PONTIFICIA UNIVERSITAS LATERANENSIS

INSTITUTUM PATRISTICUM AUGUSTINIANUM

JUSTICE AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PASTORAL ACTIVITIES OF

SAINT AUGUSTINE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED AS REQUIREMENT FOR A

POST-GRADUATE DEGREE IN AUGUSTINIAN STUDIES AND SPIRITUALITY

Student : Kolawole Chabi, OSA

Supervisor : Prof. Mauricio Saavedra, OSA

ACADEMIC SESSION 2014 – 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Prima facea, I am grateful to the God for the good health and wellbeing that were necessary to
complete this research.

I also wish to express my heartfelt thanks to Fr. Mauricio Saavedra, OSA, the Director of the Post-
graduate Programme in Augustinian Studies and Spirituality, for providing me with all the
necessary facilities and for moderating the research.

I place on record, my sincere thank you to Prof. Miles Hollingworth for his thorough reading and
correction of the text. I am equally appreciative to all the lecturers who taught in this programme. I
am extremly thankful and indebted to them for sharing expertise, and sincere and valuable guidance
along the academic year..

I also place on record, my sense of gratitude to all, who directly or indirectly, have contributed to
this venture.
OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I : A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON JUSTICE

I. 1. Justice prior to Augustine

I. 1. 1. Justice in Ancient Philosophy

I. 1. 2. Justice in the Scriptures

I. 1. 2. 1. In the Old Testment and Intertestamental Literature

I. 1. 2. 2. in the New Testament (except Pauline Literature)

I. 1. 2. 3. In Pauline Literature

I. 1. 3. Justice in Patristic literature

I. 1. 4. Augustine’s initial reflection on Law and Justice

CHAPTER II: A CHRISTIAN TRANSLATION OF THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF JUSTICE

II. 1. “Unicuique suum tribuere” applied to the self and to God

II. 2. Order of love

CHAPTER III: AUGUSTINE’S ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN HIS PASTORAL

MINISTRY

II. 1. Recommendations on how a christian judge should carry out his functions

III. 2. Augustine’s practice as a Bishop-Judge

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 1

JUSTICE AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PASTORAL ACTIVITIES OF

SAINT AUGUSTINE

INTRODUCTION

Justice is among the major issues that have always occupied the thought of thinkers, and
nourished the desire of individuals and of all peoples in society down through the ages.
Philosophers of yesteryear defined it and theorised on it, lawyers defended it and lived on it,
judges applied it or obfuscated it, the poor sought after it, the oppressed cried for it and rulers
promoted or ignored it. The situation with this virtue seems to have continued unchanged up to
the present day. However, there seems to be an ambiguity about the notion of Justice. Some
seem to think that justice is the ground-floor of the edifice of virtues, with charity on the upper
storey. Others believe that when justice prevails universally there will be no room for charity,1
and there are many more variegated views. But since the social order is impossible without
justice, any ambiguity surrounding this virtue interferes not only with the truth with which
philosophers are formally concerned, but also with that universal concern - peace, which
follows only upon the order established by justice not in terms of mere philosophical
speculations and theories but in concrete and tangible life events through the guidance and
illumination of God.

In this dissertation we intend to examine Justice as Saint Augustine practiced it in his pastoral
activities, in the administration of the people of God under his care. Although he has not written
any particular treatise on Justice, there is no doubt that the bishop of Hippo theorised on this
virtue ; and as we shall see later, many references it are found in his works. Above all, our
concern in this dissertation will be to show that he not only theorised on Justice, but
encountered concrete situations which allowed him to speak and act in such a way as to
harmonise his teaching with his deeds.

Considering the limited space that we have in this work, we shall avoid going into scientific
details on the issues we are examining. Instead, we shall carry out an overview of the question
of Justice in the as it would have presented itself to Augustine in his time and culture. We shall

1
Cf. M. T. Clark, Augustine on Justice, in Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes (REAug.) IX (1963), 87.
 2

also exam the theory of Justice that can be found diffused throughout the various works of the
Bishop of Hippo; though, without pretenting to give an exhaustive account. Finally, we shall
consider how Augustine the Bishop actually practised Justice in his diocese at the service of the
people of God, as well as in relation with the civil authorities.
 3

CHAPTER ONE : A THEORY OF JUSTICE

In this chapter, we intend to carry out an overview of the question of Justice in the context of
the culture in which Augustine grew up and thought. So, we shall examine Justice before
Augustine, as well as what he inherited of it and then finally what he came to contribute
himself to the understanding of the virtue.

I. 1. Justice prior to Augustine

The record of ideas about justice extends back many centuries to the beginnings of philosophy,
which was a Greek creation. Collections of laws dating from the late third and early second
millennia BCE have been preserved from several kingdoms that once existed in ancient
Mesopotamia, including Assyria, Accad, Sumer, and Babylonia itself (into which the territories
of Accad and Sumer were combined). Similarities among these sources provide strong evidence
for the existence of a common customary Mesopotamian law in the third millennium that
bridged political divisions. The most extensive of these collections is the Babylonian law,
sometimes known as the Code of Hammurabi ; although it more nearly resembles a series of
amendments to the common law of Babylon or a set of guidelines than a code or collection of
statutes.2 Conscious of the constraints of space, we shall not dwell on the question of Justice
beyond the views of Ancient philosophers which Augustine knew and studied.

I. 1. 1. In ancient philosophy3

As stated in the introduction, the question of Justice has always been part and parcel of the
concerns of human society. David Jonhston considers that the geography of ideas about Justice
“is in fact astonishingly ahistorical”.4 Let us simply consider some major figures in the history
of western thought who, prior to Augustine, have tackled the question.

In ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, we find a massive contribution to the elaboration of
the understanding of Justice. By the 5th c. B.C.E, Greek writers had recognized the importance
of regulating relationships between individual persons and with the gods according to ethical,
juridical, and religious norms. Plato developed a theory of justice (δικαιοσύνη) as a universal
virtue or regulatory principle of order and harmony among all things, in particular in relation to
2
D. Johnston, A Brief History of Justice, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chichester 2011, 15.
3
The article of J. R. Dodaro on Iustitia published in Augustinus Lexikon vol. 3, 865-882 is an excellent piece of work to
which we make reference in this part of our dissertation.
4
Id., A Brief History of Justice, 8.
 4

individuals and society5. He held that the essence of justice consisted in a distinct idea that
could be known by means of an anterior affinity with the Good. He defined justice as the
obligation that every man should perform his proper duty, whether in personal, religious, or
political contexts.6 Compatible with this definition is his more classical one “rendering to each
his due”.7 However, although Plato includes justice, along with prudence, temperance, and
fortitude, as one of the political virtues, it nevertheless remains for him the foundation of all
other virtues. Successive Greek philosophers followed Plato’s general account of justice, but
also specified its meaning with greater precision. Aristotle, whose account of justice in Book 5
of Nichomachean Ethics is of paramount importance for the classical tradition, defines it as “the
disposition that renders men capable of performing just deeds”.8
Important contributions to ancient philosophical understandings of justice also derive from
Epicurean, Stoic, and Neoplatonic writers.9 The Stoics taught that man should live according to
virtue, which for them meant to live in accord with nature and reason. Cicero’s views on the
question have Stoic roots, but they are also eclectic, in that they represent Platonic and
Aristotelian elements as well. Cicero thus highlights the earlier, Greek understanding of justice
as “suum cuique tribuere” which he associates primarily with “aequitas” which is also common
in Roman law.10
Plotinus proposed that the political virtues play a significant role in the soul’s assimilation to
God, a position he is thought to have found in Plato. In Plotinus’s scheme the four political
virtues undergo purification through which they are transformed from concern with material
reality and refocused upon spiritual reality in the soul’s gradual ascent to beatitude. Porphyry
develops Plotinus’s doctrine of the hierarchy of virtues.11 All these philosophical views on
Justice contributed to shaping the outlook of the intellectuals of Saint Augustine’s day.
Therefore we say that his general understanding of the virtue of Justice was to this extent
informed by that which others had thought on the subject before him.

5
Cf. R. J. Dodaro, Iustitia, in AL vol.3, 865.
6
Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 433a.
7
Ib. 1,331e.
8
Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachian Ethics 5, 1, 1129.
9
R. J. Dodaro, Iustitia, 865.
10
We shall return to this shortly when we consider Augustine’s initial understanding of law and justice.
11
R. J. Dodaro, 886.
 5

I. 1. 2. In the Scriptures

According to Richard J. Clifford, all agree that Justice in the Bible is relational – how a thing,
act, or person relates to a standard of justice, in this case God. In biblical religion there is no
order or fate beyond God to which things conform; Yahweh, the Most High, is the standard of
justice and those properly related to God become just.12 We shall consider the Old Testament
and the New Testament separately, with a special treatement of Pauline literature.

