9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY CASE DIGEST

TITLE 9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY_DIGEST CRIMREV | SBCA | A.Y.
2021-2022
TITLE 9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY DIGEST

1. People v. Chan | G.R. No. 226836 | 05 December 2018 | JL 2
2. People v. Mamantak | G.R. No. 174659 | 28 July 2008 | Ivy 3
3. People v. Dionaldo | G.R. No. 207949 | 23 July 2014 | Enzo 6
4. People v. Borja | G.R. No. 199710 | 02 August 2017 | Vee 8
5. People v. Cornista | G.R. No. 218915 | 19 February 2020 | Jammy 10
6. People v. Mirandilla | G.R. No. 186417 | 27 July 2011 | Louise 13
7. Caluag v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 171511 | 04 March 2009 | Issa 15
8. Paera v. People | Threats | G.R. 181626 | 30 May 2011 | Jolo 17
9. Escolano v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 226991 | 10 December 2018 | Aubrey 20
10. Consulta v. People | Coercion | G.R. 179462 | 12 February 2009 | Kate 25
11. Maderazo v. People | Coercion | G.R. 165065 | 26 September 2006 | Vee 27
12. Baleros v. People | Coercion | G.R. 138033 | 22 February 2006 | JL 30
13. People v. Ramirez | Trafficking | G.R. No. 217978 | 30 January 2019 | Ivy 32
14. People v. XXX & YYY | Trafficking | G.R. No. 235652 | 09 July 2018 | Enzo 35
15. People v. Mora | Trafficking | G.R. No. 242682 | 01 July 2019 | Vee 37
16. Arambulo v. People | Trafficking | G.R. 241834 | 24 July 2019 | Jammy 39
AGUILAR, CABEL, CAROCHE, DIMAYACYAC, GABUCO, MANDOCDOC, NARZABAL, VIADO, VILLAMOR, VILLAVERT, VILORIA | 1 of 41
TITLE 9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY_DIGEST CRIMREV | SBCA | A.Y. 2021-2022
1. People v. Chan | G.R. No. 226836 | 05 December 2018 | JL
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines |accused-appellants: BongChan (Bong) and Elmo Chan (Elmo)
victim(s):Reynard P. Camba | Location: Alaminos City, Pangasinan | Date of Incident: September 27, 2004
Information: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of RPC
RTC: guilty
CA:guilty
SC: Court affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
Mode: appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: N/A
FACTS:
Prosecution: The victim went to the witness Ernesto's house to visit the victim’s son, who was living with Ernesto and his
wife, and told Ernesto that, earlier that evening, the victim had a quarrel with Melrose and her husband, Ronnie, because
Melrose refused to sell the victim liquor from her store and that Melrose's father, appellant Elmo, threatened to kill the
victim. That upon hearing this, Ernesto told the victim that it would be better for the latter to stay the night, but the victim
refused because his wife might look for him. When he left, Ernesto followed the victim only until the latter was nearing the
house of Helen Pamo, and when the victim reached Melrose's house, witness saw appellants come out of the yard and he
hid upon seeing them. He saw appellants hit the victim with bamboo sticks on the neck even after he became
unconscious and fell to the ground face down, went inside the yard and came back carrying a sack where they placed the
victim, who was then unconscious and carried him inside their yard. Witness did not see what happened after.
Defense: Melrose testified that she was inside their house when the victim and Tito wanted to buy liquor and she told the
victim that she had no more stock of wine and that there was no heated argument. She left them and returned inside their
house to take care of her husband who was sick at that time; and that on the said night, her brother and her father were at
the auditorium of Barangay Tawin-tawin, to watch over their sacks of palay. Appellant Bong, on the other hand, denied
the accusations against them and claimed that, on the said evening, he and his father were at the cemented pavement
near the auditorium to watch over their palay that was scheduled for drying the following day; and that they stayed there
until the next day.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the RPC
CA: CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
Contention to SC: insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established as the prosecution allegedly failed to
establish actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
HELD: Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are, as
follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the
victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer." All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. First, appellants are both private individuals. Second, the fact that
they kidnapped the victim was clearly established by the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto. Third,
appellants' act of kidnapping was illegal. Lastly, the victim has been detained for more than three days. In fact, until now,
the victim has not returned, nor his body been found.
Furthermore, actual confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element of the crime of kidnapping.
And in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution must show "actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that
such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor." In this case, Ernesto testified that he saw appellants: (1) hit the
victim on the neck and other body parts using bamboo sticks causing the victim to fall down on the ground unconscious;
(2) retrieve a sack from their yard; (3) place the victim inside the sack; and (4) carry him to their yard. Clearly, the acts of
appellants of hitting the victim until he was unconscious, of putting him inside the sack, and of carrying him to their yard
showed their intention to immobilize the victim and deprive him of his liberty. Thus, contrary to the claim of appellants,
the element of restraint was clearly established. As aptly pointed out by the CA, "[a]ctual restraint of the victim was
evident from the moment appellants clubbed the victim on the neck and other parts of his body and thereafter placed
him inside a sack. Not only was [the victim's] freedom of movement restricted, he was immobilized because the blows
rendered him unconscious. Putting him inside the sack completely rendered the victim powerless to resist."
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding
appellants GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is affirmed
with MODIFICATIONS that the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages be increased.
2. People v. Mamantak | G.R. No. 174659 | 28 July 2008 | Ivy
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

accused-appellants: RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK
victim(s): Christopher (kidnapped when he was 2 y.o.)
Location:McDonald's outlet in Binondo, Manila. | Date of Incident: 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999
Information: Kidnapping for ransom

RTC: guilty as charged - reclusion perpetua
CA: affirmed conviction (modified penalty from reclusion perpetua to death)
SC: affirmed with modification as to penalty
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald's
outlet in Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food.
Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his
mother's sight when she realized that he had disappeared. As their continued search for the child was futile, they
reported him missing to the nearest police detachment. The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to
appeal for help and information. Teresa received no word about Christopher's whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were
gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery. Teresa was pregnant with her third child during this time. Said child
was born sickly and eventually died. Teresa almost lost her sanity
16 months later on February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller
claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from
the Jalal Restaurant in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of
Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her.
When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the
ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang's Carinderia in
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police
Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa's niece.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang's Carinderia, two women came. They were
Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who
they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the
picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the
latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa
and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her
but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher. Several hours
later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She
asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia.
Taurak came back with Christopher.
Christopher no longer recognized his mother and now only speaks in a muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy
gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname. Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom
money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded
a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak's watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom
money to Mamantak. PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Defense:
Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and date of the alleged
kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly,
she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to
come for him. No one did.The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was
there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa
contacted her and asked for Christopher's picture for confirmation. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boy's mother
did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak's testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on
December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she
had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang's Carinderia but only by chance.
RTC: guilty of kidnapping for ransom and was sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
CA: affirmed the conviction of the RTC but modified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death
CA ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance
required the imposition of the death penalty.
Contention to SC:
ISSUE: whether or not Taurak and Mamantak are both guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
HELD: YES.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
7659. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances mentioned under par. 1-4 of Art. 267 of the RPC
were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained
for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and
becomes punishable by death
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the
accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time. And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one's right to enjoy
his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16 months
from Taurak and Mamantak. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or
restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants' custody and return to his family on
his own.
Findings of the RTC and CA further affirmed by the SC: Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody
and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded P30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other
hand, Mamantak's actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt
that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her.
On Taurak’s contention that she merely gave Christopher refuge: Court did not agree.Taurak’s story was like the
apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home
not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end.She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities
or surrender him to the DSWD’s social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he
was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to
each other?
On Mamantak’s contention that she was only at the carinderia by chance: Court rejected such contention.The
unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release
of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed
otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
ON THE DEMAND FOR P 30,000
CA: considered the demand for P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death
penalty
RTC: deemed the amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and
subsistence of Christopher for almost two years
SC: CA is correct. the demand for P30,000 is equivalent to demand for ransom.The payment was demanded as a
condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for
the victim's freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
PENALTY REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA
Pursuant to RA 9346, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION.
3. People v. Dionaldo | G.R. No. 207949 | 23 July 2014 | Enzo
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON,

RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON
private complainant: *delete if not applicable | victim(s): Edwin Navarro
Location:Caloocan City| Date of Incident: May 16, 2003
Information: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
SC: Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide
Mode: | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
Prosecution:
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro
(Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another
brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando,
Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark
green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to
the police. At around 10 o'clock in the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin's kidnappers who
threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom money in
the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had P50,000.00. On May 19,
2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the
kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard
light when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in
Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his
vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat,"
the men returned to their car and drove away.
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero
(SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym,
confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In
the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at
Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.
Defense:
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Except for
Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses when they were taken
by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the
other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 o'clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his
way home, he noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded
him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial
confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do
so.
RTC: GUILTY
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly established
that it was the accused- appellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of
his liberty. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is
punishable by death. Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the
accused-appellants' individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was abducted,
deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider
said death in its judgment.
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE:
1. Whether the respondents are guilty as charged? NO

2. Whether there was Conspiracy? YES
HELD:
NO. They are guilty of Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
The Court is constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellants have committed
does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim's (i.e., Edwin's) death, which was (a)
specifically charged in the Information and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. The fact that the kidnapping
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants' conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty
of death.
YES, THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering
all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. In the case at bar, it clearly shows that
accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts emanated from the
same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that all the accused-appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpertua, without eligibility of
parole.
4. People v. Borja | G.R. No. 199710 | 02 August 2017 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellant: PO3 JULIETO BORJA

victim(s): Ronalyn G. Manatad (kidnapped) | Location: Diliman, QC | Date of Incident: 05-26-2004
Information: kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267, RPC

