Hamid - 1994 - Population Displacement and Household Coping Strategies in Sudan

Population Displacement and
Qousehold eoping Strategies in

Sudan: The View from Greater
Khartoum1
Gamal Mahmoud Hamid
University of Khartoum
uring the past ten years, massive population displacements have been the
most visible manifestation of crisis in the socioeconomic development of
the Sudan. The severe droughts that hit western and eastern Sudan in 1983 and
1984, and the armed strife which has escalated in the southern region since
mid-1983, have coalesced to make the post-1983 period a disastrous one in which
millions of people have fled their homelands in search of sustenance and a safe
refuge.
The prevailing situation during the mid-1980s was depicted succinctly as
follows:
Ten years of drought in Sudan have taken their toll. For the last two
years, upwards of 2 million people have been affected by the drought.
Thousands have converged from the west [Kordofan and Darfur
regions] onto the national capital to stay encamped just outside it.
Others (nearly 1 million) have migrated southward. In the
[northleast, conditions are also dire: more than half a million Beja
people are threatened with extinction, according to some sources.
O n top of that, the number of refugees from Chad, Eritrea, and
Ethiopia in Sudan has risen to more than a million, and 1,500 are
coming every day from Eritrea and Ethiopia alone. (Sudanow,January
1985:9)
By early 1985, some 400,000 drought- and famine-displaced Sudanese
people were estimated to have taken refuge in the national capital, Greater
Khartoum (Commission of the Displaced, 1990:2). Following the good rains
of 1985-1986, many of them voluntarily returned home. However, several
thousand households are still reluctant to d o so either because their herds
were obliterated by the drought or their farms and pastures have been
completely covered by the creeping desert. Others have managed to assimi-
'I am grateful to Dr. Seteney Shami, and to the participants in the Study Group on the Social
Ipplications of Population Displacement and Resettlement held atYarmoukUniversity in July 1991,
for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Special thanks to ProfessorsJohn Friedrnann.
Peter Marris. and Gerry Hale, of the University of California, Los Angeles. The research on which
the paper is based was supporied by grants from the Rockefeller Foundadon, through its African
Dissertation Internship Awards. and the Population Council through iu Middle East Research
Awards Program in Population and Dcvclopment (MEAwards). The Ford Foundation and the
University of Khartoum provided invaluable fiilaiicial support. I am deeply indebted to these
institutions for their generous support.
47
48 POPULATION DISPLACEMENT
AND RESETTLEMENT
late and gain employment in Greater Khartoum. A new wave of population

displacement from northwestern Sudan to Greater Khartoum started in late
1990 due to a dearth of rains for two consecutive years (Hiltzik, 1991:A1),
but fortunately the rainy season of 1991 was plentiful.
This situation is aggravated by a vicious civil war that has been ravaging
southern Sudan since mid-1983, with sporadic incursions into the southern
parts of the Blue Nile and southern Kordofan provinces. Nobody knows for
sure how many people have perished since the war started. As of 1989, the
number of those who starved to death, were killed, or died because of
epidemics unleashed by the war was estimated at 200,000-300,000 people
(Alier, 1990:261; Peace and Foreign Relations Commission, 1990:106).
About 4 million southern Sudanese people were estimated to have been
displaced (Commission of the Displaced, 19903). Some 425,000 of them had
crossed the border, primarily into Ethiopia and Uganda as refugees (United
States Committee for Refugees, 1990:47) ,2 while the remainder have mi-
grated to northern Sudan. Apart from a few thousand households who have
returned to their homelands in the south, the vast majority of civil war
nuzihem3 still await a permanent settlement of hostilities.
The displacement process has been traumatic for the millions of people
who have been uprooted from their homelands. Hardships include the loss
of dear ones, the abandonment, destruction, or confiscation of their posses-
sions, the specter of having to seek refuge in alien lands, or as in the case of
the Dinka households who have taken refuge in southern Kordofan, among
hostile communities who had played a deplorable part in their own plight
(Mawson, 1991; see also Umbadda in this volume), and finally, the ultimate
sojourn in a bustling metropolis amidst resentful people who view them as a
source of their own hardships. Every day entailed more suffering and agony.
Pastoralists who have lost most or all of their herds have become severely
impoverished. Without considerable external assistance, they may never
recover their lost assets. The plight of people displaced from the south is
compounded further when they move to the north, where the majority of
the population are ethnically and culturally different. Ethnicity and the
language barrier (the imperative of learning to communicate in Arabic)
constitute heavy constraints on their prospects for gaining employment, or
of assimilating with the local population. This problem is less severe for the
migrants and nuziheen from western Sudan, who share many cultural traits
with the population in the north (uiz., religion and language).
2Since the change of government that took place in Ethiopia in June 1991, most of the Sudanese
refugees fled Ethiopia to southeasternSudan.
q h e term nazih (pl. mi-) refers to a person who relocates from one place to another. It has
gained wider use in the last 8 years in reference to Sudanese nationalsdisplaced within the country.
Therefore it facilitatesdistinguishinga wihfrom a hji (i.e., an internationalrefugee or a Sudanese
national who has taken refuge in another country).No special term is used for voluntary migrants
but it is generally understood that they constitute a separate group from the other two categories.
STRATEGIES
COPING IN SUDAN 49
The conventional response to the plight of displaced people in Sudan has

been to congregate them in physically and socially peripheralized mo'skurut
(camps) lacking many of the basic necessities of life.4 There they become
dependent on intermittent relief handouts and develop a high degree of
dependence and powerlessness that is damaging to their own self-esteem and
to the national economy. Unable to provide sufficient relief to such large
numbers of uprooted people, Sudan has come to rely on the assistance of other
countries and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), Yet external relief tends
to wane once the horrible and immediate manifestations of the disaster are
palliated and the television screens stop showing images of the victims. Long-
term responses to the trauma of displacement are often ignored in the rush to
provide immediate relief to the victims. On the other hand, hurried 'repatria-
tion' programs that do not start with rebuilding the destroyed economic and
physical infrastructure are likely to compound the suffering and lead to further
starvation and/or migration.5
The large numbers of nuziheen who have taken refuge in urban areas has
escalated the pace of urbanization in Sudan. For instance, Greater Khartoum
has received more than 1 million displaced southerners since 1983. Conse-
quently, its population has doubled from 1.8 million in 1983 (Department of
Statistics, 1987:Table 1) to 3.6 million in early 1990 (Doxiades et ul., 1990),
exhibiting an extreme case of hyperurbanization with an annual growth rate of
10.5 percent. Already deficient in their food supplies, housing, social services
and infrastructure, urban centers cannot accommodate the unexpected arrival
of large numbers of destitute nuziheen without considerable hardship to their
original inhabitants. As the reception period of displaced people has lingered
on, the initial sympathy of urban dwellers and local authorities has dwindled.
Consequently, the preferential treatment in the distribution of relief, water, and
medicine accorded initially to the nuziheen has changed to resentment and/or
hostility. I t is not inconceivable that the bulldozers of local authorities will one
day raze their way through the mo'skarat, which over time have become indistin-
guishable from other squatter settlements.
Objectives and Research Strategy

