Professional Documents
Culture Documents
J. Warren Smith
ABSTRACT
While Michael Walzer’s distinction between preemptive and preventive
wars offers important categories for current reflection upon the Bush Doc-
trine and the invasion of Iraq, it is often treated as a modern distinction
without antecedent in the classical Christian just war tradition. This paper
argues to the contrary that within Augustine’s corpus there are passages
in which he speaks about the use of violence in situations that we would
classify today as preemptive and preventive military action. While I do not
claim that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between the two types
of war (such would be anachronistic), I will argue that based on exami-
nations of De libero arbitrio I.v.11–12 and De civitate Dei I.30 Augustine’s
discussions of hypothetical cases or actual wars in history provide insights
helpful for contemporary reflection on preemptive and preventive wars.
KEY WORDS: Augustine, just war, preemptive war, preventive war, Third
Punic War, De libero arbitrio, City of God, restorative justice
IN HIS CLASSIC WORK, Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer questions the
circumstances in which states may “rightly defend themselves against
violence that is imminent but not actual” (1977, 74). In order to set limits
on wars fought as anticipatory self-defense, he offers the now well-known
distinction between preemptive war and preventive war. A preemptive
war is fought only in situations where a would-be aggressor has exhib-
ited “hostile acts short of war” that suggest an intent to attack accompa-
nied by military preparation that makes the intent a “positive danger”
(1977, 81). The classic example of a preemptive war is the Arab–Israeli
Six-Day War of 1967 (Walzer 1977, 84).1 A preventive war, by contrast,
differs from a preemptive war in that while there may be a possible fu-
ture threat, there is no imminent threat or vulnerability. The goal of
preventive war is to prevent another nation from gaining a geopolitical
1 Anticipating an attack on both its southern and northern fronts, Israel on June 4, 1967
launched assaults against Egyptian forces and mobilized Syrian armored units. Although
Walzer admits that Egypt’s mobilization did not constitute an “instant and overwhelm-
ing necessity” for war, it made Israel so vulnerable to a potentially devastating attack at
anytime as to justify preemptive action (1977, 84).
JRE 35.1:141–162.
C 2007 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
142 Journal of Religious Ethics
sizes a Stoic deontological voluntarism with a Neoplatonic eudaimonism, that is, happiness
lies solely within the individual’s act of willing the good (I.xiii. 28–29). Since willing the
144 Journal of Religious Ethics
The logic of Augustine’s view that the good person can satisfy her
desire to be free from fear by loving only that which cannot be taken
from her against her will should lead him toward pacifism.3 That is, if
the only thing that one truly loves is that which cannot be taken from her,
namely her good will, then no assassin or robber or invading army could
threaten to deprive her of that which she loves. Therefore, she would not
be motivated to kill the brigand who threatens her life any more than
she would kill a mere pickpocket for the trivial offense of pinching her
wallet. This, however, is not Augustine’s conclusion.
Conscious of the “pacifist” implication of his view of right love,
Augustine turns directly to the question of killing an attacker or would-
be assailant. He writes,
Augustine: I think we ought first to discuss whether an attacking enemy
(hostes inruens) or an assassin lying in ambush (insidiator sicarius) can be
slain in defense of life or liberty or chastity, without lust (sine ulla libidine).
Evodius: How can I possibly think that men are void of lust (libidine) who
fight for things which they can lose against their will (inviti)? If they cannot
lose them, what need is there to go so far as to kill a man on their count?
Augustine: Then the law is not just which gives the traveler authority to
kill a brigand lest he should himself be killed by him. Or the law that allows
any man or woman to slay, if he can, anyone who comes with intent to rape,
even before the crime has been committed (ante inlatum stuprum) . . . . Shall
we dare to say that these laws are unjust or rather null and void? [1953,
118, De lib. arb. I.v.11].
There are two key things to notice in this passage. First, when Augustine
poses the question of whether one can kill in self-defense without lust
(sine ulla libidine), he is concerned not just with the question of the
psychological state of the person attacked—is she driven to kill out of
hatred or the “blood lust” of revenge? He is also concerned with culpable
cupidity. That is, does the soldier’s motive for drawing blood arise from
the love of transitory goods (which can be taken against our will) rather
than the proper love of transcendent goods, which are invulnerable to
good is entirely within one’s control and is the source of our sense of fulfillment (eudai-
monia), then we can maintain our happiness even in the midst of affliction. Augustine’s
synthesis seeks to overcome the problem of people, such as his mother, Monica, who, by
Neoplatonist standards, do not possess the intellectual gifts and training to engage in that
contemplative ascent to the One necessary for eudaimonia (O’Connell 1970, 53–54, 58–59).
