FORCE COMPARISON

1987
NATO and the WARSAW PACT
Public Document - Published by the Press a nd Inform a tion Offic e of the Federal Government,
Bonn, 5/1988

Responsible for the contents: The Federal Ministry of Defence

Printed by Limburger Vereinsdruckerei GmbH

Layout: Seidel
 3

Table of Contents
para page
1. INTRODUCTION 6
. General 1— 8 6
. Comparing NATO and WARSAW PACT Forces 9 — 15 9
. The Problems of Mobilisation and Reinforcement 16 — 18 12

II. C ONVENTIONAL FORCES 12

. Land Forces 19 — 22 12
. Air Forces and Air Defence Forces 23 — 28 15
. Maritime Forces 29 — 39 19

III. R EGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 24

. Northern and Central Europe 40 — 44 24
. Southern Europe 45 — 54 27

IV. NUCLEAR DETE RRENCE AND NUCLEAR EQUATION 28

. Nuclear Forces in NATO’s Strategy 55 — 58 28
. Note on the Comparison of Nuclear Forces 59 — 60 29
. Strategic Nuclear Forces 61 — 68 30
. Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces 69 34
. Longer-Range INF Missile Systems (LRINF) 70 — 72 36
. Longer-Range INF Aircraft (LRINF) 73 — 74 37
. Shorter-Range INF Missile Systems (SRINF) 75 — 77 38
. Shorter-Range INF Aircraft (SRINF) 78 — 79 39
. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) 80 — 82 40
. Sea-Based Nuclear Forces 83 — 85 41

V . NATO AND WARSAW PACT

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 86 — 89 42

VI. MILITARY PRODUCTION AND

TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES 90 — 95 43

VII. EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR DATA IN

THIS PUBLICATION 44
. Sources 44
. Conventional Forces Counted 44
. Nuclear Forces 44
. Abbreviations 45
. NATO and WARSAW PACT Countries and
the Soviet Military Districts in Europe (Figure 23) 46

FOREWORD
by Federal Minister
of Defence
Dr. Manfred Wörner
Security policy in both East and West has clearly started
to move. For the first time in post-war history, signs of
a comprehensive restructuring p rocess can be per­
ceived in the East, which makes us hope for a change
in Soviet policy. Constructive dialogue and cooperation
with the countries of the WARSAW PACT have been an
integra l part of Western Alliance security policy since
1967.
Numerous initiatives - not just words but deeds - have
since that time demonstrated the A lliance’s willingness
to be ready for cooperation in order to advance stability,
particularly in Europe, and to make peaceful coexis­
tence possible. Progress in arms control and disarma­
ment could be a first indication of real changes in Soviet
behaviour towards the Alliance’s 20-year old offer to in­
crease the security of all concerned by constructive
cooperation. Still, however hopeful such expectations
may be, they must not obscure our view of today’s re­
alities in the field of security.
Comparing the military capabilities of NATO and the
WARSAW PACT is an indispensable prerequisite for
making a sound assessment of the security situation, as
well as for developing plans for the armed forces, so es­
sential to preserving our security.
The 1987 Force Comparison meets this requirement. It
is designed as a sequel to the 1984 NATO FORCE
COMPARISONS which have been updated on the
Bonn, 22 December 1987
5
basis of current information coordinated within the
Alliance.
It includes the data published by the Soviet Union and
the United States after signing the INF-Treaty. The So­
viet figures confirm the reliability of past NATO Force
Comparisons; thus they show that the arguments of
those critics who accuse the NATO members of over­
drawing the Soviet arms buildup and misrepresenting
the balance of forces as favouring the Soviet Union or
the WARSAW PACT have no foundation in reality.
On balance, the outcome of the overall analysis is quite
sobering. The WARSAW PACT still maintains far more
armed forces than are necessary for the defence of its
territory. This raises the question why it places such a
great burden on the national economies of its members.
Of special concern is the strength and offensive orienta­
tion of the WARSAW PACT’S conventional forces. The
fundamental problem of security, particularly in Central
Europe, lies in the invasion capability of these forces as
seen against the background of nuclear disarmament
which is about to commence. NATO, on the other hand,
has never sought such a capability. The structure, size
and logistics of its forces are such as to make them inca­
pable of lauching any large-scale offensive operations
into the WARSAW PACT area. They must, however, be
strong enough to be able to accomplish their mission
within the concept of Forward Defence. It is only then
that the Alliance’s strategy of deterrence aimed at pre­
venting war and securing the peace can be realised.
6
I. INTRODUCTION
GENERAL________________________
1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations, and
forty years after the end of the Second World War, a divided
continent.
The forces on both sides are an expression of political dispari­
ty. The ways they differ in size, deploym ent, organisation,
structure, equipment and orientation reflect the different politi­
cal goals and strategies. Comparison of their forces, further­
more, indicates what military capabilities and options are at
the disposal of either side. A balanced ratio of forces would be
a sign of stable relations, whereas existing imbalances can be
a persistent source of danger and a cause of tension, mistrust
and further arms buildup.
The endeavour for stable security in Europe, in particular the
debate concerning suitable means of attaining it, presuppo­
ses first a foundation of accurate and up-to-date knowledge of
existing military capabilities. This foundation might best be
created by cooperative stocktaking.
The 1987 Force Comparison is intended to enable the dis­
cussion of security policy to be carried out in terms of clear
concepts, on an objective basis, by supplying up-to-date infor­
mation on the military capabilities of both NATO and the WAR­
SAW PACT.
2. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance of
sovereign and independent European and North American
democracies. Its primary objective is to safeguard peace in
freedom and to prevent any kind of war— conventional as well
as nuclear.
The Treaty provides that alliance members will come to each
other’s assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any
one of them. NATO is dedicated to serving this purpose with
a jointly formulated security policy, with Allied Forces, Head­
quarters and with mutual defence planning.
3. The Alliance is strictly defensive in nature. It possesses a
comprehensive and cogent concept of maintaining and pre­
serving peace. In this context, defence capability is linked with
a readiness for both dialogue and practical cooperation. This
concept of security policy was formulated in the 1967 Harmel
Report. Since then the Alliance has reaffirmed on several oc­
casions that this balanced policy remains valid. This was also
expressed in the “ Washington Declaration on East-West Re­
lations” of 31 March 1984, which stated:
“ To ensure the security of members of the Alliance, the most
appropriate long-term policies are the maintenance of ade­
quate military strength and political solidarity and, on that ba­
sis, the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the coun­
tries of East and West through dialogue and cooperation.
These elements are complementary: dialogue can only be
fruitful if each party is confident of its security and is prepared
to respect the legitimate interests of others: military strength
alone cannot guarantee a peaceful future. Experience points
to the continuing need for full, consistent and realistic imple­
mentation of the two main tasks of the Alliance set out in the
Harmel Report.”
4 . Political solidarity and adequate military strength within
the North Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and
the search for genuine détente are integral parts of this policy.
Military security and a realistic policy of détente are not contra­
dictory, but complementary.
Arms control and disarmament should lead to a stable bal­
ance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our securi-
ty.Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable
and stand the test of time. They have to increase the security
of all parties concerned and advance both stability and coope­
ration. West and East have a common interest in achieving
this.
In line with this objective, the Allicance set forth the outline of
its comprehensive concept of arms control in the declaration
of the NATO Foreign Ministers made at their Spring Meeting
in Reykjavik on 11-12 June 1987. The treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination
of land-based intermediate-range missiles with a range bet­
ween 500 and 5,500 km (INF-Treaty) will constitute an impor­
tant element of such a concept.
According to that, efforts will be made to attain:
. a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear offensive weapons of
the United States and the Soviet Union,
. worldwide elimination of chemical weapons,
. establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional
forces by correcting imbalances throughout Europe, and
• in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional ba­
lance and the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons,
clear and verifiable reductions of Soviet and American
ground-launched nuclear missile systems with ranges un­
der 500 km, leading to equal ceilings.
The Permanent NATO Council was instructed to work with the
appropriate military authorities to consider the further deve­
lopment of an overall concept for arms control and
disarmament.
In particular, it will be important to eliminate the fundamental
military problem of European security, i.e. reducing the War­
saw Pact’s superiority in conventional forces and its in­
vasion capability*), and creating conventional stability on a
lower level.
Determined to exploit all opportunities in order to make further
progress towards arms reductions, compatible with its securi­
ty and with its priorities, the Alliance also takes into account
the fact that work in this area raises complex and interrelated
*) This includes the c a pability of the WARSAW PACT for large-scale offen­
sive operations and strategic surprise in Europe, favoured by its geostra­
tegic advantages.
 7

issues. They will thus be evaluated together, bearing in mind The Warsaw Treaty itself, according to the official premises of
the political and military requirements of Alliance security and its treaty, appears as a defensive alliance of independent
progress in the different negotiations. states, patterned after NATO in structure and organisation.
Thus, Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty of 14 May 1955, provides
that “ In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more
of the States Parties to the Treaty, each State Party to the
Treaty shall, in the exercise of the right of individual or col­
lective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Uni­
5. The geostrategic situation of NATO in Europe makes it ted Nations Charter, afford the State or States so attacked
particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with the
and nuclear forces of the WARSAW PACT. other States Parties to the Treaty, by all the means it considers
necessary, including the use of armed force.”
As far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the Western
strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace The Soviet Union as the leading WARSAW PACT power has
in freedom for a very long period in Europe. To be credible and repeatedly stressed that the alliance pursues a purely defen­
effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must conti­ sive objective. For example, the “ Statement on Military Doctri­
nue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear ne ofthe Warsaw Treaty Member States” issued following the
and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which meeting of its highest governing body, the Political Consulta­
can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. tive Committee (PCC) in East Berlin, on 29. May 1987 states:

The substantial presence of US conventional and nuclear for­
ces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They
embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe
and provide the indispensable linkage with the US strategic
deterrent.
.. the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States
is strictly a defensive one. It proceeds from the view that the
use of military road for resolving any disputed question is into­
lerable in the present conditions. Its essence is that: The War­
saw Treaty Member States will never, under no circumstan­
ces, start hostilities against any country or an alliance of coun­
tries, unless they become the target of a military attack them­
selves ... In the event of an attack, they will give a devastating
rebuff to the aggressor...”

6. The size and type of fo rces that might be used against Aside from the fact that the phrase “ ...give a devastating re­
NATO substantially determine the forces the Alliance needs buff” implies the intent and expectation of military victory to
in order to deter a potential adversary. the point of annihilation of the enemy, in the past the practical
policy ofthe Soviet Union has also been in open contradiction
NATO preserves its security by maintaining military forces to these declarations of intention. It shows this especially
which ensure its defence capability and are adequate to deter clearly in the political use of its military strength, which today
aggression and intimidation without seeking military super­ embraces the entire spectrum from the erection of a screen of
iority. threats all the way to military employment, as for example in
Afghanistan. Nor is this contradiction resolved by repeatedly
emphasising the “ defensive nature” of its military doctrine,
but rather intensified, so long as the basic lines of the Soviet
7. All nations of the WARSAW PACT have committed them­ Union’s policy, in particular the function of its military might,
selves to “ omnilateral cooperation” through numerous bilate­ do not visibly change. Future negotiations on conventional
ral treaties. arms control, for which the Western side presented a proposal
for a negotiating mandate on 27 June 1987 in Vienna, will be
This network of treaties was established after World War II at a critical touchstone after signing the INF-Treaty.
the instance of the Soviet Union, and has since been constant­
ly renewed and expanded. Inclusion ofthe Mongolian Peo­
ple’s Republic gives the network more extensive territory than
the Warsaw Treaty, which applies to Europe only. In effect,
this system of bilateral treaties amounts to an additional milita­
ry alliance of the WARSAW Treaty Member States, a large
number of “ Alliances within an Alliance” so to speak, becau­
se it firmly links their forces to form the WARSAW PACT, and
subordinates them to overriding planning under the leader­
ship of the Soviet Union. There is no similar system of bilateral 8 . According to official publications in the Soviet Union, its
treaties within the Western Alliance. military doctrine has a political (‘ ‘sociopolitical ’ ’) and a military
(“ military technical” ) aspect. In the eyes of the Soviet Union
This account has been given in order to show that if NATO and both aspects form a unity. They stand “ in a close dialectical
the Warsaw Treaty were dissolved, as the Soviet Union from relationship and in mutual dependence. They cannot be sepa­
time to time demands, a network of effective military alliances rated from each other.” ’ )
would continue to exist in the Eastern side.
*) Orgarkov, N.V. “ Die Geschichte lehrt Wachsamkeit (History teaches
Vigilance)” , Moscow, 1985, p. 58
8
In the political arena, the “ strictly defensive nature” of Soviet
military doctrine has been emphasised for years. This aspect
was again brought into the foreground in the 29 May 1987
Declaration of the WARSAW PACT PCC cited above.
Consequently, the following statements from the political are­
na, partially borrowed from Western thinking, can be attribu­
ted to military doctrine:
• ‘ The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each
of its Member States, is subjugated to the task of preven­
ting war, both nuclear and conventional.
• The Warsaw Treaty Member States will never be the first
to use nuclear weapons.
• They have no territorial claims to any state either in Europe
or outside it.
. They do not view any state, any people as their enemy.
• They are prepared to build relations with all countries with­
out exception on the basis of mutually taking into account
the interests of security and peaceful coexistence."
In contrast, the statements in the same declaration that fall in­
to the “ military technical” side of Soviet military doctrine,
were relegated to the background. In the same document the
responsibilities of the armed forces of the WARSAW PACT
are described only as follows:
"... The combat readiness... is maintained at a sufficient level
so as not to be caught unaware.” Subsequently, they are plac­
ed under a postulate of victory that requires them to give “ a
devastating rebuff to the aggressor” in the event that an attack
is nevertheless mounted against them. How this is to be done
must be discovered in the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia1),
the Encyclopaedic Military Dictionary2), and other authorita­
tive Soviet literature on the subject. The “ military technical”
principles of military doctrine they contain can still be summa­
rized in the following objectives for WARSAW PACT Armed
Forces:
. The first command is victory.
. The military objective is to destroy the enemy on his own
territory.
• The military-strategic goals can only be attained within the
framework of offensive action.
According to Western understanding, the two sides of Soviet
military doctrine are in striking contradiction to each other. So
long as the repeatedly cited “ defensive” nature of the political
side has not been incorporated into the objectives of the milita­
ry side and is, above all, not reflected in the force posture,
i.e. in size, structure and deployment, this contradiction will
remain.
1) Soviet Military Encyclopaedia 1976 — 1980, Ge r man Democratic Re­
public, National People’s Army T ranslation
2) Encyclopaedic Military Dictionary, Military Publishing House of the
USSR, Moscow, 1986
Against this background, the Soviet Leadership’s occasional
claims that the political side is “ decisive” for its military doc­
trine carry little weight, indeed.
Consequently, it is only understandable when the Soviet
military doctrine, because of its two different aspects, is often
characterised as two-faced by the West. This assessment
finds confirmation in the examination of the Soviet meaning of
the conceptions used equally in both sides of the military doc­
trine. Largely ideologically defined concepts frequently reveal
noteworthy differences vis-à-vis Western understanding. Ac­
cording to current Soviet understanding, “ the acts of a state
that is under attack, even if they are offensive acts, cannot be
designated aggressive.” The essence of aggression includes
“ considering aggression and aggressive intentions” 3).
If these two statements are added together, then one can only
conclude that the Soviet Union even today considers an at­
tack by itself as sufficiently justified, if such attack would
preempt the supposedly aggressive intentions of a possible
adversary.
If stability and equal and undiminished security are to be
achieved, then the Soviet Union will have to make its military
doctrine consistently defensive, even in case of aconflict. This
means not only a complete renunciation of any strategy of vic­
tory as well as of the operational concept of large-scale offen­
sive operations and the objective of ending a conflict through
onward defence that would annihilate the enemy on his own
territory, but also a renunciation of military capabilities that ex­
ceed those necessary for defence.
Consultations with the aim of comparing the military doc­
trines of both Alliances... and jointly studying the directions of
their further evolution ...” proposed by the WARSAW PACT
to the member states of NATO in the 29 May 1987 PCC State­
ment would give the Soviet Union in particular the opportunity
to clarify the contradictions of its military doctrine as seen by
the West.
Today, the military strategy called for by the WARSAW
PACT’S military doctrine — as shown by its publications and
military exercises — requires its armed forces to undertake
large-scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure
strategic objectives. It emphasises the special significance of
strategic and operational surprise and demands rapid, offen­
sive operations with the aim of defeating the enemy quickly.
The armed forces of the WARSAW PACT are organised,
equipped and trained in such a way that they can fu lfil the “ mi­
litary technical” requirements of the Soviet Union’s military
doctrine. This is especially true of their capability to mount a
strategic offensive against NATO at the very beginning of a
conflict in Europe. This capability, which forms the material
prerequisite for the current invasion capability of the WAR­
SAW PACT4) against NATO in Europe, is the end result of a
military programme begun in the early seventies. All services
have been involved in this. The apparent purpose of this com­
prehensive programme is to fulfil the requirement of Soviet
military strategy for a fast, victorious conclusion to a conflict
3) See definition of “ aggression” in Encyclopaedic Military Dictionary,
Military Publishing House of the USSR, Moscow, 1986
4) see footnote in para 4

