Section 5

De Lima vs. Guerrero

Jurisdiction/ Salary Grade 27
Doctrine: The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to
the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher,
regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. ​The power of
the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent.
The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined
and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660

Summary:
Upon several inquiries by the Congress on the proliferation of dangerous drugs in the New
Bilibid Prison, several inmates executed affidavits which led to four consolidated complaints
against Sen. Leila De Lima. The DOJ then conducted hearings on her case which she strongly
opposed to, expressing alleged partiality on the former’s part. After preliminary investigation,
the DOJ recommended the filing of Informations against her before the RTC of Muntinlupa.
One of the said Informations charged her for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj),
Section 26 (b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. Sen. De Lima filed a Motion to Quash with one of the grounds being
the lack of jurisdiction over the RTC. In its Decision, this Court held that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the ​exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is
not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as
Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to
office. It reiterated that jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court
as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to
the public officials' office. It remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

Facts:
The Senate and House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison, inviting inmates who executed
affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of four
consolidated complaints against Senator Leila De Lima ("Sen. De Lima"), et al. with the
Department of Justice ("DOJ").

In the DOJ Panel’s preliminary hearing, Sen. De Lima filed an Omnibus Motion to
Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the DOJ Panel and
the Secretary of Justice. She argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints.

Sen. De Lima decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two
motions. The DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed
counter-affidavits and declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution.
Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel
On January 13, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her.

In the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded
with the conduct of the preliminary investigation. In its Joint Resolution dated February 14,
2017, the DOJ Panel recommended the filing of Informations against Sen. De Lima.
Accordingly, three Informations were filed against Sen. De Lima and several co-accused
before the RTC of Muntinlupa City

On February 20, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a Motion to Quash based on several grounds
including:
○ The RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged
○ The DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information
○ The Information charges more than one offense
○ The allegations and recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge
○ The Information is based on testimonies of the witnesses who are not qualified to be
discharged as state witnesses
○ The testimonies of the witnesses are hearsay.

On February 23, 2017, Judge Guerrero issued an Order finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against Sen. De Lima and her co-accused. Thereafter, the PNP and CIDG
served the warrant of arrest on Sen. De Lima.

On February 27, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a the current petition with the SC praying for the
following reliefs:
○ Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside Order for a Warrant of Arrest
○ Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality
○ Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the proceedings
○ Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the
Order and Warrant of Arrest, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom

In the OSG’s comment, it argued that the petition should be dismissed as Sen. De Lima failed
to show that the has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. It further argued that she did
not observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. It asserted
​inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against the petitioner, that the
respondent judge observed the constitutional and procedural rules, and so did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the warrant

​ hether or not the RTC or the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the
W
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act by a public officer? ​-NO
Ruling:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the instant petition
on substantive grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information
charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery — a felony within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade
31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA
9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts
described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some
justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the Information charged
against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of
RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so
the respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the
power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out
that the history of the laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction
was streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth.

The designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information repeatedly
provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165."
From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with
which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165.

● Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted would
convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading.

● While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct
Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations in
the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The averments on solicitation of
money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description
on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The averments on how petitioner asked for and
received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos,
Dayan and the NBP inmates in wilfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of
mobile phones and other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b),
and Section 28, of RA 9165.

● As the Information provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading
of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates.

● A plain reading of RA 9165 will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested
with the Regional Trial Court and no other. No other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having
the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases.
● The change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the
RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction"
to select RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on
House Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic
Act No. 6425.

● The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of
whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to
sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,
which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98 As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660.

● To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers
in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is
vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the
violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal
Case No. 17-165.

People vs. Laba GR 199938 28 January 2013

DOCTRINE: If a person is found to have more than five (5) grams of shabu in his possession, then his
purpose in carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it.

KEYWORDS: Rubber Shoes, Spicer, extortion

CRIME CHARGED: violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165

● Appellant was supposed to take his flight bound for Davao City.
● He was approached by Villocillo, a non-uniformed personnel. Upon inspection of the rubber
shoes, which Villocillo asked appellant to remove, the former discovered three (3) plastic
sachets containing shabu two plastic sachets were inside the left shoe while one was inside the
right shoe
● PDEA, through Police Inspector Peter P. Alvarez, requested that a laboratory examination on
 the three (3) plastic sachets be conducted.
● Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
● In defense, appellant claimed that on the date and time in question, he was at the Manila
Domestic Airport for his flight to Davao City. After passing through the metal detector and
while walking towards the ticketing counter to check-in, a police officer, whom he later
identified as SPO2 Peji, called his attention and asked him to stay for a while because
something was allegedly recovered from him.
● At the same time, the appellant noticed that someone had been arrested, and he heard SPO2
Peji tell that person to settle the case so that they could just "pass" the "thing" to the appellant,
which turned out to be shabu.
● Thereafter, SPO2 Peji and Villocillo brought the appellant to an office where SPO2 Peji forced
him to admit ownership of the shabu. When appellant refused, SPO2 Peji suggested the
settlement of the case for P100,000.00, an amount which appellant could not afford.
● Appellant denied wearing the white rubber shoes with the label "Spicer" at the time he was
arrested.
● RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements for transportation of
drugs, i.e., actual physical possession and control of the prohibited drugs, coupled with the
presentation of the corpus delicti in court, have been established by the prosecution. It found
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Villocillo and SPO2 Peji to be candid, forthright and
reliable. Moreover, as law enforcers, they were presumed to have regularly performed their
official duties.
● RTC refused to give credence to appellant's bare and unsubstantiated denials, as well as his
claim that he was merely framed-up, and his insistence that the police officers were extorting
money from him.
● C.A affirmed the decision. holding that the identity of the seized substance had been adequately
proved and that the chain of custody was properly established, from the time that it was
recovered from the person of the appellant, tested at the laboratory for a qualitative
examination, and its actual presentation in court.
● While the CA conceded that the arresting officers were unable to strictly comply with the
requirements set forth under Sec. 21, Par. (1) of RA 9165 by failing to photograph the seized
items, it nonetheless found that the evidentiary value of the confiscated substance had been
preserved. It also did not find the non-presentation of the forensic chemist as fatal to the
cause of the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether the CA and the RTC committed any reversible error in convicting appellant as
charged?

HELD: No. Appellant was convicted of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, which reads:

Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. ―The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
In adjudging appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said offense, the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, considered the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of an extremely large
amount of prohibited drugs inside the airport, before boarding his flight bound for Davao City. The
RTC explained that Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 penalizes the act of transporting shabu, under which
provision the appellant must clearly be convicted.

"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey from one
place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one
place to another.

In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound
for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it
may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs
in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for
the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.

With respect to the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, the Court likewise finds no reason to
disturb the findings of the CA that the same had been faithfully observed by the arresting officers: from
the time that the illegal substance was seized from appellant and properly marked by the arresting
officers, to its laboratory examination until its presentation in open court for identification purposes.
Considering that the integrity of the seized substance has been duly preserved, failure to strictly comply
with Sec. 21, Par. (a) of RA 9165 requiring the apprehending officers to physically inventory and
photograph the confiscated items shall not render the evidence inadmissible.

PEOPLE VS. SIU MING TAT

Buy-bust operation in a hotel
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.

Facts:

Prosecution:

● A buy-bust operation that will be conducted on the basis of the information gathered from a
confidential informant who was able to arrange a drug deal with appellants Tat and Lee.
● PO3 Mabanglo was assigned as the poseur-buyer while PI Salmingo was his immediate
backup. Thereafter, PCI Ibañez, the team leader, handed to PO3 Mabanglo 10 pieces of P1,000
bills to be used as the buy-bust money. The latter then prepared the boodle money to be used
together with the genuine P1,000 bills as the deal made by the confidential informant was for
about half-kilo of shabu worth P1.3 Million.
● After the briefing at around 4 p.m. of the same day, PO3 Mabanglo and PI Salmingo left the
 office and checked in at the China Town Hotel as the confidential informant informed them that
the appellants were already in the said hotel.
● At 9 p.m. the following day, the confidential informant called PO3 Mabanglo and met him at
the hotel lobby at around 9:30 a.m. At the lobby, the confidential informant told PO3 Mabanglo
that the deal that he arranged will be held at Room 315 of the hotel.
● Upon reaching the target area, they were greeted by a Chinese-looking man, later identified as
appellant Tat, who told them to go inside. Inside the room, PO3 Mabanglo was introduced to
appellant Tat by the confidential informant as the one who will buy the drugs. Appellant Lee
was also seen in the room seated on the bed. PO3 Mabanglo was then asked if he had the
money to which he answered in the affirmative.
● After that, appellant Tat then went to the cabinet at the left side of the room and got a travelling
bag. He placed the bag on top of the bed and pulled out a yellow plastic bag with Chinese
characters. From the yellow plastic bag, appellant Tat took out one heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 426.30 grams of white crystalline substance. Appellant Tat then
showed the sachet to PO3 Mabanglo, who told the former that "it was good" and gave the
money to appellant Lee.
● Immediately thereafter, PO3 Mabanglo executed the pre-arranged signal by pressing on his
cellphone PI Salmingo's number to signify that the deal had already been consummated. The
latter then rushed to the scene and effected the arrest of appellant Lee while PO3 Mabanglo
arrested appellant Tat. The appellants were then apprised of their violation and constitutional
rights.
● Following that, SPO1 Calva and PCI Ibañez arrived at the crime scene while the other
members of the buy-bust team prepared the documentation of the evidence seized from the
appellants.
● Seized from the appellants were the yellow plastic bag and one plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance as well as the buy-bust money. PO3 Mabanglo then, with the assistance of
the members of the team, conducted the marking and physical inventory of the seized items in
the presence of the appellants, ACP Tuvera, Brgy. Chairman Que, and Marco Gutierez, a media
representative from ABS-CBN. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
confiscated from the appellants was marked. Photographs of the same were taken as well. The
seized items were then turned over to the duty investigator, SPO1 Calva, by PO3 Mabanglo
after accomplishing the Receipt/Inventory Form and the Chain of Custody Form as proof that
he was turning over the seized items to the former.
● After making the request for laboratory examination and drug testing, the specimen was
brought to the laboratory for qualitative examination. After conducting the said examination on
the contents of the plastic, they found that the seized item tested positive for ephedrine, a
dangerous drug. The ephedrine subject of the sale was brought to and duly identified in open
court.

Defendant:

● The defense, on the other hand, presented its witness in the person of appellants Tat and Lee
who denied the accusations against them.
● Appellant Tat declared that he and appellant Lee arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong
through Clark International Airport in Pampanga to take their vacation. From the airport, they
immediately proceeded to Binondo, Manila by taking a taxi. Upon arrival there, they
checked-in into a hotel in Binondo.
● The following day, around 8 a.m., Tat asked appellant Lee to go to a travel agency in Binondo
to buy airline tickets. While he was left alone inside the hotel room, police officers went inside
the room and pointed a gun at him. One of the police officers handcuffed him and searched the
 room. When appellant Lee arrived at the hotel room at around 10:30 a.m., he was surprised to
see appellant Tat in handcuffs and being ganged up on by police officers. He was also
handcuffed and he saw one of the police officers bring something into the room and placed this
thing inside a plastic bag owned by him. He also saw a paper bag with money inside and
photographs were taken as well by a media representative. Thereafter, they were brought to the
police station. Appellant Lee corroborated the testimony of appellant Tat in its material points.
● Merlyn Tadoy, was the last witness who testified for the defense. She declared that she works
as a Reservation Officer at Timberfield Travel and Tours Agency. She presented documents to
show that appellant Lee purchased a Cebu Pacific ticket bound for Malaysia on July 26, 2012.
However, she stated later that she does not know Lee as she was not the one who dealt with the
latter but her boss.

Crime Charged: Violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, paragraph (b), Article II of RA No.
9165

Procedural History:
● RTC - found the accused Tat and Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals for violation
of Section 5 in relation to Article 26 of RA 9165
● Tat and Lee moved for reconsideration; RTC denied
● Appealed to the CA; denied

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY SAPLA y GUERRERO

G.R. No. 244045. June 16, 2020

SC: Acquitted

Keyword: Passenger Jeep 4 bricks of marijuana, illegal search

FACTS:

11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned
citizen, who informed the said office that a certain male individual [would] be transporting marijuana
from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their
deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a possible joint
operation. Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan coordinated
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). PSI Ngoslab immediately organized a team
and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3 Labbutan as the arresting
officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security and backup. The said officers then
proceeded to the Talaca detachment. The RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the
subject male person who would transport marijuana was wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the
Talaca command post. The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the
police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan
approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The
police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of him,
which the latter answered in the affirmative, said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to
open the blue sack. After [accusedappellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan
saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar.
PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest
and his constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the Talaca detachment for proper
markings. PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized items, one (1)
blue sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer placed his
signature on the said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by [accused-appellant
Sapla], and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla,
an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media representative. PO2 Mabiasan
personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case for custody, safekeeping and
proper disposition. Also, PSI Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which
requested that a chemistry examination be conducted on the seized items. The said initial examination
revealed that the specimens "A-1" to "A-4" with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded
positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.

(Side note) Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal his true
identity by using a fictitious name — Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators were able to contact
[accused-appellant Sapla's] sister, who duly informed the said investigators that [accused-appellant
Sapla's] real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.

RTC: RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating Section 5 of R.A.
9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the
crime.

CA: CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA found that
although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was without a search warrant,
the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the
essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the officers which will determine
whether there is enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused under Sec.5 of RA 9165

RULING: No, the accused appellant cannot be convicted of violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165, as the
search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not valid.

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA
considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. "Warrantless search
and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant
under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection." And an extensive search of a
vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."

In People v. Comprado the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person." "In
search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is
worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular
bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said
bus."

In applying the Comprado case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the search conducted
was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said
vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched the description given by the person who
called the RPSB Hotline. Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as
a search of a moving vehicle.

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the
operation undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search
of a moving vehicle. In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non- violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where
the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle ; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where
the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Routine inspections do not give the authorities discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as
opposed to a mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched."
Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the
vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

The singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part of the police officers was the
information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from an anonymous person.
The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless searches
and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.”

"Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay
no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen, held that the accused was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. x x x
There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably
allow them to infer anything suspicious."

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on
an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accusedappellant Sapla was an
invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search, which is not the case
here. Further, the prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of evidence in plain
view, that it was a customs search, and that there were exigent and emergency circumstances that
warranted a warrantless search.

Additional info

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in this case and that the illegal
drugs — four (4) bricks of marijuana, discovered as a result of consented search [are] admissible in
evidence."

Wrong

The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to
object to a search does not amount to permission thereto. the consent to a warrantless search and
seizure must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by duress or coercion.

Mere passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not
amount to consent and that the presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that the petitioner
therein consented to the warrantless search. In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented
convinces the Court that accused-appellant Sapla's apparent consent to the search conducted by the
police was not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It
cannot be seriously denied that accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment,
considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a checkpoint.

The prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla.
Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.

Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures [is]
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other
words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding.
People vs. Quijano
GR 247558 19 February 2020

Facts:

● Appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

● JO2 Briones is a jail officer assigned at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Manila.
There, he noticed Marivic Tulipat (a regular visitor at the city jail) receiving a light violet bag from
someone inside the city jail bakery.
● He became suspicious and called her attention. Tulipat appeared hesitant and he had to call her
attention several times more before she finally approached him. But before she did, she handed the
bag to appellant Allan Quijano. This prompted him to also summon appellant who, just like Tulipat,
appeared hesitant.
● He then asked the appellant about the contents of the bag. Instead of responding, however, appellant
turned to Tulipat and tried to give it back to her. But Tulipat refused. His suspicions grew and so he
grabbed the bag and opened it. Inside, he saw another blue bag which contained a transparent bag
containing white crystalline substance. He immediately arrested appellant and Tulipat.
● The seized items were marked, inventoried, and photographed inside the Manila City Jail, Tulipat,
appellant, JO3 Antonio, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Maria Josefina Concepcion, Kagawad
Jurilla, and Police Inspector Natividad were all present during the marking, inventory and
photographing.
● JO3 Briones marked the light violet bag and the self-sealing transparent bag and took photos of the
items. He brought these items to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The same were
received by Forensic Chemist Sweedy Kay L. Perez. Forensic Chemist Kay Perez certified that the
seized item with a net weight of seven hundred thirty-five point eight (735.8) grams yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

RTC - the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

CA - affirmed the Decision of the RTC

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction despite his alleged lack of
animus possidendi. He argued that the third element of illegal possession of dangerous drugs - the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drugs in question is absent. He merely received the bag from Tulipat
without actual knowledge of its contents. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
defended the verdict of conviction. Appellant's contention that he had no knowledge of the contents of the
bag was belied by his behavior during the incident. Appellant was fully aware that Tulipat was already then
being summoned by JO2 Briones and a commotion even ensued since the latter was running after Tulipat.
Despite the commotion, appellant readily accepted the bag handed by Tulipat without hesitation. When
summoned by JO2 Briones, appellant did not promptly surrender the bag to the former. Thus, the
prosecution had sufficiently established that appellant, through his prior and contemporaneous actions,
consciously intended to possess the prohibited drug.

The Court of Appeals held that appellant failed to establish his so-called lack of knowledge of the contents
of the blue bag which turned out to contain more than seven hundred (700) grams of shabu. It noted that
first, appellant knew Tulipat was involved in a commotion inside the Manila City Jail and was being
summoned by JO2 Briones, yet, he still readily and without any hesitation accepted the bag containing the
subject shabu; second, appellant was reluctant to approach and surrender the bag to JO2 Briones when the
latter summoned him; and third, appellant attempted to return the bag to Tulipat when he realized they were
about to get caught in possession of the illegal drugs contained inside the bag. Further, the unstable
weighing scale used during the ocular inspection and the different weighing scales used during the
laboratory examination accounted for the variance in the weight of the seized drugs.

Issue: Whether or not the CA err in affirming appellant's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs?

Ruling: NO.

For a successful prosecution of an offense for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. This crime is mala prohibita, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
The prosecution, however, must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus possidendi).
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused.
Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

In possession of illicit drugs cases, ownership is inconsequential. Mere possession of the illicit drugs is
malum prohibitum and the burden of proof is upon the accused to prove that they have a permit or clearance
to possess the prohibited drugs.

Here, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found that the prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Appellant was caught in
possession of illegal drugs of considerable quantity 729.2 grams of shabu inside the Manila City Jail, sans
any authority. He has not disputed this fact, albeit, he asserts that the element of animus possidendi was
absent.

Appellant failed to prove absence of animus possidendi

Animus possidendi is a state of mind. It is determined on a case-to-case basis taking into consideration the
prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. It must be inferred from
the attendant events in each particular case. A mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he or.she did not
know that he or she had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, Animus possidendi is then presumed
because he or she was thereby shown to have performed an act that the law prohibited and penalized.
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Consequently, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
 During the commotion inside the city jail involving Tulipat and the bag in question, Tulipat suddenly handed
the bag to appellant who readily and unquestionably accepted it. Under normal circumstances, appellant
should have already become suspicious when he saw and heard JO2 Briones calling for Tulipat because of
the bag she was holding at that time. In fact, appellant himself said Tulipat's possession of the bag already
caused a commotion inside the city jail. In any event, when JO2 Briones also called for appellant himself,
like Tulipat, the latter hesitated and even tried to pass on the bag back to Tulipat who refused to accept it.
And when appellant finally came face to face with JO2 Briones, appellant did not immediately surrender the
bag to the former nor denied his ownership of the bag or knowledge of the shabu found inside. Even during
the investigation, appellant was not shown to have interposed any such disclaimer. Surely, these
circumstances altogether negate appellant's pretense of lack of animus possidendi.

Section 11

People v. Pis-An. GR No. 242692. July 13, 2020

Service of search warrant yielded 14 pieces of transparent plastic sachets each containing white
crystalline substance, which were later confirmed to be shabu.

As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be
done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any
elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media. The law requires
the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

The maximum penalty of life imprisonment may only be imposed when the crime of illegal
possession was committed in the presence of two or more persons or in a social gathering
pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165. Here, since it was not shown Pis-an was caught
possessing the dangerous drugs during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two persons, the maximum imposable penalty should be below life
imprisonment which is currently pegged 40 years and 1 day.

