Importance of the South China Sea

US$5.3 trillion in ship-borne goods traverse the South China Sea annually, accounting for almost one-half of the world’s
shipborne trade in tonnage. Four leading exporting countries use the South China Sea for their maritime trade – China,
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Sixty-five percent of South Korea’s petroleum imports, 60% of Japan and Taiwan’s
petroleum imports, and 50% of China’s petroleum imports pass through the South China Sea.* Twelve percent of the
annual global fish catch comes from the South China Sea, worth US$21.8 billion. Two billion people live in 10 countries
bordering the South China Sea, and hundreds of millions of people depend on fish from the South China Sea for their
protein. The maritime areas close to the coast of countries bordering the South China Sea are rich in oil and gas. The
South China Sea is also rich in methane hydrates – which China considers its future source of energy.* https://
www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2
Importance of Sandbars and Rocks Above Water At High Tide

A sandbar or rock, above water at high tide even by a few inches, is an island entitled to a 12
NM territorial sea around it (Article 121, UNCLOS). This amounts to 155,165 hectares of
maritime space, more than twice the land area of Metro Manila of 63,600 hectares, and more
than twice the land area of Singapore 70,000 hectares. All the fish, oil, gas and mineral
resources within this huge area belong to the state that has sovereignty over the rock or sandbar.
 LTE Rock or Sandbar Within Territorial Sea

Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly within the territorial sea, the low-water
line on that low-tide elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea (Article 13 [1], UNCLOS).
 Root Cause of South China Sea
Dispute: Nine-dashed Line
Claim of China to 85.7% of
Waters and Resources of SCS

China did not explain the legal basis for

the dashes. The dashes had no fixed
coordinates.

“China has indisputable sovereignty

over the islands in the South China Sea
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over
the relevant waters as well as the seabed
and subsoil thereof.” - China’s Note
Verbale of 7 May 2009

The Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia

promptly protested China’s claim under
this dashed lines map. The Philippines
Nine-Dashed Line Map Submitted by China belatedly protested on 11 April 2011.
to United Nations on 7 May 2009
 Effect of Failure to Protest - Acquiescence
In international law, the oft-quoted definition of
acquiescence is —

[T]he inaction of a State which is faced with a situation

constituting threat or infringement of its rights xxx.
Acquiescence thus takes the form of silence or absence of protest
in circumstances which generally call for a particular reaction
signifying an objection.*

Silence or inaction can be interpreted as a state’s

acceptance of a factual or legal situation. This principle
applies to both territorial and maritime disputes.

* Ian C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 143
(1954).
 Ruling of Tribunal on other Coastal States’ Acquiescence
To China’s Maritime Claims under Nine-Dashed Line

“The extent of the rights asserted within the

‘nine-dash line’ only became clear with
China’s Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009. Since
that date, China’s claims have been clearly
objected to by other States. In the Tribunal’s
view, there is no acquiescence.”*
*(Para 275, Page 116, Award of 12 July 2016.)
 China’s Historical Narrative
To Claim the South China Sea

“Chinese activities in the South China Sea date

back to over 2,000 years ago. China was the first
country to discover, name, explore and exploit the
resources of the South China Sea Islands and the
first to continuously exercise sovereign powers
over them.” (China’s Position Paper of 7 December 2014
submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal)
 China’s 2013 Map with Ten Dashes
As China’s “National Boundaries”

•  In 2013, China released a new map of China, adding a 10th

dash on the eastern side of Taiwan. In its 2013 map,
China claims the ten dashes are its “national boundaries,”
without again explaining the legal basis or giving the fixed
coordinates for the dashes. The 2013 China map was
published by SinoMaps Press, under the jurisdiction of
China’s State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. This
means the 2013 Map is an official Chinese government
map.

•  In its Note Verbale of June 7, 2013 to China, the

Philippines stated it "strongly objects to the indication
that the nine-dash lines are China's national boundaries
in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.”
China Claims the Ten Dashes
In the 2013 Map Are China’s
“National Boundaries”
 Core Dispute: China’s Claim to 80 Percent of Philippine EEZ

Under the nine-dashed line, China claims the Reed Bank, James Shoal, waters within the EEZ of Vietnam,
and prohibits foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the high seas of the South China Sea without
permission from China. In short, China claims all the resources within the nine-dashed line, which
encloses 85.7 percent of the South China Sea. Under the nine-dashed line, China wants to grab 80
percent of the EEZ of the Philippines in the South China Sea.
 China’s Creeping Expansion in the SCS from 1946 to 2017
Before World War II, China’s
southernmost defense perimeter was
Hainan Island. Before the war, China
did not have a single soldier or sailor
stationed in any SCS island outside of
Hainan Island. In 1946, right after
the war, China (Kuomintang) took
over the Amphitrite Group of the
Paracels and Itu Aba in the Spratlys
following the defeat of the Japanese,
moving China’s defense perimeter
southward. China vacated Itu Aba in
1950 until 1956, when Taiwan
occupied Itu Aba. In 1974, China
fo rc i b l y d i s l o d g e d t h e S o u t h
Vietnamese from the Crescent Group
of the Paracels. In 1987, China
installed a weather radar station in
Fiery Cross Reef. In 1988, China
In 1995, China seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines, just 125 NM from
forcibly evicted Vietnam from
Palawan and 594 NM from Hainan. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal
Johnson South Reef, and seized Subi from the Philippines, just 124 NM from Luzon. In 2013, China seized Luconia
Reef from the Philippines, moving Shoals from Malaysia, just 54 NM from Sarawak’s coast. In 2014, China started
island-building on rocks and submerged areas in the Spratlys to construct air
further south China’s defense
and naval bases.
perimeter in the Spratlys.
China’s Air & Naval Bases to Control the South China Sea
China’s Grand Design in the South China Sea
China’s grand design is to control the South China Sea for economic and military
purposes. China wants all the islands, reefs, rocks, fishery, oil, gas and mineral
resources within the nine-dashed line. China already takes 50% of the annual fish
catch in the South China Sea as more than 80% of its coastal waters are already
polluted. China has the largest fishing fleet in the world, with 220,000 sea-going
vessels and 2,640 long-distance ocean-going vessels. China’s fish consumption is the
highest in the world considering China’s 1.4 billion population.