I. 1. 2. 1. In the Old Testament and Intertestamental Literature

Let’s first examine the terminology of Justice in its biblical usage. In the Old Testament, the
terminology of righteousness (involving “tsedeq”, “tsedaqah”, and their cognates) is complex
because its wide, variable application precludes assigning it primary and secondary meanings.
However, the terminology appears most often in the description of human conduct that is right
in God’s eyes, as well as to Israel’s fidelity to its covenant with God. God’s righteousness
consists in his faithfulness in the relation to his covenant with Israel (cf. Gn. 18: 25). In this
context, God is “righteous” because he wills to save Israel.13 God’s righteousness brings about
this salvation, which is a gift, whether through military victories over Israel’s enemies, or
through the vindication of the innocence of specific persons (where righteousness can signify
blamelessness).14 The “righteous” consist of those persons who are properly religious. The
terminology is also employed in the context of juridical cases (where the nominative form
translates best into English as “justice”).15 God is a just judge; Israel’s judges should judge
justly and its rulers should issue just decrees (Prv. 8: 15). The classical prophets of the 8th c.
B.C.E. further develop this juridical and ethical sense of justice. In the LXX the Greek
philosophical background of δικαιοσύνη as a virtue implying a norm for conduct is broadened
by the Hebrew concept of covenant relationship. As a consequence, (tsedaqah) is translated in
the LXX 14 times as ἐλεημοσύνη (“piety”, “mercy”), rather than δικαιοσύνη.16

12
R. J. Clifford, Justice in the Bible, in M. R. Tripole, S.J., (ed.), Jesuit Education 21: Conference Proceeding on the
Future of Jesuit Higher Education, Saint Joseph's University Press, Philadelphia 2000, 1.
13
Cf. Idc 5: 11; Ps 96(97): 2; Prv 8: 20; Is 41: 10; 42: 6.
14
Cf. 2 Rg 4: 11; 3 Rg 2: 32; Mi 7: 9. Job offers a particular instance of righteousness as a claim to innocence (cf. Iob 9:
2; 10: 15; 13: 8; 15: 20; 33: 12; 34: 5), as does the Servant of Yahweh (Is 53: 11). On the gift quality of God's
righteousness in the context of salvation for Israel
15
Cf. R. J. Dodaro, Iustitia, 866.
16
Ibid.
 6

We shall now examine Justice in the practical rapport of Yahweh with his people. There are two
aspects of God that are indispensable if we are to understand biblical Justice: God is generous
and He is just. Let’s examine these two aspects.
In the seven-day creation account in Gn. 1, God’s generosity finds expression in the two
defining imperatives given to the human race in 1:28: (1) be fertile and multiply; (2) fill the
earth and subdue it. The chapters that follow tell how human beings fulfil these imperatives:
they “multiply”17 and they ‘fill’ the earth and ‘subdue’ it” as they move out to their diverse
lands and take possession of them. In other words, human beings are commanded to participate
in the rhythms of the good universe, a point that is very clear with regard to land.
Parenthetically, the command “Subdue the earth” does not command people to exploit the earth
but to take possession of the territory God has given them. In Gn. 10, each of the seventy
nations is to have its own land. Later, when Israel takes its own land, the prophets insist that
every Israelite family have its land over which God alone has domain. God intends that people
enjoy and be satisfied with the bounty of creation; and we note that to be sated is a favourite
verb in the Bible as in Ps. 22 : 26, “The poor shall eat and be satisfied.” The prophets condemn
land grabbing as rebellion against God’s generous will that all members of the Israelite
community be sated. Woe to those whose greed keeps others from enjoying what God has given
to all.18
Regarding the Justice of God, the same chapters show God acting justly, affirming righteous
behaviuor (e.g., rescuing Noah) and frustrating wicked behavior (Adam and Eve, Cain, Lamech,
etc.). God is not capricious or volatile like the gods in comparable literatures, but responds
predictably (albeit mysteriously) to human actions, seconding what is right and bringing to
naught what is wrong. In assessing these chapters, it is all too easy to focus on the sins (Adam
and Eve, Cain, the illicit marriages, the human race building their city) to the neglect of God
and God’s blessings. Many Christian commentators have read the chapters too pessimistically,
ending up with a “low anthropology” that forgets the God-centered perspective. Jewish tradition
can instruct us here, for it has generally focused on the transmission of the blessing in the face
of human resistance to receiving it. We cannot leave these chapters without commenting on the
most quoted Genesis verses on social justice (1:26-27): “So God created humankind in his
image, / in the image of God he created them.” The image of God is an important concept even
within Genesis. Gn. 5:1 shows that the image is transmitted to succeeding generations, and 9:6
17
The genealogies with their famous “begats” are in chapters. 4, 5, and 11 of the book of Genesis
18
Cf. R. J. Clifford, Justice in the Bible, 2.
 7

uses it is as the basis of the prohibition against murder (you can slay animals in the post-Flood
world but not human beings). What does the image of God mean? A historical comparison may
help. Comparable ancient creation accounts invariably depicted human beings as slaves of the
gods, created to build their temples, observe their rituals, and carry out their commands. In
some creation accounts, the king was created separately as the gods’ representative on earth, a
kind of lieutenant making sure that human labour benefited the gods. In a sense, the king
represented the god(s) as a statue represented a person. Genesis borrows this language about the
privilege and role of kings but extends it to all human beings: all human beings are made in the
image and likeness of God. In the Genesis text, the author seems to say two things: (1) human
beings share in the dominion of God over the rest of creation (1:28), furthering the goodness of
the world; (2) human beings have value in themselves, for human blood may not be shed
because of the image of God (Gn 9:6).

Going a step further in the Biblical account of the experience of God’s people, we get to know
that the Exodus is not only the “going out” from Egypt, but the whole narrative of the
oppression of the Hebrews, God’s defeat of Pharaoh their oppressor, and the journey to Sinai,
where they agree to be God’s people and accept his covenant and law. According to Exodus 1-
6, the misery of God’s people in Egypt was system-related and produced by human malice. God
addresses the evil in a new and unexpected way. Instead of alleviating the Hebrews’ distress
through the time-honoured means of giving to the poor, Israel’s God Yahweh removes the
slaves from the cripping situation; he leads them out from the Egyptian system. God’s work
here is a new creation. What is created is a society having all the usual institutions of a nation of
that time: a God (with a house), a leader, a land, and laws. But because Israel is different from
the nations, it becomes something for them to watch – a model. The point is succinctly and
memorably made in Exodus: “You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, / how I bore you on
eagles’ wings and brought you to myself. / Now therefore, if you obey my voice and keep my
covenant, / you shall be my treasured possession out of all the peoples. / Yes, the whole earth is
mine, but you shall be my priestly kingdom and a holy nation” (19:3-6). Israel agrees and God
forms their society. Israel, shaped by the just God, will show the nations God’s generosity and
power. The holy community has a mediating role regarding divine justice.
 8

I. 1. 2. 2. In the New Testament (except Pauline literature)

In the New Testament δικαιοσύνη, in general terms, almost always signifies right conduct
before God on the part of human beings who are pleasing to God because they obey the divine
will. It also occasionally signifies God’s or Christ’s just judgment and rule.19 Righteousness
(δικαιοσύνη) in Mt. entails a strict observance of the Jewish law. Mt. 5 : 20 and 6 : 1 call for
Christ’s disciples to perfect their observance of the Jewish law and religion. In Lk. and Acts the
term similarly links moral and religious right conduct.20 Moreover, Acts emphasizes God’s
expectation that the Gentiles should adhere to the same conduct as Jews in this regard. More
than Mt and Lc, the Johannine literature interprets righteousness in a Christological key.
Moreover, 1 Io. 3: 10 demonstrates that righteousness consists in the love of one's brother or
sister, Iac. 1: 20 holds that God’s righteousness consists in his right conduct. The explanation
offered ib. 2: 23 for the claim at Gn. 15: 6 that Abraham's faith was “credited to him as
righteousness” emphasizes the union of faith and works against the unorthodox view that takes
faith seriously apart from works.

I. 1. 2. 3. In Pauline literature

Justice (δικαιοσύνη) and its inflected forms “just” (δικαίως) and “to pronounce or make just”
(δικαιόω) occur over 100 times in Pauline writings, for the most part in Rm, an indication of
the importance of this concept for the apostle’s theology.21 The nominal form δικαιοσύνη
carries a variety of meanings including “righteousness declared” (ib. 4: 3.5sq. 9.11), wherein
Abraham's faith is “credited to him as righteousness”; “righteousness as gift of God” (ib. 5:
17.21); “righteousness of faith”, the instrument through which God’s righteousness comes to
believers (ib. 4: 11.13sq.; Phil 3: 9); “righteousness of obedience”, the life of those who have
been justified (Rm. 6: 13.18-20; 2 Cor 6: 7; 9: 10), In Rm. and 2 Cor., Paul equates God’s
righteousness (δικαιοσύνη ϑεοῦ) with the saving work of Christ (cf. Rm. 1: 16sq.; 3: 5.21sq.;
10: 3; 2 Cor. 5: 21), in particular, with the sacrificial atonement of his death (cf. Rm. 3:
24sq.). Righteousness arises in the heart not from observance of the Law as such, but from
faith grounded in Christ (cf. ib. 3: 21.26), because true righteousness and with it the deepest

19
Cf. Act 17: 31; Ap. 19: 11 ;2 Pt 1: 1.
20
Cf. Lc 1: 75; Act 10: 35; 13: 10; 24: 25
21
Cf. R. J. Dodaro, Iustitia, 867.
 9

fulfillment of the Law (cf. ib. 3: 30sq.) is made possible by the Spirit of love through faith (cf.
ib. 13: 8-10; Gal 5: 14).22

I. 1. 3. Justice in Patristic literature

Although they were aware of conceptions of justice common to Greek and Roman
philosophical and legal traditions, in general, Christian authors in the 2nd century preferred
biblical conceptions rooted in the idea of standing in a right relationship to God and to other
human beings.23 Justin identifies justice with God, who communicates it as virtue to human be-
ings (cf. I apol. 6,1; 10,1). Irenaeus holds that justice originates in God, a claim intended to
counter Gnostic arguments that, in God, justice and goodness or mercy are irreconcilable.
Irenaeus also represents justice as a constitutive feature of the history of Israel, concentrated in
God’s revelation of the law, which reaches its fulfillment in Christ. This latter view is shared by
Clement of Alexandria (paed. 1,18,4) who also ranks justice as the most important of the four
political virtues and, in Stoic fashion, understood man as being naturally drawn to it. For
Origen, human justice, understood as “the faculty to distribute anything according as its value”,
stands in continuity with divine justice through the mediation of Christ, who is God’s justice
and whose teaching reveals the fullness of justice. Among Latin Christian writings, Lactantius’s
inst. (especially Book 5) is of primary importance on the subject of Iustitia In keeping with his
general apologetic intentions, he harmonizes understandings of justice found in Plato, Cicero,
Seneca, and the Corpus Hermeticum with biblical conceptions in order to argue that God is a
just and equitable judge, that Christ became incarnate in order to teach justice, and that Iustitia
consists in the correct worship of God. The latter argument informs Lactantius's refutation of
Cicero’s claim that Rome had once constituted a “res publica” (cf. Cic. rep. 2,70). 4th century
Greek and Latin Christian authors applied and developed earlier conceptions of justice. Thus,
for Eusebius of Caesarea, the biblical revelation of Christ’s actions and teachings enable men to
turn back to justice from injustice (d. e. 4,10,14). John Chrysostom recognizes that justice
consists in the fulfilment of all the commandments (hom. 10 in Mt. 1). Ambrose integrates into
the biblical, religious meaning of Iustitia as “righteousness” the philosophical and juridical

22
Cf. Ibid., 868.
23
A. Cortesi, La giustizia di Dio e degli uomini nella riflessione patristica tra il II e il IV secolo, in R. Fabris et al.
(eds.), Il vissuto virtuoso: la giustizia, Roma 1993, 69-140, cited by R. J. Dodaro, Iustitia, 870.
 10

traditions behind the concept which he acquired principally through Cicero. He thus treats
Iustitia as one of the “uirtutes cardinales”, the name he gives to the political virtues, and he
defines it according to its distributive and commutative functions: “suum cuique tribuit” and
“communem aequitatem custodial” (Ambr. off. 1,115).