This paper has two primary objectives. The first is to examine the dynamics of
population displacement in the Sudan. Of particular relevance is the relation-
4Mo'skaraf (sing. mo'skar) literally mrans camps. Prior to 1984. the term was used primarily for
military camps and was hardly used in reference to civilian habitat within Greater Khartoum. Its
wider adoption afterwards in reference to displaced peoples' housing, seems to be a result of a
perceived transient status of the displaced. Two groups were influential in popularizing the use of
the term: the state and relief agencies. Both entities were active in delivering services and relief
supplies to the displaced and wanted to differcntiatr their target groups from the rest of the
population.
%Strictly speaking, repatriation applies to rrfugees who return home after spending some time in
anofher country. The displaced who remain within their own country of origin are not refugees
according to the definition adopted by the IJNHCR and other international institutions.
AND RESETTLEMENT
ship between the root causes and the immediate precipitating forces of displace-
ment. The second objective is to analyze the ramifications of displacement on
the naziheen and on their host communities. Emphasis is placed on the coping
strategies of the nuziheen who have taken refuge in Greater Khartoum, the hub
of economic and political life in the Sudan, and the uncontested destination of
migrants from all over the country.
More than just a theoretical interest, the focus on the coping strategies of the
displaced is motivated by a practical interest in identifying the effectiveness of
these spontaneous strategies. Thus, the constraints that impinge upon the lives
and livelihoods of the displaced can be readily identified, and, it is hoped,
addressed through public policy and/or popular initiatives.
In order to achieve the second objective, I conducted a field study of a sample
of households during 1990. This study involved structured household inter-
views, informal interviews with community leaders, civil servants, and relief
workers, and the analysis of direct observations recorded during numerous visits
to many settlements over that period. The household questionnaire was de-
signed to collect data on the household at large, as well as on the household
head as designated by the members themselves. This combination was necessary
because some sustenance activities (e.g.,seasonal migration, employment in the
formal sector, etc.) are usually undertaken by the household head only. The
objective of the questionnaire was not the collection of infinitesimal details
about each household but to identify its livelihood strategies, assimilation
processes, and future prospects.
The field research was conducted in the spontaneous settlements and tran-
sient housing which provide most of the migrants with their first abode in
Greater Khartoum. Using cluster sampling, 450 households were randomly
selected and interviewed from nine settlements: (1) Mo'skar Wad al-Basheer,
(2) Mo'skar Zagalona, (3) the northwestern edge of Umbadda, (4) Mo'skar
al-Muwailih in Omdurman, ( 5 ) Mo'skar al-Izbah, (6) Kartoan Kassala, (7)
Tayibat al-Ahamida, (8) at-Takamol/asSiriha in Khartoum North, and (9)
Mo'skar as-Suq al-Markazi in Khartoum (Map l).6 These settlements were
selected from a pool of 96 unplanned settlements which together accommo-
dated some 60 percent of Greater Khartoum's population (Doxiades et al.,
1990). Kartoan Kassala, at-Takamol/as-Siriha, Tayibat al-Ahamida, and north-
western Umbadda are relatively old areas of sakan 'shwaee' inhabited primarily
by voluntary migrants, with much smaller proportions of nariheen. By contrast,
the selected mo'skurut are known to have high concentrations of naziheen from
6Mo'skar as-Suq al-Markazi itself was a large mo'skurcomposed of six quarters, or smaller mo'skarul,
each dominated by a particular ethnic group. It was formed by relocating displaced households
from different parts of Khartoum at different times.
'The term sakan 'shwwe literally means haphazard, unplanned housing. It was coined in the last 15
years or so to refer to unauthorized self-help housing. The outcome of'this process, ie., the
settlements, are also called sakan 'shwute. Alternative terminology includes squatter settlements,
informal housing, shantytowns, etc.
STRATEGIES
COPING I N SUDAN 51
MAP I
LOCATION OF THE SURVEYED SETTLEMENTS WITHIN KHARTOUM
GREATER
Note: Since late 1991, the government has embarked on an aggressive campaign to
relocate the mo'skurut and some of the suhun 'shwuee to the outskirts of Greater
Khartoum. Hence, some of the surveyed settlements no longer exist. The new
relocation sites are situated to the west of Umbadda, east of at-Takamol/as-Siriha,
and southwest of as-Suq al-Markazi.
Source:Adapted from Alirnatl (1985)

AND RESETTLEMENT
the drought-stricken areas of western Sudan and the war zone in southern and
southwestern Sudan. Thus, the selected settlements included a diversified
population that made possible comparisons between different kinds of migrants
- viz., wardisplaced, droughtdisplaced, and voluntary migrants.
The household, defined as a co-resident group of people who may or may
not be related to each other and who make collective decisions pertaining
to the consumption and allocation of common resources, was chosen as the
unit of analysis for the survey. It is generally recognized that the household
plays an important role in mediating a large set of behaviors and decisions
such as participation in the labor market, consumption patterns, and migra-
tion (Schmink, 1984:87). Furthermore, a focus on the household has the
potential of bridging the analytical gap between microeconomic approaches,
which concentrate on atomistic behavior, and historical-structural ap-
proaches, which focus on social phenomena at the macro level (Wood, 1982).
Thus, the household approach is bound to generate data that capture the
essence of the social context under study.8
Households may be regarded as economic units since they actively engage in
the production and consumption of goods and services. Additionally, they may
be viewed as political units because they arrive, through negotiation and/or
coercion, atjoint decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods. The household,
of course, is not a homogenous unit. Conflicts of interest among household
members (e.g.,along gender and age lines) do arise and are likely to affect the
behavior of the household as a collectivity. Households, then, can be considered
as miniature political economies that have a territorial base” (Friedmann,
“
1992:59).
The general objective of each household is not simply to subsist and repro-
duce itself. It also has the objective of improving its material conditions through
expanded production. Households, therefore,
engage themselves actively and aggressively in what seems to be a
constant process of producing and reproducing, at a minimum, a level
of income permitting them to survive, and at a maximum, a process
of household economic growth and development (Fass, 1988:xm).
This process of production and reproduction is always constrained by forces
beyond the control of the individual household. (For instance, legal and
political institutions affect the household’s access to productive resources such
as land, water, and capital). The livelihood of each household is determined by
the effectiveness of the strategies it adopts to sustain itself within the limitations
imposed by the socioeconomic and physical environments, as well as its own
internal limitations embodied in its material and human resources.
8The household may not be the appropriate unit of analysis in studies that deal, for instance, with
collective consumption of services,in which case the neighborhood or village is more appropriate.
Furthermore,notwithstandingthe large number of studies on “household survival strategies” that
focus on low-income groups, the concept is not confined exclusively to the poor. High-income
households also adopt sustenance activities, albeit quite different from those employed by the poor.
COPING STRATEGIES IN SUDAN 53
The Dynamics of Population Displacement in the Sudan

Displacement is defined here as the uprocess of collective dislocation and/or
settlement of people away from their normal habitat by a superior force”
(Shami, 199O:l). The merit of this formulation is that it avoids the futile
dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary migrations, shifting the empha-
sis instead to displacement as a social process deeply rooted in the social
context under study. This conceptual framework recognizes that the forces that
induce people to relocate from their normal habitat overlap and may give rise
to one another (Shami, 1990:8).Indeed, these forces constitute a continuum,
at one extreme of which are life-threatening forces that leave no choice for
people but to relocate. At the other extreme are personal aspirations for a
“good life” and upward social mobility, which for most people is not an
adequate migration-inducing force on its own. In between these extremes is a
wide array of forces, such as poverty, unemployment, inadequacy of services,
etc., that have a differential impact on people depending on each household’s
repertoire of tangible assets and human resources. In this paper, in order to
distinguish between the different kinds of migrants, I shall reserve use of the
term displacement only for dislocations caused by life-threatening forces such
as war, severe famine, the spread of epidemics, and lack of potable water. On
the other hand, dislocations induced by poverty, unemployment, and lack of
services will be termed voluntary migrations even though they also originate in
response to deprivation and hardship.
To begin to understand the enigmatic process of displacement in Sudan, I
propose to utilize the framework adopted by Curtis et al. (1988:5) for analyzing
famine - a principal force behind the displacements under study. They identify
three categories of causation for famine: i) long-tenn (structural) factors which
render a large number of people poor and vulnerable; key amongthese are lack
of economic development or alternative means of subsistence, and long-term
environmental degradation; ii) immediate precipitatingfactors such as droughts,
epidemics, wars, and floods which instigate a series of effects, such as failure/de-
struction of crops, escalation of food prices, and breakdown of services; and iii)
relief failure, which usually results from the inability of governments and aid
agencies to deliver relief expeditiously to the affected people. The first two
categories correspond, respectively, to the “causes” and “agents” of displace-
ment in the conceptual framework suggested by Shami (1990).
Although the agents of displacement observed in western and northeastern
Sudan (uiz., droughts, desertification, and famine) were different from those
observed in southern Sudan (viz., war, famine, and epidemics), the structural
causes behind them overlap considerably. Regionally and sectorally biased
development policies adopted by colonial and postcolonial governments have
concentrated most national development funds in the “modern,” large-scale
agricultural sector centered primarily in eastcentral Sudan. The resultant
stagnation of the traditional” agriculture in the neglected regions, coupled
“
with unchecked population growth, has had an adverse impact on people’s

AND RESETTLEMENT
livelihoods. In order to make ends meet, and to ensure their economic viability,
peasants and pastoralists in western and eastern Sudan have resorted to destruc-
tive patterns of land use: ie., overgrazing, overcultivation, and clearing forests
to expand cultivable land and/or sell firewood and building materials. These
destructive practices pave the way for encroachment of the desert on fertile
lands and pastures, and hence have long-term detrimental consequences for
the economic survival of peasants and pastoralists.
The combined effects of underdevelopment and destructive resource exploi-
tation have been mass impoverishment and vulnerability. The severe drought
of 1983-1984, which was part of a long-term decline in rainfall experienced
throughout the African Sahel since the mid-l960s, was only the final straw that
led to the total collapse of the rural economy in western and northeastern
Sudan, uprooting millions of people from their homelands. Hence, the resul-
tant famine can best be described as a chronic, man-made disaster rather than
a natural one.9
On the other hand, the civil strife between the north and the south is deeply
rooted in: i) weak national sentiments between heterogenous peoples who share
the same territory, yet have little in common in terms of a common culture or
history; ii) bitter memories of a distant past marred by human enslavement in
which various people from the north and south, as well as expatriates, were
involved in one form or another; iii) a series of mistrustful acts, unkept promises,
and dishonored agreements which precipitated a deep sense of mistrust be-
tween southerners and northerners; and iv) colonial policies and other histori-
cal forces that facilitated domination of the economy and the state apparatus
by northern elites, who used it to perpetuate the subordinate position of the
South vis-a-vis the north (Hamid, 1992a:86-98). The end result of this situation
has been a lack of socioeconomic development in the south. The very small
window of opportunities open to southerners minimizes the marginal cost of
rebellion.
By early 1984, the sporadic defection of discontented southern troops,
officers, and civilians had blossomed in to a well-organized resistance movement
(the SPLM/SPLA, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army), in which a
guerilla war was waged against the central government.A number of tactics were
used by the SPLA to strengthen its hold in the south, by the government’sarmy
in order to crush the rebellion and to deprive it of its support bases, and by
some tribal militias, which exploited the situation to enrich themselves and to
weaken their rival tribes. These included destruction of crops, confiscation of
livestock, and killing and/or home-burnings of suspected collaborators (Am-
nesty International, 1989). This state of affairs exacerbated famine conditions
91n their study of the consequences of famine on the family and society,J e l l i e and Jelliffe (1991)
categorize disasters into acute and chronic disasters. Examples of acute disasters include earth-
quakes, volcanoes, cyclones, etc., while chronic disasters are exemplified more than anything else
by famine, usually a product of environmental and social imbalances that interact for many years
before culminating into famine.
C O P I N G STRATEGIES IN SUDAN 55
and led to a virtual collapse of services - hence, to outbreaks of epidemics in

the south. Accordingly, massive population displacements from the ancestral
homelands to areas of refuge in the north or across the national borders has
taken place.
In addition to the above-mentioned causes and agents of displacement, the
inadequacy of relief efforts exacerbated the situation considerably. The central
government was very slow in recognizing the early signs of famine during
1983-1984 and in responding to the crisis when it developed. Disbursement of
cereals from the public silos in eastern Sudan to the famine-stricken regions did
not start until April 1984 (Shepherd, 1988). Hampered by an inefficient trans-
portation system, the relief consignments did not reach their targeted popula-
tion in a timely manner so as to avert the loss of assets, displacement, and death.
In the southern region, both the government and the SPLA had refused to allow
safe passage of food shipments to the areas controlled by the ‘enemy’ (Bonner,
1989:86; Voorhis, 1989:30; Minear, 1991:12). Succumbing to international pres-
sure, the two warring sides agreed to cooperate in massive relief efforts (Opera-
tion Lifeline) spearheaded by the United Nations during 1989, 1990, and 1991.
But in the absence of total peace, the effect of these efforts has been at best
fragmentary and inadequate.
Thus, in addition to physical insecurity, the lack of food and medical supplies
has been a principal displacing agent in southern Sudan. Evidently, the civil war
has replicated in the south over the past few years the same conditions of mass
destitution and vulnerability that developed in the north over several decades
(Duffield, 1990a). In essence, famine in southern Sudan is also a man-made
disaster resulting from destruction of the means of livelihood and denial of
access to food and essential services under political and military pretenses.
Afflicted with these disastrous conditions, people have reacted in two ways.
First, there are those who have refused to abandon their ancestral lands.
Secondly, there are those who have moved on and who strive to reconstitute
their lives wherever they can. This paper focuses on the coping strategies of the
second group. I t analyzes their living conditions and assimilation processes, the
conflicts between the aspirations of‘the nazihem and those of policymakers, and
the emerging social changes occurring among the nuziheen themselves and
within the host community of Greater Khartoum.
Primary Motives for Migration: Displacement Versus Voluntary

Migration
Notwithstanding the considerable overlap and interdependence between the
migration-inducing forces, the respondents were asked to identify what they
considered to be the kqr factor behind their emigration. Some 19 percent of
them reported migrating because they were badly affected by drought and
famine, 33 percent because of the physical insecurity caused by the civil war, 41
AND RESETTLEMEN?
percent in search of employment, and the remaining 7 percent in search of

services and amenities.
Apparently, ownership or access to productive resources in the homelands
was very high. Almost all the respondents had owned some tangible assets in the
form of arable land, livestock, tools and implements, and merchandise. About
one-half reported that they had designated a relative or friend to be in charge
of their assets in their absence, while one-third reported that all of their assets
were lost either because of the drought or the civil war. Except for a very small
percentage that reported assets sold or transferred to Greater Khartoum, the
remainder of households abandoned their assets and knew nothing about them.
Human suffering and perceptions of danger were clearly reflected in the
responses: the majority of the surveyed households reported that they lost a
household member, a relative, or a neighbor because of the war and/or the
famine. Similarly, most of them believed that they would have been killed or
have died from hunger and epidemics had they stayed in their homelands.
Based on what the respondents considered to be their prime motive for
migration, and supported by data on the premigration conditions, a strong case
can be made for categorizing the respondents into wardisplaced, droughtdis-
placed, and voluntary migrants. In addition to the self-reported primary motive
for migration, the nuziheen typically lost a substantial portion of their assets and
some of their relatives or neighbors, and considered themselves to have been
physically endangered by the war or the famine. The voluntary migrants, by
contrast, rarely lost assets or lives. Although some of them experienced consid-
erable hardship in their homelands resulting from long-term droughts, deser-
tification, and declining real incomes, most of them did not consider themselves
to have been in any real danger. Hence, they had relatively more volition in the
migration decision than the displaced. This categorization helps focus atten tion
on the nuziheen as a disadvantaged segment of the population which deserves
special attention in policy formulation.
Those reporting the search for services and amenities as a reason for their
migration were further investigated by cross-referencing their answers to other
questions in order to determine whether the lack of services in their homelands
was attributed to the war and drought. Some of them were found to be southern
migrants whose homelands had been struck by epidemics and who came to
Greater Khartoum seeking medical care; hence, they were added to the wardis-
placed group. The remainder were added to the category of voluntary migrants.
Accordingly, the full sample of 450 households included 20 percent drought-
displaced, 38 percent wardisplaced, and 42 percent voluntary migrant house-
holds.
Social Profile
The surveyed households are descended from 20 different tribal groups inhab-
iting various parts of the Sudan (Figure I). Generally speaking, 42 percent are
Dink 1
27%
m w westetel
22% a Din3E2
Nuer
9%
er Sowiem
5%
9%
Nomads
14%
Sample Size = 450

Note: Dinka 1live in the southern region, Dinka 2 live in southern Kordofan. Nomads
include Kababish, Hamar, and Dar Hamid. "Other Western" include Fur, Daju,
Baggara, Zaghawa, etc. "Other Southern" includes Shilluk, Zande, etc.
Source:Field Survey, 1990
I. TRIBAL
FIGURE ORIGIN
OF MIGRANTS
from tribes which inhabit Southern Sudan, 50 percent are from tribes inhabiting
western Sudan, and the remaining 8 percent are from other tribes inhabiting
the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country.I0
The small percentage of households from northern, central, and eastern
Sudan ( i e . , Others) in the sample is noteworthy. Despite the high percentage
of Greater Khartoum residents who descend from northern tribes (vzz., Nubi-
ans, Ja'aliyin, Danagla, etc.), they are not proportionally represented in the
sample because they tended to live in planned neighborhoods, either doubling-
up with their extended families or living separately in rented accommodations
or their own homes. On the other hand, eastern tribes, such as the Beja,
constitute an insignificant proportion, both of Greater Khartoum residents and
of the sample, because they tended to converge on the major cities of the eastern
Region - Port Sudan, Kassala, and Gedaref.
'Qribe refers here to a group which has a common ancestor. Tribes are usually composed of clans
or subtribes, sometimes loosely called tribes also. For example, an-Nurab, asSarajab, al-Hamadab,
etc. are clans of the Kababish tribe. Similarly, the Dinka tribe includes more than 20 subtribes, such
as the Twic, Malual, Bor, etc. Tribe is neither a regional nor a religious definition. The Dinka, for
example, are spread over southern Kordofan, Bahr el-Chazal, and Upper Nile provinces/regions.
They include Christians, Muslims, and followers of indigenous religions.
AND b S E l T L E M E N T
The wardisplaced group is comprised of Southern households and a smaller