China is the largest net importer of petroleum in the world. China wants the lion’s
share of the oil and gas in the South China Sea. The Chinese estimate that the
South China Sea holds 130 billion barrels of oil, and if this is correct, the South
China Sea is as rich in oil as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. The South China
Sea is also rich in methane hydrates or “flammable ice” - said to be one of the fuels
of the future. One cubic meter of methane releases 164 cubic meters of natural gas.
China wants to secure all these methane hydrates for itself.

China also wants the South China Sea as a sanctuary for its nuclear-armed
submarines – free from surveillance by U.S. submarine-hunting Poseidon airplanes
or U.S. nuclear attack submarines. China wants a second-strike nuclear capability,
joining the ranks of the U.S. and Russia.
 Maritime Zones under UNCLOS

An island above water at high tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea (Article 3 & 121(1), UNCLOS). If such island is capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own, it is entitled to a 200 NM EEZ (Article 121(2), UNCLOS). If there is an outer continental shelf beyond
200 NM, the island is entitled to an ECS of 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ. The maximum maritime zone a coastal state can claim is
150 NM from the outer limits of its 200 NM EEZ (or 100 NM from the 2500 meter isobath (Article 76(5), UNCLOS), a limitation which does
not apply to coastal states in the South China Sea based on the geology and geomorphology of the South China Sea). China is claiming
maritime zones more than 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ, or more than 350 NM from its coastlines in Hainan Island or its mainland.
 Low Tide Elevation vs. Rock/Island

A low-tide elevation is not entitled to a territorial sea or any maritime zone. A rock above water at high
tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea (Article 3 & 121(1), UNCLOS). An island capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea, a 200 NM EEZ, and an outer
continental shelf of 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ [or 100 NM from the 2500 meter isobath, if
applicable] (Article 121(2) & Article 76(5), UNCLOS).
 China Seized Mischief (Panganiban) Reef in February 1995

The Philippine formally protested in 1995 China’s seizure of Mischief Reef. A protest is a
peaceful, non-violent and non-confrontational assertion of Philippine sovereign rights to
preserve and prevent waiver of such rights in view of the opposing claim or action of another
state.
China Seized Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal in 2012

Just as in 1995 when China seized Mischief Reef, the Philippines had no military capability to defend or
retake Scarborough Shoal in 2012 when China seized the shoal. The Philippines decided to bring the
dispute to a forum where warships, warplanes and nuclear bombs do not count - to an UNCLOS arbitral
Tribunal which would resolve the dispute solely based on the Law of the Sea. Robert Kaplan, in his book
Asia’s Cauldron, called this resort to international law the “ultimate demonstration of weakness.”
 Six Major Issues Raised in the Arbitration &
Resolved by the Annex VII UNCLOS Tribunal
1.  China’s claim to historic rights under the nine-dashed line is contrary to
UNCLOS, without lawful effect and cannot be the basis to claim any maritime
entitlement (territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and extended continental
shelf).
2.  No geologic feature in the Spratlys is capable of human habitation or economic
life of its own so as to generate a 200-NM EEZ that overlaps with Palawan’s EEZ.
3.  Mischief Reef, 125 NM from Palawan, is a low-tide elevation situated outside the
territorial sea of any state and therefore forms part of the continental shelf and
EEZ of the Philippines. Only the Philippines can exploit Mischief Reef and
construct structures on it.
4.  Reed Bank, 85 NM from Palawan, is completely submerged and within the
Philippine EEZ. Only the Philippines can exploit the natural resources in Reed
Bank.
5.  China severely harmed the marine environment when it dredged reefs to
reclaim or create artificial islands, and when it failed to prevent Chinese
fishermen from harvesting endangered species.
6.  Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled only to 12-NM territorial sea. Filipino,
Vietnamese and Chinese fishermen have traditional fishing rights in the
territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal.
 Ruling on China’s Claim to Historic Rights
Under the Nine-Dashed Line
•  The nine-dashed line has no legal effect and cannot serve as legal basis to
claim any maritime entitlement under UNCLOS. In short, “there was
no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the
sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”
•  China’s maritime zones, just like those of other coastal states, cannot
extend beyond the limits prescribed under UNCLOS. Maritime
entitlements must be claimed only from land.
•  All historic rights in the EEZ, ECS and high seas were
extinguished upon effectivity of UNCLOS: “[A]ny historic rights that
China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the
‘nine-dash line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the
Philippines and China, by the limits of the maritime zones provided for
by the Convention.”
•  “[T]here was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters [of the South China Sea] or their resources.”
The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue.
 High Seas and EEZs in South China Sea

“[T]he Tribunal concludes that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and non-living resources
within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent that it exceeds the limits of
China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention.” (Para 261, Award of 12 July 2016)
 High Seas and EEZs in South China Sea

“[T]he Tribunal concludes that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and non-living resources
within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent that it exceeds the limits of
China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention.” (Para 261, Award of 12 July 2016)
 Can the President Recognize that China
Co-Owns the West Philippine Sea?
The Constitution mandates that the “State shall
protect the nation’s marine wealth in its xxx
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.”