Crime charged: illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
RTC: convicted
CA: convicted
SC: acquitted with modification as to the maximum period of the penalty

Facts:

PROSECUTION:
 ● On February 16, 2015, Pis-an was placed under surveillance after the police received a tip from
a confidential informant that the former was involved in drug dealing. The police then
conducted a test-buy operation and was able to recover from Pis-an one transparent plastic
sachet which yielded positive results for shabu.
● Thus, on February 18, 2015, Police Officer 3 Derek T. Alcoran (PO3 Alcoran) applied for a
search warrant before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental. That same day, Search
Warrant (SW) No. 10-2015 was issued by Executive Judge Gerardo A. Paguio, Jr., authorizing
the search of Pis-an's residence located in Barangay (Brgy.) Camanjac, Dumaguete City.
● On February 25, 2015, a team headed by PO2 Eugene A. Calumba (PO2 Calumba) and PO2
Dexter S. Banua (PO2 Banua) discussed their individual assignments and plan of action. After
receiving the coordination control number from the local Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the team marched to implement SW No. 10-2015. Upon reaching the house of Pis-an,
the police officers, along with Brgy. Kagawad Raul Dicen (Brgy. Kagawad Dicen), enforced
the warrant. Among the seized items included one red coin purse containing 14 pieces of
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance.
● All the items were carried out to the porch of the house where PO2 Calumba marked them
while PO2 Banua took photos. Afterwards, an inventory was made in the presence of Pis-an
and Brgy. Kagawad Dicen; together with media practitioner Juancho Gallarde (Gallarde) and
Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Anthony Chilius Benlot (Benlot), who had both
arrived by then. Thereafter, Pis-an and the seized items were brought to the Provincial
Intelligence Branch (PIB) satellite office where a Memorandum Request for Laboratory
Examination and Drug Test and a Return of Search Warrant were prepared and signed by PO2
Calumba.
● That afternoon, at the crime laboratory, PCInsp. Llena received the confiscated items from PO2
Calumba and proceeded to conduct confirmatory tests thereon. In her Chemistry Report No.
D-079-15, PCInsp. Llena stated that the 14 pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance have a total aggregate weight of 9.38 grams and all tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PCInsp. Llena also examined the urine sample
taken from Pis-an and, as inscribed in her Chemistry Report No. DT-068-15, the same also
tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.
● Pis-An was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.

DEFENSE

● During trial, Pis-an denied the charge against him and testified that (i) on February 25, 2015, at
around 5:00 a.m., police officers barged through their gates and demanded to search the place;
and (ii) he asked to see the search warrant but PO2 Calumba replied that there was no need to
show the same as it was already signed by higher authorities. Pis-an contended that he was not
able to witness the search as he was made to stay on the porch of the house.

RTC

● The RTC convicted Pis-An of the crime charged. He was sentenced to suffer a penalty of 20
years and 1 day to life imprisonment.

CA

● The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. In doing so, the CA held that the prosecution was able
to prove all the elements required to secure Pis-an's conviction. Moreover, the CA observed
 that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were properly preserved as each link
in the chain of custody rule was duly established by the prosecution. Further, the CA opined
that Pis-an's allegation that no search warrant was shown to him was belied by the fact that his
signature appears thereon.

1. WON Pis-An is guilty of illegal possession of a dangerous drug

2. WON the chain of custody rule was complied with by the police officers
3. WON the maximum penalty to be imposed should be life imprisonement

1. YES.

For the charge of illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be proven that (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2)
such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug.

In the case at bench, the courts a quo correctly held that all the aforementioned elements are present
here, since: (i) by virtue of SW No. 10-2015, a valid search warrant, the police officers recovered,
among others, 14 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which
later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (ii) such possession is not
authorized by law as Pis-an himself admitted during the pre-trial; and (iii) the prohibited drugs were
uncovered from Pis-an's house which was a prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
Verily, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are binding upon this Court absent any
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.

2. YES.

As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation
of the same. The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a
representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence.

Records reveal that right after Pis-an was arrested, the police officers immediately took custody of the
seized items and marked them right there and then. They also conducted the requisite inventory and
photography in the presence of all three (3) insulating witnesses as required by R.A. No. 9165 prior to
its amendment, namely: Brgy. Kagawan Dicen; media practitioner Gallarde; and DOJ representative
Benlot. Thereafter, PO2 Calumba delivered the confiscated drugs to PCInsp. Llena for laboratory
examination. Later, confirmatory tests on all 14 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets would yield a
positive finding for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or more commonly known as
shabu. Clearly, therefore, the chain of custody over the seized drugs remained unbroken as the recovery
and proper handling of the corpus delicti were sufficiently shown.
 3. NO.

The maximum penalty of life imprisonment may only be imposed when the crime of illegal possession
was committed in the presence of two or more persons or in a social gathering pursuant to Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9165. Here, since it was not shown Pis-an was caught possessing the dangerous drugs during
a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two persons, the
maximum imposable penalty should be below life imprisonment which is currently pegged 40 years
and 1 day.

In view of the foregoing, we modify the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Since
Pis-an was found to have been in illegal possession of 9.38 grams of shabu, he is meted the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 20 years and one day, as minimum, to 30 years, as maximum.

Section 15

Dela Cruz vs. People GR 200748 23 July 2014

Keyword: Accused is arrested for extortion but urine samples were taken.
RTC: Accused is guilty for violating Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
SC: Petitioner ACQUITTED

Facts:
● Jaime dela Cruz (a police officer in Cebu) was charged with violation of Section 15, Art II of
RA 9165 by the Ombudsman - Visayas.

Prosecution:
● The complainants are Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido who claimed that at 1 AM of
January 31, 2006, Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was
picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling
drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. The people who answered instructed
the complainants to go to Gorordo Police Office. The complainants, upon going to the Police
Office, they met “James” who demanded Php 100,000, later towered to Php 40,000 in
exchange for the release of Ariel. The complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a
complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the
NBI-CEVRO, Charito received calls from “James” instructing her to bring the money ASAP.

Defense:
● Petitioner was presented as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while
eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When
he was at the NBI Office, he was required to urinate for drug examination but he refused,
saying that he wants it to be done by the PNP Crime Laboratory and NOT by the NBI. It was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer but to no avail.
RTC:
● Accused is guilty for violating Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 (penalty: compulsory
rehabilitation for a period NOT less than 6 months).
● Petition filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness.

CA:
● The appeal is devoid of merit. Affirmed RTC.

Petitioner:
● Filed an MR. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that
drug testing conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a person’s right to
privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.
● Filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari, assigning as errors the use of hearsay
evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest
and drug test.

Respondent:
● Through the OSG, filed its Comment, saying that petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which
may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of
his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by
direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law.

Issue: WON the drug test is legal.

Ruling: The drug test conducted is NOT grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence. We gloss
over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate
originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Petitioner was charged with the use of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 15 of RA 9165. The
RTC subsequently convicted the petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to a drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug. We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial
court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts. The drug test
in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.|||

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for
any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section
15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under the law. To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused-appellant here was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion (not one of the acts stated in Section 15).

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated instead of charging and
convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. As stated in People v. Martinez, “On a final
note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and
Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law
enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where
the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being
subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with
the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first-time offenders of
drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15...To file
charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to
rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life. The
presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the
accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the
evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed
charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all,
they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, the Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory
test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a
chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should
only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in
the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.”

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to
all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to the SCs pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, “x x x
[M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the
bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test
as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this
case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.”

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question
the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest."
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest. In People v Gallarde:

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical/moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused
does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may
be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for a
medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.
The RTC & the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine
for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation." SC notes a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In
Gutang v. People, the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu
materials & paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give
urine samples, which yielded positive results. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. The
Court clarified that what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused.

SC emphasizes that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the instant case. First,
Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there
were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case,
petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; & finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidence used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

In the face of the constitutional guarantees under Section 2 and Section 17 of Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, the SC cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being made.

While SC expresses their commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down
offenders in their laudable effort to curb the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they
must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority. It is not unlikely that in
their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

People v Sullano, G.R. No. 228373 March 12, 2018

Keywords: Police Drug User
Doctrine: The phrase "apprehended or arrested" immediately follows "a person," thus
qualifying the subject person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons
found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the provision.
Crime Charged: Violation of Section 15, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Facts:
● On October 16, 2012, Senior Superintendent Nerio T. Bermudo (P/SSupt. Bermudo), the City
Director of the Butuan City Police Office, ordered fifty (50) randomly selected police officers
under the Butuan City Police Office to undergo drug testing pursuant to Section 36, Article III
of R.A. No. 9165. Among those who underwent testing was respondent, a police officer at
Butuan City Police Station 5.

● Respondent's urine sample was received on October 17, 2012. According to the Initial
Chemistry Report 5 of the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office 13, the
test conducted on respondent's urine specimen gave a positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine. The confirmatory test on the same specimen completed on November 5,
2012 yielded the same result.

● Given the result of the random drug test and confirmatory test, P/SSupt. Bermudo filed a
Complaint Affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. In lieu of a counter-affidavit, respondent filed a Manifestation, wherein he claimed that
he voluntarily submitted to the random drug test ordered by P/SSupt. Bermudo; the urine
sample he submitted gave a positive result to the presence of methamphetamine; he did not use
the dangerous drug but had no means to contest the test's veracity; and he entered into a
rehabilitation program with Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse. He concluded by
pleading for the dismissal of the complaint against him.

● Assistant City Prosecutor Isabel Corazon Cabuga-Plaza recommended the dismissal of the
complaint through a Resolution dated February 1, 2013. This was reversed by Deputy City
Prosecutor Aljay O. Go in an Order dated April 8, 2013, finding probable cause against
respondent. Consequently, an information was filed, the delictual allegations of which read:

● That sometime on October 17, 2012 at Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused not being authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu, which is a dangerous drug and found positive for use, after a confirmatory test.

Defense:
In his Demurrer to Evidence, respondent argued that the case against him should be dismissed as the
State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essential
elements of the crime were not proven as it was never asserted that respondent was apprehended or
arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug.
Procedural History:
RTC: Granted Demurrer to evidence. Case dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
CA: Affirmed RTC Ruling

Issue:
(1) WON Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person
for the latter to be considered as violating the provision

(2) WON a narrow interpretation of Section 15 will result in an absurd situation where a person
found to be positive for use of dangerous drugs through Section 36 may not be penalized for
not being arrested or apprehended, rendering Section 36 meaningless

Ruling:
(1) Yes.

The provision, Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive
for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of
Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also
found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11
of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article III of the same
law, which mandates the random drug testing for certain employees, and pertinently includes police
officers like respondent. Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165:

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies. — Officers and
members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory
drug test;

The phrase "apprehended or arrested" immediately follows "a person," thus qualifying the subject
person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons found to be positive for use of
any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the provision.

Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others, also known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, is relevant
and applicable. This rule applies where the very terms of the statute expressly limit it to certain matters;
thus it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. In the provision in question, Congress itself confined
and restricted the liability arising from use of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or
arrested if charged with a violation of Section 15.
 (2) No.

It is true that every part of a statute must be considered together with other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Parenthetically, the Court finds no difficulty
in harmonizing Section 36 with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last paragraph states
"[I]n addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act." This may be construed to mean
that rehabilitation for six (6) months in a government center, as stated in Section 15, may be imposed
on those found positive of use of dangerous drugs through a random drug test. This reading of the
provisions would still pursue the intent of the law to encourage not the prosecution and incarceration of
those using dangerous drugs, but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds relevance in this case
as respondent voluntarily submitted himself to rehabilitation.

Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law specifically calls for its
punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another basic criminal law precept important to
remember here is in dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will always be construed strictly against the state and in
favor of the accused.

These concepts signify that courts must not bring cases within the provision of law that are not clearly
embraced by it. An act must be pronounced criminal clearly by the statute prior to its commission. The
terms of the statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the latter to be held
liable under the provision

Applying these age-old precepts to the case at bar, petitioner's arguments should be rejected. Petitioner
wishes to expand the coverage of Section 15 to cover those under Section 36, and beyond what is
specifically limited by the wording of the statute under Section 15, even when the information only
alleges a violation of Section 15. Because of the strict construction of penal laws, this is not possible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 10, 2016 Decision and the November 17, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

Section 21

People vs. Suating

Facts:
Two separate (2) Informations were filed against Suating for violations of Sections 5 6 and 11 7 of
Republic Act No. 9165, 8 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
1. the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one
large stick of marijuana cigarette marked as BOK1, a prohibited drug to an asset of the Silay
City PNP posing as a poseur [-] buyer in exchange for three [3] twenty peso bills.
 2. the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
possession and control [one] (1) large rolled stick of Marijuana cigarette with a total weight of
0.14 grams marked as BOK-2, a prohibited drug without any license or permit to possess the
same.

Upon arraignment, Suating pleaded not guilty to the charges. Joint trial on the merits commenced. The
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution corroborated the following account of events:

● Acting on a tip from concerned constituents and barangay officials, the Philippine National
Police of Silay City (PNP Silay) effected a surveillance to verify whether or not Suating was
selling marijuana within the area of Barangay Mambulac Elementary School. 13 After several
test buys, the Information against Suating was confirmed.

● In coordination with the Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
in Iloilo City, the police officers planned a buybust operation. They prepared three (3) P20.00
bills. As marking, they underlined the last digit of each bill's serial number. They subscribed to
the marked money before City Prosecutor Ma. Lisa Lorraine Atotubo, and the use of the same
was entered in their blotter book under entry number 01723.

● Before the buy-bust operation, a short briefing commenced. PO2 Reynaldo Bernil (PO2 Bernil)
handed the marked money to a confidential asset who was the designated poseur [-] buyer.

● On the afternoon of November 9, 2011, the operation ensued.

● The poseur [-] buyer went to the premises of Barangay Mambulac Elementary School, ahead of
the police officers. Shortly thereafter, he called PO2 Bernil when Suating was already "within
his sight." The rest of the police officers followed, positioning themselves approximately 10
meters away from the area of operation and about 50 meters away from the school.

● PO2 Bernil was the point person of the entrapment. He saw the poseur [-] buyer approach
Suating and engage in a short conversation with him. He also witnessed when Suating left the
area of operation, only to return to the poseur [-] buyer after a few minutes. While Suating and
the poseur [-] buyer were talking, the latter took out the marked money from his pocket and
gave it to Suating. In exchange, Suating handed unknown articles suspected to be marijuana.

● After the sale, the poseur [-] buyer left the area. He proceeded to where PO2 Bernil was in
order to surrender the large stick of suspected marijuana cigarette bought from Suating. PO2
Bernil then handed the item to PO2 Ian Libo-on (PO2 Libo-on), who marked it with "BOK-1."

● PO2 Bernil and the other police officers immediately moved towards Suating and restrained his
hands. After introducing themselves as persons of authority, they apprehended Suating and
informed him of his constitutional rights. Suating's father, along with the other unidentified
individuals, attempted to stop the arrest but to no avail.
 ● Thereafter, the police officers brought Suating to a police station in Silay City, and proceeded to
conduct a body search on him in the presence of Kagawad Jose Junsay of Barangay Mambulac.
Found in his possession were the marked money used during the operation, together with
another large rolled cigarette stick of suspected marijuana, which was marked "BOK2" by PO2
Libo-on.

● In the presence of an elected official, the police officers inventoried and photographed the
confiscated items. After the request letter was prepared, the items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory of the Negros Occidental Police Provincial Office in Bacolod City. Under
Chemistry Report No. D-217-2011, Forensic Officer Paul Jerome Puentespina (Forensic Officer
Puentespina) examined the seized illicit drugs, which yielded positive for marijuana.

● On the other hand, Suating denied all charges against him and claimed that he was merely
framed by the police.

● Suating detailed in his testimony, which the witnesses corroborated, that he was allegedly
buying fish in the flea market of Barangay Mambulac on the day of the buy-bust operation,
when a police officer suddenly apprehended him. The police officer brought him to a room in
Silay City Police Station where they asked him certain questions. When Barangay Kagawad
Junsay arrived, Suating was frisked. However, they were only able to recover two pesos and
fifty centavos (P2.50) from his possession. Thereafter, the police officers took his photo, made
him sign a document, and later brought him to the Negros Occidental Police Provincial Office
where he was made to urinate in a disposable cup.

RTC: convicted Suating of the charges. Found the testimonies of police officers Bernil and Libo-on to
be "detailed and straightforward. Hinging on the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duties, and in the absence of any convincing proof that they have ill intent to falsely testify
against Suating, the trial court upheld the testimonies of the arresting officers.

On appeal, Suating assailed his conviction, asserting that the trial court was mistaken in relying on the
weakness of his defense. He insisted that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, as the identity of the confiscated illicit drugs were not sufficiently proven due to non-conformity
with the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

CA: The illegal sale transaction was effectively completed when Suating gave the hand rolled
marijuana cigarette to the poseur-buyer in exchange for the marked money. As to the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, Suating failed to persuade that he had legal authority to possess the
marijuana cigarette found when he was frisked. Moreover, his previous act of selling marijuana to the
poseur buyer showed his intention to "freely and consciously" possess illicit drugs.

Relative to the alleged non-conformity with the chain of custody, the Court of Appeals underscored that
the prosecution was able to prove that there was "no gap or confusion in the confiscation, handling,
custody and examination" of the confiscated illicit drugs.
Suating maintains his innocence.

● While he concedes that the defense of frame-up and denial is weak, he asserts that this cannot
be utilized to further the prosecution's cause, as the latter's evidence "must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of [his] defense."

● Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, 53 Suating claims that the prosecution failed to
establish the illegal sale of illicit drugs. Arguing that the police officers were 10 meters away
from the area of operation, he insists that it would be impossible for them to observe or even
hear what transpired during the alleged transaction. 54 He then questions why the prosecution
failed to present the poseur [-] buyer as witness when only the latter can best ascertain the
necessary details surrounding the sale.

● As to the chain of custody in handling the seized illicit drugs, Suating underscores the
following irregularities on the part of the police officers:

● First, he points out that the marking of the large stick of marijuana cigarette was done neither in
his presence nor in the presence of third-party witnesses. 57 Moreover, Suating emphasizes that
during the inventory, the confiscated illicit drugs were already laid down on the table when the
barangay officials came. Hence, they have no personal knowledge on how the items were taken
from his possession.

● Second, he also stresses that since the body search was belatedly undertaken, there is a
possibility that the second item might have been merely planted by the police.

● Lastly, Suating also stresses his misgivings on whether or not the articles allegedly seized from
him were the same ones tested by the forensic chemist in the first place, and eventually, the
ones presented in court. He posits that the records failed to provide details on who handled the
confiscated illicit drugs after examination and up to the moment they were offered as evidence
in court.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that the statements of PO2 Bernil, who had
the opportunity to observe the sale from a distance, duly substantiated the identities of both the buyer
and seller. 63 That even if the actual dialogue cannot be heard, the actions of both the accused and the
poseur [-] buyer supports the conclusion that the sale of illicit drugs did happen. 64

The Office of the Solicitor General also underscores that the testimony of the poseur [-] buyer is neither
necessary for conviction nor crucial to a plausible prosecution of the charges. With the statements made
by the police officers, the testimony of the poseur [-] buyer is only corroborative. 65

As to the alleged broken chain of custody, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that PO2 Bernil
and PO2 Libo-on were able to ascertain the identities of the marked seized illicit drugs. Further,
non-conformity with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not immediately render the
apprehension of an accused as illegal, or the articles seized inadmissible.

Finally, it argues that the defense of frame-up necessarily involves the assessment of the credibility and
statements of witnesses. It underscores that, as an often repeated rule that higher courts mostly accede
to the evaluation of trial courts, which have the opportunity to hear and observe the actuations of
witnesses during the proceedings.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the guilt of Suating was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the police officers complied with the chain of custody as provided for under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules.

Ruling
1. This Court rules in favor of Suating.

In order to guarantee a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove the following:
(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor[.]

In sum, the occurrence of the sale should be established.

Moreover, the object of the deal should also be offered as evidence and must similarly be
proven as the same one confiscated from the accused.

As to the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements should be ascertained:
[1] [T]he accused was in possession of dangerous drugs;
[2] such possession was not authorized by law; and
[3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.

In both cases, the confiscated illicit drugs from the accused comprises the corpus delicti of the
charges, "i.e., the body or substance of the crime [which] establishes that a crime has actually
been committed."It is of paramount importance to maintain the integrity and the identity of the
corpus delicti. Thus, the chain of custody rule warrants that "unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed."

The chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs.
. . of each stage, from the time of seizure [or] confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." As a means of verifying evidence, it
demands "that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by [proof] sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be." Accordingly, the prosecution
must be able to monitor each of the following links in the chain of custody over the illicit
drugs:
 First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In this case, a prearranged police entrapment led to Suating's apprehension. However, despite a
carefully planned and coordinated buybust operation, there were still irregularities committed
in the course of the entrapment, which caused apparent lapses to the chain of custody rule.

For this reason, the identity of the corpus delicti was not duly established beyond reasonable
doubt. We are no longer certain whether or not the miniscule quantities of 0.15 83 and 0.14
grams 84 of marijuana, presented as evidence against Suating in court, were the very same ones
allegedly confiscated from him.

2. The apprehension of Suating and the consequent seizure of illegal drugs in his possession were
due to a buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, after prior surveillance and
investigation. 85 Although this type of operation has been recognized to be effective in
eliminating unlawful dealings that are covertly undertaken, it has a notable "downside that has
not escaped the attention of the framers of the law." 86 Buy-bust operations are vulnerable "to
police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion."

Accordingly, police officers are mandated to strictly observe the procedure for confiscation and custody
of prohibited drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 88 The initial procedural safeguard 89 under Article
II, Section 21 90 thereof provides:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the d r u g s shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; 91
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In effecting the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, the Implementing Rules and Regulations 92 read:

a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; 93 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Notwithstanding the mandatory directive of the law as construed from its use of the word "shall," 94
the police officers miserably failed to comply with the specific procedures in handling the seized
marijuana cigarettes allegedly taken from accused-appellant.

The initial link in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated illicit drugs. Marking precludes
any contamination, switching or planting of evidence. Through it, the evidence is separated from the
corpus of other similar and correlated evidence, starting from confiscation until its disposal at the close
of criminal proceedings.To be at par with the rule on the chain of custody, the marking of the
confiscated articles should be undertaken: (1) in the presence of the accused; and (2) immediately upon
seizure. This effectively guarantees that the articles seized "are the same items that enter[ed] the chain
and are eventually the ones offered in evidence[.]"

In this case, the prosecution offered no reason as to why the marking of the seized marijuana labelled
"BOK-1" was not immediately done after confiscation, but rather only after a considerable lapse of
time, thereto when the poseur buyer was able to leave the area of operation, away from the sight of the
accused. Moreover, they particularly failed to explain why the police officers could not have promptly
marked the item in the presence of Suating, if only to remove any uncertainty that the marijuana
cigarette marked by PO2 Libo-on, and later subjected to laboratory testing, was the very same one
allegedly sold by the accused to the poseur [-] buyer. 98 Here, an apparent break in the chain of custody
already existed before the item was even marked.

Additionally, the prosecution's failure to present the poseur [-] buyer is prejudicial to their cause. 99 To
emphasize, the negotiations during the assailed transaction was intimately between the poseur buyer
and Suating. PO2 Bernil, whose exact location from the area of operation was not specifically stated,
was merely observing from a distance. 100 Considering that the poseur buyer was the one who has
personal knowledge of the illegal sale transaction since he was the one who conducted the same, his
testimony is not merely corroborative to that of the police officers. 101 The quantity of dangerous drugs
here is "so small that the reason for not presenting the poseur [-] buyer does not square with such a
miniscule amount."

Moreover, this Court observed that while there was a narration that the confiscated items were
inventoried and photographed in the police station, 103 it is not, however, clear 104 whether such
procedures were done in the presence of the required third-party witnesses. To underscore, the
prosecution's narrative in the Court of Appeals' Decision states that both the inventory and photograph
of the confiscated articles were undertaken before " a n elected public official. " 105 However, in the
Appellee's Brief, the mandatory procedures were allegedly made "in the presence of Hon. Ireneo Celis
and the Barangay Kagawad."

The inconsistencies in the prosecution's narration of events points out that the required attendance of
representatives (from both the media and the Department of Justice) during the inventory and
photographing was not faithfully complied with, despite having more than enough time to secure their
presence during preparation of the allegedly well-planned entrapment. Although their absence does not
per se make the seized articles inadmissible as evidence, the prosecution must prove that it has
acceptable reason for such failure, or a showing that it exerted "genuine and sufficient effort" to secure
their presence, 107 which, in this case, the prosecution failed to do.

The attendance of third-party witnesses is called for in order "to ensure that the chain of custody rule is
observed and thus, [it] remove[s] any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a case." 108 Even assuming that the inventory and
photographing of the seized articles were made in the presence of two (2) elected public officials —
still, the superfluity cannot justify the absence of the other required personalities therein. With the
glaring lapses committed by the police officers, which inevitably tainted the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized illicit drugs, we cannot help but subscribe to Suating's contention that there is a
possibility that the marijuana stick allegedly confiscated from his possession was merely planted,
considering that the body search was belatedly done at the police station and only after more than an
hour from his apprehension. 109

Finally, the prosecution's narration of facts ended when the confiscated articles were examined by
Forensic Officer Puentespina, whose findings under Chemistry Report No. D-217-2011 provided that
the items yielded positive for marijuana. 110 This finding, however, leaves the following questions
unresolved: (1) did the confiscated drugs remain under Forensic Officer Puentespina's custody; and (2)
were they conveyed to some other place until their presentation in court as evidence? The lack of
details on the post-chemical examination custody 111 of the confiscated illicit drugs creates another
substantial gap in the chain of custody rule, particularly on the must accounted "turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court."

Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 "is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects." 113 Moreover, it "spells out matters that are imperative." 114 Even performing
actions, which seemingly near compliance but do not really conform to its requisites, is not enough. 115
More so, "when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs . . . is the result of carefully planned
operations, as is the case here."

In addition, the prosecution cannot merely assert the saving clause under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. Non-conformity with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
certainly not fatal to the cause of the prosecution, as long as the lapses committed by police officers in
the handling of evidence were "recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have [also] been preserved."

However, these requirements were not present in this case, since the prosecution, to begin with, failed
to acknowledge that there were lapses committed by police officers while dealing with the custody of
the seized illicit drugs. These irregularities created major gaps in the chain of custody rule, which, if
remained unjustified, is prejudicial to the claim of the prosecution.

To emphasize, only 0.15 119 and 0.14 grams 120 of marijuana were confiscated from
accused-appellant. For this reason, courts must exercise "heightened scrutiny, consistent with the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of
drugs[,] [for] [t]hese can be readily planted and tampered."

People vs. Lim GR 231989 04 Sep. & 13 Nov .2018

Doctrine: It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory
and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public
official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no
fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before
the offenders could escape.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven

Keywords: stepson, acquitted, violation of chain of custody

Crime charged: Violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS:

● An Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
● That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, xxx Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance
recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.
● Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
● On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted
for illegal sale of shabu
 ● That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, xxx Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred
peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked and recorded for the
purpose of the buy-bust operation.
● In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. They were detained in the city jail
during the joint trial of the cases.
● The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2
Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused,
Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

PROSECUTION’s version
· Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional
Office X of PDEA.
· Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged
in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were
directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust
operation.
· During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team
leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.
· The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the
PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related
documents.
· Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office and arrived in the target area at
10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer
leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members
disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in the area to observe.
· IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house.
· The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. "
· Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while
watching the television.
· When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get
one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he
handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent
plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust
money.
· After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which
was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately
rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the
door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that
they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their
arrest for selling dangerous drugs. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and
to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1
Orellan conducted a body search on both.
· When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his
pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money
and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it
contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug
 was seized.
· IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of
white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet
that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets.
Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and
barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
· The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and
prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for
the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case.
Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not
signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of
both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
· The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of
shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist,
and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7 personally received the letter-requests and the two
pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI
Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory
tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of
shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With
respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of
shabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings
were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own
marking on the cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them
to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the
fiscal's office during the inquest.
Defense’s version
· Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina,
Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was
watching the television.
· When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before
he could reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and
kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him,
instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him.
· They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the
whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men
went there and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his
head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet.
· The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights.
Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory.
· During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel,
ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would
imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest.
· Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in
the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the
PDEA agents and that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.
 · Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita,
Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made.
· The following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock
was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the
defense, which the court admitted as part of her testimony.
RTC: ruled guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack
of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.
· With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of
evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated
denial of Lim.
· As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the
buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony
of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or
prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred.
Between the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution
evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of
malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim.
· On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA
operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.
· as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough
to support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was
insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision

ISSUE: Whether Lim is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as to make him liable for illegal possession
and sale of shabu?

HELD: No. It is in violation of the chain of custody and tt the time of the commission of the crimes,
the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series
of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as- the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized items shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated
prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence
is what the party claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient
evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government
claims it to be

Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover
of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the
illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

Further, Seizure and marking of the illegal drug as well as the turnover by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer should be followed

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165

In this case, here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet
of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that
she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan
testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of
shabu.27 To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1
Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and
AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the
media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do
not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: The prosecution bears the burden of proving
a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial
proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and
must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules
require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state
this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the
integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal
drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as: (1) their attendance was
impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any
person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged
with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often
rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the
crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's
house.35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering
that it was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials
despite their effort to contact them.36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the
barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak confidential information.

Hence, We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and
sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding
accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim
y Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED
from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be
issued immediately.

PEOPLE VS. RUIZ

Keyword: Buy-bust in a sari-sari store
Doctrine: The marking, physical inventory and photographing of the seized items by the
apprehending team shall be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, and in the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel. The law also mandates that the foregoing be witnessed by
specific persons, namely: (a) an elected public official; and (b) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media.

Facts:
● A buy-bust operation is being prepared after receiving a tip from a confidential informant of
the rampant illegal sale of drugs by a certain “Presing”, later identified as accused-appellant
Ruiz.
● PO2 Tibuc was tasked as poseur-buyer in the operation and PO2 Cailo as back-up arresting
officer. The other member-officers of the buy-bust operation team shall act as perimeter
security.
● On the same day, the buy-bust operation team, together with the confidential informant,
 proceeded to the alleged location of illegal drug activity located in Southville Subdivision,
Barangay San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. PO2 Tibuc and the confidential informant
proceeded on foot to a sari­sari store owned by Ruiz, while PO2 Cailo and the other officers
stationed themselves on a street nearby.
● Upon arriving at the sari-sari store, PO2 Tibuc observed a woman inside the store, who he
identified as Ruiz. He and the confidential informant first bought cigarettes. Then, the
confidential informant asked Ruiz, "te baka merun ka diyan iiscore sana kami." In reply, Ruiz
asked how much they were going to purchase to which PO2 Tibuc said, "kukuha po sana kami
ng singko." Ruiz picked up a crossbody bag on the floor and took out several pieces of plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance. She then handed one sachet to PO2 Tibuc, in
exchange, the latter gave the P500.00 marked bill. Upon receipt of the plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance, PO2 Tibuc secretly placed a call in his cellphone to PO2 Cailo as the
pre-arranged signal that the sale of illegal drugs had been completed.
● Alerted by the missed call of PO2 Tibuc, PO2 Cailo immediately rushed to the crime scene.
Just as PO2 Cailo was approaching the location, he observed a young woman running towards
the sari-sari store and shouting, "Lola, lola may mga pulis na paparating." PO2 Tibuc also
observed the same young woman approach the sari-sari store alerting Ruiz of the arrival of the
police. Thus, he took the opportunity to introduce himself as a police officer and prevented
Ruiz and the young woman, later identified as Macaraeg, from leaving the sari-sari store. At
that same instant, PO2 Cailo, who arrived at the crime scene, reached for the young woman's
arm, while the latter was trying to close the door of the sari-sari store.
● After arrest, PO2 Tibuc seized the crossbody bag from Ruiz and opened the same to find 14
pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and other paraphernalia. He
then correspondingly marked at the same place of arrest the 14 sachets and the other
paraphernalia. PO2 Tibuc also marked the purchased plastic sachet. He also recovered the
P500.00 bill with the markings.
● The officers then brought Ruiz and Macaraeg to the police station in Calamba, Laguna for
photographing and inventory-taking of the seized items. A media representative signed the
inventory. Thereafter, the documentary request for laboratory examination of the seized items
was prepared. PO2 Tibuc brought said items to the forensic chemist for quantitative and
qualitative examination. The sachets containing white crystalline substance yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more commonly known as shabu. Ruiz was then indicted for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia.

Defendant:
● Ruiz, on the one hand, claims that she was attending to her sari-sari store when two men, later
identified as PO2 Tibuc and PO2 Cailo, bought soft drinks. Thereafter, said officers brought her
and her granddaughter to the police station in Calamba, Laguna due to a suspicion that Ruiz
was involved in the sale of illegal drugs. At the police station, PO2 Cailo took illegal drugs out
from a cabinet, which they claimed belonged to Ruiz, who was detained by the officers at the
police station from the time she was arrested until formal criminal charges were filed against
her.

Crime Charged: Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, Illegal
Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs

Procedural History:
● RTC held that the prosecution was able to present all the elements of illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs.
 ● The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC holding that the chain of custody had been established.
The CA explained that the location of inventory-taking and photographing of seized items will
depend on whether or not a search warrant had been issued. When the seizure of items is
supported by a search warrant, the inventory-taking and photographing of seized items "must"
be conducted at the place where the warrant was served. For warrantless seizures, the CA held
that the same must be conducted at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officers, whichever is practicable. In this case, since the illegal drugs were taken
pursuant to an arrest in flagrante delicto, the police officers were correct in conducting the
inventory-taking and photographing of seized items at the police station in Calamba City. he
absence of an elected official or a representative from the National Prosecution Service was
excused because what is important is establishing an unbroken chain of custody.
● Unsatisfied with the Decision of the CA, Ruiz filed the instant appeal before this Court arguing
that the corpus delicti was never established before the court a quo for failure to comply with
the rules on custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs under Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
Ruiz reiterates her position that the sachet from the buy-bust sale and the 14 sachets retrieved
from her could have been mixed-up by PO2 Tibuc because he was in possession of all seized
items prior to marking. Hence, there could not have been any way for PO2 Tibuc to identify
which of the sachets in his custody was from the buy-bust sale or those retrieved from Ruiz by
reason of her arrest. In addition, the marking was not witnessed by any elective official, and
media or representative from the office of the National Prosecution Service, nor was the
inventory-taking and photographing of the seized items conducted at the place of seizure as
required under the law. There were no records showing what happened to the seized items
between the turnover by the forensic chemist to the evidence custodian and, later, the
presentation of the corpus delicti in open court.

Issue(s): Whether the chain of custody rule set out in Section 21 of RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640
must be strictly observed

Ruling: NO.
● Under R.A. 10640, the marking, physical inventory and photographing of the seized items by
the apprehending team shall be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, and in
the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel. The law also mandates that the foregoing be
witnessed by specific persons, namely: (a) an elected public official; AND (b) a representative
of the National Prosecution Service OR the media.
● Records show the police officers' failure to comply with the foregoing rule. While the marking
of the seized items took place immediately after seizure and confiscation, it is undisputed that
the same was conducted without the presence of any of the additional witnesses prescribed by
law. Likewise, only a media representative was present to sign the inventory of the seized items
prepared at the police station. The mandate of R.A. 10640 is clear that there be the presence of
at least two witnesses during the inventory-taking and photographing of the seized items. The
sole presence of the media representative will not suffice as compliance.
● The law admits exceptions to the compliance with the provisions on custody and disposition of
seized dangerous drugs. These include presenting justifiable grounds for non-compliance and
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Unfortunately, We did not find any explanation from the police officers why they failed to
observe the two-witness rule. There were no records or allegations that coordination had taken
place with elective officials or the office of the National Prosecution Service regarding the
conduct of a buy-bust operation nor a showing of an attempt to secure the presence of said
persons aside from the media representative. We can only infer from said facts that the officers
 had sufficient time to prepare the necessary documentation for the buy-bust operation, which
should have included securing attendance of the required witnesses under the law. To reiterate,
this was not proven.
● We cannot uphold the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Ruiz is charged for
illegal sale of one plastic sachet containing and illegal possession of 14 plastic sachets
containing of shabu or a total of 15 plastic sachets, but the document entitled "Chain of
Custody," which was signed by PO2 Tibuc himself, only states transmittal of 12 plastic sachets
bearing markings that could not be identified to have any relation to the instant case.
● We emphasize that the dangerous drug is the corpus delicti of the offenses charged against
Ruiz, and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. It is essential that the
identity of the prohibited drugs be proven beyond doubt after the police officers have
established compliance with the chain of custody rule. Faithful obedience of the rules requires
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, to presentation in court
for identification, and eventual destruction. It would include proof about every link in the
chain.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SAMIAH S. ABDULAH

G.R. No. 243941. March 11, 2020

Keywords: Shabu, EB the minor, muslim area

SC: Acquitted

FACTS: Abdulah and another accused, a child in conflict with law identified as "EB,"(17 yrs old) were
charged with violating Section 5 4 of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, both Abdulah and EB
pleaded not guilty to the crime. prosecution averred that a confidential informant went to the District
Anti-Illegal Drug of the Eastern Police District in Pasig City, reporting that two (2) girls were selling
illegal drugs on Singkamas Street in Tumana, Marikina City. Superintendent Ogbac at once instructed
PO3 Temporal and the informant to verify the tip. At the area, the informant introduced PO3 Temporal
to "Erika" and "Lalay" — later identified as EB and Abdulah — as a potential buyer of shabu.
However, PO3 Temporal was advised to just return the following day, as they had no shabu at that time.
PO3 Temporal reported the incident, and Superintendent Ogbac formed a buy-bust team accordingly.
PO3 Temporal was designated as the poseur-buyer, PO2 Gayatao as his back-up, and the others as the
support group. PO3 Temporal was given a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money, which he marked
with his initials, "EJT." The buy-bust team went to the target area where they saw EB and Abdulah. At
first, the girls hesitated approaching PO3 Temporal as he was with PO2 Gayatao, so PO3 Temporal
advised the other to distance himself. Abdulah then approached PO3 Temporal and inquired about his
order. The officer handed her the marked P500.00 bill, which she then passed to EB. In turn, EB placed
the money in a sling bag and retrieved from it a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, which she handed to the officer. PO3 Temporal immediately introduced himself as a police
officer and apprehended Abdulah and EB. PO2 Gayatao proceeded to frisk the girls while PO3
Temporal seized the sling bag from EB, recovering the buy-bust money and another sachet of white
crystalline substance.

Believing that the area was unsafe for being "a Muslim area," the team brought Abdulah and EB to the
barangay hall where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized items. The proceeding was
witnessed by Barangay Tanod Reynaldo Garcia, Barangay Kagawad Francisco delos Santos, Abdulah,
and EB.

The defense, on the other hand, presented Abdulah as its sole witness. She denied selling drugs,
insisting that she was merely sleeping in her house during the incident. She further testified that EB is
her nephew's wife. By escaping the Department of Social Welfare and Development, under whose
custody she had been placed, EB was considered to have waived her right to present evidence.

RTC: rendered a Decision 19 convicting Abdulah and EB of the crime charged.

CA: Abdulah argued that the Regional Trial Court erred when it rendered conviction despite the
apprehending officers' failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. She noted that the
inventory and photographs were taken only at the barangay hall, without the presence of representatives
from the media and the National Prosecution Service.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, maintained that
noncompliance with the chain of custody rule does not render the confiscated items inadmissible. It
insisted that the determination of a person's guilt is based on the prosecution's ability to safeguard the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items

Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court Decision.

Abdulah filed a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant Abdulah for the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs

RULING: No.

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act spells out the chain of custody requirements for the
safeguarding and custody of items seized in a buy-bust operation. Complying with these stringent
measures preserves the seized items' authenticity and integrity. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
— The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition.

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

Strict observance of the chain of custody requirements ensures the seized items' integrity. When the
integrity of the seized items cannot be trusted — as when there are procedural lapses in the chain of
custody — the prosecution has failed to establish the corpus delicti. It has fallen short of proving an
element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which engenders reasonable doubt on the
accused's guilt.

Nonetheless, in situations that render strict compliance impossible or impracticable, deviations from
Section 21's requirements do not invalidate the seizure of illegal items. Noncompliance may be excused
when

"(a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and

(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved."

The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the items presented are authentic without any
indication of tampering.

