GWANDA STATE UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENT

DEPARTMENT OF MINING ENGINEERING
EMI

COURSE NAME PEACE LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT

TRANSFORMATION
COURSE CODE 1101
LECTURER MR N NCUBE
EMAIL Xamukavalelwa4049@gmail.com
PHONE 2638428-24720EXT210
MOBILE NUMBER 263772760336
OFFICE ADDRESS 38 DUNCAN Road, Suburbs, BULAWAYO

BANDE TAKUDZWA BYRON G0207892L(conventional) bandetakudzwa12@gmail.com

g0207892l@students.gsu.ac.zw

ASSIGNMENT TWO
How would you demonstrate the linkages among Restorative Justice; ADR/Five Conflict
Management Styles and Conflict Transformation? Discuss with Examples from Africa. [25]
Due date: 30 November 2020
INTRODUCTION
Restorative justice has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human
history for all the world’s people (Braithwaite 1998:323). Taking one example, it appears that
during the time of the Roman Empire, victims could select between civil and criminal
proceeding. Non judicial forms of dispute resolution took precedence over state centered
remedies. Lacey (1988) however asserts that the shift towards court punishment as a way of
solving a conflict was a gradual one and in relation to that assertion, moving away from
restorative approaches towards retributive models in which crime is treated as a matter of fealty
to and felony against the monarch occurring simultaneously with decline of feudalism (McAnany
1978, Braithwaite 2002). Now reflecting to this trend, Christie (1977) commented on
the way in which conflict has been approached in terms of its resolution and later suggested for it
to be in phases thus following analogy brought to light by Burton (1972) of viewing conflict as
sex in which both should feel its pervasiveness and should enjoy it at the end with reasonable
frequency. Christie (1977) went on to conclude that the same analogy should be applied to the
issue of post conflict in conflict resolution. However from a restorative justice approach,
linking to conflict management and transformation, questions arise like, what does forgiveness
mean? Who has the power to grant forgiveness? Should pardon be offered to repentant
perpetrators? How do socio-political environments shape the discursive constructions on
forgiveness? (Eppel 2004). The essays reflects on these questions, critiquing the specific
details of linking the relationship of restorative justice, styles of conflict management and
conflict transformation as a step by step process which can modelled from African case studies
as these case studies “specifically from Africa” according to Tidwell (1998) are seen to thrive on
primordial social ethnic identities and metaphysical belief systems and seemingly, by
implication, lack clear-cut ideological agendas of post conflicts. Thus generally the essay will
briefly outline the conflict details and later post conflict.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Is a conflict resolution paradigm that brings together the victims, offenders and community
members to address and resolve a crime or dispute. It aims at restoration, reintegration and
community participation in tackling crime, disputes and related problems that affect them
(Doolin 2007). In relation, Ladan (2013) asserts that restorative justice takes many forms
such as compensation, reparation or apology and helps mend broken relationships.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Procedure for settling disputes other than litigation and it comprises of five techniques which are
facilitation, negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STYLES

Ways of handling conflicts. They are 5 styles of conflict management which are accommodating,
avoiding, collaborating, competing and compromising.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Is the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of
conflict. Shailor (2015) supports this as he defined conflict management as a comprehensive
approach that addresses personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions of conflict as a
catalyst for positive change in all of these areas. It mainly aims at enhancing learning and
group outcomes, including effectiveness or performance in a community or organizational
setting.

Profile

A clear demonstration would drive us back to the Rwandan Genocide. After the 1994
Genocide which was mainly due to the existence of ethnocentrism between its two main groups
the Hutus who were predominant farmers and the Tutsis who raised cattle as their way of life
(Gourevitch 1998). The genocide alarmingly emerged on April 7 1994 right after the deaths of
Rwanda and Burundi Presidents the previous day. Massacres erupted throughout Rwanda
against unarmed Tutsi civilians and targeted Hutu oppositionists (Gourevitch 1998, Human
Rights Watch 1994, Prunier 1995, Kinzier 2008, United Nations 1999). Statistically
an estimate of 800000 to 1000000 innocent civilians were killed (Moshman 2007).
Recognizing the historical narrative is essential to grasp how situation forces act as antecedents
to genocidal behavior. The social, political and economic influence leading to the 1994 disaster
was mainly due to the Belgians who were colonial rulers of Rwanda (Gourevitch 1998,
Prunier 1995, Shyaka 2005) granted to them by the league of nations Mandate after World
War 1. Tutsis due to their ethnic features and role in the society, in the eyes of the Belgians made
them more superior than Hutus and the minority Twas thus lead to the elevation of economic,
political and social power of Tutsis as a colonial vision of the Belgians (Prunier 1995). This
rather led to frustration which later led to aggression which was shown through the genocide
towards the Tutsis.