Under UNCLOS, the Philippines has exclusive

sovereign rights to explore and exploit the oil and
gas in its exclusive economic zone. The President
cannot cede, in whole or in part, this exclusive
sovereign rights of the Philippines in favor of China.
 1136 AD “Hua Yi Tu”

“The Philippines submits that Chinese historic maps dating back to 1136, including those
purporting to depict the entirety of the Empire of China, consistently show China’s territory
extending no further south than Hainan.” (Para 195, Award of 12 July 2016)
 1896 “Huang Chao Zhi Sheng Yu Di Quan Tu” or The Qing
Empire’s Complete Map of All Provinces

During the Chinese dynasties, Hainan Island was a part of Guangdong Province. Hainan
became a separate province only in 1988. The Qing Dynasty saw one of the largest expansions
of Chinese territory throughout the Chinese dynasties. The Qing dynasty ceded Formosa to
Japan in 1895 following the Qing’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).
China’s Southernmost Territory Through the Dynasties – Hainan (1894)
 1688 Coronelli Terrestrial Globe

Vincenzo Coronelli made this famous terrestrial globe in 1688. This map is one of the 12 gores (sections) of the 1688
globe. Famous for his atlases and globes, Coronelli was the Father General of the Franciscan Order. The Franciscans
arrived in the Philippines in 1578.
1734 Murillo Velarde Map – Mapa delas Yslas Filipinas*

Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica delas Yslas Filipinas

 Expansion of Southernmost
Territory of China Started in 1932

•  In 1932, the French occupied the uninhabited

Paracels. China sent a Note Verbale to the French
Government on September 29, 1932 protesting
the French occupation of the Paracels. In its
Note Verbale, the Chinese Government officially
declared:
 “Note of 29 September 1932 from the Legation of
the Chinese Republic in France to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Paris

On the instructions of its Government, the

Legation of the Chinese Republic in France has
the honor to transmit its Government’s reply to
the Foreign Ministry’s Note of 4 January 1932 on
the subject of the Paracel Islands.”

xxxx
“xxx The eastern group is called the Amphitrites
and the western group the Crescent. These groups
lie 145 nautical miles from Hainan Island, and
form the southernmost part of Chinese
territory.” (Emphasis supplied)

xxx [Source: Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,

Monique Chemelier-Gendreau, Annex 10, Kluwer Law
International, 2000]
 “Southernmost Part of Chinese Territory” – the Paracels

The Paracels - “These groups lie 145 nautical miles from Hainan Island, and form
the southernmost part of Chinese territory.” China’s Note Verbale to France of 29
September 1932
Status of Geologic Features in Spratlys
 Ruling on Status of Geologic Features in
Spratlys to Generate 200-NM EEZ
•  None of the geologic features (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys is capable of
“human habitation or economic life of [its] own” so as to be entitled to a 200-
NM EEZ.
•  Since there is no other EEZ that overlaps with Palawan’s EEZ, the Tribunal has
jurisdiction to rule on the maritime issues in the Spratlys.
•  To be entitled to a 200-NM EEZ, the geologic feature must have the “objective
capacity, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or
economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in
nature.”
•  Itu Aba, 45 hectares in area and the largest geologic feature in the Spratlys, is a
borderline case. However, historically, there has been no community of people
that ever inhabited Itu Aba because the natural conditions there could most
probably not sustain human habitation. Thus, Itu Aba is entitled only to a 12-
NM territorial sea.
•  The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue.
Seven Geologic Features Occupied by China in Spratlys
 Ruling on Status of Geologic Features in Spratlys -
Low-Tide or High-Tide Elevations, or Completely Submerged
•  Of the seven (7) reefs China occupies in the Spratlys, five (5) are high-
tide elevations (above water at high tide), namely: Fiery Cross Reef,
Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reef, Cuarteron Reef and McKennan Reef;
these reefs are entitled to 12-NM territorial sea.
•  Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation situated outside the territorial sea of
any state. Mischief Reef forms part of the Philippine EEZ. Only the
Philippines can erect structures on Mischief Reef. China’s structures on
Mischief are illegal. Ayungin Shoal is also a low-tide elevation outside
the territorial sea of any state, and therefore part of Philippine EEZ.
•  Reed Bank is entirely submerged and forms part of Philippine EEZ as it
is within 200-NM from Philippine baselines.
•  The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue except for
Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef, which the Philippines argued are only
low-tide elevations but the Tribunal ruled they are high-tide elevations
entitled to 12-NM territorial sea.
 Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef

McKennan Reef is a high-tide feature controlled by China within the Philippine EEZ in the
Spratlys. As a high-tide feature, McKennan Reef is entitled to a 12-NM territorial sea. The
other high-tide feature controlled by China in the Spratlys and within the Philippine EEZ is
Johnson South Reef.
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
 Before and After Reclamations

https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
http://www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea
 President Duterte: “Ignore the Missiles”
The Philippine Star reported on 19 February 2018:

Duterte admitted that China is building military facilities in the

West Philippine Sea, the area in the South China Sea being claimed
by the Philippines. He is convinced, however, that the military
installations are not intended for the Philippines.
“It's really intended for those who China thinks will destroy them
and that is America. We are not part of it,” the president said.
"There's negotiations for joint exploration. Can you beat that?
Ignore the missiles there. They are not for us," he added.

https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/19/1789428/duterte-
jokes-about-philippines-province-china#HkX3XImMi5P7qjeF.99
China’s Air & Naval Bases in
The Spratlys Will Enforce
China’s “National Boundary”
In the South China Sea
 Ruling on Harm to the Marine Environment
China violated its obligation under UNCLOS to “protect and
preserve the marine environment” when China:

1.  Dredged and built islands on seven (7) reefs;

2.  Failed to prevent its fishermen from harvesting
endangered species like sea turtles, corals and giant clams
in the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal.

The Tribunal ruled that China “caused permanent and

irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem.”

The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue.