I. 1. 4. Augustine’s initial reflection on Law and Justice24

Im the early stages of his thought, Augustine’s notions of Law and Justice, included what was
common among the authorities in classical education. For example like Cicero, Augustine
distinguished the lex aeterna (eternal law) from the lex naturalis (natural law) and the lex
temporalis (temporal law). But for him, the lex aeterna was the will and wisdom of a personal
Creator, the eternal reason and will of God.25 In this approach, we clearly see the opposition of
Augustine to pagan thought. The personal God commanded the observance of the natural order
of things and forbade the disturbance of it.26 The content of the lex aeterna was to preserve the
order of creation; this was the object of their incommutabiles regulae. In God’s creation, in this
ordo naturalis, everything had its due order and as a reflection of the divine, the lex naturalis or
lex intima was the imprint of the lex aeterna on the human soul: “therefore, to explain briefly
how I value the notion which is impressed on us by eternal law, it is the law by which it is just
that everything should have its due order”27 says Saint Augustine. For him, in order to
understand the lex aeterna and to grasp truly what was just and what was not, all human beings
depended on God’s grace.28 The bewildering discontinuity of human action and circumstance
was the result of weakness and ignorance (infirmitas et ignorantia); time and time again they
were getting in the way and stood in contrast to the invincible purpose of an omnipotent God.29
This resulted in the paradox of the need for God’s privilege of grace on the one hand and free
24
In our attempt to elaborate Augustine’s understanding of Law and Justice, we depend on experts in this field of
inquiry, chiefly Eva-Maria Kuhn’s well-researched article Justice Applied by the Episcopal Arbitrator: Augustine and
the Implementation of Divine Justice, in Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, IX, (2007), 2, 71-104. We shall also make
reference to several works by Robert Dodaro.
25
E.-M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 74.
26
Cf. Aug. C. Faust. XXII, 27 (CSEL 25/1, 621): Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem
conservari iubens, perturbari vetans. And A.-H. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine, in The Philosophical
Review 53 (1944), 196.
27
Aug., Div. qu. 53, 2 (CCL 44A, 88): Transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem; Lib. arb. I, 6, 15 (CSEL 74,
15f.): …ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae inpressa nobis est, quantum valeo, verbis explicem, ea est, qua
iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissimma.
28
Cf. Aug., Nat. et gr. 19 (CSEL 60, 245): Aliud intellegere velle nec posse et facere contra legem non intelligendo
quid fieri velit; H. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit. Prolegomena zu einer Rechtsphilosophie,
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1951, 53f
29
Cf. P. Brown, St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion, in Journal of Roman Studies, 54 (1964), 111.
 11

will on the other. But a reconciling view could be found already in the New Testament. In the
Gospel according to John, Christ was identified with the Logos, a term that conveyed multiple
traditions and encouraged diverse images and could be understood as “word” of the Jewish God
become fact, but also echoed the cosmic law of classical philosophy.30 For Augustine in like
fashion, man’s weakness and ignorance could be overcome by Christ, who was the incarnate
solution to man’s need for God’s direct mediation.31 Through Christ man can decipher the truth
inscribed in his soul, a revelation that Augustine experienced himself reading the Holy Scripture
in a garden one day.32

The correlation of divine law and justice with the lex naturalis again meant the theoretical
rejection of any value in themselves of the rules of the lex humana, the leges temporales. Laws
and rules of the world were only binding if they were in accordance with divine law. The lex
temporalis was forever changeable. It was positive law that had to be adjusted to time and
place. It was only binding and just, were it drawn from the eternal law of God, which never
changed: “I think you can also see that in the temporal law nothing is just and lawful that men
do not derive from eternal law”,33 Augustine explained, and he would go further and hold that
non est autem ius ubi nulla est iustitia34 – “but there is no law, where there is no justice”. A

30
Jn. 1, 1-18 (prologue): “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was fully God …
and the Word became flesh…”. The Creator of the book of Genesis is evoked here, of course, but also the Divine
Wisdom of e.g. Proverbs 8, 22-31, already a similar conception to the universal principle of Greek thought. Justin’s
interpretation, for instance, was influenced by Stoicism, when he presented Christ as the logos spermatikos who
‘inhabits everybody’ (cf. Apol. App. 10, 8). On the adaptability of the word logos and the understanding of the
Johannine Gospel there is much and also much biased controversy. I found E. L. Miller, The Johannine Origins of the
Johannine Logos, in Journal of biblical Literature, 112 (1993), 445-457 quite useful, or: H.P. Thyssen, Philosophical
Christology in the New Testament, in Numen, 53 (2006), 133-176. In patristic thought also Rom 2,14ff, and Mt 7, 12
would often be quoted: the divine order is there all along, but Jesus Christ brings a new perception of it.
31
Cf. Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004,
70f. Augustine’s model for Christ as the instructor is again Cicero’s vir optimus.
32
Here we are making reference to the episode narrated by Augustine in his Confessions about his conversion. Most
especially his famous prayer in Confessions X, 27, 38, (CSEL 33, 255): Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam
nova, sero te amavi! Et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quærebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis
inruebam. mecum eras, et tecum non eram. ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. vocasti et
clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam, coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam, fragasti, et duxi spiritum et
anhelo tibi, gustavi et esurio et sitio, tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam. (“Late have I loved you, Beauty so ancient
and so new, late have I loved You! Lo, you were within, but I outside, seeking there for you, and upon the shapely
things you have made I rushed headlong, I misshapen. You were with me but I was not with you. They held me back
from you, those things which would have no being were they not in you. You called shouted, broke through my
deafness; you flared, blazed, banished my blindness; you lavished your fragrance, I gasped, now I pant for you; I tasted
you, and I hunger and thirst; you touched me, and I burned for your peace”.) Translation by Maria Boulding, O.S.B. in
Rotelle, J., E., O.S.A. (ed.), The Works of Saint Augustine. A translation for the 21st Century. The Confessions I/1, 2 9th
edition, Hyde Park N.Y: New City Press, 2008).
33
Aug., Lib. arb. I, 6, 15 (CSEL 74, 15f.): “Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporalis nihil esse iustum atque
legitimum quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivaverint”. The translations throughout the article strongly bear on
the translations given in The works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century, New City Press, New York.
34
Aug. Civ. XIX, 21 (CSEL 40/2, 408). With his opposition to the Pelagian model of ‘self-perfection’ (emancipatus
 12

temporal law that was not just was not a law and did not cause obligation, “for, if the emperors
were in error – God forbid! – they would issue laws in favour of their error against the truth,
and by those laws the good would be tested and receive crowns as their reward for not doing
what the emperors commanded, because God forbade it”.35 But does this mean that Augustine
negates the value of temporal laws?

First of all at a general level, Augustine certainly believes that all political regimes are
depraved, though he admits that some are less depraved than others and that some are less
depraved at certain times in their history than at other times.36 But it is good to acknowledge
with Clarke that far more than he is generally credited with, Augustine appreciated the
necessary role of government in the making of peace within man and among men. Far too often
his name for sovereignty as “organized brigandage”37 is referred to in isolation from the
context wherein he shows the contribution to the common good that can be made - not by rulers
who are Christian, but by Christian rulers who are just.38 Augustine did revive Cicero’s view
that temporal laws depended for their value on the eternal law, but he was aware of the need for
implementation of temporal rules and regulations. The dynamic of change required Augustine’s
lawmaker to know when a just law had to be modified to bring about a sound reflection of the
eternal, unchangeable principles. Augustine derived the need for rule and order from the
necessity of a restoring order and peace. Since Adam’s fall men could live peacefully together
only under the authority of rules accompanied by sanctions. Man achieved justice in a peaceful
society when there were laws made by men for their fellow men,39 where justice was “the virtue

a deo, C. Iul. imp. I, 78, Augustine also replaced Cicero’s concept of ius with the concept of vera iustitia.
35
Aug. ep. 105, 2, 7, written after the year 406 (CSEL 34/1, 599): Imperatores enim si in errore essent, quod absit, pro
errore suo contra veritatem leges darent, per quas iusti et probarentur et coronarentur non faciendo, quod illi iuberent,
quia deus prohiberet; Cresc. III, 51, 56 (CSEL 52, 462): Reges cum in errore sunt, pro ipso errore leges contra
veritatem ferunt; cum in veritate sunt, similiter contra errorem pro ipsa veritate decernerunt: ita legibus malis
probantur boni et legibus bonis emendantur mali. In Lib. arb. I, 5, 11, (CSEL 74, 12) he was explicit: Nam mihi lex
esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit (“so an unjust law does not seem to me to be a law”) And in Civ. IV, 4 Augustine
would reference Cicero’s De legibus I, 16, 43: remota iustitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?
36
Cf. R. Dodaro, Augustine on the Statesman and the Two Cities, in Mark Vassey, A companion to Augustine, Wiley-
Blackwell, London 2013, 387.
37
Cf. Aug. ciu. dei. IV, 4.
38
Cf. M. T. Clarke, Augustine on Justice, 91.
39
Cf. Ibid., XIX, 6 (CSEL 40/2, 381): “Quid ipsa iudicia hominum de hominibus, quae civitatibus in quantalibet pace
manentibus deesse non possunt, qualia putamus esse, quam misera, quam dolenda? Quando quidem hi iudicant qui
conscientias eorum, de quibus iudicant, cernere nequeunt” (“What of those judgements pronounced by men on their
fellow men, which are indispensable in cities however deep the peace that reigns in them? How sad, how lamentable we
find them, since those who pronounce them cannot look into the consciences of those whom they judge.” Transl. by
W.C. Greene, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. VI, 143).
 13

that assigns to every man his due”.40 So for Augustine, the very fact of living in society
demands that there should be guiding principles and regulations to govern the course of events
among members. He makes recourse to the all-present classical view of justice to that effect but
he would also introduce the distinctive mark of his Christian faith. This is what many scholars
fail to acknowledge and so many end-up accusing Augustine of Manichaeism, or as a thinker
who merely baptised ancient pagan thoughts as the title of an important book by a renowned
professor suggests.41