The first in the chain of custody's interconnected links is the marking stage, in which the arresting
officer or poseur-buyer affixes "initials or other identifying signs on the seized items . . . in the presence
of the accused shortly after arrest." This crucial step "serves to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence. Here, the marking of the seized drugs was not done
immediately after accused-appellant's arrest. In his own words, PO3 Temporal revealed that the team
decided to mark and inventory the items at the barangay hall after deeming the target area to be unsafe,
it being "a Muslim area".
 The prosecution's attempt to justify the delay in marking and inventorying the items is too weak, if not
callous, a reason to validate the police officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements.
Such invocation constitutes a bigoted view that only stirs conflict among Filipinos of different religious
affiliations. To sustain the police officers' equating of a so-called "Muslim area" with dangerous places
does not only approve of a hollow justification for deviating from statutory requirements, but reinforces
outdated stereotypes and blatant prejudices. Islamophobia, the hatred against the Islamic community,
can never be a valid reason to justify an officer's failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165. Courts must be wary of readily sanctioning lackadaisical justifications and perpetuating
outmoded biases. No form of religious discrimination can be countenanced to justify the prosecution's
failure to comply with the law.

Worse, the manner by which the allegedly seized drugs were handled after their confiscation, and while
in transit to the barangay hall, remains unaccounted for. All that was alleged was that PO3 Temporal
kept them himself. This Court has previously decried police officers' plain claims of having close,
personal custody of allegedly seized items in transit. This lone assertion, is "fraught with dangers,"
"reckless, if not dubious," and "a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items".

Another glaring failure was the absence of representatives from the media and the National Prosecution
Service during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items. The prosecution gave no
excuse to justify their absence, either. Yet, worse, the prosecution did not even show that the police
officers exerted any effort to call in these representatives. The officers had sufficient time to secure
their presence, since a surveillance operation had been conducted prior to the buy-bust operation. By
then, the necessary arrangements could have been made.

The prosecution cannot merely rely on the oft-cited presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty to justify noncompliance with the law's mandate. The presumption of innocence enjoyed
by the accused stands so long as there is reasonable doubt on their culpability. To overcome the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution must prove the accused's criminal liability beyond
reasonable doubt; it cannot be overcome by merely relying on the weakness of the defense.

Section 23

Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo

GR 226679, 15 August 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in a criminal case for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing
0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to
withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the
principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which
offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition, it manifested that it "is
open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as
provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of R.A. 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23,
prohibiting plea bargaining, it is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the RTC Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC, as presided by Judge Lobrigo, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to declare Section 23 of RA 9165 as
unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."

It is towards the aim of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.

Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and
the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may
denote an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.
Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of
the accused.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
 If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor
and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end
that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

Does Sec. 23, RA 9165 Violate the Equal Protection Clause?

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper
to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

Section 24

Pascua v. People. GR No. 250578. September 7, 2020

Facts:

● The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations 8 filed before the RTC, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. 9 Upon arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to
the crimes charged. However, he later filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into Plea
Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12, 10 Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases. 11 The prosecution
filed its Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department
Circular No. 027-18, 12 the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser
offense.

RTC
 ● On January 29, 2019, the RTC issued separate Orders allowing Pascua to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case
Nos. 18805 and 18806. However, it was expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the Order
pertaining to Criminal Case No. 18805 that Pascua was "ineligible to apply for probation."
● Accordingly, Pascua applied for probation as regards Criminal Case No. 18806, which the RTC
acted upon issuing an Order dated February 26, 2019 which, among others, directed the Bataan
Parole and Probation Officer to conduct an investigation on Pascua in accordance with Sections
5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of
1976" (Probation Law).
● On the other hand, Pascua moved for reconsideration as to the Order made in Criminal Case
No. 18805, particularly for declaring him ineligible for probation. He argued that A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC only prohibits probation if the accused is actually found guilty of sale of illegal
drugs (Section 5), and not when he is found guilty to the lesser offense of "possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs" (Section 12).
● In an Order dated February 26, 2019, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. The RTC held that probation is not a matter of right but a
special privilege which is discretionary upon the court. It held that the framers of A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC clearly intended that persons charged with sale of illegal drugs would not be
qualified for probation if they choose to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
● Aggrieved, Pascua filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

CA

● In a Decision 26 dated September 13, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that
a reasonable interpretation of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC would lead to the conclusion that the
Supreme Court intended for drug trafficking and pushing (Section 5) to still be covered by the
"no probation rule" under Section 24, Article II of RA 9165. It rejected Pascua's contention that
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC should apply to the lesser offense allowed instead of the offense
actually charged. The CA opined in this wise: "[t]his interpretation will result to absurdity,
since Section 5 is not among the enumerated lesser offenses to which an accused can admit
guilt to in lieu of being convicted of a higher offense. If this was really the intention of the
Supreme Court, it would not have included this provision since there is no acceptable plea to
which this exception to the general rule would be applicable. It is therefore rational and logical
to conclude that persons charged [with] violating Section 5 who subsequently avail of plea
bargaining may not apply for probation[,] x x x it would mean that every person accused of sale
of illegal drugs would simply have to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section
12, apply for probation, then be released scot-free." It likewise held that even assuming Pascua
was eligible for probation, the same is still within the discretion of the lower court.

WON petitioner MAY be allowed to file for probation.

YES, but only after the trial court arrives at a judgement of conviction.

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC provides, among others, in the "Remarks" column of the aforesaid offense that
"if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal drug
trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to [Section] 24 thereof, then the law on probation
apply." Notably, Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under Section 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. — Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.

In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as disqualifying
persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but were convicted of the
lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law — such as Pascua — from applying
for probation.

However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and
reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under this Act" shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view is not supported
neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation
Law. It likewise disregards the legal consequences of plea bargaining.

It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the
provisions of the Probation Lawapply. "Probation" is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as "a
disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer." Section 9 thereof, which lists the
disqualified offenders, also highlights that the disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions
meted out to the prospective applicant.

It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law that in
applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused
is ultimately found guilty of.

In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually
found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in
criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge."

Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the
lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as
all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for
probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was
ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since
the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA
9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se make Pascua eligible
for probation. This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement that Pascua is
"ineligible to apply for probation," thereby allowing him to file such application. If he files for the
same, the grant or denial thereof will then lie in the sound discretion of the RTC after due consideration
of the criteria laid down in the Probation Law, e.g., Section 8 thereof.
Section 26

People vs. Morilla GR 189833 05 February 2014

Keyword: Ambulance Driver with Mayor (both vehicles with drugs)
RTC: Convicted Morilla and Mitra (co-conspirators). Acquitted Dequilla & Yang.
CA: Affirmed RTC
SC: Petition is denied. CA is affirmed with modification (Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life
Imprisonment with fine of Php 10,000,000 by each accused).

Facts:
● It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and
the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van
(ahead of the ambulance) was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers.
However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the
untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry
of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained Narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced, the
police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection.
● When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were scattered on
the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the
police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.
His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks
turned out to be sacks of shabu. This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van
of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked
to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed
that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Mayor Mitra was
also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. Mayor Mitra offered to settle the
matter but was rejected. The sacks were likewise found to contain shabu.
RTC (Quezon City):
● The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles, as the police
officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used
for transportation of dangerous drugs. The information turned out to be accurate: the two
accused had in their motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of shabu (503.68 KG).
● The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of
the contents of the sacks as he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his
Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because
the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla
of lack of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he
was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents
of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
● Rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were caught in flagrante
delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any
convincing circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the validity of their apprehension
was sustained. The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves.
● The two other accused in this case, Dequilla & Yang, were acquitted for failure on the part of
the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Dequilla's and Yang's mere
presence inside the vehicle was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators.
 ● Convicted Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan,
Quezon, of illegal transport of shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred three point
sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution's
failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged.

CA:
● Affirmed RTC. Sentenced accused to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10 M each.

Defense:
● Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1 (b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to
state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of them an
incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transport" He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the
words used in the Information.
● Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in
the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.

Issue(s): (1) WON Morilla may be convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans
allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
(2) WON the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the Information.|||

Ruling: Dismissed Morilla’s Arguments. RTC’s and CA’s rulings were correct.
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is
deemed to have been waived due to Morilla's failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash
before entering his plea.
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the
allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right
within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the
factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a
common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of
dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the
checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla's turn to pass through the checkpoint,
he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the
floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in
conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed
the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears
no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous
drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or
convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the
ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra. The very act of transporting shabu is malum prohibitum
since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
In a similar case of People v. Libnao, this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of
marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they
were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, the penalty for illegal transportation of shabu
was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was
amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The
penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659, where the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,000.00 to be paid by each of the
accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659
and the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment
for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does
not appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.

People v Laylo, G.R. No. 192235 July 6 2011

Keywords: Iskor ng Shabu
Doctrine: Peddlers of illicit drugs have been known,with ever increasing casualness and
recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not.
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and
venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of
the prohibited drugs.

Crime Charged: violation of Section 26 (b), Article II (Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs) of
Republic Act No. 9165 4 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Facts:
● In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian
clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations. While they were in front of a
 sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Rolando Laylo (Laylo) and his live-in partner,
Melitona Ritwal (Ritwal), approached them and asked, “Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?” PO1
Reyes replied, “Bakit mayroon kaba?” Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing
shabu and told the police officers, “Dos (P200.00) ang isa.” Upon hearing this, the police
officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the
other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and
found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying. PO1 Reyes and
PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and
forwarded them to the NP Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. The specimens are found
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

● The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic
sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs
using as basis the third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu.

Procedural History
● Two separate Informations against appellant Laylo and Ritwal were filed. The RTC found
Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165. The RTC gave
credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who were presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner. The RTC stated that Reyes and Pastor were straightforward and
candid in their testimonies and unshaken by cross- examination. Their testimonies were
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points. The RTC added that the
denial of appellant Laylo is weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of evidence or
frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus, Laylo’s defense cannot be given credence over the
positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
● Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. Laylo imputed that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him
despite the prosecution witness’ fabricated accounts, that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt and that the apprehending officers failed to preserve the integrity of the
alleges seized shabu.
● The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Decision of RTC in
convicting appellant of attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:
NO.
The appeal lacks merit. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.

Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts
shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under
this Act:
xx x
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; x x x

Appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime by
showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor. The sale was aborted when the police officers
 identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. The plastic sachets were presented
in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently
established by evidence.

In People v. de Guzman, we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known,with ever
increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be
they strangers or not. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or
the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and
delivery of the prohibited drugs.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 January 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631.

F. Articles 200-202 Crimes Against Public Morals

G. Articles 203-245 Crimes Committed By Public Officers

Include: RA 3019 as amended by RA 10910: The Anti-Graft & Corrupt

Practices Act (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 14)

RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659: The Anti-Plunder Act
(Sections 1, 2, 4, and 6)
RA 9745 The Anti-Torture Act

Direct Bribery

Marifosque vs. People

Facts:
Crime Charged: Direct bribery from demanding , obtaining and/or receiving directly from Yu Su Pong
1 and Hian Hian Sy 2 the total amount P5,800.00 in consideration for his recovery from alleged
robbers, eighteen Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victims in the aforesaid amount.

October 13, 1990, Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio Sy, went to the office of Captain Alberto
Salvo, Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division stationed at the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) in Region 5, to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the gasoline station of her father, Yu So
Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso Marifosque, in exchange
for the recovery of the lost items. Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian
Hian Yu Sy prepared the pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00 and listed down the serial numbers
of the bills. The pay-off was scheduled at 7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden Grace Department
Store which was owned by Yu So Pong.
At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men arrived at the target area and strategically positioned
themselves outside the Golden Grace Department Store to await the arrival of the suspect. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on board a tricycle. He went inside the store and demanded the
money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money, which was
wrapped in a newspaper. When petitioner stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged
signal, whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down upon the suspect and arrested him.

Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00 but she bargained for
P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time. She proposed that petitioner return the
following morning to pick up the balance.

Defense:
Marifosque testified that in the morning of October 13, 1990, a police asset came to his house and
reported that he witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of Yu So Pong. Petitioner went to the
gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the information. Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So
Pong proceeded to the police station to report the robbery to the desk officer, PFC Jesus Fernandez, who
then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct an investigation. As they were leaving
the police station, the asset approached petitioner asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as
his reward. Petitioner relayed the message to Yu So Pong, who said he was amenable "if that [was] the
only way to recover the cylinders and to apprehend the robbers." 4 Based on information furnished by
the asset, the police investigators proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi
City, where they found the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle.
Meanwhile, Arnaldo arrived. Petitioner did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead them
to the other stolen cylinder tanks. 5 The group returned to the police station where petitioner made a
written report of the recovery of the gas tanks.

Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force and occasionally
received rewards from the police for any information of the criminal activities. On October 13, 1990 at
around 4:00 in the morning, he went out to buy bread and saw three individuals stealing gas cylinder
tanks in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and reported to him the robbery. He went
back to his house to feed the chickens. Sometime thereafter, he dropped by the police station to discuss
with petitioner the reward of P350.00 per cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00 and
told him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and petitioner went to the store of Yu
So Pong to collect the balance of the reward money. Petitioner went inside the store and Arnaldo, who
was left outside, saw a woman giving him a folded newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the
petitioner, so he ran away.

Sandiganbayan- Convicted the accused for direct bribery.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is liable of direct bribery under Article 210 of the RPC

Held:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.

There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." At the time of the incident, petitioner was
a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the bribe money
from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder
tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer.

Although the petitioner appealed, his petition was denied. The decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct
Bribery and imposing upon him the indeterminate prison term of 3 years, 6 months, and 5 days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased to P18,000.00.

Merencillo vs. People GR 142369 13 April 2007

DOCTRINE: Sec. 3 of RA 3019 provides that “in addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law”. One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in
addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent
to being charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.

KEYWORDS: Double jeopardy, extortion

Crime charged: charged with violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery.

FACTS: Petitioner Juanito Merencillo, Group Supervising Examiner of BIR was charged with two
Informations for violation of Sec 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for direct
bribery.

On 13 Sept 1995, Lucit Estollore went to BIR to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real
property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR).

She was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp tax
(P37,500) and capital gains tax (P125,000) which was approved by petitioner Juanito Merencillo, a
Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR. Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be released
after 7 days.

Merencillo approved the computation and on the same day, Cesar received a call from Merencillo
asking her to go to his office.

On seeing Cesar, Merencillo handed the CAR to her and was cued to follow him downstairs. Cesar
handed the envelope and was asked, “why is this thick?” Before she could answer, a member of the
PNP photographed them. The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to the petitioner and
invited him to go with them to their headquarters.

Merencillo contends that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec
3 of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

Merencillo denied the charges during trial and that the allegations only existed in Cesar’s mind after
she was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid.

The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer 8 years and 1 month to 15
years of imprisonment.

Merencillo appealed to Sandiganbayan but was denied

ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy?

HELD: No. Petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy. Sec 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following
statement, “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law…”
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a
felony under the Revised Penal Code.

There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of

Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit
it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter;
and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct
bribery.

While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or
form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present,
share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance
of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on
the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b)
execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining
from doing an act which is his official duty to do.

Although the two charges against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave
rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy
proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.

The Court ruled that both the RTC and Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution
sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction. Questions of fact cannot generally be raised for
the consideration of this Court. The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to
the appellate court. Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by this Court unless there is no
evidence on record to support them. Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts because trial courts have the distinct
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in
A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.

BALDERAMA VS. PEOPLE

Keyword: NAIA Taxi Drivers
Doctrine: The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.

Facts:
 ● Rolando L. Balderama and Rolando D. Nagal, was employed with the Land Transportation
Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services.
Juan S. Armamento, respondent in both cases, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10)
taxi units.
● Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate
against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a "contract" basis, the
LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints. Petitioners in these cases were
members of the team, popularly known as "Flying Squad," together with Cipriano L. Lubrica
and Cresencio de Jesus.
● The team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by respondent. The team impounded
the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the
LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter
waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The
vehicle was released to respondent.
● The respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioners as well as Lubrica and de Jesus. He
alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting
"protection money" from him. They went to his office and proposed they would not apprehend
his drivers and impound his vehicles for violations of LTO rules, provided he gives them the
amount of P400.00 every 15th and 30th day of the month. They agreed to the reduced amount of
P300.00. On the same day, he started giving them P300.00 and from then on, every 15th and
30th day of the month until June 15, 1992. Thereafter, he failed to give them the agreed amount
because his business was not doing well.
● The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Prior thereto, they were suspended pendente lite
from the service for a period of ninety (90) days.
● Accused de Jesus died and the cases against him were dismissed. The hearing proceeded
against petitioners and Lubrica.

Crime Charged: The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Informations for
violations of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioners and the other members of the
team

Procedural History:
● Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
● Sandiganbayan found petitioners and Lubrica guilty of direct bribery in seven (7) of the nine
(9) Informations filed against them and were sentenced in each count
● Petitioners and Lubrica were also convicted for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended and were also disqualified perpetually from holding public office.
● Both petitioners filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari, both arguing
that the Sandiganbayan erred: (1) in finding that they are guilty of the offenses charged; (2) in
holding that petitioners and their co-accused acted in conspiracy; and (3) in disregarding the
recantation made by respondent.

Issue(s): Whether the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases has been proved by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
● The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the
 following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime
or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The Sandiganbayan found the
above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the accused demanded
and received P300.00 as "protection money" from respondent on several dates. As against the
prosecution's evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of
defenses.
● Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her
public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or
a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica
participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of
respondent, causing him undue injury.
● Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are
binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established
exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave
abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We
found none of these exceptions in the present cases.
● Petitioners' prayer for complete acquittal on the strength of respondent's affidavit of recantation
fails to impress us. A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and
reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the
accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the
probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the
case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. As found by the Sandiganbayan,
"(t)here is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the guilt of accused
Balderama and Nagal."

Mangulabnan vs. People

GR 236848 08 June 2020

Keywords: Judge and court interpreter getting monetary favors from complainants

Facts:

● The accused was charged with Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
 ● Mangulabnan is the Court Interpreter and specially assigned as Chairman of the Revision
Committee of the same MTCC of San Fernando City, Pampanga
● The prosecution alleged that private complainant Alberto Guinto (Guinto) filed an election
protest against Dario Manalastas (Manalastas) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 2, where Rodrigo R. Flores was
Presiding Judge (Judge Flores) and Mangulabnan worked as a Court Interpreter.
● On several occasions, Judge Flores allegedly visited Guinto in the latter's workplace and asked
for several monetary favors. Despite receiving these favors, Judge Flores decided the case in
favor of Manalastas.
● Guinto then filed complaints before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging
Judge Flores for his failure to decide the election protest within the required period, and against
Mangulabnan for releasing an unauthorized copy of the decision. These administrative
complaints were referred to Executive Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina (Judge Medina) for
investigation, review, and recommendation.
● In her report, Judge Medina revealed that while the election protest case was pending before
the MTCC, Judge Flores borrowed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from Manalastas,
which Mangulabnan received as a middleman in favor of Judge Flores. Hence, Judge Medina
recommended Mangulabnan's dismissal from service for her participation as conduit in the
commission of the crime.
● In a Resolution dated August 10, 2006, the Court adopted Judge Medina's findings, suspended
Mangulabnan for one (1) year, and ordered that the Court's Resolution be furnished to the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) for investigation. Thereafter, the OMB found that the
allegations make out a case for Direct Bribery; hence, the Information was filed.
● Mangulabnan pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.

Sandiganbayan -

In a Decision, the SB found Mangulabnan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Bribery. The SB
noted Mangulabnan's admission in open court in a separate civil case for injunction filed by
Manalastas, which formed part of the administrative case's records, that she indeed received money
from the latter and delivered it to Judge Flores, thus proving their conspiracy in committing the crime.
Moreover, it found that the prosecution had established all the elements constituting Direct Bribery
under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that: (a) Judge Flores and Mangulabnan were
both public officers, being the Presiding Judge and Court Interpreter, respectively, of the MTCC of the
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 2 at the time of the commission of the offense; (b)
Mangulabnan acted as a conduit of Judge Flores when she received Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from Manalastas, and delivered the same to Judge Flores; (c) the amount was in
consideration of the rendition of judgment in the pending election protest in favor of Manalastas; and
(d) that the rendition of judgment relates to the function of Flores as Presiding Judge. Considering the
concurrence of all the elements, and that Mangulabnan was a co-conspirator of Judge Flores, the SB
found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the SB correctly convicted Mangulabnan of the crime of Direct Bribery under
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: YES.

Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states:

The elements of the crime of Direct Bribery are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he
accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (c) such offer or
promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must
be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (d) the act which
the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.