This is the first time that an international tribunal applied the
UNCLOS provision on protection and preservation of the
marine environment.
Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal - High-Tide
Elevation Incapable of Human Habitation
 Ruling on Status of Scarborough Shoal;
Right to Traditional Fishing
•  Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide elevation entitled to
12-NM territorial sea but not to a 200-NM EEZ since
obviously it is not capable of human habitation.
•  The territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, including its
lagoon, is a traditional fishing ground of Filipino and
Chinese fishermen, as well as fishermen from other
countries; China cannot prevent Filipino fishermen
from fishing in Scarborough Shoal.
•  The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this
issue.
Disputed EEZ Area before the Ruling of Tribunal
 Disputed Area after the Ruling of Tribunal

The Tribunal ruled that McKennan Reef is above water at high tide. McKennan Reef and Johnson South
Reef are the only Chinese-occupied high-tide features within the Philippine EEZ in the Spratlys.
Scarborough Shoal, McKennan Reef and Johnson South Reef are thus the only disputed land features
occupied by China within the entire Philippine EEZ. The Tribunal ruled that these three land features
generate only a 12-NM territorial sea, with no EEZ.
The Philippines’ EEZ in the South China Sea
Is Larger than its Total Land Area
The Philippine EEZ in the SCS has an area of about 381,000
square kilometers. Deducting the 4,650 square kilometers
total territorial seas of Johnson South Reef, McKennan Reef
and Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines has an EEZ of about
376,350 square kilometers in the SCS free from any Chinese
claim.

This maritime area is larger than the total land area of the
Philippines of approximately 300,000 square kilometers.
All the living and non-living resources in this huge maritime
area – the fish, oil, gas and other minerals – belong
exclusively to the Philippines.
 China Claimed Reed Bank in 2010

In February 2010, the Philippines awarded a Service Contract to Sterling Energy (predecessor of Forum Energy) for Block SC 72 in the Reed
Bank. China protested, sending a Note Verbale to the Philippines on 22 February 2010, "express[ing] its strong objection and indignation,”
and asserting "indisputable sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Nansha Islands (Spratlys) and its adjacent waters.” China
demanded that the Philippines "withdraw the Service Contract immediately.” China sent another Note Verbale on 13 May 2010 again
demanding that the Philippines "immediately withdraw the decision to award the Service Contract” to Sterling Energy. Block SC 72 is 85
NM from Palawan, well within the Philippines’ EEZ, and 595 NM from Hainan. The entire Reed Bank is a fully submerged area even at
low-tide.
 China Reiterated its Claim to Reed Bank in 2011

In 2011, the Philippines invited bids for the exploration of Area 3 and Area 4 in the Reed Bank, well within
the Philippines’ EEZ. On 4 July 2011, China protested and sent a Note Verbale to the Philippines, stating:
“The Chinese government urges the Philippine side to immediately withdraw the bidding offer in Areas 3
and 4, refrain from any action that infringes on China's sovereignty and sovereign rights.”
 Chinese Coast Guard Vessels Harassed
A Philippine Survey Ship in Reed Bank in 2011

In March 2011, two Chinese coast guard vessels, the CMS-71 and CMS-75, prevented a Philippine-
commissioned ship, the MV Veritas Voyager, from undertaking oil and gas survey in the Reed Bank,
which is entirely within the Philippines’ EEZ. The nine-dashed line cuts through Malampaya, the
Philippines’ largest operating gas field which supplies 40% of the energy requirement of Luzon.
Malampaya will run out of gas in less than10 years.
 Ruling of Arbitral Tribunal on Reed Bank

The “Tribunal finds that China has, through the

operation of its marine surveillance vessels with
respect to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 to 2 March
2011 breached Article 77 of the Convention with
respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the non-
living resources of its continental shelf in the area of Reed
Bank.”
 Joint Development in the Reed Bank
Reed Bank, a fully submerged area, is within the
Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone as confirmed by
the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the Philippines has
exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the
resources in Reed Bank.

Since the Constitution mandates the State to “protect

the nation’s marine wealth in its xxx exclusive
economic zone, and reserve it use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens,” the Philippine
Government cannot enter into any kind of joint
development agreement with a foreign state or entity
that expressly or impliedly derogates from the
Philippines’ exclusive sovereign rights over Reed Bank.
Any such agreement is unconstitutional.
Sandy Cay, about 2 NM from Pagasa
 China’s Seizure of Sandy Cay
On the presence of Chinese navy, coast guard and fishing
vessels around Sandy Cay, President Duterte stated on
August 22, 2017: “Why should I defend a sandbar and
kill Filipinos because of a sandbar?” Asked what the
Chinese were doing in the sandbar, Duterte replied:
“Nagpa-patrol kasi magkaibigan man kami.” (They are
patrolling because they are my friends).
•  http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/08/23/1731846/rody-carpio-no-
need-fight-over-sandbar

The arbitral tribunal had ruled that Subi Reef, being a

low-tide elevation within 12 NM from the low-tide
elevation rocks of Pagasa, is within the territorial sea of
Pagasa and forms part of the continental shelf of the
Philippines. At the time of the ruling and before 2017,
Sandy Cay was unoccupied.
 Sandy Cay

Thitu Reefs: Survey by HMS Rifleman (1867), depicting Sandy Cay on reef west of Thitu. This
sketch is shown in the Award of July 12, 2016.
 Effect of China’s Seizure of Sandy Cay

When China dredged Subi Reef to build an artificial island, the

pulverized corals from the dredging drifted to Sandy Cay and increased
the elevation of Sandy Cay, which is now permanently above water at
high tide. Hence, Sandy Cay is now land or territory subject to
sovereign ownership, with its own 12 NM territorial sea and airspace.

Sandy Cay is located between 1 to 2 NM to the southwest of Pagasa,

between Subi Reef and Pagasa. If China acquires sovereignty over Sandy
Cay, Pagasa will lose over one-third of its territorial sea which will form
part of the territorial sea of Sandy Cay. Moreover, Subi Reef, being
within 12 NM from Sandy Cay, will form part of the territorial sea of
Sandy Cay, legitimizing China’s possession of Subi Reef.

