Influenced by the sequential approach to negotiation (DOUGLAS, 1957, 1962,

MORLEY and STEPHENSON, 1977), DRUCKMAN considers that flexibility can be present
during all stages of international negotiation in different forms:

● During the preparatory period of thenegotiation, flexibility is expressedin the desire to

study the problem by adopting the perspective of the opposing party, the search for
integrative solutions that lead to a large joint profile, the effort to minimize the
ideological differences existing between the parties involved in the conflict.

● During the first phase of thenegotiation, the desire to separate the different themes to
be discussed, to consider that there is a possibility of partial agreement when
agreement on all the themes is not possible expressions of flexibility.

● During discussions, flexibility lies in the willingness to take into

consideration an argument from the opposing party.
● During the final phase of thenegotiation, flexibility is expressed through concessions
and the willingness to propose several solutions in the hope that there will be at least one
on which the parties can reach an agreement.

In 1993, DRUCKMAN identified a set of situational factors that led to concessional

behaviour. Starting from the theoretical model of SAWYER and GUETZKOW, DRUCKMAN
proposes to test the effect of situational factors relating to the context of international
negotiation. The origin of this study consists in the grouping within the same
negotiation scenario of a large number of variables
situational grouped into four subsets according to the stage at which they intervene in
the negotiation:

Table: The situational variables studied by Druckman (1993) and their grouping into four trading
operations (DRUCKMAN, 1993, p.10)

To study the simultaneous effect of situational variables on flexibility behaviours.

DRUCKMAN uses a simulation of multilateral international negotiation. The creation of
three experimental conditions made it possible to test the hypotheses and confirm the
results of previous studies: 1) produce flexibility behaviors throughout the
negotiation; 2)produce the inflexible (distributive) behaviors throughout the
negotiation; 3) produce distributive behaviors during the first three stages and flexible
behaviours at the final stage of negotiation. DRUCKMAN (1977), in the more recent
version of this model, enriches theoperationalization of pivotal factors by emphasizing
the influence of cognitive and motivational factors (within the fundamental factors) and
thesocial process ofnegotiation.

The subjective perception of the negotiator(s) regarding the attitudes and intentions of
the opposing party, as well as the subjective perception of the situation of the
international negotiation, turn out to be cognitive variablesthat can explain the behaviour
and outcome of the international negotiation. The experimental studies carried out by
TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN, focusing on the cognitive limitations of human reasoning,
constitute the starting point of the cognitive approach in the study of negotiation in terms
of bias affecting the behavior of negotiators and the outcome of negotiation. These
authors are interested in specific functions of human reasoning (decision-making in
situations involving a certain degree of risk, judgment in situations of uncertainty),
identify a series of biases and cognitive patterns that do not allow the individual to
produce objective judgments and lead him to the formulation of judgments. and
subjective assessments based on limited data, and
formulated according to pre-existing patterns. Precisely they identify three main
cognitive biases affecting human reasoning in case of judgment/evaluation under
conditions of uncertainty: 1) the bias of representativeness: 2) the bias of the
availability of information; 3) the bias of adjustment and anchoring: The final
judgment will, therefore, be a value adjusted in relation to the initial value. The
anchoring cognitive bias consists in the persistence of the individual at the initial value
which subsequently becomes the final judgment. This list of three cognitive biases
affecting human reasoning in the event of judgment in situations of uncertainty will
subsequently be enriched by the identification of other cognitive biases, such as
the overconfidence of the individual (KAHNEMAN et al. 1982).
Studies carried out on decision-making during problem solving show that subjects who
are sure of havingan objective reason in decision-making: 1) they propose original
solutions that deal with them in depth, 2) they increase the number of innovative and
effective concessions, 3) they redefine the previous proposals before ec the
corrections acceptable to the opponent, 4) they synthesize and re-study their credible
ideas to find an optimal solution (BROUSHLINSKY, RADCHENKO, 1988)