RTC: guilty of kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267, RPC to suffer reclusion perpetua
CA: affirmed with modification (added award of damages)
SC: affirmed CA with modification. sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
the award of damages is increased.
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE
DOCTRINE: Extortion done by police themselves amounting to kidnapping with ransom undermines the
government efforts to establish the rule of law in general and the proper prosecution against drug traffickers in
particular. Even the subsequent prosecution of the victim of extortion does not negate the criminal liability of the
accused for the crime the latter committed against the former.
FACTS: (Prosecution) On the day of the incident, May 26, 2004, Ronalyn Manatad (Ronalyn) and her friend, Vicky
Lusterio (Lusterio), were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was later identified as
PO3 Borja, grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where 3 other men were waiting.
Both Ronalyn and Lusterio shouted for help but no one came to their rescue. Lusterio managed to escape. She
immediately reported the incident to Ronalyn’s mother, Adelina Manatad (Adelina).
Meanwhile, PO3 Borja and his companions drove the van around Quezon City. One of Ronaly’s abductors, certain Major
Clarito, asked for her relatives’ contact numbers. Ronalyn gave the number of her brother, Edwin G. Silvin (Edwin).
Adelina received a phone call from one of the kidnappers, who demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for Ronalyn’s liberty.
Adelina informed him that their family could not afford to pay the ransom due to their financial condition. Suddenly, the
caller hung up. Edwin thereafter arrived and negotiated for a reduced ransom when one of the kidnappers called again.
The kidnappers acceded and lowered their demand to P100,000.00.
Edwin sought assistance from Sgt. Cordova of National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF). At around 2PM, Edwin
received a call from Ronalyn’s abductors. They instructed him to place the money in an SM plastic bag and to proceed to
the Wildlife Park along Quezon Avenue at 3PM. Edwin informed Sgt. Cordova. The police operatives proceeded to the
Wildlife Park and positioned themselves within the area.
Edwin went to the Wildlife Park as planned. Shortly after, PO3 Borja approached Edwin and took the SM plastic bag
containing the ransom money. Upon seeing the exchange, the police operatives arrested PO3 Borja and recovered the
following items from him: (1) a 0.9 mm pistol, (2) a cellphone, (3) a wallet, and (4) the P100,000.00 ransom amount. PO3
Borja was then brought to the NAKTAF headquarters for investigation.
Despite the successful entrapment operation, the authorities failed to rescue Ronalyn. While she was inside the van,
Ronalyn heard one of her abductors say that PO3 Borja was entrapped. The others cursed her and said, "Putang ina,
iyung kapatid mo. Tumawag ng taga-NAKTAF." Afterwards, she was taken by her captors to the PDEA where she was
charged with the illegal sale of shabu.
PO3 Borja was then arrested and was charged of kidnapping for ransom.
Defense: Denial and alibi.
PO3 Borja testified that on the day of the alleged incident, he was with PO2 Ding Tan at Branch 79, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City to testify as a witness in a criminal case. However, the hearing was postponed. After securing a certificate of
appearance, PO3 Borja decided to go home at 12:00 noon.
At around 2:00 p.m., PO3 Borja received a phone call from an unknown person. The caller sought assistance to recover
his sister who had been arrested. He instructed the caller to call back. On the second call, the caller told him to go to the
Wildlife Park and meet a certain Edwin, who would be wearing a white T-shirt and a bull cap.
PO3 Borja proceeded to the Wildlife Park and met Edwin, who told him that Ronalyn and Lusterio had been arrested
earlier in a buy-bust operation. PO3 Borja advised Edwin to go with him to the police station and report the incident.
However, Edwin said that he had to wait for his cousin to arrive.
Half an hour later, he was arrested by the NAKTAF shouting “Meron lang ditong nag-eextortion.”
Contention to SC: Accused-appellant anchors his arguments on the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ronalyn for the
sale of shabu. He argues that it is absurd to convict him of kidnapping considering that the alleged victim was
caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation on the day of the alleged incident. Furthermore, Ronalyn was
found guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 9165 by both the CA and SC. She is now serving her sentence in the
Women's Correctional in Mandaluyong.
OSG: asserts that the categorical and spontaneous testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses are sufficient to convict
accused-appellant of kidnapping. It was not physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was
committed since Quezon City Hall of Justice was just a few blocks away from where the victim was taken.
ISSUE: WON PO3 Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping under Art. 267 of the RPC
HELD: YES. All the elements of kidnapping were sufficiently proven by the prosecution.
The conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the concurrence of the following
elements:
1. The offender is a private individual.
2. That individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty
3. The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal.
4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
a. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days.
b. It is committed by one who simulates public authority.
c. Any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill that
person is made.
d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.
1st element present - PO3 Borjal not acting in his official function, hence, a private individual
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact that the accused is a
public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an Information for kidnapping against him. A public
officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. The
burden is on the accused to prove that he or she acted in furtherance of his or her official functions.
Accused-appellant's membership in the PNP does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or
serious illegal detention against him. He may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is shown
that he committed acts unrelated to the functions of his office.The first two (2) and the last elements of the crime of
kidnapping are present in this case, Ronalyn, a woman, was forcibly taken by accused-appellant and loaded in a van
where she was detained for several hours. These acts are completely unrelated to accused-appellant's functions as a
police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
2nd element present - Ronalyn was forcibly taken and detained in a van and transferred to a car
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is "the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of
the accused to effect it. The deprivation of a person's liberty can be committed in different ways. It is not always
necessary that the victim be imprisoned. The second element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there is a
showing that the victim's liberty of movement is restricted.
In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside a vehicle by accused-appellant and
his cohorts and was driven around Quezon City for at least 5 hours. The victim categorically testified on the manner and
details of her detention.
3rd element present
Accused-appellant and his companions deprived the victim of her liberty to extort ransom from her family.
Last element - person kidnapped is a woman
The first two (2) and the last elements of the crime of kidnapping are present in this case, Ronalyn, a woman, was forcibly
taken by accused-appellant and loaded in a van where she was detained for several hours. These acts are completely
unrelated to accused-appellant's functions as a police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Effect of Ronalyn’s conviction
Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically negate the criminal liability of
accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission of the crime with which accused-appellant is
charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably coexist.
Furthermore, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping. Ronalyn's
arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-appellant's criminal liability. In other words, Ronalyn's
innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the
resolution of this case will depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION (award of damages increased).
Accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
5. People v. Cornista | G.R. No. 218915 | 19 February 2020 | Jammy