The Court is convinced that the SB correctly convicted Mangulabnan for Direct Bribery under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code as the co-conspirator of Judge Flores. Firstly, the conspiracy between
the two accused has been duly proven by the findings of Judge Medina and by Mangulabnan's own
admission. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations.
Secondly, the elements constituting Direct Bribery have been sufficiently established considering that:
(a) Mangulabnan and Judge Flores were indisputably public officers, being the Court Interpreter and
Presiding Judge, respectively, of the MTCC of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 2 at the
time of the offense; (b) she acted as Judge Flores' middleman in committing the crime, specifically by
receiving Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from Manalastas and delivering it to Judge Flores; (c)
the amount was given in exchange for the rendition of a judgment favorable to Manalastas, as may be
inferred from Mangulabnan's own admission that Judge Flores ordered the release of the decision only
after receiving the Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and (d) the rendition of judgment relates to
the functions of Judge Flores.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn these findings, as there was no showing
that the SB overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case. As such, Mangulabnan's conviction for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code must stand.

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 156643. June 27, 2006

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 156891. June 27, 2006

Keywords: Yakuza, Japanese passport confiscated

FACTS: Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez,
together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at
Parañaque. His purpose was to serve a Mission Order issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio
against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel
Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big
boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien. To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao
Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who issued an undertaking which Aoyagi signed. The
undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December
20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez.
Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport.

Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito 'Dick' Perlas and informed him about the taking of her
husband's passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their problem to his brother-in-law,
Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law Firm. They
discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December
20, 1993. Hernandez prepared a Progress Report which was submitted to Ponciano M. Ortiz, the Chief
of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who was
reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial investigation. In the evening of
December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas III who was
then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who would handle their
case. In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the
Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas
P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee.
while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her brother, Filomeno 'Jun'
Pelingon, Jr., about her husband's passport.

Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at
the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and
Hernandez attending. On account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao Aoyagi's
passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica
Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty.
Somera who arranged the entrapment operation. Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at
the Coffee Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera
arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope
containing marked money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and
Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters.

SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery, as well as
conspiracy in the commission of the crime, had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded
money; Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants; and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it
to Perlas.

Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Although he had picked up the envelope containing the
payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused.

The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the
balance of the law firm's legal fees. If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him, he
should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to protect
his client's rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.

Acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas.
According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be present during the meetings on January
8 and 12, 1994. His presence during one of those meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively
show his participation as a co-conspirator

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are guilty of direct bribery

RULING: YES. The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform an act that
constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the gift in
consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the
performance of official duties.

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements:

1) the offender was a public officer,

2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another,

3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and

4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.

Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was
merely implementing a Mission Order, which required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi. The passport
was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he
returned it upon the instruction of his superior.

The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had taken
the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also
Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff,
during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.

Hernandez did not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his representatives had
 to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz,
chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a standard
operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations. It can readily be inferred
that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite the absence of
any legal purpose.

Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecution's version
that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport. According to him, he kept
giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case. Acejas testified
that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses Aoyagi. His
supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a charade and was in fact
belied by Pelingon's testimony.

Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his client's behalf, he still failed
to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had received
the purported payoff. It would be illogical to sustain his contention that the envelope represented the
balance of his firm's legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez immediately after the return of the
passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the money was a consideration for the return.
Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his.

Instigation: There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an
extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged for
the payoff.

Indirect Bribery

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan. GR No. 155574. November 20, 2006

LTO Regional Director, through a representative, borrowed a vehicle from a company which had
transactions with the LTO.

Borrowing by a public officer can be considered as a gift in contemplation of the law punishing
indirect bribery.

Crime Charged: 57 Counts of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
practices Act, with one information withdrawn.
SB: Convicted of 56 Counts of the crime charged
SC: Acquitted

Facts:
PROSECUTION

● ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed

as the driver and liaison officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (hereinafter,
"the Company"), an establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles, during the
period covering the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to officially report to the Land
Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis numbers prior
to the assembly of any motor vehicle. In the process, the Company had to secure from the LTO
a Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has been completely assembled, for purposes of
carrying out the necessary road testing of the vehicle concerned. After the said road testing and
prior to its eventual sale/disposition, the vehicle has to be first properly registered with the
LTO. Accused Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO of Cagayan de Oro City,
during all times relevant to the instant cases, was the approving authority on the aforesaid
reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct Permits.
● By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would always
personally talk to accused Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct Permit for any
newly assembled vehicle. Yungao would secure from accused Garcia as many as 30 to 40 of
such permits in a year.
● In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to
inform either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused Garcia)
would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his farm. When Yungao could not be
contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the Company and talk to the owners thereof
to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the assigned
government vehicle for his own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this
reason that he had to borrow vehicles from the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
● Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles from the
Chiongs during the period covering January of 1993 up to and until November of 1994.
Accused Garcia would always ask his representative to take the Company's vehicle on a
Saturday morning. However, Yungao never reported for work on Saturdays; thus, he was not
the one who actually released the borrowed motor vehicles to the representative of accused
Garcia. Nonetheless, Yungao would be aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the
vehicles requested because, for every such instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued,
which is placed on top of his table for him to place in the Company's record files on the
following working day. The numerous delivery receipts would show and indicate the actual
number of times accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the Company.
● On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating to the
road testing of the motor vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits were secured by
him from accused Garcia before the vehicles were eventually put on display or presented to
potential buyers. Although there was a Regulation Officer at the LTO before whom the request
for the issuance of a Conduct Permit is to be presented, Yungao was often told to go straight up
to the room of accused Garcia so that the latter could personally sign the said permit. It was
only when accused Garcia is absent or is not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO
were attended to by his assistant.
● Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the Company's
motor vehicle verbally and on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he was not very
familiar with the signature of accused Garcia, and that the latter's signature did not appear in
any of the delivery receipts.
● During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia failed to
approve the Company's request, and this was a request for an extension of the usual "5-day
 road test" period granted to the Company. Nonetheless, the Company found the said
disapproval to be acceptable and proper.
● On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the
persons who actually received the Company's vehicles were reflected on the faces of the
delivery receipts. However, Yungao does not recognize the signatures appearing on the said
delivery receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa, because Yungao was not
present when the vehicles were taken.
● The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma. Lourdes V.
Miranda (hereinafter, "Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao testified. Prior to her
presentation, however, the parties agreed to enter into stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was
stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a child named Jane, who was run over and killed in a
vehicular accident; that the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo; that
Miranda, thereafter, successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the
existence of numerous delivery receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that
said discovery led to the institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. As a
result of such admissions and stipulations, the proposed testimony of Miranda was, thereafter,
dispensed with.

● AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and
General Manager of the Company, a business establishment engaged in the assembly of motor
vehicles. In the process, the Company has to submit a Dealer's Report to the LTO prior to the
assembly of a motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed, the Company has to secure a
permit from the LTO for purposes of conducting the necessary road testing of the newly
assembled motor vehicle.
● In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was
the officer who approves the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles.
He was also the LTO officer who approves and signs the Company's annual LTO Accreditation
Certificate.
● Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to transport
water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a
motor vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly through telephone calls or through
Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the
Company would issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person
whom accused Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the
company officer who signed the delivery receipt for the release of the borrowed motor vehicle
to the representative of accused Garcia. When she was not in office, she would authorize her
personnel to place [their] initials on top of her name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen
accused Nabo affixing his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out the borrowed
motor vehicles. Chiong was very sure that the driver who picked up the motor vehicle from the
Company was the personnel of accused Garcia because the latter would always call her up first
before sending his representative to get a vehicle. Chiong was likewise very familiar with the
voice of accused Garcia because she had been dealing with him for a long period of time
already, and all the while she had always maintained a cordial relationship with him.
● On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask his
driver to get a vehicle on a Saturday at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning. He would return it
in the late afternoon of the same day. There was only one instance when accused Garcia
returned the motor vehicle on the day after, and this was the time when the said vehicle had
figured in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of a certain Jane, the daughter of
Miranda. Chiong was not the complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could
not afford to offend or antagonize accused Garcia, and she had always considered the lending
 of motor vehicles to accused Garcia as a public relation thing.
● Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused Garcia were
all company service cars and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she testified that she gets
irritated whenever accused Garcia would ask for a vehicle at a time when she herself would
also need it. However, under the circumstances, she had to give in to his request.

DEFENSE

● Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the LTO
from August, 1987 to December, 1994.
● He downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from the Company arguing that his
signatures never appeared in the Delivery Receipts submitted by the prosecution.
● He admitted, though, that the Company has been continually transacting business with his
office properly and officially, and has not, even for a single instance, violated any rules with
respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was no reason for the owners of the
Company to harbor any ill-feelings against him.
● He further admitted that he had known Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General
Manager of the Company, even before he became Regional Director when he was still the
Chief of the Operations Division.
● He added that employees of the LTO are used to borrowing vehicles from their friends and that
this practice has been going on prior to his being Regional Director. He claimed he repeatedly
warned his subordinates about the illegality of the same but they merely turned a deaf ear.
● Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and
visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing
that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from his (Nabo) friends.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The case stemmed from the complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda.

CRIME CHARGED: 57 Counts of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against petitioner, Gilbert Nabo, and Nery Tagupa. One information was withdrawn.
Nabo remains at large.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Petitioner was convicted of 56 counts of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

Tagupa was acquitted. The cases against Nabo, who remained at large, were archived.

1. WON petitioner should be convicted of the crim of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019
2. WON petitioner should be convicted of the crime of direct bribery
3. WON petitioner should be convicted of the crime of indirect bribery

1. NO.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) 20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) who requested
or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other
person; (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public
officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
The prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is very clear from
Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit must be
in connection with "a contract or transaction" wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what transactions the
Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from
the Company. It is insufficient that petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted
with his office. What is required is that the transaction involved should at least be described with
particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of
requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This, the
prosecution failed to do. The prosecution's allegation that the Company regularly transacts with
petitioner's LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and
chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report, and other similar transactions,
will not suffice. This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged borrowings with
their corresponding transactions.

2. NO.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer. Thus, the acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to
perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration
of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his
official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official
duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise.

In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that
petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did
not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or
abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong,
Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company complied with all the
requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention from petitioner or from anybody else from
said office. From the evidence on record, petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery.

3. NO.

Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code
is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. In the case at
bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company? The
alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in
contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times,
the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts allegedly signed by petitioner's representative
whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and received
the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner received the
vehicles via his representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The prosecution relies heavily on
the delivery receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that
petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the
prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner's representatives who picked up the vehicles. The
acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the vehicles from the Company
further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on
behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received
the vehicles in the end.

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan GR 169823 11 September 2013

Keyword: Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
Sandiganbayan: Denied the motion to quash and denied Disini’s motion for reconsideration.
SC: Disini’s arguments has no merit.

Facts:
● The Office of Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004, charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with:
(1) Corruption of Public Officials (Art 212 in relation to Art 210 of RPC); and
(2) A violation of Section 4(a) of RA 3019 (RA No. 3019) aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
● Criminal Case No. 28001: From 1974 to 1986 in Manila, accused Herminion Disini, conspiring
with the then President Ferdinand Marcos, promise and give gifts and presents to Marcos,
consisting of Disini's ownership of 2.5 billion shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining
Corporation & 4 billion shares of stock in The Energy Corporation (with both shares of stock
having then a book value of P100.00 per share of stock) and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by Marcos, on the mechanical and
electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project ("Project") of the
National Power Corporation (Morong, Bataan)-- all for and in consideration of accused Disini
seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct,
respectively, the Project, as in fact Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and
presents, did award to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the
engineering & architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively. These acts
constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
● Criminal Case No. 28002: From 1974 to 1986, Disini, conspiring together and confederating
with the then President Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of
Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of
then First Lady and family physician of the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close
personal relation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Project ("PROJECT") of the NPC at Morong,
Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe (foreign consultant) the amount of
$1,000,000.00, more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation $17,000,000.00,
more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application
with the Government of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused Disini, as
accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
 to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT,
and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by
accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned
and controlled by Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks,
commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, through
the direct intervention of said Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.||

Defense:
● Aug 2, 2004: Filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that the criminal actions has prescribed & that
the informations DID NOT conform to the prescribed form. Prosecution opposed.
● Sept 16, 2004: Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.

Sandiganbayan (First Division)

● Denied the motion to quash.
● Denied Disini’s motion for reconsideration.

Defense
● Commenced this Special Civil Action for Certiorari

Issues:
1. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
a. It erred when it ruled that Sec 4 (pars A and B) of RA 8249 DO NOT apply since the
informations were filed pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.
b. It erred when it assumed jurisdiction w/o having met the requisite under Sec 4 of RA
8249 that the accused must be a public officer.
2. The respondent court acted with such grave abuse of discretion when it effectively ignored,
disregarded, and denied petitioner’s constitutional and statutory right to prescription.
3. By merely assuming the presence of glaringly absent elements in the offenses charged.
4. The respondent court acted with such grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the
informations despite their utter failure to comply with the prescribed form.

Ruling: This petition has no merit.

1. Preliminary Considerations

Reference was made to the ruling of the Court in GR No. 175730, which involved the civil action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages filed by the PCGG against Disini and
others. The amended complaint alleged that Disini has acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants
in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation of public funds, plunder
of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption. The PCGG then
transmitted the records of Criminal Cases 28002 and 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez for
appropriate action. Such letter was adverting to the ruling in Cojunangco, Jr. v. PCGG. It appears that
the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation
on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in
PCGG v Desierto with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file to informations that
became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Cases 28001 and 28002.
2. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters Disini, saying that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction because Criminal Cases 28001 and 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of
R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or
criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but
also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases 28001 and 28002.
PD No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving Civil and criminal cases
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.|
It was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office
of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr
case the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the
ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being
established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Cases
28001 and 28002 involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the
intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Given their
sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Cases 28001 and 28002 that the charges
involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary. With Criminal Cases 28001 and
28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No. 0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal
prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the
authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos' immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 applied
only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249. Unquestionably, public
officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and
Subsection 4b, signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public
officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c
would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to
and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini's being a private
individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory
of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
|||

3. The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed.

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article
212 of the RPC with the "same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the
execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the
value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the RPC, the period of prescription for this specie of
corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019.
By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the
offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the
prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, that the
longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not
be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the
period from 1974 to 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.
For crimes punishable by the RPC, Art. 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses
punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Accordingly, The court is not persuaded to hold that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the
time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as
the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA
Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the
unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG's exhaustive
investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute
Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of
official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
SC further notes that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to
the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the preliminary investigation. In
accordance with Article 91 of the RPC and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the
filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of
the period of prescription.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the
RPC or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the
discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman.|||
4. The informations were sufficient in form and substance.
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or
information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether
a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or
evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of
the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to
proceed to trial.
The informations in the two Criminal Cases (corruption of public officials and violation of Section 4 (a)
of RA No. 3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the RPC are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and
promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers,
promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office,
was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of
corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not
absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging
that President Marcos received or accepted Disini's offers, promises and gifts — an essential element in
direct bribery — the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No.
3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly
or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person
having some business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene
in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being
the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and
at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with
and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and
close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00
from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government
 in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had
family/close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.

Corruption of Public Officials

Pozar v CA, G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984

Keywords: American
Doctrine:
Crime Charged: Crime of Corruption of a Public Official|

Facts:
an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines, was charged with the crime of
Corruption of a Public Official
Prosecution
● "The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco and
Mr. Danilo Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed on the witness stand appellant
himself and his counsel Atty. Reynaldo Suarez.

● Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he started
working at the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know appellant because the
latter had gone to said office in connection with his application for probation; that at about
noontime of December 17, 1979, appellant came to the office looking for Probation Officer
Danilo Ocampo and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a closed envelope
bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery to the latter; that two days later, he gave the envelope
to Ocampo who opened the same in his presence; that the envelope contained some official
papers connected with appellant's application for probation and attached thereto was a hundred
peso bill; that Ocampo then remarked: 'This is something bad', that the opening of the envelope
was done on December 19, 1979; that Ocampo kept the envelope and its contents, including the
one hundred peso bill, but within a week's time gave them to him with instructions to give the
same to appellant but the latter never came to the office and so he returned them to Ocampo;
that although he later saw appellant about two weeks after December 17, 1979, when the latter
came to the office to sign some papers, he never mentioned to appellant the one hundred peso
bill

● Manalo further declared that at the time the envelope with the one hundred peso bill was given
to him by appellant for delivery to Ocampo, he already had an inkling or knowledge that the
Probation Office will recommend for the grant of appellant's application for probation because
he was the one who makes the final typing of a post-sentence investigation report and before
said final typing Ocampo usually talks to him, so that he knows whether the recommendation
was for a grant or denial of an application .

● Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation Office,
declared that she knows appellant because the latter was one of the applicants for probation in
1979 and she was the one assigned to investigate appellant's case; that as Assistant Probation
Officer in the Investigation of applications for probation and in the case of appellant, she
requested him to submit certain pertinent documents required by their office, such as barangay,
 police and court clearances, residence certificate, etc.: that she prepared appellant's
post-sentence Investigation Report (Exhs. "B" to "B-5"); that she first saw appellant on
December 7, 1979, when she interviewed him on his social and personal history and his version
of the offense, among others; that she gave the list of documents which are to be submitted to
the office; that the second time she saw appellant was on December 21, 1979 but appellant was
out at the time and when she saw that he was in his car that broke down in front of the
Pampagueña she tried to call him but the car left as she was about to reach the place.

● Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21, 1979, the
latter was asking permission to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with Probation
Officer, Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter; that she then prepared a draft of the Post-Sentence
Investigation report and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo who told him not to delete
the bribery incident from the report; that it was first from Manalo and later from Ocampo that
she became aware of the bribery or more accurately corruption of a public official, committed
by appellant.

● The third prosecution witness was complainant himself, Danilo Ocampo, who declared that he
has been the Probation Officer of the Angeles City, Probation Office since 1977 and that his
employees thereat were Ricardo Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and Ramon de Leon; that at about
9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1979, he received a closed letter envelope from
his clerk, Manalo, at the Probation Office at Merlan Building, Angeles City, Manalo informing
him that the same came from appellant; that he opened the envelope on the presence of Manalo
and found that the same contained xerox copies of the passport and visa of appellant and
inserted with said documents was a hundred peso bill with Serial No. BC530309 ; that the
envelope given him by Manalo was addressed to him, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, Probation Officer,
in handwritten form; that he could not, however, produce said envelope the same having been
misplaced; that he kept the one hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence against
appellant; that when he met Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, appellant's counsel, at the Angeles City
Court on January 14, 1980, he told the latter about the envelope received from appellant
containing the passport, visa and the one hundred peso bill inserted with said documents and
intimated to the lawyer that the client should not have inserted said one hundred peso bill .

● Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was prepared by Mrs.
Francisco who conducted the investigation; that the first time he saw appellant was on
December 10, 1979, when the latter was seeking permission to go to Baguio City and being a
foreigner, he required him to submit to his office copies of the latter's passport and visa; that the
second time he met appellant was in March, 1980, when the hearing of appellant's application
for probation was conducted at Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required
appellant to give money, so that when he saw the one hundred peso bill in the envelope handed
him by Manalo, he was very much surprised; that he intended to confront appellant but was
unable to do so but was able to inform Atty. Suarez, appellant's lawyer, about the matter when
he met him at the City Court; that at the time the envelope containing the documents and
money was handed to him on December 19, 1979, the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was
not yet finished and that the same was submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on
February 5, 1980; that the fact that appellant enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope
was mentioned in said report

● Ocampo further testified that at the time of the hearing of appellant's application or petition for
probation, the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the City Court held a conference in the court's
chamber with appellant's counsel, the trial fiscal and himself, during which they discussed the
 bribery incident mentioned in the report; that the presiding judge of Branch I, after some
clarifications regarding the incident in question, suggested that complainant should lodge a
complaint against appellant and the fiscal should conduct the corresponding preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was a prima facie case

● Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-Sentence Investigation Report

recommending the granting of appellant's application for probation, notwithstanding the
bribery or corruption incident mentioned in said report, because appellant's act was not yet a
disqualification under the law, as he was still presumed innocent until he is found guilty by the
court

Procedural History:
RTC: Guilty of the crime of Corruption of a Public official
CA: Confirmed in Toto the decision of the RTC

Issue: WON Accused is guilty of Article 212 of the RPC

Ruling: No.
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as
consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant court) for it is clear from the
evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the
complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one hundred peso bill. Hence, the crime would be
attempted corruption of a public official.

Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
that the one hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it will
be used to defray expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the Probation
Office in connection with petitioner's application for probation then pending in said office.

he evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer,
Primitiva Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information
(complaint), Court decision, Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police,
the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and told to report once a
week on Mondays. (Exhibit "E"). This was on December 7, 1979.

Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10, 1979
when the latter was asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and
passport. Mrs. Francisco also testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for
Baguio. And according to the petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for probation, he made
more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there unscheduled
for conference and clarification of the various requirements he needed. During all the time he went
there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo
interviewed him. He submitted all the requirements to the Probation Officer; at times, he submitted
them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr. Ocampo. Other than
those listed in the list given by Mrs. Francisco, he was required to submit xerox copy of his passport,
his visa and his pictures. He explained that he gave the requirements to the person who was inter
viewing him, primarily Mrs. Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office
xerox copy of the original. He likewise submitted his two passports, and later xerox copy of his
passports. When Mrs. Francisco was asking for the original, which documents are in the possession of
his lawyer at his office, he had to return to get the originals." (Decision of Trial Court, p. 5). Petitioner's
travail is, therefore, quite evident.

From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for
probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut. And since the
accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is
reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and
advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his
probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.

In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense as
against the conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted
with approval in the appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in
the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred peso (P100.00) was done in
good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the
Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule
that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that
moral certainty required to convict him. Even the complainant himself, the Probation Officer, filed the
complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding judge of the Angeles City Court during the hearing
on petitioner's application for probation, the complaint having been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on
June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED. The accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED

Go vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
FACTS:
● Petitioner, Henry T. Go, a private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which punishes “public officers who, on behalf of
the government, enter into contracts or transactions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”

● The information in this case, reads:

“The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with violation of Sec. 3(g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as
follows: On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and
taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law)
providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event that the latter defaults
specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more
beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. CONTRARY TO LAW.”

● Petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."

● Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or ReDetermination) of Probable Cause and
Motion to Dismiss.

● Petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Petitioner Go maintained that apart
from the bare allegations contained in Pesayco's affidavit-complaint, there was no supporting
evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause against him and Rivera. Petitioner
Go further alleged that he could not be charged under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 because
he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of the important elements of the
crime under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.

● Petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment with Motion to
Quash, which the prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman, opposed.
● The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Rivera's Motion for Judicial
Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner
Go's Motion to Quash.

● The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecution's submission, it could still entertain
petitioner Go's Motion to Quash even after his arraignment considering that it was based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner Go's Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim, the allegations in
the Information actually make out the offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that
accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA
with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense charged as defined under
Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

● The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Go's contentions that he is not a public officer, he
did not conspire with Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said agreement
cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, could not be
properly considered for the purpose of quashing the Information on the ground relied upon by
him. According to the Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved
during trial.
● Petitioner Go contends that Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even
enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons. The
said provision of law allegedly punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act of "entering,
 on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby."
As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the government,"
there being no showing of any agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on
behalf of the government.
● By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime
penalized under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public officer. Since he
is not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is lacking; hence, there is no
other recourse but to quash the Information.

Issue: Whether or not a private individual may be charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
act No. 3019.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 (g), by its clear terms, can only be committed by public
officers, for if it were otherwise, then the law itself would have clearly provided for it. Notably, even
certain paragraphs of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 provide for its application to private
individuals, but not Section 3 (g), thus: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — …The person
giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering
or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging
or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall,
together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified, in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any
form with the Government. It is clear that sub-paragraph (g) is not included in the quoted portion of
Section 3. There are indeed offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws
where the mere allegation of conspiracy will suffice in order to validly charge the persons who
connived in the commission of the offense. In Section 3 (g), however, and other penal provisions,
which can only be committed by a certain class of persons, an allegation of conspiracy to indict those
which are clearly not within its purview, is deficient, as shown in Luciano v. Estrella where the public
officers were convicted under Section 3 (g) and yet the private parties therein were acquitted inspite of
the allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
RA 3019
Section 3(e)

Canlas vs. People GR 236308-09 17 February 2020

FACTS:

Two Informations were filed against petitioner Canlas, along with public officers named therein, before
the Sandiganbayan.

The Informations charged him and his co-accused, former Mayor Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., among
others, with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 in relation to the construction of
the Makati City Hall Parking Building.

Alleging that the accused former Makati City Mayor Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. and the other accused
public officers of Makati City mentioned therein, in the performance of their official and/or
administrative functions, conspired with petitioner, a private individual and the representative of
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), in giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, and
preference to Hilmarc's, and causing undue injury to the Government by awarding Hilmarc's the
contract for the Phase IV construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building amounting to
P649,275,681.73, through simulated public bidding.

Canlas filed for a Motion to Quash Information, arguing that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 explicitly applies
only to public officers and he was alleged as a private individual in the Informations and that the
informations did not allege that he induced or caused any public officer to commit a violation of the
said law.

Petitioner adopts his arguments in the two motions to quash information and argues that as a private
individual, he can only be held liable under Section 4(b) of RA 3019. Moreover, Section 3 of RA 3019
applies only to public officers. Since the Informations did not allege that he committed the acts
provided under Section 4, the Informations should be quashed under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court.Petitioner maintains that while the prosecution alleged that the accused public officers
acted in conspiracy with him, conspiracy does not make him a public officer

The Sandiganbayan denied the two motions to quash information, hence this petition. Canlas seeks a
reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision or at least a clarification for the ruling. He argues that as a
private individual, he can only be held liable for Section 4(b) of RA 3019 and that conspiracy does not
make him a public officer. He prays for the issuance of a TRO. On the other hand, the People in its
Comment argues that a private individual, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and held liable for pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying Canlas’ petition to quash the information.

HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motions to quash the information. Moreover, the Court does not
find the need to revisit the doctrine that private individuals may be held liable under Section 3(e) of RA
3019 if they act in conspiracy with public officers.

The well-settled rule is that “private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section
3 of RA 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft of corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.” The Court, in various cases, had the occasion to affirm the indictment and/or conviction of a
private individual, acting in conspiracy with public officers, for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019.

In PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman,the Court reiterated the well-settled elements of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 as follows: (i) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers; (ii) that he
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (iii) that his action
caused any undue injury to any patty, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The Court, in various cases, had the occasion to affirm the indictment and/or conviction of a private
individual, acting in conspiracy with public officers, for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 particularly
paragraph (e) thereof.

Given the foregoing pronouncements, the petition, together with the prayer therein that the case be
referred to the Court En Banc and that a TRO be issued, should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated September 25, 2017 and
November 20, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan Third Division are AFFIRMED.
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175457. July 6, 2011

KEYWORDS: Ambil, Jr. the Provincial Governor, Apelado the Provincial Warden, transferred Mayor
Adalim from prison to the residence of the governor without authority

SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY VIOLATION OF RA 3019 SEC.3 E

FACTS: Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, prayed for an investigation into the alleged transfer
of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to
the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. NBI recommended the filing of
criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the
Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern
Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping . . . each other,
with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor
Francisco Adalim, placed under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.'s custody, by allowing said Mayor
Adalim to stay at accused Ambil's residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which
act was done without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had given
unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the
government.

Petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the
Information. They reason, however, that Adalim's transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalim's sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same
jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.

Adalim confirmed that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with,
his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with
a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at
Ambil, Jr.'s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was
downgraded to homicide.

Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and undermanned. According
to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail,
each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time.
Also, there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Found petitioners guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court
ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other
privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention
by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted
to bail.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on Adalim's life but relied simply on the
advice of Adalim's lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and
nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate
Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s failure to turn over Adalim despite
advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019

RULING: YES. The court held that in order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following
elements must concur:

(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

(2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner
Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the
HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is
only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher
shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a
co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. Petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention
of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s contention
that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial
Jailer" of Eastern Samar.

It is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and
supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts
beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the
bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on
how the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.

Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is
vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. This was amply clarified
by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr.

Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said petitioner's
usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in
order to accommodate a former political party mate, betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad
faith that attended his actions.
 Likewise, amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As mentioned
above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that
the act constituting the offense consist of either

(1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or

(2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the
accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case Section 3 (e)
is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or employee and the
purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.

As regards his first contention, a prosecution for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law will
lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. (Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan)

Regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s second contention, Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public
officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the
government. The lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to describe the
recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term "party" is a
technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from "person" which, in
general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a
public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or
a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. In the present case, when
petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s
residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a
detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3 (e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment,
was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to
Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor's life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail.

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES:

Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or
office. As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the
transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft
Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.

Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for some lawful
purpose. While the order for Adalim's transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was
lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched
Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of
petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17 (1) of
the RPC.

Fuentes v. People. GR No. 186421. April 17, 2017

Mayor singled out a company by refusing to issue a business permit to the detriment of the latter.

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud." In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand,
"evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.

Crime charged: Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
SB: Convicted
SC: Convicted

Facts:

PROSECUTION

● The prosecution alleged that private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is

the sole proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A),
which was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993 until 2001 through the Business
Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU) during the said period.
● However, in 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's Business Permit,
despite: (a) Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees; (b) all the other municipal officers of the
LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their approval thereto; and (c) a Police
Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no derogatory records in the municipality.
● Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Business Permit
by securing temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of
Customs (BOC).
● However, Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist
Order after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was
involved in smuggling and drug trading. This caused the BOC to require Valenzuela to secure a
Business Permit from the LGU in order to resume Triple A's operations.
● After securing the Memorandum, Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be issued a
Business Permit, but the latter's security refused to receive the same.
● Valenzuela likewise obtained certifications and clearances from Isabel Chief of Police Martin F.
Tamse (Tamse), Barangay Captain Dino A. Bayron, the Narcotics Group of Tacloban National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Isabel Police Station,
and the Police Regional Office 8 of the PNP similarly stating that she is of good moral
 character, a law-abiding citizen, and has not been charged nor convicted of any crime as per
verification from the records of the locality.
● Despite the foregoing, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of
its goods bought in early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited from boarding the said
goods to the vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations
from 2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in Triple A's favor.

DEFENSE

● In his defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing
rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading,
but he did not act on the same.
● However, in 2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress
and Isabel Chief of Police Tamse allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to
hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered
Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC.
● Fuentes maintained that if he went on with the approval of such permit and the rumors turned
out to be true, many will suffer and will be victimized; on the other hand, if the rumors were
false, then only one stands to suffer.
● Further, Fuentes presented corroborative testimonies of other people, essentially: (a) refuting
Valenzuela's claim that Triple A was unable to resume operations due to lack of Business
Permit; and (b) accusing Valenzuela of pulling out her application for Business Permit from the
Mayor's Office, which precluded Fuentes from approving the same.

CRIME CHARGED: Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

SANDIGANBAYAN

● The Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
● The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established all the elements of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, considering that: (a) Fuentes was admittedly the Mayor of Isabel,
Leyte at the time relevant to the case; (b) he singled out Valenzuela's Triple A despite the fact
that the rumors relative to the illegal smuggling and drug-related activities covered all ship
chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel; (c) he still refused to approve Valenzuela's Business
Permit for Triple A even though she had already secured clearances not only from the other
offices of the LGU, but from the PNP itself, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and (d)
as a result of Fuentes's acts, Valenzuela was unable to operate her ship chandling business
through Triple A, thus, causing her undue injury.

WON Fuentes is guilty of the crime charged

YES.

The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor
of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of.

As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the
crime, namely, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and/or "gross negligence." In Coloma,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court defined the foregoing terms as follows:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud."

In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith"
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes.

In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad
faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he
heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling
and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused
issuance of a Business Permit, as evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2) other chandling
services operators in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler and General Maritime
Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services. Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela
was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have issued Business
Permits to the latter's other businesses as well. However, and as aptly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security,
which provides security services to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these questionable
circumstances, the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business Permit to
Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of
the other ship chandling operators in the Port of Isabel.

As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend,
revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16 and 444 (b) (3) (iv) of the Local
Government Code as an incident of his power to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized
that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein;
and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said
issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe due process in that it must afford the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.

Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for the issuance of a Business
Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the other concerned
officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even submitted numerous certifications issued by various law
enforcement agencies clearing her of any kind of participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and
drug trading activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a Business
Permit for Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an opportunity to controvert the rumors against
her. Worse, he even issued the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
conducting its ship chandling operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly, if Fuentes truly
believed the rumors that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel, then
he should have already acted upon it in the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, or when he allegedly first heard
about them. However, Fuentes's belated action only in 2002 — which was done despite the clearances
issued by various law enforcement agencies exonerating Valenzuela from such activities — speaks of
evident bad faith which cannot be countenanced.

Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business
Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which
effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business
Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of
Triple A's ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful
endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit
for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple
A's favor. Under prevailing case law, "[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient
that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely
negligible."

Sison vs. People

GR 170339 09 March 2010

Keywords: Mayor did not comply with the procedure for the procurements

Facts:

● Petitioner Rolando E. Sison was the municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, a
fourth-class municipality, while Rigoberto de Jesus was the municipal treasurer.
● State auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during
petitioner’s incumbency, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land
Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials,
two Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out that there
were irregularities in the documents supporting the acquisitions.
● Thus, petitioner and de Jesus were indicted before the Sandiganbayan in seven separate
Informations for seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019.
● Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the Informations. Accused de Jesus has remained at large.
● Trial on the merits ensued. Pajayon was the lone witness for the prosecution. She narrated the
State’s version of the facts as above stated. The prosecution thereafter rested its case and
formally offered its exhibits.
● When it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, petitioner was called to the witness
stand where he admitted that indeed, no public bidding was conducted insofar as the purchases
he was being accused of were concerned. When asked how the purchases were made, he
answered that they were done through personal canvass. When prodded why personal canvass
 was the method used, he retorted that no public bidding could be conducted because all the
dealers of the items were based in Manila. It was therefore useless to invite bidders since
nobody would bid anyway. The defense thereafter rested its case and formally offered its
exhibits.

Sandiganbayan - The SB found the petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed to this Court,
praying for an acquittal because his guilt was allegedly not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

Ruling: YES.

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. xxx.
(emphasis supplied)

To be found guilty under said provision, the following elements must concur:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial
functions;
3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The only question left is
whether the third and fourth elements are likewise present. We hold that they are.

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection
with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.

Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross
negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally
with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property."

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under his watch.
Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his
signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his
actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did
not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors. This was an
admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable,
considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief
executive, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his
constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.

Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no
matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These
requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the
acquisition of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass.
Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body assures
the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that
no personal preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given the best possible price
for its procurements.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any
undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways
by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be
charged under either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need
not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.

Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having
given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. Under the second mode,
damage is not required.

The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies
priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner
 did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal
canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers.
These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in
determining the best possible price for the government. The private suppliers, which were all personally
chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without showing proof that their prices
were the most beneficial to the government. For that, the petitioner must now face the consequences of
his acts.

Section 3(g)

People vs. Go GR 168539 25 March 2014

Keyword: Death of Secretary Enrile
SC: A private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, among others, is
that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, DOES NOT require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with public officers. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.

Facts:
● The information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court’s Decision in Agan Jr v
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc which nullified the various contracts awarded
by the government, through the DOTC, to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III.
● Subsequent to the decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia Pesayco filed a complaint with the office of
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with the DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract
which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
● On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While
there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
● Jan. 13, 2005: an Information was charged before the SB against Enrile, committing the offense
in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused Henry Go
(Chairman & President of PIATCO).
● SB issued an order: The prosecution is given a period of 10 days within which to show cause
why this case should NOT be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased. The prosecution complied with the Order contending that
the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.

Respondent:
● Filed a motion to quash the information, filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
 ● Citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent,
who is NOT a public officer not was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

SB
● Resolution (on Motion to Quash filed by Henry Go): granted the Motion to Quash filed by
accused Henry Go.

Issue: 1. WON the Court A Quo gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a manner NOT in
accord with law or applicable jurisprudence in granting the demurrer to evidence and in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 28090 on the ground that it has NO jurisdiction over the person or respondent Go.

2. WON the Court A Quo gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a manner NOT in
accord with law or applicable jurisprudence, in ruling that it has NO jurisdiction over the person of
respondent GO Despite the irrefutable fact that he has already posted bail for his provisional liberty.

3. WON the Court a Quo gravely erred when, in complete disregard of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, it quashed the information and dismissed criminal case no. 28090.

Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

● Section 3(g) of RA 3019 - the elements are the ff:
a. That the accused is a public officer;
b. That he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
c. That such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
● Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, in consonance with
the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft / corruption practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case
involving herein private respondent.
● The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
information.
● Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is NO public officer
who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may NOT
prosper. The SC is NOT persuaded.
● Secretary Enrile’s death DOES NOT mean that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of the Secretary is his criminal liability. His death DID NOT
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy. The death of
Secretary Enrile DOES NOT mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3(g). In fact, were it not for the death of Secretary Enrile, he should have been charged.
● A private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, among others, is
that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, DOES NOT require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with public officers. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged
in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may
 be indicted alone.
● It is NOT necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. The
death of one of two or more conspirators DOES NOT prevent the conviction of the survivor /
survivors. So long as the acquittal / death of a co-conspirator DOES NOT remove the bases of
a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
● The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that, as alleged in the Information filed
against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter’s Motion to Quash,
respondent conspired with Secretary Enrile.
● The Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to
reporess “acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,” would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
● HOWEVER, It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better
left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove
or disprove its presence.
● The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and
filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
● The issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of
the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
his case.
● it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by
public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal
court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving... violations of R.A.
3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case,... respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally,
under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and
tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death... of the latter, this can
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB
is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a... court to decide a case would
no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death
of one of the alleged offenders.
● WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Section 3(h)

Domingo v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175 October 25, 2005

Keywords:
Doctrine: The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said
public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or
in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer has
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Crime Charged:Violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Facts:

● The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint
with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then
president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and
Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant. The complaint was docketed as
TBP Case No. 87-02391.

● In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from
the complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other
respondents. In the same order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO,
the President of PNB at the time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence
on record that he was involved in the case. However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at
PNB, Escolta, Manila, his last known address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer
connected with the said bank at the time it was served.

● On 8 June 1988, in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor and Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing them to continue the
preliminary investigation of cases pending as of 27 April 1988 until the same are terminated.

● On 6 February 1992, after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the case,
Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him to
submit a counter-affidavit. DOMINGO submitted on 9 March 1992 his counter-affidavit with
the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

● On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that DOMINGO and
Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, but that the complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand
E. Marcos for being moot and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus
for lack of merit. This was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and the
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992

Procedural History:
Sandiganbayan: petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information against
him on the grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription, and
(2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense which was denied.

Not satisfied, DOMINGO filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied his motion to quash the
information.

Issue:
(1) WON the crime has prescribed
(2) WON the facts charged in the information constitute an offense
(3) WON the long and inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
and the filing of the information violated his right to speedy trial, invoking the ruling
enunciated in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.

Ruling:

(1) No.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. llcd

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive period.
Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years." This was
later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the
prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.

Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable
rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 17 as amended, which
provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is
not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. 18

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the
transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the government. 19 The alleged
anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one
of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said
date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. 20 Hence,
the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense,
which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the
initiatory complaint was filed.

As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." Whether the
running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when DOMINGO was impleaded as
an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the information against him was filed with the Sandiganbayan, is
immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery of
the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A. No. 3019 or
fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to quash on the ground
of prescription was, therefore, correctly denied.

(2) Yes.
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of
said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state
the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.

The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is a public officer
or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and (5) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

The information specifically stated as follows:

(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a government financial
institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with DOMINGO, capitalizing and exploiting his close
personal association with then President Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP;

(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in the performance of his
official functions;

(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Resolution No.
144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCP's
obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the CDCP defaulted in the payment of the loan
amounting to US$29 Million;

(4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of the Letter of Credit and the
waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby granting unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount;
and

(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.

Clearly, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail.

(3) No.
A review of the records show that his right has not been violated. The Office of the Special Prosecutor,
in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, 29 has adequately explained the reason for the said
delay.

Perforce, DOMINGO cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering that one
of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to submit his
counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved. After DOMINGO filed his
counter-affidavit on 9 March 1992, the corresponding information was in due time filed on 30 July
1992. The delay, if any, was actually more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was
intended to afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against him.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to
try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.