percentage of Nuba households from Southern Kordofan. The high percentage
of Dinkas in the sample (30 percent) is an indication of the adverse impact of
the civil war on this tribe, the largest in the South. On the other hand, virtually
all of those reporting drought and famine as their main driving force for
migration came from western Sudan, where livelihood is chiefly dependent on
rains for subsistence cultivation and livestock husbandry. The droughtdisplaced
group includes nomadic and seminomadic pastoralist, such as Kababish, Hamar
and Dar Hamid, as well as sedentary households such as the Fur. About
two-thirds of this group were from Kordofan, reflecting the devastating impact
of the drought and famine on it, and also its relative proximity to Greater
Khartoum. The remainder came from Darfur and, to a lesser degree, from the
White Nile province of central Sudan.
The voluntary migrants are a heterogeneous group of households repre-
sentingvarious tribal groups. The Other Western (Fur, Daju, Zaghawa, etc.) and
Nuba households constitute the majority of the voluntary migrants, confirming
that the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur are the largest laborexporting
regions within Sudan. Although households from tribes within the “Other
Western” group constitutes a small percentage in the whole sample it is signifi-
cant that most of them were voluntary migrants, indicating the insignificance
of displacement outside the Western and Southern Regions. (SeeMap 11.)
The vast majority of the surveyed households had a married couple as a
nucleus. A smaller number had only one spouse, either because of divorce,
unexplained absence, or death. A recent study of maternal and child health
among Greater Khartoum’s displaced communities found that 34 percent of
the households were headed by women (Dodge et al., 1987:247). Although a
breakdown of the female-headed households by reason of displacement is not
presented, we would expect that a majority of them were wardisplaced. Among
the displaced, the percentage of female-headed households is chiefly a reflec-
tion of the large number of men who died, are missing, or are currently involved
in the civil war in one form or another.
The surveyed households ranged in size from two to nineteen members, with
an average household size of 5.8 persons per household, which is slightly below
the average of 6.2 for Greater Khartoum calculated from the 1983 census
(Department of Statistics, 1987:Table 1).However, the average household size
among the wardisplaced (6.5 persons) was higher than both the sample and
the metropolitan average. Overall, more than a third of the surveyed households
were above the average household size.
The number of dependents, calculated by comparing the household size with
the number of bread winners in each household, was high, reaching a maximum
of fifteen persons in some cases. The overall average was 4.5 dependents. The
average number of dependents among the wardisplaced was higher, reaching
5.2 dependents per household. Therefore, the wardisplaced households are
larger in size and have a higher proportion of dependents than do the other
AND RESETTLEMENT
two groups. This was due in part to the large number of orphans and widows
living with kinfolk.
Regarding the education of the household head, it was found that the vast
majority of them were either completely or partially illiterate, i.e., had attended
but not necessarily completed elementary school or khalwa.11 The highest
percentage of illiteracy was recorded by the droughtdisplaced nomads, fol-
lowed by the wardisplaced southerners. This high illiteracy is reflective of the
inadequacy of educational services in their regions of origin. Furthermore, the
high mobility of pastoral nomads and the important role in the pastoral
economy played by young children (who look after young animals) contrive to
reduce the importance assigned to children's education in these communities
(Khogali, 1980:307).
Migration and Settlement in Greater Khartoum

The present migration is the first one for most respondents. Only one-third of
them had engaged previously in seasonal migrations to various parts of the
country in search of employment opportunities. This finding illustrates the
profound impact of the civil war and the drought-induced famine on people's
lives. In normal times, the majority of the respondents would have second
thoughts about leaving their homelands. In sharp contrast to the voluntary
migrants, most of whom migrated individually or in nuclear families, the
majority of the drought- and wardisplaced households migrated collectively, in
groups of families or even whole hamlets. Such mass movement of people is an
important characteristic of population displacements where the agents and
causes of displacement affect a large number of people collectively (Shami,
1990:9).
The vast majority of the voluntary migrants and the droughtdisplaced house-
holds came in a one-step migration,while only one-half of the wardisplaced had
done so. These results can be explained by the relative proximity of the former
two groups to Greater Khartoum and the relative ease of transportation from
their homel&ds.lz By contrast, the long distance between the South and
Greater Khartoum, and the high cost of transportation involved, forced many
of the wardisplaced migrants to stop and work at several intermediate locations
in order to collect the needed transportation fares. Accessibility of the home-
lands also enables the voluntary migrants and some of the droughtdisplaced to
return to them more frequently. Therefore, a reasonable degree of social and
economic linkage is maintained between the homeland and the area of refuge.
"A khalwuis an educational institution set up by some learned men in villages and neighborhoods,
to teach children and adults recitation of the Quc'an, basic Islamic teachings, reading, writing, and
some arithmetic.
'2For instance, the &hour bus trip from Um Saiyala district, the epicenter of droughtdisplacement
in northern Kordofan, to Greater Khartoum costs about fS40 per person (September 1990). For an
extra fS50 per head, many households were able to transport their sheep and goats with them, an
added advantage in their quest for subsistence in Greater Khartoum.
TABLE 1
KHARTOUM AS A DESTINATION
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF GREATER
Frequency Distribution and Row Percentages
(permatages in parentheses)
Familiarity/ Seek
Escape Seek Have Public
Migrant Group Famine/War Employment Relatives Service Other Total
9 43 23 8 4 87
Droughtdisplaced (10.3) (49.4) (26.4) (9.2) (4.6) (99.9)
37 66 23 27 8 161
Wardisplaced (23.0) (41.0) (14.3) (16.8) (5.0) (100.1)
1 135 18 20 5 179
Voluntary migrants ~
(0.6) (75.4)
- _ ~ _ _ __- (10.1) (11.2) (2.8) (100.1)
__
47 224 64 55 17 427
Total sample (11.0) (57.1) (15.0) (12.9) (4.0) (100.0)
Chi-square = 92.3 P = 0.00
Source: Household Suntey, 1990
Earlier migrants, who came to Greater Khartoum before 1970, constituted

only 17 percent of the total sample. Taking 1984 as a cut-off point after which
population displacement intensified due to the 1983-1984 drought and the
resumption of civil war in mid-1983, it was found that the majority of the
respondents came after 1984.
There were notable variations among the three migrant categories in terms
of their date of arrival in Greater Khartoum. More than 70 percent of the
droughtdisplaced came after 1984,with a marked peak between 1984 and 1985
corresponding to the nadir of the famine. Similarly, more than threequarters
of the wardisplaced households came after 1984,with a marked increase in the
period 1987-1989. The voluntary migrants, on the other hand, followed a
different pattern - the vast majority of them came before 1984. In fact, about a
third of them were earlier migrants who migrated prior to 1970.
The respondents’ motives for coming to Greater Khartoum were not neces-
sarily the same as those for emigrating from the homeland (Table 1). A large
proportion of the drought- and wardisplaced considered employment as the
prime motive for their migration to Greater Khartoum, while the push factors
of drought and war were assigned less importance. This finding confirms that
although their migration from the homelands was a result of a disaster ( i . e . , a
displacement), coming to Greater Khartoum in particular was a decision af-
fected primarily by economic considerations. It illustrates the large degree of
overlap between the different migration motives. In the present case, displace-
ment has led to labor migration as an adaptive strategy ($ Shami, 1990).While
the degree of volition of the nuziheen in their emigration from the homeland
62 POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT
was limited, their choice of Greater Khartoum as a destination involved a large

degree of free will - given that Greater Khartoum is the hub of services and
employment opportunities for the whole country. While the provincial towns
and regional capitals formed the initial safe havens for the displaced, the
national capital provided them with prospects for a better future.
Although those reporting the search for public services as the main reason
behind their migration are a small group of 55 households, it is notable that
about one-half of them were wardisplaced. The destruction of healthcare
facilities in the south as a result of the civil war led to the spread of epidemics
and, consequently, to the migration of several thousand people who feared for
their lives.
Familiarity with Greater Khartoum, either from previous visits and seasonal
migrations or from the presence of relatives or acquaintances, was an important
factor in the migration decision of some 15 percent of the households. Within
this category, nomads are overrepresented. Their familiarity with Greater Khar-
toum stems from its position as the largest livestock market in the country.
Al-Muwailih, one of the oldest mo'skurut they live in today, is situated near a
well-known livestock market equipped with water tanks and public services.
Similarly, the area west and south of Hai al-Arda in Omdurman. which is now
inhabited by several thousand nuziheen, is an old livestock market long fre-
quented by many pastoral groups for business transactions. During the weeks
and months it took them to conduct their business, they would build makeshift
shelters in the nclman's land surrounding the markets and utilize the services
and facilities available in Greater Khartoum. When famine struck hard in the
homelands, these seasonal markets constituted viable destinations to which they
could migrate for as long as the drought continued.
In addition, many of the nomads and displaced southerners emphasized that
they came to Greater Khartoum primarily because they believed the central
government had an obligation to assist them in their misery, and because they
expected it to be better equipped than the local and regional governments to
provide them with the assistance they needed to rebuild their lives.
Household Sustenance Strategies