accused-appellants: HECTOR CORNISTA Y REOTUTAR AND ALVIN LABRA Y CORNISTA
private complainant: *delete if not applicable | victim(s): Arturo Picones
Location: Binangonan, Rizal | Date of Incident: May 3, 2005
Information: Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (R.A. No. 7659).
RTC: guilty
CA:guilty
SC: guilty
FACTS:
Prosecution: Carmelita testified that she and her spouse, Arturo Picones ("Arturo"), owned a restaurant located on
Manila East Road, Binangonan, Rizal. On May 3, 2005, at around 2:30 in the morning, while they were about to leave
their restaurant and to board their car, four armed men approached them. One of the four men poked a gun at Carmelita
who was seated at the front seat while another man occupied the back seat of the car. At the same time, the two other
men poked a gun at Arturo who was standing on the left side of the car. Arturo was then made to sit at the back seat of
the car together with one of the men. The other man sat at the driver's seat.. Thereafter, the four men sped away taking
Arturo with them. Carmelita then immediately ran inside the restaurant and reported the abduction of her husband to the
Angono police. During the incident, Arturo was wearing a white shirt, maong pants, and Islander slippers. At 10:30 in the
morning of the same day, Carmelita received a call from a man informing her that they have custody of Arturo and
demanding the amount of P5,000,000.00 as a precondition for Arturo's release. After reporting the incident, Carmelita
received a text message that their car was found in Muzon, Taytay. At 10:30 in the evening, Carmelita received another
call asking her how much she was able to raise. Carmelita answered that she has P70,000.00 which angered the caller
again. On May 5, 2005, at 10:30 in the morning, a man called again and inquired from Carmelita how much she was able
to raise. She told the caller that she already has P370,000.00. She also requested to talk to her husband, which was
granted. During said call, Arturo told her to borrow money from his employer. However, Carmelita was only able to raise
the amount of P470,000.00. She was then instructed to separately wrap the amounts of P150,000.00 and P320,000.00 in
a newspaper. She was also told to place the money in a blue plastic bag. On May 6, 2005, at 1:30 in the afternoon,
Arturo's abductors instructed Carmelita to proceed to Metropolis, in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Accompanied by her son-in-law,
John, Carmelita went to the designated place. However, upon reaching Metropolis, she was told to proceed to Robinson's
Fairview in Quezon City., Carmelita received another instruction to proceed to Jollibee. When Carmelita the caller
instructed her instead to go to Sta. Lucia Mall, Cubao. While on their way to Sta. Lucia Mall, they received another
instruction for them to proceed to Jollibee Masinag in Antipolo City, which they followed. They arrived there at around 7:30
in the evening and were instructed to use the restrooms to relieve themselves. Thereafter, they were told to go to the
parking area of tricycles on Panorama Street, Marikina City. Upon reaching said location, they were again told to proceed
to Purok 6, Manggahan. This time, Carmelita requested John to deliver the money in her stead. Consequently, John
boarded a tricycle to reach Purok 6, Manggahan, bringing with him the money and Carmelita's cellphone. At around 8
o'clock in the evening, John arrived at the meeting place. He then received a phone call, informing him that somebody
would approach him, and that he should give the money to that person. A few minutes later, a man approached John and
took the ransom money and Carmelita's cellphone. John asked the man about his father-in-law, Arturo, and he was
informed that Arturo was okay. The man then immediately left with the money and Carmelita's cellphone. John returned to
the place where he parked the car.Arturo was not released by his kidnappers despite the delivery and receipt of the
ransom money. Carmelita and John had waited for a month until a police officer from the Angono Police Station informed
them that a dead body was found in Brgy. San Isidro, Angono, Rizal. Carmelita and John confirmed that it was Arturo.
During the trial, Carmelita identified appellant Alvin as the man who poked a gun at her and appellant Hector as the one
who pulled Arturo to the back seat of the car during Arturo's abduction on May 3, 2005. On the other hand, John identified
accused Bathan as the one who received the ransom money. In addition, accused-turned-state witness Mendoza testified
during the trial that he was recruited by his cousin, Hector, to be a member of the Waray-Waray Kidnap for Ransom
Group. He was recruited to be the cook of the group. At around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 2, 2005, Hector brought
him to a small house in Angono, Rizal which was owned by a certain alias "Toto." Hector then left after instructing
Mendoza to stay behind. When he arrived at the said house, accused Quintana, Sorima, Isidro, Bitangol, Entoy alias
"Berkley," an alias "Lito," Rayga, Romeo and Antonio were already there. Mendoza further testified that on May 3, 2005,
at around 3 o'clock in the morning, Hector arrived together with accused Banaay, Romeo, Freeman, Bathan, Alvin and
alias "Toto." They brought with them a man who was hogtied and wearing a white shirt, maong shorts, and Islander
slippers. Mendoza later came to know the man as Arturo. As Hector instructed, Mendoza cooked for and provided food to
Arturo for four days. On May 6, 2005, around 10 o'clock in the evening, Hector, along with accused alias "Toto," alias
"Ekong," Bathan, and Freeman returned to the house in Angono, Rizal on board a white taxi. Hector then gave Mendoza
P16,000.00. Afterwards, Mendoza saw Hector having a conversation with accused Freeman, alias "Toto," Bathan,
Banaay, and alias "Ekong." After their conversation, Hector called on accused Bitangol. Thereafter, Hector ordered
accused Quintana and Gamba to bring Arturo downstairs where accused Bitangol shot him on the head four times with a
0.45-caliber gun. Arturo was then thrown into a creek.
Defense: Hector and Alvin averred that they have been working as administrators of Hacienda Ragaza in Brgy. Palanog,
Jaro, Leyte since the years 2000 and 2001, respectively. On August 27, 2005, they went to Manila. Alvin narrated that
prior to August 27, 2005, he has never set foot in Manila. Similarly, Hector emphasized that he went to Manila on August
27, 2005, accompanied by Alvin, to buy spare parts for his jeepney. They met up with Mendoza in Valenzuela who agreed
to help them buy the spare parts for the jeepney. While they were staying in a rented house in Valenzuela, a group of
armed men, who introduced themselves as police officers, arrived and arrested Mendoza as well as Hector and Alvin.
They were then brought to a camp in Laguna where they were individually subjected to tactical interrogation. They were
accused of being members of the Waray-Waray Kidnap for Ransom Group. Hector and Alvin then claimed that they were
tortured, electrocuted, and forced to admit the accusation. Thereafter, they were turned over to the PACER in Camp
Crame.
RTC: On September 24, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding Hector, Alvin, and Banaay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. The case against Bitangol, Bathan,
Quintana, Sorima, alias "Lito," and alias "Toto," were ordered archived pending their arrest. On the other hand, the rest of
the accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
CA:The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling that Hector, Alvin, and Banaay are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However, the CA modified the amounts of damages awarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of appellants for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide?
HELD: YES. Appellants are guilty of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide.
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of
the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of
the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the foregoing elements of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
Firstly, appellants' intent to deprive Arturo of his liberty was evident from the moment his freedom of movement was
forcibly curtailed on May 3, 2005 at 2:30 in the morning, wherein appellants poked a gun at him and his wife Carmelita
while they were both about to board their car, and made Arturo take the back seat of the car. Thereafter, Arturo was taken
against his will to Angono, Rizal.
Secondly, the prosecution was able to prove the actual deprivation of his liberty. Prosecution witness Mendoza testified
that on May 3, 2005, appellants brought Arturo to a small house in Angono, Rizal. He further witnessed that Arturo's
hands were tied at the back with a chain. In addition, he testified that he, together with some of the accused, guarded
Arturo for several days until he was shot by accused Bitangol on May 6, 2005.
Thirdly, the prosecution was able to prove that ransom money was demanded for the release of Arturo. Carmelita testified
that on May 3, 2005, at 10:30 in the morning, she received a call informing her that Arturo was held captive and will only
be released upon payment of P5,000,000.00. Several negotiations were had between the kidnappers and Carmelita
during the period of May 3 to May 5, 2005. Eventually, the kidnappers agreed to the amount of P470,000.00 which
Carmelita was able to raise. Thereafter, she was instructed to wrap the money in two separate batches – Pl50,000.00 in
one newspaper and the remaining P320,000.00 in another newspaper, and to place them in a blue plastic bag. On May 6,
2005, Carmelita and her son-in-law, John, received several instructions from the kidnappers as to where to proceed with
the money, which they followed. Finally, she was ordered to go to Purok 6, Manggahan, to deliver the money. In turn, she
requested John to go to said place.
In addition, John testified in relation to the ransom money. According to him, he rode a motorcycle and went to Purok 6,
Manggahan as per instruction of the kidnappers. On his way to the said place, the kidnappers made several calls and
instructions. Upon his arrival at the meeting place, the kidnappers called again and instructed him to give the ransom
money to the person who will eventually approach him. When said person arrived, John handed him the ransom money;
He later identified the man as accused Bathan. However, Arturo was not released by his· kidnappers despite the delivery
and receipt of the ransom money.
Finally, Arturo was killed in the course of the detention. About a month after the delivery and receipt of the ransom money,
Carmelita and John were informed by a police officer from the Angono Police Station that a dead body had been found in
Brgy. San Isidro, Angono, Rizal. On May 28, 2005, Carmelita and John went to the Angono Police Station and pleaded for
the police to dig up the corpse of Arturo. Together with the police, Carmelita and John went to the Angono Municipal
Cemetery. After the body was exhumed, Carmelita and John confirmed that it was Arturo.
On the other hand, appellants mainly raised alibi as their defense. However, the defense of alibi is the weakest among the
defenses as it is easily fabricated. Thus, "[f]or alibi to prosper, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time it was committed." In the instant case, appellants assert that they were in Jaro, Leyte at the time the crime was
committed, thus it was impossible for them to have been present at the scene of the crime in Binangonan, Rizal. However,
We find that appellants failed to . prove that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene at the
time the crime was committed, since nowadays a person may easily travel back and forth to Manila and Leyte. Thus, it
was not physically impossible for appellants to travel to said places during the period that the crime was committed or on
the first week of May 2005. In any case, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the
prosecution's witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that the award for moral damages is reduced, while the award of civil indemnity is increased.
6. People v. Mirandilla | G.R. No. 186417 | 27 July 2011 | Louise
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendant-appellant: FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR

Victim: AAA Location: Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City | Date of Incident: 12-2-2000
Information: kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and rape
through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279)
RTC: convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault
CA: Special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
SC: Special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS: AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla. AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a
nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a man (MIrandilla) grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped
around her shoulders, with a knife's point thrust at her right side. Another man joined and went beside her, while two
others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd. After a four-hour walk
through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon
passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a
companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed
her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. When she defied him, he slapped her and
hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three
fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed
and pulled his penis inside.When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, no
rescue came. At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to open
her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and
slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
road's side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap,
and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla's penis inside her vagina. A little
while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun
aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. The
following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the same fate. They
repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to
Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy
field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was
allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions
were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested
for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people's sight for two nights. Finally, she
found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It
was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police
gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man's face — she
was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.
Defense: Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost nightly
during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy
they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAA's intentional
abortion of their first child to be — a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
RTC: kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault
CA: Special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
CA rejected Mirandilla's defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual.
It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense
Contention to SC: Prosecution's lone witness, AAA, was not a credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in
partners whose intimacy they expressed in consensual sex.
ISSUE: WON Mirandilla should be convicted. Yes
HELD: First Issue Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be
believed, it must not only come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself — tested by human experience,
observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. First, the trial judge, who had
the opportunity of observing AAA's manner and demeanour on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA
appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and
serious contradictions. Second, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible in itself. AAA's ordeal was entered into
the police blotter immediately after her escape, 35 negating opportunity for concoction. 36 While in Mirandilla's company,
none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None
of them knew her whereabouts. 37 AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City's Health
Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted
diseaseMore importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination. The defense lawyer tried
to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA's credibility in affirming the RTC
decision.
Second Issue "Sweetheart Theory" not Proven: Accused's bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand.
To be credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. The sweetheart theory as a defense, however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove
only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. This admission makes the
sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to
adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of
proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. Burden of
evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case
in his favour or to overthrow one when created against him." (Emphasis supplied) Mirandilla with his version of facts
as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecution's prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia
Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret. Arlene Moret, the cigarette
vendor who also served as the CR's guard, testified that on 30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the
park. They approached her and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone
two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. She also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on
30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with the version that she met them previously, three
times at least, in the previous month. On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the
park. The accused's mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao only after his
imprisonment. This contradicted Mirandilla's claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000
until January 2001. Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain,
with the abortifacient pills' cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAA's
abortion only through the latter's admission. Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses' testimonies
contradicted each other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they concocted stories in a
desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
Crimes and Punishment: AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was
also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1)
Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. .the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision
gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v. Larrañaga, this arises where the law provides
a single penalty for two or more component offenses.
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape,
the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single
indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case,
there is only one crime committed — the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd
designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the
taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the
other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
It having been established that Mirandilla's act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and
on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in
view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death
is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty of beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659.
7. Caluag v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 171511 | 04 March 2009 | Issa
petitioner: RONNIE CALUAG | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

private complainant: SPOUSES NESTOR & JULIA DENIDO | victim(s):
Location: | Date of Incident:
Information: 1) SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