In short, the loss of Sandy Cay to China will mean the loss of at least
one third of the territorial sea of Pagasa (at least 51,721 hectares or
more than three times the area of Quezon City of 16,530 hectares),
including Subi Reef.
Subi Reef, Sandy Cay and Pagasa
Subi Reef, Sandy Cay and Pagasa
Subi Reef, Sandy Cay and Pagasa
 Acquiescence Principle Applies to
Territorial and Maritime Disputes
Foreign Secretary Allan Cayetano:

“Let me assure you that everything is being done to protect

our claims. Unlike land disputes where if you don’t protest
it the other claimants could mature, that’s not the law of
the seas. xxx If it’s not theirs, it’s not theirs. It will not
mature into ownership.”*

Sadly and dangerously for the nation, Secretary Cayetano is

grossly mistaken. The principle of acquiescence definitely
applies to both territorial and maritime disputes.

* http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/cayetano-trust-us-in-dealing-with-china-on-scs-dispute/
 Ruling of Tribunal on other Coastal States’ Acquiescence
To China’s Maritime Claims under Nine-Dashed Line

“The extent of the rights asserted within the

‘nine-dash line’ only became clear with
China’s Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009. Since
that date, China’s claims have been clearly
objected to by other States. In the Tribunal’s
view, there is no acquiescence.”*
*(Para 275, Page 116, Award of 12 July 2016.)
Duterte: Chinese Ships Are Just There Around Sandy Cay
But China is Not Claiming Anything

1.  “We were not invaded,” President Rodrigo Duterte said last night. “It’s not
true. They are just there, but they are not claiming anything.”
https://www.news.com.au/world/a-chinese-fleet-appears-to-be-making-a-move-
on-another-contested-spratly-island/news-story/
26e4482961de30e07c55318a4ac269e2.

2.  “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” China’s Note Verbale
of 7 May 2009 submitted to the United Nations, together with the Nine-Dashed
Line Map.

3. Clearly, Chinese Coast Guard vessels are present around Sandy Cay to enforce
China’s nine-dashed line claim.
 Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc)

The lagoon of Scarborough Shoal has an area of 150 square kilometers or 15,000 hectares,
almost as large as Quezon City which has an area of 16,531 hectares.
 What is the Legal Basis of the Philippines’
Claim to Scarborough Shoal

•  The 1898 Treaty of

Paris between Spain
and the United States
drew a rectangular line
wherein Spain ceded
to the United States all
of Spain’s territories
found within the treaty
lines. Scarborough
Shoal lies outside of
the treaty lines.
 China’s Argument Why Philippines Does Not Have
Sovereignty Over Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated: "The

three treaties that stipulate the Philippines'
territory, the first in 1898, the second in 1900 and
the third in 1930, all regulated the Philippines'
western boundary line at 118 degrees east
longitude. Areas in the west of the 118 degrees
east longitude do not belong to the Philippines.
But the Nansha islands claimed now by the
Philippines, the Huangyan Islands, are all in the
west of the 118 degrees east longitude.” Speech on
25 February 2016 at the CSIS, Washington, D.C.
1900 Treaty of Washington between Spain & United States*

•  In the 1900 Treaty of Washington, Spain clarified that it had

also relinquished to the United States “all title and claim of
title, which (Spain) may have had at the time of the
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all
islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside
the lines” of the Treaty of Paris. Thus, under the 1900 Treaty
of Washington, Spain ceded to the United States all territories,
to which Spain had title or claim of title, lying outside the
lines of the Treaty of Paris. These territories outside the lines,
west of the 118 degrees east longitude, included Scarborough
Shoal and the Spratlys.

•  *Treaty between Spain and the United States for Cession of Outlying
Islands of the Philippines, signed on 7 November 1900.)
 Separated by a “Narrow Body of Water”
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in February
2016 in Washington DC, that China and the
Philippines are very close neighbors separated by just a
“narrow body of water” – referring to the sliver of
territorial sea and EEZ between the Philippine coastline
and the nine-dashed lines.
China considers the nine-dashed lines as the common
border between China and the Philippines, running
1,700 kilometers very close to the territorial sea of the
Philippines, just 64 kilometers off the coast of Balabac
Island in Palawan, the southernmost island in Palawan,
70 kilometers off the coast of Bolinao in Pangasinan,
and 44 kilometers off the coast of Y’ami Island in
Batanes, the northernmost island in Batanes.
China and Philippines “Separated by Narrow Body of Water”
 Gravest External Threat to Philippines Since World War II
The Philippines will lose 80 percent of its EEZ in the West
Philippine Sea, a maritime space as large as the total land area
of the Philippines. This is the gravest external threat to the
Philippines since World War II. The Philippines will lose to
China all the oil, gas, fishery, methane hydrates or
combustible ice, and other mineral resources within this huge
maritime space, including the gas-rich Reed Bank. The Reed
Bank is supposed to replace the Malampaya gas field when it
runs out of gas in less than 10 years. Malampaya supplies 40
percent of the energy requirement of Luzon.

Without a replacement for Malampaya, Luzon will have 10 to

12 hours of brownouts every day less than 10 years from now.
Factories will close and workers will be out of jobs. This will
devastate the Philippine economy. Unless there is assurance
of a replacement for Malampaya, no serious investor will put
up a new factory in Luzon during the Duterte administration.
 Next Steps – Enforcement of Ruling
Article 11, Annex VII, UNCLOS. “The award shall be
final and without appeal, unless the parties to the
dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate
procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to
the dispute.”

Article 300, UNCLOS. “State parties shall fulfill in

good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention xxx.”

Thus, China and the Philippines, which have both

ratified UNCLOS, have the obligation to comply in
good faith with the award.
 Two Aspects in Enforcement of Ruling

1.  Enforcement of the ruling by the world’s naval

powers with respect to freedom of navigation
and overflight for military vessels and aircraft in
the high seas and EEZs of the South China Sea.