in the main theatre of war by means of a joint strategic opera­
tion with the objective of annihilating the enemy on his own ter­
ritory. The Soviet Union's strategic posture allows only the
conclusion that, in its view, this main th e atre of war is
Europe.
C o mparing NATO and
WARSAW PACT Forces
9 . Long-term political intentions and military strategic objec­ the relative NATO - WARSAW PACT force capabilities has
tives determine the mission, type and size of forces. Th e pur­ therefore been deliberately omitted.
pose of military force comparison is to furnish the reader with
the objective basis enabling him to judge whether the forces NATO and the WARSAW PACT deploy a number of weapon
are able to perform the mission assigned to them by the re­ systems capabel of being used both in a conventional and a
spective political leadership.
The 1987 Forc e Comparison intends therefore to portray the
capabilities of the military potentials of both NATO and the
WARSAW PACT, especially in Europe, by comparison and
contrast, without participating in, much less speculating over,
considerations of conceivable current political intentions.
The capability of political utilisation of military potentials and
of engaging in military conflicts embraces numerous factors,
including political and social stability, geography, economic
strength, human resources, industrial, technological and
scientific resources as well as military capabilities. The milita­
ry forces of each side are clearly important but are not the only
elements in this equation. A comprehensive worldwide com­
parison of military capabilities would also have to take into ac­
count forces other than those that are available to NATO and
the WARSAW PACT. Even if a comparison was to be restric­
ted to the conventional forces of the two alliances, considera­
tion should be given not just to their respective disposition of
forces in Europe. Rather, also those forces would have to be
taken into account that are deployed by several NATO coun­
tries as well as by the Soviet Union outside of NATO and War­
saw Treaty areas. For instance, the two leading powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, have worldwide interests
and commitments and therefore maintain substantial forces
in Asia and the Pacific.
10. A comparison of military forces must not confine itself to
quantitative values only, because this would unduly narrow
the field and invite errors of judgement. Besides quantifiable
force differences the significance of other factors that are deci­
sive to the result of a military force comparison must be noted.
These include, for example, differences between NATO and
the WARSAW PACT with respect to strategy and military
structure, political organisation and cohesion, the qualitative
aspect of forces, and the capability of bringing up reserves in
time. Other important considerations are differences between
the two sides in the organisation and structure of the forces,
their capability for rapid buildup, their combat efficiency, their
combat readiness and rapid availability, the quality of equip­
ment, the amount of ammunition, fuel and other stocks, the
civil and military infrastructure, as well as the economic, in­
9
dustrial and technological ability to sustain a military conflict.
While some of these factors take on significance only after a
conflict has lasted for some time, others are really decisive for
the capability of attacking by surprise or of terminating a con­
flict quickly.
The 1987 Forc e Comparison cannot attempt to cover all
these issues. Instead, it supp lies up-to-date information on the
especially important aspects of the military postures of NATO
and the WARSAW PACT, thus providing the reader with a ba­
sis for forming his own opinion. Any summary assessment of
nuclear role. Such systems are therefore considered in both
the CONVENTIONAL FORCES section and, according to
their category, the NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE NU­
CLEAR EQUATION section. The allocation of forces shown
does not necessarily correspond to any specific scenario or
concrete situation.
The 1987 Force Comparison which aims to depict the
military capabilities of NATO and the WARSAW PACT,
necessarily includes the military postures of both Alliances in
their respective treaty areas, thereby taking into account their
state of readiness, their deployment, and their availability
resulting from these two factors.
In the case of force comparisons earmarked for arms control
purposes other criteria may take precedence. In this connec­
tion, the overa l l capabilities of the respective negotiating
partners in the area of negotiation have a determining in­
fluence.
Aforce comparison compiled under such aspects would inevi­
tably deviate in individual points from certain parts of the 1987
Force Comparison. The end result, however, would be the
same.
11. The fundamental geostrategic conditions for NATO and
the WARSAW PACT are a determining factor for their actions
in crisis situations and conflicts, because they definitely influ­
ence the missions and operational capabilities of the armed
forces.
The WARSAW PACT is an alliance of continental orientation
in the geostrategic perspective. Its area forms a geographic
entity. The leading power, the Soviet Union, is a European and
at the same time an Asiatic land power.
Unlike NATO, the WARSAW PACT did not come into being
by linking two autonomous major regions, but by the Soviets
drawing the adjacent countries in Central and Southeast
Europe into its continental sphere of power. The main charac­
teristics of the Soviet Union’s continental situation is the geo­
graphical limitation on its access to the world’s oceans.
The Soviet naval forces are therefore divided into four widely
separated fleets. This makes it difficult to mass naval power
10

for joint operations or to maintain an effective naval p resence
for sustained periods far away from home ports.
In Europe, the WARSAW PACT holds the geostrategic advan­
tage of the “ interior line” . This enables it to transfer land and
air forces as well as reinforcements and support rapidly be­
tween different areas via controllable and largely secure land
lines of communications. The WARSAW PACT is th us in a
position to move up forces rapidly from the rear, to concen­
trate its forces and to shift such concentrations of troops. Stra­
tegic reserves can be held in readiness advantageously and
deployed within a short time to any theatre.

GEOSTRATEGIC DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

fóóóiB.

12 . NATO as a whole is an alliance of a strong maritime orien­ ferent missions for WARSAW PACT naval forces on the one
tation, an alliance enclosing the North Atlantic. The European hand and NATO naval forces, on the other.
NATO territory, geographically speaking, is a highly articulat­
ed, peninsula-like extension of the Eurasian landmass, bor­ The geographical structure of the European NATO territory
dering on maritime areas in the north, west and south. In this renders coherent defence difficult and considerably restricts
general topography, numerous individual NATO countries in the possibilities of moving forces rapidly between the different
turn are of peninsular character. Nearly all European NATO areas. Thus, NATO would have to conduct its defence along
countries are littoral states, some with coastlines of considera­ afar-flung, curved line about 6,000 km in length, extending all
ble length. Moreover, the European NATO territory is separa­ the way from Northern Norway to Eastern Turkey. The lack of
ted in some regions by the territory of nations that are not geographical depth renders rear areas, headquarters and
members of the Alliance. A still more important drawback to supplies more vulnerable to enemy attack, scarcely permit­
the Alliance is the geographical situation of the United States, ting NATO to maintain strategic reserves within Europe.
which is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. NATO’s leading
power with its strategic reserves is separated from its Europe­
an allies by the 6,000 km wide Atlantic. Owing to geographical
conditions, NATO must transfer forces and resources along
lengthy and vulnerable air and sea routes to and around Euro­
pe. Moreover, NATO nations to a ve ry high degree depend on
merchant shipping for vital economic purposes. This is not
true for the WARSAW PACT. This fact requires markedly dif­
 11

. improved precision, ranges and endurance,

WORLDWIDE FORCE COMPARISON
OF ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT NATIONS
• enhanced active and passive protective measures, and
6.0 Mil (STANDING FORCES)

• reduction of submarine noise levels.

In many areas, gaps that formerly existed relative to western
standards have been closed, and some new standards have
even been set, for example in the development of add-on ar­
mour for combat vehicles.

14 . The standing forces of all NATO nations, including the for­

ces of France and Spain, comprise on a w o r l dwide basis:

. about 5.3 million personnel, of whom about 2.8 million are

NATO earmarked forces. France and Spain will make their
forces available to the Alliance only by decision of their go­
vernments. There are also some 300,000 other personnel
Division Main Co mbat Aircraft Submarines Aircraft Carriers, Destroyers,
who, in a defence emergency, may be assigned military
Equivalents Battle Tanks (excluding
naval aviation)
Helicopter
Carriers,
Frigates.
Corvettes security tasks (e.g. Gendarmerie)
Battleships

. a scant 170 division equivalents including about 28,000

battle tanks of varying quality
. about 12,000 combat aircraft (excluding naval aviation)
. about 290 submarines of all classes
. some 60 major surface combatant ships (aircraft carriers,
battleships, cruisers) and
. about 450 destroyers and frigates.
Since a considerable number of these forces are deployed
outside of NATO territory not all could be made available to
NATO (see also para 29 at seq.)

The modernisation of NATO forces is an ongoing process;

present efforts are predominantly addressed to:

Rgure 2 . enhancement of mobility and firepower

13. W orldwide the WARSAW PACT nations have a standing • automation of operational procedures
force, which, being rapidly deployable, includes: • reduction of radar signatures (STEALTH technology)

. about 6 million personnel, of whom 4.5 million face NATO • improvement of reconnaissance assets, detection and
in Europe. In addition, there are more than 800,000 men position-finding equipment, end
enrolled In the national security forces who are available for . development of active and passive protective measures.
military assignments
. 295 division equivalents') including 15. The global figures given in the previous paragraphs have
. about 69,000 battle tanks of various degrees of modern­ been mentioned so that the statistics and comparisons which
isation follow can be weighted and seen in their proper perspective.
The following information focuses on those forces which could
. more than 14.000 combat aircraft (excluding naval avia­ be expected to be available to NATO for defence in Europe
tion) and those of the WARSAW PACT which are considered would
be facing them. Only brief reference is made to the forces de­
. about 370 submarines of all classes, a number of which are
equipped to launch cruise missiles ployed outside Europe or hardly expected to be available for
employment in Europe.
• about 40 major surface combatant ships (carriers and crui­
sers), and
• more than 300 destroyers and frigates.
About a third of these forces are deployed east of the Urals or
outside the Soviet Union. The most modernised units are for
the most part deployed opposite NATO in Europe. *) Counting c r iterion of the 1982 and 1984 NATO Force Comparisons.
According to this defintion, every three av a ilable brigades/regiments
maintained outside an existing divisional organisation are counted as
Over all, in recent years the WARSAW PACT has continuous­ one division equivalent. This method is used for a quantitative consider­
ly improved the quality of its equipment by the use of modern ation of all brigades and regiments, i.e. including those outside the
technologies and materials with respect to: divisional strucutre, for purposes of comparison.
12
The Problem s of Mobilis ation
and Reinforcement
16. NATO and WARSAW PACT forces rely heavily on the mo­
bilisation of reservists in order to bring active duty and cadre-
strength units up to full strength. Mainly, due to general con­
scription to be found in most countries, both sides have ade­
quate manpower reserves availableforthis purpose. A perfect
system of registration and assignment planning, as well as
central management and the length and intensiveness of mili­
tary service permit the WARSAW PACT nations to maintain
an extensive pool of well trained reservists. The NATO nations
endeavour to find appropriate ways and means both to keep
their extensive reserve manpower proficient and have the re­
servists on retraining with the troops while keeping in mind the
personnel requirements of the economy.
17. Unlike NATO, the WARSAW PACT, whose in-place for­
ces in Europe hold a distinct numerical superiority over those
of NATO, has the advantage that it can move up its reserves
over relatively short land lines of communications. This
superiority of its immediately available forces permits the
WARSAW PACT to organise both build-up and moving-up of
its mobilisable forces in such time ly fashion that they will be
available in accordance with its operational principles (eche­
lon system) at full combat effectiveness when needed. Conse­
quently, in case of a conflict, the difference in geostrategic
conditions could cause an asymmetrical increase in mobilis-
II. CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Land Forces
19. WARSAW PACT forces facing Allied Command Europe
(ACE) consist of a total of 197 active and mobilisable divi­
s ions. These forces include 18 divisions from the regional
and strategic reserves based in the three central Military
Districts of the Soviet Union, i.e. Moscow, Ural and Volga, and
which can be committed according to operational needs. In
addition, about 23 d ivi s i o n e quivalent s have been identified
which could be made available as additional reserves only
after time-consuming mobilisation, making use of predomi­
nantly older major equipment. Of this total number, the forces
of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations (NSWP) and the So­
viet forces stationed in these countries account for about 101
division equivalents. 121 divisions are deployed so well for­
ward in the European part of the Soviet Union and the Forward
Area*) or are in such a high state of readiness that they are
considered ready to fig h t at very short notice.
*) Terr itories of GDR, Poland, CSSR, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania
able forces. As a result, WARSAW PACT superiority would
still increase until the time of arrival of all NATO re­
inforcements or reserves.
18. The bulk of NATO’s reinforcements of men and equip­
ment intended for Europe must be moved across the Atlantic
and the English Channel by air, but largely by sea. Since
NATO could not sustain an effective defence solely with in
place forces, such a defence would depend upon the timely
arrival of substantial reinforcements from the United States
and Canada, but also in Europe itself, e.g from the British Isles
and the Iberian peninsula. This may involve considerable
problems, even if reasonable periodsof warning time and time
for military preparation were available.
Because of existing geographical conditions, the rapid rein­
forcement of land forces is a very complex operation for NATO
that demands the timely availability of numerous resources,
particularly transport aircraft and shipping, as well as recep­
tion and prepositioned equipment storage facilities.
The reinforcement of air forces involves infrastructure and lo­
gistic problems of a different but also complex nature, particu­
larly in the areas of survivability and combat support. While
there are a considerable number of reinforcement air squad­
rons available to cross the Atlantic within a few hours, there
would have to be advance deployment of their ground crews
and support equipment to make them operational.
Although WARSAW PACT divisions consist of fewer person­
nel than NATO divisions, they have at least an equal amount
and often even more decisive major equipment than most
NATO divisions. The reason for this is that WARSAW PACT
divisions contain principally combat troops and a proportiona­
te number of combat support troops. Additional combat sup­
port and logistic troops required for combined arms opera­
tions are found at higher echelons — Army and Front — in ap­
propriate numbers.
Since the WARSAW PACT has been continually improving its
land forces with respect to firepower, mobility and logistical
endurance, they now largely correspond to Western
standards.
While on the NATO side only the United States has a limited
chemical capability comprising de livery systems, and old che­
mical agents, Soviet forces possess a wide variety of chem ical
agents as well as advanced long-range delivery systems. All
WARSAW PACT forces are equipped to sustain operations in
a chemical environment.
 13

COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT LAND FORCES IN EUROPE

MANPOWER AT TOTAL STR E NGTH

NATO WP
Forces
in Place in Europe i .e. Rapidly Deployable Forces - Include those North Am erican forces whose equipm ent is prepositioned In

□ □ Onci. France and Spain)

Reinforced by Rapidly
Europe and high-readiness Soviet forces'located in the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa
and Trans Caucasus Military Districts.

□
6.0 Mil Deployable Forces

Fully Reinforced Forces Fully

Ural mountains

129 900
4.5 54 300
4.0 5 240
47 5OO
2 385
40 300 2 265
2.8
32 200 68 450
197 ( + 2 3 ) 26 920 2 7OO
22 2OO 23 600 1 530
20 3OO 46 240
131 17 885 I 17 700
121 38 350 1 210
13 330 14 370

□
102

□
680 1125

□ 0 a
XX
't e *
Total Military Division M ain Battle Tanks Guided Artillery/M ortars Arm oured F’ersonnel Attack Helicopters Transport/Support
including Equivalents ' (m ain arm am ent W eapon Launchers (tubes 100 m m and Carriers and Infantry Helicopters
Naval Forces 9 0 m m and above) (crew-served above, including Fighting Vehicles and
and/or m ounted) Multiple Rocket other Arm oured
Launchers) Vehicles
*) WP divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions, but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby obtaining simular
combat power; their support elements are incorporated into higher echelons.

Figure 3
20. Land forces committed to NATO and station e d in or ra­ 21 . To compare both strength and numbers of major equip­
pidly deployable to Europe, consist of some 102 division ments of NATO and WARSAW PACT forces as was done in
equival e nts, including the equivalent of 5 reinforcement divi­ the 1984 NATO Force Comparisons, a distinction has been
sions whose major equipment is for the most part already pre­ made between:
positioned in Central Europe. An additional 29 major form a­
tion equivalents in divisional strength (active and reserve) . forces already in place in Europe reinforced by forces mo­
can be brought in from the United States and Canada after bilisable at short notice and those rapidly deployable, and
a longer period of tim e, or moved up from Spain. After full
mobilisation and reinforcement, there are then about 131 di­ • forces whose availability requires a longer period of mobi­
vision equivalents available to NATO. lisation and movement. This includes the Spanish land
forces until their current reorganisation is completed.
The majority of these major formations have meanwhile been
equipped with materiel adequate to the threat. However, the It thus can be seen that the balance of forces after full rein­
long-standing and considerable numerical inferiority to the forcement shifts to the disadvantage of NATO. Whereas
WARSAW PACT still persists, since its member countries, NATO, following the maxims of its strategy, endeavours to
too, have continued their armament efforts in an unabated prevent an early success of the WARSAW PACT and hence
manner. to preserve the integrity of its teritory to the greatest extent
possible, the WARSAW PACT is in a position to mobilise more
reserves, move them forward, and commit them time-stag­
gered in line with its echelon system. This advantage is inten­
sified by its geostrategically favourable position — i.e. relative­
ly short land lines of communications — so that on the whole
WARSAW PACT superiority increases with the duration of
war.
14
COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT
TANK FORCES IN EUROPE - 1970 AND 1987
(IN ACTIVE UNITS W ITHOUT DEPOT RESERVES)
M a in B attle T a n k s
(main armament 90 mm and above)
Modem Main Battle lank 32 000
18 800
11 500 including
9700
1970* 1987“
NATO
in dudng Franca
* including France and Spain
22. In retrospect it is quite apparent that the current superiority
of the WARSAW PACT over NATO in land forces in Europe
has been increasing continuously. This is not only true with re­
spect to the total number of available weapon systems, but for
the proportion of qualitatively equivalent equipment as well.
Since 1970 NATO has increased its inventory of main battle
tanks by about 7,300, while the Warsaw Pact has increased
its tank forces by more than 22,000, or about three times as
much.
Even more serious is the development in artillery. While the
number of NATO tube artillery (including multiple rocket laun­
chers) has remained almost unchanged over this period, the
WARSAW PACT has increased that number by 24,500.
In the past, NATO has endeavoured tooffset the numerical su­
periority enjoyed by the WARSAW PACT by qualitatively bet­
ter weapon systems. Up to the end of the seventies, this was
possible to a certain extent. In 1970, about 30% of its main
battle tanks were considered modern compared to about 12%
of WARSAW PACT tanks, which brought the two to approxi­
mate numerical parity. Even though NATO’s number of ad­
vanced main battle tanks (e.g. equipped with gun stabilisation
system, automatic range finder, and integrated fire control
system) has increased to more than 50% in this time period,
while the WARSAW PACT'S percentage of some 40% re­
flects a relatively smaller increase relative to total assets, this
means however, that NATO’s 9,700 advanced main battle
COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT
ARTILLERY IN EUROPE - 1970 AND 1987
(IN ACTIVE UNITS WITHOUT DEPOT RESERVES)
54 300
47 500
Artillery / M o rtars
(tubes 100 mm and abwe including multiple rocket launchers)
23 000
15 400 15 400
T-64
T-72
T-80
including
1000
1970 1987 1970* 1987" 1970 1987
W ARSAW PACT NATO W A RSA W PACT
France
France and Span
Figure 5
tanks in Europe face about 22,800 WARSAW PACT tanks of
comparable quality.
As to artillery, the balance in Europe has clearly tipped toward
the WARSAW PACT to the disadvantage of NATO since
1970. Where WARSAW PACT superiority was 1.5 : 1 at
that time, it has increased to 3 : 1 since then. All command
levels of Warsaw Pact land forces have seen their artillery
strengthened. For example, the number of artillery pieces in
existing battalions has been increased by 25%, and a new
artillery component has been set up for almost every tank
regiment.
Both alliances still have a relatively large inventory of older ar­
tillery systems. It should be noted that artillery weapons be­
long to that category of military materiel which in every army
remains in service use for the longest period of time. In 1970,
both alliances had about the same number of advanced artil­
lery systems. Today, about 20% of the artillery capability of
both sides can be evaluated as advanced. In absolute num­
bers, this reflects the same general superiority held by the
WARSAW PACT since the second half of the seventies, also
partially in the course of a change of generation, has equipped
its force with many more advanced artillery pieces — such as
122 mm and 152 mm armoured self-propelled howitzers and
other self-propelled carriages — than NATO. This meant an
improvement of the artillery’s tactical mobility and survivability
in particular and of its effectiveness in rendering support to
armoured fighting units. WARSAW PACT artillery is now even
more capable of establishing points of main effort rapidly at all
levels of command and, if required, of moving them quickly.

N A T O , 1 5 5 m m H o w itz e r M 1 0 9
The qualitative edge in artillery which NATO still had in the ear­
ly seventies, particularly in terms of tactical mobility and the
ability to support combat operations directly, no longer exists.
Extensive logistic stockpiling is another contributing factor in
the current superiority held by WARSAW PACT artillery.
Air Forces and Air Defence Forces*)
23. The overall global total of WARSAW PACT combat aircraft
is about 14,000. Approximately 10,000 of these are facing
NATO in Europe, of which many are of types technically ca­
pable of delivering nuclear weapons. The total number of
combat aircraft (fixed-wing) in operational units facing NATO
Europe is 7,465. WARSAW PACT air defence forces provide
the majority of combat aircraft (fixed-wing), thereby neglecting
the operational flying units of the Moscow Air Defence District.
Training activities and exercises held by the WARSAW PACT
show that many of these interceptors can also be used in an
*) Excluding t r ainers
15
W A R S A W P A C T , 1 5 2 m m H o w itz e r 2 S 3
offensive role as fighte r bombers. With in-flight refueling,
some 200 TU-22M BACKFIRE bombers in place in Europe are
capable of reaching United States territory, and are thus in a
position to also carry out strategic missions in addition to their
mission in continental Europe.
The modernisation of WARSAW PACT aircraft inventory in re­
cent years has brought about substantial improvements over
previous aircraft. These modern aircraft
• are capable of carrying about twice the payload,
. can travel overthree times the range at substantially higher
speeds than the interceptor aircraft they are replacing,
• fly at low altitudes, where they can largely evade radar
detection, and
• can operate by day or by night as well as in adverse wea­
ther conditions.
It is particularly due to the massive introduction of fourth gene­
ration interceptors (MiG-29 FULCRUM, Su-27 FLANKER,
MiG-31 FOXHOUND) having “ true look down/shoot down-
capability” that the WARSA PACT has been able to close the
qualitative gap in this area.
 16

24. The overall global total of combat aircraft (fixed-wing) be­

NATO - WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFT longing to NATO air forces is about 9,000, of which many are
QUANTITATIVE COMPARIS ONS technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The land-
SELECTED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE based air forces, available in Europe for NATO consist of
(EXCLUDING MOSCOW AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT
AND NAVAL AVIATION) 2,245 fighter bombers, 1,115 interceptors and 340 reconnais­
sance aircraft. The United States and Canada could reinforce
Total Numbers in Europe: with some 1,050 more combat aircraft (fixed-wing), which
could be serviced and supported on receiving airfields in
NATO WP 1
3 700 7 465 I Europe. This would, however, require that both technical
equipment and ground crew be brought in beforehand.
Bombers Fighter Bombers / Interceptors* Reconnaissance
Ground Attack
With the introduction into service of more F-18 HORNET, F-16
4145 and TORNADO aircraft, NATO continues to improve the qua­
lity of its combat air assets. Although NATO airforces are still
superior to those of the WARSAW PACT in terms of training

NATO — WAR S AW PACT Combat A ircraft

in place in E urope

Fighter Inter- Recon- Bombers

Bombers ceptors naissance

NATO 2,245 1,115 340 O

WARSAW
PACT 2,380 4,145 580 360*)

TU-16 BADGER F-4, F-104 MiG-23 FLÜGGER D/H/J M 8 .M 5 MiG-23 FLÜGGER BG TR-1, RF-4 TU-95 BEAR
TU-22 BLINDER F-5, F6 SU-7 FITTER M . F-104 MiG-25 F0XBATA t RF-5, RF-104 TU-16 BADGER
TU-22 BLINDER F-16, A-10 SU-24 FENCER MIRAGE SU-15 FLAGON TORNADO TU-22 BUNDER C
TU-22M BACKFIRE A-6/7 SU-25 FR0GF00T TORNADO TU-128RDOLER JAGUAR YAK-28 BREWER
MIRAGE MiG-21 F1SHBED MiG-21 RSHBED MIRAGE MiG-25 F0XBAT B/D
JAGUAR MiG-29 RJLCRUM MiG-21 RSHBED H
HARRIER MiG-31 FOXHOUND SU-7 FITTER *) This figure does not include about 230 bombers of Naval Aviation, the
ALPHA-JET SU-27 FLANKER SU-24 FENCER
TDRNADO M-4 BISON and T u-95 BEAR strategic bombers, support aircraft such
BUCCANEER
F-111 as tankers or those aircraft used for command and control or electronic
* A large proportion of interceptor airc raft can be used in ground/attack roles. warfare.