40
Cf. Aug. ciu. dei. XIX, 21 (CSEL 40/2, 408f.): Iustitia porro ea virtus est quae sua cuique distribuit. This definition
of justice is also to be found in Dig. 1, 1, 10 pr. (Pseudo-Ulpian) and Inst. 1, 1 pr.; cf. D. Liebs, Römisches Recht, 6th
completely rev. ed., Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 62: Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum
cuique tribuendi. For the shift in Augustine’s thought away from the ancient model, cf. R. Dodaro, Justice, in A.D.
Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids (Michigan), Cambridge 1999,
482.
41
J. Rist, Augustine. Ancient Thoughts baptised, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994. According to a review
of this book by the Augustinian scholar Frederick van Fleteren, the illustrious professor Rist, in his intention to placate
the recent critics of Catholic and Augustinian thinking, fell into anachronism at best, or regrettable misinterpretation at
worst. While appraising his great effort, Fleteren observed that Rist made contradictory remarks either concerning
Augustine’s thought or its sources. (Cf. F. van Fleteren, John Rist. Augustine, in Augustinian Studies 26-2 (1995), 167-
171.
 14

CHAPTER II : A CHRISTIAN TRANSLATION OF THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF JUSTICE

II. 1. “Unicuique suum tribuere” applied to the self and to God

Going by what we have been saying, Augustine inherited a classical definition of justice. However,
now it is important for us to examine the extent to which he carried out a reinterpretation, or
Christianisation of that definition. I start with the one that Augustine used routinely as a definition
of justice: “giving to each his own” (unicuique suum tribuere). We know that he takes it especially
from Cicero. However it is in the way that he interprets and uses this definition of Cicero’s that he
shows his originality. For to the “horizontal” dimension of mutual relations between human beings
he adds the “vertical” dimension of the relationship between man and God as well as the “interior”
dimension of man’s relationship to himself. The vertical dimension and inner dimension are not
simply be added to the horizontal but actually influence it decisively. According to Augustine, in
fact, I can be right in my “horizontal” relationships with my fellow men only if I am right with
myself ; and I can be right with myself only if I am first just before God.

Justice toward others is summarized in the so-called “golden rule” to do unto others what I would
have done unto me ; that is, not to do unto them what they would not like to do unto me (the two
formulas, positive and negative, for Augustine have the same meaning, because the desire to do
good implies not wanting to do evil, while not wanting to do evil implies wanting to do the good,
the privation of which would be bad). In this golden rule we find summarized the last seven
commandments, which concern the love of neighbor, and which are themselves therefore nothing
but the explanation of a natural law inscribed in the conscience of every man. So that the golden
rule be understood correctly, it is necessary that the verb “will” contained in it is taken in its own
sense, according to which it designates a rational and virtuous desire which, always refers to a true
good. If not, then we should admit that the golden rule, recommended by Jesus himself, would do to
others a bad thing that we would like to be done unto us (eg. to offer wine to get drunk). We should
not confuse the will (voluntas) with lust (cupiditas). We properly “will” when we are able to control
our impulses with reason. When in man reason prevails with respect to the impulses, his spiritual
side prevailing over his carnal side, then to Augustine he is “right” with himself. He is right with
himself because each element of his being has been assigned to its rightful position. So the
horizontal dimension of justice, condensed in the Golden Rule, presupposes the inner dimension of
justice i.e. the order that man carries within himself.
 15

This order within him has, in turn, has compromised by the sin of our first parents. Disobeying God
and thus proving to prefer themselves to God, the first couple was punished with the loss of inner
balance: their carnal sides rebelled against thei spiritual sides, and the passions bought a violence
that their reason could hardly control and govern. This, for Augustine, according to the account in
Genesis, is the sense of shame and nakedness that Adam and Eve felt immediately after having
sinned. And to their descendants has been transmitted both their guilt and their lust, which latter is
the internal disorder of which we have been speaking. The injustice done to themselves, and from
which injustice to others arises in course, therefore depends first on an injustice done to God, that is,
in rebellion and disobedience against him. The vertical dimension of justice is therefore crucial, as
we will see even better when we discuss the way in which man can once again become righteous.

II. 2. The order of love

As we have seen above, the initial understanding Augustine had of the concept of Justice derived
from the classical philosophical point of view about the notion. However, exploring his writings,
one comes to discover a fundamental shift in his position on Justice. While the Greco-Roman
thinkers considered Justice as a virtue (one of the four political virtues along with prudence,
temperance, and fortitude) necessary in a human society, Augustine accentuates his understandings
of the New Testament and Latin patristic accounts of justice42 by equating the virtue with the love
which is due to God and to neighbour. In effect, he follows Christian authors in synthesising the
biblical-christian and the philosophical-juridical understandings of Justice grounding them in Love
(Amor, Caritas, Dilectio).43 So he translated the classical notion of Justice into Chrsitian terms as
giving to God and to one’s neighbour the love which is due by virtue of the double commandment
of love, as stipulated in Mt 22:40, and thus defined Justice as “dilectio dei et proximi” (love of God
and of neighbour).
Augustine accurately develops these two aspects of Justice with clear expositions. Concerning the
love of God, he holds that Justice obliges that God be loved by man not according to God’s value
but according to man’s capacity. Although God can never be loved as much as He deserves to be

42
Some of the Fathers who must have influenced the shift in Augustine’s view of Justice would include Cyprian, De
opere et eleemosynis; Lactantius, div. inst. 5; Epitome 54-55; Ambrose, De officiis ministrorum 1.20-23; 1. 252; 1.130-
36; 1.142; 1.188; 2.49; Expositio Psalmi CXVIII 35.7; De Nabuthae historia 47-48).
43
Cf. R. Dodaro, Justice, in A. Fitzgerald, Augustine through the Ages, 866.
 16

loved, he can be “loved wholly” and “by the whole man”.44 To give God the just measure of love is
to love without measure. It is but just on God’s part, we come to see, that He should sum up all His
requests of man in a commandment of love. For love is the one thing that is so much one’s own
that circumstances and people cannot interfere with the giving of it. However, Augustine reminds
us that because “no other creature can separate us from the love of God”, the blame must lie
squarely with our own misdirected will.45
His view on love of neighbour is indicated in De Trinitate 8.9-10 in conjunction with Rom. 13:8 :
“owe no one anything except to love one another”. This Christian notion of justice guarantees that
love of neighbour does not stand in competition either with self-love (cf. Mk. 12:33) or with love of
God, because “true love” consists in “loving the other either because they are just or so that they
might become just”.46 Thus, living justly (iuste vivere) means loving one’s neighbours in a way that
aids them in living justly by enabling them to love themselves, their neighbours, and God in the
manner prescribed by divine law and by the example of Christ.

Along this line, we discover that when Augustine is issuing directions about how to proceed along
the difficult path of social justice, the providing of all men with what is needed for human and
spiritual fulfilment, he refers primarily to the interior: “... the first thing to aim at is, that we should
be benevolent, cherishing neither malice nor evil design against another”.47 This justice, as the
virtue which is the manifestation of the sincerity of brotherly love, does not remain within the one
who loves. It is grounded in the objective social order of external goods. At times there is a
tendency to think that whereas physical injury to another is an injustice, a failure to extend a helping
hand is only a failure in charity to which I was not obligated. But Augustine unites these two acts
and regards them both as failures in justice and failures in charity: “... a man may sin against
another in two ways, either by injuring him or by not helping him when it is in his power”.48 In fact,
failure to love one’s neighbour sufficiently, refusal to put oneself to inconvenience and
unwillingness to suffer in order to assist him is called by Augustine “criminal”, a word generally
descriptive of unjust acts of major proportions. This lack of charity to a neighbour is considered by

44
Aug., De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae, 1, 8 (PL 32,) : “Audiamus ergo quem finem bonorum nobis, Christe,
praescribas… Diliges, inquit, Dominum Deum tuum . Dic mihi etiam, quaeso te, qui sit diligendi modus … Ex toto,
inquit, corde tuo. Non est satis. Ex tota anima tua. Ne id quidem satis est. Ex tota mente tua. Quid vis amplius? Vellem
fortasse, si viderem quid posset esse amplius. Quid ad haec Paulus? Scimus, inquit, quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia
procedunt in bonum.
45
Ibid., I, 12, 21 (PL 32, 170).
46
Aug., De Trinitate 8, 9.
47
Aug., De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae, I, 26, 49 (PL 32, 210): “Agendum autem in primis est, ut benevoli simus, id
est, ut nulla malitia, nullo dolo malo adversus hominem utamur. Quid enim homini homine propinquius?”
48
Ibid., I, 26, 50, 210 : Sed cum duobus modis peccetur in homine, uno si laedatur, alio si cum potest non adiuvetur
eaque ipsa sint quibus mali homines esse dicantur
 17

him to be an assault against God.49 Augustine puts it nicely in his comment on the passage of Luke
16, 10 about the rich man and Lazarus: “if you want to hear what that rich man’s crime was, look
no further than what you hear from the Truth: he was rich. He used to wear purple and fine linen,
and feasted sumptuously every day. So what was his offence? The man lying at his gate covered
with sores, and given no help”.50