Unlike in the homelands, where only two percent of the respondents had been
employed as wage laborers, about half of them were employed as wage laborers
in Greater Khartoum at the time of the survey and in the month preceding it
(Tables 2 and 3) The major employers were the construction and manufac-
turing industries, various government agencies, and private enterprises. Not all
ISThe survey questions about current and orevious employment were directed to the head of the
household whose income is usually the major source of the household's income. Subsequent
questions about other gainfully employed household members, other sources of income and
livelihood (e.g.,home production of commodities,reciprocal relationships)were asked in order to
get a more comprehensive picture of the household economy.
TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTSIN THE HOMELANDS
(@mentapesshown an brackets)
Primary Self- Govern-
MigpntGroup Employ- Employ- ment Wage (Unemp
menr ment Sector Labor Other loyedb) Total
82 2 0 1 0 4 89
Droughtdisplaced (92.1) (2.2) (0.0) (1.1) (0.0) (4.5) (99.9)
104 20 10 6 7 23 170
Wardisplaced (61.2) (11.8) (5.9) (3.5) (4.1) (13.5) (100.0)
129 17 6 3 2 31 188
Voluntary migrants (68.6) (9.0) (3.2) (1.6) (1.1) (16.4) (99.9)
315 39 16 10 9 58 447
Total sample (70.5) (8.7) (3.6) (2.0) (13.0) (100.0)
(2.2)
Chi-square = 35.2 P = 0.00 __--
aPrimary Employment includes agriculture, livestock husbandry, game hunting, etc.
bunemployed is loosely used in reference to people outside the labor market such as students,
retired people, homemakers, as well as those unable to find employment; for some people this is
only a temporary state. Unemployed does not necessarily mean that a person does not earn any
income; many do, albeit on a sporadic basis.
Source: Household Survey, 1990
TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTSIN GREATER KHARTOUM
~~
(percentagesshown in parentheses)
Primary self- Govern-
MigrantCmup Employ- Employ- ment Wage (Unemp
me& ment Sector Labor Other loyedb) Total
2 20 1 47 7 10 87
Droughtdisplaced (1.1) (8.0) (11.5) (99.9)
(2.3) (23.0) (54.0)
0 30 9 92 10 27 168
Wardisplaced (5.4) (6.0) (16.1) (100.2)
(0.0) (17.9) (54.8)
1 66 28 80 6 10 191
Voluntaty migrants (14.7)
(0.5) (34.6) (41.9) (3.1) (5.2) (100.0)
3 116 38 219 23 47 446
Total sample (0.7) (8.5) (5.2) (10.5) (100.0)
(26.0) (49.1)
Chi-square = 47.3 P = 0.00
SeeTable 2 Notes.
Source: Household Survey. 1990
AND RFSE'lTLEMENT
the migrant groups, however, were equally represented in this Wage Labor
category. Whereas the majority of the war- and droughtdisplaced respondents
were employed as wage laborers, only 42 percent of the voluntary migrants were.
This is a reflection of the high concentration of displaced persons in the
construction industry, which requires virtually no skills. On the other hand, and
by virtue of their long stay in Greater Khartoum, many voluntary migrants
gained some skills and established connections which enabled them to gain
greater access to self-employment and to the civil service.
Migration to Greater Khartoum resulted in a change of employment for a
large number of people. Most of those who had been engaged in primary
employment ( i e . , agriculture, livestock rearing, game hunting, etc.) in their
homelands had shifted in Greater Khartoum to wage labor, and to a lesser
degree to self-employment. Very few respondents were engaged in primary
employment, reflecting its insignificance as a source of livelihood in Greater
Khartoum.
Work in the construction industrywas highly erratic and it was not uncommon
for many people to go without work for many days. To ensure some job security
for themselves, some migrants entered into informal agreements with the
building contractors who employed them whenever they had projects. Workers
who demonstrated greater diligence and docility were usually selected for these
medium-term (albeit nonbinding) work agreements. Work crews are invariably
organized along tribal lines in order to avoid intertribal friction that would
impinge upon labor productivity.
To guard against the vagaries of prolonged unemployment, most households
diversified their sources of income, such that loss of income from one source
was compensated for by income from another source. In this regard, the naziheen
and voluntary migrants ensured their sustenance by resorting to a wide range
of strategies. Key among these were increasing the participation of several
household members in the informal (and sometimes illicit) sector, moonlight-
ing between formal and informal employment, pooling the incomes and re-
sources of several household members, cultivating nonmonetized,
interhousehold exchanges based on reciprocity relations, soliciting relief s u p
plies from aid agencies, receiving remittances from relatives who work in other
parts of the Sudan or overseas and investing them in microenterprises and petty
trading, and scavenging solid waste dumps for reusable items (Hamid, 1992b).
Women and teenage daughters played an important role in the household
economy of those surveyed. For instance, making and selling food, beverages,
and beer, which supported a considerable number of households, was totally
dominated by women. Alternatively, some women and teenage daughters
worked as maids in affluent neighborhoods. There are two variations of domes-
tic employment: long-term, where the maid is paid monthly, and perdiem work,
where she rotates between various employers each week. More and more women
shifted to the second variant, which affords them more freedom, shorter work
days, and more income.
The median household monthly income, calculated by adding wages of

working members to income generated from businesses and from the sale of
goods and services, was Sudanese &700,equivalent to US$57 using the official
exchange rate, or US$l5.5 using the black market rate that was prevalent at the
time of the survey. Although this median income was about 2.5 times the
minimum oficial wage and was comparable to a starting salary of a university
graduate in the civil service, it was barely sufficient for a monthly supply of grain.
Among other things, this paradox was indicative of the unrealistic official
minimum wage, the meager salaries paid to government employees, and the
high cost of living in Greater Khartoum.
As shown in Table 4, there were significant differences between the three
migrant groups in terms of their average incomes. A breakdown of the sample
into tribal groups revealed further income variations (Table 5). There are at
least two interpretations for this income disparity. First, job specialization by
tribe whereby the majority of southerners worked as unskilled wage laborers
while a large number of people from the Others and Other Western groups were
self-employed, was reflected in higher incomes for the latter groups. By virtue
of their long specialization in trading throughout the Sudan and the business
connections they developed, entrepreneurs from the Others group dominated
most of the small-scale trading within the mo'skurut and sukun 'shwaee.Although
many Dinkas were also self-employed, they worked primarily in low-status, small,
service enterprises, such as water vending and tailoring, which do not generate
high incomes in settlements where the majority of residents are poor. On the
other hand, the high incomes reported by the nomads resulted from their work
as middle-men in the thriving livestock markets of western Omdurman and from
monopolizing arduous jobs such as digging pit latrines and percolation wells in
residential areas. Second, since most of the Others and Other Western house-
holds came to Greater Khartoum as voluntary migrants, some of them were able
to transfer some assets from their areas of origin to the city. Thus, they gained
a head start in the quest for sustenance in the city. By contrast, very few nuzihea
were able to transfer their assets.
Access to Housing, Rationed Commodities, and Public Services

Housing
In terms of housing for a third of the droughtdisplaced and 41 percent of the
wardisplaced households, the state determined where to settle in Greater
Khartoum. Almost all of the surveyed mo'skarutwere demarcated by the govern-
ment for nuziheen who were relocated from construction sites and vacant lots
within planned neighborhoods, which they had occupied upon their arrival.
Following the destructive floods of August 1988, and yielding to pressure from
some residents who felt threatened by the presence of nuziheen amidst their
neighborhoods, the Greater Khartoum Commission and the Commission of
AND RESElTLEMENT
TABLE 4
-IAN MONTHLY INCOME OF WGRANT GROUPS(IN ma)
Migrant Group Median Income IQR~
Droughtdisplaced 800 600
Wardisplaced 600 400
Voluntary migrants 725 550
Total sample 700 500

aSudanesePound; 1990 official exchange rate was USfl.00 = fS12.30.
bInterQuartileRange; the difference between incomes of 75th and 25th percentiles. (In addition
to excluding extremes, IQR represents a good measure of the spread of incomes in the sample.)
TABLE 5
-IAN MONTHLY INCOME OF TRIBAL GROUPS(IN 33.)
Wbal Group Median Income IQR~

NomadsC 900 600
Othersd 900 500
Other Westerne 785 600
Nuer 700 500
Dinka 600 500
Nuba 600 400
Other Southern' 600 350
Total Samde 700 500