2) GRAVE THREATS
MeTC: GUILTY OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (RONNIE CALUAG & JESUS SENTILLAS) & GRAVE THREATS
(RONNIE CALUAG)
RTC: AFFIRMED
CA: AFFIRMED
SC: AFFIRMED
Mode: Review on Certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS: At around 4:00 pm of March 19, 2000, Nestor Denido learned that 2 of his guests from an earlier drinking spree
were mauled. At the time, Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas.
When Nestor asked several people including his son Raymond about what happened, Caluag butted in and said, “Bakit
kasama ka ba roon?” and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but was overpowered by Caluag and
Sentillas. Julia Denido saw her husband getting boxed. She tried to pacify them but they did not listen to her. Nestor ran to
his house and Julia followed him. At around 6:00 pm, Nestor told Julia to report the incident to the barangay authorities. At
around 7:30 pm, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to the barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who
blocked her way in the alley. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun and poked it at her forehead saying, “Saan ka pupunta,
gusto mo ito?”. Despite this encounter, Julia was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the
gun-poking incident.
Prosecution: 2 separate Informations were filed against Caluag. The first charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight
physical injuries from the mauling of Nestor Denido, which required medical attendance for less than 9 days. The 2nd
Information was for grave threats committed against Julia Naval.
Defense: According to Caluag and barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr., at around 6:00 pm of March 19, 2000, Caluag
was then on his way home with his 3-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked their way and asked him,
“Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?”. Caluag answered no but Nestor persisted and would not allow them to pass through.
Annoyed, he told Nestor, “Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!”. Nestor then boxed him on the face which caused him to fall
down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified them, he
was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated,
bystanders separated them. An unidentified man with a knife then went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded. He
also denied poking a gun at Julia.
Sentillas claimed that he never boxed Nestor.
MeTC: 1. Caluag and Sentillas- GUILTY OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
2. Caluag- GUILTY OF GRAVE THREATS
The MeTC noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got
annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s
unruly behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that while Julia intended to report the mauling of her husband, she
did not waste time and instead reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay.
RTC: AFFIRMED IN TOTO
CA: AFFIRMED
The CA noted that the MeTC gave credence to the testimony of the Denido spouses because they were in accord with the
natural course of things. Likewise, petitioner’s negative assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Julia.
Contention to SC: (only Caluag appealed) Caluag contends that contrary to the findings of the lower courts that he
offered only mere denials, he was able to present Pablo Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness. His testimony
should have been given full credit. Caluag also argued that there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude that he lost
his temper because of Nestor’s unruly behavior and that just because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident
to the barangay, this does not necessarily mean that it actually happened. Caluag further argues that assuming that he did
poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats under Art. 285 of the RPC.
ISSUE: W/N there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats.
HELD: YES.
As the lower courts and the CA correctly stated, the testimonies of the Denido spouses were more in accord with the
natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as Caluag himself
admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s unruly behavior. The positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that Caluag
committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in Caluag’s
behalf cannot be given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. The SC found
that they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down Caluag on any criminal act.
The MeTC, RTC and CA uniformly found Caluag guilty of grave threats under Art. 282, par. 2 of the RPC. Under the RPC,
there are 3 kinds of threats:
1. Grave threats (Art. 282)

2. Light threats (Art. 283)
3. Other light threats (Art. 285)
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In
light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light
threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the
mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier. On her way there, Caluag confronted her and pointed a gun to her
forehead saying, “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Considering what transpired earlier between Caluag and Nestor,
Caluag’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or inflict serious physical injuries on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not
go against the threat to kill or inflict serious injury evinced by Caluag’s accompanying act. The offense committed falls
under Art. 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: 1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and 2) the threat to kill was
not subject to a condition.
Art. 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states “shall threaten another with a weapon or
draw such weapon in a quarrel”, since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That
the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not is the distinguishing factor between grave threats and light
and other light threats.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the CA are
AFFIRMED.
8. Paera v. People | Threats | G.R. 181626 | 30 May 2011 | Jolo
petitioner: SANTIAGO PAERA | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

private complainant: INDALECIO DARONG
victim(s): INDALECIO DARONG, DIOSETEA DARONG, VICENTE DARONG
Location: Negros Oriental | Date of Incident: April 7-8, 1999
Information: 3 counts of Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
MTC: Guilty of 3 counts of Grave Threats
RTC: Guilty of 3 counts of Grave Threats
SC: Guilty of 3 counts of Grave Threats
Mode: Petition for Review | Modifying Circumstance/s: None
FACTS: As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his
constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas,
Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant
Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio
continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme
and cut Indalecio’s access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner
discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak,
petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened
next is contested by the parties.
Prosecution: According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards
Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea
Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the
matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don’t spare anyone,
even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a
relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he
passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on
nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").
Defense: According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why
petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the
borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper. Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial.
Petitioner was the defense’s lone witness.
MTC: The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found petitioner guilty as
charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the three counts. The MCTC found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs’ persistent water
tapping contrary to petitioner’s directive "must have angered" petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior. The MCTC
rejected petitioner’s defense of denial as "self-serving and uncorroborated."
RTC: The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive. The RTC similarly found
unconvincing petitioner’s denial in light of the "clear, direct, and consistent" testimonies of the Darongs and other
prosecution witnesses
Contention to SC: Petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the "continued complex crime" of
Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the latter’s failure to testify
allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the
charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying
circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of 3 counts of Grave Threats
HELD: Yes. To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the concept of
"continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one
criminal intent or resolution. To fix the penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum
period.
The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and complex crimes
preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory. Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]"
This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."
Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack open Vicente’s skull
are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the
RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening
remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession,
petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a single mental resolution, a
single impulse, and single intent" to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this
assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing
petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was
chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after
Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his "single intent" to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and
Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs’ presence near the water
tank at the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he
inadvertently came across each of them. Petitioner’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm
arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims. Indeed, Santiagos theory holds water only if the facts are altered
that is, he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true, then
Santiagos liability for one count of Grave Threats
There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s claim of having acted to "defend and protect the water rights of his constituents"
in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay. The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the
RPC, which negates criminal liability of -
[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment. None of these requisites obtain here.
Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights when petitioner successively threatened
them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts – Indalecio was standing near the
water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few meters
away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to
prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme,
causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.
Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the
RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of office.2Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services"
when he barred the Darongs’ access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his
office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating
his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before petitioner and his resort to any
of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of
criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies
use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.
9. Escolano v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 226991 | 10 December 2018 | Aubrey
Petitioner: ERLINDA ESCOLANO y IGNACIO | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