2.  Enforcement of the ruling by the Philippines

with respect to its exclusive right to exploit the
resources of its EEZ in the South China Sea.
 Maritime Zones under UNCLOS

An island above water at high tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea (Article 3 & 121(1), UNCLOS). If such island is capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own, it is entitled to a 200 NM EEZ (Article 121(2), UNCLOS). If there is an outer continental shelf beyond
200 NM, the island is entitled to an ECS of 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ. The maximum maritime zone a coastal state can claim is
150 NM from the outer limits of its 200 NM EEZ (or 100 NM from the 2500 meter isobath (Article 76(5), UNCLOS), a limitation which does
not apply to coastal states in the South China Sea based on the geology and geomorphology of the South China Sea). China is claiming
maritime zones more than 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ, or more than 350 NM from its coastlines in Hainan Island or its mainland.
 World’s Naval Powers Will Sail and
Fly in the High Seas and EEZs of SCS
1.  The United States says its military forces will continue to operate in the
disputed South China Sea in accordance with international law. The US Chief
of Naval Operations John Richardson said, "The US Navy will continue to
conduct routine and lawful operations around the world, including in the
South China Sea, in order to protect the rights, freedoms and lawful uses of sea
and airspace guaranteed to all. This will not change.”* Just recently, U.S.
President Donald Trump approved a Pentagon plan that requires regular
challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.**

2.  France is urging the 27-nation EU to coordinate naval patrols in the South
China Sea to ensure a "regular and visible" presence in the disputed waters
illegally claimed by China xxx. The French government said the protection of
freedom of the seas is vital from an economic standpoint. It's also concerned a
loss of this right in the South China Sea might lead to similar problems in the
Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea, said Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le
Drian.***
* http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/20/476110/US-Navy-South-China-Sea
** http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/07/20/trump-pentagon-south-china-sea-plan/
*** http://en.yibada.com/articles/147065/20160731/france-urges-european-union-join-patrolling-south-china-sea.htm
 World’s Naval Powers Will Sail and
Fly in the High Seas and EEZs of SCS
3.  British Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Darroch stated that British Typhoon
fighter jets that visited Japan in October 2016 flew over the South China Sea in
their return flight to assert freedom of overflight. He added: “Certainly, as we
bring our two new aircraft carriers on-stream in 2020, and as we renew and
update our defense forces, they will be seen in the Pacific. And we absolutely
share the objective of this U.S. administration, and the next one, to protect
freedom of navigation and to keep sea routes and air routes open.”*

4.  Australian Defense Minister Marise Payne stated on 4 February 2017 at the
Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore that Australia military ships and aircraft will
continue to “operate in the South China Sea, as they have for decades,
consistent with the rights of freedom of navigation and freedom of
overflight.”** On 19 September 2017, Prime Minister Malcolm Thurnball
announced that six Australian navy ships had left Australia on 4 September
2017 to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea. This is the biggest
deployment of an Australian naval task force in 30 years.***

* http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-southchinasea-fighters-idUSKBN13R00D
** http://www.defensenews.com/articles/global-allies-call-for-continued-us-patrols-in-south-china-sea
*** http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/turnbull-orders-australian-warships-to-head-to-south-china-sea-for-military-exercises-drawing-
criticism-in-chinese-media/news-story/df9779c3572ae0fbd26df3057642739f
 World’s Naval Powers Will Sail and
Fly in the High Seas and EEZs of SCS
Without much publicity, the navy and air force of Japan
have also been sailing and flying in the high seas and
EEZs of the South China Sea. Likewise, the navies of
India and Canada have sailed in the high seas and EEZs
of the South China Sea.

The Philippines should welcome, and even encourage,

the navies of all UNCLOS member-states to sail in the
high seas and EEZs of the South China Sea to adopt by
state practice the core ruling of the arbitral tribunal
declaring without legal effect China’s nine-dashed line,
effectively affirming the existence high seas and EEZs in
the South China Sea.
High Seas and EEZs in South China Sea
 Significance of Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
Operations by Naval Powers in the South China Sea
The freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the South
China Sea by the world’s naval powers affirm the existence of high
seas in the South China Sea, and the existence of EEZs around such
high seas. Under UNCLOS, there is freedom of navigation and
overflight in the high seas and EEZs.
The waters and living resources in the high seas belong to all
mankind. The non-living resources in the seabed of the high seas,
beyond the extended continental shelf of coastal states, belong also to
all mankind. The living and non-living resources in the EEZs belong
exclusively to the adjacent coastal state.
In effect, the freedom of navigation and overflight operations of the
world’s naval powers enforce the core ruling of the arbitral tribunal
that since China’s nine-dashed line has no legal effect, there are high
seas in the South China Sea, and EEZs around such high seas. The
South China Sea can no longer become China’s Mare Nostrum.
 Weakening of Arbitral Award and
Frustrating Enforcement of Arbitral Award
1.  President Duterte stated: “I just want to patrol our territorial waters.
We do not go into patrol or join any [foreign navy] because I do not
want trouble. Territory is limited to the 12-mile limit. That is ours.
Hanggang diyan lang tayo.” (Inquirer.net, 13 September 2016, http://
globalnation.inquirer.net/144805/duterte-rejects-joint-patrols)

Any refusal to patrol Philippine EEZ in the West Philippine Sea

violates the command of the Constitution that the “State shall
protect the nation’s marine wealth xxx in its exclusive
economic zone.” If the Philippines announces to the world that
it will not patrol its EEZ in the West Philippine Sea despite the
arbitral ruling affirming that these waters form part of
Philippine EEZ, then that is a signal to China that there will be
no opposition from the Philippines to China’s expansion in the
West Philippine Sea. China will interpret this as a green light
to grab Philippine EEZ in the West Philippine Sea.
2. On 17 December 2016, upon arriving in Davao City after his state
visits to Cambodia and Singapore, President Duterte declared:
“In the play of politics now, I will set aside the arbitral ruling. I
will not impose anything on China.” http://
globalnation.inquirer.net/150814/duterte-says-hell-set-aside-arbitral-ruling-on-
outh-china-sea#ixzz4nWRuPn; http://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-says-wont-
impose-anything-china/302346/;http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/19/16/
duterte-on-pursuing-west-ph-sea-claim-not-this-time

In law, to “set aside” a ruling means to annul, void or abandon

the ruling. There is a well-recognized principle in international
law that unilateral declarations of heads of state on on-going
disputes can bind the state if accepted by other disputant states.