= Sudanese Pound. 1990 official exchange rate was USfl.00 = fS12.30
bIQR = Inter-Quartile Range; the difference between incomes of 75th and 25th
percentiles. (In addition to excluding extremes, IQR represents a good measure of
the spread of incomes in the sample.)
CIncludesKababish, Hamar, and Dar Hamid.
dIncludes Danagla, Ja'aliyin, etc.
eIncludes Fur, Daju, Zaghawa, etc.
'Includes Shilluk, Zande, etc.
COPING IN SUDAN
STRATEGIES 67
the Displaced, assisted by the police and the army, relocatedvirtually all pockets
of nariheen to newly-established mo'skarat on the periphery of the three cities.
Thus, Mo'skar as-Suq al-Markazi was created as a holding ground for those
evacuated from the neighborhoods of Khartoum, al-Izbah for those evacu-
ated from Khartoum North; and Zagalona and Wad al-Basheer for those
evacuated from Omdurman. Apart from mobilizing the personnel and
equipment of the armed forces to relocate a particular settlement, the
government delegates the provision of rudimentary services in a new settle-
ment to the PVOs, who d o so at their own pace, if and when they can.
Otherwise, the relocated households fend for themselves in terms of land
subdivision, shelter provision, waste disposal, etc.
Gradually, these burgeoning mo'skarat created a growth momentum of
their own. They became attractive to newly-arriving naziheen, who found in
them fellow tribesmen willing to offer them free temporary accommodations
until they could erect their own shacks. They also attracted some earlier
migrants, usually from the same tribal backgrounds, who joined them from
other sakan 'shwaee areas, because the cost of housing in the mo'skarat was
very low. Some small entrepreneurs also moved to the mo'skarat to capitalize
on the opportunity of establishing microenterprises such as restaurants,
corner shops, etc. By virtue of their connections and familiarity with the
administrative system in Greater Khartoum, some earlier migrants convinced
the displaced communities to elect them as community leaders. To some
extent, movement in the other direction, Le., from the mo'skarat to other
areas of sakan 'shwaee also takes place, particularly by some nariheen who
intend to settle permanently in Greater Khartoum. Therefore, displacement
results in increased residential densities in the sakan 'shwaee areas, aggravat-
ing the difficult environmental conditions in them.
Apart from the state, the presence of relatives and friends in a settlement
influenced the choice of settlement for about one-third of the respondents.
Furthermore, the cost of housing influenced some 28 percent of the respon-
dents. It was more important, however, for voluntary migrants who had
sought to establish their own shelters after an initial stay with a relative or in
rented accommodation.
Virtually none of the surveyed households spent any money on land, which
was invariably owned by the government. In the case of the mo'skarat, the
naziheen were given informal, unspecified usufructuary access to the land; in
the sakan 'shwaee, inhabited primarily by voluntary migrants, the land was
usually invaded and illegally subdivided. Conversely, the majority of house-
holds spent some money on building materials (particularly roofing ele-
ments), which were likely to consist of recycled building materials bought at
nominal prices or scrap materials acquired for free. The labor component
' q h e only exception to this home ownership rule was encountered in Wad Ajeeb, a quarter in
Mo'skar asSuq al-Markazi,where residents were living in tents provided to them by the army when
their houses were destroyedby the 1988 floods.The community,led by an outspoken,well-connected
sultan, lobbied the highest authorities in Greater Khartoum to let them keep the tents.
AND RESElTLEMENT
in the process of home construction was primarilysupplied by the mutual help

of relatives and neighbors. Apart from food and drinks supplied by the owner
of the house under construction, no compensation was paid to the laborers.
Reciprocity plays a key role in this nonmonetized form of labor. Accordingly,
the overwhelming majority of respondents were living in shelters of their own
making or whose construction process they had managed.'*
In order to maintain the perceived transient status of the mo'skurut, the
authorities banned the use of durable building materials such as adobe and
baked bricks. The permissible building materials, which included jute sacks,
canvas, reed, animal skin, cardboard, etc., provided little protection against cold
weather and torrential rains, thus compounding the suffering of the displaced.
Those who have defied the ban have seen their homes swiftly bulldozed to the
ground. By comparison, in some areas of sakun 'shwaeewhere these regulations
are not strictly enforced, residents have built reasonably protective and well-
maintained adobe houses.
Rationed Commodities
The question of who should be issued commodity rationing cards (CRCs) was
a controversial one at the time of research. CRCs enabled their holders to buy
bread, sugar, cooking oil, sorghum, soap, and tea at subsidized prices through
the stringent rationing system established by the Khartoum Commission in early
1990. While CRCs were desired by potential migrants, the government paid a
heavy subsidy on the rationed goods. The declared policy at the time of the
survey was to issue them to all residents of Greater Khartoum, including the
naziheen. However, the survey indicated that the nuzihea were not treated on an
equal footing with the rest of Greater Khartoum's residents. As shown in Figure
2, only 44 percent of those surveyed had been issued CRCs. Furthermore, there
was a marked disparity between the three migrant groups in terms of their
holding of CRCs: 82 percent of the droughtdisplaced, 47 percent of the
voluntary migrants, and only 21 percent of the wardisplaced households were
issued CRCs. Those who did not have CRCs resorted to the black market, paying
exorbitant prices for indispensable items.
This apparent discrimination against the wardisplaced is in fact part of a
general discrimination against Nuba and southern households. For instance, of
those included in the study, 71 percent of the Dinka, 97 percent of the Nuer, 78
percent of the Other Southern, and 82 percent of the Nuba did not have CRCs.
By contrast, only 15 percent of the nomads, 45 percent of the Other group, and
31 percent of the Other Western tribes did not have CRCs. This discrimination
was illustrated vividly by the case of Mo'skar al-Izbah, which was inhabited by
displaced Nuba and southern hougeholds, and Tayibat al-Ahamida, an old area
of sukan 'shwuee inhabited by a diverse group of voluntary migrants. Although
the two settlements abut each other with fuzzy, overlapping boundaries and
share some communal facilities such as a water tank, a marketplace, and access
roads, 90 percent of the respondents in Tayibat al-Ahamida had CRCs, while
IN SUDAN
STRATEGIES
COPING 69
only 33 percent of those interviewed from al-Izbah had them, mainly those in
the zone of overlap between the two settlements.
Another example was encountered in Mo‘skar Wad al-Basheer, where
droughtdisplaced nomads and wardisplaced southerners live in two adjoining
quarters and share a school, a water tank, and a canteen. Adjacent to Wad
al-Basheer lies an old sukun ‘shwueeinhabited primarily by seminomadic house-
holds from northwestern Sudan. This latter group had managed to get CRCs by
pressuring the local people’s council - which prepares the list of households
eligible for CRCs - to incorporate their names onto the list of residents of Hai
al-Arda, the nearest planned neighborhood. Being from the same regional and
cultural background as their seminomadic neighbors, the displaced nomads of
Wad al-Basheer followed suit by enlisting their names with Hai al-Arda residents.
Consequently, they were issued CRCs, which gives them access to regular rations
from an outlet in Hai al-Arda. Meanwhile their neighbors, the southern nuziheen,
remain without CRCs and totally dependent on the black market. It may well
be that the local people’s council had accepted the droughtdisplaced nomads
because of their ethniccultural background, which is in harmony with the
dominant culture and ethnicity in their neighborhood and in Greater Khar-
toum in general, and rejected the nonconforming southerners.
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Drought- War- Voluntary Total Sample
Displaced Displaced Migrants
7
1, ElHave CRCs I3 No CRCs

Sample Size = 447 households, including 89 droughtdisplaced,
169 wardisplaced, and 189 voluntary migrants
Source: Field Survey, 1990
FIGURE
11.
TO COMMODIW
ACCESS
MIGRANT C m s (CRCs)
RATIONING
AND RESETTLEMENT
Drinking Water
As regards drinking water, the mo'skarat surveyed were better off, in general,
than many areas of sukan 'shwaee in that most of them boasted water tanks
donated and operated by PVOs, who ensured that the tanks were filled daily by
mobile tankers. Except in Wad Ajeeb, a neighborhood in Mo'skar asSuq
al-Markazi where the residents had elected to pay a nominal fee which generates
a revolving fund used for small local projects ( e . 6 , building communal latrines),
distribution of water from these tanks was free. Households in the mo'skarutthat
did not have water tanks (viz., al-Izbah and Zagalona) either bought it from
vendors or procured it at a lower price from stand pipes in adjacent settlements.
Alternatively, some households established connections with security guards in
the industrial areas adjacent to these mo'skarat, who allowed them to fill their
containers for free, without necessarily obtaining the consent of the owners of
the establishments. Others have developed some form of patronclient relatiion-
ships with some households in the adjacent planned neighborhoods which
enabled them to obtain water.
Overall, about one in every five households had free access to drinking water
distributed from water tanks donated by PVOs. The vast majority, however, had
to buy water from vendors who filled their donkey-pulled tanks from stand pipes
located outside the settlement for a nominal fee and sold it at a much higher
price. For those who did not have access to free water, it constituted a substantial
proportion of household expenditure, reaching as high as 15 percent of the
median household income.15
Efectricity
None of the surveyed households had electricity at home or within their
settlements. In this regard, they were not different from the majority of Greater
Khartoum's residents who live in sukun 'shwaeeand mo'skarat, or even from many
residents of new planned neighborhoods, where the provision of infrastructure
by public agencies usually lags behind private home construction. Although
electricity may not be as essential as water, for example, the lack of it hampers
the extension of educational and cultural activities such as adult education,
informative television programs, and mobile cinema.
Schools
Because of the interruption of schooling in the south due to the civil war, an
attempt was made by the Ministry of Education, in collaboration with regional
governments and PVOs, to absorb the displaced students in temporary schools.
15The price of water varied considerably among settlements. In October 1990, the price of a
four-gallon container bought directly from the public stand pipe serving al-Izbah and Tayibat
al-Ahamida was fS 0.25. Water vendors in these two settlements sold a container for S 1.00-1.25,
while vendors in Wad al-Basheer and asSuq al-Markazi sold it for fS 0.50 and 1.50 respectively. I n
some of the drought-prone areas of Northern Kordofan a container of drinking water sold for ES
10-15! (Documentaryaired on national television in late 1990)
Invariably, primary schools were accommodated in makeshift buildings within

the mo‘skurut. Intermediate and high schools were temporarily accommodated
in public schools, where the displaced students utilized the school facilities
during the afternoons and evenings after the regular school hours. Every
attempt was made to replicate affected southern schools in Greater Khartoum.
The students and teachers of each school were absorbed separately in a tempo-
rary school, often adopting the same southern name of the school. Thus
Shambi, Maridi, and Mandi are a few examples of southern schools recreated
in Greater Khartoum.
The vast majority of those surveyed had access to free education within the
settlement or at a short walking distance from it. Schooling thus provided a
glimpse of hope that a better future might emerge from the miserable life of
the mo‘skurutand sukan ‘shwme.Unfortunately, it was not available to all children
of school age because charitable organizations could not afford to provide space
for everyone, and public schools were severely overcrowded and understaffed.
Health Care
About two-thirds of those surveyed had access to rudimentary medical care,
either within their settlement or in adjacent neighborhoods. Most of these
facilities were sponsored by PVOs and provided vaccination and primary medi-
cal care for free or at a nominal fee. The remainder of the households did not
have facilities within walking distance from their houses, having to travel longer
distances to the nearest health center. This latter group, together with those
who needed specialized medical services, usually used public hospitals. These
facilities were severely overcrowded and ill-equipped to begin with, thus com-
pounding the discontent felt by some of Greater Khartoum’s residents towards
the added pressure exerted by the nuziheen on “their” facilities.
Migrants‘ Perceptions and Future Intentions

When asked what they liked most in Greater Khartoum, the majority of the
respondents mentioned the availability of services (particularly educational and
healthcare facilities).About four in every ten citedjob opportunities, about one
in every four mentioned availability of food and water, and an equal number
cited a group of related aspects encompassing “stability,” “security,” and
“peace.” In essence, the respondents cited what they lacked most in their
respective homelands. The wardisplaced group mentioned services and security
more often than the other groups, while the droughtdisplaced cited food and
water.
On the other hand, the aspects disliked most about life in Greater Khar-
toum included the high cost of living and the difficulty of obtaining (subsi-
dized) food and (free) drinking water, as cited by 40 percent of the
respondents. Inadequate means of public transportation was reported by
AND RESElTLEMENT
one-third. N o significant differenceswere observed among the migrantgroups

regarding the aspects they disliked most in Greater Khartoum.
Only 29 percent of the respondents perceived their presence in Greater
Khartoum as a temporary sojourn. Most of this group wanted to return to
their homelands once conditions permit; a small percentage wanted to
migrate to another part of the country, such as the agricultural belt of central
Sudan. Conversely, the vast majority of heads of households believed that their
stay in Greater Khartoum was a permanent one. The overwhelming majority
of this latter group wanted to remain where they were, while the remainder
wished to move to another location within Greater Khartoum.
As shown in Figure 3, the three migrant groups differed in their future
intentions. While slightly less than 50 percent of the war-displaced perceived
their stay in Greater Khartoum as permanent, more than 80 percent of each
of the other two groups believed so. In fact, southerners constituted about
63 percent of those who perceived their stay in Greater Khartoum as tempo-
rary. This is a reflection of the dissatisfaction of a considerable number of
southerners with life in Greater Khartoum, stemming from the difficulties
they face in assimilating, as well as the relatively small number of migrants
from the other groups who wished to repatriate. In fact, the nomads and the
Other Western groups were passionately in favor of settling permanently in
Greater Khartoum. For the pastoral communities of western Sudan, the
process of replenishing their lost herds would evidently be more costly
compared to the resumption of farming for sedentary peasants (Dodge et al.,
1987:247).
Impact of Public Policy on Migrants’ Livelihoods

One of the major findings of the present study is that the vast majority of those
surveyed intended to settle permanently in Greater Khartoum, a reflection of
the appalling conditions in their homelands. It is also indicative of their
anticipation of a better future in Greater Khartoum even though their current
living conditions are very difficult (Harris and Todaro, 1970). However, their
insistence on settling in Greater Khartoum contrasts sharply with the percep
tions of politicians and policymakers. Because no one, to my knowledge, had
investigated the long-term intentions of the nuziheen, their sojourn in Greater
Khartoum is perceived by the authorities, and by many concerned citizens, as
temporary.
The national policy recommended by the 1990 National Conference of the
Displaced (Ministry of Relief, 1990), and endorsed by the political leadership
declared that citizens have the liberty to relocate freely from one place to
another within Sudan. There are, however, several indications that permanent
settlement of the naziheen in Greater Khartoum is not welcomed. This is evident
in the substandard level of public services offered to them, in the small amount
of rationed commodities allocated to them through the oMicial channels, and
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Drought- War- Voluntary Total Sample
Displaced Displaced Migrants
~ - _
Permanent Transient1
i
Sample Size = 442 households, including 89 droughtdisplaced,
165 wardisplaced, and 188 voluntary migrants
Source: Field Suivey, 1990
FIGURE
111. MIGRANT AUOUT
VIEWS SETTLING
I N GREATER
KHARTOUM
in the restrictions imposed on the standard of housing that can be built in the
mo‘skurut. Furthermore, it was evident in the government’s decision to dissolve
the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and the Displaced and Refugees AfFairs
(RRDRA), and to expeditiously transport the nuziheen to so-called “production
regions.”
The sites selected by the authorities for the mo‘skurut were indicative of this
perceived temporariness: Mo‘skar Zagalona, for instance, was situated on land
demarcated for industrial use; similarly, al-Izbah was located on land that has
been used for several decades as a dumping ground for the Khartoum North
industrial area. As-Suq al-Markazi, on the other hand, was situated on agricul-
tural land owned by some private entities. Because of this ad hoc siting of the
mo‘skurut, some of the nuziheen are subjected to multiple displacements within
Greater Khartoum itself whenever problems arise within a particular settlement
or when the site is needed for another use. A notable example was the forced
relocation of Mo‘skar Bentiu in October 1990 from its location in south-central
Khartoum to an isolated site nearJebel Awlia, about 25 miles south of Khartoum.
For residents of Bentiu who were relocated before from the spontaneous
“%terview with P. Orat, former minister of RRDRA, in Asharq al-Awsal, 9 August, 1991.
AND RESETTLEMENT
encampments they erected upon their arrival in Greater Khartoum, this was
their third displacement in less than six years, including their initial flight from
the war zone in the south. By late 1990, relocation of Mo'skar Zagalona was on
the drawing boards of concerned government agencies. In fact, relocation of
all the mo'skurut is a major feature in the Greater Khartoum Development Plan
prepared by private consultants for the Ministry of Housing (Doxiades et al.,
1991: Table Hw/s.2) (Seenote to Figure 1.)
Invariably, the new locations designated by the authorities have been worse
off than the old ones in terms of access to employment and availability of
communal services. In the case of Mo'skar Bentiu, for instance, its current
location is plagued by a severe shortage in drinking water, and has virtually no
employment opportunities in the vicinity. Any trip to the business or industrial
centers of Khartoum is a lengthy one that involves a high transportation cost.
These recursive displacements also result in tremendous social instability within
the displaced communities since the process of adaptation to a new location is
abruptly disturbed at a time when communities have only just adjusted to the
previous location. Furthermore, they have a detrimental impact on livelihoods
since they sever the social networks which are crucial to households' survival.
The lack of CRCs also had a detrimental impact on the livelihood of the
excluded households. Since most of the essential reproduction needs are
distributed through the rationing system, the lack of CRCs forces the impover-
ished migrants to cut down on the consumption of vital nutrients because they
cannot afford to purchase them through the black market. It is not surprising,
therefore, to detect a high incidence of malnutrition and disease among young
children. In their study of the health conditions of the displaced, Dodge et ul.,
concluded that the undernutrition rate for children less than 36 months of
age was twice the average for northern Sudan (1987~249).Rather than
issuing CRCs to all residents of Greater Khartoum, including the affluent
ones, priority should have been given to disadvantaged groups - including
all the nuriheen.
To make matters even worse, in an effort to arrest the rapid escalation of
sorghum prices during 1990, the government issued a decree in mid-1990
banning PVOs from purchasing sorghum from the local markets. Additionally,
they were ordered to stop any sorghum distribution in the mo'skurut and to
report the quantities of sorghum in their reserves. Local merchants were also
banned from dealing in sorghum until the government reviewed the sor-
ghum supply situation in the capital. In effect, the main outlets for sorghum
distribution (in the virtual absence of the commodity rationing system in the
mo'skurut) were blocked for about three months until the ban was lifted in
September 1990.17 Meanwhile vast numbers of nuriheen and voluntary mi-
grants were left to the mercy of black-marketeers who seized on the oppor-
tunity and increased the price of sorghum fourfold during the second half
of 1990. This incident illustrates that misguided policies based on govern-
"Al-Inqaz al-Watani, 28 September, 1990, p. 1.
ment perception of the nuziheen as temporary sojourners in Greater Khar-

toum, often create serious bottlenecks in the supply of basic commodities,
thus putting a heavy strain on the livelihood of the vast majority of urban
dwellers, and of the nuziheen in particular.
Summamy and Conclusions

The surveyed households constituted three groups that can be made analytically
distinct: voluntary migrants, the wardisplaced, and the droughtdisplaced - all
three encompassing a wide array of tribal groups. The majority migrated to
Greater Khartoum after 1984, when living conditions in the south and west
became intolerable due to the expansion of the civil war in the south and
drought-induced famine in the west. These migrants differ in terms of their
social characteristics, namely household size, number of dependents, and level
of education. They also differ in many of the parameters investigated in the
study. For most of the respondents, this was their first sojourn away from home,
a direct consequence of the displacement-inducing forces.
The survey revealed that the prime motives for people to choose Greater
Khartoum as their destination were different from those that induced them to
leave their homelands in the first place. Employment was the single most
important motive for both war- and droughtdisplaced households to migrate
to Greater Khartoum, which indicates that displacement led to labor migration
as a coping mechanism for a substantial number of the affected populations. In
effect, they have chosen to move to where their chances of gaining more
rewardingjobs are greater rather than to settle in the first safe haven they could
reach.
Generally speaking, in comparison to the homelands, the mo‘skurutand sakun
‘shwuee boasted more and better public services, either within the settlement
itself or within a reasonable distance from it. Compared to the planned neigh-
borhoods of Greater Khartoum, however, they were worse off, especiallyin terms
of sanitation and environmental health conditions because some of them were
established on industrial waste dumps, near sewage treatment plants, or on
natural drainage courses. Furthermore, the crippled citywide waste disposal
system does not extend to these “unplanned” settlements, making the living
conditions in them even more hazardous.
Despite an economic climate characterized by rampant unemployment and
runaway inflation in Greater Khartoum, the nuziheen and voluntary migrants
make ends meet by utilizing a plethora of sustenance activities. In this regard,
they have made great strides towards becoming self-supporting communities,
and have come a long way from total dependence on relief handouts during
their first few years in Greater Khartoum (Hamid, 1992b). However, their
diligence in earning a decent living is continually frustrated by public policies
that relocate them to desolate sites and preclude the distribution of essential
commodities and basic services at reasonable prices in the mo ‘skurut.
AND RESETTLEMENT
The naziheen developed three distinct strategies in response to the official

policy of resettling them outside Greater Khartoum. First, some households
abandoned the mo'skarat and moved to some areas of sakan 'shwaee not
targeted for immediate repatriation or relocation. This is best exemplified
by some naziheen who blended with other voluntary migrants in the
newly-invaded land surrounding Sheikh Abu Zeid and Hara 33 in Umbadda.
To emphasize their sense of permanence, this group rejects being called
nuziheen.IRSecond, there are those who agreed to be repatriated, and received
supplies and monetary assistance from the government to sustain them during
the first few months of their homecoming but who then returned to Greater
Khartoum after a short period of time. This was illustrated by many drought-
displaced households repatriated to their homelands in Northern Kordofan
during 1986 and 1987. Lastly, there is the majority of nerihetmwho remain in the
mo'skarat, express no objection to repatriation or to the naziheen label, and in
the meantime go about their daily lives in Greater Khartoum as if they are there
to stay.
The population displacements that have taken place in Sudan since the
mid-1980s have long lasting social ramifications on the affected groups and on
Greater Khartoum itself. The insistence of the droughtdisplaced groups on
settling in Greater Khartoum, for instance, is indicative of an emerging tendency
toward spontaneous sedentarization of some of the pastoral nomads of Western
Sudan. The observed form of adaptive flux" ,I9 whereby a group of displaced
semipastoralists repatriates to cultivate their fields when rains are plentiful then
returns to Greater Khartoum during the dry season to settle for a few years,
fosters a rural-urban continuum in which incomes generated in the city are used
to revive and stimulate the rural economy devastated by the drought. By
contrast, the pastoral households who lost all of their livestock have virtually no
incentive to return to their homelands. The same is true for the wardisplaced
households as long as the war continues.
The large exodus of population from the south and southwest is changing
the ethnic-religious composition of Greater Khartoum from one dominated by
arabized Muslim groups to one which is more diversified, if not dominated by
African non-Muslim groups. This change in the ethnic composition of Greater
Khartoum is reflected in the latest parliamentary elections in 1986. For the first
time in the history of Sudanese elections, a candidate from the Nuba peoples,
the Reverend Philip Ghabboush, succeeded in winning the majority of votes in
an electoral district in Greater Khartoum, defeating candidates from the
arabized Muslim groups.
%ome of these households refused to participate in our survey even though we explained to them
that it did not deal with the naziheen only. In early 1990, social workers from the Commission of the
Displaced were chased away from Sheikh Abu Zeid settlement because the residents did not like to
be counted as nazihea. Police were brought in to enable the social workers to conduct their work.
'"The term "adaptiveflux" was used by Van Arsdale (1989) in reference to a wide range of Strategies
adopted by nomadic peoples of western Sudan in response to severe droughts and desertification.
For the wardisplaced southerners, some 60 percent of whom have migrated

for the first time in their lives, the migration is leading to significant cultural
changes resulting from the inevitable interaction with the arabized Muslim
majority of Greater Khartoum's residents. A process which Doornbos calls
becoming Sudanese" (1988), whereby some southerners feel obliged to adopt
some aspects of the dominant culture, is evidently taking place. Some southern
women, for instance, have adopted the toub, the typical dress for Muslim women,
in order to gain more respect and to assist them in the process ofjob hunting
(Ibrahim, 1991253). Similarly, some southern Muslim men have adopted the
white juhbzjyu, which distinguishes them as Muslims, thus giving them more
access to Muslim-based PVOs and to some job opportunities. This cultural
assimilation is hailed by some of the urban elites as a stimulus to national unity,
and to the process of nation building.
On the other hand, there are many southerners who resent this cultural
assimilation and strive to preserve the cultural identity of the southern nnzihem.
A clear manifestation of this trend is that there are currently few unskilled men
from the south interested in working as domestic laborers, as they did in the
past. It seems that the civil war and the propaganda aired daily by the now-de-
funct SPLA radio service to which many people in the mo'skurut listened,
increased their self-esteem. However poor and unskilled they might be, they are
no longer willing to accept jobs that compromise their sense of dignity.
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Hamid - 1994 - Population Displacement and Household Coping Strategies in Sudan

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Hamid - 1994 - Population Displacement and Household Coping Strategies in Sudan

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Population Displacement and

Qousehold eoping Strategies in

late and gain employment in Greater Khartoum. A new wave of population

The conventional response to the plight of displaced people in Sudan has

Objectives and Research Strategy

Source:Adapted from Alirnatl (1985)

The Dynamics of Population Displacement in the Sudan

with unchecked population growth, has had an adverse impact on people’s

and led to a virtual collapse of services - hence, to outbreaks of epidemics in

Primary Motives for Migration: Displacement Versus Voluntary

percent in search of employment, and the remaining 7 percent in search of

Sample Size = 450

Source:Field Survey, 1990

The wardisplaced group is comprised of Southern households and a smaller

Migration and Settlement in Greater Khartoum

Earlier migrants, who came to Greater Khartoum before 1970, constituted

was limited, their choice of Greater Khartoum as a destination involved a large

Household Sustenance Strategies

The median household monthly income, calculated by adding wages of

Access to Housing, Rationed Commodities, and Public Services

Wardisplaced 600 400

Voluntary migrants 725 550

Total sample 700 500

Wbal Group Median Income IQR~

Other Westerne 785 600

Nuer 700 500

Dinka 600 500

Nuba 600 400

Other Southern' 600 350

Total Samde 700 500

in the process of home construction was primarilysupplied by the mutual help

1, ElHave CRCs I3 No CRCs

Source: Field Survey, 1990

Invariably, primary schools were accommodated in makeshift buildings within

Migrants‘ Perceptions and Future Intentions

one-third. N o significant differenceswere observed among the migrantgroups

Impact of Public Policy on Migrants’ Livelihoods

Source: Field Suivey, 1990

ment perception of the nuziheen as temporary sojourners in Greater Khar-

Summamy and Conclusions

The naziheen developed three distinct strategies in response to the official

For the wardisplaced southerners, some 60 percent of whom have migrated

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