victim(s): *AAA (11 years old); BBB (9years old); CCC (8 years old)
Location: Philippines | Date of Incident: May 29, 2009
Information: Violation of Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610 or Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
RTC: Guilty of violation of Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610 or Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
CA:Affirmed the ruling of RTC
SC: Not guilty of violation of Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610 or Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act. Only liable for OTHER LIGHT THREATS and suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
Mode: Appeal by certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE
FACTS:
On May 30, 2009, Escolano was alleged to commit an act of child abuse or cruelty against AAA (11 years old); BBB
(9years old); CCC (8 years old), all minor by making hacking gestures with a bolo and uttering insults and invectives at
them, which act debases, demeans and degrades the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said minors as human beings to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution:
Presented the minors and private complainants DDD, mother of complainants and Barangay Peace and Security Officer
Wilfredo Lim.
AAA:
He testified that on May 29, 2009, at around eleven o'clock in the morning, he and his two brothers: BBB, 9 years old, and
CCC, 8 years old, were flying paper planes from the third floor of their house when the planes landed in front of the house
of Perlin Escolano, the daughter of petitioner. Perlin uttered “putang ina” directed at CCC.
The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of their house. Private complainants got three ketchup sachets from their
refrigerator and threw these at her. However, Perlin went inside their house so it was petitioner who was twice hit instead
by the sachets. Petitioner exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak,
subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko." Private complainants
reported the incident to their mother DDD when she arrived from the market.
When DDD confronted petitioner, the latter uttered "nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka. " Petitioner then went inside her
house, came out with a bolo, and threatened DDD, "walang demanda demanda sa akin, basta bumaba kayo dito
lahat, papatayin ko kayong lahat. Tatagain ko kayo, papatayin ko kayo." The incident left private complainants
terrified. They only went downstairs when they had a companion; and they no longer played as they usually did. BBB and
CCC corroborated AAA's testimony that they threw ketchup sachets at Perlin because she uttered bad words against
CCC.
DDD:
He testified that on May 30, 2009, private complainants told her about the incident, thus, she confronted petitioner. The
latter pointed her finger at her and uttered, "Hoy, putang ina mo," got a bolo, and yelled "Kaya ninyo ito?
Pagtatatagain ko kayo." Thereafter, DDD noticed a change in the behavior of private complainants as they no longer
played downstairs and they even transferred residence because of the incident. DDD averred that her children were
traumatized, and they were in constant fear because of petitioner's threat.
BPSO LIM:
Corroborated the testimony of private complainants that he heard petitioner utter, "Putang-ina ninyo, wala ng
dimandemanda, papatayin ko na lang kayo, lalaban na lang ako ng patayan." He tried to pacify the parties. He stated
that petitioner was being held by his co-BPSO Rolando Estrella as she was shouting invectives while brandishing a bolo.
After the incident, he brought petitioner inside the latter's house and the bolo was confiscated by his fellow BPSO.
Defense:
Offered the testimonies of Rosario Bondoc, Rodolfo Niebres, and petitioner.
BONDOC:
Petitioner and DDD had been neighbors since 1992. Sometime on May 30, 2009, she saw petitioner sweeping her house
premises. Then, she heard petitioner warning private complainants that she would report them to their mother
DDD. Thereafter, DDD approached petitioner's house yelling at her, "Poñeta ka, putang ina mo, bobo, wala kang
pinag-aralan." Bondoc also said that a BPSO accompanied DDD to her house to pacify her since DDD had started the
quarrel. Bondoc also averred that petitioner did not brandish a bolo against DDD and private complainants. She added
that the parties had a previous disagreement or misunderstanding involving DDD's construction of a high-rise home.
NIEBRES:
Testified that he heard Escolano arguing only with DDD and not with private complainants; that he did not see the
petitioner brandishing a bolo; and that petitioner merely lightly reprimanded private complainants for throwing stones
that hit petitioner's roof.
ESCOLANO:
She argued that while she was sitting beside the gate of her house, AAA threw a sachet of ketchup at her. She scolded
AAA saying, "Huwag kang mamamato." Instead of desisting, AAA and his brothers BBB and CCC continued to
throw ketchup sachets. Thereafter, AAA shouted, "Linda, putang ina mo, wala kang kwenta." Petitioner warned that
she would report them to DDD, their mother. DDD suddenly arrived uttering invectives and pointing her finger at petitioner
while uttering, "Linda, putang ina mo! Bobo ka! Wala kang pinag¬ aralan!"
RTC:
Guilty of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It gave credence to the clear testimony of private complainants. The RTC
noted the gravity of petitioner's act of threatening private complainants by wielding and making hacking gestures with a
bolo while uttering invectives. It took into account the negative effect of petitioner's act that resulted in private
complainants' transfer of residence because they were in constant fear.
CA:
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that the acts of petitioner caused untoward repercussions in the life and dignity
of private complainants. The incident made hostile the environment for private complainants where they could no longer
freely live and enjoy their childhood and were forced to move out. Private complainants were even deprived of their
chance to play games and enjoy leisure time within their own home.
Contention to SC by Escolano:
Escolano argued that private complainants' inconsistencies could only have come from prevaricated testimonies and
judicial admissions which engender reasonable doubt in her favor. Also, the bolo allegedly used by petitioner to make
hacking gestures while uttering invectives against private complainants should be disregarded in light of the unrelenting
disavowals in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC.
Aside from the point that the existence of the bolo was not established, petitioner averred that the testimony of DDD had
no probative value to support the alleged threatening remarks against her children. The testimony of DDD that she did not
exactly hear the statements made by the petitioner and the "sumbong" of her children constitute hearsay evidence.
Petitioner also argued that the purported hacking gesture with a bolo was actually geared towards DDD.
Defense of OSG:
Testimonies the prosecution witnesses are consistent on all material points showing that petitioner's words, demeanor,
and actions towards them constitute the crime as charged. The OSG maintained that the incident caused the children to
become frantic due to such threat; and it affected them so much that they had to move as far away as possible from the
petitioner. Further, the OSG posits that the non-presentation of the "bolo" used by petitioner to threaten the children does
not offset the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding its existence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for violation of Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610 or Special Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
HELD:
No. The Court ruled that Sec. 10 (A) Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 any person who committed acts of child abuse shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 refers child abuse as maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;
3. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law, highlights that in child abuse, the act by deeds
or words must debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement is
defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a
person's or thing's character or quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation or character. When
this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused shall be convicted of violating Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries or other light threats under the
RPC.
Bangalon v. People - petitioner therein was charged under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 because he struck and slapped
the face of a minor, done at the spur of the moment and in the heat of anger. he Court ruled that only when the accused
intends to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of the child as a human being should the act be punished with
child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Otherwise, the act must be punished for physical injuries under the RPC.
It was emphasized therein that the records must establish that there must be a specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being, being the essential element in child abuse. Since the
prosecution failed to establish the said intent, the petitioner in that case was convicted only of slight physical injuries.
Jabalde v. People - petitioner therein slapped, struck, and choked a minor as a result of the former's emotional rage. .
The Court declared that the absence of any intention to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of a child victim,
the petitioner's act was merely slight physical injuries punishable under the RPC since there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance. Essential element of intent to debase
must be established with the prescribed degree of proof.
Lucido v. People - petitioner strangled, severely pinched, and beat an eight-year-old child, causing her to limp. The Court
held that these abusive acts are intrinsically cruel and excessive as they impair the child's dignity and worth as a human
being.
Here, petitioner had no intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather an act carelessly done
out of anger. The circumstances surrounding the incident proved that petitioner's act of uttering invectives against the
minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the heat of anger. The utterances against private complainants were made
because there was provocation from the latter. AAA, BBB, and CCC were throwing ketchup sachets at petitioner's
daughter Perlin. The latter evaded this by getting inside their house, so that private complainants hit petitioner on the head
and feet, instead. The complainants continued to throw these sachets which angered petitioner. Evidently, petitioner's
statements "bobo, walang utak, putang ina" and the threat to "ipahabol" and "ipakagat sa aso" were all said out of
frustration or annoyance. Petitioner merely intended that the children stop their unruly behavior. On the other hand, the
prosecution failed to present any iota of evidence to prove petitioner's intention to debase, degrade or demean the child
victims. The record does not show that petitioner's act of threatening the private complainants was intended to place the
latter in an embarrassing and shameful situation before the public. There was no indication that petitioner had any specific
intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC; her threats resulted from the private complainants' vexation.
Verily, as the prosecution failed to specify any intent to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of complainants as human
beings, or that she had intended to humiliate or embarrass AAA, BBB, and CCC; thus, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
It must also be emphasized that the alleged hacking gestures and the expression "putang ina mo" were not
specifically directed to the children; rather, these were made against DDD, their mother. AAA revealed that the
statements made by petitioner were indeed directed to his mother DDD.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: (JUST IN CASE MATANONG)
AAA: After I told my mother that, my mother told us that she will confront Erlinda Escolano. Then, "dinuro po ni Erlinda
Escolano iyong Nanay ko po, tapos sabi niya, nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka, tapos binabaan po siya sabi niya wala kayong
mga utak kasi ikaw nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka."
COURT: kanino sinabi yon?
AAA: Sa Nanay ko. Tapos pumasok ng bahay si Erlinda Escolano, tapos pagkalabas niya, meron siyang itak po.
Hence, testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the alleged hacking gestures and profanities subsequently
hurled by petitioner were not directed against private complainants but towards DDD. Petitioner's ensuing outbursts were
due to DDD's confronting her. AAA clearly testified that the threats stated by petitioner were aimed towards DDD. he
present case is only concerned with the acts committed by petitioner against private complainants; and not those
committed against DDD which purportedly constituted grave threats. Moreover, DDD conceded that the profanity hurled
by petitioner was directed at her. The expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the dialect that
is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an
expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. Thus, it cannot be held with moral certainty that the purported
hacking gestures and profanities subsequently hurled by petitioner were intended for private complainants.
Petitioner committed the crime of OTHER LIGHT THREATS
The Court ruled that though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of
private complainants, petitioner still uttered insults and invectives at them. Specifically, petitioner's statement "Putang ina
ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinagaralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko
ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko," were directed against private complainants. However, it must also be
emphasized that, as discussed, petitioner's utterances were made in the heat of her anger because private complainants
had thrown ketchup sachets at her. Petitioner merely intended that private complainants stop their rude behavior. Thus,
petitioner committed the crime of Other Light Threats with a penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos. It may imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall threaten another with a
weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a crime, and who
by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the
offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
In grave threats, the wrong threatened to be committed amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a
condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In
other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.
Here, the threat made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private complainants was expressed in the heat of
anger. Petitioner was merely trying to make private complainants stop throwing ketchup sachets at her. However, instead
of doing so, private complainants still continued to throw ketchup sachets against petitioner, which infuriated the latter
causing her to utter invectives against private complainants. In addition, offense committed falls under Article 285, par. 2
(other light threats) since: (1) threat does not amount to a crime, and (2) the prosecution did not establish that petitioner
persisted in the idea involved in her threat.
Assuming arguendo that private complainants were also affected and distressed by the threat made by petitioner against
DDD in brandishing a bolo, such act is still within the ambit of Other Light Threats under Article 285 (1). Insofar as private
complainants are concerned, petitioner committed an act of threatening their mother with a weapon in a quarrel. As
discussed earlier, the present case is only concerned with the threats that affected private complainants; it should not refer
to the threats specifically aimed towards DDD. The criminal complaint for grave threats against petitioner filed by DDD
should be resolved in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, that Erlinda Escolano y Ignacio is GUILTY of Other Light Threats under Article 285 of the RPC.
10. Consulta v. People | Coercion | G.R. 179462 | 12 February 2009 | Kate
Appellant: PEDRO C. CONSULTA | Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

private complainant/victim: NELIA R. SILVESTRE Location: Makati City | Date of Incident: June 7, 1999
Information: Robbery with Intimidation of Persons

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and
penalized under Article 294, paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code
CA: Affirmed conviction
SC: Guilty of Grave Coercion
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: None
FACTS: Private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar
(Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother
Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at
once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka
namin." Appellant added "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita
matiempuhan, papatayin kita."
Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to an "alajera" in the
province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth ₱3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka!
Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi
niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!"
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical
examination. They, however, repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and reported the incident.
They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered
were expected to manifest.
Nine days after the incident, Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.
Defense: Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family.
He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house
was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted.
Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family.
Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of the maltreatment
charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and
another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia, she would track his whereabouts
and cause scandal.
RTC: The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part "is presumed from the unlawful taking" of the necklace,
and brushing aside appellant’s denial and claim of harassment, convicted appellant of Robbery, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused PEDRO C. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph No. 5,
in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code xxx
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta has committed the crime of which he was charged
HELD: Robbery With Intimidation of Persons - NO
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilt of robbery.
(Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Article 294, paragraph 5, under which appellant was penalized provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases.
x x x (Citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property; 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3)
the taking is with animus lucrandi; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon
things.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. It may
be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the
taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on
appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with
ill-feelings, manifested by, among other things, the filing of complaints against him by Nelia and her family which were
subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand, and appellant and family on the other, and
under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s taking of Nelia’s
necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi. Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
For "[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved."
Grave Coercion - YES
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to
perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act, the penalty next higher in
degree shall be imposed." (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of the
accused are the prime criterion.
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of
invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her
destination.
Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion which carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding
₱6,000. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum that may be imposed is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged CA Decision and another is rendered finding appellant,
Pedro C. Consulta, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Coercion.
11. Maderazo v. People | Coercion | G.R. 165065 | 26 September 2006 | Vee
petitioners: MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR.

respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
private complainant: Medaria Verutiao Location: Caibiran, Biliran Date of Incident: 01-27-1997
Information: grave coercion against Mayor Maderazo, Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo; and Police Chief
Perido; together with Rico, Mocorro, Azur, Oledan, Gervacio and Cesora
SB: unjust vexation petitioners only; others were acquitted
SC: affirmed SB as to petitioners Maderazo but acquitted Perido
Mode: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE
FACTS: An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging the following with grave coercion:
Municipal Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan;
and Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo
Oledan, Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora.
All of the accused were government officials. Verutiao was physically in possession of one of the stalls in the public
market of the Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997. On January 21, 1997, the premises had
been padlocked previously by Mayor Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods were inside the stall, and she was unable to
transact any business. After a week, on January 27, 1997, the locks were opened by the government upon the authority of
the mayor, the goods in the premises were inventoried and taken to the police station where they have remained up to the
present.
Prosecution: The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she had been the lessee of a stall in
the Biliran public market. She paid a monthly rental of P200.00. She was allowed to finish the construction of the market
stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.
She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development of the public
market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other structures
for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to
the monthly rentals when occupied for business. Verutiao was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her
expenses. After the construction, she then opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but
did not pay the rentals in 1993.
In 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract, renewable every year. It is also provided
that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact
that the contract has not yet expired.
In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall.
However, considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not
pay her rent. Almost weekly, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the reimbursement. She was told by then
Treasurer Lee and his successor, Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had to wait for another
budget hearing. The treasurers did not collect her rents for they knew that the Municipality still owed her money.
On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate
the stall within 24 hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall. As of January 1997, Verutiao had an unpaid
rental of P2,532.00, after deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared in his letter that the
lease contract had been cancelled.
On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter to the Mayor, stating, among others, that they can
only be ejected from the market stall if the Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the construction
of the stall and if the Municipality was no longer willing to lease the subject premises. They admitted that Verutiao had not
paid any rent since 1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, she did not have to
pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed, as the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she
advanced for the construction of the market stall, and that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have
reimbursed her expenses in the construction.
On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. The locks were opened on the authority of the
Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police
station for safekeeping. While these were being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from
the market stall. She considered the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her husband, was then a
candidate for councilor under the ticket of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing party.
SB: Convicting petitioners of the crime of unjust vexation only not grave coercion because of the 2nd element of
grave coercion is lacking. Acquitted the other accused.
The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no authority to padlock, open and inventory the contents of the subject stall
and take the same to the police station. Although, he had the power to cancel the lease contract, as Mayor, he could not
eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and seizure of the goods contained therein. The
remedies of the Municipality in cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees and rentals are provided in the
Local Government Code.
The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use violence,
threats or intimidation. Verutiao could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she was not at the
market stall when the same was padlocked, and its goods inventoried and hauled. The court, however, held the said
accused criminally liable for unjust vexation even if the private complainant was not at the stall because the overt acts of
the accused caused her annoyance, irritation and vexation. The court ruled that if the second element of grave coercion
under Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking, the crime committed falls under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the same Code.
Contention to SC: Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao was not
prevented from doing something not prohibited by law. She could not have been possibly intimidated or forced by
petitioners, and could not have been prevented from doing business. In fact, she was not transacting business at the time.
Verutiao was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods inventoried; hence, she could not have been vexed.
Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting Verutiao from her stall, thereby
compelling her to give up her possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However, they were convicted by the trial
court of unjust vexation because they allegedly padlocked the stall, hauled and/or seized the goods contained therein. It
was petitioner Mayor Maderazo who had padlocked the stall. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not
involved in the padlocking of the stall. For his part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not at the stall; he cannot, thus, be
guilty of unjust vexation for the overt acts of his co-petitioners.
Verutiao’s refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper demand and despite the fact that she was no
longer operating the same, rendered her a deforciant, and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1994. Consequently, petitioner Mayor Maderazo had every right to consider the subject stall vacant; and proceed in
accordance with Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994.
Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected therefrom but was merely stopped from improperly
using it, in the exercise of petitioner Mayor Maderazo’s power and duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the Municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of unjust vexation
HELD: YES. Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. are guilty of unjust vexation, but
petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED.
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose
of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine
equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. Compulsion or restraint need not
be alleged in the Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However,
in unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a
charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether
the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the
principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful
for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.
We agree with respondent’s contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor
Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was
petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an
inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor
Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the order of the Mayor.
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to
the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary
that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the
petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling
therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21,
1997.
Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial
intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby preventing
her from doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into
his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.
Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired without having been renewed, and petitioner Mayor
ordered Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent. Under Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an action for unlawful
detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises. Verutiao
insisted on her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the
property resort to force to gain possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims. It
was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade
the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual possession and to place the burden upon the latter of
instituting an action to try the property right.
Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we find petitioner
Seniforo Perido deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other petitioners. He
was at the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents
of the stall of Verutiao stored in the police station presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by
thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed the same or the disposition thereof determined by the authorities
concerned.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
12. Baleros v. People | Coercion | G.R. 138033 | 22 February 2006 | JL
petitioner: RENATO BALEROS, JR. | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

private complainant/ victim(s): Martina Lourdes Albano
Location: sampaloc, manila | Date of Incident: December 13, 1991
Information: Attempted Rape

RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
SC: ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge of attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged
GUILTY of light coercion.
Mode: petition for review on certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: n/a
FACTS:
Prosecution:To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private complainant
Malou, and her classmates. Malou, was occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou, was a medical student of the UST
in 1991. In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, Malou retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her
bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed. IEarly morning of the following day, she was awakened by the
smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with
chemicals were very tight. Still, she continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free.
With this the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed. The
man let her go and her went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. Over the intercom, Malou told S/G Ferolin
that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako". Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had
made out during their struggle was the feel of her attacker's clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material
while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like. He was wearing a t-shirt and shorts.
Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window without the iron grills which leads to
Room 306 of the Building. She testified that her relation with Chito, who was her classmate was friendly until a week prior
to the attack when he confided his feelings for her, to which she rejected. Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he
was on duty, Chito arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with
and black shorts with the brand name and requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by
Ansbert Co and at that time when he was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Africa was in the room. He asked Chito
to produce the required written authorization and when he could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused but later, relented and
made an entry which says that he was a visitor. Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 pm of December 12, 1991by
the time Chito’s knocking on the door woke him up, to which he was able to note that he arrived at 1:30 am because he
glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the door.
The CIS came by the building and question Chito and Joseph. They asked the students to look for anything not
belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Loyloy, another roommate
of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type from inside their unit which they did
not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the gray bag, he knew right away that it
belonged to Chito. When the contents were examined by the forensic chemist at Crame, the results showed that the night
dress and the handkerchief are to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Defense: For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime
imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. He said that he was at a Fraternity party at 7pm left
the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 am and proceeded to the Building which they reached at
about 1:30 A.M. He went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie window and for 5
minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, approached him and tried to open the door of Unit 306 but
was likewise unsuccessful. Chito then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door. When Joseph
answered the door, Chito went inside, changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. Also taking the witness stand for the
defense were petitioner's fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with petitioner in
the December 12, 1991, riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the
Celestial Marie building after the party. Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry
instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30)
seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.
RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
Contention to SC: In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape imputed to him,
absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged and in convicting petitioner of
attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for
conviction based thereon.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted rape.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress
Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really
his immediate intention, is anybody's guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would
not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner
would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any
wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the
face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against
her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts
for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable
him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The
paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner. SEHTIc
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is
arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the CA affirming that of the RTC, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge of attempted rape. Petitioner,
however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion.
13. People v. Ramirez | Trafficking | G.R. No. 217978 | 30 January 2019 | Ivy
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PH | accused-appellant: NANCY LASACA RAMIREZ a.k.a. "ZOY" or "SOY",
victim(s): AAA (16 y.o.), BBB (15 y.o.) - main focus of the case; Nica (20 y.o.), Cindy (20 y.o.),
Location: Lapu Lapu City | Date of Incident: December 5, 2009
Information: qualified trafficking of persons in relation to Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208
RTC: guilty as charged
CA: affirmed RTC
SC:
Mode: Notice of Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: person trafficked is a child (qualified)
FACTS:
Prosecution:
At around 9:45 p.m. on December 5, 2009, Police Officer 1 Nef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo) and 13 other members of the
Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation in Lapu-Lapu City. The operation was
"based on their surveillance of a widespread sexual service for sale by young girls" in the area.
In the bar, PO1 Nemenzo and a team member, Police Officer 1 Llanes (PO1 Llanes), ordered beers and waited for the
pimps. Two (2) women approached them and introduced themselves as AAA and BBB. Upon hearing that they would
need two (2) more girls, another woman approached them and introduced herself as Nancy, who was later identified as
Ramirez. She told the police officers that she could provide the girls. Then, BBB and Ramirez left, and after a while,
returned with two (2) more girls. They agreed that each girl would cost P600.00 as payment for sexual services.
After Ramirez provided the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi heading for a Motel. In the taxi, PO1 Llanes
handed P2,400.00 to one (1) of the girls. As soon as the girl received it, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes introduced
themselves as police officers, and turned the girls over to their team leader in a civilian van parked near them.Later,
Ramirez was arrested when BBB pointed to her as the pimp.
Testimony of BBB - minor
She herself was pimped out by Ramirez several times already. BBB stated that on the night of the incident, Ramirez
approached her and asked if she wanted to have sex for P200.00. She accepted and later, she and another girl, AAA,
approached two (2) customers.Before they left, Ramirez instructed BBB to get the money from the two (2) men.
testimony of AAA, a minor
testified that she had already been pimped by Ramirez twice. On the night of the incident, AAA testified that Ramirez
pimped her and three (3) other girls out to two (2) customers for P2,400.00. She stated that she knew Ramirez to be a
pimp because Ramirez would look for customers, negotiate prices, get girls to have sex with the customers, and get
commission from it.
Defense:
at about 9:00 p.m. on December 5, 2009, she and her sister, Francy Ramirez, were at ____ Grill watching a live band
when two (2) men rushed to them, arrested her, and pushed her into a van. She asked why she was being arrested but
the men just laughed. In the van, she saw BBB, who told her that police officers were around the area to arrest prostitutes.
They were subsequently brought to the police station where they were investigated for prostitution.
RTC: guilty of the crime of Qualified Trafficking of Person in Relation to Sec. 4 (e) of R.A. 9208 beyond reasonable
doubt
Ramirez appealed before the Court of Appeals. She argued that she does not work at _______ KTV Bar, and that it was
BBB who negotiated with the poseur customers about the girls' prices and received the supposed payment for sexual
services. She posits that the advanced payment made to BBB was "contrary to human nature and natural course of
events" 20 since no sexual activity had occurred yet.
CA:affirmed RTC
1. It highlighted the trial court's finding of overwhelming evidence against Ramirez, as two (2) of the minor victims
positively identified her as their pimp.
2. held that Ramirez not being employed at the _______ KTV Bar was irrelevant.
3. It also found that even if BBB initiated the negotiation with the poseur customers, the deal was only closed when
Ramirez brought another pair of girls.
4. it was not uncommon for the payment to be received by the hired girls instead of the pimps.BBB testified that P400.00
had already been earmarked from the P2,400.00 payment as Ramirez' commission. This was enough to conclude that
she was the girls' pimp.
Contention to SC:
While the case was pending, accused-appellant sent a handwritten letter 31 to this Court, insisting that on the night of the
incident, she was merely in the area with her sister to watch a live band. She claims that she only met BBB that night, and
that BBB suddenly dragged her to look for two (2) more girls. She further alleges that it was BBB who negotiated with the
two (2) customers and that she had no idea what was going on. 32 She submits that BBB pointed to her as a pimp only
because the police officers were threatening to detain her instead
ISSUE: whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking of persons.
HELD:
Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act: (a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the "recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring[,] or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation" even if it does not involve any of the means stated under the law. Trafficking is
considered qualified when "the trafficked person is a child[.]"
Here, accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation to Section 4 (e) of Republic Act
No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone "[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography[.]" The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-appellant approached PO1
Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of whom were minors, for P2,400.00. The police
operation had been the result of previous surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking
Task Force. Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that accused- appellant pimped them out to
customers, and that any payment to them would include the payment of commission to accused-appellant.
This Court in People v. Rodriguez acknowledged that as with Casio, the corroborating testimonies of the arresting officer
and the minor victims were sufficient to sustain a conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybañez, et al., this Court
likewise affirmed the conviction of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report on the prostitution of minors within
the area. In People v. XXX and YYY, this Court held that the exploitation of minors, through either prostitution or
pornography, is explicitly prohibited under the law. Casio also recognizes that the crime is considered consummated even
if no sexual intercourse had taken place since the mere transaction consummates the crime.
On Ramirez’ contention that BBB and AAA gave their consent to the transaction
In the case of Casio, “The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.”
Accused-appellant hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors. AAA's and
BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be considered as a valid defense.
On Ramirez’ initial defense of DENIAL
Accused-appellant initially used the defense of denial, testifying that she was merely in the area to listen to a live band
when the police rushed to her and arrested her. Denial, however, becomes a weak defense against the positive
identification by the poseur-buyer and the minor victims.
Moreover, accused-appellant, in her handwritten letter to this Court, seemingly abandoned her earlier statement that she
was just in the area to watch a live band when the police rushed to and arrested her. This time, she alleged that it was
BBB who approached and dragged her to the police officers, and who also started negotiating prices. This contradicts her
earlier statement that she had no knowledge of the transaction. Worse, this appears to corroborate the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies that she was indeed at the transaction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of
damages. Accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a "ZOY" or "SOY" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of having violated Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a).
14. People v. XXX & YYY | Trafficking | G.R. No. 235652 | 09 July 2018 | Enzo
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: XXX AND YYY

