Pale Part 1 - Legal Ethics

PALE
PART 1 – LEGAL ETHICS
I. DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW

REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
ADMISSION TO THE BAR
PRIVILEGES OF A LAWYER
DUTIES OF A LAWYER
PROHIBITIONS/ LIMITATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

RULE 138
1. Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father 3YRS(1960-1963); an operations officer with
the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or
economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-
judicial Davide Commission (1990).
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and
the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of Philippine
Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
As such, the petition is dismissed.
2. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms
of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
PETITIONER PRAYS this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law."
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE:Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and
whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility
RULING: YES. The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod.
ON PRACTICE OF LAW ISSUE
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . .
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-
how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What
is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge
and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
contract drafting, and so forth.
ON PARALEGAL ISSUE
There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefore.
ON ADVERTISEMENT ISSUE
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).
The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of
concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation.
There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyer’s services.
1. Publication in reputable Law lists

2. Use of an ordinary simple professional card
3. publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address
4. name listed in a telephone directory
However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the
court found and held that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.||
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and
"B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

3. IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with
which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who
had obtained an average of only 72 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on
the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of
this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June
21, 1953 without his signature.
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was,
“An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the
fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared
in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law
and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover,
the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
REGULATION OF PRACTICE OF LAW/ ADMISSION TO THE BAR - vested with the SUPREME COURT
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing the admission to the
practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this
court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court.
Being coordinate and independent branches the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires.
The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and
the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each
other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
4. IN RE: MELING
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three pending criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City, namely: two Grave Oral Defamation,
and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his
wife in front of media practitioners and other people . Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that
the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him constitute
dishonesty (YES)
(2) Whether or not he can use the appellation “Atty.”
Ruling:
First Issue:
Yes. The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him answerable under Rule 7.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Second Issue:
His use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi
v. Alauya the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by members of the
Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with
the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that: persons who pass the
Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter
is an attorney.
The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character . The

requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
Penalty: the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders
from the Court
5. Petition for leave to resume practice of law, Benjamin Dacanay - BM NO. 1678
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

PETITIONER
Facts:
DACANAY was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice.
Issue: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship NO
Ruling:The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice.
6. PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., Court of Industrial

Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72 -ULP-Iloilo in the Court of
Industrial Relations. The complainants were represented by Cipriano Cid & Associates thru Atty. ANastacio
Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non - lawyer.
Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an
award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty.
Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were
at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of the complainants; a portion of that order granted
respondent Quentin Muning , a non-lawyer , (10%) attorney’s fees for professional service.
Thus a petition was filed seeking review of the order made by the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo.
Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered? (NO)
Holding: Order under review is set aside.

Ratio: Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot
therefore, recover attorney’s fees.
Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party litigants should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications for the protection of the courts, clients and the public.
The permission of a non-lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself entitle the
representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule 138, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s Agreement as to Fees – An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees.
7. CATU vs. RELLOSA
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila. His
mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against
them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay.
Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive
at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to
do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
-- GUILTY OF VIOLATING CPR and SUSPENDED for a period of six months
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
8. ZETA vs. MALINAO

A.M. No. P-220
Facts:
A complaint against the Respondent was lodged in the CFI by a person named Julio Zeta. The complainant
alleged that the respondent, not a member of the bar, appears in multiple occasion in various courts and constitute
illegal practice of Law. All so, as a court employee, he falsifies his time sheet as present but in reality is absent to
appear in various cases. Subpoena was sent to the Complaint to attend the hearing of the complaint but was found the
complainant is a fictitious person.
Issue: W/N the acts of Malinao constitute illegal practice of law
Held: Yes, SC find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the
documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is
clear that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear
therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel,
without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the
above findings of fact of the Investigator. The defense of respondent that “his participation (sic) for defendants’ cause
was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the
locality” cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from
his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above
circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than
pure love of justice. In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to
separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body
wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
9. IN RE: ARGOSINO
B.M. No. 712 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL
BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, Petitioner
FACTS: In 1993, petitioner was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence with the death of Raul
Camaligan that stemmed from the “hazing” conducted as fraternity initiation rites. Eleven days later he filed an
application for probation which was granted. Subsequently, after a month, he filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations to which he was allowed. He passed the Bar Examination, however, he was not
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office because of lack of good moral character.
ISSUE: Whether or not good moral character is needed to be accepted as member of the bar?
HELD: Yes. “Upright character” is a condition precedent to the applicant’s privilege to receive a license to practice
law. It is only those who pass the test and maintained the standards are allowed to enter and stay in the profession. It is
a privilege burdened with conditions being which is the well-preserved good moral character. Petitioner’s
participation in the “hazing” activities fell far short of the required standard of good moral character and was totally
irresponsible behavior. With this, the Supreme Court directed the petitioner to submit to them evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar.
10. Caronan vs. Caronan

PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN
A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
Patrick - younger
Richard - older
Facts:
Complainant and respondent are siblings. Respondent is the older of the two. Both of them completed their
secondary education at the Makati High School. Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of
Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila,
where he stayed for one year before transferring to the PMA. In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA. In
1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and their 3 children. Since then, respondent never went back to
school to earn a collerage degree.
In 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College
of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. Complainant brushed these aside as he did
not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the
head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the NBI was requesting his
presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that
point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." Complainant later learned that the reason why he was
invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr.
Joseph G. Agtarap, who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant
took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is
Richard A. Caronan.
However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him.
Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name
and identity, and illegal practice of law.
Issues
Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:
(a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (YES)
(b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar. (YES)
Ruling:
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take
the Bar Examinations.
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course.
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. Respondent has not completed the requisite pre-
law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law
degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records
renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed
the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually
caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character
is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust
relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw
Penalties:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPEDand STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a
lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such
name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan,"
with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of
the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
11. IN RE: Muneses
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES
B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012
Facts:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that
he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice
law when he became a citizen of the USA on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by
taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA;
that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
Issue: Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the Philippines
Ruling:
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso
jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.
12. BRUNET vs. GUAREN