Moving on to post genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front took over after the 100 day spree of
violence (United Nations 1999). They actively went on to arrest suspected genocidaries up
until the end of 1995 when they did not have enough prisons. This rather did not show the
adherence of restorative justice as victims’ feelings, experience and concerns were not attended
to. This can be related to Robinson’s (2019) argument as he asserts that restorative justice
process provides victims with an opportunity to express their feelings, ask questions, have their
experiences, feelings, concerns and offering acknowledgements thus they have to be part of the
main judgment. This is when they realized they needed to address solving the conflict in an
audacious and creative way (Kinzier 2008) which entails greatly the mechanism of restorative
justice. Between 1998 and 1999, restorative justice was shown according to Mgbako (2005)
as officials of the republic and its citizens met regularly addressing the genocide (which points
out negotiation as an ADR technique, collaboration of every stakeholder in the conflict and non-
avoidance to the conflict) which was through the Ingando re-education camps which were
initially developed at the creation of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in
March 1999 as a tool to re-integrate those who had flee to come back to Rwanda (Thompson
2011, Mgbako 2005). In relation to efforts aiming towards peace building, the Gacaca
community court system which according to Karekezi, Nshimiyimana and Mutamba (2004)
was an informal justice system that relies upon voluntary participation of the community to help
expedite the prosecution of genocide suspects, to ease their reintegration into the community,
and to encourage communities to confront their own involvement in the genocide which clearly
entails restorative justice at its best. It was introduced as a way of empowering communities to
govern their own justice by providing a safe platform for survivors to confront the perpetrators
who have harmed them, thereby starting the process of healing and reconciliation (Gollwitzer
2011, Meder and Schmitt 2013) thus showing positive conflict transformation. Ingando
camps on the other hand were aimed at promoting the process of reconciliation, repairing the
damaged psychological resources of belongingness, social acceptance, stigmatization and
educate everyone new government policies as well as making peace in a way which brings about
everyone’s concerns and views (Des Forges and Longman 2004). Regarded as a means to
restore harmony within the community, the Gacaca has been successful because it involves all
Rwandans in search of the genocidal events without fear (hence showing that there was
collaboration and there was no avoidance), provides justice for the victims, allocate
responsibility to individuals who participated (hence accommodating those who perpetrated) and
creates a conducive environment thereafter (Africa Rights 2018). Though according to
Kalyiajin and Paloutzian (2010), they were three types of peace building that were shown by
Rwandans during the period of dialogues. There was episodic peace which was given to be
“taken to manage existing or potential conflict”, negative peace building which occurs when
measures are taken to ease the tensions between the groups in conflict actively engaged and
lastly episodic which was mainly shown soon after the genocide. Definitely positive peace
occurred as its results emerged. It occurs when “efforts to reduce structural violence, a proactive
process that promotes more egalitarian social arrangements as well as individual and collective
narratives that support the sustainable satisfaction to the basic needs for all people”. This
definitely gives account to the benefits of restorative justice as it links all victims, offenders and
community in the conflict. Ultimately the three peace building tools, the Vision 2020 which
was amended by both civilians and officials of Rwandan government, the constitution and the
development of the National and Reconciliation Commission were means to promote peace
consciousness among a deeply provided society. These measures became necessary to ensure
that the nation’s citizens are dedicated to resiliency, self-sufficiency, unity, reconciliation and
prevention of future conflict which definitely showed how Rwandans were managing the conflict
as they were “cooperative and accommodative” (Brouneus 2010).

