LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Villanueva, Rosalyn D.

Facts of the Case:

Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His
appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment
was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to
meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the COMELEC Chairman should
have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and
held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.

HELD:

Yes. Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “Practice of law,” particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law
for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first
becoming lawyers.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much
less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Victor Lingan vs. Atty Romeo Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy Baliga,
A.C. No.5377, June 30, 2014

Trajano, Jovelyn M.

Facts:

Baliga was suspended from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc
issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region
II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from
the practice of law "prevented him from assuming his post as Regional Director for want
of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.

Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions
as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office.

On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan alleged that Atty.
Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney
VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in
effect a non-lawyer and disqualified to hold the position of Regional Director during the
effectivity of the order of suspension.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation, arguing that his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, to stretch
the coverage of his suspension from the practice of law to his public office would be
tantamount to violating his constitutional rights to due process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded.

Issues:

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension
should be granted.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court finds that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We,
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution
with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of
Attorney VI. These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession.

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on
Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only
suspended after investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation
Office. Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

his motion for reconsideration. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have
desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. | June 17, 1993

Suaybaguio, Mervin Jay Z.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mauricio C. Ulep prayed this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as
that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

Ulep submitted that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he
is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition.

Respondent ‘The Legal Clinic, Inc.’, in its answer to the petition, admitted the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claimed that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. It further argued that assuming that
the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar
of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it, constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered
by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives
out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs
no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law,

Benjamin M. Dacanay, Petitioner.
B.M. No. 1678 | 17 December 2007 – Justice Corona

Salcedo, Deanne Aubrey V.

FACTS:

• Benjamin Dacanay (Benjamin) was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek for medical
attention. He then applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s Free Medical Aid
Program. On May 2004, he became a Canadian citizen.
• On July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act 9225, Benjamin reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. He then took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen, and returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE:

Whether Benjamin Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine Bar, when he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.

RULING:

• In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

• The Office of the Bar Confidant opines that by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, that he again met all the qualifications, they recommend that he be allowed
to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s
oath.

• The Supreme Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications, posing a question that “may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? The answer is NO.

• The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership
in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.

• The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen

of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

• Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
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Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Emma Dantes vs Atty. Crispin Dantes

A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004.

Plana, Gilvee Chardyl M

FACTS:

• On June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality,abandonment,
and violation of professional ethics and law.

• Emma, complainant, alleged that Atty. Dantes, respondent, is a philanderer. He purportedly

engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children
with them. From the time Atty. Dantes’ illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to
Emma and their children, thus forcing her to work abroad as domestic helper to provide for their
children’s needs. She pointed out that these acts of her husband constitute a violation of his
lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.

• On November 19, 2001, Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with Emma and the birth of
their children. He alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before
after his wife Emma had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando,
Pampanga. He claimed that when Emma came back after eighteen (18) years, she insisted that
she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced
to live alone in a rented apartment.

• Atty. Dantes alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for
their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave them
adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983. He asserted that his wife
filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.

• The Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint of
Emma Dantes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Crispin Dantes will be disbarred due to the complaint of his wife Emma.

RULING:

Yes, The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning.
In this case, Atty. Crispin Dantes’ acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Emma’s testimony, taken in conjunction with
the documentary evidence, sufficiently established Atty. Dantes’ commission of marital infidelity
and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. Thus, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty for Atty. Dantes
LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Practice of Law and Qualifications for Admission to the Bar

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar vs. Vicente D. Ching
Bar Matter No. 914. October 1, 1999.

Payot, Keely Shaye L.

FACTS:

Vicente D. Ching was born on April 11, 1964, in Francia West, Tubao, La Union, the legal son of a
Chinese citizen and a Filipino mother. Vicente has lived in the Philippines since birth. Vicente applied
to take the 1998 Bar Examinations after completing his LLB study at St. Louis University in Baguio.
In a Resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

Ching submitted the following documents:

1. CPA License issued by the PRC;

2. Voter Certification as proof that he is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification that he was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 1992 elections.

Vicente was one of the successful Bar examinees, according to the results of the Bar Examinations.
Ching was denied the opportunity to take his oath because of his citizenship status. The Court
requred him to provide further proof of his citizenship, as well as for the OSG to comment on the
petition and the documents he had submitted.

Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, according to the OSG, and if he does, it will be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. Due to the peculiar circumstances
of Ching's case, the OSG recommends that the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" be relaxed, and that Ching be allowed to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 before taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Vicente filed a manifestation that he has already elected Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority?

HELD:

The Court held Vincente was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 or over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of
the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Vicente's election was clearly beyond the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. The special circumstances invoked by Vicente cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by election.

Vicente failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and file the same with the nearest civil registry. Vicente's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, Vicente slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result,
this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.