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET,
Complainants,vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN,
Respondent
FACTS:
This is in regard to availing the services of the said Atty. Guaren for the titling of the residential lot theyacquired,
Atty. Guaren accepted the case for a fee of 10,000.00 including expenses relative to theproceedings. He advanced
1000.00 which the spouses dutifully gave, then asked for another 6,000.00. Alsothe spouses provided the documents
needed pertaining to the titling of the land. The complainants constantly reminded the respondent, but the latter tells
them that it’s already in progress. Because of the slow progress the spouses became bothered so they demanded the
return of the money they paid, Atty.Guaren agreed provided that the amount of 5,000.00 be deducted for his
professional fees Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship
betweenthem, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the MetropolitanCircuit
Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Issue: WON the respondent violated Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Codeof
Professional Responsibility
Held: YES, The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in whichduty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be amoney-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of alivelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests orwhat they
owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 aspartial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for thetitling of complainan
ts’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violatedCanons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law forsix months.
13. LINGAN v. CALUBAQUIB

A.C. No. 5377
FACTS: In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga
guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath.
Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246
of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying that respondents be disbarred, not
merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant
Lingan’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed the undatedex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.C
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the
Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter’s
suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc
issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc, Atty. Baliga’s suspension from the practice of law “prevented] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional
Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.”
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court’s resolution dated June 15, 2006 “to prevent
further injury and prejudice to [his] rights.”
As to Atty. Baliga’s claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a “lawyer-manager,” which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of
Regional Director/Attorney VI requires the officer “to be a lawyer [in] good standing.” Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V Being a “lawyer-manager,” Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment dated November 27, 2009. It argued that “the penalty imposed
upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a
public official for the same acts.” According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga’s suspension from the practice of
law is a “bar matter” while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official “is an
entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body.”
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court’s resolution of the issue and would “abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter.”
ISSUE:
A.) WON the duties of a Regional Director of CHR constitutes practice of law.
B.) WON the CHR has the power to reinstate Atty. Baliga despite the fact that he is still suspended in the practice of
law.
HELD:A.) YES. The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with
power to investigate “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]” It is divided into
regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial
jurisdiction. Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses,
and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to “[Commission on Human Rights] matters;”
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the legal
officer or investigator;
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss “immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution”;
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within
the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public — officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission’s legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of
law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
B.) NO. The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution
caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice
law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law. The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and other issuances, modify or defy this court’s orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers
and employees, it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
14. AGUIRRE v. RANA

AGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate(Vice Mayor
Bunan) in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of

the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
15. IN REL MEDADO - B.M. No. 2540
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.

(CASE DIGEST) B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he
found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter
of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in
signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty
of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the
passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification.
At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law,
he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty
akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He
was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the
practice of law.
II. LAWYER’S OATH

CHAPTER 1 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (CANON 1-6)
MCLE
1. A.C. NO. 11078- Mercullo vs. Vedano
Facts: Complainants Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedano were authorized by their mother, Carmelita Verdano, to
inquire from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) about the status of her unpaid obligations
secured by a mortgage covering their residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. They learned that their
mother’s arrear had amounted to P350,000.
Respondent Atty. Ramon advised them about their right to redeem the property within one year from foreclosure.
Complainants handed respondent P350,000 who in turn issued two acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price
and for litigation expenses. She even showed them her NHMFC identification card. When complainants went to the
NHMFC to follow up on the redemption, they discovered that Atty. Ramon is no longer connected to them.
Nevertheless, respondent informed them that the redemption is on process and that the certificate of redemption will
be issued in two or three weeks time. Complainants went to see the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Caloocan City to
inquire on the status of the redemption. There they discovered that respondent had not deposited the redemption price
and had not filed the intent of redeeming the property. They then demanded the return of the money to which
respondent promised to deposit it in Verlita’s account, but failed to do so. Complainants brought their disbarment
complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP required respondent to file her and answer and to
attend the mandatory conference set. Respondent failed to do so. In IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Rrecommendation, he found respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended her suspension for two years and to return the P350,000. This was adopted by IBP Board of Governors.
Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred. Ruling: The court declared respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every

lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or
other commensurate disciplinary action. Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are
not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his continued membership in the
Law Profession. Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath. The respondent certainly
transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants after having made them believe that she
could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on
the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough, however, that she had
meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so informed them. She further misled them
about her ability to realize the redemption by falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She
concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured
them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum
of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability
to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust
in the Legal Profession. As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with competence and
diligence. Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her.
Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her liable. Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the
money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect
and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants. The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or
omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code
exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Yet another
dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such
disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body
that the Court has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited
her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated
that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities,
like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney
misconduct.
The Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of
P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment.
2. A.C. NO. 8172 - NULADA vs PAULAMA

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00
as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his
being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted
the check without question.
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids. Respondent
failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant
to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 against respondent, before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637, which issued a Resolution dated May 26,
2006 recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of
Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).
Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent guilty of violation of
BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to
pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with
interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint;
(2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees
of P1,500.00 per hearing.
Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67
(RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. In a Decision dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC
ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory.
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this administrative
complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense, respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005,
he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he
merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did
not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof.
Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check. He
also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage.
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011, referred this administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well
as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of
the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to
protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character" which justifies either his
suspension or disbarment.
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution adopting and
approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Issue Before the Court
whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and modified by the
IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law x x x."
Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for
the orderly administration of justice.
As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court.
In Enriquez v. De Vera, the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the
law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to
be abated. Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his
illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support
the Constitution and obey the laws.
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath,
as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary
action. In Heenan v. Espejo, the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services,
Inc. v. Valerio, the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her
loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza, the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to
respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II, respondent was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks
and failure to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the
foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the
Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.As a final word, it should be emphasized
that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions.
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also
erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.