From another point of view, Justice is understood in conjunction with Augustine’s concept of order.
First of all, Augustine insists on order in man. Justice, according to him, is one of the four main
forms of loving God. From the other cardinal virtues, which are referred to in the Old Testament
(Wis. 8, 1, 4, 7), he distinguishes it by emphasizing “right relationship”. Rightly related to God,
man is properly related within himself and to the external world of people and things. Not only
does justice produce harmony within man, peace among men, but like the other moral virtues, its
value lies in preparing us for the vision of God. This vision begins now with an understanding of
what we believe and to the just man belongs this understanding.51
This distinctive view of justice as order within man redounding to social order was retained by
Augustine until the end of his life. Writing in the City of God, and defining Justice in the classical
way we have mentioned earlier on: “the virtues whose task is to see that to each is given what
belongs to each”, Augustine nevertheless says that the public order of just transactions among men
is impossible unless there are just men, rightly related to God by an interior order. Justice begins
within. There must first be “the right order within man himself”. The struggle for this internal order
is always far from finished, but until justice reigns, man’s happiness cannot be complete; Augustine
advises that the subjection of man to God which originates personal integration begins in the mind.
He tells us that the man “with God in his thoughts”, is the man who is becoming just. This
Augustinian emphasis upon personal order as the preliminary to social order is constantly recurring.
If a man has no order within himself, “then there is certainly no justice in an assembly made up of
such men. As a result, there is lacking that mutual recognition of rights which makes a mere mob
into a ‘people’, a people whose commonweal is a commonwealth”. But neither should we miss the
key to this personal order, namely, an attitude of subjection to God which serves as the model for

49
Cf. M. T. Clark, Augustine on Justice, in Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes (REAug.) IX (1963), 87.
50
Aug. Sermo 178, 3 (PL 38, 962): quod ergo ejus crimen? Jacens ante januam ulcerosus, et non adjutus. See also e.g.
ep. 153, 26 or Vera rel. 14, 21. Cf. J. Gaudemet, La formation du droit séculier et du droit de l’èglise aux IVe et Ve
siècles, Sirey, Paris 19792, 178; F.-J. Thonnard, Justice de Dieu et justice humaine selon saint Augustin, in Augustinus,
12 (1967), 387-402.
51
Cf. M. T. Clark, Augustine on Justice, 87.
 18

the order which should exist between the soul and the body, between reason and the irrational
powers. Only when this order prevails in man, can he act justly to others.

From order within, we can evolve to the “order of love” (ordo amoris) which imparts a hierarchy of
goods established by God as objects of love and desire.52 Justice conceived according to this proper
ordering of love harmonizes the volitional aspect of love with the created order of nature.53 As
such, justice expresses a series of right relationships which escalate in value in proportion to the
order willed by God. In this context Augustine defines justice as “love serving God alone and thus
ruling well those things subject to human beings.”54 We could remain with these hints of
Augustine’s reflections on Justice on the theoretical level. However, in the second articulation of
our work we will explore how Augustine acted on the practical level in applying Justice to concrete
situations.

In this first part of our investigation, we have examined how Augustine made an intelligent use of
the cultural patrimony available in the philosophical thought of his time to set a background for
what we could call his theory of Justice. He valued the position of such philosophers as Cicero by
adopting those of their views that are not in contradiction to the Christian teachings and ultimately
carried out a Christianization of secular thought by positing the double commandment of love God
and of neighbour as the key to understanding and practicing true Justice.

52
Cf. Aug., div. qu. 36.1-3; lib. arb. 1.11-15; c. Faust. 22.27; cat. rud. 14.1-2; ep. 140.4; Trin. 9.14; civ. Dei 11.
17;15.22).
53
Cf. Aug., Conf. 13.9.10; Sermo 335 C.13.
54
Cf. Id., De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae, I, 25.
 19

CHAPTER THREE: AUGUSTINE’S ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN HIS PASTORAL

MINISTRY

For Augustine, justice was not restricted only to his philosophical reflection and spiritual
meditation. As a bishop he fulfilled the role of a magistrate himself, and had to dispense justice in
the public court. He responded to concrete problems faced by magistrates and judges. Again and
again Augustine shows that moral reasoning must be transformed by the deeper wisdom offered by
Christ and the Bible. On the question of the activity of St. Augustine as a judge, and the person of
the Bishop in general in his relationship with the imperial administration, there are many works
carried out by distinguished researchers and specialists in the field. Prominent among them are the
works R. Dodaro, O.S.A., Church and State, in A. Fitzgerald, O.S.A.(ed.), Augustine Through the
Ages: An Encyclopedia, 176-184 ; the work of the Anglican prelate and celebrated patrologist H.
Chadwick, The Role of the Christian Bishop in Ancient Society, in Protocol, Colloquy of the Center
for Hermeneutical Studies, Berkeley 1979 ; A. Cunningham’s The Bishop in the Church: Patristic
Textes on the Role of the Episkopos, Wilmington, Glazier 1985, G. Vismara’s La giurisdizione
civile dei vescovi (secoli I-IX) Milan, Dott. A. Giuffrè, 1995, to name but a few. In the context of
this article, we cannot elaborate on the various positions of researchers and historians because of the
limited space we have. We shall instead dive straight into the writings of Augustine himself to find
out what he said and did in his position as Bishop.

II.1. Recommendations on how a Christian judge should carry out his functions.

In his epistolary correspondences, we discover many issues Augustine tackled in his ministry,
which constitute important information we wouldn’t have discovered otherwise. On the question of
Justice the Bishop of Hippo explicitly took on the rhetoric of what in particular was required from a
Christian judge.55
There is a fitting passage on the difference Augustine drew between a Christian and a non-Christian
judge56: The Christian proconsul Apringius was in charge of trials against some Donatist people
who had murdered and beaten Catholic priests. This was at the end of the year 411, shortly after the
conference of Carthage. Again the issue of religious peace had been settled in favour of Augustine’s
Catholic party. The imperial commissioner, who had presided over the conference, was

55
Cf. E. M. Kuhn, Justice Applied by the Episcopal Arbitrator: Augustine and the Implementation of Divine Justice, 82.
56
Aug., ep. 134 to Apringius (CSEL 44, 84-88)
 20

Marcellinus, brother of Apringius and Augustine’s new friend.57 Marcellinus was actively engaged
with the enactment of the laws against the Donatists. Upon his verdict the emperor had proscribed
Donatism. The clergy was to be separated and exiled, fines had to be paid and Donatists’ property
was to be handed over to the Catholics.58 The offences of murder and the injuries were usually
under the jurisdiction of the proconsul, but in the person of Marcellinus a special imperial
commissioner was still in charge in Africa. Thus Augustine was not sure who would take the chair
in the trial and wrote them both.59 He was concerned about court procedure and wanted to advise on
the verdict.

Of course, other than with the habit of the Church whose admonition should show clemency, the
governance over a province had to be carried out with severity. Augustine acknowledged this: sed
alia causa est provinciae, alia est ecclesiae, illius terribiliter gerenda est administratio, huius
clementer commendanda est mansuetudo. Were Apringius not a good Christian, Augustine would
still defend the interest of the church and argue that the acts against servants of God should remain
beneficial in the sense that the victims stand out as examples of patience (exempla patientiae) and
that the church should not therefore be remembered in connection with vengeance; their blood
should not be mixed with the blood of their enemies.60 If Apringius did not yield, Augustine
continues, he would suspect him of hostility. Thus implicitly argued, a hostile judge could not be
impartial. Augustine explicitly requests the imperial judges to add his letters to the protocol of the
proceedings and so appears to be prepared to take the case to the emperor’s own council.61 “We act
within the limits of our episcopal power when we threaten a person at times with the judgement of
men but most of all and always with the judgment of God”, he would write a few years later to
Macedonius, then the vicarius Africae.62 Augustine demands to have a say in the issue: firstly the

57
On Augustine’s politically marginal role in African and Roman politics until 412 see McLynn, Augustine’s Roman
Empire; the new friendship (ibid. 46ff.) “offered Augustine access to the empire at a new level and gave him, at last, a
platform from which to address Marcellinus’ peers”, and thus the dedication of his City of God to his dearest son was
“not incidental”.
58
Cf. Cod. Theod. 16, 5, 52. For more detail see W.H. Frend, The Donatist Church, Clarendon Press, Oxford
1952, 289ff.
59
Cf. Aug., ep. 139 (to Marcellinus, CSEL 44, 148-154); 133 (to Marcellinus, CSEL 44, 80-84), 134 (to Apringius,
CSEL 44, 84-88).
60
Cf. Aug., ep. 134, 3 (CSEL 44, 86). He repeated this in letter 139, 2 (CSEL 44, 150) to Marcellinus: “propter
conscientiam nostram et propter catholicam mansuetudinem commendandam”; Augustine was afraid that the Donatists
would celebrate themselves as martyrs for their religious cause.
61
Aug., ep. 139, 2 (CSEL 44, 151): Etiam gestis iubete allegari epistulas meas. He is explicit in this regard in this
letter to Marcellinus: should his brother support the death penalty he should at least leave the convicted in custody until
Augustine asked the emperor for clemency, ut in custodiam recipiantur, atque hoc de clementia imperatorum impetrare
curabimus.
62
Aug., ep. 153, 21 (CSEL 44, 420f): Agimus quantum episcopalis facultas datur, et humanum quidem nonnunquam,
sed maxime ac semper divinum judicium comminantes.
 21

Church could not be held responsible in case the accused be killed, since she did not indict them for
the deeds. He often stressed the obligation not to accuse. Christian morality forbade it. He
courageously took it as his responsibility to ask for clemency from the authority. In the
aforementioned ep. 153 to Macedonius he wrote in deeply touching words:

“We do not in any way approve the faults which we wish to see corrected, nor do we wish
wrongdoing to go unpunished because we take pleasure in it. We pity the man while
detesting the deed or crime, and the more the vice displeases us, the less do we want the
culprit to die unrepentant. We are forced by our love for humanity to intercede for the
guilty lest they end this life by punishment only to find that punishment does not end with
this life” (ep. 153, 1, 3).