The Sierra Leone socio-political conflicts and aftermath of the conflict could give us a clear
demonstration of the processes that lead to its peace building. Alie (2000) narrated that in
March 1991, Sierra Leone was plunged into anarchy when an insurgency force calling itself the
Revoluntary United Front (RUF) invaded the state borders with the aim of reintegrating the state
policies as they did not agree with it being a one party state under the governance of President
Joseph Saiduh Momoh filled with exacerbated corruption, nepotism, tribalistic and also viewed
as a state which lacked a popular mandate (Alie 2000, Shaw 2002, Lord 2000). The
conflict was fuelled by nearby states such as Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Libya as they
wanted to benefit economically from Sierra Leone’s natural resources (Lord 2000). The
conflict was periodic up until 1996 when the All People’s Congress was overthrown which rather
led to a larger conflict as another military coup (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) AFRC
emerged for democratic purposes which led to the rise to it power (Shaw 2002). Five thousand
people died including cabinet ministers, lawyers, journalists as the Revolutionary United Front
and its allies appeared in Freetown the capital of Sierra Leone with a larger force with women
and children sadly being used as human shields. To add on the damages, three thousand children
were abducted as rebel retreated and larger parts of the city were burnt to the ground (Alie and
Lord 2000).

The transition journey to peace building involved several actors. These included international
agencies both governmental and non-governmental and their local counterparts with the
inclusion of the Sierra Leone community (hence showing collaboration in peace talks). From the
Freetown incident United Nations, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States),
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOWASMOG) and local civil society organizations supported
the Kabbah governments in its efforts to make peace with the rebels (Kane et al 2004, Kelshall
2005). The Peace talks were objected into two phases, the first phase were the talks at Lome,
the Togolese capital between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government which after long and
often tortuous deliberations led to the signing of the Lome peace Agreement (Kane et al 2004)
hence “conciliation”. According to Harris (1998), the agreement was a significant
improvement on the 1996 Abidjan accord which was signed after the overthrowing of the All
People Congress (APC). It dealt with issues relating to the cessation of hostilities truth and
reconciliation, post conflict military and security issues for peace monitors, demobilization and
reintegration and the reconstruction of Sierra Leone human rights and socio economic issues. In
general, Lord (2000) asserts that the agreement offered great hope for achieving peace and also
equalizing the benefits of rebels and the offended (hence accommodativeness, assertiveness,
non-avoidance and cooperativeness gave a positive result). The second phase was after the
issuing out of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) act (showing positive peace
building). It served to seek assistance from traditional and religious leaders to “facilitate” its
public sessions and in resolving conflicts arising from past violations or abuses or in support of
healing and “reconciliation”. The commission enabled traditional, civil society and religious
elders in its truth seeking and reconciliation sessions in which among the above mentioned
were the perpetrators and victims of the tragedy (henceforth restorative justice as a platform for
perpetrators, victims and the community and also the issue of collaboration as a management
style). This established the encouraging of local rituals which were aimed at not cursing but
rather at holding memorials for the succumbed of the Freetown genocide and also traditional
ceremonies such as pouring of libations and cleansing rituals which was also seen as a way of
peace building as it acknowledged the significance of these rituals to the harmed. In relation,
Kelsall (2005) outlined that the commission performed general reconciliation ceremonies where
the perpetrators accepted their wrong doing and asked for forgiveness and the victims were also
encouraged to accept and gradually work towards forgiveness and reconciliation (hence they
were accommodating, assertive and not avoiding) . As they were working on the development
of positive conflict peace building, it was concluded that with regards to the Freetown incident, it
collected over eight thousand statements from different victims and perpetrators in all its 12
provincial district headquarter towns and they were attended accordingly.

Giving an account of the Acholi “chronic” political conflict, similarities can be drawn in relation
to Zimbabwean Gukurahundi of 1986 an how the post conflict was addressed. The conflict
background for the Gukurahundi genocide denotes the state orchestrated violence that was
unleashed upon the Ndebele speaking civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces between
1983 and 1987(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008, Kriger 2003, Lindgren 2005). At least 20000
Ndebele speaking people were killed when the Mugabe led Zimbabwe Africa National Union
(ZANU) regime deployed the North-Korean trained fifth brigade militia to Matabeleland and
Midlands (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). The killings, mass detentions, disappearances, torture,
rape and other gross human rights violations committed by the fifth brigade and other state units
were documented extensively in the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal
Resources Foundation Report (CCJP and LRF 2007).

However as the post genocide was characterized by the signing of the Unity Accord between
ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 (hence partly conciliation and less restorative justice shown), the
perpetrators of the genocide have not been held accountable and truth about the atrocities have
remained buried and heavily guarded by the government (Eppel 2004, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003).
In response to the amnesty they have been growing calls in Matabeleland for justice,
compensation, reburials and commemoration for the Gukurahundi (McGregor, Alexander and
Ranger 2000, p 262). Moreover Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) identified the flaws of the Unity
Accord as its failure to address issues such as the compensation of Gukurahundi victims.
However since Muller-Fahrenholz (1997) views conflict management as “restitution of the
human” and “the remission of guilt” in a forgiveness conception, this thus shows negative
conflict transformation as the offended in the genocide are still in call for justice (Allais
2007), as articulated by Bhangale, a participant of NewZimbabwe.com as he responds by
arguing that, “You won’t wish it away that way, justice never rots. We are waiting for justice”
(Doran 2015). Landilani adds that “our relatives were killed, our homes were burnt, and we
will never forget that we want justice (Mpala 2013). Thus with these comments there is no
shred of doubt that the Gukurahundi was not resolved well as it attest to the explosive legacies of
the post-colonial violence (hence shows avoidance, unassertiveness and unaccommodating). It is
evidence that forgiveness cannot be taken for granted as there is a need for critical reflection of
what it entails (Reisilg and Wodak 2001). However with the regime that committed the
genocide in power, the prospects of the victims granting for forgiveness to the perpetrators are
slim with some participant pressuring the Gukurahundi survivors to move on and focus on
rebuilding the nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). A recommendation can be adopted form
Lederach (1997) as outlines that all post-Gukurahundi initiatives should adopt a bottom-up
approach while prioritizing the victims and affected societies (Lederach 1997). This approach
should ensure that the felt needs of victims are well addressed thereby laying a firm foundation
for the sustainability of these initiatives (Lederach 1997, Moyo 1993).

The background of the Acholi conflict however was characterized by a one party state, Uganda
People’s Congress (UPC) led by Milton Obote, which had been in power for several years in the
Ugandan region (Gaima 2002). His rule of brutal dictatorship in which an estimate of 500000
people mainly Acholi were murdered in cold blood later led to the aggression of his
Commander’s Army General Amin who issued a military coup to overthrow Obote in power but
rather failed (Gaima 2002). The conflict vastly emerged in 1980 after the allegedly rigging of
elections by Obote to the Democratic Party led by Yuweri Museveni who decided to take up
arms in the Luwero bushes to wage a protracted war on the (UPC) government (Odongo 2003).
The conflict continued up until Obote was overthrown after the rising of a vast group led by
General Tito Lutwa who became the state president.

Moving on to his reforms towards peace building, Prah (1999) narrated that the “new de
facto” General Tito Lutwa acquired assistance from his neighboring countries to engage in peace
talks as he wanted them to act as the “mediators” which theoretically represents a conflict
management style. This lead to the initiation of comprehensive negotiations of all the
conflicting groups in what was known as the Nairobi peace talks with Kenya and other
neighboring countries acting as “facilitators”, which later led to the 1985 agreement which
was signed by all parties except Museveni’s rebel National Resistance Movement (NRM) which
tore the agreement apart which again shows a theoretical argument showing that the was “no
cooperation and rather was there collaboration” of another party in conflict transformation
(Erin et al 2005). This agreement introduced an ideology dogmatically according to Barber
(1998) referred to as Ten Points Programme ostensibly geared to bring about a fundamental
change in the governance of the country. However Latigo (2006) reported the agreement to be “a
transition stage which gave the Ugandans a second chance”, though the National Resistance
Movement (NRM) did not agree as they felt their views had not been heard relating to what had
happened before they were in power (Latigo 2006) hence avoidance and not
accommodating can be noted. This thus shows negative conflict peace building as some are
not satisfied by the outcome as similarly shown in Zimbabwe Gukurahundi thus the essay can
draw the same recommendation as those issued for the Gukurahundi atrocity.

CONCLUSION

In summation, the essence to appreciate and conform to certain scholarly perspectives of peace
building in post-conflicts should be considered. To take for example the Lederachian
framework in the Gukurahundi could lead to a positive peace building fair to all and thus to
some extent transform the economic, social and political status of the state. Since we cannot
avoid the issue of conflicts due to socio-political and economic differences, there are positive
conflict resolution mechanisms that can be adopted in relation to conflict peace building. The
Gacaca courts can be applicable as it gave positive outcomes in terms of its management and
transformation in the conflict. Given again that one aspect of the whole conflict resolution was
not applied, a negative outcome might be observed as shown in Acholi and Gukurahundi
atrocities.

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Lacey N. (1988) State Punishment Political Principles and Community Values. London
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Burton J. (1972) World Society. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

McAnany P. (1978) ‘Restitution as Idea and practice’, “The Retributive Prospect,” In J Hudson
and B Galaway (eds) offender Restitution in Theory and Action. Lexington, MA: Lexington
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Christie N. (1977) ‘Conflicts as property’, British Journal of Criminology 17(10); 1-5.

Tidwell A. (1998) conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of conflict Resolution. London:

Pinter.

Gourevitch P. (1998) We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families:
Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Karekezi UA., Nshimiyimana A. and Mutamba B. (2004) Localizing Justice: Gacaca courts in
post-genocide Rwanda: United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Kinzier S. (2008) Land of thousand hills: Rwanda’s rebirth and the man who dreamed of it. The
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 18, pp.201-224.

Prunier G. (1995) The Rwanda Crisis: History of a genocide. New York: Columbia Press
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Shyaka A. (2005) The Rwandan Conflict. Origin, development and exit strategies. Kigali.

United Nations. (1999) Report of the independent injury in the actions of the United Nations
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Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (2004)Reconciliation Final Report.

Wejkowska E. (2006) Doing Justice: How informal Justice System can contribute. Oslo
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Kane et al M. (2004) Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment. Legal vice Presidency. World Bank.

Alie JAD. (2000) Conflict in Sierra Leone: Rising from the ashes: New York: United Nations
Development Programme.

Shaw R. (2000) Remembering to forget: Report of local techniques of healing and reconciliation
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Lord D. (2000) ‘paying the price’: The Sierra Leone Peace Process. Accord Conciliation
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Harris WT. (1968) The Springs of Mende Beliefs and conduct: A discussion of the influence of
the Belief in the Supernatural among the Mende. Freetown: Sierra Leone University Press.

Abraham A. (2000) Liberia and Sierra Leone: History of misery and misery of history,
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Kelshall T. (2005) Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the truth and reconciliation
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Gaima EA. (2002) International Criminal Justice and Children.

Barber J. (1968) Imperial Frontiers, Nairobi: East African Publish House.

Latigo J. (2006) ‘The Acholi Traditional Conflict resolution in light of current circumstances,
Hotel Africana. Kampala.

Odongo O. (2003) “Causes of Armed Conflicts in Uganda”, Historical Memory Synthetic Paper.

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Prah K. (1999) “African Knowledge Production, Language and Identity.”

SEGMENT TOTAL ACTUAL MARK EXPECTATION STANDARD
MARK
Introduction 5% 5% Use of freeflow writing showing understanding of
subject and use of thesis statement telling what
the essay is about
Conceptual 5% 4% Defining key terms from acceptable scholars
Framework
Discussion 75% 68% Balancing facts, views, citations, Balancing facts,
views, citations, use of models and theories to
justify and or qualify a matter under review
Conclusion 5% 4% Restating/submitting major points raised by the
essay in a conclusive manner, showing the side
taken by writer and reasons, recommendations
here necessary
Referencing 5% 5% Last page of the essay with the appropriate type
and style of referencing specified
Presentation 5% 5% The layout, flow of argument, arrangement of
facts and debate direction, nuancing of academic
arguments with application of examples to
establish facts
TOTAL MARK 100% 91% Total marks earned from the breakdown

LESS Late 0% 91% Assignments must of necessity be submitted

Submission before, or by the Due Date at all time.