Malversation (as amended by RA 1060)

Venezuela vs. People GR 205693 14 February 2018

DOCTRINE:Malversation of public funds, in its simplest term, is the crime where an

accountable officer had received the public funds but failed to account for the said funds upon
demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage

FACTS: Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1986 to June 30, 1998

Venezuela was accused of the crime of Malversation or public funds after team of auditors composed
of Ruiz, llarenas and Austria conducted an investigation on the cash and accounts of Pacita
Costes (Costes), then Municipal treasurer of pozorrubio, Pangasinan.

The audit team discovered a shortage of Php 2, 872, 808.00 on the joint accounts of Costes
and Venezuela. Likewise, it noticed 17 illegal cash advances made by Venezuela.

Moreover, the audit team found out that Venezuela was neither bonded nor authorized to receive
cash advances. In response, Venezuela acknowledged his accountability for the cash advances
amounting to Php 943, 200.00 while denying the remainder of the cash advances.

The sandiganbayan convicted Venezuela of the crime of malversation of public funds and issued a
warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Venezuela.

Venezuela voluntarily surrendered and posted bail. He also moved for reconsideration of the case. He
asserted that he already remitted the amount of 2, 872, 808. 00 in installments to costs as
evidenced by receipts bearing serial numbers and dates
Venezuela maintains that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of the crime of malversation
of public funds. Venezuela avers that he had fully liquidated his cash advances to Costes.

ISSUE: WON Venezuela committed malversation of public funds?

HELD: Yes. Venezuela is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds. The
elements of malversation under art 217 of RPC are (i) the offender is a public officer; (ii) the he has
custody or control of public funds by reason of his office; (iii) those funds are public funds for
which he is accountable and ; (iv) he misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them. In the case at bar, all the elements are present.
Venezuela is a public officer being a municipal mayor and that during his tenure as a mayor, he
incurred unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 2, 872, 808. 00

These unliquidated cash advances are funds belonging to the municipality of Pozorrubio and earmarked
for the use of the municipality. Payment or reimbursement of the funds malversed after
commission of the crime does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability. The act of
reimbursement may only affect the civil liability and may be credited in his favor as mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary
surrender

Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan
from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. Notably, he falls
within the definition of a public officer, stated in the RPC as "any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class."

Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the municipal mayor, he incurred unliquidated cash
advances amounting to Php 2,872,808.00.These unliquidated cash advances constituted
funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and earmarked for use by the said
municipality.

Undoubtedly, as the municipal mayor, Venezuela had control of the subject funds, and was
accountable therefore.

Thus, based on all the foregoing facts and circumstances, it becomes all too apparent that
the Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in convicting Venezuela of the
crime charged.
Wa-acon vs. People

Facts:

On the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P. Wa-acon was a Special
Collecting Officer of the National Food Authority (NFA) and was assigned at the Kadiwa Center at
Moriones, Tondo, Manila. One of his duties was to receive grains, consisting of rice and mongo, which
shall then be sold to the public on retail. The proceeds of the sale of the grains shall then be collected
by the same accused.

On September 28, 1981, by virtue of a Travel Order, a team of Auditors from the Commission on Audit
one of whom was accused Robert P. Waacon. The said examination was conducted at the Office of the
Regional Auditor, NFA Metro Manila Office at Paco, Manila. In that office, the audit team asked the
presence of accused Robert P. Waacon by virtue of a demand letter dated September 1981, demanding
the latter to produce cash, cash items, stocks and empty sacks and other pertinent papers. As testified by
Prosecution witness Dionisio A. Nillo, accused Robert P. Wa-acon told the audit team that "he has no
cash on hand at the time pertaining to his accountability as Special Collecting Officer. Hence, it was
indicated in the Cash Count Sheet that there was no cash counted during the cash examination.

Based on the examination conducted on the various Warehouse Stock Issues, Empty Sacks Receipts,
Official Receipts submitted and the Certificate of Inventory of Stocks and Empty Sacks dated
September 18, 1981, containing the signature of accused Robert P. Wa-acon and witnessed by Virgilio
Cacanendin, Special Investigator, Manolito Diaz, Bookkeeper, Louie Pastofide, Proceso A. Saavedra,
Audit Examiner II and Gloria T. Reyes, Audit Examiner I, the audit team rendered a Report of
Examination, Form 74-A of the Cash and Accounts of accused Robert P. Wa-acon. All of the
aforementioned documents were submitted by Proceso Saavedra, a resident Audit Examiner of the NFA
Metro Manila Office, Paco, Manila, to the Audit team headed by Dionisio A. Nillo.

The Report of the Examination of the Cash and Accountabilities of accused Robert P. Wa-acon shows
that the latter incurred a cash shortage of P114,303.00. In the Revised Summary of the Cash
Examination of accused Robert P. Wa-acon, the cash shortage was changed to P102,199.20 after
deducting the cost of sixty (60) bags of regular milled rice value of (P6,900.00) and the monetary value
of the empty sacks returned by accused Robert P. Wa-acon, which is (P5,203.80). However, accused
Robert P. Wa-acon made a refund of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Therefore, the
total shortage amounted to (P92,199.20).

During the trial before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner denied that he misapplied and converted for his
personal use the stocks of rice and empty sacks as he had been faithfully remitting all the proceeds of
the rice he sold to consumers.

Petitioner also contended that the shortage discovered by the Audit Team may be attributed to the
discrepancy in the actual weight of the rice actually delivered to him and that of the weight reflected in
the receipts. In other words, he claimed that the rice delivered to him weighed less than that for which
he signed. He alleged that he discovered the shortage of five (5) to ten (10) kilos per sack only upon
delivery of the rice to the station/outlet. Petitioner explained that he could not check the weight of the
sacks delivered to him as the weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity of only twelve (12)
kilograms. Petitioner claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was
unheeded.
Petitioner further claimed that the only reason he signed for the sacks of rice, despite the shortage, was
because he was told that he would not be paid his salary if he would not sign, added to the fact that he
was then hungry — all of which prompted Wa-acon to sign the audit report of the Audit Team. 7 As to
the missing empty sacks, petitioner argued that those were in the custody of the delivery man who had a
logbook where Special Collecting Officers sign as proof that the delivery man had taken the sacks.

Sandiganbayan- Convicted petitioner Robert P. Wa-acon of Malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code for misappropriating PhP 92,199.20, which forms part of his accountabilities as
Special Collecting Officer of the National Food Authority (NFA).

Sandiganbayan- Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code that "the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds which he is
chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use" and the inability of accused Waacon to "rebut the
presumption that he had put the rice stocks and the empty sacks to personal use," the Sandiganbayan
found him guilty of malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not there is malversation of funds.

Ruling:

The court sustain petitioner's conviction.

In seeking the recall of his conviction, accused petitioner asserts that the unremitted amounts for the
rice stocks and the money allegedly gained from the empty sacks were not used for his personal use and
therefore, the fourth element of malversation — that the accused appropriated, took, or misappropriated
public funds or property for which he was accountable was not proven. According to petitioner, while
he might have violated certain auditing rules and regulations, this violation is not tantamount to
malversation. He leans on the rulings in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, and Agullo v. Sandiganbayan that
"it is essential to prove that there had been a conversion of public fund to personal use" and that
"conversion must be affirmatively proved"; otherwise, the presumption is "deemed never to have
existed at all."
Accused petitioner has conceded that the first three (3) elements of the crime of malversation exist but
asseverates that the fourth element that he appropriated, took, or misappropriated the public funds for
which he was made accountable by the Commission on Audit (COA) to his own personal use –– was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Unfortunately, petitioner's postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act
1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or
misappropriated public funds or property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was
installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property — with which said officer is accountable — should be prima
facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use.

After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an explanation, petitioner
Wa-acon was not able to make money readily available, 15 immediately refund the shortage, 16 or
explain satisfactorily the cash deficit. 17 These facts or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence
that he converted such funds to his personal use.
Neither can accused petitioner claim that such presumption under Article 217 violates the constitutional
guarantee of presumption of innocence for "the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away
the presumption of innocence which may . . . be such as to rebut and control it." 19 Such prima facie
evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, "can counterbalance the presumption of innocence to
warrant a conviction."

Since the facts adduced by the State brought about a prima facie evidence which is considered sufficient
to sustain petitioner's conviction under Article 217, it is incumbent upon petitioner Wa-acon to destroy
the presumption of law.

ANGELICA ANZIA FAJARDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 239823. September 25, 2019

Malversation

3m pcso some money missing, letters admitting but retracted and irregular audit.

FACTS: Fajardo was the Cashier V and designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Division Chief III, Prize
Payment (Teller) Division, Treasury Department of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO).
As such, she exercised direct supervision and control over paying tellers and other employees assigned
in the division, instituted procedures in actual payment of prizes, conducted periodic check-up and/or
actual count of paid winning tickets, and requisitioned cash from the Assistant Department Manager for
distribution to paying tellers.

By virtue of her position, Fajardo was likewise authorized to draw a cash advance in the amount of
P3M from which P2M was intended as payment of sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes, while P1M
was devoted for the PCSO-Pacific Online Systems Corporation (POSC) Scratch IT Project.

On the basis of two (2) letter-complaints from Crispina Doria, Division Chief of the Sales Department
and Gina V. Abo-Hamda of the POSC protesting the inability of the Prize Payment Division of the
Treasury Department to pay the winning Scratch IT tickets on time, as well as the delay in the
replenishment of the Teller and Provincial District Office's prize fund, a spot cash audit on the account
of Fajardo was ordered.

November 13, 2008, the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of the PCSO conducted a cash examination
of Fajardo's account and, after a reconciliation of all the documents, checks, winning tickets, issuances,
and vouchers against Fajardo's cash on hand, discovered that there was a shortage of P218,461.00 from
the total accountability of P3M. Fajardo was furnished a copy of the certified cash count sheet
reflecting the said shortage. The result of the spot audit was then forwarded to the Legal Department of
the PCSO for a fact-finding investigation.
The following day, or on November 14, Fajardo did not report for work. Thereafter, or on November
17, after discovering that someone went to the Treasury Department on November 16, a Sunday, and
occupied Fajardo's workstation with the lights out, Paruginog directed the audit team to seal Fajardo's
vault.

Fajardo reported back to work on January 8, 2009. Mr. Mario Coral, head of the Treasury Department,
informed her that the audit team will open her vault to conduct a spot cash count in her presence and in
the presence of Paruginog, as well as representatives from the Commission on Audit (COA) and the
Treasury and Legal Departments of the PCSO.

The audit revealed a much bigger shortage in the amount of P1,877,450.00. Moreover, the audit team
found that the P1,621,476.00 worth of cash and P37,513.00 worth of checks presented during the first
audit were all missing. The IAD then furnished Paruginog a copy of the Certified Cash Count Sheet
indicating the increased shortage of P1,877,450.00. The audit team issued a demand letter to Fajardo
requiring her to return the missing funds and to explain within 72 hrs from receipt thereof the reasons
why the shortage occurred. Fajardo wrote a reply, requesting for more time to explain and expressing
her willingness to settle the matter as she had no intentions of evading the same. Fajardo wrote another
letter to the PCSO Legal Department acknowledging her mistake and admitting her liability for the
missing funds and offering to settle her accountability by waiving her monetary benefits.

PCSO Legal Department issued a Resolution finding a prima facie case against Fajardo and
recommending that she be formally charged with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, without prejudice to the
filing of the present charge against her for Malversation of Public Funds.

DEFENSE: Fajardo claimed that on November 13, 2008, the audit team proceeded to her workstation
and announced that they will conduct a spot cash examination. They counted the cash in her possession
without giving her the opportunity to balance her accounts and when all the cash items were produced,
they did not include the same in the audit. Thereafter, she was forced to sign two (2) Cash Examination
Count Sheets indicating 2 different figures, one stating a shortage in the amount of P734,421.00 and the
other indicating the amount of P218,461.00. She did not report for work the following day and
extended her leave of absence due to health problems and when she learned that during her absence, her
safe and vault were sealed by the auditors that a certain Ms. Josefina Sarabia assumed her duties.
Further, she contended that it was one Carlos Lector who was seen in her workstation opening the vault
with the lights off and was consequently administratively charged. She claimed that the sealing of her
vault was directed in order to pass the blame on her despite the shortage having occurred as a result of
pilferage, robbery or theft.

As regards her letters, she claimed that she was merely tricked into writing them, as she was then
confused, helpless, and vulnerable after being confronted with the audit results.
Finally, she insisted that the spot cash audits were attended with serious irregularities and that the
sealing of her vault 4 days after the first audit did not conform with prescribed COA guidelines.

RTC: RTC found Fajardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Affirmed Fajardo's conviction and rejected Fajardo's contention that her letter
dated January 27, 2009 was involuntarily given and in violation of her rights against self-incrimination
and to counsel, as she voluntarily submitted the letter during the fact-finding investigation of the PCSO
Legal Department; therefore, the said rights do not come into play.

With respect to the alleged irregularities in the cash count and/or audit conducted by the IAD, Fajardo
neither challenged nor questioned the manner through which the audit was conducted; in fact, she
appeared to have acknowledged the amount of the missing funds through her letters which contained no
objection or reservation with respect to the regularity of the spot audits. SB found that the IAD was
able to sufficiently explain the two (2) different figures appearing on the two (2) Cash Count
Examination Sheets both dated November 13, 2008, i.e., P734,421.00 and P218,461.00. Ma. Theresa
Chua, an auditor of the IAD, clarified that the second Cash Examination Count Sheet was issued after
Fajardo recalled that she issued cash to her tellers in the amount of P515,960.00, which amount was
then deducted from P734,421.00. Hence, the reduced amount of P218,461.00.

Fajardo's motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: W/N the conviction of Fajardo was correct

RULING: YES. The elements of the crime are as follows:

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

(c) the funds or property are public funds or public property for which he was accountable; and

(d) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence,

permitted another person to take them.

After a judicious perusal of the case, the Court finds the confluence of the foregoing elements to uphold
Fajardo's conviction.
Fajardo was a public officer, her duties as such required her to handle cash, as in fact, at the time
material to this case, Fajardo was authorized to draw a cash advance in the amount of P3M intended as
payments for sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes and the PCSO — POSC Scratch IT Project. By
reason thereof, Fajardo had in her custody public funds in the total amount of P3M for which she was
clearly accountable.

Part of the said funds went missing while in her custody. After the conduct of two (2) spot audits on her
account, a total deficit in the amount of P1,877,450.00 was discovered, which she failed to explain or
produce upon demand. Her failure to account for the said moneys thereby gave rise to the presumption
that she had converted the funds to her personal use, which presumption she failed to rebut with
competent evidence. Accordingly, her conviction for the crime charged stands.

ADDITIONAL:

Fajardo insists that the SB should not have taken into consideration her letters dated January 15 and 27,
2009, having been used in violation of her rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. Further, she
claimed that not only were the letters involuntarily written, but she had also retracted the same in the
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman hence, the same should not have been used against
her.

WRONG

The right to counsel vis-à-vis administrative inquiries or investigations has already been succinctly
explained in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court declared that "a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel”.

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not
to those made in an administrative investigation

RETRACTION:

Petitioner subsequently retracted the said letters in her counter affidavit before the Ombudsman will not
exculpate her. Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor because they are generally
unreliable, as there is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.

AUDIT:

Fajardo did not challenge the conduct of the audit nor did she point out any irregularity therein. Instead,
she requested for more time to respond to the allegations and later, acknowledged her infractions and
offered ways to restitute the missing amount. Further, and as aptly pointed out by the respondent People
 through the Ombudsman, the fact that the spot audits were conducted pursuant to the IAD's authority to
do so raises the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Besides, this issue does
not detract from or diminish the fact that Fajardo failed to produce the missing funds upon demand.

LAST:

Fajardo's argument that it is the prosecution, not her, who had the burden of proving the loss of the
money in the amount of P1,621,476.00 and checks worth P37,513.00 at the time of the second spot
audit on January 8, 2009 deserves little weight. Having established that the total amount of P3M was in
her custody by reason of her public position, it was incumbent upon her to produce the same upon
demand or explain its whereabouts; failing in which, the presumption of misappropriation arises as
there is no competent evidence to rebut the same, the presumption stands and her conviction
consequently upheld.

Technical Malversation

Ysidoro vs. People

GR 192330 14 November 2012

Keywords: A municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from
malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities.

Facts:

● The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public property (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
● The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of
Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction
materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries
provided the labor needed for construction.
● When construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done,
the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement.
● Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of
the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished
children.
 ● Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom.
And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be
given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
● Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to
seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and
signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to
CSAP.
● Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department
regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the
Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an
emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those
goods to its beneficiaries.
● Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint
against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the
subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local
Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical
malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
● In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for
the poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the
Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP
beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA
Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found
nothing irregular in its transactions.

Sandiganbayan - The SB found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation.
The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a public purpose other than that for
which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied
Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision
to this Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Mayor Ysidoro is guilty of Technical Malversation - YES
2. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for Technical Malversation - NO

Ruling:

1. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has
three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds
or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which
such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for
SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its
feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the moderately and
severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six
members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below. This rule provides assurance that the
SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government’s
limited resources.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation.

If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter
to CSAP beneficiaries.

2. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.

Abdulla v. People. GR No. 150129. April 6, 2005

Accused applied for the payment of wages of casuals the partial funding alloted by the DBM,
which was intended for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers.

In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically
malversed, the use thereof for another public purpose will not make the accused guilty of
violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Crime charged: Technical Malversation

SB: Conviction
SC: Acquittal
Facts:

● Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant Norma Abdulla was charged under an
Information which pertinently reads:

That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo,

Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being
then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by
reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the
Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals,
the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary
school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.

● Appellant's co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted.
● Only the appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan.
● The evidence on record show that the request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers to Instructor I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president,
accused Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); that
consequent to the approval of the said request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial
funding for the purpose of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the "lump
sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688
(General Appropriations Act January 1 — December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under
personal services of said school; that out of the thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers, only
the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the
twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled
to salary differentials as they were already receiving the same salary rate as Instructor I; and
that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00 allotment,
was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals.
● Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials of only
six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34)
teachers, twenty-eight (28) were already holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III
receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary
Teacher II positions and therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were
paid salary differentials. In fact, the notarized audit investigation report and the Joint
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, also point that said act of the accused
is justified.

1. WON the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent on the part of the
accused
2. WON the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime
of technical malversation
1. YES.

The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131
as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.

For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from its
very language that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent
presupposes the commission of an unlawful act.

Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is found in possession of stolen
goods precisely because the taking of another's property is an unlawful act.

The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here,
appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu
State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to
under existing civil service laws.

In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that
appellant's act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done
with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to prove
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single
witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the documentary
evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the
part of appellant.

The Sandiganbayan's improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the
prosecution's deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from
the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court
has no basis to affirm appellant's conviction.

2. NO.

The elements of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:

1. That the offender is a public officer;

2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;
3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;
4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has
been appropriated by law or ordinance.

Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the crime
charged. She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings,
had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
The Court finds merit in appellant's submission.
As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally
intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose
employment status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation"
authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal
services of said school.

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation
which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The
authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not
an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan that in the absence of a law or
ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of
any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the use
thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects
other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the
DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of
the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any
provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In
fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are
lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

Plunder

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 19 December 2001

Keyword: Constitutionality of Plunder Law
SC: RA 7080 (Plunder Law) is CONSTITUTIONAL

● Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is to be prosecuted under RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659.

The assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according
to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal prosecutions; and © it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under the RPC
● The provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4.
● The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations.
● Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification of the charges in the Information and for
reconsideration of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.
 ● The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
● Petitioner moved to quash the Information in one Criminal Case on the ground that the facts
alleged therein DID NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than 1 offense.
● The Gov’t filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and 5 days later petitioner submitted
his Reply to the Opposition. Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash.

Issues:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; - No
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, - No
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.

Ruling:

1. No. The Plunder Law is not vague. Consequently, it is constitutional.

● There is a basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
● The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Indeed, it can be understood with
little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.||| The court ruled that it is NOT vague
or ambiguous. Petitioner’s contention that the law fails to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms “combination” and “series” in the phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional. The SC ruled that statute is
not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words. That Congress intended the words "combination" and
"series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.
● Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d). On the other hand,
to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and
raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the
legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. In conclusion, it cannot
plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
 seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.|||The doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased.
● The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real.

2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime
of plunder.
● The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted
to at least P50,000,000.00
● All the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2,
in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and
opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal. t purports to do no more than prescribe a rule
of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is
crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons
advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the demise of the law. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause.

3. The SC agrees with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent. Senator Tañada, during the deliberation of SB No. 733, said that where the
charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt / criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Additional details in SC’s ruling:

 ● Petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State.|
● Petition to declare RA 7080 is DISMISSED.

Macapagal Arroyo v People G.R. 220598 July 19, 2016

Keywords:
Doctrine:
Crime Charged:

Facts:

● Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and former
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas.

● The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following:
(1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C.
Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former
members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission on
Audit (COA).

● The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisdiction over most of the accused, including
petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted except those of the
petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her
petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.

● After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence
asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.

● The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused within its
jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was sufficient evidence
showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.

● Petitioners filed the case before the Supreme Court on certiorari to assail the denial of their
demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

● According to the prosecution, the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the
denial of her demurrer to evidence.

Procedural History:

Issue: : WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas,
and Uriarte
Ruling: No.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in denying GMA’s demurrer that GMA,
Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the
existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal charge for plunder against
several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons.
In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Citing Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, “The gravamen of the conspiracy charge…is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.”

Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such
identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be
properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause
against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against
each of them.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015
and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence;
DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of
suit.
Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan GR 224162
PDAF

Facts:

● Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De
Asis, were charged with Plunder.

● Information state:

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff
of Senator Enrile's Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

A. by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of
the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE's Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE's endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' nongovernment organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementors (sic) of ENRILE's PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

B. by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,

relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

● Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State
witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted
with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the
testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.

● In view of Napoles' application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses:
(a) Carmencita N. Delantar, then Director in the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(b) Susan P. Garcia, an Assistant Commissioner in the Commission on Audit (COA), and the former
Director of the Special Audit Office;
(c) Ryan P. Medrano, the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer from the FIO, Office of the
Ombudsman;
(d) Marina Cortez Sula, former employee of Napoles;
(e) Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar, former bookkeeper for JLN Corporation;
(f) Merlina P. Suñas, former employee of Napoles;
(g) Benhur K. Luy, former finance officer of Napoles; and
(h) Ruby Chan Tuason, former Social Secretary of former President Joseph E. Estrada.
 ● The prosecution likewise presented the following supposed beneficiaries of former Senator
Enrile's PDAF projects, all of whom identified their respective sworn statements before the
Sandiganbayan.

● The defense also stipulated that: (a) the witnesses occupied their respective positions at the
time material to the case; (b) they were unaware that their respective municipalities were
recipients of livelihood projects from former Senator Enrile's PDAF; (c) they did not receive
any agricultural package or livelihood training from former Senator Enrile, the implementing
agencies of his PDAF, or from any NGO; and (d) they did not sign or prepare any
acknowledgment receipt or liquidation documents pertaining to the transactions.

● The prosecution presented another group of beneficiaries, whose testimonies were subject of
the same stipulations

● After the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she
is not presenting any evidence for her bail application.

● Sandiganbayan- The prosecution had presented clear and strong evidence which leads to a
well-guarded dispassionate judgment that the offense of plunder has been committed as
charged; that accused Napoles is guilty thereof, and that she will probably be punished capitally
if the law were administered at this stage of the proceedings.

Issue: Whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles, was resolved by the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence.

Ruling: Yes.

The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former Senator Enrile
and Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On this point, this
Court has consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is
usually an agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act. 47 Even Congress,
in its Explanatory Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized that this crime, by its
very nature, is committed through a series or combination of acts done "in stealth and secrecy over a
period of time.

It was therefore unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among
Napoles, former Senator Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional
participation in the transaction that furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution
was able to prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.

Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

The prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that Napoles participated in the implied
conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Napoles’ participation in the
 conspiracy was established through testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former employees,
but from four (4) witnesses – all of whom corroborate each other on material points. More importantly,
they testified on the minute details of the scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy would be able
to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even refute their claims.

The Sandiganbayan may rely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers, especially since these were
corroborated by other available evidence. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were conspirators
themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and unreliable. The Court is not
the proper forum to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is elementary that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses,
are accorded great weight and respect.

Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Failure to Render Accounting

Lumauig vs. People GR 166680 07 July 2014

Keywords: mayor
Doctrine: A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an
accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code

FACTS: Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan
examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During the
course of her examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came across a
disbursement voucher for P101, 736.00 prepared for Lumauig, a former mayor of the municipality, as
cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed
to be donated to the municipality.

Her further investigation of the accounting records revealed that no payment intended for the charge
was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994. She likewise claimed that she
prepared two letters to inform the petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance but the same were not
sent to him because she could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted. She averred that on June
4, 2001, petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of the municipality.

Lumauig admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101, 736.00 during his incumbency as
municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao.

This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles
to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila.
However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed that
 it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already
turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand
from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay
when he came to know that he still had an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the
issue, he paid the amount of P101, 736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.

The petitioner was acquitted from the charge under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft And
Corrupt Practices Act but was convicted of the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lumauig can be held liable to the crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD: Yes. Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 218 consists of the following elements: that the offender is a public officer, whether
in the service or separated therefrom; that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to
a provincial auditor; and that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered. Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the
court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not
contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says
and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for
interpretation, but only application.

Petitioner is liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the petitioner received
the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before
January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash
advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar,
the petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218 because it took him over six years
before settling his accounts.

Infidelity in the Custody of Documents

DULPO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Keyword: Airmail Letters
Doctrine:

Facts:
● Petitioner Lucio Dulpo was an employee of the Post Office at Bacoor, Cavite, holding a
temporary appointment as letter-carrier. Upon the complaint of Mrs. Lorna Lacorte of Zapote,
Bacoor, the accused letter-carrier was charged before the Sandiganbayan in two separate
informations for having feloniously taken and carried away two airmail letters allegedly
containing international money orders for $150 and $100, received at the Bacoor Post Office
and entrusted to him for delivery to the addressee.

● After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan, while absolving Dulpo as to the alleged asportation
of the international money orders on the ground that it was not sufficiently proven that the
letters contained said money orders, found him guilty of the crime of infidelity in the custody
of documents under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code for the loss of the two airmail
letters and sentenced him in each of the cases "to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; to pay a fine of P500.00, plus costs; and
to suffer the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period ranging from
ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum."cral

Crime Charged: two separate informations for having feloniously taken and carried away two airmail
letters allegedly containing international money orders

Procedural History:
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration, both of which were denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this petition.

Issue(s): Two assignments of error were raised by petitioner, namely: (1) the Sandiganbayan erred in
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of infidelity in the custody of documents; and (2) it
erred in imposing too severe a penalty considering that what were involved were ordinary airmail
letters.

Ruling:
(1) The finding of the Sandiganbayan as to the guilt of petitioner is amply supported by the
evidence. The fact that the two letters in question were entrusted to, and received by, the
accused letter-carrier, Lucio Dulpo, for delivery to the addressee is admitted by him. It is also a
fact admitted by him that those letters were never delivered to the addressee. Dulpo’s defense is
that he could not deliver the letters because the addressee was unknown at the given address,
hence, in accordance with standard procedure, he returned the said letter to the sender by
putting them in the dispatch box in the post office. However, the burden of proof to establish
such defense lies on the accused. He cannot rely simply on the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed, since there was evidence presented by the prosecution which
negated such presumption. The complainant testified that upon verification from her son, she
learned that the letters were not returned to, and received by, him. In fact, it was shown that the
money orders which were intended for the complainant apparently went to someone else as
 they were encashed by a certain Adela Bonavie, and someone had apparently signed
complainant’s name on the money order, putting her address therein. The accused claimed, in
his defense, that he recorded in a logbook which he kept for the purpose the fact that he
returned the letters to the sender. However, he could not produce said logbook, saying that they
were kept in the post office. The incumbent postmaster of Bacoor Post Office, who was
subpoenaed at the request of the accused to bring the logbook in question to the court at the
hearing on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, brought only two logbooks, and stated to
the court that these were the only books of the accused which he found in the post office and
that he could not find any logbook of the accused for the said year of the incident
(2) Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code provides for two ranges of penalty for infidelity in the
custody of documents: prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P1,000 if the damage to a third
party or to the public interest is serious, and prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 if such damage is not so serious. Considering the facts
and circumstances of the case, we find that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused
should be that which is prescribed by paragraph 2 of Article 226, which is the lesser penalty.
The Sandiganbayan itself did not sustain the charge in the informations that money orders were
contained in the undelivered letters. Moreover, these letters were sent by ordinary airmail, not
by registered mail. We do not find the cases cited by respondent — U.S. v. Marino 1 and U.S.
v. Balilo 2 — to be controlling, since the letters involved in those cases were registered letters
and the circumstances and facts established therein showed that the acts and deeds of the
accused (who were both postmasters) were of such nature that they clearly undermined the
public’s faith and confidence in the postal service. We do not find a parallel situation in the
case at bar. Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified and the accused sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum, in each of the cases.
(3) The "threefold rule" should be applied by the Court in sentencing him, is denied. Conviction
for multiple felonies requires the imposition of multiple penalties. 3 The so-called threefold
rule can only be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not
in the imposition of the penalty.
RAYMUNDO E. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 192698-99. April 22, 2015

FACTS:

● Zapanta, together with Atty. Gadia, was indicted for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and in Criminal Case No. 27503, Zapanta and Atty. Gadia was charged with the
crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC.
● Dr. Ang was a physician who was also engaged in a lending and investment business using the
business name Cebu Sterling Lending Investors, Inc. (CSLII).
● Dr. Ang recalled that a certain Erlinda Galvez-Sultan applied for a loan in the amount of
P500,000.00 and offered to mortgage a 27,442 square-meter lot covered by TCT No. T-256662
in the names of Zenaida Galvez-Lamparero, et al. to secure the said loan. TCT No. T-256662
was registered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City (RD) and was duly signed by Atty.
Gadia, the Register of Deeds. Dr. Ang agreed to extend the loan and, on January 29, 1996,
caused the annotation of the real estate mortgage in favor of CSLII at the back of TCT No.
T-256662 in the office of the RD. Later, Dr. Ang was informed that the mortgaged property had
been the subject of a sale transaction; that TCT No. T-256662 was already cancelled; and that
there were 2 new derivative titles issued bearing the same technical description as that of TCT
No. T-256662.
● Dr. Ang made a formal request to the RD for the issuance of a certified true copy of the original
copy of TCT No. T-256662 which was in the custody of the said office.
● Zapanta told Dr. Ang that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 could not be located in the
particular volume where it was filed in the vault of the RD. Suspecting an irregularity, Dr. Ang
filed a complaint before the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), and
requested for an investigation.
● Results of the investigation confirmed that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 was missing
from the vault of the RD.
● Dr. Ang then filed a complaint against Atty. Gadia and Zapanta before the Office of the
Ombudsman
● After conducting an investigation in connection with the complaint filed by Dr., there was a
commission of irregularities by Zapanta and Atty. Gadia, and recommended the filing of
appropriate administrative and criminal charges against the two.
● Chief Investigator came to know of the existence of TCT No. T-285369, the derivative title of
TCT No. T-256662, when it was shown to him by Dr. Ang during the preliminary investigation
proceedings before the Ombudsman.
● He noticed that the signatures of Atty. Gadia appeared on all the pages of TCT No. T-285369
and that it was registered in the name of First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc. (FOPVI).
● Atty. Cruzabra, the Acting Register of Deeds of Davao City, while both criminal cases were
awaiting trial, conducted an investigation regarding the missing title in compliance with the
directive of the Office of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
● She instructed the employees of the office to look for the missing original copy of TCT No.
T-256662. She specifically asked the vault keeper, Zapanta, and the records officer, who were
tasked with the safekeeping of the documents in the office, about the missing title but she was
told that the same was nowhere to be found inside the vault.
 ● The missing TCT No. T-256662 was found in the "pending transactions" steel cabinet located
outside the vault but within the premises of the office of the RD.
● The original copy of TCT No. T-256662 did not bear any signs of cancellation and that another
certificate of title, TCT No. T-285369, was also found within the "pending transaction" files
together with TCT No. T-256662. TCT No. T-285369 was issued in lieu of TCT No. T-256662
and was registered in the name of FOPVI.
● It was opined that TCT No. T-285369 was spurious and it was concluded that the issuance of
TCT No. T-285369 was without any legal basis. TCT No. T-285369 was registered with the RD
on May 28, 1997 and was signed by Atty. Gadia.

DEFENSE: Atty. Gadia admitted that, as the Register of Deeds, she signed TCT No. T-256662 as well
as the encumbrances annotated at the back page.

She also admitted that she signed the derivative title TCT No. T-285369 on May 28, 1997, which bore
the following certification: "This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662
which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned."

She further testified that the original copies of the certificates of title were kept in a vault and the
person in charge was the vault keeper.

The chief of the vault keeper was the records officer. She named two (2) vault keepers, Zapanta and
Mrs. Dimaquias, but the one in charge was Zapanta.

She claimed that she had nothing to do with the removal and disappearance of the original copy of TCT
No. T-256662.

Atty. Gadia further averred that the subject deed of sale was not registered because there were some
requirements that had not been submitted, particularly the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
T-256662.

She admitted to have written the following notation on the routing slip attached to the subject deed of
sale: "Pls. don't deliver the title unless requirements are complied."

She would usually write such a cautionary notice because it always took some time before the
registering parties could complete the submission of the required documents.

Atty. Gadia explained that there were occasions when she had to leave her station for some meetings
and so as not to prejudice the public for want of signature, she would usually sign the title but cautioned
the examiner not to release or deliver the title until all the requirements were completed.

Zapanta, on the other hand, proffered the defense of denial. He alleged that he was the vault keeper of
the RD, whose duty was to safeguard the archives and the original copies of certificates of title.

He claimed that the original copy of a title could be pulled out from the vault upon the written request
of the examiner or records officer, indicating the title and volume numbers.

The said officer would then take custody of the same until the transaction would be finished.
He stated that Atty. Gadia, being the Register of Deeds, could also order the pull out of the documents
from the vault.

He denied participation in the removal and disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662
from the vault. He insisted that he did not participate in the processing of TCT No. T-285369.

He pointed out that aside from him, three utility workers were allowed by his office to pull out titles
from the vault. His only link to the missing title incident was that he was the one who helped Jimboy
Ibañez, the person approached by Dr. Ang, to look for the missing title. He assured Dr. Ang that he
would continue to look for it.

He denied that he conspired with Atty. Gadia in the commission of the crimes charged.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding Atty. Gadia and Zapanta
guilty as charged. it held that Atty. Gadia and Zapanta conspired with each other in causing the removal
and disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault of the RD, which was then
under their official custody, to the damage and prejudice of the mortgagee, Dr. Ang.

ISSUE: W/N Zapanta is guilty of the offense charged as co-principal

RULING: NO.

In convicting Atty. Gadia for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan held that the
series of acts she had performed in obvious disregard to the established rules in land registration were
badges of evident bad faith and manifest partiality towards FOPVI. According to the anti-graft court,
scandalous irregularities in the procedure were committed by Atty. Gadia in registering and issuing the
derivative title, TCT No. T-285369, but without the proper cancellation of TCT No. T-256662, and the
carrying over of the mortgage encumbrance annotated as Entry No. 930010 in the latter title in favor of
mortgagee Dr. Ang. In so doing, she gave unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference to FOPVI, to
the damage and injury of Dr. Ang in the sum of P500,000.00.

Anent the charge of Infidelity in the Custody of Document, the Sandiganbayan held that Atty. Gadia,
who was entrusted with the safekeeping of TCT No. T-256662, caused the removal of its original copy
from the vault of the RD and, thereafter, concealed the same to facilitate the issuance of TCT No.
T-285369. This caused damage to Dr. Ang and eroded public trust and confidence in the Register of
Deeds. Atty. Gadia's act of concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a breach of trust in the official
care of the said certificate of title.

Regarding the guilty verdict against Zapanta, the vault keeper, the Sandiganbayan explained that the
series of acts of Atty. Gadia would not have been completed or their criminal purpose would not have
been achieved were it not for the disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T[1]256662 from the
vault which was amply covered by the active participation of the said petitioner.

It added that those series of acts smacked of conspiracy which showed their common design to achieve
one common goal to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Ang.
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions of the
Sandiganbayan with respect to the criminal culpability of Zapanta.

In order to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy can be inferred from,
and established by, the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests.

What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same
purpose. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Zapanta conspired with Atty. Gadia in committing the crimes charged.

No testimonial or documentary evidence was presented to substantiate Zapanta's direct or indirect

participation in the anomalous registration of TCT No. T-285369, and in the
concealment/disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662.

Not a scintilla of proof was adduced to show with absolute certainty that Zapanta was the one who
actually withdrew the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault of the RD.

Prosecution witness Atty. Cruzabra testified that there were several vault keepers in the RD and they
were all authorized to pull out titles from the vault at the instance of the examiner or the records officer.
At best, the prosecution witnesses only identified Zapanta as a vault keeper of the RD but not
necessarily the vault keeper who pulled out the subject title.

Granting, in gratia argumenti, that it was Zapanta who took the original copy of TCT No. T-256662
from the vault, this alone would not suffice to prove the conspiracy theory advanced by the prosecution.

Plainly, the accusation against Zapanta rests upon his alleged act of pulling out the subject title from
the vault which the Sandiganbayan considered as necessary for Atty. Gadia to attain her criminal design
of entering TCT No. T[1]285369 in the Registry Book of the RD in the name of FOPVI and concealing
the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 to prevent the discovery of the aberrant registration of the said
derivative title.

The only deduction extant from the prosecution evidence is that, being then the vault keeper, Zapanta
had the duty to safeguard the documents kept inside the vault and to withdraw any title therefrom upon
the request of any proper officer of the RD.

What he did here was the very function he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties.
Also, once the title was released from his custody, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon
the recipient to keep the document until the transaction was finished.

Hence, Zapanta could not be faulted if after the subject title was released to the requestor, it was
subsequently utilized in the furtherance of an illegal and fraudulent design as he had no control or
participation over the registration process or in the issuance of TCT No. T-285369.
Open Disobedience

The Law Firm of Chavez vs. Fria

GR 183014 07 August 2013

Keywords: Clerk of Court was accused of the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Facts:

● An Information was filed against respondent Atty. Fria, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 (Branch 203), charging her for the crime of Open
Disobedience under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code.
● The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in a civil case instituted before Branch
203.
● Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, prompting the defendant in the same case to
appeal.
● However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution
be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the defendant’s motion for
reconsideration, judgment became final and executory.
● In its Complaint-Affidavit, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been
following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment.
● However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ.
● In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution was not addressed to
her but to Branch Sheriff Felicen, who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the
presiding judge would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she
maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge
issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.
● The prosecutor issued a Memorandum, recommending that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime
of Open Disobedience.

MTC -

In an Omnibus Order, the MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of
probable cause.
It found that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the
existence of the other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience.
In particular, the second element of the crime, i.e., that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a
superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities,
unlikely since the Court already declared as null and void the entire proceedings due to lack of
jurisdiction.
 In this regard, the MTC opined that such nullification worked retroactively to warrant the dismissal of
the case and/or acquittal of the accused at any stage of the proceedings.

RTC -

In a Resolution, the RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the latter’s
part since its dismissal of the criminal case for lack of probable cause was “in full accord with the law,
facts, and jurisprudence.”

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC’s dismissal of the case for Open
Disobedience against Atty. Fria for lack of probable cause.

Ruling: NO.

Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately
dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would
only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. Applying this principle to the case at bar
would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the
criminal case against Atty. Fria for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the
records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open
Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in
view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime
evidently remain wanting.

To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment,
decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all
legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have
been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction over the said case.

Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope of a superior
authority’s jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of the crime of Open
Disobedience does not exist. Lest it be misunderstood, a court – or any of its officers for that matter –
which has no jurisdiction over a particular case has no authority to act at all therein. In this light, it
cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime based on the premise that the Court’s
pronouncement as to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction came only after the fact.

Proceeding from this discussion, the third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal
justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to
obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty.
Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey. Besides, as the MTC correctly observed, there lies ample
legal justifications that prevented Atty. Fria from immediately issuing a writ of execution.
In fine, based on the above-stated reasons, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the MTC as correctly found by the RTC. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” Consequently, the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause is hereby sustained.