We learnt from Possidius that Augustine received an answer from Macedonius to his letter in which
he interceded on behalf of a suppliant. Macedonius, granting his request, had this to say on
Augustine’s wise approach:
I am struck with wonder at your wisdom, both in the books you have published and in this
letter which you have not found it too great a burden to send me by way of intercession for
those in distress. For the former writings, my venerable lord and esteemed father, possess a
discernment, wisdom and holiness which leave nothing to be desired, and the latter such
modesty, that unless I do as you request, I could not regard myself as remaining free from
blame in the matter. You do not insist, like most men in your position, on extorting all that
the suppliant asks. But what seemed to you fair to ask of a judge occupied with many cares,
this you advise with a humble modesty which is most efficacious in settling difficulties
among good men. Consequently I have not hesitated to grant your request as you
recommended and as I had given you reason to expect.63

Repeatedly Augustine complained about people taking advantage of this reluctance to hand over
offenders. Instead the accusations here had been made by officials, maybe defensores civitatis.64
But since the victims were servants of God, Augustine is very clear: “we do not want the sufferings
of the servants of God to be avenged by punishments equal to those sufferings”.65 The defensor
civitatis was a new development in criminal law.66 Originally the initiative of a trial had lain with
the victim, the person involved. Augustine thus uses a promising forensic trick. Although the
iurisdictio was in the hands of the magistrate, the fact that his action depended on somebody’s
accusation, resulted in Augustine’s argument that he should be referring to the victim’s interest,
63
Possidius, Vita Aug., 20, 3-5.
64
Aug., ep. 133, 1 (CSEL 44, 81) : “Quia non accusantibus nostris sed illorum notoria ad quos tuendae publicae pacis
vigilantia pertinebat”. In Aug. ep. 134, 2 (CSEL 44, 85)they are the preservers of public security, cura eorum, qui
disciplinae publicae inserviunt.
65
Aug., ep. 133, 1, (CSEL 44, 81): “Nolumus tamen passiones servorum dei quasi vice talionibus paribus suppliciis
vindicari”.
66
R. Dodaro provided important information on the figure of the defensor civitatis in the time of St. Augustine in his
article Church and State, A. Fitzgerald, Augustine through the Ages., 179.
 22

which in this case was the Church. Secondly he reminds Marcellinus of his duty and mission: he
had come to Africa for the benefit of the Catholic cause. Augustine subtly commands regional
authority to testify and decide about the content of this benefit, since he was the responsible
churchman in Hippo, where the crimes had transpired.67 If this reminder did not show enough
power of persuasion he lastly orders it as bishop to his Christian son.68 With a Christian judge, he
concludes the matter more diplomatically with Apringius, he dealt otherwise; they pursued the same
interest. A fellow-Christian with Augustine, Apringius had the judicial authority that Augustine
lacked, so there should be no question but that he would extend his hand to help the church.69

In another situation not involving the Church, and which also seemed to lie beyond his competence,
when the Bishop of Hippo interceded on behalf of a farmer named Faventius, he was preoccupied
lest the money of the wealthy opponent might prevail in court. Faventius, a tenant farmer, had been
taken in custody in an inappropriate manner. Further he had not been granted the legally provided
postponement to prepare his case. Instead he had been led by force to Generosus, then governor of
Numidia. Augustine emphasized the fact that laws had been violated and asked the governor to be
not only an upright, but also a Christian judge and therefore to grant a delay.70

These are some few examples in which, Augustine recommended how Christian judges should
carry out their functions.

1.2. Augustine’s practice as a bishop-judge

When anatomizing his episcopal “burden” before his people, Augustine confined himself to his
specifically pastoral duties, his responsibility for their salvation and moral welfare. A good example
of this outpouring of his heart is found in his heart Sermon 359. Augustine’s perception of his office
as judge was closely linked to his duty as leader of his congregation: “I nourish you with what
nourishes me, I offer you what I live on myself … I feed you on what I am fed on myself set food

67
Aug. ep. 133, 3, (CSEL 44, 83): “Ut modum dispensationis meae non supergredi videar”.
68
Ibid., (CSEL 44, 83f) “…if listening to a friend begging or a bishop giving advice would not suffice” ; see ep. 134, 1
(CSEL 44, 84f).
69
Aug., ep. 134, 3 (CSEL 44, 86): Subdatur sublimitas tua, subdatur fides tua; causam tecum tracto communem, sed tu
in ea potes, quod ergo non possum; confer nobiscum consilium et porrige auxilium; and ep. 134, 2: Christianus judicem
rogo, et christianum episcopus moneo. Cf. civ. V, 24: the Christian rulers are to “make their power the handmaid of his
majesty by using it to spread his worship to the greatest possible extent” (P. WEITHMAN, Augustine’s political
philosophy, in E. Stump, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001,
246).
70
Cf. Aug., ep. 113-116, especially 115 to the bishop colleague and 116 to Generosus, where he demanded: Et profecto
facies quod non solum integrum, verum etiam christianum judicem decet (Aug., ep. 116, CSEL 34/1, 663).
 23

before you from the pantry which I too live on, from the Lord’s storerooms”, he told his listeners.71
He never ceased to tell, how the office was to him a burdensome and dangerous responsibility; the
dominance it gave might weaken the demand of modesty, humilitas, and service for the task. In
Christ’s team of good pastors the bishop was to call his flock which would follow his commands.72
Of course as no less burdensome he perceived his duty to sit in the episcopal court.

Augustine’s episcopal concerns were “countless,” but he consistently singles out the demands of
jurisdiction, the adjudication or arbitration of “the tumultuous perplexities of other people’s suits”.73
Augustine is by far our fullest source of information on the late antique bishop’s judicial role, and,
although this material has been shrewdly analysed from different perspectives it has now been
shown that the institutional basis of the episcopale iudicium was far less secure than traditionally
believed74. His immersion in his flock’s “greeds and needs” (ep. 139.3) is not to be taken for
granted as part of his job description. The Bishop of Hippo may well have invested far more time
and effort in hearing cases than most other bishops – certainly far beyond the “Monday slot” for
which apostolic sanction was claimed in the East.75

One of our most important sources about the activities of the bishop of Hippo is obviously
Possidius’ Life of Saint Augustine already quoted above regarding the Bishop’s recommendation
and intercession with secular powers. From an observer’s point of view, Possidius portrayed
Augustine’s judicial activities modelled on the strong ideals of educational authority and wisdom
applied to service of the Church.76 Concerning court procedure, Augustine was aware of being in a
tricky position, since whoever decided against a friend was likely to lose one.77 Possidius
accentuated Augustine’s pastoral, administrative and forensic activities. He remembered him as
working quite hard: “Often he remained without food until midday, sometimes the whole day,
always examining and arbitrating, focusing on the state of their Christian souls, how much

71
Aug., s. 339, 4 = s. Frangip. 2 (ed. G. Morin in Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti, Typ. Polygl.
Vaticanis, Roma 1930, 193): inde pasco, unde pascor …. inde vobis appono, unde ego vivo, de thesauro dominico.
72
Cf. F. Bellentani, Episcopus ... est nomen suspecti officii: Il vocabolario del servizio episcopale in alcuni testi
agostiniani, in Vescovi e pastori in epoca teodosiana. In occasione del XVI centenario della consacrazione episcopale
di S. Agostino, 396-1996. XXV Incontro di studiosi dell’antichità cristiana. Roma, 8-11 maggio 1996, vol. I (Studia
Ephemeridis Augustinianum 58), Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1997, 667-682.
73
Aug. On the Works of Monks, 29.37)
74
Cf. N. B. McLynn, Administrator: Augustine in his Diocese, in M. Vessey (ed.), A Companion to Augustine, 316.
75
Cf. Constitutiones apostolorum 2.47 (The best critical edition of ancient document is probably that of Franciscus
Xavier Funk, Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum, Ferdinandus Schoeningh, Paderborn1905.
76
Cf. E.M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 90.
77
Cf. Possidius, Vita Aug. 19, 2 (ed. W. Geerlings in Possidius, Vita Augustini. Zweisprachige Ausgabe, Schöningh,
Paderborn etc. 2005, 64): de amicis vero unum esset, contra quem sententia proferretur, perditurus.
 24

someone advanced in his faith and good manners or retreated from them”.78 The order of procedure
is again essential: Augustine usually examined (noscebat) and then arbitrated (dirimebat); on the
basis of the results he came to his verdicts. Christian attitude and morality of the parties had a major
impact, Possidius stated. Through the study of Scriptures the bishop acquired judgments “regarding
the Christian soul.”79
However this was not always the main issue in the process of arbitration: “And when he saw that
circumstance gave the opportunity, then he taught the parties the truth of the divine law, inculcated
them, admonished and instructed them, how they could attain eternal life.”80
Augustine was settling worldly disputes according to worldly rules and only when opportune did he
lecture on the wider, godlier aspects of the laws (divinae legis veritatem). As his written questions
to the lawyer Eustochius show, he had a team of advisers for legal questions.81 And again this duty
to judge according to temporal law he had gained from Paul, 1 Cor. 6, 1-6: “Quoniam ergo
praecepit apostolus, ut saecularia iudicia si inter se habuerint christiani, ea non in foro, sed in
ecclesia fiant, unde nos necesse est perpeti tales iurgantium quaestiones, in quibus nobis etiam
terrena iura quaerenda sint, praecipue de condicione hominum temporali.”82
“The apostle has commanded that, if Christians have with one another cases concerning worldly
affairs that need adjudication, they should be heard in the church, not in the courts. For this reason
we have to endure the sort of petitions on the part of litigants in which we have to learn the laws of
this world, especially concerning the temporal condition of persons.” (transl. by R. Teske;).

The attitude might explain the good reception he attained in his court. His courtroom was forever
filling with people who expected a just decision that was free of charge and corruption; that is, they
expected decisions unlike those of civil judges. He might have come across as incorruptible,
diligently listening and gingerly deciding; it might have been a question of his personal charisma,

78
Ibid., 19, 6, (ed. Geerlings) “Et eas aliquando usque ad horam refectionis, aliquando autem tota die ieiunans, semper
tamen noscebat et dirimebat: intendens in eis christianorum momenta animorum, quantum quisque vel in fide bonisque
moribus proficeret, vel ab iis deficeret.”
79
This claim turns out to be true, since Augustine extensively quoted the Scriptures in his letters to officials, making it
his most prominent source of reference.
80
Ibid., 19, 4 (ed. Geerlings): “Atque compertis rerum opportunitatibus, divinae legis veritatem partes docebat, eamque
illis inculcabat, et eas quo adipiscerentur vitam aeternam (Mc 10, 17) edocebat et admonebat: nihil aliud quaerens ab
iis quibus ad hoc vacabat, nisi tantum obedientiam et devotionem christianam, quae et Deo debetur et hominibus:
peccantes coram omnibus arguens, ut ceteri timorem haberent (1 Tim 5, 20)”.
81
Eustochius was probably a provincial lawyer frequently consulted by Augustine.
82
Aug., ep. 24*, 1 (CSEL 88, 126). See n.65 below for an explanation about the series of letters to which this particular
belongs.
 25

but certainly his knowledge of the earthly rules could be relied on. Maybe they knew better what to
expect, and so they traded in their possibility to appeal at the next instance.83

Apart from the testimonies we get from Possidius and from some of his traditionally known letters,
Augustine’s handling of his caseload is best illustrated through his commonitoria, the memoranda
produced as part of his judicial business, whose peculiarities – on the one hand public (and copied
in his archive) and on the other informal – have only recently been analysed. Several such
commonitoria feature in Augustine’s letter collection, as instruments of negotiation or explanation;
but one of the outstanding features of the “Divjak” letters 84 – the cache of documents that, within
the last generation, have brought to our understanding of Augustine’s social position – is the
number of memoranda that are included or mentioned. Above all, for our purposes, they provide
new access to the documentation that was generated by Augustine’s judicial role, at a level which
has been suppressed during the selection process that resulted in the canonical letter collection.
Here we come closest to catching Augustine the administrator in action ; and close inspection
suggests much more agility and imagination in his handling of business than his own rhetoric of
patient victimhood would allow.85 Let’s now consider practical examples from the resources
provided by the Divjak letters.