Figure 6

NATO, Tactica l Aircraft F-16

WA RSAW PACT,
Tactical Aircraft
SU-24 FENC ER
 17

NATO, t r acked SAM ROLAND WA RSAW PACT,

t r acked SAM SA-8 G ECKO

and tactical operational procedures, the qualitative advan­ 25. The WARSAW PACT airlift capability is substantial and
tage in materiel is becoming less and less. ever expanding. Soviet military transpo rt aviation alone, con­
sisting of more than 520 long and medium-range aircraft, pro­
vides sufficient airlift to transport one reinforced airborne divi­
sion up to distances of about 2,000 km. Already in peacetime,
AEROFLOT civilian aircraft are used to supplement this capa­
1983 AND 1986 COMPARISONS bility through semi-annual personnel exchange programmes.
OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
AND MOBIL E SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSIL ES
(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)

Anti-Aircraft Artillery M obile Tactical

(20 mm calibre and above) S urface-to-Air M issile Launchers
(excluding man-portable infantry weapons)

7110*
7 250 Tnm y
¡9 5 0 26 . NATO’s military airlift assets consist of nearly 750 trans­
port aircraft, the majority of which, however, are assault air­
6 050 /.
/
craft with comparatively smaller payloads (HERCULES,
6 300 1 5 830 5 830
/ TRANSALL). While the civil air fleets of the NATO countries
'
'
I
I
can be requisitioned to render suppo rt, they are not subject to
/
1
/ central control as those of the WARSAW PACT.
'
f
I
'
/
'
/
/
'
' 27. WARSAW PACT forces have an extensive range of static
'
'
/
and mobile air defence systems in a balanced mix consisting
/
/ of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns as well as a
' 2 090*
1
/ 1840 large number of high-performance interceptors. This serves
/
/
' 1 840 to ensure
'
/
1
1
/
/ . sustained curbing of NATO aircraft penetrativity, also in the
/
/ depth of the area,
1983 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986
NATO W P" NATO W P **
• fighter escort support of offensive air operations. The intro­
Indudmg French assets
* Total number in Europe edudm g forces in the Moscow. Vtofga and Ural M ita ry Districts duction of the MiG-29 FULCRUM and of the Su-27 FLAN­
KER in particular, allows long-range operations to be sup­
ported for the first time.
Rgure 7
18
NATO, A nti-A ircraft A rm our ed Gun GEPARD
28. NATO nations have made furthe r progress in improving
the ability of their air forces to operate and survive in a hostile
environment, particularly by providing better protection fo r vi­
tal operational and logistical facilities. Due to their high state
of readiness, fu rther improved quality and tactital flexibility,
NATO, Int e rceptor A irc r aft F-15 EAGLE
WAR S AW PACT,
A nti-A ircraft Arm oured Gun ZSU-23/4
NATO airforces can still be presumed capable of prevailing
against the air forces of the WARSAW PACT, although that
capability is eroding. Therefore, the ability to augment in­
place forces rapidly in time of tension or war remains of para­
mount importance if air warfare is to be successful.
WARSAW PACT, Interceptor A ircraft SU-27 FLANKER

Maritime Forces
29. As noted earlier, there are fundamental differences in the
missions of the naval forces of the WARSAW PACT and
NATO, which are primarly a result of geographic dissimilari-
tiestietween the two alliances. The security of NATO as a ma­
ritime alliance depends on the unimpeded use of the sea lanes
in order to ensure both augmentation of the forces employed
on the European continent and the flow of supplies to the
population of the European allied nations. Thus, NATO naval
forces in the event of conflict would have the following respon­
sibilities:
3 0. The defence of the use of sea lanes demands greater re­
sources than the denial of their use, and thus the maritime
balance between the two alliances must be seen in this per­
spective.
Accordingly, th e differences in the naval missions of NATO
and the WARSAW PACT are reflected in the different types,
19
to protect and maintain the sea lines of communication,
to neutralise hostile forces, and
to support land and airforces.
Conversely, the nations of the WARSAW PACT, as an allian­
ce of continental orientation, see the role of their navies in
. the denial to NATO of its use of maritime power,
. the disruption of NATO’s sea lines of communication, and
. by means of amphibious operations conducted in North
Norway, on the Baltic exits and in Western Turkey, in sett­
ing the stage for their fleets to exit the landlocked seas and
the seas bordering Europe, while, at the same time, sup­
porting operations of their land and air forces.
quantities and weapon systems of their naval forces. Since
simple numerical comparisons do not tell the full story, the na­
val balance may be more usefully compared in terms of the
abilities of the naval forces of the two alliances to accomplish
their respective missions in the face of opposition by the other
side.
Major Surfa c e
Com batant Ships
NATO, Guided Missile
Cr u iser TICONDEROGA
WARSAW PACT, Guided
Missile Destr o yer
SOVREMENNYY
20
NATO, Am phibious Assault Transport Dock SIR TRISTRAM
WARSAW PACT Naval Fo rces
31. The four fleets of the Soviet Navy constitute the bulk of
WA RSAW PACT naval forces. In the event of a conflict, only
they will have missions to carry out in the major oceans. In both
the Baltic and the Black Sea, they are supported by naval for­
ces of the non-Soviet WARSAW PACT nations. The Soviet
fleets are organised and equipped appropriate to their mis­
sions.
There is firm evidence that the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea
fleets are committed to the European theatre of war. Their
mission is
. to gain and maintain control of the seas in their respective
waters,
. to disrupt NATO’s sea lines of communication, or at least
threaten them persistently,
WARSAW PACT, Am phibious Assault Transport Dock IVAN ROGOV
. to prevent NATO from conducting a coordinated and co­
herent overall warfare, and
. to support their own land and air forces in regional theatres
of military operations as a part of overall warfare. These
missions include improvement of the geostrategic position
by opening up the approaches to the seas bordering Eu­
rope as well.
Since the WA RSAW PACT can determine both place and
time of attack, it would be able to make optimum use of its
capabilities. The cover of large-scale exercises thus puts it in
a position to partly compensate for its geographic handicap.
32. The equipment and development of WARSAW PACT na­
val forces reflect these diverse missions. Thus, the emphasis
is logically placed on submarines, the amphibious compo­
nent, and modern surface combatant ships. The continuous
expansion of its oceangoing component by modern cruisers,
destroyers and, in the near future, also by aircraft carriers is
evidence of the efforts being made to improve the capability
to conduct worldwide operations. Qualitative improvements in
 21

NATO,
US-Carr ie r
CARL VINSON

submarines, i.e. in the areas of noise reduction and deep- The other WARSAW PACT navies are to complement the re­
diving capability, and in large warships, in antiship stand-off gional forces with guided-missile fast patrol boats, as well as
and air defence weapons as well as in sea and land-based na­ antisubmarine and amphibious capabilities.
val aviation have long since transformed a once mainly coast­
al defence force into both an instrument designed to exe rt poli­
tical pressure and an offensive fo rce capable of global power Soviet Pacific Fleet
projection. Moreover, an ongoing improvement of its assets in
the seas bordering Europe must also be noted.
34. In addition to the WARSAW PACT maritime assets that
face NATO, the re are significant Soviet naval and naval airfor­
ces located elsewhere that could be deployed against NATO
forces or at least contain and bottle up parts of the Western
navies. The following table shows a summary.
33. The Soviet Navy is continuing its comprehensive moderni­
sation programme with the emphasis on submarines and mo­ Kiev-class ships 2
dern antiship missile forces. Efforts are directed at Cruisers 15
Destroyers and frigates 71
• making detectability more difficult, Ballistic missile submarines 32
• improving endurance time to lessen logistic dependence, Cruise missile submarines 22
. heavy, long-range weaponry and Long-range attack submarines 64
• improving speed Naval aviation aircraft including helicopters 440

WAR S AW PACT,
Kiev-Class V/STOL
A ircra ft Carrier
NOVOROSSIYSK
22

parts of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Denmark and

WARSAW PACT Auxiliary Fleets in Southern Norway;

• in the Iberian Atlantic area and along the axis Canary

35 . The merchant, fishing and oceanographic fleets of the
WARSAW PACT, unlike those belonging to NATO nations,
are state-owned and under centralised command and control.
This enables them to operate mostly in support of the naval
forces. Particularly important are their intelligence gathering
and logistic support operations. In wartime, these assets
would become even more valuable because they could then
be employed in support of amphibious as well as for minelay-
ing operations.
Islands-Gibraltar-Balearic Islands, to maintain the vital sea
lines of communication to the Southern Region and to
sources of raw materials in the Middle and Far East:
. in the Mediterranean, to assure coherence of the conduct
of operations on land, in the air and at sea in the isolated
areas of the Southern Region.

NATO and WARSAW PACT Maritime Forces

in t he North Atlantic and
Seas Bordering Europe
NATO Naval Forces
Category NATO WP

36. NATO naval forces, operating from the exterior line, must Aircraft Carriers 9 —
2 (France)
be readily available in areas that are geographically widely se­
parated. Hence, their missions are VSTOL Carriers 3 —
KIEV-Ciass Ships — 2
. by controlling the Norwegian Sea to inhibit access by the 1
Helicopter Carriers
Soviet Northern Fleet into the Atlantic and in conjunction 1 (France) 2
with land and air forces in Norway and Iceland, to guaran­ 1 (Spain)
tee the integrity of those allied nations; Cruisers, Battleships 15
1 (France) 22
# by securing the Baltic Approaches in conjunction with land Destroyers, Frigates 297
and air forces, to prevent a WARSAW PACT success in 42 (France) 200
21 (Spain)

Coastal Escorts and

Fast Patrol Boats, Corvettes 185
16 (France) 493
16 (Spain)

Amphibious Ships 63
• O ceangoing 2 (France) 23
1 (Spain)

• Independent Coastal Craft 110

14 (France) 186
23 (Spain)

Mine Warfare Ships 266

29 (France) 374
12 (Spain)

Submarines 208
NATO, Fast Patrol Boat Type 143A 23 (France)
• Total (all types) 8 (Spain) 249
WARSAW PACT, Fast Patrol Boat Tarant u l I l l-Class Type
• Ballistic Missile Submarines 33 46
6 (France)
• Long-Range Attack Submarines 129 139
17 (France)
8 (Spain)

• Ohter Types 46 64
• % Submarines Nuclear Powered 55% 48 °/o
Sea-Based Tactical, ASW and Support 1,162
Aircraft Including Helicopters 189 (France) 195
53 (Spain)
Land-Based Tactical and Support Aircraft 661
Including Helicopters 79 (France) 822
4 (Spain)
Land-Based Antisubmarine Warfare 356
Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters 36 (France) 236
6 (Spain)

37. The numbers in the tables comparing the maritime forces
indicate the numerical implications resulting from the different
missions and geographic operational environment of the for­
ces concerned. In addition, they also show the capabilities cal­
led for by these missions. For example, NATO is strong in:
. carrier-based tactical air,
. land-based ASW/surveillance patrol aircraft,
. antisubmarine systems,
. improved replenishment at sea capabilities, which are es­
sential to increase endurance time.
On the other hand, the WARSAW PACT is considerably stron­
ger in its assets deployed in seas bordering Europe.
38. Since NATO is a defensive alliance, the WARSAW PACT
holds the initiative to determine time and place of an attack
and only then can the Alliance respond. Thus, taking into con­
NATO, Non-N u c l ea r -Powe r ed Submarine Type 206
WARSAW PACT, Non-Nuclea r -Pow er ed Submarine Kilo-Class Type
23
sideration the geographic handicap already indicated in de­
tail, i.e. widely separated areas of operation, a numerical naval
advantage is needed by NATO.
A one-for-one replacement of ships and other vessels as part
of the modernisation programme is of great importance to the
future accoplishment ofthe mission of NATO maritime forces.
If this contribution could no longer be made by all allied na­
tions, then in the future the numerical advantage that NATO
naval forces have over those of the WARSAW PACT may no
longer be sufficient to carry out maritime tasks esential for the
Alliance concurrently. This is particularly true in view of the
fact that some nations of the Alliance have worldwide respon­
sibilities while the WARSAW PACT, because of the general
conditions governing deployment of its naval forces described
earlier, would be in a position to impose priorities and thus fo­
cus on specific regions.
24

Aircraft carrie rs 6
United States and Cruisers 19
89
Canadian Maritime Assets Destroyers a n d Frigates
Long-range attack submarines 44
Sea-based tactical, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and
39. In addition to maritime forces located in the North Atlantic support aircraft including helicopters 524
and the seas bordering Europe and ballistic missile submari­ Land-based tactical and support
nes deployed worldwide, the United States and Canada main­ aircraft including helicopters 726
tain additional maritime assets elsewhere that could be deplo­ United States Marine Corps aircraft 939
yed in support of NATO. Land-based ASW fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters 155

III. REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Figure Í

Main Artillery/ Armoured Attack Tactical

Northern and Central Europe Battle Mortar Personnel Helicopters Combat
Land Forces Tanks (tubes Carriers Aircraft
(main ar­ 100 mm and In­ (fixed-
4 0 . WARSAW PACT forces facing Northern and Central Re­ mam e nt and above fantry wing)
gions consist of the equivalent of a total of 105 combat ready 90mm and including Fighting
or mobilisable divisions, of which above) multiple Vehicles
rocket and other
# about two Soviet divisions are deployed in the Far North
launchers) Armoured
near the common border with Norway, and another eight Vehicles
divisions including one airborne division further south with­
in the same Military District; WP 26,900 22,900 59,900 1,630 3,770
• the equivalents of 95 divisions pose a threat to the southern NATO 11,250 7,300 28,400 675 2,075
part of the Northern Region and Central Europe. The fol­
Exc e ss 15,650 15,600 31,500 955 1,695
lowing comparative listing indicates WARSAW PACT su-
periority in combat-essential major equipment, which, in
some categories, is a multiple one.*)
*) Combat-essential major equipment in place in the following coun­
tries/geog r aphic regions (excluding depot reserves) NATO: France,
Of these, the equivalent, of almost 69 divisions with about
BENELUX countries, Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, United
Kingdom;
20,200 tanks and 15,900 artillery and mortar pieces are kept
WARSAW PACT: German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, in such a high state of readiness or stationed so far to the west
Poland, Soviet Military Districts: Baltic, Belorussia, Carpathian. that they are immediately or very rapidly deployable.
Furthermore, the WARSAW PACT has considerable amphi-
bious capabilities in the Barents Sea and the Baltic, which are
NATO, M ultiple Rocket La u ncher MLRS
41. NATO’s in place and rapidly deployable forces in Northern
and Central Europe consist of the equivalent of about 42 divi­
sions fielding about 10,000 tanks and 6,400 artillery and mor­
tar pieces including equipment prepositioned in Central
Europe.
These forces are composed of armed forces from Norway,
Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Uni­
ted Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the Federal Re­
public of Germany. Most of these divisions are kept in a high
state of readiness. However, a considerable number of these
units require a few days of mobilisation to become operatio­
nally ready. The personnel for the equivalent of an additional
5 division can be airlifted from the United States and married
up with prepositioned equipment.
France has a total of 15 divisions with some 1,340 tanks and
1,430 artillery and mortar pieces that could be made available
to the Alliance wholly or in part only by national decision.
Despite some maldeployment as well as deployment routes
and lines of supply which run too near and parallel to the com­
mon border with the WARASAW PACT, approximately 75%
of these forces — not counting possible French support —
NATO, Infantry Fighting Vehicle M2 BRADLEY
held ready at all times,
WARSAW PACT, M ultiple Rocket Launcher BM27
could be in position very quickly to ensure a successful de­
fence in the initial period of a conflict.
42. As mentioned previously, out of atotal of 105 division equi­
valents of the WARSAW PACT, some
• 10 divisions in Northern Europe and
. 69 divisions in Central Europe
stationed in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslova­
kia, Poland and the four Northern and Western Military Di­
stricts of the Soviet Union, could launch operations imme­
diately or within a few days of mobilisation.
Under optimum conditions, assuming simultaneous mobilisa­
tion and deployment forward within the region, NATO could
count on the equivalent of some 47 division, which would have
to hold out until additional United States and Canadian forces
arrive on the European continent or until the French Govern­
ment directs its armed forces to operate in concert with the
other NATO contingents.____________________________
43. In the meantime, the WARSAW PACT forces could be ex­
panded to their full 105 divisions and augmented by up 18 stra­
tegic reserve divisions from the three Central Soviet Military
Districts depending on operational and strategic require­
ments.
WARSAW PACT, Infantry F ighti n g Vehicle BM P2
26

NATO could also fall back

on parts of an overall total of
24 division equivalents still
available in North America
with some 3,400 tanks and
2,300 artillery/mortar pie­
ces if these divisions could
be successfully moved to
Europe by sea and by air.
Of course, the difference in
time required to bring up
such reinforcements fa­
vours the WARSAW PACT.