In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary consequences.chanrobleslaw WHEREFORE, respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon
his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely
3. A.C. NO. 9387 - Hernandez vs. Atty. Padilla

Hernandez vs. Atty. Padilla
A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012
Re:
Disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer,
Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for
his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.
Facts:
Complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them. The RTC ordered that the
Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa
Duigan, attorney’s fees and moral damages. Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. But the respondent instead of an
Appellants’ Brief filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution. Complainant and her husband failed to file an
appeal on the Resolution, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent “several times” about the status of the appeal, but “despite inquiries he deliberately
withheld response,” to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. Hence, Complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint
with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP seeking the disbarment of respondent on grounds of deceit,
malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of 350,000. ₱ The Director
of Bar Discipline ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer
respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint. He explained that he was not the lawyer of
complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP he had never met complainant, because
it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband “despondently
pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to
lapse within two or three days.” Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly
believed that “it is this pleading which was required. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent
violated Canons 5, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) and recommended suspension
from practicing law from 3 to 6 months. The IBP board of governors of the BP issued A Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Upon Motion the IBP board of
governors partly granted by reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.
Issue:
WON respondent is guilty of malpractice, deceit and grave misconduct.
Ruling:
The SC adopted the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP but, the
six-month suspension the Board originally imposed.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a
case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.
Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. Regardless of the particular pleading his client
may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading
to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to
know the procedure and this is embodied in Canon 5 of the Code.
Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted.The supposed lack of
time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his
negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigan’s Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer
is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates
his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he
should be held accountable.
4. A.C. NO. 6368

Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo, Respondent |
A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
December 19, 2017
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo, Respondent
A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
Facts:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar, and violation of duties and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April
1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and illegally committed
fraudulent act with intent to defraud against the complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect
that he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the acquaintance
of the complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP 495,000.00 as
advanced money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by presenting
himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the land. He also led complaints to believe that
he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount. Upon receipt of
the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but instead use the money for
personal use. The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He, himself, admitted in his answer
that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land
supposedly purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can
expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of PhP 495,000.00.
The Supreme Court find the respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2 and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the CPR.
The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year and return the amount of PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela
Bengco and Teresita Bengco with 10 days upon receipt of decision. The respondent is required to submit to the
Supreme Court proof of compliance.
5. A.C. NO. 4973- Spouses Rafols v. Barrios A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010
Facts: Dismissed Judge Dizon Jr. extorted money from the complainant for the favorable outcome of their case under
the Judge’s sala. The said Judge was introduced to the complainant by their lawyer respondent. In a resolution the
Court approved the recommendations, and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate the actuations of the
respondent, and to render its report and recommendation thereon. in the proceedings of the OBC, only the respondent
appeared. Denying the charges against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of
his comment. Despite notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However, the complainants and the
respondent had testified during the administrative hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Jose Sabio Jr. In its Report and Recommendation of the OBC opined that the administrative case
against the respondent could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute due to the complainants’ failure to
appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice. Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered

in the decision against the dismissed Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, the OBC rejected the respondent’s denial of any
knowledge of the transaction between his clients and the judge.
Issue: Whether the OBC erred in finding the Respondent violating his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Held: No, the court find the recommendation of the OBC to be fully and competently supported by the evidence
adduced by the complainants and their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe
is the proper penalty. To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the
complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself
who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly
implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the respondent’s
clients.
Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of handing the money to the judge is
unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received the ₱80,000.00 from the
complainants, and having kept ₱30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the
friendship between him and the judge. The admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the illegal
transaction between the judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the
money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge as a loan, far from softening
our strong impression of the respondent’s liability, confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the
transaction. Being the complainants’ attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the respondent could not
but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was
innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did
not, which rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation was his
admission of having retained ₱30,000.00 of the “borrowed” money upon the judge’s instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent’s act of requesting the NBI Regional Office in Davao City to
investigate was an afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to
anticipate the complainants’ moves against him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants
would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney
from the time that the complainants assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite
their being very angry at the judge’s greed.
Overall, the respondent’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing
that he had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also
communicated to the complainants the judge’s illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be
accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need
derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and
insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.
The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former’s own
clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to
make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of
the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.
6. G.R. NOS. 151809-12 (APRIL 12, 2005)
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings
on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial
woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety
to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition
with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA
265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et.
al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened
in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of
the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states:
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has
no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter”
and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of
respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice
given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while
SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the
metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil
sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial.
He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as
a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding
the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public
office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his
private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03
makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the
interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement
or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
7. C. NO. 4018 (ALI vs BUBONG)

MARCH 8, 2005)
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG,respondent
.
A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005
FACTS:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding
is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the
Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him. The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then
SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a
result of this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary
Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and
insisted that respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order.
Respondent MR was denied with finality. On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become
obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he
poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular
with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence
support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for
land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus,
nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT
No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles
involved in said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of this case and penalized with
dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, which pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law from a five-
year suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that
time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE:
WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government.
RULING:
We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the
rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although
the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct,
as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of
the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness
not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall
not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties. Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the
law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the
deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the
same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos: A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administrative of justice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
8. A.C. NO. 7332

Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18, 2013
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant then
filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the respondent was
the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a
Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action until the complainant agreed to give respondent a
portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would be his share. Thereafter,
respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually,
issued a new writ of execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it modifies the
DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money
from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and
advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule
6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
HELD:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any
man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government
service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that
immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s senseof decency. On the other hand, gross
misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment." In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of
gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, hemay be suspended or disbarred.However, the Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes theCourt from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the
foregoing, the Courtdeems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize
respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the
future.
9. A.C. NO. 6622

Villatuya vs. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.In a mandatory conference
called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of theIBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared
and submittedissues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.In the
position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as
financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that
they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay
Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of hiswork and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the
cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He alsoalleged that respondent
engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services.
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing twocounts of bigamy for
having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his
law firm but rather an employee of Jesiand Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent
alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any
unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and anaffidavit
executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality,
respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent informed the Commission that he filed Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently
discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with
Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first
charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is
based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to
practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer
involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not
been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.Second charge: Unlawful
solicitation of clients. (RULE 2.03)In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was
breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting
cases for the purpose of profit.A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that
canreadily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer;or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means
toprocure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.Third charge: Bigamy.The Supreme
Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v.
Garrido:Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not
apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and
the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.What has been clearly
established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In
Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar
whom we foundguilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and
abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in
other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in him.Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of
committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent
and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
10. C. NO. 9226

1. A.C. NO. 4738 ALITAGTAG V. GARCIA
FACTS:
This is petition for disbarment against respondent for the falsification of a deed of donation and notarizing the same.
In that said Deed the alleged donor is one Cesar Flores and the alleged donee is Gregorio Gamad Flores, the brother of
Maria Eugenia who is the wife of the respondent. Respondent was later on the appointed attorney-in-fact by the donee,
his brother-in-law, with the broad power of administering and selling the property donated. The subject Deed was
notarized by respondent Atty. Garcia however he did not submit a copy of the notarized deed of donation to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Pasig City, as required. He explained that his "secretary at the time could have misplaced it
inadvertently as it was she who has the responsibility of reporting [his] notarial documents, or [his] father-in-law
could have kept all the copies forgetting to give [him] a copy. After examining several specimen signatures, the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Questioned Documents Section, found that the signature in the deed of donation is different from
the usual signature of the donor, Cesar Flores.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be disbarred.
HELD: YES. Respondent's conduct warrants his severance from the legal profession for life.
As a notary public, he is required to keep a copy of the documents he notarized and he cannot impose this obligation
to his subordinates, much less to his clients.
"Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any." In the case at bar, respondent violated his
solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. He maintained that the signature of
the donor was a genuine despite the finding of experts to the contrary. He also tried to make a mockery of the legal
profession by advancing the flimsy excuse that his failure to submit a copy of the document to the Clerk of Court was
his secretary's fault.
A notary who acknowledged a document that was a forgery destroys the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He does not deserve to continue as member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we find respondent VIRGILIO R. GARCIA guilty of grave misconduct rendering him

unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. We order him DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
2. A.C. NO. 5910 TORRES V. JAVIER
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES AND MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO v. ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION

JAVIER
A.M. No. 5910 (2005)
Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is not covered by
the absolute immunity or privileged communication.

Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer’s oath for employing statements and remarks on his
pleadings which are false, unsubstantiated, with malicious imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with the
character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings considering that his wife was included
to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that those statements he made are
privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the alleged offensive statements he made in his pleadings
HELD:
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A matter, however, to which
the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case
material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to
the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his emotional reaction in
view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained; that the
Atty. Javier is representing his wife is not at all an excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice of language is
important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer — even one gifted with
superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up his temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings
towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.
3. A.C. NO. 3149 LIKONG V. LIM

Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994
Facts: This is a disbarment case failed by Cerina against Atty Lim. What happened was complainant Cerina B.
Likong executed a promissory note and a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks which she
regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the
same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Yap to get her pension checks from the post office. About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina
informed the post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado
appeared for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to
allow Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They also entered into a compromise agreement without the participation
of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap
and that they agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments. The compromise agreement prepared by
respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
Contention of Petitioner: Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented
from seeking assistance, advice and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was
not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b)
she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her
anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to
court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she
was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity
practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived
in her defeat. Contention of Respondent: Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon
her request that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her
lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of malpractice and grave misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes, Atty. Lim violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics and Rule 1.01, Rule 8.02 and Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professioal Responsibility. RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving
her the reasons enumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform opposing
counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the
alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel. Instead, even assuming that she was really abandoned by her
counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the
compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Lim's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. Penalty: Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year. Recommendation of IBP CBD and BOG: not specifically mentioned in the case
4. A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE SUPREME COURT
FACTS:
On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano del
Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing
the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the
intent of the original works. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan
Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2)
Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University
Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme
Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the
questioned act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by issuing an
article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members. In
said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort
women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the Land.”
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s
own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case
form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore,
the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on
the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words used were
such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court
ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged
violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein that their
intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility
and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on constructive
action.” Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he,
indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that
the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of
academic freedom.