By the time he begins writing Books II and III of De libero arbitrio, Augustine has begun
calling into question the autonomy of human beings to will their own happiness (Greer
1996, 471–86).
3 David A. Lenihan places Augustine’s view of war within the pacifist tradition which,
he claims, was characteristic of the early church before Constantine (1988, 37). Similarly,
Robert L. Holmes argues that, although Augustine’s political view leans toward a realist’s
position, Augustine subscribes to personal pacifism (1999, 324).
Augustine and the Limits of Preemptive and Preventive War 145
It is, however, evident that this law is well-prepared against such an ac-
cusation, for in the state where it is in force it allows lesser evil deeds to
prevent worse being committed. It is much more suitable that the man
who attacks the life of another should be slain than he who defends his
own life; and it is much more cruel that a man should suffer violation than
that the violator should be slain by his intended victim [1953, 118, De lib.
arb. I.v.12].
attacker himself always know ahead of time precisely how much force he
will and will not use. The same is true of rape. Yet Augustine is not con-
cerned with this problem; rather his argument focuses upon protecting
the innocent from suffering unjustly and more importantly preventing
the would-be aggressor’s carrying out his unjust will.
To be sure, Augustine is not explicitly offering a theory of preemptive
attack within a just war doctrine. Rather, in the context of discussing the
morality of killing by civilians and soldiers alike, he has described pre-
emptive action on the part of individuals. Although he does not employ
a “domestic” analogy to establish rules of international law or military
engagement, this passage provides two principles that may be helpful in
contemporary reflection about preemptive war. First, the appearance of
hostile actions suggesting an imminent attack provides the casus belli, or
warrant for anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the case Augustine puts
forward in De libero arbitrio is closer to the narrow standard for preemp-
tive action set by the legalist paradigm than is Walzer’s extrapolation
from the 1967 War. Second, Augustine justifies the preemptive measure
on the grounds that the would-be aggressor is already guilty by reason
of intent to attack and that the greater injustice of an innocent party’s
suffering injury should be prevented. Ultimately, he does not explain
why his earlier understanding of good desire as loving only that which
cannot be lost against one’s will does not imply that one should allow a
highwayman or assassin to take one’s life. Society’s need for justice does
not negate the importance of acting with a good desire. Yet for the sake of
justice, society may take preemptive action, not so much for the sake of
defending and holding on to transitory goods, but for the sake of prevent-
ing injustice and its contagion. Therefore, killing a would-be attacker is
just because the killing is motivated, not by the culpable cupidity of fear,
but by a love of justice.
to annex Carthage for itself before King Masinissa was able to claim it
for himself (Hallward and Charlesworth 1954, 476). Either account of
Rome’s motives depicts the conflict as a preventive, rather than a pre-
emptive war, since Carthage was in no military position to attack Rome
or her Mediterranean colonies. Was this anticipatory war justified? For
Augustine, the answer was “No.”
In City of God, Augustine rebuts pagans who blamed Christianity for
the sack of Rome in CE 410. Augustine counters their charge by assert-
ing that the seeds for Rome’s decay began with the Third Punic War,
thus predating the rise of Christianity. Citing Scipio Nasca’s opposition
to Cato’s call for war against Carthage, Augustine explains the relation-
ship between the final war with Carthage and the beginnings of Rome’s
decline:
The great Scipio. . .dreaded that this calamity might come upon [Rome].
For that reason he opposed the destruction of Carthage, Rome’s Imperial
rival at that time, and resisted Cato’s proposal for its demolition. He was
afraid of security, as being a danger to weak characters; he looked on the
citizens as wards, and fear as a kind of suitable guardian, giving protec-
tion they needed. And his policy was justified; the event proved him right.
The abolition of Carthage certainly removed a fearful threat to the state
of Rome; and the extinction of that threat was immediately followed by
disasters arising from prosperity [Augustine 1972, 42, De civ. Dei I.30].
The Romans who in a period of high moral standards stood in fear of their
enemies, suffered a harsher fate from their fellow citizens when those stan-
dards collapsed. And the lust for power, which of all human devices was
found in its most concentrated form in the Roman people as a whole, first
established its victory in a few powerful individuals, and then crushed the
rest of an exhausted country beneath the yoke of slavery [1972, 42, De civ.
Dei I.30].
150 Journal of Religious Ethics
that we must live with our fear so as to place our hope upon the kingdom
to come. There is a sense that living with fear is living with the reality
of death and the threat of our judgment by God. Living with such knowl-
edge cultivates humility. By contrast, the quest for security and freedom
from fear is a quest for autonomy that refuses to live with the reality of
our ultimate mortality and impending judgment before God.
Augustine, in condemning Rome’s third war with Carthage, rejects
a policy of preventive military action that falsely promises peace and
the freedom from fear through eliminating points of geopolitical vulner-
ability. Such a policy rests upon the faulty assumption that peace and
security can be achieved by guarding one’s frontiers against external
threat.
If, then, safety is not to be found in the home, the common refuge from the
evils that befall mankind, what shall we say of the city? The larger the city,
the more is its forum filled with civil lawsuits and criminal trials, even if
that city be at peace, free from the alarms or—what is more frequent—the
bloodshed, of sedition and civil war. It is true that cities are at times exempt
from those occurrences; they are never free from the danger of them [1972,
859, De civ. Dei XIX.5].
just and the others unjust” (1961, 32). Although Ramsey is correct that
over time Augustine grew suspicious of wars launched under the banner
of opposing or correcting injustice, nevertheless, from his earliest writ-
ings on war to his later thought in City of God, it is the categories of
justice and injustice to which Augustine repeatedly appeals to describe
the objective of war in a fallen world.8 Contrary to Ramsey’s reading,
Augustine does in fact distinguish between the justice of the cause and
the justice or injustice of the motives for going to war. A soldier, who in
carrying out his commander’s order to kill is driven to slay his enemy by
a lust for blood, is guilty of culpable cupidity and so is acting unjustly.
Nevertheless, Augustine insists, the soldier’s corrupt motive for killing
does not render his commanding officer’s order unjust (1953, 118, De lib.
arb. I.v.12). As we shall see, the distinction between cause and motive is
central in the City of God’s critique of Rome’s wars of imperial expansion.
To be sure, war can never bring about “true justice,” that is, the jus-
tice proper to the heavenly city whose populi are united by their common
love and worship of God (Dodaro 2004, 10–19). Yet good men take up the
duty to prosecute wars to punish or minimize injustice. In a famous pas-
sage in Contra Faustum, Augustine declares that the real evil in war is
not death but the love of violence, the lust for power, desire for revenge,
and hatred of one’s enemy. The real evil of these dispositions is their
inherent injustice. That is, they are instances of human will that do not
conform to divine law.9 He then concludes, “It is generally to punish these
things, when force is required to inflict punishment, that, in obedience
to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars. . .” (1994c,
301, C. Faust 22.74). Writing twenty-six years later in City of God, he
explicitly calls the evils to be punished by war injustice. In his narra-
tion of Rome’s expansion from city-state to empire, he explains that good
men should not seek territorial expansion but be content to live in small
city-states and enjoy a peaceful and mutually beneficial coexistence with
neighboring city-states. Indeed, Rome would have remained such had its
neighbors “always acted with justice and never provoked attack by any
wrong doing.” Since Rome’s neighbors did not act according to justice,
he concludes, “It would be worse that the unjust should lord it over the
just, [therefore] this stern necessity may be called good fortune without
8 James Turner Johnson contends that Ramsey recognized that Augustine’s view of just
war sought not “to justify the use of force to respond to prior use of force—one did not have
to wait until the neighbor had been harmed to act—but to show how force was morally
justified to prevent harm from being delivered” (2005, 116).
9 “While in men a right will is in union with the divine law . . . a bad man can do only
what he is permitted, at the same time that he is punished for what he wills to do unjustly.
Thus, in all the things which appear shocking and terrible to human feebleness, the real
evil is the injustice; the rest is only the result of natural properties of moral demerit”
(Augustine 1994c, 303, C. Faust 22.74).
Augustine and the Limits of Preemptive and Preventive War 153
But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, if he remembers
that he is a human being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with
the necessity of waging just wars . . . for it is the injustice of the opposing
side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; and this injustice
10 Augustine in City of God does expand his definition of the evils of war from the evil
dispositions enumerated in C. Faustum 22.74 to include human suffering: “So everyone who
reflects with sorrow on such grievous evil [i.e., those in war], in all their horror and cruelty,
must acknowledge the misery of them. And yet a man who experiences such evils, or even
thinks about them, without heartfelt grief, is assuredly in a far more pitiable condition, if
he thinks himself happy simply because he has lost all human feeling” (1972, 862, De civ.
Dei XIX.7).
154 Journal of Religious Ethics
Here Augustine criticizes the Roman glorification of war. Far from ex-
ulting in battle, he says, the wise man is grieved by the necessity for war
because he despises the injustice that requires taking up arms. Although
Augustine draws a distinction between instances of injustice that neces-
sitate military intervention and those that do not necessitate war, he
repeats his view that war waged to oppose injustice is a political “neces-
sity” and “duty” and that such a war is just.
At first hearing, Augustine’s notion that a just war is prosecuted with
the aim of combating injustice sounds purely punitive or retributive, that
is, not allowing the aggressor to enjoy the spoils of its unjust conquest.
Yet in his epistles to the civil magistrates Marcellinus and Count Boni-
face, he insists that a just war must also seek restorative justice, that
is, reestablishing peaceful and amiable relations with one’s defeated en-
emy. Offering a word of pastoral counsel to Count Boniface, Augustine
explains that the Christian magistrate exercises his imperium only from
necessity in order to gain or maintain peace rather than other material
benefits. Therefore the magistrate must “cherish the spirit of a peace-
maker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them
back to the advantages of peace.” In other words, the Christian proconsul
preserves the “spirit of a peacemaker” whom Jesus blessed by waging war
with the sole objective of securing peace. Augustine goes on to explain
the character of the peace that is sought: “Let necessity, therefore, and
not your will, slay the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used
toward him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or
the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace
is not to be feared” (1994b, 554, Epistle 189, 6).11 Thus the Christian
magistrate who deploys his legions against an enemy to redress an in-
justice and to restore peace secures future peace, not by annihilating his
enemy but by showing clemency to the defeated. Therefore, the Christian
magistrate prosecutes the war, not merely with the goal of reestablish-
ing peace, but with objectives both military and political that will bring
about amiable and just relations when the war is over. Drawing on the
analogy of the loving father who must discipline his disobedient son,
Augustine insists that painful correction is not incompatible with a dis-
position of love. By extension, therefore, the Christian commonwealth
11 Augustine says that the Christian magistrate must cultivate the habits of patience
and benevolence so that when he uses coercion and takes punitive measures against a
malefactor or enemy it is out of benevolent severity for their welfare rather than with a
vindictive spirit (1994a, Epistle 138, 5.14).
Augustine and the Limits of Preemptive and Preventive War 155
will go to war with the goal of defeating its enemy in order to estab-
lish a just order and relationship among neighboring states. “On this
principle . . . even its wars themselves will not be carried on without the
benevolent design that, after the resisting nations have been conquered,
provision may be more easily made for enjoying in the peace the mutual
bond of piety and justice” (1994a, 485, Epistle 138, 5.14). Augustine does
not sanction the just war fought merely to restore the status quo ante
bellum. Rather the mercy of war is that it seeks to change the character
of the defeated power so as to enable it to become a just government.
At the same time that Augustine maintains that the magistrate acts
under necessity as God’s agent in punishing injustice and restoring a
just order among the various tribes and states, he offers in City of God
a harsh critique of Rome’s going to war ostensibly for the sake of justice.
Although its territorial expansion was willed by God, Rome prosecuted
these wars—even those where the cause was just—not out of a sense of
“stern necessity” but out of a love of honor and glory (1972, 179, De civ.
Dei, preface). Such desire for glory was as influential in the early days
of the Republic as in the later days after the destruction of Carthage
and the assertion of Roman hegemony over the Mediterranean. Despite
the austere republican commitment to sacrifice for the common good,
“By such immaculate conduct they laboured towards honours, power,
and glory, by what they took to be the true way” (1972, 204–5, De civ. Dei
V.15). Even then the wars of the early Republic were fought for glory; the
cause of justice was a mere pretext for going to war.12 Although Rome’s
expansion was the result of “stern necessity,” good men, he says, do not
rejoice in the expansion of empire but lament its necessity because they
are saddened by the injustice of their neighbors that precipitated the
conflict. Yet far from being grieved by injustice, Rome exulted in the
opportunity for conquest that the injustice necessitated. In a wonderfully
ironic passage, Augustine writes,
So if it was by waging wars that were just, not impious and unjust, that the
Romans were able to acquire so vast an empire, surely they should worship
the injustice of others as a kind of goddess? For we observe how much “she”
[i.e., injustice] has given towards the extension of the Empire by making
others wrong-doers, so that the Romans should have enemies to fight in a
just cause and so increase Rome’s power . . . . With the support of those two
goddesses, “foreign injustice” and “victory”, the Empire grew, even when
Jupiter took a holiday. Injustice stirred up causes of war; victory brought
the war to a happy conclusion [1972, 154–55, De civ. Dei IV.15].
12 Commenting on the Samnite War, which was often cited as an instance of republican
virtue overcoming humiliation, Augustine says, “But they [i.e., the Romans] did not love
glory for the sake of justice; they appeared to love justice only for the sake of glory . . .”
(1972, 217, De civ. Dei V. 22).
156 Journal of Religious Ethics
72:8 and Isaiah 2:4 on the coming of peace with Augustine’s interpretation. Mommsen also
points out that Augustine prefers to speak of the “development” (excursus) of history rather
than its progress (procursus) (1951, 371–72). For a view of Augustine as a progressive, see
O’Daly 1999.
14 See McLynn 1999 for a reconstruction of Augustine’s on-the-ground contact with
yet as Christians, remain people motivated by the love of God and love
of neighbor.
One question that should be asked is whether anticipatory defense is
compatible with Augustine’s models of punitive and restorative justice.
Based on Augustine’s insistence that fighting to defend perishable prop-
erty is itself a form of culpable cupidity, it is hard to see how he could
view defense of territorial integrity and the right of self-government to
be a just war aim. Protection of the state and its citizens is not, how-
ever, incompatible with a commitment to justice, or more to the point,
with an opposition to injustice (Langan 1984, 27, 33). An unprovoked
and unwarranted attack motivated by a desire for power, revenge, or
material/territorial gain qualifies as an injustice that governing author-
ities have a duty to prevent and punish by preemptive action if the cir-
cumstances warrant it. It is helpful to draw a distinction between the
injustice of the would-be attacker and the injustice about to be suffered
by the state that is attacked. In the case of a state that is preparing to
attack another state without just casus belli, the would-be attacker is
already guilty of injustice and, by Augustine’s standards, deserves pun-
ishment.15 The injustice that should be prosecuted must be understood
narrowly as the apparent intention of the aggressor. In this respect, pre-
emptive action as punishing the unjust would-be aggressor is in accor-
dance with Augustine’s punitive model of just wars. Moreover, Augustine
is rightly concerned about the injustice inflicted upon the innocent party.
The people threatened by the hostile action of the would-be aggressor
are soon to be victims. While their property and even their lives are,
according to Augustine, transitory goods, nevertheless the injury and
suffering that will result from their destruction or seizure by the hostile
power is an injustice that, Augustine says, should be prevented. Thus
anticipatory defense is just, not as the defense of transitory goods per
se, but because it seeks to prevent an injustice being inflicted upon the
state and people about to be attacked. Thus Augustine’s argument in De
libero arbitrio provides us with three standards of justice with which to
evaluate war aims: punitive justice, preventive justice, and restorative
justice.
Augustine’s concern for restorative justice as the final objective of war
has serious implications for any consideration of preemptive or preven-
tive military action. The commitment to restorative justice is the test of
the purity of the motives: was the war a mere pretext for gain or was it
15 To be sure, there are other forms of injustice, such as domestic atrocities on the order
of genocide or ethnic cleansing, that would warrant military intervention for the sake of
punitive and restorative justice. But such a scenario is different than the injustice of a
threatened invasion.
Augustine and the Limits of Preemptive and Preventive War 159
16 Louis J. Swift (1973) goes so far as to say that for Augustine the use of force to check
wickedness is not the case of justice superceding charity, but “[the] restoration of justice in
the public square as one important form of loving those who are oppressed” (378). Thus it
is one form of charity superceding another.
17 During the three years of the Marshall Plan, the US spent $13 billion, which,
when adjusted for inflation, would be around $100 billion today. See http://usinfo.state.
gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm.
160 Journal of Religious Ethics
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