| victim(s):
Location: Binan, Laguna | Date of Incident: April 2010
Information: 4 counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208
RTC: Guilty
CA: AFFIRMED but convicted YYY for only 3 counts
SC:
FACTS:
The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that
sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a
certain John Hubbard who proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to 2011,
XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic websites where AAA was
shown in her underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC
corroborated AAA's statements, both averring that from 2010-2011, XXX ordered them to dance naked in front of the
computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam," their usual
client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY would be outside the room or fixing the
computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do sexual activities to earn money for their household
expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance centers.
Sometime in February 2011, AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
as she wanted her and her siblings to be rescued. AAA was then taken by the DSWD Social Worker, who then
coordinated with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After making an investigation and a technical verification of
the pornographic websites which revealed photos and transactions of AAA, the NBI applied for and was granted a search
warrant. Subsequently, the law enforcement authorities implemented the search warrant, resulting in the rescue of AAA,
BBB, and CCC, the confiscation of the computer units and paraphernalia connected with the alleged crimes, and the
arrest of both XXX and YYY.
For their defense, accused-appellants denied the accusations and claimed not knowing any motive for their children's
accusations as XXX is a housewife, while YYY works at a printing press. They alleged that AAA ran away when she was
impregnated by her boyfriend and denied that computer gadgets were confiscated from them.
Defense:
For their defense, accused-appellants denied the accusations and claimed not knowing any motive for their children's
accusations as XXX is a housewife, while YYY works at a printing press. They alleged that AAA ran away when she was
impregnated by her boyfriend and denied that computer gadgets were confiscated from them.
RTC: GUILTY
The RTC found that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the fact that accused-appellants had
conspired and confederated with one another to maintain and exploit their children, AAA, BBB, and CCC, into
committing cybersex with several foreigners through various websites. In this regard, the RTC pointed out that
accused-appellants' assertion that the charges against them are merely fabricated cannot be given credence in light of the
children's clear and straightforward testimonies and the lack of ill motive to testify against their own parents.
CA: AFFIRMED
In affirming accused-appellants' respective convictions, the CA gave credence to the testimonies of the three (3)
children-victims who not only positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, but also
straightforwardly explained the acts of sexual exploitation perpetuated against them by their own parents. This
notwithstanding, the CA found it appropriate to find the children's father, YYY, guilty for only three (3) counts of
Qualified Trafficking, as he was only named as an accused in three (3) of the four (4) total Informations for such
crime filed before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not XXX and YYY are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) and three (3) counts,
respectively, of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
HELD:
YES.
As correctly ruled by the courtsa quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who
were all minors when the crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their children perform acts of cybersex for
different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in prostitution and pornography; (c) they received various amounts
of money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their criminal design by taking
advantage of their children's vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the money they make from their lewd shows
are needed for the family's daily sustenance.
In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one (1) count of the same crime, this time under
Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own
minor biological child, AAA, to a foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that the
money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily sustenance.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of
the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented
by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. As such, accused-appellants' conviction for
Qualified Trafficking in Persons must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, award of
damages increased.
15. People v. Mora | Trafficking | G.R. No. 242682 | 01 July 2019 | Vee

accused-appellant: NERISSA MORA a.k.a. NERI BALAGTA MORA and MARIA SALOME POLVORIZA
victim(s): AAA, 16 yo minor | Location: Polangui, Albay | Date of Incident: 07-05-2012
Information: Mora and Polvoriza charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons; qualifying circumstances of minority
RTC: convicted appellant Mora and co-accused Polvoriza of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(e) in relation
to Section 6(a) of RA 9208
CA: guilty. affirmed RTC with modification, imposing legal interest on all monetary awards given to AAA
SC: guilty. affirmed CA
Mode: Ordinary appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: none
FACTS: (Prosecution) Mora was able to convince AAA, then a mior, to come to her to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur.
Upon arriving thereat, Mora left AAA at Otoy’s Videoke Bar (Otoy’s) owned by Polvoriza. Thereafter, Polvoriza locked AAA
inside a room therein, prohibited her from going out, and took her mobile phone and destroyed its SIM card. Polvoriza
then made AAA work as an entertainer at Otoy’s under the stage name of “Rizza M. Rañada,” forcing her to take shabu,
dance naked, and even have sex with the customers.
8 months later, AAA was able to escape from Polvoriza’s custody and return to her father, to whom she narrated her
ordeal. Her father then took AAA to the police station to report the matter and also to a medico-legal, who, after
examination, confirmed that AAA sustained multiple hymenal lacerations which could have resulted from consensual and
forcible sexual contact.
An Information was filed against Mora and Polvoriza charging them of Qualified Trafficking in Persons; that the crime was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of minority, AAA, being 16 years of age at the time.
Defense: While Mora admitted knowing Polvoriza, she denied being close friends with her. She also averred that she and
AAA had been close to each other and even treated the latter as her own sister. She then narrated that AAA insisted that
she accompany her to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur, to which Mora reluctantly agreed. Upon arrival thereat, AAA
proceeded inside Otoy' s and a few moments later returned outside to give her ₱200.00. Thereafter, she returned home.
Finally, she claimed that when she first met AAA, she thought that the latter was already of age based on her physical
appearance.
For her part, Polvoriza maintained that when she first saw AAA when the latter went inside Otoy's, introduced herself as
"Rizza M.Rañada," and expressed her desire to work therein. According to Polvoriza, she initially declined as she did not
hire entertainers for her bar, but nonetheless, she let AAA stay because she was "nice." A few days later, AAA returned to
Otoy's and handed her a pink card, which Polvoriza knew to be a health card secured by entertainers from health centers.
Finally, Polvoriza claimed that she only learned of AAA's true identity when she was arrested in connection with the instant
criminal case.
RTC: found Mora and Polvoriza guilty of the crime charged.
The RTC found that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mora and Polvoriza conspired with each
other to take AAA, through deception and by taking advantage of her minority, to Otoy's where AAA was forced to become
a sex worker who, among others, danced naked in front of male customers and was even coerced into having sex with
them. In this regard, the RTC found immaterial AAA's purported voluntariness to work at Otoy's as claimed by both
accused, pointing out that knowledge or consent on the part of minor victims is immaterial in cases of Human Trafficking.
CA: Affirmed the RTC with modification, imposing legal interest on all monetary awards given to AAA
ISSUE: WON Mora is guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
HELD: YES. The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders
by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs."
The same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set
forth in the preceding paragraph." The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified when, among others, the
trafficked person is a child.
In this case, Mora and Polvoriza were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to
Section 6 (a) of RA 9208. Section 4 (e) of RA 9208 reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of
the following acts:
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Mora and Polvoriza are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged as
the prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements thereof, as seen in the following:
(a) ora, through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was able to "convince" the
latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur;
(b) upon arrival thereat, Mora took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her there; and
(c) since then and for the next eight (8) months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a prostitute in Otoy's, coercing her
to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing naked in front of male customers and even having sex
with them.
Trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent
In this regard, the courts a quo correctly found untenable Mora and Polvoriza's insistence that it was AAA who voluntarily
presented herself to work as an entertainer/sex worker in Otoy's, as trafficking in persons can still be committed even if
the victim gives consent - most especially in cases where the victim is a minor. In this regard, case law instructs that "[t]he
victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of
human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his
or her own free will."
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. As such, accused-appellant Nerissa
Mora a.k.a. Neri Balagta Mora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
defined and penalized under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208.
16. Arambulo v. People | Trafficking | G.R. 241834 | 24 July 2019 | Jammy
petitioner: FERNANDO B. ARAMBULLO | Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