The President said “he will not impose anything on China.” So

how can the President ask China to comply with the arbitral
ruling if he will not impose anything on China?
3. “President Duterte said he would not stop China from building on a
disputed shoal near the Philippine west coast because it was too
powerful. Mr. Duterte made the statement in reaction to reports that
China would set up an environmental monitoring station on Panatag
Shoal (international name: Scarborough Shoal) off the coast of
Zambales province.
“We cannot stop China from doing those things. Even the Americans
could not stop them,” President Duterte said during a press conference
shortly before flying for his state visit to Myanmar.” (Inquirer.net, 20
March 2017, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/153556/duterte-cant-stop-china-
panatag)

Just because the Philippines cannot physically stop China from

building on Scarborough Shoal does not mean that the
Philippines should simply do nothing. Publicly announcing that
the Philippines cannot stop China is a signal to China that the
Philippines will not put up any obstacle to the construction of
any Chinese structure on Scarborough Shoal. China will
interpret this as a green light to construct on Scarborough
Shoal.
 Talk or War with China – False Option
The option for the Philippines is not to either “talk with
China or go to war with China.” This is a false option.
First, the Philippine Constitution prohibits war as an
instrument of national policy. Second, the UN Charter has
outlawed war as a means of settling disputes between states.
Third, a declaration of war requires two-thirds vote of the
House and Senate voting separately. Not a single
Congressman or Senator has advocated to go to war with
China to enforce the ruling.
In resolving the SCS dispute, war is not an option, and has
never been an option. That is precisely why when China
seized Scarborough Shoal in 2012, we did not send the
Philippines marines to retake Scarborough Shoal. We sent
our lawyers to The Hague to have China’s nine-dashed line
declared without legal effect.
 Real and Practical Option for the Philippines
The real and practical option for the Philippines is
to talk with China while taking measures to fortify
the arbitral ruling. We should talk with China on
the Code of Conduct, on the application of the
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)
not only for naval but also for coast guard vessels,
on conservation of fish stocks, on preservation of
the marine environment, on how our fishermen can
fish in Scarborough Shoal, and on safety at sea.
There are many other things to talk with China on
the South China Sea even if China refuses to
discuss the arbitral ruling.
 Enforcing and Fortifying the Arbitral Ruling

As we talk with China, we can enforce and fortify

the arbitral ruling in many ways:

1. The Philippines can enter into a sea boundary

agreement with Vietnam on our overlapping
ECSs in the Spratlys, based on the ruling of the
tribunal that no geologic feature in the Spratlys
generates an EEZ. Such an agreement
implements part of the arbitral ruling by state
practice.
2. The Philippines can enter into a sea boundary
agreement with Malaysia on our overlapping EEZ
and ECS in the Spratlys, again based on the
ruling of the tribunal that no geologic feature in
the Spratlys generates an EEZ. Such an
agreement also implements part of the arbitral
ruling by state practice.
Sea Boundary Agreements with Vietnam and Malaysia
3. The Philippines can initiate an agreement among
all ASEAN disputant states – Vietnam, Malaysia,
Brunei, Indonesia and Philippines – declaring
that no geologic feature in the Spratlys generate
an EEZ that could overlap with their respective
EEZs. The arbitral tribunal has ruled that no
geologic feature in the Spratlys generates an EEZ.
Even if only the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia will agree to this declaration, it will
clearly remove any maritime delimitation dispute
among them, leaving only the territorial disputes.
This will isolate China as the only state claiming
an EEZ from geologic features in the Spratlys.
4. The Philippines can file an extended continental shelf
(ECS) claim beyond our 200 NM EEZ in the West
Philippine Sea off the coast of Luzon. If China does not
oppose our ECS claim, the United Nations Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) will
award the ECS to the Philippines, similar to our ECS
claim in Benham Rise where there was no opposition. If
China opposes our ECS claim, China will have a dilemma
on what ground to invoke. If China invokes the nine-
dashed lines again, the UNCLCS will reject the opposition
because the UNCLCS is bound by the ruling of the
arbitral tribunal which, just like the UNCLC, was created
under UNCLOS. If China claims an overlapping ECS,
then China will be admitting that the Philippines has a
200 NM EEZ from Luzon that negates the nine-dashed
lines.
 Extended Continental Shelf from Luzon

China can raise two grounds to oppose the Philippines’ ECS claim before the UNCLCS. First, China can
again raise its nine-dashed line claim but the UNCLCS is bound by the award of the UNCLOS tribunal.
Second, China can claim that the Philippines’ ECS overlaps with China’s ECS but this means China
accepts that the Philippines has an EEZ from Luzon.
5. The Philippines can claim damages before an
UNCLOS tribunal for the “severe, permanent
harm” to the marine environment, as ruled by
the arbitral tribunal, that China caused within
Philippine EEZ in the Spratlys because of
China’s dredging activities and its failure to stop
Chinese fishermen from harvesting endangered
species.
6. If China will prevent the Philippines from
exploring and exploiting the gas in the Reed
Bank, which the Arbitral Tribunal has ruled is
within Philippine EEZ, then the Philippines can
file an arbitration case against China to recover
actual damages that the Philippines may suffer
from the failure to exploit the Reed Bank due to
China’s unlawful acts.
7. The Philippines can send its Navy and Coast Guard
vessels to patrol the Reed Bank and guard
Philippine-commissioned survey ships exploring the
Reed Bank. If Chinese military vessels or aircraft
attack the Philippines Navy or Coast Guard vessels,
the Philippines can invoke the Philippine-Mutual
Defense Treaty. The U.S. has officially clarified that
the South China Sea is covered by the Mutual
Defense Treaty. Thus, while the U.S. does not take
sides in the territorial disputes over geologic features
in the South China Sea, any armed attack on
Philippine Navy or Coast Guard vessels in the South
China is covered by the treaty.
8. In case China shows signs of reclaiming
Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines can file a
new case before an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to
stop the reclamation because any reclamation in
Scarborough Shoal will destroy the traditional
fishing ground common to fishermen from the
Philippines, Vietnam and China as ruled by the
arbitral tribunal.
Arbitration is Peaceful Means of Resolving Disputes