ISSUES:
W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories in the questioned article is
not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.
“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment
and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it
a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are
bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be
shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they
belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice
and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”
5. A.C. NO. 7399 ANTERO J. POBRE VS. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following
remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a
different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as a response to the decision of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the
impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including
Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant
petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ
Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary
action by the Court for her questioned speech
RATIO DECIDENDI: o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded
parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that
she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for
indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the
controversy her utterances had managed to stir. Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because
without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should
be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not
for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
6. A.C. NO. 4697/ A.C. NO. 4728 FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA VS. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA
FACTS: C o m p l a i n a n t Saladaga and Atty. Astroga entered into
a DeedofSalewithRighttoRepurchasewhere respondent sold to complainant a parcel of coconut land located
inLeyte for P15k. Under said deed, respondent represented that he has the perfect right to dispose as owner in
fee simple the subject property and thatthe said property is free from liens and encumbrances. Also, it ptovided
thatit has 2 years within which to repurchase the property, and if not the parties shall renew the
agreementRespondent failed to exercise his right to repurchase and no renewal was madde even after the
complainant sent the respondent a demand letterComplainant remained in peaceful possession of the
property until hereceived letters from Rural Bank of Albuera that the property was mortgage by respondent to
RBAIThe complainant filed an estafa and administrative case against respondent; complainant sought the
disbarment of respondent. The admin case was referred to the IBPIBP:oRespondent was in bad faith when
he dealt with complainant andexecuted the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed
that the agreement was one of equitable mortgage. oRespondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he
represented inthe "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w a s
c o v e r e d b y T C T N o . T - 6 6 2 , e v e n g i v i n g complainant the owner's copy of the said certificate of title, when
thesaid TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB). oRespondent made matters even worse, when he had TCT No. T-3211cancelled with the
issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his wife'sname on January 4, 1982 without informing complainant
ISSUE: WON the IBP is correct
HELD:Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the P15,000.00 consideration, plus
interest
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."He gravely
violated his oath. (case did not refer to canons 7-9)
7. A.C. NO. 7618 SPOUSES JONATHAN AND ESTER LOPEZ VS. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS
SPOUSES LOPEZ vs. LIMOS A.C. No. 7618 February 02, 2016
FACTS: Complainants filed a disbarment case on Atty. Limos for violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR, as she
neglected the legal matter entrusted to her by not filing the adoption case – for almost a year until complainants finally
withdrew their documents from respondent and opted to have the filing of the case handled by another lawyer. Worse,
respondent refused to return the amount of P75, 000 representing legal fees paid by complainant to her.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03 of the CPR
HELD: Yes. Respondent's acts constitute a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which states that
“a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.” Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client's cause with diligence, care and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must held
administratively liable, as in this case.
8. A.C. NO. 6903 SUZETTE DEL MUNDO VS. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO
FACTS:
An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Suzette Del Mundo charging respondent Atty. Arnel
C. Capistrano of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky
S. Tuparan engaged the legal services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their
respective marriages allegedly for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement2 was
entered into by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00,
appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition, Atty. Capistrano
allegedly advised her to prepare an additional amount as payment for the filing fee, summons, fiscals, psychiatrist and
commissioner.In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of
PhP78,500.00.For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her
case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. She verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and
discovered that no petition has yet been filed for her. Suzette called for a conference where she demanded the refund
of the total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered to return the amount of PhP63,000.00 on
staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of Tuparans case, to which she agreed.However, Atty.
Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 thereafter, refused to communicate with her.
In the Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Quisumbing, found
that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his clients interest by his failure to inform Suzette of the status of her case and to
file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It also concluded that his inability to refund the amount
he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. In his Manifestation and
Petition for Review,he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzettes case as well as to account and return
the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach
his lawyers oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his familys
livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the
amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00.Respondent Atty. Arnel C.
Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.when a lawyer takes
a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed
on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing and should act in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this standard is subject for
discipline by the court by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, has SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely and he is ordered to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full
amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days.
9. A.C. NO. 8494 POUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO VS. ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR
FACTS:
Complainants sought the services of respondent in a case for reconstitution of title.
Respondent agreed if the complainants will give him a portion of their land as his fee for filing a petition for certiorari
to nullify the order for the reconstitution of the lost title. The complainants agreed to give him a 250 square meter lot.
Respondent subsequently asked them to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which he was given a 300
square meter lot for his services. When they noticed this change, complainants asked for an amendment of the MOA.
Respondent refused. Complainants also found out that instead of filing a petition for certiorari, respondent filed only a
Manifestation for Information.
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring their complaint against the respondent.

In due course, the IBP found the complaint against the respondent meritorious, and recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one year for his unfair and injudicious treatment of the complainants as his
clients.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?
RULING:
We find and hold that the respondent grossly violated his Lawyer’s Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney because
he did not observe candor and fairness in his dealings with his clients.
“A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in dealing with the client, and shall only charge fair and
reasonable fees for his legal services. In drawing up the terms of his professional engagement, he should not practice
deceit. The clients are entitled to rescind the written agreement for his professional services if the terms thereol
contravened the true agreement of the parties.”
The MOA which respondent made the complainants sign was not a contingency fee agreement, but an agreement for
the immediate acquisition of their property as his attorney‘s fees. Moreover, the value of the said land was much more
than the value of the services he has rendered which was only the filing of a Manifestation.
The circumstances in this case has established that the respondent was deceitful, dishonest and unreasonable in his
dealings with the complainants as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyer’s Oath, whereby he vowed, among others,
to do no falsehood, and not to consent to the doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any man’s cause for
money or malice but to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion “with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. He also breached the following canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. was penalized with suspension from the practice of law for five (5) years.
10. A.C. NO. 10443 WILLIAM G. CAMPOS, JR VS. ATTY. ALEXANDER C. ESTEBAL
CAMPOS v. ESTEBAL
AC No. 10443 | 8 August 2016
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility
DOCTRINE: Atty. Estebal’s act of receiving such substantial sums from complainants without in the least
intending to honor his word to secure the United States (U.S.) tourist visas that he promised to get for them constitutes
a breach of his professional responsibility.
FACTS:
This is a Disbarment case filed by Campos against Atty. Estebal.
Campos alleged that: Campos engaged the services of Atty. Estebal to assist them in securing tourist visas to the US;
They entered into a Service Contract stipulating an acceptance/service fee of Php200,000.00;
In case no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has been actually paid less 7% thereof; Campos paid
Atty. Estebal Php150,000.00; the two other complainants, Batac and Carpio paid Atty. Estebal Php75,000.00 and
Php120,000.00 respectively. However, unlike Campos, the agreement two other complainants with Atty. Estebal was
not put into writing;
Despite receipt of their monies, Atty. Estebal failed to apply or secure for them the said visas. Thus, they demanded
the return of their monies. However, despite repeated demands, Atty. Estebal failed to return the said amount. Hence,
they filed this case praying for the suspension/disbarment of Atty Estebal from the practice of law and that he be
directed to return the said amount.
Atty. Estebal averred that: he suggested that complainants file a collective application, meaning that the complainants,
along with other applicants for a U.S. tourist visa, should constitute themselves into a tour group, so that their overall
chances of obtaining visas for all members of the group would be enhanced; that he made this suggestion because he
believed that the more applicants join the group, the lesser the fees that would be charged; that it was agreed that a
group of 10 applicants would comprise a tour group; that although some applicants paid the proper fees and submitted
the required documents, others neither paid the proper fees nor submitted the necessary documents; that because of
this lack of cohesive action, the plan did not push through at all.
Atty. Estebal posited that complainants’ demand for the return or refund of their money has no factual or legal basis at
all, especially because he had invested considerable time, talent and energy in the processing of complainants’ tourist
visa applications with the U.S. Embassy.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional misconduct for violating Canon 15?
HELD: Yes, Respondent violated Canon 15 for the reason that he was not candid enough to tell the
complainants their chance[s] of getting [a] US visa.
● Instead, the respondent made the complainants believe that they will have a good chance of getting the US visa if
they will be joined with other groups. It turned out to be false. Complainants waited for so long before the respondent
could find other members of the group. In the end, nothing happened.
● CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS
ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional misconduct for violating Canon 16?
HELD: Yes, he violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 because he did not account [for] the money he received from the
complainants, because of this, it became unclear to the complainants how much is the amount due to the respondent.
11. G.R. NO. L-12905 VDA. DE CAINA VS. VICTORIANO

12. A.C. NO. 5098 ANION VS. SABITSANA
Facts: In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of
Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late
common-law husband Brigido Caneja, Jr.. Respondent allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a
civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido
Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Respondent of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing
the civil case.
Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
Held: Yes, the court agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s
most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless
to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
“The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.” The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer would not
be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated.” To be held accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in one case, one
of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.” Jurisprudence has
provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case. One test is
whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in
arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is
whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment. On the basis of the attendant facts of the case,
we find substantial evidence to support Respondent’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following
circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The
records show that upon the legal advice of Respondent, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed
in the complainant’s favor.
Two Respondent met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of
Sale. At that point, Respondent already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s
interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Respondent accepted the engagement
from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Respondent’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own
actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the
complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he
had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
13. G.R. NO. 161390 RAUL H. SESBREO VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Prior to this case, the petitioner represented the camineros in their case and then reached a compromised
agreement wherein they agreed for the province to pay them back immediately.
However, instead of complying with the court order, the court directly paid the camineros in full amount. For this, the
petitioner filed a complaint against the province of Cebu et al. regarding a breach of contract but then later dismissed
the motion after settling an agreement with the camineros, the case however proceeded still with the remaining
respondents and was decided by the court in favor of him with regards to the money claims should have been
computed based on the national and not the provincial rate of wages paid the camineros. The CA, however, reversed
the decision and his complaint for the grounds of lack of merit as the petitioner failed to establish his allegations
therein which he later further argued through citing precedents.
ISSUES: W/N the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the trial courts decision in view of the delay in resolving
the case.
RULING: Motion is denied; The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution dated
January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287 are affirmed.
HELD: The CA insisted that what the precedented cited by the petitioner cannot be applied in these cases as the
former were only complying to Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution. "The appellate court cannot be
faulted in not affirming the RTCs decision." For the court "cannot dismiss appealed cases solely because they had
been pending in court for a long period, especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present case."
14. A.C. NO. 10681 SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION VS. ATTY.
ELMER A. DELA ROSA
15. G.R. NO. 192866 PEDRO G. RESURRECCION, JOSEPH COMETA AND CRISEFORO LITERA TO,
JR. VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RULING: The negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client. The rationale behind this rule is that
counsel, once retained, is said to have the authority, albeit impliedly, to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to
the prosecution of the case in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of his
authority is treated by law as the act or omission of the client himself. It is only in cases involving gross or palpable
negligence of the counsel, or when the application of the general rule amounts to an outright deprivation of one's
property or liberty through technicality, or where the interests of justice so require, when relief is accorded to a client
who has suffered thereby. Here, Atty. Corpuz was present all throughout the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence. While he allegedly failed to communicate with the petitioners for nearly three years and to inform them
about the status of their case, this omission, however, does not amount to abandonment that qualifies as gross
negligence. If at all, the omission is only an act of simple negligence, and not gross negligence that would warrant the
annulment of the proceedings below.
CHAPTER 3 (CANON 10-13)

1. C. NO. 5246 PEREA V. ALMADRO
2. G.R. NO. 144412 ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts. Allied Bank Corporation (ABC) hired Galanida as accountant book-keeper with conditions that the Bank has
right to transfer employees whenever public necessity requires. Galanida every now and then got transferred and
promoted. One day, ABC sought his transfer to Bacolod. Galanida refused through a letter arguing that the transfer
would impede his family relationships in Cebu. Thereafter, Galanida filed a complaint in the Labor Arbiter for
constructive dismissal. ABC transferred Galanida to Tagbiliran citing its Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure
which provides that refusal to transfer is insubordination and insubordination is punishable by suspension to dismissal.
Galanida retaliated in a letter asserting discrimination and favoritism practices by the management. Bank Memo fired
him.
Labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of Galanida citing Dosch v. NLRC which supposedly pens that “refusal to obey
a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of
being away from the family.” National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed Labor Arbiter decision via
same Dosch case. CA affirmed the same.
Issue. Was Galanida illegally dismissed? -No
Ratio. No because the dismissal was within ABC’s power and there appears to be no discrimination in the action as
transfers in the bank are routine.
Doctrine. Relevant discussion in line with Legal Research pertains to the citation of Dosch. The present court asserts
that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA misquoted the decision in Dosch. The above cited phrase, the court says, was
lifted from the syllabus of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA). The Court in Dosch did not rule anything
of the kind as proposed by the SCRA. SCRA does not reflect the opinion of the Court as they are mere works of
reporters and lawyers beyond the Judiciary’s ambit. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer should not misquote or misrepresent court decision texts. Having cited these portions of the
report, the lawyers in Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA violated said provision.
3. M. NO. RTJ-03-1813 SELUDO V. FINEZA

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Fineza of the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 filed a complaint for revocation ofnotarial
commission against complainant Atty. Seludo. Upon the hearing of said case, the former uttered vulgar andinsulting
words against respondent, such as ’Putang ina mo!’, 'If respondent knows how to read English .’, ’Let it be put on
record, that he has a moronic attitude.’, and 'If Your Honor please, I don't know if this guy is really stupid .'As such, a
complaint was filed by complainant Atty. Seludo against respondent judge for violating Canon 2, Rule2.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).In his comment, respondent judge
admitted that he uttered derogatory words during the proceeding but justified his conduct on the ff. grounds:1.He
has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes causing him considerable anxiety and pain; a plausible
reason why he could not control his outburst.2.Incident was precipitated by the conduct of complainant and Executive
Judge.3.As a member of the bench for over twenty years, he expected the complainant to respect him, to treat himwith
politeness, dignity and courtesy, and to give him his due as a magistrate.On January 9, 2004, however, complainant
filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on the ground that he isno longer interested in pursuing the case since
respondent has retired from the judiciary.
ISSUE (s):(1)W/N respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and as such, must be dismissed
orsuspended?
•W/N the desistance of complainant to pursue instant complaint can divest the Court of its jurisdiction toinvestigate
and decide complaints against erring employees of the judiciary?•W/N the retirement of respondent judge from the
service precludes the finding of any administrative liability?
RULING:
OCA:YES.
In the Report and Recommendation of Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco found Respondent Judge guilty.His
justifications of "provocation" (which we found none), discourtesy of complainant and the various illnesses
he professed to be suffering should not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a member of the bench he
shouldhave adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don the judicial robe.
NO.
The desistance of complainant to pursue instant complaint cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction on a
matterrelating its disciplinary power and the retirement of respondent judge from the service cannot preclude
the finding ofany administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. Since he retired, however, dismissal or
suspension,is no longer feasible as a penalty for the present charges.
He recommended that (1) the instant administrative case be re-docketed as an administrative matter; andthat (2)
respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,the amount to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
Supreme Court:YES. We find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
JudicialConduct.
4. C. NO. 8920 BACULI V. BATTUNG
Facts:
Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised
him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be
cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then cite me!”Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt of court for the second
time.
After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am
not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and
lawyers escorted him out of the building.
Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued shouting and
punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Issue:
Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling:
IBP Commissioner found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also
violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should
not be given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he
created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. De la Rama recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The Supreme Court held that litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to
the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our
justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case
for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the
public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even
if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining
lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
Atty. Battung was ordered suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
5. ADM. CASE NO. 7006 RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO
Facts:
Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144: People v. Luis Plaza.
Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman. Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence presented was sufficient to prove the
crime of homicide but not murder.
Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of
the case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court).
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Bagabuyo that he “lacks the
cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate” by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail.
Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40,000. Instead of availing of judicial remediess,
Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily,
“Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.”
In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but admitted that a judge could still opt to
allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former
judge found the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only
way for the public to know that there are judges displaying judicial arrogance.
RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of
court for the publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court, sentencing him to 30
days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released).
Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the
integrity of Judge Tan. In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be suspended from the
practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02). Bagabuyo denied
the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached by someone who asked him to comment
on the Order. He justified his response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his
constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year. In
accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended
the implementation of the RTC’s order of suspension.
Issue:
Was the respondent be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
Yes, the respondent was guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Bagabuyo
violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the published article
and when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong
instead of the law.
Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities. Bagabuyo violated
Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference and submitted to a radio interview to air out his
grievances against Judge Tan.
Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article,
which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath (Lawyer’s Oath), a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court,
respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers.
The Court find the Respondent guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
6. 72 SCRA 272 GABRIEL V. COURT OF APPEALS

7. 440 SCRA 91 SANTIAGO V. RAFANAN
FACTS:
 This is a disbarment case filed by BJMP employee Jonar Santiago against Atty. Edison Rafanan.
 Santiago, in his complaint, alleged among others that Rafanan, in notarizing several documents on different dates
failed and/or refused to
 Make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants (*one making the
affidavit);
 Enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register;
 Make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he notarized
 Santiago also alleged that Rafanan executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered it as evidence (Rafanan
stood as counsel and as witness of his client) and Rafanan, as alleged by Santiago, waited for him together with his
“men” and disarmed Santiago and uttered insulting words at him.

ATTY. RAFANAN’S CONTENTIONS:
 Admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the Complaint of
Santiago. But Rafanan believed that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and
Counter-Affidavits were allowed because:
 Notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public, and Was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices (Side comment: If they
were not notarized and were used for court proceedings, edi hindi sila naging public documents? Paano sila magiging
admissible sa
court? Tenge lang yata si Rafanan)
 He also pointed out that older practitioners in Nueva Ecija also do what he did – they do not indicate affiants’
residence certificates on documents they notarized, or have entries in the notarial register for these documents.
 As to his alleged failure to comply with Sec.3 Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure: as counsel to the
affiants, he had the option not comply or not with the certification.
 As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of CPR: lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients “on substantial
matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice.”
 Santiago charged Rafanan’s clients with attempted murder. Rafanan said that since his clients were in his house
during the alleged crime, that’s why he said his testimony is very essential.
 He also contends that the case filed by Santiago was only to harass Rafanan since he is the counsel of the parties
who filed cases against him before the ombudsman (Brgy. Capt. Ernesto Ramos and BJMP)
ISSUES:
 Whether or not Rafanan is guilty in violating the Notarial Law.
 Whether or not a lawyer (in this case, Rafanan) can stand as witness in favor of his clients.
HELD:
 Yes, he violated the Notarial Law for not making the proper notation and entering the details of the notarized
documents.
 Yes, a lawyer can stand as witness of a client.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
On Issue No. 1
 The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public and these formalities are mandatory
and cannot be simply neglected.
 They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and the date as part
of such certification.
 They are also required to keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; etc.
 As to Rafanan’s defense that it’s a common practice in Nueva Ecija, SC says: It is appalling and inexcusable that he
did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad
example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
On Issue No. 2
 A lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.
 Reason: The difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relationship to their clients as witnesses
from that as an advocate (Note: A witness must only say what happened. Only the truth. As compared with the task of
a lawyer who will use all the available remedies and actions in his arsenal for his client to win the case.)
 It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate.
 The preference is for lawyers to REFRAIN from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should
they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.
In the case at bar:

Atty. Rafanan cannot be administratively liable because: It’s a duty of the lawyer to assert every remedy and defense
that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client. (Remember, there is a criminal case of attempted murder against
his client which will deprive his client of his life and liberty, if they fail to display a good defense.)
On the Side Issues:

 There is no harassment of the part of Rafanan against Santiago because there
were no pieces of evidence presented.
 Mere allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.
RULING: Atty. Rafanan is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the CPR.
He is fined P3,000.00 with a warning that similar infractions will be dealt more
severely.
8. 593 SCRA 367 FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO
FACTS:
[A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including
a can of CDO Liver spread. As Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found
the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD.
After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged
a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the
complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote
in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish
Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.
Despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.
RATIO:
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and
fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to
substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.” Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal
profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, and
by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent
also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the
integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”
9. C. NO. 8108/ A.C. NO. 10299 JIMENEZ V. VERANO/ LOZAMO V VERANO

Facts: Atty. Verano is the lawyer of Brodett and Tecson also known as the “Alabang Boys” on which they were
involved in a illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs case. During a Congressional hearing of such case, it was
revealed that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the DOJ and the
stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales when the PDEA refused to issue the release order of his clients. Jimenez
and Vizconde, as founders of (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release order and thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act.
Respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable cause,
arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. PDEA still refused to release his
clients, and he was afraid that his clients would spend the Christmas in jail so helped the families by preparing the
draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so. Issue: Whether or not the
respondent is liable under Canon 13 of Code of Professional Responsibility? Held: Yes. It was admitted during the
Congressional Hearing that the respondent personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact the case was still
pending. He also caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being
unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of “expediting the case”. The way respondent conducted himself
manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. The court further held
that, the primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients’
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.

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PALE

PART 1 – LEGAL ETHICS

I. DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW

2. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

ON PRACTICE OF LAW ISSUE

1. Publication in reputable Law lists

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

Holding: Order under review is set aside.

7. CATU vs. RELLOSA

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

-- GUILTY OF VIOLATING CPR and SUSPENDED for a period of six months

8. ZETA vs. MALINAO

Issue: W/N the acts of Malinao constitute illegal practice of law

10. Caronan vs. Caronan

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

11. IN RE: Muneses

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

12. BRUNET vs. GUAREN

13. LINGAN v. CALUBAQUIB

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

A.) WON the duties of a Regional Director of CHR constitutes practice of law.

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to “[Commission on Human Rights] matters;”

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;

14. AGUIRRE v. RANA

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

15. IN REL MEDADO - B.M. No. 2540

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.

September 24, 2013

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

II. LAWYER’S OATH

1. A.C. NO. 11078- Mercullo vs. Vedano

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every

2. A.C. NO. 8172 - NULADA vs PAULAMA

Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

3. A.C. NO. 9387 - Hernandez vs. Atty. Padilla

4. A.C. NO. 6368

PALE - Atty. Tanyag_CaseDigests_Midterms

6. G.R. NOS. 151809-12 (APRIL 12, 2005)

7. C. NO. 4018 (ALI vs BUBONG)

8. A.C. NO. 7332

9. A.C. NO. 6622

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and

10. C. NO. 9226

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be disbarred.