, 5 relates a story about a certain Menahem
who was an Essene.

This Menahem receives a divine revelation that Herod will become king and he relates it to him.
According to some scholars this is the same Menahem referred to in our mishnah. In any case, it
is interesting that he is replaced by Shammai. It is as if the mishnah is letting us know that Shammai

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is not like Menahem. While Shammai’s opinions are usually not the accepted halakhah, he is still
legitimate.

What Cannot be Touched; What We Stop Each Other From Touching1

Amud (a) of today's daf is absolutely amazing. Aggadic tales that help us to understand the rabbis'
understandings of G-d's nature. Amud (b) was similar to hitting a brick wall after flying through
the air. For me, anyhow.

Rabbi Yochanan teaches that G-d was not found in the wind, the earthquake, or the fire. But after
the fire, there was a still, small voice, and the Lord passed by.

We are told that demons are like angels and like humans. Through this discussion, we learn about
the angels. The rabbis believe that they can eat and drink, multiply and think, walk upright, and
speak and excrete like animals.

In explaining why we should not think about Creation, the rabbis note that the chaos before
Creation is not for us to know. From here they discuss the nature of a rainbow and the dangers
involved in staring at it directly. We are told that searching for the substance of a rainbow is
similar to searching for the substance of G-d. The perfection and beauty; the ethereal quality of
mist and refracted light - this seems all too real to us.

I believe that part of this prohibition is teaching us not to search too hard, in general. When we
stare at a rainbow, do we continue to admire its sublime, blissful existence? Or do we look for
those tiny water droplets and the direction of light that is refracting? Our nature leads us to be
logical; to search for answers. But we are not meant to find all answers. We cannot know the
nature of G-d, regardless of how long we look. And when we spend our energy on that search, we
miss the beauty of what we have, now, in this moment.

Again we are reminded that we are not to disgrace G-d's name in public. When we are unable to
control ourselves, we are to cover ourselves in black and to leave any public centre.

Amud (a) ends with a reminder about trusting our bodies. Modern customs suggest that we always
trust out bodies. However, ancient wisdom suggests that we are liable to fall into the grasp of yetzer
hara. We are told not to trust intimate friendships - this all suggests that our rabbis feared that
Jews would not follow the rabbis and their halachot.

1
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/09/

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Amud (b) shares a Mishna regarding placing our hands on the head of an offering. It teaches that
a number of rabbis believe that we should not place our hands during a Festival because that could
be considered labour. Another group of rabbis, including Hillel, are more lenient. The rabbis
come to discuss whether or not physical strength must be involved in placing one's hands. This
leads them to discuss whether women are obligated, not obligated, or even prohibited from placing
their hands.

A story is told of a group of women who are given an animal to sacrifice; they do this together, as
a group, exactly according to halachic instruction. The rabbis suggest that this might be done to
please the women. But if women are not obligated, is this not allowing them to add to the mitzvot?

It is discussions like this one that remind me of the rabbis serving their own agenda as they interpret
and create halacha. In this case, it is determined that women are in fact prohibited from sacrificing
the offering. How might it hurt the rabbis if women were to continually practice this ritual? First
off, the women might not be as available for other things - including preparing and serving food,
caring for children, etc., if they create a minhag that encourages religious practice. Secondly, if
women were allowed to sacrifice, what else might they be allowed to do? And how would this
also be a detriment to men's lives?

Our daf weaves together the most esoteric and essential quality of religious thought with some of
the most enduring acts of disengagement imaginable.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:2

The Gemora had stated that Rabbi Akiva entered Pardes; he ascended in peace, and he left in peace.
Upon him, it is written: Draw me, we will run after you. And Rabbi Akiva as well, the ministering
angels sought to push him away; but the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Let this elder be,
for he is worthy to avail himself of My honor.

The Gemora asks: What verse did he expound (so that he knew not to look towards the Place of
the Divine Presence)? Rabbah bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: It is written,
and Hashem approached with some of the holy myriads, which is interpreted to mean that He is a
sign amongst His myriads (indicating that he should not look in that direction).

Alternatively, Rabbi Avahu says, it is written: dagul meirvavah, surrounded with myriad angels,
which is interpreted to mean that He was distinguished in His myriads. Rish Lakish provides
another source for Rabbi Akiva being protected is because it is said: HaShem, Master of Legions,
is His Name. This is interpreted to mean that He is a master amongst His hosts.

Alternatively, Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that this is derived from
the verse that states: “HaShem is not in the wind!” [Eliyahu was told.] After the wind came an

2
https://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Chagigah_16.pdf

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earthquake. “Hashem is not in the earthquake.” After the earthquake came a fire. “Hashem is not
in the fire.” After the fire came a still, thin sound. [Prior to that it is said] and behold HaShem was
passing.

The Gemora cites a braisa: Demons are akin to angels in three matters, and they are akin to humans
in three matters. Demons have wings, they fly from one end of the world to the other, and they
know what is destined to be in the future. The Gemora interrupts: Can it possibly be that they know
the future (it cannot, for even angels do not know the future)? Rather it means that they hear from
behind the barrier like the angels. The demons are akin to humans as they eat and drink, procreate,
and die like humans.

The braisa continues: Man is akin to the angels in three matters and man is akin to animals in three
matters. Man is akin to angels in that he has intelligence, he walks upright, and he speaks the Holy
Tongue. Man is akin to animals in that he eats and drinks, procreates, and emits excrement like an
animal.

The Mishna had stated: Whoever analyzes the following four things, it would have been better if
he never entered this world: [What is above and below (the Heavenly angels), what is before and
after (beyond the universe).]

The Gemora asks: It is understandable why one should not analyze what is above, below and after
the world; but regarding what was before, what is the concern? Whatever was, was (already; and
what difference would there be if he would inquire about it)?

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar both said: Discussing what occurred prior to the creation of the
world is akin to a king who instructed his servants to build a palace on a dung heap. Subsequent
to the building, the king does not want to be reminded of the dung heap.

The Mishnah stated that if one does not concern himself with the honor of his Creator, then it is
better that he had not been created. Rabbi Abba explains that this refers to one who gazes at a
rainbow. Rav Yosef maintains that this refers to one who sins privately. The Gemora cites the
Scriptural source proving that one who gazes at a rainbow impinges on the honor of his Creator.

It is written: As the appearance of the rainbow that is in the cloud in a rainy day, so was the
appearance of the brilliance all around. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of
Hashem. Rav Yosef had said that this refers to one who sins privately. This is in accordance with
what Rabbi Yitzchak said, for Rabbi Yitzchak said: One who sins in private is akin to one who has
pushed the fete, so to speak, of the Divine Presence, as it is written: Thus said Hashem: the Heaven
is My throne, and the earth is My footstool.

The Gemora asks: But Rabbi Il’a the Elder said that if one sees that his Evil Inclination is
overwhelming him, he should travel to a place where he is not known, and he should don black
clothing and act as he wishes. This statement implies that sinning in private is not so terrible. The
Gemora resolves this contradiction by answering that if one can subdue his Evil Inclination and
does not, it is as if he has pushed away, so to speak, the feet of the Divine Presence. One who
cannot subdue his Evil Inclination, however, is better off sinning in private.

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One who gazes at a rainbow, at the Nasi, who is the Jewish leader, and one who gazes at the
kohanim when the Bais HaMikdash was standing and the kohanim uttered the Ineffable Name, his
eyesight will become dimmed.

The stones and beams of one’s house will testify against him for the sins that he commits in private.
Furthermore, one’s soul will testify against him, and even the two angels who normally escort a
person will testify against him. One’s own limbs will also testify against him.

The Mishna returns to the subject regarding the sacrifices which are brought during the festival.
Yosef ben Yoezer maintains that although one may offer a sacrifice during the festival, he may not
perform semichah, leaning on the animal. The reason for this prohibition is because leaning on the
animal is deemed to be a shevus (similar to riding on an animal), a rabbinic injunction, and one
cannot violate a rabbinical injunction on the festival.

Yosef ben Yochanan holds that one can perform the semichah during the festival.
Yehoshua ben Perachya maintains that one should not perform semichah during the festival.
Nitai Hearbeili holds that one can perform the semichah during the festival.
Yehudah ben Tabbai maintains that one should not perform semichah during the festival.
Shimon ben Shetach holds that one can perform the semichah during the festival.
Shemaye maintains that one can perform semichah during the festival.
Avtalyon holds that one should not perform the semichah during the festival. Hillel and Menachem
did not argue regarding this matter. Menachem left the Sanhedrin and Shammai replaced him.
Shammai maintains that one should not perform semichah during the festival. Hillel holds that one
can perform the semichah during the festival. The first of each of the aforementioned pairs was
the Nasi and the second one was the Av Beis Din (the head of the court).

The Gemora cites a braisa: The three Tannaim of the first pairs who said not to perform semichah
and the two from the last pairs who said not to perform semichah were the Nesiim. The second
one listed from all these pairs were the Av Beis Din. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. The
Chachamim said: Yehudah ben Tabbai was the Av Beis Din and Shimon ben Shetach was the
Nasi. (The Mishna was going according to Rabbi Meir.)

The Gemora asks: Who is the Tanna of the following braisa? Yehudah ben Tabbai said: I shall see
consolation if I did not execute a single eid zomeim (when witnesses offer testimony and other
witnesses refute them claiming that the first set of witnesses could not possible testify regarding
the alleged crime since they were together with them at a different location at the precise time that
they claimed to witness the crime somewhere else; The Torah teaches us that we believe the second
pair in this instance; the first witnesses are called "eidim zomemim" "scheming witnesses," and
they receive the exact punishment that they endeavored to have meted out to the one they accused)
in order to disprove the viewpoint maintained by the Sadducees who held that eidim zomemin are
not executed unless the defendant was executed because of them (according to the Chachamim,
this law only applies as long as the accused was not punished already).

Shimon ben Shatach heard of this and told him: I shall see consolation if you did not execute an
innocent person since we have learned that eidim zomemim can only be punished if both of the

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witnesses are found to be lying and not only one. Yehudah ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon
himself never to issue a ruling unless he was in the presence of Shimon ben Shetach (in order to
be corrected by him). For all the remaining days of Yehudah ben Tabbai’s life, he would prostrate
himself on the grave of the person that he had mistakenly killed (begging for forgiveness). His
voice could be heard but the people thought that it was the cry of the man whose blood he had
innocently shed. Yehudah ben Tabbai said: I will prove it to you that it is my voice, for after I die,
you will not hear the crying any longer.

Rav Acha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps the crying was from the one who was
executed, but after Yehudah ben Tabbai died, he stopped crying because he was appeased or
because the Heavenly Court administered justice against him. It is evident from this incident that
initially Yehudah ben Tabbai issued halachic rulings even while Shimon ben Shetach was near
him.

The Gemora asks: This is understandable according to Rabbi Meir who maintains that Yehudah
ben Tabbai was the Nasi since the Nasi is not required to consult with the Av Beis Din prior to
issuing a ruling; however, according to the Chachamim, wouldn’t it be considered disrespectful
for the Av Beis Din (Yehudah ben Tabbai) to issue halachic rulings without consulting with
Shimon ben Shetach (the Nasi). This proves that the author of the braisa is indeed Rabbi Meir. The
Gemora rejects this proof and states that Yehudah ben Tabbai (the Av Beis Din) never issued
rulings without Shimon ben Shetach; Yehudah ben Tabbai resolved that he would never even join
in a ruling unless Shimon ben Shetach was present.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

The Gemora states that the demons can hear what is being announced from behind the Partition in
the same manner as the ministering angels. The question is asked: If they can hear from behind the
Partition, what is the purpose of the Partition? A possible answer is that it is there in order to
prevent them from seeing.

Why was the Satmar Rebbe extremely particular that the beds should be placed next to a wall and
not in the middle of the bedroom, even the beds that children sleep on?

The Gemora states: If a person feels that his evil inclination is overpowering him, he should travel
to a place where he will not be recognized, dress in black and there he could do whatever his heart
desires; this way, he will not be desecrating Hashem’s name. How should this Gemora be
understood? Tosfos cites two explanations: There is the literal interpretation of the Gemora and
also that these activities will result in deflating his desires and will ultimately prevent him from
sinning.

The Gemora states: The stones located in a person’s house will testify against him if he sins; the
beams of his house will testify against him. The Chachamim say: His soul will testify against him.
Rabbi Zreika said: The two ministering angels that accompany a person will testify against him.
Others say: A person’s limbs will testify against him. Are all these opinions arguing with each
other? What is the significance of all these testimonies?

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 PROBLEM WITH INVESTIGATING PRE-CREATION

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara says that one may not inquire what existed before the world was created. The Gemara
compares this proscription to a king who built his palace on top of a garbage heap. The king does
not want people to discuss what was there before the palace.

The Gemara's comparison is difficult to understand. What disgrace would there be if one mentions
what existed before the world was created? Nothing disgraceful existed because nothing existed!
In what way is such an inquiry comparable to people who discuss the garbage heap which existed
in the place of the king's palace?

(a) The MAHARSHA answers that the disgrace in inquiring what existed before the world was
created is the very suggestion that something else existed before the world was created. The
analogy is not entirely accurate, because in the Gemara's case of one who inquires what existed
before the world was created, the disgrace is the very suggestion that something existed, and not
that something disgraceful actually existed.
(b) The Maharsha quotes the YEFEH MAR'EH on the Yerushalmi who explains the Gemara
based on the words of the RAMBAN in the beginning of Parshas Bereishis. The Ramban writes
that when Hash-m created the world, He first created a form of matter or energy called "Hiyuli"
(from the Greek "hyle," or "matter"). Hash-m created the world only after He created this elemental
matter or energy and formed the world from it. The "Ashpah" in the analogy is this "Hiyuli," which
was the unfinished, unformed matter or energy. Since it lacked form, it is a disgrace to delve into
it.

(c) RAV YAKOV EMDEN explains that the Gemara alludes to the Midrash (Bereishis Rabah
3:7) which states that Hash-m created and destroyed a number of worlds before He created this
world and decided to keep it. The earlier worlds which did not satisfy Him are like the "Ashpah"
on which the king built his palace.

(d) RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN zt'l in DARASH MOSHE (cited by the YOSEF DA'AS)
explains that it is a disgrace to Hash-m when a person seeks to explore the premundane facets of
the world's existence in order to discover evidence for the hand of Hash-m in the design of the
world, when that evidence is readily available in everything that exists in the natural world today.
The fact that Hash-m created the world is evident in the infinitely brilliant design of every object
that exists today. The Gemara compares it to praising a king for what he built his palace on, when
there are many greater things in the day-to-day life of the kingdom for which the king prefers to
be praised.

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/chagigah/insites/cg-dt-016.htm

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 THE PROHIBITION AGAINST INQUIRING INTO FOUR THINGS

The Mishnah (11b) states that "anyone who looks into four things is better off having not been
created: what is above, what is below, what is before, and what is after."

RASHI there explains that these four things are spatial: "what is above" refers to what is above
the heads of the heavenly beings; "what is below" refers to what is below the heavenly beings;
"what is before" refers to what is to the east of the "heavenly separation" outside of the world, and
"what is after" refers to what is to the west.

Why does Rashi explain that all four of these things refer to spatial elements? The Gemara here
clearly understands "what is before" and "what is after" as references to temporal elements -- what
existed before the world was created and what will be after the world ceases to exist. Why does
Rashi on the Mishnah give a different explanation from that which the Gemara itself gives?
(TOSFOS)

RAV YAAKOV D. HOMNICK (in MARBEH NEDAVAH) proposes the following

explanation for the words of Rashi. The Mishnah begins with a list of Torah subjects which may
not be taught in groups of various sizes. The subject of Arayos may not be expounded with a group
of three, Ma'aseh Bereishis with two, and Ma'aseh Merkavah with one. The second topic of the
Mishnah are the four aspects of the world which a person may not explore. The third topic is "one
who does not have mercy on the honor of His Creator is better off having not been created."

The Gemara (11b) initially assumes that the Mishnah is describing a prohibition in the laws
of learning Torah. Hence, it assumes that when the Mishnah says that Arayos may not be
expounded with three people, it means three people learning together, one expounding together
with the other two. The Gemara concludes that the Mishnah is describing a prohibition in the laws
of teaching Torah -- what the Rebbi may not teach and what the Talmid may not ask. Thus, the
Mishnah means that one may not expound the laws of Arayos to three people.

Rashi on the Mishnah therefore explains the Mishnah according to the Gemara's initial assumption:
it is discussing a prohibition in the laws of learning (and not in the laws of teaching) Torah. That
is, it is discussing what topics one may learn or may not learn. According to the Gemara's initial
assumption, when the Mishnah teaches that one may not look into four things (what is above, what
is below, etc.), it means that there are certain topics of information which one may not learn. The
information about those topics exists in the world, but one is prohibited to study it. Hence, Rashi
explains that this information refers to the things which are above and below the world, and to the
east and west of the world.

According to the Gemara's conclusion, however, the Mishnah is discussing the laws
of teaching and not the laws of learning. The Mishnah lists the topics which one may not even
inquire about from one's teacher -- the inquiry itself is prohibited, and not just the learning. By
asking for information about things outside of the realm of this world which have not been revealed
to man, a person shows a lack of respect to Hash-m. According to this understanding of the
Mishnah, the Mishnah is saying that the information about which one may not inquire does not
exist in the world; it is not known at all, and thus one is prohibited to inquire about it. This is in

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contrast to the initial understanding of the Gemara, according to which the information discussed
in the Mishnah does exist in the world, but one is not permitted to delve into it.

This approach explains why Rashi on the Mishnah (DH Arba'ah Devarim) writes, "[the four things]
which are about to be explained." Why does Rashi need to write that the Mishnah is about to
explain these four things, when this is apparent from the very next words in the Mishnah? The
answer is that Rashi is alluding to the Gemara's initial understanding of the Mishnah. The Gemara
initially assumes that the Mishnah lists the topics of information which exist in the world, but
which may not be studied, and thus Rashi says that the Mishnah is going to list those topics of
information. According to the Gemara's conclusion, however, the four items in the Mishnah's list
are not known topics of information, but rather they are questions -- one may not inquire into these
four unknowns ("What is above?", "What is below?", etc.).

WHO WAS THE NASI AND WHO WAS THE AV BEIS DIN

Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim dispute whether, generations earlier, Yehudah ben Tabai was the
Nasi and Shimon ben Shetach the Av Beis Din, or vice versa. The Gemara cites a Beraisa as proof
for the opinion that Yehudah ben Tabai was the Nasi. The Beraisa relates that a certain case came
before Yehudah ben Tabai who ruled that a single Ed Zomem must be killed, and his ruling was
carried out in practice. Shimon ben Shetach pointed out to him his tragic mistake -- Edim
Zomemim are killed only when both witnesses are proven to be scheming, but not when only one
of them is found to be an Ed Zomem. In remorse that he had put to death a single Ed Zomem,
Yehudah ben Tabai accepted upon himself never again to issue a Halachic ruling except in the
presence of Shimon ben Shetach.

The Gemara says that from this incident it is evident that Yehudah ben Tabai must have been the
Nasi, a position invested with more authority than the Av Beis Din. Had Yehudah ben Tabai been
the Av Beis Din, he would not have been able to rule on his own until now without Shimon ben
Shetach's consent. It must be that Yehudah ben Tabai was the Nasi and Shimon ben Shetach the
Av Beis Din.

The Gemara refutes this proof and says that it is possible that Yehudah ben Tabai indeed was the
Av Beis Din and had less authority than Shimon ben Shetach. He never ruled in the presence of
Shimon ben Shetach even before his oath. Rather, before the incident with the Ed Zomem,
Yehudah ben Tabai "joined others" in ruling without Shimon ben Shetach's consent, and now he
accepted upon himself never even "to join others" to rule without Shimon ben Shetach.

(a) The Gemara's refutation of the proof from the Beraisa is problematic. First, what difference did
it make if Yehudah ben Tabai (as Av Beis Din) would join others? He still was not entitled to rule
in the presence of the Nasi, Shimon ben Shetach, without permission. When the Gemara earlier
says that if he had less authority than Shimon ben Shetach then he could not have ruled without
Shimon ben Shetach, it means that he could not have even joined a Beis Din to rule without Shimon
ben Shetach. What, then, did Yehudah ben Tabai gain by accepting upon himself never to join
with others to rule without Shimon ben Shetach, if he could not join others to rule without him in
the first place?

13
(b) RASHI explains that according to the Gemara's refutation of the proof, Shimon ben Shetach
was not present (in the city) when Yehudah ben Tabai killed the Ed Zomem, because had he been
present Yehudah ben Tabai would not have been allowed to rule since he had less authority. Why,
then, does the Gemara not answer simply that his oath was that he would no longer rule when
Shimon ben Shetach was out of town (so that he would never commit another tragic error)? By
making such a commitment, he would correct the mistake he made by ruling while Shimon ben
Shetach was absent.

(a) There are several ways to understand how Yehudah ben Tabai would have issued a Halachic
ruling (before his oath) without Shimon ben Shetach and without joining others.

1. Although Yehudah ben Tabai had less authority than Shimon ben Shetach and could not rule
without him, before his oath he would have judged with another Nasi other than Shimon ben
Shetach (in the event that Shimon ben Shetach died, or a new Nasi took his place). Alternatively,
he would have ruled whenever he received Shimon ben Shetach's permission. After the incident
with the Ed Zomem, he accepted upon himself never to rule without Shimon ben Shetach; if a new
Nasi would be appointed, Yehudah ben Tabei would not issue any rulings with that Nasi.
Alternatively, he would not rule even if he had permission from Shimon ben Shetach to rule
without him.

2. TOSFOS explains that Yehudah ben Tabai accepted upon himself not to join the majority of
Chachamim when their opinion differs from that of the Nasi, even when the Nasi is present.

(b) There are several reasons for why the Gemara does not say simply that Yehudah ben Tabai
accepted upon himself to judge only when Shimon ben Shetach was in town.

1. The NETZIV explains that it is unreasonable to suggest that the Beis Din would be closed
simply because the Nasi is out of town. (This answer is difficult to understand because it seems
obvious that other arrangements would be made for Beis Din to convene without its Av Beis Din
(Yehudah ben Tabai) when the Nasi is out of town. For example, another Av Beis Din would be
appointed in the interim.)

2. The Gemara means that not only did Yehudah ben Tabai accept upon himself not to judge even
when Shimon ben Shetach is not present, but he even accepted upon himself not to join others in
judgment when Shimon ben Shetach is present (for example, he accepted upon himself not to join
a majority against Shimon ben Shetach).

This answer is also difficult to understand. How does the Gemara know that he accepted upon
himself the additional oath not to join with others? In order for the Gemara to refute the proof that
Yehudah ben Tabai was the Nasi, it would have sufficed to say that he accepted merely not to rule
when Shimon ben Shetach was out of town.

Perhaps the Gemara understands that Yehudah ben Tabai intended to make this additional oath
because he said, "I will judge only with Shimon ben Shetach." If he meant that he would not judge
when Shimon ben Shetach was out of town, then he should have said, "I

14
will not judge without Shimon ben Shetach." By saying, "I will judge only with Shimon ben
Shetach," he implied that even when Shimon ben Shetach is in town, he would judge only in
Shimon ben Shetach's presence. (M. Kornfeld)

3. The ME'IRI offers an entirely different approach to the Gemara's refutation of the proof that
Yehudah ben Tabai was a Nasi. His approach answers both questions. The Gemara does not infer
from Yehudah ben Tabai's words that he used to judge when Shimon ben Shetach was in town.
Rather, it infers from his words what he accepted to do; he accepted to judge only when Shimon
ben Shetach is present (in town), so that if he makes a mistake Shimon ben Shetach will correct
him. The Gemara asks that if Shimon ben Shetach is in town, Yehudah ben Tabai may not judge
at all because one is not permitted to issue a ruling in front of his Rebbi.

The Gemara answers that his oath was that he would judge only if Shimon ben Shetach is both in
town and is sitting on the court (in which case it is permitted for the Talmid to issue a ruling in the
presence of his Rebbi).

Apparently, the Me'iri's Girsa was that of the DIKDUKEI SOFRIM who adds a few words to the
Gemara. According to his text, Yehudah ben Tabai accepted upon himself that he "will not join
others [to judge] except with Shimon ben Shetach." That is, he accepted to judge only when joined
by Shimon ben Shetach. His oath was that he would not convene a court when the Nasi is out of
town. (Accordingly, the Gemara indeed gives the answer which we suggested (in question (b)
above).)

(RASHI (DH u'Mai Kibel) clearly disagrees with the Me'iri's approach. Rashi writes that the proof
is from what Yehudah ben Tabai used to do before his oath. However, the Dikdukei Sofrim points
out that from the text of Rashi in the Ein Yakov it appears that these words were not written by
Rashi, and thus Rashi indeed may have learned like the Me'iri.)

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

Our Mishnah describes the very first disagreement between the Sages: should semikha – leaning
on the animal being sacrificed as part of the preparation for the korban, or offering – be permitted
on Yom Tov or not? We find no fewer than five generations of Sages listed as arguing this point,
which leads Rav Shemen bar Abba to quote Rabbi Yochanan saying that even a shvut – Rabbinic
ordinance – must be taken seriously. Semikha involves use of the animal (similar to riding a horse,
for example) which is prohibited only on Rabbinic grounds, yet its status on Yom Tov is the topic
of discussion for generations.

Aside from the general argument about semikha, we also find a disagreement with regard to
women performing semikha when bringing a sacrifice. The Gemara quotes a baraita in which we
find that the Tanna Kamma limits semikha to men, based on the passage in Vayikra (1:2) that
instructs Bnei Yisrael – i.e. Jewish men – to perform semikha, apparently excluding women from
this commandment. Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Yishmael disagree, arguing that women may not be
obligated in this mitzvah, but they can, nevertheless, perform it on a voluntary basis. Rabbi Yossi
4
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_hagigah_1319/

15
goes so far as to relate how an animal that was to be sacrificed was brought to the ezrat
nashim (Women’s Court) specifically in order to allow the women to perform semikha.

From this Gemara and other similar ones, it appears that according to the Tanna Kamma, not only
are women not obligated in the mitzvah of semikha – in fact they are forbidden from participating
in it. This position can be understood most easily based on Rashi (Rosh HaShanah 33a) who rules
that whenever a woman does a mitzvah that she is not obligated to perform, she effectively
transgresses the commandment of bal tosif, which forbids adding to the mitzvot of the Torah. It
should be noted that most of the rishonim disagree with Rashi’s position. Tosafot and others
explain that, according to the Tanna Kamma, the potential problem is one of marit ayin – that it
appears as though the women are engaged in the Temple service, from which they are excluded.

In his sefer ‫ עולם שם‬,the Chofetz Chaim elaborates to explain this Gemara which tells us that the
materials of a person’s house come to testify regarding his deeds.5

Some wonder because we see that a person’s house remains intact even after the person dies, and
they do not seem to go anywhere to testify about anything. Nevertheless, we can illustrate this with
a parable. When a person is photographed, the picture usually focuses on the person, but the picture
often does not include the entire surroundings at that moment. For example, if we were to
photograph a person holding a twig while standing in front of a large forest, the photo may fail to
display the immense woodland behind the subject. This is not the purpose of the photo, nor within
the capacity of the camera. In the heavens, however, a picture of an event has the capacity to
include a complete picture, featuring the multiple facets of the situation. For example, let us
consider a person who steals from his friend. The picture of this incident in the heavens shows the
victim and the thief, and how he snatched the item. The details of where they were standing and
who was standing nearby are all part of the reenactment of the event as it is portrayed as part of
the judgment.

Therefore, on the day of judgment, if a person attempts to deny his misdeed, the entire assembly
of the heavens rises up in unison and confronts him. “How can you dare say that you did not do
that? Don’t you see that beam next to where you were standing? We all see the brick in the wall
next to where the object was sitting! There are the clothes you were wearing and the movements
you made during the act!”

This is the meaning of the Gemara as it reports how the house of a person will be present to testify
about his deeds.

5
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Chagiga%20016.pdf

16
What is it [the person mentioned in the Mishnah who is not concerned about Hashem’s honor]?
R’ Abba says that it refers to one who gazes at a rainbow.

Rabbeinu Dovid Avudraham (1) writes that the Rosh was asked how a person is permitted to gaze
at a rainbow in order to recite the appropriate berachah when it is prohibited to look at a rainbow
and one who does so will suffer from weakened vision. Rosh responded that there is a difference
between gazing (‫ )הסתכלות‬and looking (‫)ראייה‬.

Gazing involves looking at an object intently as opposed to looking which only involves a
superficial glance at the object. The restriction mentioned in our Gemara involves gazing at a
rainbow, but it is permitted and even necessary to look at a rainbow in order to recite the berachah.

The Chayei Adam (2) cites earlier authorities who maintain that one should not inform others about
the appearance of a rainbow since the appearance of a rainbow is considered to be a form of bad
news that one does not share with others.

Other authorities (3) write that the common custom is to inform others that a rainbow is visible.
The reason is that it provides others with an opportunity to repent and to praise Hashem for
establishing this covenant that He will not bring another flood like the one from the time of Noach.

The Chavos Yair (4) rules that if one is informed that there is a visible rainbow outside one is not
obligated to go outside to be able to recite the beracha and certainly a person who is studying Torah
should not interrupt his studies to go outside to recite this beracha. He finds support for this ruling
from a comment of the Maharsha on a Gemara in Berachos (6).

Maharsha notes that being able to recite a berachah on the appearance of a king was not enough to
obligate a person to see the king if it were not for the additional factor, mentioned in the Gemara,
that it provides the ability to distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish kings.

Consequently, regarding rainbows where this additional factor is not present there is no obligation
to try to see a rainbow in order to recite the berachah.

17
Once the Imrei Emes, zt”l, had a short exchange with a new chosson to see how he was adjusting
to married life and to spur him on to take a moral inventory. “How is your learning going?” the
Rebbe asked. “Good, Boruch Hashem.” “And how do you like your new neighborhood?” the
Rebbe querried. “Excellent,” the young man answered. “And are you pleased with your new
apartment?” the Rebbe probed. “Very!” “And how is your new apartment pleased with you?”
mused the Imrei Emes. “What does the Rebbe mean?” the young man wondered.

The Rebbe explained, “In Chagigah 16a we learn that the stones and beams of one’s house bear
witness against him on the day of judgment!” We find a similar incident with Rav Naftali Nosson
Nata, zt”l, the Av Beis Din of Hosikov. When he knew that someone was acting in a way that did
not become him, the Gaon would say, “It says in the verse (Eicha 3:40):
Although this literally means that we should search out our ways and investigate them, it is possible
to understand the word as the conjunction of two small words and the beam (of
the house) will be serene.

In Chagiga 16a we find that the beams of one’s house bear witness against him. So the verse can
mean that if we will only search out our ways and change, the beam of the house will be able to
relax and refrain from submitting incriminating evidence to the heavenly court!”

The Tannaim (Hebrew: ‫תנאים‬, singular ‫תנא‬, tanna) were the Rabbinic sages whose views are
recorded in the Mishnah, from approx. 70-200 C.E. The period of the Tannaim, also referred to
as the Mishnaic period, lasted about 130 years. It followed the period of the Zugot ("pairs") and
was immediately succeeded by the period of the Amoraim.

The root tanna (‫ )תנא‬is the Talmudic Aramaic equivalent for the Hebrew root shanah (‫)שנה‬,
which also is the root-word of Mishnah. The verb shanah (‫ )שנה‬literally means "to repeat [what
one was taught]" and is used to mean "to learn."

The Mishnaic period is commonly divided up into five periods according to generations. There
are approximately 120 known Tannaim (teachers of the "Oral Torah") who lived in several areas
of the Land of Israel. The spiritual center of Judaism at that time was Jerusalem, but after the
destruction of the city and its Second Temple, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai and his students
founded a new religious center in Yavne. Other places of Judaic learning were founded by his
students in Lod and in Bnei Brak.

18
 Somewhere over the rainbow

Rabbi Seth Goren writes:6

“The way I see it,” said Dolly Parton, “If you want the rainbow, you gotta put up with the rain.”
Which is true. After all, rainbows typically come out after a rainstorm. And according to the Bible,
the first rainbow came out after the biggest rainstorm of them all: the flood that covered the earth
during the time of Noah. The rainbow became a symbol of God’s promise to never again destroy
humanity by flood.

While rainbows these days have a variety of meanings, today’s daf offers a surprising warning
about them:

It is taught in the mishnah: Whoever has no concern for the honor of his Maker deserves to
have never come to the world. The Gemara asks: What is “lack of concern for the honor of
one’s Maker”? Rabbi Abba said: This is one who looks at a rainbow.

That’s unexpected. According to Rabbi Abba, one who looks at a rainbow is disrespecting God.
But what does looking at a rainbow have to do with honoring God? The Gemara continues:

As it is written: “As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain so was
the appearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the
glory of the Lord.” (Ezekiel 1:28)

According to Rabbi Abba, rainbows are the equivalent of God’s likeness, and staring at God’s
likeness is dishonorable. Rabbi Yehuda echoes Rabbi Abba’s position and adds a specific
consequence:

Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Nahmani, the disseminator of Reish Lakish, interpreted a verse
homiletically: Whoever looks at the following three things, his eyes will grow dim: One who
looks at a rainbow, at a Nasi, and at the priests.

While a rainbow isn't so bright as to be literally blinding, we can infer that the text is speaking
metaphorically about the overwhelming splendor of God's symbol in the sky. But the teaching is
nevertheless confusing: There’s a blessing traditionally said upon viewing a rainbow. If we don’t
look at rainbows, how can we say the blessing? If you follow Ashkenazi practices, it can’t be
because someone else notifies you that there’s a rainbow in the sky. The Mishnah
Berurah specifically says that you shouldn’t tell other people about rainbows, equating doing so
with gossip. (Sephardim say it’s OK to spread the word about rainbows.)

6
Myjewishlearning.com

19
The Shulchan Aruch, the medieval law code, presents a compromise: "One who sees the rainbow
says, 'Blessed are you, God our Lord, king of the world, who remembers the covenant, who is
faithful to his covenant, and who fulfills his word.' And it is forbidden to look upon it further." In
other words, look at the rainbow enough to serve as a basis for the blessing, but that’s it.

So yes, Dolly Parton’s wisdom rings true and can buoy us through challenging times. But if we’re
hewing closely to the instructions in today’s daf, we should be careful about how we look at the
rainbow that comes after the storm.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:7

While evil which is witnessed by others can be testified about by others, our daf (Chagigah 16a)
raises the question of who – or what – will bear witness to evil perpetrated in settings where few
or no people can see what is going on, such as in the privacy of someone’s home? To this, the
Gemara cites the words of Habbakuk 2:11 which state, ‫‘ – ִכּי ֶאֶבן ִמִקּיר ִתְּזָﬠק ְוָכִפיס ֵמֵﬠץ ַיֲﬠֶנָנּה‬even a
stone set in the wall will cry out, and the wooden beams will bear witness’.

Reflecting on this Gemara, the Chafetz Chaim – writing in 1893 - explains in the ‘Chatimat
HaSefer’ to his ‘Shem Olam’ how the emerging technologies of his time such as the telephone and
the photograph are, in fact, a realisation of the ideas expressed in this Gemara whereby sounds and
images that were previously unrecordable and that could only be witnessed by stone walls or
wooden beams may now be heard and seen. As a result, this awareness should make us think twice
about what we do and, at the very least, realise that evil that was previously hidden from the eyes
of many people has the chance of being recorded in order to bear witness in the future.

Today, the technologies available to us are far more sophisticated than those that existed in 1893,
and the chilling photographs, videos and recordings of events currently taking place in Ukraine
send a shudder down our spine and bear witness to the evil taking place before our eyes. In fact,
so much of what Habbakuk says in this same chapter seems to speak directly to what is taking
place, namely about those who, ‘greedily take what is not theirs’ (2:6), who carry out assaults
‘upon lands, cities and their inhabitants’ (2:8), who ‘garner evil gains’ (2:9) and who overtake
cities and subsequently ‘build cities with bloodshed’ (2:12).

Seeing what we see, and knowing what we know, we cannot – and we must not – turn a blind eye
to evil happening in our time. We must be outraged! And we must speak up! Of course, this
situation highlights the profound moral failure of so many leaders and so many countries who say
so much and do so little. Still, even if we do not have the resources to change what is currently
taking place, the stones in our walls and the beams in our ceilings will, in the future, bear witness
to whether we were vocal or silent, restful or restless, when we saw evidence of evil, when we
witnessed those who greedily took what was not theirs, and when we observed those who carried
out assaults upon lands, cities and their inhabitants.

7
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

20
 The Korban Yachid: Nedava and Chova
Rabbi Menachem Leibtag writes:8

Does God need our "korbanot"?

Or would it be more correct to say that we 'need' to bring them, even though He doesn't need them?
In an attempt to answer this 'philosophical' question, this week's shiur undertakes an analysis of
Parshat Vayikra to show how its specific topic of "korbanot" [sacrificial offerings] relates to one
of the primary themes of the Bible.
Introduction

The Mishkan certainly emerges as a primary topic in both the books of Shemot and Vayikra, and
hence, it would only be logical to assume that its underlying purpose must be thematically
important. To appreciate that purpose, we must first note a very simple distinction that explains
which details are found in each book.

In Sefer Shemot, the Torah explains how to build the mishkan, and hence Shemot concludes (in
Parshat Pekudei) with the story of its assembly. In contrast, Sefer Vayikra explains how to use the

8
https://outorah.org/p/37481/

21
mishkan, and hence Parshat Vayikra begins with the laws of the korbanot - i.e. instructions
regarding the sacrifices that will be offered there.

Even though this distinction explains why Sefer Vayikra discusses korbanot in general, it does not
explain why the Sefer begins specifically with the laws of korban olah [the burnt offering]; nor
does it explain the logic of the progression from one type of korban to the next. In our shiur, we
begin with a technical analysis of its internal progression - but those conclusions will help us arrive
at a deeper understanding of the purpose of korbanot in general.

An Outline for Parshat Vayikra

In our study questions, we suggested that you prepare an outline of chapters one thru five, by
identifying the primary topic of each individual 'parshia'. The following table summarizes our
conclusions. Before you continue, study it carefully (with a Chumash at hand), noting how the
section titles provide an explanation of the progression of its topics.
[Note how each 'parshia' corresponds to one line in our chart. Note also that each asterisk ('*') in
the outline marks the beginning of a new 'dibra', i.e. a short introduction for a new instruction from
God to Moshe [e.g. "va-yedaber Hashem el Moshe..."]. Note as well how the outline suggests
a short one-line summary for each parshia, as well as a title for each section. See if you agree with
those titles.]

I) Korban Nedava - Voluntary offerings (Lev chaps. 1-3)

A. Olah (the entire korban is burnt on the mizbeach)

1. 'bakar' - from cattle
2. 'tzon' - from sheep
3. 'of' - from fowl
B. Mincha (a flour offering)
1. 'solet' - plain flour mixed with oil and 'levona'
2. 'ma'afeh tanur' - baked in the oven
3. 'al machavat' - on a griddle
4. 'marcheshet' - on a pan (+ misc. general laws)
5. 'bikkurim' - from wheat of the early harvest
C. Shelamim (a peace offering, part is eaten by the owners)
1. bakar - from cattle
2. tzon - from sheep
3. 'ez' - from goats
[Note the key phrase repeated many times in this unit: "isheh reiach nichoach l-Hashem."]

II) Korban Chova - Mandatory Offerings

22
A. Chatat (4:1-5:13)

For a general transgression [laws organized according to violator]:

1. 'par kohen mashiach' (High Priest) - a bull
2. 'par he'elem davar' (bet din) - a bull
3. 'se'ir nassi' (a king) - a male goat
4. 'nefesh' (layman) a female goat or female lamb

For specific transgressions ('oleh ve-yored'):

1. a rich person - a female goat or lamb
2. a poor person - two birds
3. a very poor person - a plain flour offering

B. Asham (5:14-5:26) - animal is always an 'ayil' (ram)

1. 'asham me'ilot' - taking from Temple property
2. 'asham talui' - unsure if he sinned [Note the new dibbur at this point]
3. * 'asham gezeilot' - stealing from another
[Note the key phrase repeated numerous times in this unit: "ve-chiper alav... ve-nislach lo."]
Let's explain why we have chosen these titles.

Two Groups: Nedava & Chova

First and foremost, note how our outline divides Parshat Vayikra into two distinct sections:
'korbanot nedava' = voluntary offerings and 'korbanot chova' - mandatory offerings.

The first section is titled "nedava", for if an individual wishes to voluntarily offer a korban to God,
he has three categories to choose from:
1. An OLAH - a burnt offering [chapter one];
2. A MINCHA - a flour offering [chapter two]; or
3. A SHELAMIM - a peace offering [chapter three]

Note how these three groups are all included in the first "dibbur" - and comprise the "nedava"
[voluntary] section.
In contrast, there are instances when a person may transgress, thus obligating him to offer a sin
offering - be it a "chatat" or an "asham" (depending upon what he did wrong).
The two categories (chapters 4 and 5) comprise the second section, which we titled "chova"
[obligatory].

23
The Chumash itself stresses a distinction between these two sections not only the start of a new
dibbur in 4:1, but also the repetition of two key phrases that appear in just about every closing
verse in the parshiot of both sections, stressing the primary purpose of each respective section:
• In the nedava section: "isheh reiach nichoach l'Hashem" ["an offering of fire, a
pleasing odor to the Lord" - see 1:9,13,17; 2:2; 3:5,11,16];
• In the chova section: "ve-chiper a'lav ha-kohen... " ["the kohen shall make expiation
on his behalf..." - see 4:26,31,35; 5:6,10,13,16,19,26]

With this background in mind, we will now discuss the logic behind the internal structure of each
section, to show how (and why) the nedava section is arranged by category of offering and the
type of animal, while the chova section is arranged by type of transgression committed, and who
transgressed.

Nedava - Take Your Pick

If an individual wishes to offer a korban nedava, he must first choose the category that reflects his
personal preference. First of all, should he prefer to offer the entire animal to God, he can choose
the olah category; but should he prefer (for either financial or ideological reasons) to offer flour
instead, then he can choose the mincha category. Finally, should he prefer not only the animal
option, but would also like to later partake in eating from this korban - then he can choose
the shelamim category.

Once the individual has made this general choice of either an ola, mincha, or shelamim - next, he
can pick the subcategory of his choice.

For example, should one choose to offer an olah - which is totally consumed on the mizbeach -
then he must choose between cattle, sheep, or fowl.

The Torah explains these three options (in the first three parshiot of chapter 1), including precise
instructions concerning how to offer each of these animals.
Should the individual choose a mincha - a flour offering - instead, then he must select from one
of the five different options for how to bake the flour, corresponding to the five short parshiot in
chapter two. In other words, he can present his offering as either flour (mixed with oil) or baked
in an oven ("ma'afe tanur) or fried on a skillet ("al machavat"), or deep fried
("marcheshet"). Should the flour offering be from the wheat of the early harvest ("minchat
bikkurim"), it must first be roasted and ground in a special manner (see Ibn Ezra 2:14).

Finally, should he choose the shelamim option- a peace offering - then he must select between
cattle ("bakar"); sheep ("kevasim"); or goats ("izim") - corresponding to the three individual
parshiot in chapter three.

It should be noted as well that the laws included in this korban nedava section also discuss certain
procedural instructions. For example, before offering an olah or shelamim, the owner must
perform the act of 'smicha' (see 1:4, 3:2,8,13). By doing "smicha" - i.e. resting all his weight

24
on the animal - the owner symbolically transfers his identity to the animal. That is to say, he
offers the animal instead of himself (see Ramban).

One could suggest that the act of smicha reflects an understanding that the korban serves as a
'replacement' for the owner. This idea may be reflective of the korban olah that Avraham Avinu
offered at the akeida - when he offered a ram in place of his son - "olah tachat bno" (see Breishit
22:13).

Chova: If You've Done Something Wrong

As we explained earlier, the second category of Parshat Vayikra discusses the

"korban chova" (chapters 4 & 5) - an obligatory offering that must be brought by a person should
he transgress against one of God's laws. Therefore, this section is organized by event, for the type
of sin committed will determine which offering is required.

The first 'event' is an unintentional transgression of 'any of God's mitzvot' (see 4:2 and the header
of each consecutive parshia in chapter 4). Chazal explain that this refers to the unintentional
violation ('shogeg') of any prohibition of the Torah - that had the person transgressed intentionally
("meizid"), his punishment would have been 'karet' (cut off from the Jewish nation).
[This offering is usually referred to as a 'chatat kavua' (the fixed chatat).]
Should this transgression occur ("b'shogeig"), then the actual animal that must be brought depends
upon who the sinner is. If the kohen gadol (high priest) sins, he must bring a bull ("par"). If it is
the political leader ("nasi"), he must bring a male goat ("se'ir"). If it was simply a commoner, he
must bring either a she-goat or lamb ("se'ira" or "kisba").

[There is also a special case of a mistaken halachic ruling by the 'elders' [i.e. the 'sanhedrin' - the
supreme halachic court], which results in the entire nation inadvertently sinning. In this case, the
members of the sanhedrin must bring a special chatat offering - known as the "par he'elem davar
shel tzibur". See 4:13-21.]

In chapter five we find several instances of specific transgressions that require either a "chatat" or
an "asham".
The first category begins with a list of three specific types of transgressions, including - the case
when a person refuses to provide witness (see 5:1), or should one accidentally enter the Temple
(or Mishkan) while spiritually unclean ('tamei' / see 5:2), or should one not keep a promise (to do/
or not to do something) made with an oath ('shevu'at bitui' / see 5:4).
Should one transgress in regard to any one of these three cases (detailed in 5:1-4), the specific
offering that he must bring depends on his income. If he is:
1. Rich - he brings a female lamb or she-goat;
2. 'middle class' - he can bring two birds instead;
3. poor - he can bring a simple flour offering.

25
Interestingly, this korban is categorized as a "chatat" (see 5:6,10,13), even though the Torah uses
the word "asham" [guilt] in reference to these acts (see 5:5). It makes sense to consider it a
"chatat", because in the standard case (i.e. if the transgressor be rich) - the offering is exactly the
same animal as the regular chatat - i.e. a female goat or sheep.
Furthermore, note that these pesukim (i.e. 5:1-13) are included in the same "dibbur" that began in
4:1 that discussed the classic korban "chatat", while the new "dibbur" that discusses the korban
"asham" only begins in 5:14!
The rabbis refer to this korban as an "oleh ve-yored" [lit. up and down] as this name relates to its
graduated scale - which depends entirely upon the individual's financial status.
One could suggest that the Torah offers this graduated scale because these specific transgressions
are very common, and hence it would become rather costly for the average person to offer an
animal for each such transgression.
The final cases (from 5:14 till the end of the chapter) include several other categories of
transgressions - that require what the Torah refers to as a korban asham - a guilt offering. In each
of these cases, the transgressor must offer an ayil [a ram], including:
• when one takes something belonging to hekdesh ('asham me'ilot'/ 5:14-16)
• when one is unsure if he must bring a chatat ('asham talui'), i.e. he is not sure if he
sinned.
• when one falsely denies having illegally held possession of someone else's property
('asham gezeilot' / 5:20-26), like not returning a 'lost item' to its owner.

The General Title - Korban Yachid

We titled the entire outline as korban yachid - the offering of an individual - for this entire unit
details the various types of korbanot that an individual (='yachid') can (or must) bring. Our choice
of this title reflects the opening sentence of the Parsha: "adam ki yakriv..".- any person should he
bring an offering to God..." (see 1:2).

The korban yachid stands in contrast to the korbanot tzibbur - the public offerings - which are
offered by the entire congregation of Israel (purchased with the funds collected from the machatzit
ha-shekel). The laws relating to korbanot tzibbur we first found in Parshat Tetzaveh in regard to
the daily "olat tamid" offering. They continue with the special offering that the nation brings
(collectively) on the holidays, as detailed primarily in Parshiyot Emor (Vayikra chapter 23) and in
Parshat Pinchas (Bamidbar chapters 28-29).

Which Should Come First?

Now that we have explained the logic of the internal order of each section, we must explain why
the laws of korban nedava precede those of korban chova. Intuitively, one would have perhaps
introduced the compulsory korban before the optional one.

One could suggest that Parshat Vayikra begins specifically with the korban nedava since these
korbanot in particular reflect the individual's aspiration to improve his relationship with God.

26
Only afterward does the Torah detail the korban chova, which amends that relationship (when
tainted by sin). Additionally, perhaps, the korban nedava reflects a more ideal situation, while
the obligatory sin-offering seeks to rectify a problematic situation.

We may, however, suggest an even more fundamental reason based on the 'double theme' which
we discussed in our study of the second half of Sefer Shemot.
Recall from our previous shiurim that the mishkan served a dual purpose:
A) to perpetuate the experience of Har Sinai (emphasized by Ramban);
B) and B) to atone for chet ha-egel (emphasized by Rashi).

(A) Reenacting Har Sinai

Recall how the covenantal ceremony that took place at Har Sinai (when Bnei Yisrael accepted the
Torah) included the public offering of "olot" & "shelamim" (when the declared "na'aseh ve-
nishma"/ see Shemot 24:4-7). In fact, in that ceremony we find the very first mention in Chumash
of a korban shelamim, suggesting a conceptual relationship between the korban shelamim and
Har Sinai.
[Note also that Chumash later refers to the korban shelamim as a 'zevach' (see 3:1 & 7:11). The
word zevach itself is also used to describe a feast, generally in the context of an agreement between
two parties. For example, Lavan and Yaakov conduct a zevach after they enter into
a covenant ('brit') agreeing not to harm each other (see Br. 31:44-54). Today, as well, agreements
between two parties are often followed or accompanied by a lavish feast of sorts (e.g. state dinners,
weddings, business mergers, etc.). Therefore, one could suggest that by offering
a zevach shelamim, an individual demonstrates shows his loyalty as a joint partner in a
covenantal relationship with God.]

The korban olah also relates to Ma'amad Har Sinai, based not only on the above parallel, but also
based on a key phrase - "isheh reiach nichoach l-Hashem" - that the Torah uses consistently in its
description of the korban olah. [See 1:9,13,17.]

This exact same phrase is also found in the Torah's description of the "olat tamid", the daily
congregational offering, as inherently connected to Bnei Yisrael's offerings at Har Sinai:
"Olat tamid ha-asuya BE-HAR SINAI, le-reiach nichoach isheh l-Hashem" (see Bamidbar 28:6).

Similarly, in Parshat Tetzaveh, when the Torah first introduces the olat tamid and summarizes its
discussion of the mishkan - we find the exact same phrase:

"... le-reIach nichoach isheh l-Hashem... olat tamid le-doroteichem petach ohel
mo'ed..." (Shemot 29:41-42)

Hence, by offering either an olah or a shelamim - the efficacious reminders of Ma'amad Har Sinai
- the individual reaffirms the covenant at Har Sinai of "na'aseh v'nishma" - the very basis of our
relationship with God at Ma'amad Har Sinai.

27
[One could also suggest that these two types of korbanot reflect two different aspects of our
relationship with God. The olah reflects "yirah" (fear of God), while the shelamim may represent
"ahava" (love of God).]

Recall also that the last time Bnei Yisrael had offered olot & shelamim (i.e. before chet ha-egel)
was at Har Sinai. But due to the sin of the Golden Calf, God's shechinah had left Bnei Yisrael,
thus precluding the very possibility of offering korbanot. Now that the mishkan is finally built and
the Shechina has returned (as described at the conclusion of Sefer Shemot), God's first message
to Bnei Yisrael in Sefer Vayikra is that they can once again offer olot & shelamim, just as they
did at Har Sinai - at not only as a nation, but also as individuals.

This observation alone can help us appreciate why the very first topic in Sefer Vayikra is that of
the voluntary offerings - of the korban olah & shelamim, and hence it makes sense that they would
precede the obligatory offering of chatat and asham.

(B) Korban Chova - Back to Chet HaEgel

In contrast to the 'refrain' of 'isheh reiach nichoach' concluding each korban nedava, we noted that
each korban chova concludes with the phrase "ve-chiper alav ha-kohen... ve-nislach lo". Once
again, we find a parallel to the events at Har Sinai.

Recall our explanation that Aharon acted as he did at "chet ha-egel" with the best of intentions;
only the results were disastrous. With the Shechina present, any transgression, even should it
be unintentional, can invoke immediate punishment (see Shemot 20:2-4 & 23:20-
22). Nevertheless, God's attributes of mercy, that He declares when He gives Moshe Rabbeinu the
second "luchot", now allow Bnei Yisrael 'second chance' should they sin - i.e. the opportunity to
prove to God their sincerity and resolve to exercise greater caution in the future.

We also find a textual parallel in Moshe Rabbeinu's statement before he ascended Har Sinai to
seek repentance for chet ha-egel: Recall how Moshe Rabbenu told the people:
"Atem chatatem chata'a gedola… ulai achapra be'ad chatatchem" (Shemot 32:30; read also
32:31-33).

Later, when Moshe actually receives the thirteen /middot ha-rachamim' on Har Sinai along with
the second luchot (34:-9), he requests atonement for chet ha-egel:
"... ve-salachta le-avoneinu u-lechatoteinu..." (34:9).

This key phrase of the korban chova - "ve-chiper alav... ve-nislach lo" - may also relate to this
precedent of God's capacity and willingness to forgive. The korban chova serves as a vehicle by
which one can ask forgiveness for sins committed "b'shogeg" and beseech God to activate His

28
"middot ha-rachamim" [attributes of mercy] to save them for any punishment that they may
deserve.

Therefore, we may conclude that the korban nedava highlights the mishkan's function as the
perpetuation of Ma'amad Har Sinai, while the korban chova underscores the mishkan's role as
means of atonement for chet ha-egel.

Who Needs the 'Korban'?

With this background, one could suggest that the popular translation of korban as a sacrifice may
be slightly misleading. Sacrifice implies giving up something for nothing in return. In truth,
however, the 'shoresh' (root) of the word korban is k.r.v., 'karov' - to come close. Not only is the
animal brought 'closer' to the mizbeach, but the korban ultimately serves to bring the
individual closer to God. The animal itself comprises merely the vehicle through which this
process is facilitated.

Therefore, korbanot involve more than dry, technical rituals; they promote the primary purpose of
the mishkan - the enhancement of man's relationship with God.
In this sense, it becomes rather clear that it is the individual who needs to offer the "korban" - as
an expression of his commitment and loyalty to his Creator. Certainly it is not God who needs to
consume them!
For the sake of analogy, one could compare the voluntary offerings [the korban nedava] to a gift
that a guest brings to his host.. For example, it is only natural that someone who goes to another
family for a shabbat - cannot come 'empty handed'. Instead, the custom is to bring a small gift, be
it flowers, or wine, or something sweet. Certainly, his hosts don't need the gift, but the guest needs
to bring something. But the reason why they are spending quality time together is for the sake of
their relationship. The gift is only a token of appreciation - nonetheless a very important act.

Tefillah Keneged Korbanot

In closing, we can extend our study to help us better appreciate our understanding of "tefilla"
[prayer before God].
In the absence of the Beit haMikdash [the Temple], Chazal consider 'tefillah' as a 'substitute' for
korbanot. Like korbanot, tefilla also serves as a vehicle through which man can develop and
strengthen his relationship with God. It is the individual who needs to pray, more so that God
needs to hear those prayers.
As such, what we have learned about korbanot has meaning even today - as individual tefilla
should embody both aspects of the korban yachid: nedava and chova.

Tefilla should primarily reflect one's aspiration to come closer to God - an expression of the
recognition of his existence as a servant of God. And secondly, if one has sinned, tefilla becomes
an avenue through which he can amend the tainted relationship.

29
Finally, tefilla, just like the korbanot of the mishkan, involves more than just the fulfillment of
personal obligation. Our ability to approach God, and request that He evoke His "middot ha-
rachamim" - even should we not be worthy of them - should be considered a unique privilege
granted to God's special nation who accepted the Torah at Har Sinai, provides an avenue to perfect
our relationship. As such, tefilla should not be treated as a burden, but rather as a special privilege.

Can Agents, Women, or Friends Perform Semicha on a Sacrifice?

Rabbi Shmuel Wise writes:9

The Gemara derives from the passuk that only the owner himself may perform the semicha (by
placing both hands on the head of the animal offering and leaning on it just before it is offered)--
as opposed to having an agent do so.

The Olas Shlomo asks on this Gemara: It would appear that semicha is a mitzva that is similar to
the mitzva to wear tefillin or shake a lulav which definitely cannot be accomplished through an
agent. Isn’t it obvious then that one cannot use an agent to fulfill the mitzva of semicha?

9
https://outorah.org/p/45037/

30
The Olas Shlomo gives an answer which makes a fundamental point about
the mitzva of semicha: Semicha is not strictly an obligation on the person, rather, semicha should
also be understood as focused on the object. In other words, separate and distinct from the owner’s
personal obligation to lean, the Halacha is also saying that the animal must be leaned upon. Thus
it is indeed conceivable that semicha can be accomplished through an agent.

This point presents a possible resolution to a question posed by Tosfos (93b heading "‫)"ידו‬. Tosfos
wonders why we need the passuk to teach us that women do not perform semicha when we already
have an established rule that women are exempt from all time-dependent mitzvos (and
since semicha can only be performed by day, it is a time-dependent mitzva). Based on the Olas
Shlomo’s point, we can answer that the rule the Tosfos cites isn’t necessarily relevant here. For
if semicha is simply what must happen to this animal before it is offered, there’s a good case to
make that women are required to fulfill this for their animal offerings. Thus, the passuk is needed
to teach us that in fact women do not perform semicha.

One more interesting point to consider is the fact that the Gemara presents a separate derivation to
establish that “a friend” (who isn’t an owner of the korban) cannot perform semicha. The Keren
Ora asks: Since we’ve already derived that an agent cannot perform the semicha, why isn’t this
teaching redundant (especially since an agent had the superior quality of being legally considered
like the owner himself--so all the more so by this “friend” who wasn’t even formally appointed an
agent!)?

The Keren Ora answers by invoking the concept that we’ve been discussing: The idea that in one
sense semicha is animal-oriented rather than owner-oriented. Because of this concept, we might
have said the following: By teaching that an agent cannot fulfill the semicha obligation the Torah
is saying that the primary obligation, i.e. the owner-oriented idea that the owner himself has a
personal obligation to perform semicha, cannot be fulfilled through an agent. However if in the
absence of the owner, someone comes along and does the semicha, we might have said that that
still accomplishes something, i.e. that it fulfills the secondary element of the obligation that the
Halacha wants the animal to be leaned on. The Torah teaches us that in fact, anyone other than the
owner does not achieve anything whatsoever by leaning on the sacrifice.

Tannaim10

10
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Tannaim

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Many of the Tannaim worked as laborers (e.g., charcoal burners, cobblers) in addition to their
positions as teachers and legislators. They were also leaders of the people and negotiators with
the Roman Empire.

The origin of the Tannaim

The Tannaim operated under the occupation of the Roman Empire. During this time,
the Kohanim (priests) of the Temple became increasingly corrupt and were seen by the Jewish
people as collaborators with the Romans, whose mismanagement of Judea led to riots, revolts and
general resentment. Throughout much of the period, the office of the Kohen Gadol (High Priest)
was rented out to the highest bidder, and the priests themselves extorted as much as they could
from the pilgrims who came to sacrifice at the Temple.

The conflict between the high priesthood and the people led to the split between the Sadducees and
the Pharisees. The elitist Sadducees (who generally controlled the high priesthood) were supported
by the Hasmonean royal family and later by the Romans. The Pharisees were a more egalitarian
sect; they accepted students from all the tribes, not only the Levites, and they also taught laws in
addition to those set forth in the Torah. These laws make up the Mishnah, whose compilation
marked the end of the period of the Tannaim.

By this period, the "House of Hillel" and the "House of Shammai" came to represent two distinct
perspectives on Jewish law, and disagreements between the two schools of thought are found
throughout the Mishnah.

The Tannaim, as teachers of the Oral Law, were direct transmitters of an oral tradition passed from
teacher to student that was written and codified as the basis for the Mishnah, Tosefta, and tannaitic
teachings of the Talmud. According to tradition, the Tannaim were the last generation in a long
sequence of oral teachers that began with Moses.

Transmission of the Mishnah

The Mishnah (‫משנה‬, "repetition," from the verb shanah ‫שנה‬, or "to study and review") is a major
work of Rabbinic Judaism, and the first major redaction into written form of Jewish oral traditions,
called the Oral Torah. It was debated between 70-200 C.E. by the group of rabbinic sages known
as the Tannaim[1] and redacted about 200 C.E. by Judah haNasi when, according to the Talmud,
the persecution of the Jews and the passage of time raised the possibility that the details of the oral
traditions would be forgotten. The Mishnah does not claim to be the development of new laws, but
merely the collection of existing traditions.

The Mishnah is considered to be the first important work of Rabbinic Judaism[2] and is a major
source of later rabbinic religious thought. Rabbinic commentaries on the Mishnah over the next
three centuries[3] were redacted as the Gemara.

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Prominent Tannaim

Their titles

The Nasi (plural Nesi'im) was the highest-ranking member and presided over
the Sanhedrin. Rabban was a higher title than Rabbi, and it was given to the Nasi starting with
Rabban Gamaliel Hazaken (Gamaliel the Elder). The title Rabban was limited to the descendants
of Hillel, the sole exception being Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai, the leader in Jerusalem during the
siege, who safeguarded the future of the Jewish people after the Great Revolt by pleading with
Vespasian. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah, who was also Nasi, was not given the title Rabban, perhaps
because he only held the position of Nasi for a short while and it eventually reverted to the
descendants of Hillel. Prior to Rabban Gamliel Hazaken, no titles were used before someone's
name, based on the Talmudic adage "Gadol miRabban shmo" ("Greater than the title Rabban is a
person's own name"). For this reason Hillel has no title before his name: his name in itself is his
title, just as Moses and Abraham have no titles before their names. (An addition is sometimes
given after a name to denote significance or to differentiate between two people with the same
name. Examples include Avraham Avinu (Abraham our father) and Moshe Rabbeinu (Moses our
teacher). Starting with Rabbi Judah haNasi (Judah the Nasi), often referred to simply as "Rabbi,"
not even the Nasi is given the title Rabban, but instead, Judah haNasi is given the lofty
title Rabbeinu HaKadosh ("Our holy rabbi [teacher]").

The Nesi'im

The following were Nesi'im, that is to say presidents of the Sanhedrin:

• Hillel
• Rabban Shimon ben Hillel, about whom nothing is known
• Rabban Gamaliel Hazaken (Gamaliel the Elder)
• Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel
• Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai
• Rabban Gamaliel of Yavne
• Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah, who was Nasi for a short time after Rabban Gamliel was
removed from his position
• Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of Yavne
• Rabbi Judah haNasi (Judah the Nasi), known simply as "Rabbi," who compiled the
Mishnah

The generations of the Tannaim

The Mishnaic period is commonly divided into various periods according to generations of the
Tannaim, which are as follows:

1. First Generation: Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai's generation (circa 40 B.C.E.-80 C.E.).
2. Second Generation: Rabban Gamliel of Yavneh, Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Yehoshua's
generation, the teachers of Rabbi Akiva.

33
 3. Third Generation: The generation of Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues.
4. Fourth Generation: The generation of Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and their colleagues.
5. Fifth Generation: Rabbi Judah haNasi's generation.
6. Sixth Generation: The interim generation between the Mishnah and the Talmud: Rabbis
Shimon ben Judah HaNasi and Yehoshua ben Levi, etc.

Before the destruction of the Temple

• Hillel
• Shammai
• Rabban Gamaliel Hazaken (Gamaliel the Elder)
• Elisha ben Abuyah

The generation of the destruction

• Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

• Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai
• Rabbi Yehuda ben Baba

Between the destruction of the Temple and Bar Kokhba's revolt

• Rabbi Yehoshua son of Hannania

• Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurcanus
• Rabban Gamaliel of Yavne
• Rabbi Eleazar ben Arach

The generation of Bar Kokhba's revolt

• Rabbi Akiba
• Rabbi Tarfon
• Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha
• Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah
• Rabbi Yosei]] the Galilean

After the revolt

• Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of Yavne

• Rabbi Meir
• Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who wrote the Zohar
• Rabbi Yosei ben Halafta
• Rabbi Judah ben Ilai

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Notes

1. The plural term (singular tanna) for the Rabbinic sages whose views are recorded in the Mishnah; the period of
the Tannaim is also referred to as the Mishnaic period and followed the Zugot ("pairs"), preceding the period of
the Amoraim. The root tanna (‫ )תנא‬is the Aramaic equivalent for the Hebrew root shanah (‫)שנה‬, which also is the root-
word of Mishnah. The verb shanah (‫ )שנה‬literally means "to repeat [what one was taught]" and is used to mean "to learn".
2. The list of joyful days known as Megillat Taanit is older, but according to the Talmud it is no longer in force.
3. Recorded mostly in Aramaic.

References

• Berger, Michael S. 1998. Rabbinic Authority: The Authority of the Talmudic Sages. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-
0195122695
• McGinley, John W. 2007. The Forbidden Relations and the Early Tannaim. iUniverse, Inc. ISBN 978-0595428434
• Moore, George F. 1997. Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of Tannaim. Hendrickson
Publishers. ISBN 978-1565632868

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 The State of Mishnah Studies

AMRAM TROPPER writes:11

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY· 165 RABBINIC TEXTS AND THE HISTORY OF LATE-ROMAN
PALESTINE Edited by MARTIN GOODMAN & PHILIP ALEXANDER,
file:///Users/julian/Desktop/The_State_of_Mishnah_Studies.pdf

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 "Laying" the Table for the Controversy Over Semicha

Ephraim Diamond writes:12

This sheet is part of a series of source sheets related to Mishnayos Chagigah. Other sheets
include:

• Mishnayos Chagigah: A running Commentary (https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/64672)

• Sources for Mesechtas Chaggah (https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/64137)

This source sheet provides background material for the controversy over Semicha. Translations
are from Sefaria.

12
https://www.sefaria.org.il/sheets/65427.23?lang=bi

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Source 1

These sources set forth the biblical foundations requiring Semicha for personal Korbonos

‫ד׳‬:‫ויקרא א׳‬

(‫ ָי֔דוֹ ַ֖ﬠל ֣ר ֹאשׁ ָהֹעָ֑לה ְו ִנ ְרָ֥צה ֖לוֹ ְלַכֵ֥פּר ָﬠ ָ ֽליו׃ )ד‬¢‫ְוָסַ֣מ‬

Leviticus 1:4

(4) He shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, that it may be acceptable in his behalf,
in expiation for him.

‫ב׳‬-‫א׳‬:‫ויקרא ג׳‬

(‫ ָיד ֙וֹ ַﬠל־ )ב( ְוִאם־ ֶ֥זַבח ְשָׁל ִ֖מים ָק ְרָבּ ֑נוֹ ִ֤אם ִמן־ַהָבָּק֙ר ֣הוּא ַמְק ִ֔ריב ִאם־ָזָכ֙ר ִאם־ ְנֵקָ֔בה ָתּ ִ֥מים ַיְק ִריֶ֖בנּוּ ִלְפ ֵ֥ני ְיה ָֽוה׃ )א‬¢‫ְוָסַ֤מ‬
‫֣ר ֹאשׁ ָק ְרָבּ ֔נוֹ וְּשָׁח֕טוֹ ֶ֖פַּתח ֹ֣אֶהל מוֵֹ֑ﬠד ְוָז ְר֡קוּ ְבֵּנ֩י ַאֲהֹ֨רן ַהֹכֲּה ִ֧נים ֶאת־ַה ָ֛דּם ַﬠל־ַהִמְּזֵ֖בַּח ָס ִֽביב׃‬

Leviticus 3:1-2

(1) If his offering is a sacrifice of well-being— If he offers of the herd, whether a male or a
female, he shall bring before the LORD one without blemish. (2) He shall lay his hand
upon the head of his offering and slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; and
Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash the blood against all sides of the altar.

Source 2

These Mishnayos set forth the basic rules of Semicha. Generally limited to personal Korbonos
An agent (Shliach) does not perform Semicha If Semicha is not done the Korban remains valid
Semicha is done by placing your hands on the animals' head. Semicha takes place in the Beis
HaMikdash Semicha should take place immediately prior to sacrificing the animal.

‫ח׳‬-‫ז׳‬:‫משנה מנחות ט׳‬

(‫ רבי שמעון אומר אף )ז‬.‫ ושעיר המשתלח‬.‫ חוץ מן הפר הבא על כל המצות‬.‫ אין בהם סמיכה‬.‫כל קרבנות הצבור‬
‫ והיורש סומך ומביא נסכים‬.‫ חוץ מן הבכור והמעשר והפסח‬.‫ כל קרבנות היחיד טעונים סמיכה‬.‫שעירי עבודה זרה‬
‫וממיר‬:

(‫ בשתי )ח‬.‫ על הראש‬.‫ וסמיכה שירי מצוה‬.‫ והעבד והשליח והאשה‬.‫ סומא ונכרי‬.‫ חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן‬.‫הכל סומכין‬
‫ ותכף לסמיכה שחיטה‬.‫ ובמקום שסומכין שוחטין‬.‫ידים‬:

Mishnah Menachot 9:7-8

(7) All of the offerings of community do not require the laying on of hands except the bull that is
offered for [the transgression] of any of the commandments, and the scapegoat. Rabbi Shimon

47
says: also the goats offered for [the transgression] of idol worship. All the offerings of an individual
require the laying on of hands except the first-born, the cattle tithe, and the pesach. And an heir
may lay his hands [on them], and he may bring the libations, and [if he wrongfully] substitutes
[another animal for it, it is holy].

(8) All perform the laying on of hands except for a deaf-mute, a shoteh, a minor, a blind person, a
non-Jew, a slave, an agent, and a woman. The laying on of hands - the last part of the
commandment [of bringing the offering] - is on the head, and [is performed] with both hands, the
place they would slaughter is where the hands are laid [upon the animal], and immediately after
laying hands upon it they would slaughter it.

Source 3

This Mishna describes the Rabbinic prohibition on utilizing an animal (e.g., leaning on for support)
on Yom tov.

‫ב׳‬:‫משנה ביצה ה׳‬

(‫ לא )ב‬.‫ ואלו הן משום שבות‬.‫ חייבין עליו ביום טוב‬.‫ בשבת‬.‫ משום מצוה‬.‫ משום רשות‬.‫כל שחייבין עליו משום שבות‬
‫ ואלו הן משום‬.‫ ולא מרקדין‬.‫ ולא מספקין‬.‫ ולא מטפחין‬.‫ ולא שטין על פני המים‬.‫ ולא רוכבין על גבי בהמה‬.‫עולין באילן‬
.‫ ולא מחרימין‬.‫ ולא מעריכין‬.‫ לא מקדישין‬.‫ ואלו הן משום מצוה‬.‫ ולא מיבמין‬.‫ ולא חולצין‬.‫ ולא מקדשין‬.‫ לא דנין‬.‫רשות‬
‫ אלא אוכל נפש בלבד‬.‫ אין בין יום טוב לשבת‬.‫ קל וחומר בשבת‬.‫ כל אלו ביום טוב אמרו‬.‫ולא מגביהין תרומה ומעשר‬:

Mishnah Beitzah 5:2

(2) Any [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat as a matter of shevut [restrictions established
by the Sages regarding Shabbat to prevent violation of Torah-level Shabbat prohibitions,
and to increase its sanctity], or as an optional matter [i.e. something not fully a mitzvah],
or as a mitzvah, one is also liable [for such an act] on a holiday. And these are [the acts for
which one is liable] as a matter of shevut: one may not climb a tree, and one may not ride
atop an animal, and one may not swim in water, and one may not clap, nor slap [thighs],
nor dance. And these are [the acts for which one is liable] as an optional matter: one may
not judge [a court case], and one may not betroth, nor perform chalitzah [the ceremony
performed to release a widow of a childless man from the obligation of levirite marriage],
nor perform yibum [the enactment of a levirite marriage of the widow of a childless man].

(3) And these are [the acts for which one is liable] as a mitzvah: one may not consecrate
[anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make something cherem
[proscribed from personal use, possibly due to being dedicated to the Temple], nor raise
terumah or tithes out [from one's produce]. All of these were said [to be forbidden]
regarding holidays so, a fortiori, [they must also be forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no
difference between [the laws of] holidays and Shabbat except only for okhel nefesh [certain
types of food preparation which, though forbidden on Shabbat, are permitted on festivals].

Source 4

48
These Mishnayos describe the generational dispute surrounding Semicha. The juxtaposition of
these two Mishnayos provides strong support for interpreting the first Mishna as also describing
Semicha on Yom Tov.

‫ג׳‬-‫ב׳‬:‫משנה חגיגה ב׳‬

(‫ ניתאי הארבלי )ב‬.‫ יהושע בן פרחיה אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫ יוסי בן יוחנן אומר לסמוך‬.‫יוסי בן יועזר אומר שלא לסמוך‬
‫ אבטליון אומר‬.‫ שמעיה אומר לסמוך‬.‫ שמעון בן שטח אומר לסמוך‬.‫ יהודה בן טבאי אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫אומר לסמוך‬
‫ הראשונים‬.‫ הלל אומר לסמוך‬.‫ שמאי אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫ נכנס שמאי‬.‫ יצא מנחם‬.‫ הלל ומנחם לא נחלקו‬.‫שלא לסמוך‬
‫ ושניים להם אב בית דין‬.‫היו נשיאים‬:

(‫ ובית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות )ג‬.‫ אבל לא עולות‬.‫בית שמאי אומרים מביאין שלמים ואין סומכין עליהם‬
‫וסומכין עליהם‬:

Mishnah Chagigah 2:2-3

(2) Yose ben Yoezer says not to lean hands [on the Chagigah sacrifice]; Yose ben Yohanan says
to lean hands. Yehoshua ben Perahia says not to lean hands; Nitai the Arbelite says to lean hands.
Yehuda ben Tavai says not to lean hands; Shimon ben Shetach says to lean hands. Shemaya says
to lean hands; Avtaliyon says not to lean hands. Hillel and Menahem did not disagree. Menahem
left and Shammai entered. Shammai says not to lean hands; Hillel says to lean hands. The first [of
each pair] was the nasi [head of the Sanhedrin] and the second [of each pair] was the av beit din
[vice-head of the Sandhedrin].

(3) Beit Shammai says, they bring peace offerings [on Yom Tov] and do not lay their hands on
them, but they do not bring burnt offerings. And Beit Hillel says, they bring both peace offerings
and burnt offerings and lay their hands on them.

Source 5

This Mishna is the source for Chagigah 2:3. There are two distinct disputes embedded in this
Mishna. First, is whether one should be bringing an Oleh on Yom Tov (everyone agrees a
Shelamim may be brought as it is "Ochel Nefesh"). The second is whether one can perform
Semicha on Yom Tov immediately prior to bringing his Korban or may he perform Semicha prior
to Yom Tov. Embedded in the second dispute is whether or not Semicha must immediately precede
the slaughtering of the Korban or may it be done earlier.

‫ד׳‬:‫משנה ביצה ב׳‬

(‫ )ד‬.‫ ובית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות‬.‫ אבל לא עולות‬.‫ ואין סומכין עליהן‬.‫בית שמאי אומרים מביאין שלמים‬
‫וסומכין עליהם‬:

Mishnah Beitzah 2:4

(4) Beit Shammai say: Shelamim [offerings whose various parts are consumed by their owners, by
the priests, and by the fire on the altar] may be brought [on a festival], and one does not lean upon

49
them [as one normally does when bringing a sacrifice], but not olot [offerings that are entirely
burnt on the alter]. And Beit Hillel say: shelamim and olot may be brought [on a holiday], and one
does lean upon them.

Source 6

The following sources, the Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi and Talmud Bavli expand and expound
on the dispute over Semicha. The sources can be broken down into three distinct topics.

The sources create an idyllic picture of Halachik history. At first, any time there was uncertainty
or a difference of opinion over a particular Halacha, they would pose the question to the great 71-
member Sanhedrin that sat inside the Beis HaMikdash. If someone had a tradition as to the proper
rule (‫ )אם שמעו אמרו‬they would accept the tradition. Otherwise, the august group would vote and
determine the Halacha according to the majority. For reasons we will discuss, the one issue they
could not resolve was the dispute over Semicha. Following Shammai and Hillel, their students no
longer were capable of properly being instructed and from then on disputes multiplied.

As noted above, embedded within the Machlokes over Semicha on Yom Tov are two disputes.
First, whether one may bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov. According to Beis Shammai one cannot
bring an Olah since it is wholly burnt rather than eaten, there is no purpose for such a Korban on
Yom Tov. Beis Hillel permits a person to bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov based on the principal
that how can we concern ourselves with our food and not also be concerned with Hashem's.
However, everyone agrees that you can bring a Shelamim on Yom Tov.

Separately, they argue whether or not one is permitted to perform Semicha on Yom Tov itself
(whether for the Korban Olah according to Beis Hillel and the Shelamim according to everyone).
According to Beis Shammai, you are permitted to do Semicha prior to bringing the Korban;
consequently, he does not permit a person to violate the Rabbinic prohibition on using an animal
on Yom Tov. According to Beis Hillel, however, one can only perform Semicha at the time of
bringing the Korban and cannot do so earlier. When pitting the obligation to perform Semicha
against the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals on Yom Tov, he allows Semicha to be
performed.

Taking a step back, on a very practical level this dispute had meaningful consequences for the
population. According to Beis Shammai a person who could not make the trek to the Beis
HaMikdash (whether for the Festivals or any other time) could still send Korbonos and participate
in ritual life since he could perform Semicha at home and send his Korban with a Shaliach.
Whereas, according to Beis Hillel, this is Halachacily impermissible, and such a person would not
be able to participate in the Temple ritual.

50
According to the sources, both disputes were eventually resolved. The sources vary slightly but
the major details remain the same. The Talmud Yerushalmi's version is the most dramatic retelling.
Briefly, Hillel once arrived at the Beis HaMikdash on Yom Tov prepared to bring a Korban Olah.
Shammai's students quickly surround him (in an effort to prevent an Olah from being brought) and
Hillel resorts to obfuscating the gender of the animal and pretends it is a female (which cannot be
used for an Olah) and that he is bringing a Shelamim. Shammai's students invariably decide it's
time to bring an end to the dispute by bringing the matter to a vote.

However, one student, Bava ben Butah knew that the Halachah was like Beis Hillel. According to
the Yerushalmi's retelling, Bava was inspired/prompted by the reality of the fact that under Beis
Shammai's paradigm the Beis HaMikdash was empty on Yom Tov. Rather than teeming with
people it was desolate. Perhaps as a result of not being able to perform Semicha--while not
absolutely required, it was very much a part of the Korban process for people--people refrained
from bringing any Korbnos (including Shelamim) on Yom Tov. Preferring to wait until Chol
HaMoed or after Shavuous when they could bring the Korban in the preferred manner.

To remedy the situation Bava went out and brought 3,000 animals to the Beis HaMikdash and
urged the population to come and bring them--including allowing them to perform Semicha. And
with that display he established the Halacha like Beis Hillel. Presumably as to both permitting
Olos on Yom Tov and allowing Semicha to be performed at the same time. [One interesting note
is whether the allowance of Semicha was only according to Hillel's rule that it must be performed
immediately prior to slaughtering the animal or was it even according to Shammai who allowed
you to perform Semicha earlier if need be. In other words, did they change the requirement for
Semicha or did they dispense with the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals even when not
directly conflicting with Semicha].

[My read of the sources suggest that Shammai's students were more concerned over an Olah
being brought than whether or not Hillel was going to perform Semicha. The former would
impugn the Beis HaMikdash as a whole (i.e., by having to be burnt on the Mizbeach) whereas
Hillel's desire to perform Semicha was a personal choice. However, all of the Bava ben Butah
sources have him exhorting the population to come and bring Korbonos and to perform
Semicha. This suggests that he was concerned with both issues. This then requires an
explanation why the next statement in each of these sources is about a student of Hillel's
bringing a Korban and performing Semicha who is stopped by a student of Shammai's
demanding the former not perform Semicha. Hillel's student shuts down the objection with
seemingly positive results. (I.e., establishing that Semicha can be performed on Yom Tov). While
it may simply be a secondary form of support it does seem like it is meant to establish the
Semicha rule. See Lieberman, Tosephta Kepshuta, Moed, pp 1200, n. 42 suggesting that
Shammai and Hillel only disputed Semicha, it was their students who added the dispute of
Korbnei Olah on Yom Tov.]

‫ו׳‬-‫ד׳‬:‫תוספתא חגיגה ב׳‬

51
 ‫מימיהן לא נחלקו אלא על הסמיכה חמשה זוגות הן שלשה מזוגות הראשונים שאמרו ]שלא[ לסמוך ושנים מזוגות )ד(‬
‫האחרונים שאמרו לסמוך ]שלשה[ היו נשיאים ושנים ]מהן[ אבות בית דין דברי רבי מאיר ]רבי יהודה אומר שמעון בן‬
‫שטח נשיא[ יהודה בן טבאי אב ב"ד‬

‫היו יושבין ‪...‬אמר רבי יוסי בתחלה לא היתה מחלוקת בישראל אלא בית דין של שבעים ואחד ]היה[ בלשכת הגזית‬
‫מתמיד של שחר עד תמיד של בין הערבים ובשבתות ובימים טובים נכנסין לבית המדרש שבהר הבית ]נשאלה הלכה[‬
‫אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו עומדין במנין אם רבו המטמאין טימאו אם רבו המטהרין טיהרו משם הלכה יוצא רווחת‬
‫בישראל‬

‫‪...‬משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן ]הרבו[ מחלוקת בישראל ]ונעשו כשתי תורות‬

‫איזו היא סמיכה שנחלקו עליה בית שמאי אומרים אין סומכין ביום טוב ושלמים החוגג בהן סומך עליהן מערב יום )ה(‬
‫‪] ...‬בית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות וסומכין עליהן[טוב‬

‫מעשה בהלל הזקן שסמך על העולה בעזרה וחברו עליו תלמידי בית שמאי אמר להם באו וראו שהיא נקבה וצריכין )ו(‬
‫אנו לעשותה זבחי שלמים הפליגן בדברים והלכו להם מיד גברה ידן של ב"ש ובקשו לקבוע הלכה כמותן והיה שם בבא‬
‫בן בוטא שהוא מתלמידי בית שמאי ]ויודע שהלכה כדברי בית הלל[ בכל מקום ]והלך[ והביא את כל צאן קדר והעמידן‬
‫בעזרה ואמר כל מי שצריך להביא עולות ושלמים יבוא ויטול באו ונטלו ]את הבהמה והעלו עולות[ וסמכו עליהן בו‬
‫ושוב מעשה ]בתלמיד אחד[ מתלמידי בית הלל שסמך על ]ביום נקבעה הלכה כדברי בית הלל ולא ]ערער אדם בדבר‬
‫‪.‬העולה בעזרה מצאו תלמיד אחד מתלמידי בית שמאי אמר לו מה זה סמיכה אמר לו מה זה שתיקה שתקו בנזיפה‬

‫‪Tosefta Chagigah 2:4-6‬‬

‫‪...‬‬
‫תלמוד ירושלמי חגיגה ב׳‪:‬ב׳‪:‬ב׳‪-‬ד׳‬

‫בראשונה לא היתה מחלוקת בישראל אלא על הסמיכה בלבד ועשו שמאי והלל ועשו אותן ד' משרבו תלמידי ב"ש‬
‫ותלמידי ב"ה ולא שימשו את רביהן כל צורכן ורבו המחלוקת בישראל ונחלקו לשתי כתות אלו מטמאין ואלו מטהרין‬
‫ועוד אינה עתידה לחזור למקומה עד שיבוא בן דוד ר' חייה בשם ר"י לא תהא שבות קלה בעיניך שהרי סמיכה אינה‬
‫אלא רשות ונחלקו עליה אבות העולם א"ר יוסה זאת אומר שאדם צריך לכבוש את כובדו דלא כן מה אנן אמרין אסור‬
‫‪.‬ליגע בבהמה בי"ט‬

‫‪Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:2:2-4‬‬

‫‪...‬‬
‫תלמוד ירושלמי חגיגה ב׳‪:‬ג׳‪:‬א׳‪-‬ה׳‬

‫‪:‬ב"ש אומרים מביאין שלמים ואין סומכין עליהן אבל לא עולות וב"ה אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות וסומכין עליהן‪...‬‬
‫ב"ש אומרים הותרה סמיכה שלא כדרכה וב"ה אומרים לא הותרה סמיכה שלא כדרכה אי זו היא סמיכה שלא כדרכה‬
‫מאתמול א"ר זעירה כל עמא מודיי באשם מצורע שסמך עליו מאתמול לא יצא שלמי נדבה שסמך עליהן מאתמול יצא‬
‫‪ ...‬מה פליגין בשלמי חגיגה בית שמאי עבדין לון כשלמי נדבה ב"ה עבדין לון כאשם מצורע‬

‫מעשה בהלל הזקן שהביא עולתו לעזרה וסמך עליה חברו עליו תלמידי ב"ש התחיל מכשכש בזנבה אמר להן ראו נקיבה‬
‫היא ושלמים הפליגן בדברים והלכו להן לאחר ימים גברה ידן של ב"ש וביקשו לקבוע הלכה כדבריהם והיה שם בבא‬
‫בן בוטא מתלמידי ב"ש ויודע שהלכה כב"ה ופעם אחת נכנס לעזרה ומצאה שוממת אמר ישמו בתיהן של אלו שהישמו‬
‫את בית אלקינו מה עשה שלח והביא שלשת אלפים טלי מצאן קדר וביקרן ממומין והעמידן בהר הבית ואמר להן‬
‫שמעוני אחיי בית ישראל כל מי שהוא רוצה יביא עולות יביא ויסמוך יביא שלמים ויסמוך באותה השעה נקבעה הלכה‬
‫‪ ...‬כבית הלל ולא אמר אדם דבר‬

‫‪52‬‬
 ‫מעשה באחד מתלמידי ב"ה שהביא עולתו לעזרה וסמך עליה וראהו אחד מתלמידי ב"ש אמר להן מה זו סמיכה אמר לו‬
‫מה זו שתיקה ושיתקו בנזיפה והלך לו‬: ...

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:3:1-5

...
‫ב׳‬:‫כ׳ ב‬-‫י׳‬:‫ביצה כ׳ א‬

..... ‫וסברי בית שמאי שלמי חובה לא בעו סמיכה והתניא אמר רבי יוסי לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על הסמיכה‬
‫עצמה שצריך על מה נחלקו על תכף לסמיכה שחיטה שבית שמאי אומרים אינו צריך ובית הלל אומרים צריך הוא‬
‫דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא אמר רבי יוסי בר' יהודה לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על תכף לסמיכה שחיטה שצריך על‬
‫מה נחלקו על הסמיכה עצמה שבית שמאי אומרים אינו צריך ובית הלל אומרים צריך‬:

‫ת"ר מעשה בהלל הזקן שהביא עולתו לעזרה לסמוך עליה ביו"ט חברו עליו תלמידי שמאי הזקן אמרו לו מה טיבה של‬
‫בהמה זו אמר להם נקבה היא ולזבחי שלמים הבאתיה כשכש להם בזנבה והלכו להם ואותו היום גברה ידם של בית‬
‫שמאי על בית הלל ובקשו לקבוע הלכה כמותן והיה שם זקן אחד מתלמידי שמאי הזקן ובבא בן בוטא שמו שהיה יודע‬
‫שהלכה כבית הלל ושלח והביא כל צאן קדר שבירושלים והעמידן בעזרה ואמר כל מי שרוצה לסמוך יבא ויסמוך ואותו‬
‫היום גברה ידן של בית הלל וקבעו הלכה כמותן ולא היה שם אדם שערער בדבר כלום‬: ‫שוב מעשה בתלמיד אחד‬
‫מתלמידי ב"ה שהביא עולתו לעזרה לסמוך עליה מצאו תלמיד אחד מתלמידי ב"ש אמר לו מה זו סמיכה אמר לו מה זו‬
‫שתיקה שתקו בנזיפה והלך לו‬...

Beitzah 20a:10-20b:2

... And do Beit Shammai hold that obligatory peace-offerings do not require placing of hands
on the head of the animal? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Beit Shammai and
Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the placing of hands itself that it is required in the
case of obligatory peace-offerings. With regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed
with regard to the halakha that states that immediately following placing hands on the head of
an offering is its slaughter. As Beit Shammai say: It is not necessary to be particular in this
regard, and the ceremony of placing hands on the animal’s head may be performed even on the
eve of the Festival, long before the animal is slaughtered. And Beit Hillel say: It is necessary,
and therefore one who brings an offering on a Festival must place his hands on the animal’s head
on the Festival itself. The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna said what he said in
accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Yosei,
son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the
halakha that immediately following placing hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter,
that it is necessary. With regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed with regard
to the placing of hands itself on the head of obligatory peace-offerings. Beit Shammai say: It is
not necessary, and Beit Hillel say: It is necessary. § The Gemara returns to the basic dispute
between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

The Sages taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving Hillel the Elder, who brought
his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to place his hands on the animal’s head
on a Festival. The students of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him:
What is the nature of this animal that you are bringing? Hillel, being humble and meek, did not
want to quarrel with them in the Temple and therefore concealed the truth from them for the sake
of peace. He said to them: It is a female, and I have brought it as a peace-offering, as burnt-

53
offerings are always male. He swung its tail for them so that they would not be able to properly
discern whether the animal was male or female, and they departed. On that day, when the
incident became known, suggesting that even Hillel had accepted Shammai’s view, Beit Shammai
gained the upper hand over Beit Hillel, and they sought to establish the halakha in this regard
in accordance with their opinion. But a certain Elder of the disciples of Shammai the Elder
was there, and Bava ben Buta was his name, who knew that the halakha is in accordance with
the opinion of Beit Hillel in this matter. And he sent for and brought all the high-quality sheep
of Kedar that were in Jerusalem, and he stood them in the Temple courtyard and said:
Anyone who wishes to place his hands on the head of an animal should come and place his
hands there. And on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand over Beit Shammai, and they
established the halakha in this case in accordance with their opinion, and there was no one
there who disputed the matter in any way.

And sometime later there was another incident involving a certain disciple from among the
disciples of Beit Hillel who brought his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to
place his hands on the animal’s head on a Festival. A certain disciple from among the disciples
of Beit Shammai found him and said to him: What is this placing of hands? Why do you place
your hands on the animal’s head and thereby violate the statement of Beit Shammai? He said to
him: What is this silence? Why do you not stay silent, as the halakha was not established in
accordance with their opinion? He silenced him with a rebuke, and he, Beit Shammai’s disciple,
departed quietly.

Source 7
The Gemara derives from the fact that there was even a dispute whether one can perform Semicha
on Yom Tov that Semicha requires you to press and lean down on the animal with all your weight.
Something that is not obvious from the Mishna. Second, we see that while women were not
obligated in performing Semicha, they still desired to do so. The Semicha process was comforting
in its own way perhaps by allowing a person to fully appreciate the magnitude of what was about
to take place.

‫י״ט‬-‫י״ד‬:‫חגיגה ט״ז ב‬

.... ‫אמר רמי בר חמא שמע מינה סמיכה בכל כחו בעינן דאי ס"ד לא בעינן בכל כחו מאי קא עביד ליסמוך מיתיבי‬
[‫ ב( דבר אל בני ישראל וסמך בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות רבי יוסי ור' )ישמעאל( ]שמעון‬,‫)ויקרא א‬
‫אומרים בנות ישראל סומכות רשות אמר רבי יוסי סח לי אבא אלעזר פעם אחת היה לנו עגל של זבחי שלמים‬
‫והביאנוהו לעזרת נשים וסמכו עליו נשים לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים אלא כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים ואי ס"ד סמיכה‬
‫בכל כחו בעינן משום נחת רוח דנשים עבדינן עבודה בקדשים אלא לאו ש"מ לא בעינן בכל כחו לעולם אימא לך בעינן‬
‫בכל כחו דאמר להו אקפו ידייכו אי הכי לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים תיפוק ליה דאינה לסמיכה כלל א"ר אמי חדא ועוד‬
‫קאמר חדא דליתא לסמיכה כלל ועוד כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים אמר רב פפא שמע מינה צדדין אסורין דאי ס"ד צדדין‬
‫מותרין לסמוך לצדדין אלא לאו שמע מינה צדדין אסורין‬

Chagigah 16b:14-19

....Rami bar Ḥama said: You can learn from here, from this dispute, that the mitzva of placing
hands requires not only placing one’s hands on the animal’s head, but we also require that one

54
places his hands with all his strength. For if it enters your mind that we do not require all his
strength, what prohibition does one violate by placing his hands? Let him place them on a
Festival as well, as this does not resemble a prohibited action at all. The Gemara raises an
objection to this from a baraita: “Speak to the children of [benei] Israel” (Leviticus 1:2). The
word benei literally means: Sons of. And it states nearby: “And he shall place his hand on the
head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:4), from which we learn that the sons of Israel place their
hands, but the daughters of Israel do not place them. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael say:
It is optional for the daughters of Israel to place their hands. They may place their hands if they
so choose, although they are not obligated to do so.

Rabbi Yosei said: The Sage Abba Elazar related to me the following incident: On one occasion,
we had a calf for a peace-offering, and we brought it to the Women’s Courtyard, and women
placed their hands on it. We did this not because there is an obligation of placing hands in the
case of women, but in order to please the women, by allowing them to sacrifice an offering, in
all of its particulars, as men do. Now, if it enters your mind that we require placing hands with
all one’s strength, would we perform work with consecrated offerings in order to please the
women? Placing one’s hands forcefully on an animal is considered performing work with it, and
if one does it without being obligated to do so, he has thereby performed work with an offering.
Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this that we do not require placing hands with all one’s
strength?

The Gemara rejects this: Actually, I could say to you that we do require placing hands with all
one’s strength, but here they allowed women to place their hands by saying to them: Ease your
hands and do not press forcefully, so that their hand placing should not constitute work. The
Gemara retorts: If so, then the reason formulated as: Not because there is an obligation to place
hands in the case of women, is irrelevant to this law. Let him derive the permission for women
to do so from the reason that it is not considered placing hands at all. If placing hands must be
performed with all one’s strength, this action the women are performing does not constitute placing
hands. Rabbi Ami said: He stated one reason and another. One reason is that it is not
considered placing hands at all, as it is not performed with all of one’s strength; and another
reason is that they allowed it in order to please the women. Rav Pappa said: Learn from this
that anything upon which one may not place objects or upon which one may not sit on Shabbat, its
sides are likewise prohibited, for if it enters your mind to say that the sides are permitted, they
could have told the women to place their hands on the sides, i.e., on the head of the animal rather
than on its back, as the head of the animal is considered as if it were one of its sides. Rather, must
one not conclude from this that the sides are prohibited?

Source 8

All of the above discussion assumes (as does the Talmud and all traditional Meforshim) that the
Zugos were arguing whether or not Semicha on a Korban was permitted on Yom Tov. While it's
clear what Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel were arguing over, it's not 100% clear that that is
what the Zugos were arguing about. While the Mishna uses the terminology ‫ לסמוך ושלא לסמוך‬,
nonetheless, it's not exactly the same. Among the Scholars, there has been much discussion as to

55
the nature of the dispute. While many agree with the Gemara's conclusion, others have tried to find
suitable substitutes. What follows is a brief recap.

Guiding the discussions are observations and questions like:

• Why would Beis Shammai disrupt the bringing of Korbonos over a Shevus of leaning on
an animal?
• the juxtaposition of the two Mishnayos in Chagigah.
• What was it about this dispute that could not be resolved over so many generations?
• Why is there a need for a separate dispute by Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel?
• The Tosefta says ‫איזו היא סמיכה שנחלקו עליה‬regarding Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel and if
they are the same as the Zugos why the limiting nature of the question?

Reliance and the Authority of the Chachomim and Tradition:

According to Solomon Zeitlin, the subject of the Zugos's dispute is not over physical Semicha on
an animal, rather it is over the reliance on and the authority of the Chahcomim. In other words,
how much to be "‫ "סומך‬on the Chachomim's traditions and innovations in Halacha. He attempts to
prove this dispute transcended all five generations of Zugos by identifying identifying Halachos
each of them said and showing how they can be attributed to their views of how much or, if at all,
to rely on the changing traditions of the Chachomim.particular statements of Halachos each of
them said and showing how they can be attributed to their views over reliance on the Chachomim.
One cogent point he makes is that according to his understanding, we can add Mishna 2:2 to the
prior set of Mishanyos dealing with the types and nature of Torah Shel Ba'al Peh, i.e., this Mishna
concludes that grouping. Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah Controversy between the Zugoth, JQR,
New Series 4:4 pp 499-517. For Zeitlin's exposition on Shammai and Hillel's dispute over Semicha
on Yom Tov see (below) Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah Controversy between the School of
Shammai and Hillel, JQR, New Series, 56:3 pp. 240-244.13

Laying of hands at time of Ordination:

Some scholars have suggested that the preserved dispute is whether or not rabbinic ordination
required the laying of the hands on the student's head. The ambiguity can be seen in the differing
interpretations given by traditional commentators to the opening line of Mishna 1:3 in Sanhedrin.
There is says, ‫ ִדְּבֵרי ַרִבּי ִשְׁמעוֹן‬,‫ָשׁה‬º‫ ִבְּשׁ‬,‫ְסִמיַכת ְזֵק ִנים ַוֲﬠ ִריַפת ֶﬠְגָלה‬. Many of the commentators, taking
their que from the Gemara and the context of the Mishna, understand the Mishna to be referring
to Semicha on a Korban. Specifically, the special Korban brought by the Court when a wrongful
ruling is relied and acted upon by the majority of the people. The Rambam, on the other hand,
interprets our Mishna as referring to Rabbinic Ordination. Others, including the R"AV and Yachin
suggest that the Mishna is referring to both scenarios. Either way, it highlights the ambiguity of
the term Samach.

13
See sources and rebuttal at Lawrence A. Hoffman, The Origins of Ordination, in Rabbinic Authority, Papers Presented before
he Ninety-First Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis ("CCAR"), Vol. XC, Part Two, Ed., Elliot L.
Stevens, CCAR Press 1982, pp. 71-94 notes 1-10.

56
Traditionalist Views:

Even among those who accept the traditional interpretation that the Zugos' controversy is over
Semicha on an animal, they nonetheless dispute the contours and the particulars of the dispute.

• Zecharias Frankel, Darchei HaMishna, Breslau pp. 43-44 suggests that while the dispute
may have started over the appropriateness of Semicha on Yom Tov, as noted above,
underlying that that dispute was how you viewed the core obligation of Semicha. Was it
simply the preferred way to bring a Korban or was it obligatory? Allowing Semicha on
Yom Tov meant it was likely obligatory and if obligatory, that meant those who lived far
from the Beis HaMikdash could not send Korbonos. [per the Gemarah eve according to
Beis Shammai they could perform Semicha the day before--but perhaps he does not read
that into the Mishna.] According to Frankel, this dispute proved wider and enveloped
Korbonos throughout the year. The Chachomim, rather than resolving the issue, allowed it
to remain an open question thus allowing each individual to choose whether to come and
perform Semicha or send his Korban to the Beis HaMikdash without performing Semicha.

• Isaac Hersh Weiss, Dor Dor V'Dorshav, Vol. 1, pp 98, takes exception to Frankel's
limitation and argues that the controversy was over Semicha on Yom Tov and the reason
it lasted so long was that it was, in part, the prototype for the developing disputes among
the Peirushim and Tziddukim. At its core, the Machlokes whether to perform Semicha in
the face of a Rabbinic prohibition. Pitting the Biblical imperative against the Rabbinic
injunction.

• Yaakov Halevy, Otzar Nechmad, Vol. 3, Isaac Blumenfeld editor, Wien, 1860, pp. 27-40,
takes this to the extreme, identifying the dispute in our Mishna as a vestige of a dispute
with the Essene's. According to Blumenfeld, the Essene's viewed themselves as always
being ritually impure, preventing them from approaching the Beis HaMikdash and bringing
a Korban. Recognizing, however, that to completely disengage from the Temple ritual
would mean cutting themselves off from the entirety of the Jewish nation, they needed to
figure out a way to still bring Korbonos. This was not only an issue for the Festivals, but
for everyday life. The major impediment was the obligation to perform Semicha
immediately prior to the slaughtering of the animal--an impossibility for the Essenes.
However, if they could reinterpret the obligation to one of discretionary conduct, they could
then send their Korbonos to the Beis HaMikdash. This line of thinking is rather extreme
and also is problematic as he takes the liberty of identifying many of the Tanaim in our
Misha as being Essenes.

57
• E. E. Halevy, Tarbiz, Teves 5719, pp. 154-157: views the controversy from a sociological
perspective. [Some of this is incorporated above in my explanation of the sources]. It is
clear that Semicha was an integral part of the Korban process. It was the most participatory
aspect of the Korban and, therefore, the most meaningful. In the absence of being able to
perform Semicha the people stopped bringing Korbonos, hence the desolation of the Beis
HaMikdash even though everyone agreed they could bring Shelamim. He goes one step
further and suggests that at its core, the Machlokes between the Zugos and Beis Shammai
and Beis Hillel was over the character of the Beis HaMikdash during the Festivals. Would
it have a somber and staid feel in line with the auspicious nature of the day or would it have
a more carnivalesque feel with multitudes streaming in through the gates with their
Korbonos, creating a ruckus and much joyous atmosphere. Those who wanted the former,
understood that limiting the performance of Semicha would have the natural effect of
drastically limiting the quantum and quantity of Korbonos. In other words, the prohibition
or permissibility of Semicha was a proxy for their perception as to and over the nature of
the Beis HaMikdash on the Yomim Tovim.

• Chanoch Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishna, Moed, p. 511, collecting and rejecting various
interpretations and upholding the traditional view.

• Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Kapshutah, Vol. 5, pp 1200, citing Albeck, E.E Halevy and
Yaakov Halevy favorably.

58
 The Semikah Controversy between the School of Shammai and Hillel

Solomon Zeitlin writes:14

14
The Jewish Quarterly Review , Jan. 1966, Vol. 56, No. 3,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1453706.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3363b4a6d4e256f68ae451475ef10d2c&ab_segments=&ori
gin=

59
60
61
62
63
64
 Olam Ha-Zeh

Rabbi Harry Zeitlin writes:15

This world is not an easy place.

I suspect that thinking, spiritually oriented people have always searched for ways to transcend
everyday reality, but I also am pretty sure that certain periods in history have been more
challenging to people of faith and morality than others. (Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo writes
beautifully this week on how halacha functions as a way to balance life in Olam HaZeh, the “real”
while yearning for Olam HaBah, the ideal.) We’re living in an extremely challenging time.

15
https://rabbizeitlin.com/2015/03/20/olam-hazeh/

65
Our mystical tradition has a pretty apt description for much of modern society, ‫שולטת לילית שפחה‬
‫( הרעה‬Sholetet Lilit, Shifcha HaRa’a), the dominion of Lilith the evil handmaid (or the handmaid
of Evil). As you’d guess, this refers to a time of unbridled license to every imaginable (and
unimaginable) desire. Fueled by a marketing culture that exploits the very nature of wanting,
everything is not merely available, not merely permitted, but satisfying every whim, no matter how
selfishly unhealthy, unsavory, immoral, exploitative, and destructive is endorsed and celebrated.
The childish chant of the (nineteen) sixties, “If it feels good, do it” has taken over as much of
“modern culture’s bible.

We’re encouraged to eat as much junk as we can stuff into our maws and damn the diabetes and
heart disease, binge- drink and drug ourselves into not only oblivion, but into becoming hazardous
drivers and aggressors without inhibition. Paradoxically, sex is good and should be unlimited but
is immoral and exploitative at the same time, requiring prior notarized written consent–perhaps
the traditional consequence of sex, bringing children into the world, is no longer considered
quite…..savory. (They will destroy the future environment and, oh yeah, they require our acting
responsibly, infringing on our Self-fulfillment.) Even giving full rein to anger and violence is no
longer quite so terrible, is it, as constant exposure to public beheadings, right there on Youtube,
has dulled our shock.

Of course most people are not like that but take a look a popular entertainment and at the news
media. Think about the cult of celebrity which encourages the rich and famous to become ever
more outrageous. Who has become role models and what value do we give to truth when everyone
has their own narrative?

This brings me to this week’s parsha, Vayikra, which deals entirely with the Temple Service, i.e.
animal sacrifices. This portion is always read just before Pesach, the festival of freedom. It
describes in infinite detail every step from choosing an animal to slaughtering it to collecting and
splashing its blood to disposing of its carcass. Many “modern” Jews are embarrassed and disgusted
by this part of our history and are horrified at the prospect of a Third Temple which might feature
a return to this practice.

At the very least, the common understanding of the English word, sacrifice, points at giving up
something that is ours. It can begin to deflect the constant focus on self, on consuming, on filling
every desire. Of course, the Hebrew word, ‫( קרבן‬Karban) tells us even more. Its root, ‫ב‬-‫ר‬-‫ק‬, means
to approach, to come close, and at its most literal it teaches that giving, rather than taking, brings
us closer to holiness.

At a more mystical level, though, we’re told that these processes, this Divine Service in the
Temple, served to bring the upper, “heavenly”/spiritual realms close to the lower, mundane world
in which our consciousness usually resides. Each step that each of us takes in this direction
facilitates the ultimate realization of ‫( אחדות‬Achdut) Oneness. In Rav Cardozo’s language,
these mitzvot mediate the gap from what is to what ought to be. They are steps towards our freedom
from our enslavement to Lilith, the embodiment of our slavery to greed.

66
No one knows exactly what the nature of the ideal will look like when it manifests. There is a full
range of halachic/philosophical opinions as to whether sacrifices at all, and if so whether they
include animal or be restricted to meal offerings, will be part of the daily service in the future Third
Temple. Regardless, Bayit Shlishi, the Third Temple (literally, the Third House, since it will be
the finite, physical space in the material world where the infinite, immaterial Shechina, Divine
Presence, will dwell) will “join the worlds” and fill our finite/material reality with Unlimited Light
through whatever process(es) will at that time be designated.

For the time being, prayer, tefilla, fulfills the function of those karbanot, sacrifices. As ‫הושע הנביא‬
(Hoshea HaNavi), Hoshea the Prophet (14:3) says, ‫( וּ ְנַשְׁלָּמה ָפ ִרים ְשָׂפֵתינוּ‬U’n’shalma Pharim
Sifoteynu), and may our lips complete/replace (the previous function of) our (sacrificial) cattle.

If nothing else, prayer makes us humble, and humility is liberating.

67