NATO,
Combat Helicopter
AH-64 APACHE

WARSAW PACT,
Combat Helicopter
Mi-24 HIND

have not been included in these force comparisons. Likewise,

Air Force s no comparison of the surface-to-air defence systems of the
two alliances, which are difficult to quantify in their efficiency,
44. In Northern and Central Europe, the WARSAW PACT is
has been attempted. However, the WARSAW PACT may be
superior to NATO in combat aircraft (fixed-wing). While the assumed to have a distinct superiority in these weapon sy­
WARSAW PACT’S interceptor component is supposed to
stems as well.
% provide protection for offensive fighter bombers and com­
bat helicopters and also
• prevent the penetration of NATO fighter bombers into North e rn and Central Europe
WARSAW PACT airspace, in place A ir Forces1)
the high proportion of fighter bombers in NATO air forces is Fighter Interceptors2) Reconnaissance
inter alia required to counter WARSAW PACT superiority in Bombers Aircraft
tanks, armoured combat vehicles and missile systems in both
NATO 1,585 655 230
regions.
WARSAW
Because of the long distances separating them from the two PACT 1,550 2,450 405
regions,
• aircraft from the Moscow Air Defence District in support of
the WARSAW PACT and 1) Including French air forces
• reinforcements from America in support of NATO 2) Inte r cepto r s may be tasked to support offensive operations.

So uthern Euro pe
La nd Forc es
45. In Hungary, the WARSAW PACT has 10 Soviet and Hun­
garian divisons ready for employment against North-East Ita­
ly. They are equipped with 2,300 tanks and 1,820 artillery and
mortar pieces. If required, these forces can be reinforced with
13 divisons, dependent on mobilisation to a considerable de­
gree, from the Kiev Military District. Other operational options,
for example up the valley of the Danube, against Central Eu­
rope and against the Central Mediterranean, are conceivable.
46 . The NATO land forces in this region consist of 8 Italian divi­
sion equivalents with 1,370 tanks of widely varying degrees of
modernisation and 1,450 artillery and mortar pieces. These
forces are so deployed that they can fight forward and bring
up reinforcements from depth. An additional point is that be­
sides defending the lowland of Upper Italy, the remainder of
Italian territory must be protected and if necessary defended
especially against amphibious and airborne operations. In the
execution of this mission, co-ordinated co-operation both
between the three services and between the allied forces in
the region assume special importance.
47. The political attitude and military actions of neutral Yugos-
27
Figure 9
lavia would have considerable influence on the balance of for­
ces in this region in the event of war.
48. For operations against Greece and Turkish Thrace, the
WARSAW PACT has 30, and after mobilisation of the cadre-
strength divisions a total of 34 division equivalents with more
than 7,600 tanks and about 6,800 artillery and mortar pieces
that can be brought into battle. Of this maximum of 34 division
equivalents, more than 20 are stationed so far forward or kept
in such a high state of readiness that they can employ their
4,200 tanks and 3,020 artillery and mortar pieces after a short
period of preparation.
Land warfare can be effectively supported by airborne and
amphibious operations and by operations of the naval forces
deployed in the Black Sea.
49. Despite progress in mechanisation, most of NATO’s 25
Greek and Turkish divisions in this region are motorised major
units of infantry. Terrain features favouring defence are coun­
terbalanced by extreme lack of depth in some areas, so that
it will be mandatory to employ the 3,550 tanks and 3,000 artil­
lery and mortar pieces early. Co-operation with naval and air
forces and coordinated action of both allies are therefore of
decisive importance.
28
50. At least 20 Soviet divisions will be available for operations
against Asiatic Turkey upon completion of mobilisation. Of
these, more than 12 divisions with about 3,000 tanks and
about 3,400 artillery and mortar pieces are deployed near the
border. From the adjacent North Caucasian Military District,
an additional 2,600 tanks and 2,300 artillery pieces/mortars
can be brought in.
51 . The Turkish Army holds a total of 12 divisions in readiness
in Eastern Turkey, with 1,550 tanks and 2,000 artillery wea­
pons. Of these, however, some are tied down by security mis­
sions a long Turkey’s common borders with the crisis areas of
the Near East. Continual modernisation of materiel and impro­
ved training compensate for the inferiority of their equipment
com pared to that of the opposing WARSAW PACT land forces
to a limited extent only.
52. Spanish land forces, which are atthe moment undergoing
restructuring and reorganisation, would be made available to
the Alliance in this region after prolonged preparation, provi­
ded that the Spanish government approves their commit­
ment.
53. While the WARSAW PACT would at times have to attack
across the territories of neutral states, it is nevertheless fa­
voured by the solid land mass of its own territory and the ad­
vantage of the interior line. For NATO, on the other hand, co­
herent operations and logistic support are rendered difficult by
the geographical separation of its several areas of operation.
IV. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND
NUCLEAR EQUATION
Nuclear Forces in NATO’s Strategy
55. In combination with conventional forces, nuclearforcesas
an instrument of NATO strategy serve to maintain peace
through deterrence of aggression. To deter effectively, NATO
must have nuclear weapons capable of manifold, flexible re­
sponses. They must — and it must be unmistakably apparent
to the WARSAW PACT that they do — admit of effective and
commensurate employment. Only in this way can a potential
aggressor be convinced that
. he cannot use his military might as an instrument of ag­
gressive policy, and
• any attack against a NATO nation orthe Alliance as a whole
is doomed to failure and would entail the risk of inflicting un­
acceptable damage on the aggressor’s territory as well.
56. NATO has the nuclear weapons that are absolutely neces-
sary in view Of the overall threat. In 1 9 8 3 , the Alliance decided
Keeping its sea lines of communication open is therefore cru­
cial for successful operations.
A ir Fo rces
54. The flexibility, mobility and long range of airforces make
a quantitative comparison difficult, especially when these fac­
tors are considered against the background of the special ge­
ographical features of Southern Europe. At the moment the
two alliances have approximately the following forces availa­
ble in Southern Europe:
Southern Europe in place A ir Forces1)
Fighter Interceptors2) Reconnaissance
Bombers Aircraft
NATO 660 460 110
WARSAW
PACT 830 1,695 175
It should be borne in mind that both sides are able to bring up
reinforcements which, if available in time, could effect deci­
sive shifts in weight. The geographical conditions of the Medi­
terranean place special importance on effective co-ordination
of land, air and naval operations.
Carrier-based aircraft represent a component that is especial­
ly well-suited to overcoming the geographical separation bet­
ween the various areas of operation.
NATO’s quantitative superiority in this category can therefore
offset its inferiority in land-based aircraft to some extent.
at Montebello (Canada) to withdraw — irrespective of any
arms control agreement — an additional 1,400 nuclear warhe­
ads from Europe by 1988 besides the 1,000 removed in 1980.
This unilateral concession will reduce NATO’s nuclear inven­
tory in Europe to its lowest level in over twenty years.
57. The reduction was justifiable only with the proviso that the
remaining nuclear inventory is to be modernised, and the con­
ventional defence capability improved at the same time. The­
se efforts are required to keep an adequate counterweight
against the WARSAW PACT superiority to NATO both in con­
ventional forces and in its nuclear weapons directed against
Europe.
This counterweight must include adequate forces to ensure a
capability of response and escalation against the WARSAW
PACT’S forces in Europe, so as neither to grant the Soviet
1} |nC|Uding Spanish air forces.
2) Interceptors may be tasked to support offensive operations.
 29

Union a sanctuary in any conflict below the strategic level nor
lose the flexibility of Western strategy in the face of a WAR­
SAW PACT threat of aggression.
58. The nature and extent of NATO’s nuclear arsenal is deter­
mined essentially by the numerous options of response requi­
site to effective deterrence. Flexibility, assured availability, ef­
fectiveness, survivability, political controllability and limitabili-
ty of damage are the chief parameters of the strength and
structure of its nuclear forces.
Note on Comparison
of Nuclear Forces
59. The determination of criteria for an analytical comparison
of nuclear forces is problematic because some relevant fac­
tors such as accuracy are very difficult to quantify. Moreover,
for reasons of secrecy, which is felt to be indispensable, relia­
ble performance data in sufficient detail are very rarely pub­
lished officially. The geographical location, mode of deploy­
ment, mobility and vulnerability of the weapons as well as the
existence of defences are additional factors complicating cri­
teria definition.
The count is confined to those weapon systems which are
maintained in a permanent operational status; e .g. be­
sides the launcher a missile with a nuclear warhead and the
required trained operating personnel are permanently avai­
lable. Reloads, training equipment, systems being tested and
other reserves are not included. Therefore, the total invento­
ries of the two alliances e.g. of missiles and warheads exceed
the figures given in the 1987 Force Comparison.
In addition, any identified or identifiable quantitative and quali­
tative developments will be noted. In the case of longer-range
intermediate-range missiles, operational warheads in the field
will also be compared, because such a comparison is most
readily possible and clarifies the balance of forces in this
category.
The category classification follows the definitions adopted by
the members of NATO and used in the 1984 NATO Force
Comparisons. This terminology is in accord with existing arms
control agreements and usage in current arms control nego­
tiations. Since some nations often use other terms, some­
times with different meanings, public discussion is occasion­
ally characterised by a confusing abundance of terminology.
Figure 10, Classification of Nuclear Forces (Comparison of
NATO and WARSAW PACT Definitions), is intended to help
eliminate any possible misunderstandings.

A numerical comparison can provide no more than a prelimi­

nary objective basis upon which an independent judgement
on this complex matter can be formed in the light of further in­
formation. Even the determination of a method of counting for
a purely numerical comparison is not a simple matter. Thus a
comparison based on operational weapon systems is often CLASS IFICATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES
criticised as inaccurate and misleading, and a count by war­ (COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT DEFINITIONS)

heads is demanded. This demand is doubtless justified, but

there are a number of difficulties, not all of which can be satis­ Combat Radius /
factorily solved: NATO Range
km
WARSAW PACT
. Many strategic missiles, even of the same type, are capab­
le of carrying different numbers of warheads. The maxi­ S trategic N uclear Forces Strategic W eapon System s
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
mum number can indeed be calculated, but the actual and Weapon Systems

number is not known.

. Aircraft can be equipped with different armament depend­
ing on configuration and may carry varying numbers of
weapons/warheads.
5 500
. Most intermediate-range and short-range nuclear systems Interm ediate-R anae Long-Range Rockets
and Weapon Systems
are reloadable. Reliable information on existing reloads is N uclea r Forces. INF
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons)
Longer-Range Intermediate-Range
not available. Nuclear Forces, LRINF

. Many aircraft and nearly all missiles with a range up to

1,000 km are capable of being used in nuclear as well as
conventional or chemical roles. Alternatively, they may be
tasked for one role only. Sho rter-Range
1 000
O perational / Tactical
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces, SRINF R ockets / W eapo n System s

60. In the following sections (Strategic Nuclear Forces; S hort-R ange

N uclear Forces, S NF
Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Systems; Sea-
Nuclear Battlefield Weapons S hort-R ang e Rockets
Based Nuclear Forces), therefore, the nuclear forces of NATO and W eapo n System s
and the WARSAW PACT will be compared, insofar as they are (Tactical Rockets / Weapon Systems)

comparable, by categories and components for selected

weapon systems (e.g. aircraft, missile launcher, artillery pie­
ces/mortars).
Figure 10
30

EFFECTIVE RANGE OF STRATEGIC FORC ES

Deploym ent areas for

Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBM)

Bases for Strategic Nuclear

Powered Ballistic Missile
Submarines (SSBN)
Figure 11

Each element is different in terms of state of readiness, sur­

Strategic nuclear Forces vivability, flexibility, accuracy, and capability to penetrate the
enemy’s defences. They are complementary, so strategic
61. Strategic weapons are what A rticle II of the SALT II -treaty weapons must be considered and analysed as a who le.
defines as strategic offensive arms, i.e. those which, by rea­
son of their range or combat radius in excess of 5,500 km or
because of their nature, are siutable for intercontinental emp­
loyment. They comprise
• land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM),
• submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), 62. The United States and the Soviet Union built up their nu­
. heavy bombers. clear strategic forces after World War II from different points
NATO, SSBN OHIO-Class WARSAW PACT, SSBN TYPHOON-Class
of view and on the basis of
different concepts and
have continued to develop
them accordingly to this
time. Apart from strategic
concepts, it was the com­
bined influence of available
technologies, geostrategic
conditions, historical expe­
rience and the traditional
image either side has of its
military power which go­
verned the composition of
their forces and their mili­
tary research and develop­
ment of new weapon sys­ NATO, Strategic Bom b e r A ircraft B-1
M
WARSAW PACT, Strategic Bomber Aircraft BLACKJACK
tems. Structural differen­
ces and asymmetries, as
well as current modernisa­
tion programmes intended
to resolve these differen­
ces, must be viewed
against this background.

TOTAL STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES

BY COMPOSITION
STRATEGIC FORCES
CLASSTFTETTBY^WEÄPÖN SYSTEM
NATO* WARSAW PACT * *
(USA and UK) (Soviet Union)

NATO W ARSAW PACT

2 044 I 2 491
(USA and UK) (Soviet Union)

Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) SS - 11
SS - 13
M IN U T E M A N II k SS - 17
1 OOO M IN U T E M A N III
PEACEKEEPER 1 SS
SS
-
-
18
19

I
Intercontinental
1 SS
SS
-
-
24
25

including Ballistic Missile

(ICBM) Submarine-Launched
550 MIRV Ballistic Missile
(SLBM) SS - N - 6
POLA R IS SS - N - 8
POSEIDON SS - N - 17
704 SS - N - 18
TR ID E N T
SS - N - 20
- 11
U -
Submarine-Launched SS - N - 23
640 MIRV Ballistic Missile
(SLBM)

Heavy Bomber

340 T U -9 5 BEAR A
B - 1 B
including T U -9 5 BEAR B
B - 52
132 ALCM carriers*" T U -9 5 BEAR G
B - 5 2 A LC M

4?
Heavy Bomber T U -9 5 BEAR A LC M
FB - 111
M -4 BISON
* NATO figures include United States strategic missiles, 64 British strategic POLARIS SLBMs
and operational United States B-52s, B-1Bs and FB-111S.
The FB-111 aircraft based in the United States have been included because their mission
is strategic. Not included are the French forr ' of 18 IRBM (S 3).
96 SLBM (M-20. M-4) and 18 bombers (Mirage IV).

* WP figures inc lude Soviet strategic missiles and TU-95 BEAR and M-4 BISON bombers.

* ALCM = Air-Launched Cruise Missi le.

J Figure 12
32

63. NATO’s strategic deterrent consists primarily of the strate­
gic nuclear forces of the United States and in small part those
of the United Kingdom (64 POLARIS SLBMs). In the WAR­
SAW PACT, only the Soviet Union maintains comparable for­
ces. Comparison of the arsenals of the two sides shows that
the WARSAW PACT has more assets than NATO. On the
other hand, NATO has the advantage that the United States,
owing to its much larger number of air-launched cruise missile
(ALCM) carriers, has more operational warheads available
than the Soviet Union.
As previously explained, it is very difficult to determine the
number of warheads with sufficient accuracy. Calculations
based on available performance data indicate that the United
States keeps about 11,000 strategic nuclear warheads in
a permanent operational status and the Soviet Union about
10,500. This information is inadequate for an analytical com­
parison, since it ignores asymmetries in the allocation of for­
ces of the two sides. More than two thirds of all strategic war­
heads of the Soviet Union are allocated to its ICBM force,
while the figure is about one fifth for the United States. All So­
viet ICBMs are highly accurate and moreover have a higher
throw weight*) altogether than all of the United States mis­
siles combined.
The Soviet Union is therefore in a position to launch a success­
ful attack against the entire U.S. ground-launched strategic
force at once with only part of its ICBMs. On the other hand,
the United States has deployed more than half its warheads
on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In general
SLBMs are less accurate than ICBMs, but they are also less
vulnerable because of their deployment mode. In penetrability
they are comparable to ICBMs. With its SLBM force, the Uni­
ted States would be in a position to respond effectively even
after the loss of its ground-launched strategic force.

STR A TE G IC N U LEAR FO R C E - M O D E R N IS A TIO N C O M P A R IS O N

C

INTRODUCTION OF S ELE CTE D SYS TEMS BY YEAR

BOMBERS B-52 H FB-111 B-1 B

ZD MINUTEMAN II MINUTEMAN III MINUTE MAN III PEACEKEEPER

ICBM
C
T3 TITAN I MINUTEMAN I (M K 12 A) (MX)
11 IAN II

SS
ZD
SLBM POLARIS A 2 POLARIS A 3 POSEIDON C 3 TRIDENT I (C-4)

ETAN ALLAN Class BENJAMIN FRANKLIN Class OHIO Class

SUBMARINES
LAFAYETTE Class

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

TU -95 BEAR H BLACKJACK

BOMBERS

SS-7 SS4 SS-9 SS-13 SS-9 Mod 3 SS-17 Mod 2 SS-19 Mod 3 SS-25

SS-6 SS-9 Mod 2 SS-13 SS-11 Mod 3 SS-24

ICBM Mod 2
SS-11 SS-18 SS-17 SS-18 Mod 3 SS-17 Mod 3
co SS-19 SS-18 Mod 4
c
Z3 SS-19 Mod 2
03
ê
C/3
SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-N-8 SS-N-18 SS-N-20 SS-N-23

SLBM SS-N-6 Mod 2 SS-N-18 Mod 2

SS-N-6 Mod 3 SS-N-8 SS-N-18 SS-N-17
Mod 2 Mod 3

GOLF II HOTEL II YANKEE DELTA I DELTA II DELTA III TYPHOON DELTA IV

SUBMARINES
YANKEE II

Operational systems SS = Surface to Surface Missile

Systems now out of service SS-N = Submarine to Surface Missile
Systems in flight test . . . .

Figure 14

64. The Soviet Union and the United States are making great
efforts to modernise their strategic nuclear forces. These pro­
grammes are at present running nearly parallel in time, and
they embrace all three elements of the strategic nuclear
forces. In the time since the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet
Union has increased and improved its force to a far greater ex­
tent than the United States.
*) Throw weight: Total weight of the missile’s warheads, ejection mecha­
nisms and penetration aids. Unused reserves allow the number of war­
heads to be increased.

Figure 14 illustrates the dynamic progress of modernisation
programmes. Since 1973, the Soviet Union has introduced at
least
. 5 new types of ICBM, including in October 1985 the world's
first road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25 (to date about 100 such
systems have been operationally deployed) and most re­
cently the SS-24;
• 5 new SLBMs, including the SS-N-23 early in 1986, deploy­
ed on the new DELTA IV-class large submarines;
• 1 new bomber version (Tu-95 BEAR H).
In the same period the United States has developed and
deployed
• 1 new ICBM (PEACEKEEPER, operational since late
1986),
. 1 new SLBM (TRIDENT I C-4), and
. 1 new bomber (B-1B).
It should be pointed out that the introduction of the PEACE­
KEEPER ICBM and the B -1B bomber are results of a United
States modernisation programme not begun until the begin­
ning of the 1980s. The same applies to the deployment of air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on modified B-52 bombers.
65. If the Soviet Union continues its current modernisation
programme, its lead in ICBMs will be extended. Introduction
of the new SS-24 ICBM with 10 warheads has recently begun.
This missile may be either launched from a silo or deployed
on rails.
Testing of a successor to the SS-18 is in progress. Equally
dynamic progress can be observed in Soviet SLBM forces.
The addition of TYPHOON- and DELTA IV-class submarines,
of which 5 respectively 4 have already been commissioned,
will increase the number of warheads deployed with the SLBM
forces to about 30% of the total inventory in the foreseeable
future.
Testing of the new Tu-16O BLACKJACK supersonic bomber
is nearing completion. Its introduction is to be expected within
the next two years. In addition to the Tu-95 BEAR H bomber,
that will give the Soviet Union another modern carrier for
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Both systems are
equipped with AS-15 ALCMs and have continental and inter­
continental capabilities. Moreover, the Tu-22M BACKFIRE
bomber introduced in the mid-seventies continues to be ma­
nufactured in large numbers, replacing older bombers in the
long-range and naval airforces. Owing to its in-flight refueling
capability, the Tu-22M BACKFIRE can also be tasked for stra­
tegic missions.
66. In view of the fact that the dynamic Soviet arms buildup
continues unabated, the United States and the United King­
dom early in the 1980s likewise initiated a programme to mo­
dernise their strategic nuclear forces in order to preserve their
deterrence value to NATO. This includes the deployment of
an initial 50 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs with multiple warheads
33
in specially hardened MINUTEMAN III silos converted for the
purpose.
Procurement of an additional 50 is planned but must be autho­
rised by the United States Congress. The development of a
“ small” mobile ICBM with one warhead, the MIDGETMAN, is
planned. The immediate aim of these efforts is to make the
United States ICBM force less vulnerable and improve its ef­
fectiveness in terms of NATO’s deterrence capability.
When the ninth OHIO-class submarine is commissioned in
1989, this system is to be equipped with the new TRIDENT II
(D-5) SLBM, a missile supposed to be accurate enough to de­
stroy ICBM silos. The United Kingdom intends to replace the
obsolescent POLARIS with this system in the mid-nineties.
The United States intends to continue deploying air-launched
cruise missiles. This programme is to be concluded early in
the 1990s.
The development of an advanced technology bomber (ATB)
and advanced cruise missiles (ACMs) has begun, both using
STEALTH*) technology. These systems can be expected to
be ready for service no sooner than the early 1990s. By that
time, introduction of the new B-1B bomber, in mass produc­
tion since 1986, should be completed according to plan.
67. The independent French nuclear forces, which are not
included in NATO targeting, are being modernised in accor­
dance with increased requirements for range and especially
accuracy. It is to be expected that at the turn of the century
France will have a balanced mix of strategic nuclear forces,
whose strongest element will be its SLBM force.
68. By modernising the strategic nuclear forces in its military
posture and maintaining their diversity, NATO assures that
the Alliance will
• retain its deterrence capability despite the arms buildup of
the WARSAW PACT, and
. remain sufficiently secure for the foreseeable future
against a technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union,
which cannot be ruled out absolutely.
The sound balance and quality of NATO's strategic nuclear
forces thus contribute substantially to the creation of stable
conditions for reaching solid, comprehensive and verifiable
arms control agreements, as has seemed possible since the
meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachov in Reykjavik on 12 October 1986.
*) Collective term for technologies designed and developed for conceal­
ment from reconnaissance systems, in particular radar.
34

Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces

COVERAGE OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHORT-RANGE MISSILES

Figure 16
NATO, Rocket Launcher LANC E WARSAW PACT, SS-21 SCARAB

69. NATO and the WARSAW PACT have a variety of nuclear
weapons whose range, or combat radius, is shorter than that
of strategic weapon systems. These include:
. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), effective range
from 150 km to 5,500 km, and
. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF), maximum effective
range 150 km.
INF are further subdivided into INF missiles and aircraft:
• Longer-Range INF (LRINF), effective range from 1,000 km
to 5,500 km, and
. Shorter-Range INF (SRINF), effective range from 150 km
to 1,000 km.
SNF consist of ground-launched missiles an artillery. Some of

COMPARISON OF NATO - WARSAW P ACT NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS

WITH A MAXIMUM RANGE OF 500 KM, INCLU D ING THE PERSHING I A MISSILE SYSTEM

140
SS -21

580 635
SC JD FR )G

72 r" i
P I A I LANCE I
NATO WP
 SH O RT- AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
M O D E R N IS A T IO N C O M P A R IS O N IN T R O D U C T IO N O F S Y S T E M S BY Y E A R

NATO ▲ BUCCANEER
A F-104 ▲ F-111 ▲ JAGUAR ▲ F-16, TORNADO
Aircraft A m

PERSHING I I .

A PERSHING I A LANCE GLCM A

Missiles

A 203 mm A 155 mm
Artillery

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

. SU-17
WARSAW PACT A FITTER
. TU-16 . SU-7 . TU-22 MiG-21 M IG-23 . TU -22M .
A BADGER A FITTER A BLINDER A FISHBED FLOGGER A BACKFIREA su_24
Aircraft A FENCER

A SS-4 A SS-20
A scud A frog Ass-12 Ass-21 A s s -23

Missiles A s s -22

A 240 mm
A 203 mm A 152 mm
Artillery
▲ Operational system s

Rgure 18

these INF/SNF systems can be used in either conventional or
nuclear mode.
There are significant differences between the forces of NATO
and the WARSAW PACT. Taken as a whole, as well as in each
individual category, the WARSAW PACT has an appreciable
numerical advantage. Figures 15 and 16 show the disparities
in INF missiles in terms of target coverage in Europe today.
The WARSAW PACT will remain numerically superior several
times in Europe even after implementation of the INF-Treaty,
under which all United States and Soviet missile systems with
a range from 500 km to 5,500 km will be removed (“ zero-zero-
option” ).
The WARSAW PACT would then have some 1,360 missile
systems as against NATO’s 160 (including the 72 PERSHING
lAs) (Figure 17 and paras 72, 75, 77 and 81). Moreover, the
WARSAW PACT’S INF and SNF forces in Europe — viewed
as a whole — are more modern and more broadly modernised
than those of NATO (Figure 18).
ployed in Soviet territory and forms a component of its Strate­
gic Rocket Troops, an independent Service, where according
to data supplied by the Soviet Union*) a total of 405 of the
mobile SS-20 and 65 nonmobile SS-4 with a combined total
of 1,280 warheads are maintained in a permanent operational
status. Of these missiles and warheads, 243 SS-20 and all the
SS-4, with a total of 794 warheads, are held in the European
part of the Soviet Union, and so are immediately ready for use
against NATO Europe (Figures 19 and 20).
Until 1976, the Soviet Union had about 600 SS-4 and SS-5
LRINF missile systems with an equal number of warheads in
the field. With the rapid introduction of the SS-20 systems and
nearly parallel phase-out of the SS-5, the Soviet Union scarce­
ly altered the number of operational systems in this category,
but by September 1985 had increased the number of war­
heads in the field by 140%. At that time the Soviet Union main­
tained 441 SS-20 and 112 SS-4 systems with a total of 1,435
warheads in a permanent operational status. This increase
was possible because each SS-20 missile has 3 warheads,
each of which can be guided to a different target.
Substantially improved performance parameters, specifically
range, accuracy, response time and mobility, signify an addi­
tional leap forward in quality.

With this new force the Soviet Union has acquired new options
with respect to NATO in both the political and the military
spheres, especially in Europe.
Longer-Range INF Missile Systems
(LRINF) In addition, the Soviet Union developed ground-launched
cruise missiles that have by now entered the in-service phase,
70. Among the memberstates of the WARSAW PACT, only
the Soviet Union has LRINF missile systems. This force is de­ *) cf. footnote p. 37
 37

i .e. are ready for use. Thus, the Soviet Union, according to its This programme would not have increased the total number
own data*), has 6 SSC-X-4 launchers and 84 cruise missiles of nuclear warheads located in NATO Europe, since it had
of that type. been agreed within the Alliance to remove an older warhead
from Europe for each LRINF missile warhead deployed.
L O NG E R -R A N G E IN F M IS S ILE S Y S T E M S
O P E R A T IO N A L L Y D EP L O Y ED IN E U R O P E *

NATO W A R S A W PA C T

S S -4
72. NATO had always made it clear that the deployment of
PERSHING II and GLCM would be stopped, revised or even

S S -2 0 k reversed as soon as an equitable, balanced and verifiable

arms control agreement were reached. On 8 December 1987
after signing the INF-Treaty the Alliance has therefore
stopped its programme of LRINF missile system deployment.

By signing the INF-Treaty, the Soviet Union has accepted the

PERSHING II proposal advanced by NATO since 1981 and has agreed to
the worldwide elimination of ground-launched intermediate­
G LCM
a range missiles of this category.
■
According to Article IV of the INF Treaty, the two parties have
undertaken to complete that elimination not laterthan 3 years
after entry into force of the treaty').

W arheads: 1 1 3 M IR V 1 Longer-Range INF Aircraft (LRINF)

R ange (km ): 2 50 0 1 8 00 4 4 00 - 5 000 2 000
Op erational M ode: mobile m obile m obile fixed
Total (operationally deployed): 256 108 243 65
Y ear operational: 1 98 3 1983 1 97 7 end o f 5 0 's
TOTALS O F LO N G E R -R A N G E IN TE R M E D IA TE -R A N G E
N U C LEA R FO R C E S ( L R IN F*)
O PER A TIO N A LLY DEPLO YED IN E U R O PE_____
c l a s s if ie d b y c a t e g o r i e s /w e a p o n system s
* This table has been prepared on the basis of missiles o n launc hers; data taken from the
MoU of the I NF-Treaty, cf. foot note re para 70.

Missiles Com bat Aircraft

71. NATO viewed this development with alarm, which even­

tually led to the dual-track decision of December 1979, in
which the Alliance decided to offset the WARSAW PACT’S — id « *
new LRINF strength by deploying a numerically limited LRINF
LRINF Longer-Range Intermediate-Range
missile system force of its own, thus closing a gap in the spec­ Nuclear forces
(range/combat radius: 1 000 - 5 500 km)

trum of escalation. That decision was linked with an offer of ne­ GLCM : Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
Foe NATO, the number of mssiles is the same
gotiations on cancelling the deployment programme if that as the number of warheads
The Warsaw Pact s 306 missiles carry 794 warheads
would make possib le a concrete arms control agreement with­ • The data do not include the nwaJ aviation
based in Europe
in the next 4 years. Since the Geneva INF negotiations had re­ 794*** (about 230 TU-16 BADGER. TU-22 BLINDER and
TU-22M BACKFIRE)
mained inconclusive until that time, NATO began late in 1983
to deploy the PERSHING II LRINF systems and ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCM), which it had not had in Eu­
rope before. On 1 November 1987, 108 PERSHING lls and
256 GLCMs were operationally deployed in Europe, i.e. all the
PERSHING lls and about 55% of the 464 GLCMs that were 364**
to have been deployed by 1988.
—30.8.—
108
PERSHING II

Data as of 1 November 1987, the as of date for the information disclosed 243
by the United States and the Soviet Union, in the MoU rega rding the SS-20
256'
establishment of the data base for the INF- Treaty signed by them, on GLCM

their missile systems subject to the treaty:

• United States: PERSHING IA, PERSHING II, GLCM 65
SS-4
. Soviet Union: SS-20, SS-5, SS-4, SS-12/22, SS-23, SSC-X-4.
Details, cf. data base Memorandum of Understanding of the INF- T reaty NATO WP
(“ MEMORANDUMOF UNDERSTANDING REGARDINGTHEESTAB-
LISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE Figure 20
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STA­
TES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OFTHEIR INTERMEDIATE­ *) According to Article XVII the INF-Treaty shall enter into force on the date
RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES” ). of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
38
NATO, LRINF A ircraft F-111
73. Aircraft combat radii vary widely as a function of operating
altitude, flight profile, speed and weapon payload. While the
majority of INF aircraft can carry only one nuclear warhead,
the longer-range aircraft (LRINF) are capable of carrying from
2 to 4. However, their combat radius is specifically dependent
on the number and location of airfields they can use as inter­
mediate stops or to which they can return.
74. Since it does not appear feasible to base force compari­
sons on numbers of operational warheads deployed, as men­
tioned above, Figure 20 compares the NATO and the WAR­
SAW PACT LRINF aircraft stationed in Europe that can be as­
signed nuclear missions.
Shorter-Range INF Missile Systems
(SRINF)
75. The WARSAW PACT SRINF missile systems are an inte­
gral component of its land forces. In Soviet terminology, they
are defined as “ operational-tactical rocket systems” . Each
echelon, from Army to TVD1) inclusive, is equipped with
appropriate-range SRINF missile systems. Their target plan­
ning is coordinated with that of other Services, such as Strate­
gic Rocket Troops and air forces. Thus the WARSAW PACT’S
SRINF missile systems, especially if moved forward, can
attack many of the targets primarily covered by SS-2Os and
SS-4s.
According to the present posture of WARSAW PACT forces,
more than 700 operational SRINF missile systems are targe­
ted on NATO Europe today, including
• 63 SS-12/22s, range over 900 km
• 58 SS-23s, range over 500 km
. more than 580 SCUDs, range up to 300 km
According to intelligence available to NATO, about 50
SS-12/22 systems have been operationally deployed in the
western glacis of the Soviet Union since 1980. The Soviet
WARSAW PACT, LR INF A irc r aft BACKFIRE
According to this comparison, NATO has 144 F-111s sta­
tioned in the United Kingdom, whereas the WARSAW PACT
in Europe has 360 nuclear-capable Tu-22M BACKFIRES,
Tu-16 BADGERs and Tu-22 BLINDERS in the Soviet Long-
Range Air Forces and annother 230 aircraft of that type in the
Naval Air Forces. This total of about 590 LRINF aircraft does
not include special aircraft — electronic warfare, tanker and
reconnaissance aircraft — or trainers, none of which is inten­
ded to deliver weapons.
The superiority of the WARSAW PACT in this category must
be considered still greater if the current fielding of the modern
Tu-22M BACKFIR E bomber is taken into account, while the
comparable NATO force remains nearly static.
Union states2) that today the number is 58 of which 24 are de­
ployed in Czechoslovakia and 34 in the German Democratic
Republic where also 16 operational SS-23 systems of the total
of 58 are located.
Over and above the force targeted on NATO Europe, the
Soviet Union has about 190 combat-ready SRINF missile
systems, including 48 SS-12s and 12SS-23s. Of these forces
about 20 SCUD systems are deployed as strategic reserves
west of the Urals.
Since 1957 when fielding of SCUD began, the WARSAW
PACT has steadily expanded and modernised its SRINF mis­
sile arsenal. Thus in 1970 it had 350 operational systems in
this category. In the meantime, the performance characteris­
tics of the older types have been so greatly improved that they
can be used in conventional or chemical mode as well. This
applies in particular to the SS-12/22 and the SS-23, which en­
tered service in 1985, both of which possess the requisite ac­
curacy, responsiveness and mobility.
1) Teatr Voennykh Deistvii (TVD) (Russian) = theatre of milita ry opera­
tions; a Soviet command level embracing sever al fronts that includes
elements of two or more services under one command up to strategic
level.
2) All SS-12 and SS 23 figures originate from the data base M oll included
in the INF-Treaty. Cf. footnote re para 70.

TOTALS O F S H O RT ER -R A N G E IN TE R M E D IA TE -R A N G E
N U C LE A R FO R C E S (S R IN F *)
O PER A TIO N A LLY D EPLO YED IN EU R O P E
CLASSIFIED BY CATEGORIES/WEAPON SYSTEMS
(EXCLUDES WARHEADS)
Missile Systems Com bat Air c raft
* SRINF: Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range
Nudear Forces.
(range/combat radius: 150 - 1 OOO km)
* NAJO dala exc lude French forces
(75 MIRAGE III E. JAGUAR aircraft).
* Figure represents the technically nuclear-capable
aircraft (including naval aviation).
SU-7/SU-17
18OO
[7 00
63SS-12/22
58 SS-23
>560 scuo
NATO WP NATO**/
76. As NATO introduced the PERSHING II, its SRINF missile
strength was reduced from 180 to 72 systems of the PER­
SHING IA type, made available by the Federal Republic of
Germany. In addition to the WARSAW PACT’S numerical su­
periority of 9.4 : 1, any comparison must note that the PER­
SHING IA system was introduced early in the 1970s, whe reas
the WARSAW PACT, as described, has continually updated
its SRINF missile force.
77. The-INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet
Union also covers the worldwide elimination of their ground-
launched INF missiles with a range from 500 km to 1,000 km.
In conjunction with the “ zero option” for LRINF, this is referred
to as the “ zero-zero option” .
Even after the “ zero-zero option” is effected, the WARSAW
PACT’S inventory of ground-launched SRINF missiles will still
be more than 600 SCUD systems west of the Urals, while
39
Shorter Range INF-Missiles
4 OOO
FITTER
MIG-21
RSHBED
MiG-23
FLÜGGER
SU-24 To the SCUD there is no com p a r a ble weapon system
in NATO’s inventory
NATO will have no missile systems of this category following
removal of the 72 PERSHING IAs M)
Shorter-Range INF Aircraft (SRINF)
W P*
78. A large portion of the NATO and WARSAW PACT combat
aircraft classified as SRINF on the basis of their performance
characteristics are technically suitable for nuclear use.
The WARSAW PACT maintains a far larger number of such
technically nuclear-capable aircraft than NATO, a capability
which moreover is continually being modernised by both al­
liances. For various reasons, only some of these aircraft can
be assumed to be available for nuclear use. For example, a
large portion might be limited to conventional missions only
because not all of the pilots are trained in nuclear weapon de­
livery. Unlike NATO, the WARSAW PACT does not publish
the number of aircraft assigned to a nuclear role. A direct com­
parison of the SRIN F air forces of the two all iances is therefore
difficult.
79. Figure 21 shows the number of WARSAW PACT shor-
ter-range INF aircraft with a technical nuclear capability and
*) O n 26 August 1987 the Chancellor of the Fede ral Republic of Germany
said in a public statement that if agreement o n the definite
elimination of all Soviet and American INF missiles were reached, the
German PERSHING IA missiles w o uld not be modernised but dismant­
led. He said this with the understanding that, inter alia,
• the INF-Treaty between the parties would be ratified and enter into
force and
• the parties would adhere to the agreed timetable for the elimination
of their weapon systems.
40
NATO’s comparable aircraft. Of NATO’s 1,800 aircraft, 650
are assigned to a nuclear role. This figure does not include the
French force of 75 MIRAGE III Es and JAGUARs. In view of
the above-mentioned difficulties involved in a comparison of
NATO and WARSAW PACT SRINF aircraft, one must as­
sume that the Pact, because of its greater numbers, maintains
a substantially larger number of combat-ready SRINF aircraft.
This balance of forces, even now disadvantageous to NATO,
might be made worse in the future by the continual deploy­
ment of more Su-24 FENCER fighter bombers.
Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)
80. Short-Range nuclear forces (SNF) consist of tube artillery
and missile systems with a range up to 150 km. Hence they
are also known as nuclear battlefield weapons. Most SNF can
deliver nuclear as well as conventinal or chemical warheads.
This applies especially to the artillery, where nuclear ca­
pability depends technically on calibre. Delivery of nuclear
munitions imposes additional requirements such as special
TO TALS OF SHORT-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF*)
OP E RATIONALLY DEPLOYED IN EUROPE
c l a s s if ie d b y c a t e g o r ie s / w e a p o n s y s t e m s
Missile Systems
SNF: Short-Range Nuclear Forces
(range: up to 150 km )
NATO data exclude French forces
(ar tillery and 33 PLUT0N missile systems)
• Rgures show ho# many weapon systems could
be used in nuclear role
1 200
775
140 SS-21 155 mm
203 mm
LANCE
NATO* WP NATO
training and communications equipment. Since 1981, the
WARSAW PACT has fundamentally renewed its 152mm artil­
lery In particular. The new ordnance issued to the land forces
is self-propelled and meets all criteria for nuclear use.
81. Figure 22 is acomparison of the short-range weapons sys­
tems that might play a nuclear role as SNF.
In Europe, NATO’s 88 LANCE missile systems introduced
since 1972 are opposed by about 775 WARSAW PACT
FROGs and SS-21s which in the Pact’s present posture are
maintained in a permanent operational status against NATO
Europe. Of this force, 140 launchers are assigned to the new
SS-21 weapon system, whose performance characteristics
are substantially better than those of FROG (notably range,
accuracy, response time and reliability). By now, nearly all di­
visions of the Soviet Army in the Forward Area are equipped
with SS-21. Introduction to the non-Soviet land forces of the
WARSAW PACT goes on steadily. Over and above its FROGs
directed against NATO, the Soviet Union has more than 300
others of which about 35 systems are held in readiness as
strategic reserves west of the Urals.
In retrospect, it appears that the WARSAW PACT has conti­
nually expanded its short-range missile force since the FROG
system was introduced. As early as 1970 it hade more than
450 FROGs, whereas NATO as that time had about 200
operational HONEST JOHN systems, which have since been
Artillery phased out.
3 800
82. In the fie ld of nuclear capable tube artillery, the balance
of forces has shifted distinctly in favour of the WARSAW PACT
since the early 1980s. Until then, NATO had been clearly su­
perior to the WARSAW PACT in Europe in terms of total SNF
systems, because at that time the Pact had scarcely any nuc­
lear artillery. This advantageous situation for NATO has since
been reversed. Since the end of 1981 alone, the WARSAW
PACT has deployed more than 3,000 modern pieces of self­
152 n propelled ordnance with nuclear capability, notably howitzers
guns 152 mm. This radical modernisation was also aimed at
240 mm
increasing the conventional firepower of the mechanised
units with a view to increasing their thrust. At the same time,
however, this modernisation provided the WARSAW PACT
with a sizable new SNF capability.
Figure 22 shows that these approximately 3,800 WARSAW
PACT nuclear capable artillery mortar pieces oppose 1,200
equivalent NATO systems. This does not include about 2,800
combat-ready NATO pieces and more than 5,600 WARSAW
PACT pieces whose design makes them technically nuclear
capable.
WP*
Rgure 22

Sea-Based Nuclear Forces
83. The sea-based strategic nuclear forces of both sides were
discussed in paras 61 through 68 and land-based INF aircraft
having a primarily naval role in paras 73 and 74. NATO and
the WARSAW PACT have still other sea-based nuclear sys­
tems for air defence purposes as well as for antiship and anti­
submarine operations. These systems are intended to sup­
port the respective naval forces.
84. Th e WARSAW PACT has several versions of antiship
cruise missiles of types SS-N-3, SS-N-7, SS-N-9, SS-N-12,
SS-N-19 and SS-N-22 and the antisubmarine SS-N-15 missile
system. In addition the Soviet Union has 13 combat-ready
GOLF ll-class submarines, of which 5, each equipped with 3
non-strategic SS-N-5 SLBMs (range about 1,300 km), are per­
manently assigned to the Baltic Fleet. From there this system
may also deliver nuclear strikes against land targets in
Europe.
41
Currently, the Soviet Union is developing and testing sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). While SS-NX-24 is still un­
der development, SS-N-21 has been operational since
mid-1987. The deployment of this missile - ranging as far as
3,000 km - on attack submarines (VICTOR-, YANKEE- or
AKULA-class) has been initiated. This gives the Soviet Union
longer-range SLCMs capable of nuclear strikes against land
targets.
85. On NATO’s side, the category dealt with in this section in­
cludes TERRIER type surface-to-air missiles, the ASROC and
SUBROC antisubmarine missiles, and bombs as well as
A-6/A-7 type aircraft, which are deployed on U.S. aircraft car­
riers. The latter may also deliver nuclear strikes against land
targets, although this is not their primary mission. Some surfa­
ce warships (e.g. lOWA-class battle ships) and attack subma­
rines (e.g. LOS ANGELES-class) of the U.S. Navy are
equipped with the longer-range TOMAHAWK SLCM, also ca­
pable of nuclear strikes against land targets.
42
V . NATO AND WARSAW PACT
DEFENCE EXPENDITURES
86. In NATO countries, governments must justify and account
fortheir expenditures before their parliaments, where defence
budgets, itemized in detail, are discussed, reviewed and
approved in public debate.
The WARSAW PACT countries ge nerally disclose a single
budget entry under the heading of “ defence” . This official in­
formation must be regarded as highly questionable, because
it does not nearly approximate the amount that must be actual­
ly spent to support the known military force and its current
modernisation. This applies in particular to the Soviet Union,
which accounts for by far the greatest portion of the WARSAW
PACT’S defence expenditures.
Although the defence budgets of the other WARSAW PACT
countries are considered more likely to be accurate today, the
amounts shown appear to be understated, so that it may be
assumed that parts of their defence expenditures are con­
cealed in other compartments of the national budget. Since
the financial statements of the WARSAW PACT governments
are not sufficiently transparent to allow their actual defence
expenditures to be inferred directly from official information,
NATO must fall back upon estimates. Differences in price and
cost accounting systems, rates of inflation and the absence of
fixed rates of exchange between the currencies of NATO and
WARSAW PACT countries make it difficult to establish re­
liable estimates that can be used to compare the defence
expenditures of the two alliances.
This comparison would have to be made on the basis of a com­
mon reference currency, for example the dollar or the rouble.
Given the different baseline conditions, this problem is best
solved today by comparing the defence expenditures of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
87. The Soviet Union states that its 1987 defence spendings
amount to somewhat more than 20 billion roubles. This is
equivalent to about 2% of its estimated gross national pro­
duct. According to official figures, defence expenditures in the
years 1972 to 1984 steadily decreased slightly, and only then
began to rise annually by 6% to 12%. This information is clear­
ly at variance with identified personnel strengths and exten­
sive arms procurements taking place within the framework
of an all-encompassing military modernisation programme
since the early 1970s. In the meantime, the Soviet Union an­
nounced to the United Nations on 25 August 1987 that the offi­
cial Soviet defence budget in 1987 (20.2 billion roubles) repre­
sents only part of the actual defence spendings. It was admit­
ted that expeditures for military equipment, research and de­
velopment are found in other parts of the national budget. Ac­
cording to Western estimates, the Soviet Union’s defence ex­
penditures now amount to six to seven times its official de­
fence budget, which could be 12% to 14% of its estimated
gross national product.
88. According to NATO’s estimates, it appears that from 1970
to date the Soviet Union has increased its defence expendi­
tures on the average by between 2% and 3% in real terms per
annum. Priorto 1976 the annual rates of increase in real terms
were about 4%. This trend reflects the history of a comprehen­
sive, long-term military programme. Its start-up costs were
especially high, while relatively less funds have been required
for its continuation.
In retrospect, this military programme has led to a continuing
process of modernisation and steady growth in the total
strength of the Soviet forces. This process has been associa­
ted with fundamental restructuring and reorganisations, and
judging from known appropriations, does not appear to have
been concluded.
In view of the level of arms procurement from 1970 to date,
which is high compared to NATO’s, and the lack of structural
change in the Soviet Union's defence expeditures, the un­
animous opinion of experts is that no reversal of trend is to be
expected for the time being.
89. In all NATO countries, defence budgets are disclosed in
full, and are not infrequently a subject of vigorous parliamen­
tary debate and public discussion.
According to preliminary information, NATO defence expen­
ditures in 1986 totaled 394 billion dollars.*) In many member
countries of the Alliance, defence expenditures by NATO
criteria increased more rapidly in recent years than the gross
domestic product, whose real growth remained generally low
under conditions of economic recession.
In the United States, this development was especially pro­
nounced. After a distinct decline in real defence expenditures
during the 1970s, a higher priority has once more been as­
signed to them since the beginning of the 1980s. During the
period from 1981 to 1985, the average increase in U.S. de­
fence expenditures in real terms was 7%.
The other NATO countries too have increased their real de­
fence expenditures, though not to the same extent. In 1986,
defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic pro­
duct consequently rose to 6.8% in the United States and to
5.3% for NATO as a whole.
*) 1986 prices a nd exchange rates

VI. MILITARY PRODUCTION AND
TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES
Production
90. NATO and the WARSAW PACT both have substantial mi­
litary production capacities, but it is difficult to compare them.
NATO’s total capacity is composed largely of the individual
capacities of a limited number of countries having major de­
fence industries which compete and cooperate in the pro­
duction of materiel to meet NATO’s requirements. NATO
has no central procurement agency; the sovereignty of each
NATO member state manifests itself especially clearly in de­
cisions on procurement. Furthermore, the individual coun­
tries have different procurement procedures and regulations.
9 1 . In the WARSAW PACT, on the other hand, one state —
the Soviet Union — plays the dominant role in WARSAW
PACT military production and exerts great influence on the
planning and procurement of the other members of the
Eastern pact system. The Soviet procurement process is
based on strict bureaucratic planning, where risk is reduced
to a minimum. This discipline contributes to the implemen­
tation of new equipment programmes in strict compliance with
planning schedules.
92. Each of these fundamentally different approaches to
procurement has its advantages and disadvantages. The
methods of the NATO countries are based on a productive
and flexible defence industry, which faces market competition
and hence uses modern Western civilian technologies to a
great extent to improve its products. The Soviet procedure, on
the other hand, is definitely centralised. The comparatively ra­
pid development and deployment of weapon systems ob­
served in the WARSAW PACT stems from the absolute priori­
ty of the armaments industry over all others and the Soviet ar­
maments philosophy, according to which proven technolo­
gies serve as the foundation and new ones are used only whe­
never and wherever necessary to meet new military require­
ments.
93. In one area, the WARSAW PACT’Sstrictly controlled cen­
tral procurement process offers great advantages over the
more nationally oriented procurement under NATO — and
that is standardisation.
Military operations by the integrated forces of an alliance
place exacting requirements on the interoperability of the
weapons, equipment and ammunition of the various national
forces. In the WARSAW PACT these requirements are met to
a large degree. The high degree of standardisation within the
WARSAW PACT contrasts not only to the amazing examples
of insufficient interoperability within NATO, but also to the
danger of mutual interference.
43
Technology
94. In assessing capabilities from a security policy point of
view, technology as a measure of industrial and military power
is indeed a significant factor but by no means the only one.
General data on the state of militarily relevant technologies of
NATO and the WARSAW PACT are not very helpful, because
the situation is different for each field of technology or for each
weapon system. In principle, therefore, the discussion of this
topic should be based on concrete specific questions. It must
also be kept in mind that systems with a higher technological
standard do not automatically have a higher battlefield value
in all cases. Various studies and comparisons have given im­
pressive evidence that a technologically less sophisticated
solution may nonetheless be extremely effective under spe­
cial operational conditions. Furthermore, the conditions under
which the WARSAW PACT operates enable it as a rule to
translate technological development into useful materiel more
quickly.
95. A comparative analysis of the general development of mili­
tary technology in the East and West leads to the conclusion
that the Soviet Union is catching up appreciably in areas
where NATO formerly had the lead. In the WARSAW PACT
the pursuit of ambitious and demanding performance goals is
supported by an extraordinarily large number of scientists and
engineers. In the Soviet Union alone, about one million of
them are active in the field of military research and develop­
ment. Moreover, the Soviet Union takes advantage of the
openness of Western society to acquire Western technology,
equipment and know-how.
An important reason why the Soviet Union and its allies suc­
ceed in cutting down the lead of the West in specific areas of
technology is that the resources the NATO countries have de­
voted to arms-related research and development have gene­
rally not kept pace with worldwide inflationary trends and the
increasing costs of opening up new technologies, so that avai­
lable opportunities have not been optimally utilized.
Still, Soviet efforts are not expected to close the technological
gap and catch up with the West in the foreseeable future. Of
course it is impossible to make a long-term forecast of future
developments. The Soviet Union should tend to become
stronger in military technology if it allocates funds for that pur­
pose to the extent it has in the past and if the Western coun­
tries do not make appropriate military use of their technologi­
cal advantage.
44
VII. EXPLANATORY
NOTES FOR DATA IN
THIS PUBLICATION
1 . So u rces
a. The data for NATO forces were taken
from the annual reports of the member
countries to NATO headquarters. Addi­
tional information was used to complete
the overall picture of capabilities.
b. The data for WARSAW PACT forces are
based on intelligence coordinated within
the Alliance, or are taken from the data
base MoU of the INF-Treaty
(cf. footnote re para 70).
2. Conventional Fo r ces Counted
The data contained in this document reflect
the state of knowledge as of the end of 1986;
exceptions have been specially noted.
The comparison extended to
• forces present in Europe and capable of
rapid growth through mobilisation,
• forces that can be moved in quickly be­
cause their materiel is prepositioned on
the European continent, and
. forces that can be made available for
commitment in Europe in due course af­
ter full mobilisation, and whose person­
nel and equipment must be transported
or moved forward by land, air and/or sea.
a. For NATO
The land and air forces covered were
(1) in the Northern and Central Regions
those of Norway, Denmark, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Lu­
xembourg and the Federal Republic of
Germany, as well as forces deployed in
those countries by the United States and
Canada.
Also included were those United States fleets or waters according to operational re­
forces stationed mainly in the United Sta­ quirements, a precise evaluation of the ba­
tes, but whose materiel has been prepo­ lance of NATO and WARSAW PACT naval
sitioned in Europe.
French forces were included, but since wing procedure;
France is not militarily integrated, they (1) Because most of the naval forces of the
are listed separately in the regional
comparisons.
(2) in the Southern Region
the forces of Portugal, Italy, Greece and
Turkey, as well as forces of the United
States stationed in those countries and in
Spain.
The forces of Spain, likewise not militarily
integrated in the Alliance, have been in­
cluded but are listed separately in the re­
(2) WARSAW PACT forces, including the
gional comparisons; because of opera­ Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets as
tional and transportation considerations, well as all forces of the other WARSAW
the land forces now undergoing reorgani­ PACT members have been taken into
sation are listed as reinforcements. account, again avoiding attempts to
quantify those units which the Soviet
(3) Reinforcem ents Union more frequently assigns to waters
The totals include forces from North outside the area under review in this
America that would become available af­ Force Comparison.
ter a prolonged time and the Spanish (3) It was assumed that the Pacific fleets of
land forces. the two superpowers are and will be per­
manently deployed in the Pacific or at
b . For the WARSAW PACT least in seas from which events between
the two blocs would not be directly
(1) Northern and Central Eu rope influenced.
NATO forces in Northern and Central Eu­ (4) The French and Spanish navies have
rope face the national land, air and air de­ been included but listed separately.
fence forces of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslova­ 3. Nuclear Forces
kia and the Soviet units stationed in those The criteria and counting methods used to
countries and in the Military Districts of derive the data on nuclear forces are ex­
Leningrad, the Baltic, Belorussia and plained under "Note on the Comparison of
Carpathia, as well as flying units from the Nuclear Forces” (paras 59 to 60) and in the
Air Defence Districts of Leningrad, Ar­ various sections. If not stated otherwise, the
changelsk and Minsk. Added to this is the as of date for the data published in this docu­
Legnica Air Army, tasked for missions in ment is 30 June 1987.
the Central/Western European Theatre Data for those systems which are subject to
of Operations (TDV). the INF-Treaty signed by the United States
and the Soviet Union on 8 December 1987
(2) Southern Eu rope were taken from the data base of the Memo­
In Southern Europe, the WARSAW randum of Understanding contained in the
PACT has available the national and So­ treaty as of the date of signature (cf. footnote
viet land, air and air defence forces statio­ re para 70). The as of date for that informtion
ned in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria is 1 November 1987. According to Article IX
as well as units from the Military Districts of the IN F Treaty, the two parties have under­
of Trans Caucasus, North-Caucasus, taken to update the data provided in the MoU
Kiev and Odessa, the Air Defence Di­ not later than 30 days after entry into force of
stricts of Kiev, Tiflis and Sverdlovsk, and the treaty. It is anticipated that that updating
the Vinnitsa Air Army. will result in minor deviations from the perti­
nent information contained in the 1987 Force
(3) Reserves Comparison.
The land, air and air defence forces de­
ployed in the three central Soviet Military
Districts of Moscow, the Urals and the
Volga as well as in the Air Defence Di­
strict of Moscow were counted as regio­
nal or strategic reserves.
c. Naval Forces
Because naval forces redeploy frequently
and quickly and can be assigned to other
forces in European waters is difficult. The
1987 Force Comparison adopted the follo­
European NATO members are perma­
nently deployed in European waters, and
it may be assumed that the forces of the
American Second and Sixth Fleets ser­
ving in the Atlantic and in the Mediterra­
nean will be used in support of NATO,
they have been included in the compari­
son. Any attempt to quantify the elements
of these fleets that are regularly or even
permanently deployed outside the geo­
graphical area of NATO's responsibility
has been deliberately avoided.
 45

Abbreviations
ACM = Advance d Cruise Missile N ATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(e.g. STEALTH techno lo gy) PCC = Political Consultative Committee
A LCM = Air-Launched Cruise Missile (highest political authority ot the Warsaw Pact)
A SR O C = Antisubmarine Rocket SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile System
A TB - Advanced Techn o logy Bomber SNF = Short-Range Nuclear Forces (0 km -150 km)
EW = e lectronic warfare SLBM = Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
GLCM - Ground-Launched Cruise Missile SLCM = Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM = Intercontinenta l Ballistic Missile SRINF = Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(over 5,500 km range) (150 k m - 1,000 km)
INF = Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces SU BR O C = Submarine Rocket
(150 km - 5,500 km range) (submarine-carried antisubmarine missile)
LR INF = Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces TVD = Russian abbreviation for Theatre of Operations
(1,000 km - 5,500 km) (Teatr Voennykh Deistvii)
V /S T O L = Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing
 NATO AND WARSAV PACT COUNTRIES
AND THE SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS IN EUROPE

Figure 23
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Press and Information Office of the Federal Government
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