From the information contained in ep.8*, we come to discover that even a Non-Christian might
have had higher hopes to get what he wanted and to succeed in his cause, when referring to bishop
Augustine instead of going to ordinary judges. Augustine’s handling of the complaint of the Jew
Licinius shows what he expected of his own colleague-bishops. It was not so opportune to teach
Licinius the Jew about God’s justice. Augustine rather rebuked one of his own colleagues, the
seemingly arrogant bishop Victor, who was not such a model bishop after all:
The case was all about some little pieces of land, quos agellos.86 It seemed they had formerly all
belonged to the mother of the Jew Licinius. Apparently the mother was not on good terms with her
son. Perhaps she had not been altogether happy with his choice of wife. The son had bought the
83
E.-M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 91.
84
About these previously unknown letters, there are a whole lot of issues. In 1969, Johannes Divjak, a scholar from
Vienna, came to France to work on the project. In the Bibliothèque Municipale of Marseilles, to the delight of
Augustine scholars, Divjak discovered a manuscript of letters that included twenty-nine letters of Augustine that were
wholly unknown. The manuscript in question had been produced about the year 1440 for King René of Anjou, a rich
but minor monarch. This manuscript had been known, but it had never been closely examined. It was assumed that an
elegant late medieval manuscript could hardly contain any new work of an author as ancient and as frequently copied as
was Augustine. In reference to these letters, it is conventionally agreed to abbreviate them with an asterisk in front of
the number of the Letter concerned. Thus we shall continuously use ep. with the number followed by*.
85
Cf. N. B. McLynne, Administrator: Augustine in his Diocese, 316.
86
Aug., ep. 8* (CSEL 88, 41-42).
 26

land from the people to whom his mother had previously sold it. He then had given part of it to his
wife upon their marriage. The whole lot had been the object of a sale of the old lady again, as if she
were the proprietor. But in truth now her son and his wife were the owners of the land and were in
possession of it. Regardless of this fact, Bishop Victor, the purchaser, forcefully took possession.
When Licinius protested, Victor replied that he had bought it from his mother. Licinius should
argue with her and ask Victor for nothing, because Victor did not owe him anything: Ego emi si
male mihi vendidit mater tua, cum ipsa litiga! A me noli aliquid quaerere, quia nihil tibi debeo. So
Licinius turned to Augustine for help.
Licinius’s documents had proven the complaint well founded and hence had convinced Augustine.
His memorandum to Victor provides evidence for Augustine’s high regard and knowledge of
property law: he reproaches Bishop Victor for severe ignorance of the laws (ignorantiam iuris) and
sets the issues right. Victor had to give back the estates because his action contradicted what justice
demanded and the laws cried for, necesse est enim ut eam recipiat intercedente iustitia clamantibus
legibus. Ultimately he refered to the word of the Apostle and cited 1 Cor 10:32: no offence should
be given to the Jews or the Greeks nor to the church – a passage that preaches respect and in a way
tolerance.87 Better for Victor thus to do what was just, rather than to risk trial before an episcopal
court, Melius est autem, ut a tuo carissimo frater commonitus facias quod iustum est, quam ut ista
causa veniat ad episcopale iudicium. In this eventuality, Victor at best would be asked to do
penance, at worst he would be permanently deprived of his office as bishop.88

Augustine’s most extravagant hypothesizing occurs in the next Divjak letter, a memorandum
produced in reply to one from Alypius (ep. 9*), concerning a high-profile case brought to the
latter’s tribunal which had nothing to do with Augustine. A vir honestus, member of the legal
profession most likely, had abducted and taken with him, a nun to make her the “plaything of his
debauchery”, ad ludibrium stupri de patria duxerat. This phrasing means that he – as they were not
married and she had vowed abstinence – had dishonoured her, by taking her with him, be it with or
without her consent.89 The clerics, who had traced and found him with her, may-be in a church,90

87
On Augustine and the Jews see B. Blumenkranz, Augustin et le judaisme, in Recherches Augustiniennes, vol. I
(1958), 225-240 (repr. in B. Blumenkranz, Juifs et Chrétiens. Patristique et Moyen Age, Variorum Reprints, London
1977, nr. III). In Hippo there was a Jewish community as well as in Carthage, where Augustine often went – the biggest
Jewish community in Africa was there.
88
Cf. the measures taken against bishop Antoninus, a bird of the same feather, who robbed his town to build a villa for
himself, Augustine’s letter to Fabiola, ep. 20*; see S. Lancel, L’affaire d’Antonius de Fussala, in Les Lettres, 267-285 ;
Ch. Munier, La question des appels à Rome d’après la Lettre 20* d’Augustin, ibid., 187- 199.
89
Though Augustine uses the mild ‘duxerat’ instead of ‘abduxerat’, he is sure that she was forcefully subdued to
the man’s lust. Aug. ep. 9*, 2 (CSEL 88, 44): “Libidini suae subdere”.
 27

had obviously given him a good beating. In late antiquity social status and legal privilege were
divided in society between more respectable and lower people, honestiores and humiliores.
Members of the provincial curiae for example or lawyers (as here) received better treatment
especially in criminal procedure, where they were exempt from torture or beatings.91 Therefore
unhappy about his treatment, the man had appealed to Pope Celestine (422-432) and had been
granted a trial against the rough clerics before bishop Alypius’ court. Alypius was given papal order
to investigate and then discipline the clerics for violating the privileged man. These developments
did not much please Augustine. It gave him the occasion to advise his friend in charge who had
asked his opinion on the quaestio iuris.92105 Augustine had already been interviewing a presbyter
named Commodianus, allegedly involved in the case somehow, who had complained about the
upcoming trial to Augustine. The latter had questioned him about details, but Commodianus
claimed to have seen nothing. Only responsible for the subordinate clerics involved, he had not
been himself present at the scene of the beating. In this confused situation Augustine writes to
Alypius, he was worried lest the other clerics should be punished and the abductor walk away
unharmed. One is tempted to detect some trace of criticism of the worldly laws.93 For Augustine
seems to be quite excited and annoyed that honesti homines might think they could have a licence to
do whatever they pleased, just because they were legally granted the privilege not to be corporally
punished.
Augustine is much more concerned with church procedure and the treatment of cases where
somebody appeals with a false or incomplete story and consequently gets granted favours. True,
Augustine does say that the civil laws were not useful: leges publicas nequeant. Yet civil laws
might have covered the offence. Given the facts, a vir honestus might well be punished for the
crime of stuprum (e.g.) and so lose his privileges once and for all in a trial before ordinary judges
through the punishment of infamia. Augustine himself is aware of this possibility, since he holds
that he could not believe that clerics in defence of the Lord’s house were to be punished for doing
something so much less than the civil laws provided for, incomparabiliter minus quam paretur
legibus publicis, and he explains their alleged motivation in beating and his justification of it: “…in

90
This is not obvious; it cannot be deduced from 9*, 2, but could from 9*, 3, where Augustine is shocked about
malefactis nequissimorum hominum, quae in ecclesia nefandis ausibus perpetrant.
91
Cf. Aug., ep. 9*, 2 (CSEL 88, 43-45): cum honorem vel curiae vel fori habent, quem videtur habere iste de quo
agitur.
92
Alypius had (in 427) just come back from a mission to Italy, where he had met Celestine. This explains why he, thus
known, is put in charge.
93
Cf. E.-M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 97.
 28

order that there might be something to fear on the part of those who have no fear that the bishop or
clerics may bring the civil laws to bear against them.”94

Another sex crime, against a nun, is treated at ep. 15*, but this time Augustine seems to let off the
offender lightly, recommending only that he lose his position (he was legal officer to the devout
senator Dorotheus). The bishop creates a mechanism that commits the senator to a certain response
before he has heard the facts of the case. The danger, one suspects, was that a full investigation
conducted on Dorotheus’ own terms would uncover mitigating circumstances (and good land agents
were hard to find). In this case, too, the nun had obviously brought her complaint to Augustine, and
had presumably found his own initial solution (excommunication and penance) inadequate. With
his memorandum he could be seen to be taking action on her behalf. Such an interpretation does not
denigrate Augustine: the more we recognize the limits of his reach, the more we can appreciate his
skill at finding means to obtain the partial redress that would also serve to reaffirm his principles.

In ep10*, Augustine evokes a dramatic situation. It is an exchange of memoranda with Alypius.