private complainant: *delete if not applicable | victim(s):
Location: Calamba, Laguna | Date of Incident: September 2011 up to January 12, 2012
Information: Qualified Trafficking in Persons

RTC: guilty
CA: guilty
SC: guilty
FACTS:
Prosecution: Essentially, the prosecution alleged that petitioner and his minor son, Dominique Dimple Arambulo
(Dominique), invited the latter's three (3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely AAA, BBB, and CCC, 10 to their
house sometime in 2011. It was then revealed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss petitioner's plans to commit
robberies with the help of AAA, BBB, and CCC. Upon learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but
petitioner got angry and punched him; thus, he was forced to join the group. AAA, BBB, and CCC then similarly testified
that not only was petitioner the mastermind of the series of robberies they subsequently committed against various
people, but he was also the driver of their getaway tricycle.
Defense: In his defense, petitioner and Dominique similarly testified that the filing of the instant case was merely an act of
retaliation by a certain Lt. Hoseña,12 one (1) of the alleged victims of the aforesaid robberies, following the dismissal of
the theft and obstruction of justice cases filed by the latter against petitioner.
RTC: The RTC found that the prosecution, through the consistent, direct, and unequivocal testimonies of AAA, BBB, and
CCC, was able to establish that petitioner had indeed recruited them into performing criminal activities, i.e., various
robberies. In this regard, the RTC opined that petitioner's aforesaid acts constitute Qualified Trafficking in Persons not
only because the victims were minors, but also because it is considered "in large scale" as it involved three (3) or more
victims.
CA: CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons as defined and penalized under Section 4 (k) subparagraph 4, in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c), of RA 9208,
Mainly upholding the factual findings of the RTC, the CA held that the prosecution had established the commission of the
crime charged, and that he was properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Contention to SC: In his brief, petitioner pointed out, inter alia, that the crime being imputed to him is defined and
penalized under Section 4 (k) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, which was approved on February 6, 2013,
published on February 13, 2013, and thus, only took effect on February 28, 2013. Significantly, such provision did not exist
in the original version of RA 9208. Hence, since the acts for which he was being made accountable for occurred sometime
in or about September 2011 to January 12, 2012, or before the amendatory law took effect, he could not be convicted of
the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons?
HELD: YES. Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court affirms petitioner's
conviction, albeit. under a provision of law different from what is stated in the CA ruling.
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph." The crime becomes qualified when any of the
circumstances found under Section 6 of the law is present.
It must be clarified that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 merely provides for the general definition of "Trafficking in Persons" as
the specific acts punishable under the law are found in Sections 4 and 5 of the same (including Sections 4-A, 4-B, and
4-C if the amendments brought about by RA 10364 are taken into consideration). This is evinced by Section 10 which
provides for the penalties and sanctions for committing the enumerated acts therein. Notably, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208
(renumbered as Section 10 [e] under RA 10364) of the law also provides for penalties for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons"
under Section 6. Nonetheless, since Section 6 only provides for circumstances which would qualify the crime of "Human
Trafficking," reference should always be made to Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5 of the law. Hence, convictions for
"Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on: (a) the commission of any of the acts provided under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B,
4-C, or 5; and (b) the existence of any of the circumstances listed under Section 6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be
convicted of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is not found to have committed any of the punishable acts under the
law.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, petitioner similarly contends in his appellant's brief filed before the
CA and in the instant petition that the acts imputed to him, i.e., recruiting minors to commit a series of robberies, constitute
the crime defined and penalized under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364. He then posits that since
this specific provision was only introduced by the amendatory law in 2013 as the original iteration of Section 4 of RA 9208
did not contain the same, and the acts imputed to petitioner were committed sometime in September 2011 to January 12,
2012 as indicated in the Information against him, it may be said that at the time he committed said acts, there was no
specific provision in RA 9208 in its original form which specifically defines and penalizes the said acts as Trafficking in
Persons. As such, his conviction must be set aside.
While petitioner correctly pointed out that he cannot be convicted under Section 4 (k) (4)31 of RA 9208 as amended by
RA 10364 since said provision was only enacted on February 28, 2013, or after the period stated in the Information when
he committed the acts imputed against him, this will not ipso facto result in his acquittal, as his acts of recruiting minors for
the purpose of committing a series of robberies reasonably fall under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form, which
reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the
following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines the term "forced labor and slavery" as "the extraction of
work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion,
including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception."
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found - through the consistent, direct, unequivocal, and thus, credible testimonies
of AAA, BBB, and CCC - that the prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements of violation of Section
4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 in its original form, as evinced by the following: (a) petitioner, through
his minor son, Dominique, recruited three (3) other minors AAA, BBB, and CCC; (b) based on AAA, BBB, and CCC's
testimonies, petitioner was able to do so by taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors, particularly through
enticement, violence, and use of force and coercion; and (c) petitioner recruited them for the purpose of engaging them to
perform illicit work/services, i.e., commit a series of robberies. Notably, the ultimate facts constitutive of these
circumstances were clearly alleged and contained in the Information. In this regard, case law instructs that "[t]he victim's
consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her
own free will."
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of
the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented
by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. Hence, petitioner's conviction for Qualified
Trafficking in Persons - not under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364 as erroneously ruled by the CA,
but under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of the same law - must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
petitioner Fernando B. Arambulo is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons, defined and penalized under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) and (c) of RA 9208.

9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY CASE DIGEST

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TITLE 9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY_DIGEST CRIMREV | SBCA | A.Y.

TITLE 9 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY DIGEST

2. People v. Mamantak | G.R. No. 174659 | 28 July 2008 | Ivy 3

3. People v. Dionaldo | G.R. No. 207949 | 23 July 2014 | Enzo 6

4. People v. Borja | G.R. No. 199710 | 02 August 2017 | Vee 8

5. People v. Cornista | G.R. No. 218915 | 19 February 2020 | Jammy 10

6. People v. Mirandilla | G.R. No. 186417 | 27 July 2011 | Louise 13

7. Caluag v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 171511 | 04 March 2009 | Issa 15

8. Paera v. People | Threats | G.R. 181626 | 30 May 2011 | Jolo 17

9. Escolano v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 226991 | 10 December 2018 | Aubrey 20

10. Consulta v. People | Coercion | G.R. 179462 | 12 February 2009 | Kate 25

11. Maderazo v. People | Coercion | G.R. 165065 | 26 September 2006 | Vee 27

12. Baleros v. People | Coercion | G.R. 138033 | 22 February 2006 | JL 30

16. Arambulo v. People | Trafficking | G.R. 241834 | 24 July 2019 | Jammy 39

1. People v. Chan | G.R. No. 226836 | 05 December 2018 | JL

Mode: appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: N/A

CA: CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

2. People v. Mamantak | G.R. No. 174659 | 28 July 2008 | Ivy

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Information: Kidnapping for ransom

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:

ON THE DEMAND FOR P 30,000

PENALTY REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA

3. People v. Dionaldo | G.R. No. 207949 | 23 July 2014 | Enzo

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON,

Information: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

Mode: | Modifying Circumstance/s:

1. Whether the respondents are guilty as charged? NO

YES, THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.

4. People v. Borja | G.R. No. 199710 | 02 August 2017 | Vee

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellant: PO3 JULIETO BORJA

Information: kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267, RPC

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE

Defense: Denial and alibi.

3rd element present

Last element - person kidnapped is a woman

Effect of Ronalyn’s conviction

5. People v. Cornista | G.R. No. 218915 | 19 February 2020 | Jammy

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mode: | Modifying Circumstance/s:

HELD: YES. Appellants are guilty of the special complex

crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with

6. People v. Mirandilla | G.R. No. 186417 | 27 July 2011 | Louise

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendant-appellant: FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:

ISSUE: WON Mirandilla should be convicted. Yes

7. Caluag v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 171511 | 04 March 2009 | Issa

petitioner: RONNIE CALUAG | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Information: 1) SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

Mode: Review on Certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:

Sentillas claimed that he never boxed Nestor.

MeTC: 1. Caluag and Sentillas- GUILTY OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

2. Caluag- GUILTY OF GRAVE THREATS

RTC: AFFIRMED IN TOTO

1. Grave threats (Art. 282)

3. Other light threats (Art. 285)

8. Paera v. People | Threats | G.R. 181626 | 30 May 2011 | Jolo

petitioner: SANTIAGO PAERA | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mode: Petition for Review | Modifying Circumstance/s: None

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of 3 counts of Grave Threats

9. Escolano v. People | Threats | G.R. No. 226991 | 10 December 2018 | Aubrey

Petitioner: ERLINDA ESCOLANO y IGNACIO | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mode: Appeal by certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE