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Our time to step up is now.

AND CANADA HAS A ROLE TO PLAY

Gurney,

NOEL CELIS/AFP VIA GETTY

IMAGES FILES
The next cold war — China and the
U.S. are going to compete, hope-
fully largely peacefully, for global
leadership and dominance, writes
columnist Matt Gurney.

The question that Canadian diplomatic, political and military leaders are now confronted with is not so
much whether there will be a cold war between China and the West — it’s whether or not we call it a “cold
war.” It can easily be argued that we shouldn’t. But that doesn’t mean we won’t go through something that
is awfully cold warlike.

The first Cold War, between Western democracies, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union, had
very particular features born of geography and history. You cannot begin to understand the Cold War until
you appreciate the fact that dozens of Soviet army divisions were within a distressingly short drive of the
heart of Western Europe (and at times, it probably really would have been a mere matter of driving).

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The first Cold War, between Western democracies, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union, had
very particular features born of geography and history. You cannot begin to understand the Cold War until
you appreciate the fact that dozens of Soviet army divisions were within a distressingly short drive of the
heart of Western Europe (and at times, it probably really would have been a mere matter of driving).

You cannot begin to understand it if you do not appreciate how transformative it was when the United
States and the Soviet Union rose to become the world’s only superpowers, with all of the great empires of
European history either outright destroyed, as in Germany, humiliated and broken, as in France, or tri-
umphant but broke, as in the United Kingdom.

You cannot begin to understand it if you do not appreciate how transformative it was when the United
States and the Soviet Union rose to become the world’s only superpowers, with all of the great empires of
European history either outright destroyed, as in Germany, humiliated and broken, as in France, or tri-
umphant but broke, as in the United Kingdom.

Nor can you understand the Cold War without understanding the unique forces that marked the dawn of
not only the atomic age, but shortly thereafter, the space age.

Nor can you understand the Cold War without understanding the unique forces that marked the dawn of
not only the atomic age, but shortly thereafter, the space age.

Is a geopolitical contest without a race to nuclear parity and eventually to mutually assured destruction a
cold war? Can you have a cold war without some analogue to the Berlin Wall and Checkpoint Charlie?
Will the 21st century see any equivalent to that mad scramble in the late 1940s for Washington and
Moscow to project their power into parts of the earth left suddenly up for grabs by the spectacular col-
lapse of the pre-1939 world order?

Personally, I am a simple man of simple tastes, and see no reason to reinvent the wheel. Calling what is
taking shape between the West and China “Cold War II” works just fine for me. We can tack on as many
numerals after the term as required to keep up with the march of history. So sure, let’s call it the “Second
Cold War,” or “Cold War II.”

Personally, I am a simple man of simple tastes, and see no reason to reinvent the wheel. Calling what is
taking shape between the West and China “Cold War II” works just fine for me. We can tack on as many
numerals after the term as required to keep up with the march of history. So sure, let’s call it the “Second
Cold War,” or “Cold War II.”

But whatever we call it, let’s not have any illusions: It’s going to happen, but it will look very different.
China and the U.S. are going to compete, hopefully largely peacefully, for global leadership and domi-
nance. This may look like the Cold War, or maybe it looks more like the great power politics of the early
1900s.

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But whatever we call it, let’s not have any illusions: It’s going to happen, but it will look very different.
China and the U.S. are going to compete, hopefully largely peacefully, for global leadership and domi-
nance. This may look like the Cold War, or maybe it looks more like the great power politics of the early
1900s.

In any case, useful allusions to the Cold War will apply in a broad sense, but probably only to a certain
limit. If nothing else, we’ll have to remember that China also witnessed the wall coming down and Mikhail
Gorbachev trying to shout over the crowd cheering for Boris Yeltsin. They won’t make the same mistakes
the Soviets did.

Likewise, Canada should try to avoid its prior mistakes. Canada is, inevitably, a member of the demo-
cratic Western alliance. We simply do not have the clout, and have never even attempted to build suffi-
cient clout, to meaningfully go off on our own. Our fortunes are linked to the United States whether we like
it or not, and as you all well know, throughout history, the answer has often been “not.”

Likewise, Canada should try to avoid its prior mistakes. Canada is, inevitably, a member of the demo-
cratic Western alliance. We simply do not have the clout, and have never even attempted to build suffi-
cient clout, to meaningfully go off on our own. Our fortunes are linked to the United States whether we like
it or not, and as you all well know, throughout history, the answer has often been “not.”

But geopolitical facts don’t care about our feelings, and that’s as true now as it’s ever been. If it had come
down to a shooting war, no amount of Canadian tourism in Cuba was going to stop the Russians from
nuking us. In Cold War II, we can talk about Norman Bethune till we’re blue in the face; but in a crisis,
China will see us as a U.S. ally, or, bluntly, a semi-autonomous adjunct to the U.S. And they won’t be
wrong. This is what being the junior partner in an unavoidable continental alliance means.

As much as many Canadians hate to admit it, and by golly do we often hate to admit it, we are more like
the United States than different. Our prosperity and our security is inextricably bound to American suc-
cess.

Given recent instability in the United States, this is a more alarming prospect than it usually is, but there is
simply no appetite here, at any level, to meaningfully increase our own state capacity in ways that will
leave us less dependent on Washington’s good will. We can petulantly try to ignore the obvious and pre-
tend otherwise, or we can lean into the reality of our geography and try to be a meaningful contributor to
the allied cause.

We have before. During the first Cold War, Canada certainly found ways to meaningfully contribute. We
maintained a small force in Europe. We collaborated with other allies on intelligence sharing. We co-oper-
ated closely with the Americans on diplomatic issues, and obviously, we shared responsibility for the de-
fence of North America. The first Cold War lasted a long time, and Canada’s participation didn’t always
look the same throughout. But we played our part, though too often grudgingly and half-heartedly.

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We have before. During the first Cold War, Canada certainly found ways to meaningfully contribute. We
maintained a small force in Europe. We collaborated with other allies on intelligence sharing. We co-oper-
ated closely with the Americans on diplomatic issues, and obviously, we shared responsibility for the de-
fence of North America. The first Cold War lasted a long time, and Canada’s participation didn’t always
look the same throughout. But we played our part, though too often grudgingly and half-heartedly.

That’s probably all we’ll need to do this time. The balance of global power is not going to hinge on the gap
between modest Canadian participation and enthusiastic Canadian participation. But if we are going to be
bound tightly with the United States — and make no mistake, we are and will be — we might as well find
areas to not just contribute, but excel.

Cybersecurity, energy security, patrol and development of the Arctic, economic and diplomatic support for
beleaguered democracies abroad, close military co-operation and intelligence sharing with the United
States and other key allies ... these are the things that we will be expected to do, and will do. The ques-
tion before us is whether we do them with confidence and competence, or grudgingly drag our feet, hop-
ing against hope that no American or other ally dares to be so uncouth as to publicly note our laggard-
ness.

Cybersecurity, energy security, patrol and development of the Arctic, economic and diplomatic support for
beleaguered democracies abroad, close military co-operation and intelligence sharing with the United
States and other key allies ... these are the things that we will be expected to do, and will do. The ques-
tion before us is whether we do them with confidence and competence, or grudgingly drag our feet, hop-
ing against hope that no American or other ally dares to be so uncouth as to publicly note our laggard-
ness.

As noted above, in the final analysis, it may not matter how hard Canada tries to be a good member of
the democratic team. But the pandemic has laid bare many of the yawning deficiencies in Canadian
government capacities. We are simply not nearly as competent as we have flattered ourselves into believ-
ing we were, nor nearly as morally superior as we’ve long presumed the world considers us.

As noted above, in the final analysis, it may not matter how hard Canada tries to be a good member of
the democratic team. But the pandemic has laid bare many of the yawning deficiencies in Canadian
government capacities. We are simply not nearly as competent as we have flattered ourselves into believ-
ing we were, nor nearly as morally superior as we’ve long presumed the world considers us.

All of these problems are fixable — all it will take is commitment, money and effort. There is no reason we
cannot provide those things. We’ll just have to choose, for a change, to focus not on punching above our
weight, but simply carrying it.

OUR PROSPERITY AND OUR SECURITY IS INEXTRICABLY BOUND TO AMERICAN SUCCESS.

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National Post (Latest Edition)

31 Jul 2021

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