The main interest lies in the postscript, which takes up five sixths of the text and introduces the
sensational topic of the depredations of slave traders in the territory of Hippo and the kidnapping of
children for sale abroad. Here we see Augustine at work to alleviate evil, and his method – he
attaches a copy of the existing law covering such crimes, and asks Alypius to secure a revision
better suited to Christian enforcement – has been treated as a model of carefully targeted lobbying.95
But the letter is both more and less than a straightforward administrative response to a humanitarian
crisis. It is peculiar, for example, that Augustine chose to lead off with an assault on a farmhouse
where the “slavers” killed the men and kidnapped the women and children, which was still an
unconfirmed rumour, especially since his own investigations had uncovered a crime hardly less
foul, a child snatched by brigands from her parents’ home.
Here we see the Bishop applying himself with determined energy to a problem that has just
emerged, and the text does show him applying a cosmetic remedy to an evil inherent in his society,
and beyond his (or anyone else’s) power to solve. According to McLynn Augustine was caught
uncomfortably between Roman law and Christian charity.96 In an outburst of the latter, four months

94
Aug., ep. 9*, 3 (CSEL 88, 45): “Quod donec fiat, quae sententia proferenda sit adversus dei servos qui pro domini
sui domo faciunt aliquid sceleratis incomparabiliter minus quam paretur legibus publicis, ut sit utcumque quod timeant
qui easdem publicas leges contra se episcopis vel clericis moveri posse non timent, omnino non video”.
95
Cf. N. B. McLynn, Administrator: Augustine in his Diocese, 316.
96
Cf. Ibid., 317.
 29

previously, in his absence, his people had rescued some 120 slaves from a ship and nearby holding-
pens. The fate of these unfortunates was still uncertain when Augustine wrote, since “Galatian
slavers” (the pejorative ethnic label is repeated over and again) had found patrons to support their
bid to reclaim their merchandise. Augustine in his capacity of Bishop tried his best to make sure
excesses in this area of the society he lived in were reduced. That one on earth has been able to
totally quench the fire of injustice is a fact. What we appraise in the Bishop of Hippo is not the
solutions he brought to the issues at hand, but as in the aforementioned case, his humanitarian
initiatives.

We could multiply examples of Saint Augustine’s praxis as a bishop-judge. His Christian faith
remains his source of inspiration. In short, this second section of our article has shed light on the
praxis of Augustine as a bishop with regard to justice
 30

CONCLUSION

We have looked at Augustine’s thought on Justice and seen how, while acknowledging some of the
aspects of the traditional understanding of the notion, he grounded his position on Christian faith
and the heritage he received from patristic tradition. He did not limit himself to theorising or
instructing on how to apply Justice in society. In real life situations, moved by Christian love, the
Bishop of Hippo took concrete actions to aid those oppressed by injustice. To the limit of his power
he stood against the long-standing evil that had succeeded in thoroughly pervading human society.
From the texts we read and studied, we could say that injustices resulted not from the body of
administration, nor from its regulations and prohibitions, courts and appeal-courts, but from the
weak human condition. Advocates earned money to defend their clients whatever their case might
be; judges accepted money for their verdicts: and one sometimes even had to pay money for a just
verdict: “These gains (the earnings of corruption) are as wrongly possessed as those that come
through theft”, “and I would demand their restitution, but there is no judge under whom they can be
claimed.”97 In Augustine’s experience it was beyond his immediate influence and rested in God’s
hand: a confession of powerlessness by an otherwise strong-minded and always highly committed
bishop in the African province of Numidia.98 Some scholars, based on various conjectures, hold that
the Bishop had actually no power whatsoever to solve any social problem since the imperial
legislations had never succeeded to establish a lex Christiana.99 But Augustine’s writings
themselves tell us how many humanitarian initiatives he undertook in his capacity as a Christian
bishop-judge, some of which did have positive results.
In the last resort, we all are aware of the fact that until final judgement, the just cause will often fall
short. For Augustine this shortfall was exemplified by the suffering of humillimus Christ.
Augustine’s role as a bishop was to broker for a Christian caritas, which by its nature was so much
closer to divine justice than any merely procedural justice with its property-managing or order-
restoring aims. To Augustine, the office and duty of a bishop was to lead in this enterprise. His
conversion to Christianity was the turning point: the imitation and following of Christus iustus et

97
Aug., ep. 153, 25 (CSEL 44, 426): Haec atque hujusmodi male utique possidentur, et vellem restituerentur; sed non
est quo judice repetantur. Augustine’s letter to Count Macedonius well displays his dark view on selfrighteous people
and on forensic bribery.
98
Cf. E.-M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 103.
99
For further readings on this aspect one could see Gaudemet, L’Église, 351, where he stresses how the bishop legally
to significant extent remained a private person. Also C. Ando, Religion and ius publicum, in C. Ando - J. Rüpke (ed.),
Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome, Steiner, Stuttgart 2006, 126-145 holds that Theodosius did not
succeed in establishing the lex Christiana and so Augustine remained an outsider.
 31

iustificans100 became essential to finding the vera iustitia and crucial to Christian life and
leadership.101 From it he would derive his primary legitimacy to instruct, admonish and teach about
truth as bishop and judge. Christ was the source of his call to be followed even by imperial officers
of the highest status in matters of justice.

100
Augustine emphasises Christ’s role as iustus et iustificans (cf. Rm 3,26), in particular, during his controversy with
the Pelagians, in order to highlight the grace of Christ as necessary for justification, and to underscore the exclusiveness
of Christ’s place in history as perfectly iustus. Cf. R. Dodaro, Iustis (Iusti), in Augustinus Lexikon, Vol.3, 884.
101
Cf. E.-M. Kuhn, Justice Applied, 104.
 32

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS

AL Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. C. Mayer (Basel/Stuttgart, 1986– ).

CCL Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Turnhout, 1949– ).

C.J. Codex Justinianus = Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. II, ed. P. Krueger (Berlin, 1954).

CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna, 1866 – ).

C.Th. Codex Theodosianus, in Theodosiani libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis,

ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1904–5; repr. Dublin/Zurich, 1097), 27–906.

NPNF A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed
P. Schaff (Edinburgh, 1886–8; repr. Grand Rapids, 1971–80).

PG Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1857–66).

PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1841–55).

WSA The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. J. Rotelle (New
York, 1989– ).

ABBREVIATED TITLES OF BIBLICAL BOOKS

Gen. Gen esis

Exod. Exodus
Lev. Leviticus
Num. Numbers
Deut. Deuteronomy
Josh. Joshua
1Sam. 1Samuel
2Sam. 2Samuel
1Kgs. 1Kings
2Kgs. 2Kings
2Chron. 2Chronicles
 33

Ps. Psalms
Prov. Proverbs
Wisd. Wisdom
Ecclus. Ecclesiasticus (= Sirach)
Is. Isaiah
Jer. Jeremiah
Ezek. Ezekiel
Dan. Daniel
Hos. Hosea
Jon. Jonah
Hab. Habakkuk
Zeph. Zephaniah
Mal. Malachi
Mt. Matthew
Mk. Mark
Lk. Luke
Jn. John
Acts. Acts of the Apostles
Rom. Roman
1Cor. 1Corinthians
2Cor. 2Corinthians
Gal. Galatians
Eph. Ephesians
Phil. Philippians
1Thess. 1Thessalonians
Col. Colossians
1Tim. 1Timothy
2Tim. 2Timothy
Tit. Titus
Heb. Hebrews
Jas. James
1Pet. 1Peter
1Jn. 1John
Rev. Revelation
 34

ABBREVIATED TITLES OF AUGUSTINE’S WORKS.

adult. coniug. De adulterinis coniugiis. CSEL 41.

bapt. De baptismo. PL 43. CSEL 51.
brevic. Breviculus conlationis cum Donatistis. CCL 149A.
c. adu. leg. Contra aduersarios legis et prophetarum. PL 42.
c. Don. Contra Donatistas. CSEL 53.
c. ep. Parm. Contra epistulam Parmeniani. CSEL 51.
c. Gaud. Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum episcopum. CSEL 53.
c. Iul. imp. Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum. CSEL 85.
c. litt. Pet. Contra litteras Petiliani. CSEL 52.
cat. rud. De catechizandis rudibus. PL 40. CCL 46.
civ. De civitate Dei. PL 41. CSEL 40. CCL 47–48. H. Bettenson,
Concerning the City of God against the Pagans (London,1972). R. W.
Dyson, The City of God against the Pagans (Cambridge, 1998). FC
8,14, 24.
conf. Confessiones, PL 32. CSEL 33. CCL 27. R. S. Pine-Coffin, Saint
Augustine, Confessions (London, 1961). FC 21. WSA 1.1.
cons. ev. De consensu evangelistarum. PL 34. CSEL 44. NPNF 1.6.
Cresc. Contra Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati. CSEL 52.

diu. qu. De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus liber unus CCL 44A,11-
249
doct. chr. De doctrina christiana. PL 34. CSEL 80. CCL 32. FC 2. WSA 1.11.
en. Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmos. PL 36–37. CCL 38–40.
ep. Epistula(e). PL 33. CSEL 34, 44, 57, 58. FC 12, 18, 20, 30, 32.
ep.* Epistula(e) 1*–29*. CSEL 88. FC 81.
haer. De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum. PL 42. CCL 46. WSA 1.18.
Io. ev. tr. In Iohannis evangelium tractatus. PL 35. CCL 36. FC 78, 79, 88, 90,
92.
lib. arb. De libero arbitrio libri tres CSEL 74,3-154.
 35

nat. et gr. De natura et gratia liber unus CSEL 60,233-299.

ord. De ordine. CCL 29. FC 2.
pecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum ad
Marcellinum. PL 44. CSEL 60. WSA 1.23.
qu. ev. Quaestiones evangeliorum. CCL 44B.
retr. Retractationes. PL 32. CSEL 36. CCL 57.
serm. Sermo(nes). For a listing of Latin editions, cf. AL 1. xxxviii–xxxix.
To these should be added Augustin d’Hippone. Vingt-six sermons au
peuple d’Afrique, ed. F. Dolbeau (Paris, 1996). WSA 3.1–11.
uita Possidius, Vita Augustini, ed. W. Geerlings in Possidius, Vita
Augustini. Zweisprachige Ausgabe, Schöningh, Paderborn etc. 2005

Latin editions of Augustine’s works are indicated at AL 1. xxvi–xli. For a listing of English
translations, consult the table prepared by A. Fitzgerald, Augustine through the Ages: An
Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, 1999).

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Ambrose, De officiis ministrorum

_______, Expositio Psalmi CXVIII
_______, De Nabuthae historia 47-48.

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Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum, Franciscus Xavier Funk (ed.), Ferdinandus Schoeningh,
Paderborn1905.
Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, (PL 6, 111A-113A)
_________, Epitome 54-55;
Constitutiones apostolorum 2.47 (The best critical edition of ancient document is probably that of

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