There are those who say that arbitration is not a

peaceful means of settling disputes between states,
echoing China’s reason for refusing to take part in the
arbitration at The Hague.
The UN Charter expressly recognizes arbitration as a
peaceful means of settling disputes (Para. 1, Article 33,
UN Charter).
Moreover, UNCLOS expressly provides that in case of
dispute arising from the interpretation or application of
the provisions of UNCLOS, any party to the dispute can
generally invoke arbitration as a legal means of settling
the dispute (Part XV, UNCLOS).
 Arbitration is Part and Parcel of Diplomacy
There are those who say that arbitration is not part of
diplomacy, and that the South China Sea dispute can only
be settled through diplomacy. It is, of course, basic and
fundamental, that arbitration is part and parcel of
diplomacy. Arbitration is one of the tools in the toolbox of
diplomats in negotiating the peaceful settlement of
disputes between states. An authority on this subject, Dr.
Claas D. Knoop, stated:
“Third party intervention in different situations of a conflict is nothing
new in international politics. It has become an established instrument in
the diplomatic toolboxes of many foreign services and governments
around the world. Two common forms of third party intervention are
arbitration and mediation.”*

* Third Party in Conflict Resolution: As Facilitator, Mediator, or Arbitrator, Dr. Klass D. Knoop,
October 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184539/295_Knoop.pdf
 Application of the Arbitral Ruling by other States

In July 2017, Indonesia named as North Natuna Sea its EEZ in the Natuna Islands facing the South China
Sea. Indonesia cited as basis the 12 July 2016 arbitral ruling, which declared that China’s nine-dashed line
has no legal effect and cannot serve as basis to claim any part of the South China Sea beyond what is
allowed under UNCLOS.*
*https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Jakarta-disregards-Beijing-renames-part-of-South-China-
Sea
 Declare the Spratlys an International Marine Peace Park
As a win-win solution to the territorial dispute in the Spratlys, (the Tribunal’s
ruling does not resolve the territorial dispute), all claimant states should suspend
for 100 years their territorial claims and declare all the low-tide and high-tide
features in the Spratlys, and an area of 3--NM around each feature, an international
marine peace park* for the benefit of all coastal states in the South China Sea.

This insures that the Spratlys will remain the South China Sea’s nursery where fish
spawn. The eggs and larvae of fish that spawn in the Spratlys are carried by
currents to the coasts of China, Vietnam, Luzon, Palawan, Malaysia, Brunei,
Natuna Islands, as well as the Sulu sea.

The claimant states will hold on to whatever islands/structures they now possess.
Only coast guard personnel and vessels can be stationed in the Spratlys. The
islands/structures can only be used for marine scientific research and eco-tourism.

There is a precedent to this. The 1994 peace agreement between Israel and Jordan
created the Red Sea Marine Peace Park in the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea.

* First proposed by Dr. John W. McManus in 1994, The Spratly Islands: A Marine Peace Park? Ambio, Vol. 23, No. 3,
May 1994; See also John W. McManus, Kwang-Tsao Shao and Szu-Yin Lin in 2010. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/00908320.2010.499303?journalCode=uodl20
Marine Ecologists from PROC, Taiwan, the Philippines and
Vietnam Support a Spratlys Marine Protected Area

1.  “Kwang-Tsao Shao, a marine-biodiversity expert at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica in

Taipei, says that at meetings that include his mainland peers, there is
consensus from ecologists on both sides of the strait that the region should be
set aside as a marine protected area.”*

2.  Prof. Edgardo Gomez, Philippine national scientist for marine biology, and
other marine biologists at the U.P. Marine Science Institute, support a marine
protected area in the Spratlys.**

3.  Professors Nguyen Chu Hoi and Vu Hai Dang, Vietnamese marine ecologists,
support a marine protected area in the Spratlys.***

* http://www.nature.com/news/south-china-sea-ruling-sparks-conservation fears-1.20279
** http://www.fpi.sais-jhu.edu/#!Marine-Peace-Park-Plan-Offers-Promise-for-South-China-Sea/c1qvb/
563ba7370cf28330832ed0fb
*** Nguyen Chu Hoi and Vu Hai Dang, Building a Regional Network and Management Regime of Marine Protected Areas in
the South China Sea for Sustainable Development, 18 J.INT’L WILD LIFE L. & POL’Y (2015).
 Dispersal of Eggs and Larvae of Fish

Of the total world annual fish catch, 12% comes from the SCS, valued at US$21.8 billion. The
SCS has 3,365 species in 263 families of fish. Bordered by 10 countries with two billion people,
the SCS is one of the top five most productive fishing zones in the world in terms of total
annual fish catch. (Boom or Bust, the Future of Fish in the South China Sea, U. Rashid Sumaila &
William W.L. Cheung, 2015) Fish consumption per person in Southeast Asia has increased
from 13.1 to 33.6 kg. in the last two decades.

 Major Fisheries Collapse
Could Lead to Mass Starvation

“If we don’t do this (establish a Marine Protected

Area), we are headed toward a major, major
fisheries collapse in a part of the world where
[that] will lead to mass starvation,” Prof. John
McManus warned on 12 July 2016 in a
Washington, D.C. forum organized by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.*

* http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-environment-20160713-snap
story.html
www.imoa.ph