Diño vs. Olivarez

9/8/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 590
Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a

corporate cause of action; the corporation is a necessary party to the
suit. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 443 SCRA 259 [2004])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 170447. June 23, 2009.*
BIENVENIDO DIÑO and RENATO COMPARATIVO, petitioners,

vs. PABLO OLIVAREZ,1 respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Filing of an information in the trial

court initiates a criminal action; While it is true that the fiscal has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court, once the case has been brought to court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should be addressed to
the consideration of the trial court.—The filing of an information in the trial
court initiates a criminal action. The trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case. After the filing of the complaint or the information, a warrant
for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court. When the accused
voluntarily submits himself to the court or is duly arrested, the court then
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In this case, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused Carmelo Jaro,
Remedios Malibaran, and the respondent, who posted bail bonds after the
trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest on 4 October 2004. While it is true that
the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court, once the case has been brought to
court, whatever disposition
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
1 Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, public respondents need not be included
in the title as either petitioners or respondents.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diño vs. Olivarez
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017bc5b22b3703daec2f000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/13
the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should be addressed to the
consideration of the trial court.
Same; Arraignment; Instances that can Suspend the Arraignment of the
Accused.—Arraignment shall follow as a matter of course. Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, enumerates the instances that can
suspend the arraignment of the accused: Section 11. Suspension of
arraignment.—Upon motion of the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases: x x x x (c) A petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice,
or the Office of the President; Provided, That the period of suspension shall
not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Law Firm of Maronilla & Partners for petitioners.
Mendoza, Arzaga-Mendoza Law Firm for private respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners Bienvenido Diño and Renato Comparativo assail the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89230, nullifying the Orders3 dated 12 January 2005, 9
March 2005, and 31 March 2005 of Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of
Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, in
Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105.
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Lucas

P. Bersamin (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 10-29.
3 Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona; CA Rollo, pp. 20-26.
561
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 561

Diño vs. Olivarez
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against

respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause
in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor
Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of
Parañaque, two Informations4 were filed before the RTC on 29
September 2004 charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation
of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code, which read:

Criminal Case No. 04-1104

“That on or about the 10th day of May 2004, in the City of Parañaque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Remedios Malibiran and Pablo Olivarez, conspiring and

confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, engage in
vote buying activities on election day of May 10, 2004, by distributing or
giving Uniwide gift certificates, a thing of value, as consideration to induce
or influence the voters to vote for candidate Pablo Olivarez, a candidate for
the City Mayor of Parañaque, in violation of Omnibus Election Code.
Criminal Case No. 04-1105
“That on or about the 10th day of May, 2004, in the City of Parañaque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Carmelo Jaro and Pablo Olivarez, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, engage in
vote buying activities on election day of May 10, 2004, by distributing or
giving Uniwide gift certificates, a thing of value, as consideration to induce
or influence the voters to vote for candidate Pablo Olivarez, a candidate for
the City Mayor of Parañaque, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.”
The arraignment of the respondent was initially set on 18 October

2004.5
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 33-34.

5 Id., at p. 151
562

Diño vs. Olivarez
On 7 October 2004, respondent filed before the Law Department

of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) an “[a]ppeal of [the]
Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City with
Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority” pursuant to Section 10,
Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Respondent
argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before
the COMELEC should prevent the filing of the Informations before
the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause until the
COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Moreover, he argued that the
charges made against him were groundless.6
In a letter7 dated 11 October 2004, the Law Department of the
COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the
entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation of
the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until final resolution
of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
On 11 October 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two
criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was
charged therein, in violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.8
This caused the resetting of the scheduled arraignment on 18
October 2004 to 13 December 2004.9
Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash,

Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor, filed on 28 October 2004 its “Opposition to the Motion
to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informa-.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 35-48.

7 Id., at p. 50.
8 Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense.—A complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses.
9 CA Rollo, p. 151.
563
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 563

Diño vs. Olivarez
tions.10” The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged

respondent with violation of only paragraph a, in relation to
paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election
Code.11
On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona issued an Order resetting
the hearing scheduled on 13 December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on
account of the pending Motion to Quash of the respondent and the
Amended Informations of the public prosecutor.12
On 14 December 2004, respondent filed an “Opposition to the
Admission of the Amended Informations,” arguing that no
resolution was issued to explain the changes therein, particularly the
deletion of paragraph k, Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code. Moreover, he averred that the city prosecutor was no
longer empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC
had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and
suspend the hearing of the cases before the RTC until the resolution
of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc.13
On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona issued an order denying
respondent’s Motion to Quash dated 11 October 2004, and admitted
the Amended Informations dated 25 October 2004.14 Respondent
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 January 2005
thereon.15
On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9
March 2005, with a warning that the arraignment would proceed
without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue an
injunctive writ.16
_______________
10 Id., at p. 213.
11 Id., at pp. 56-57.
12 Id., at p. 151.
13 Id., at pp. 58-64.
14 Id., at pp. 20-21.
15 Id., at pp. 65-69.
16 CA Rollo, pp. 74-75.
564

Diño vs. Olivarez
On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear before the RTC.

Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of
respondent and the confiscation of the cash bond.17
On 11 March 2005, respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to Lift the Order of Arrest of Accused Dr.
Pablo Olivarez,”18 which was denied in an Order dated 31 March
2005. The Order directed that a bench warrant be issued for the
arrest of respondent to ensure his presence at his arraignment.19
On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of the COMELEC filed
before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion20 wherein it alleged that
pursuant to the COMELEC’s powers to investigate and prosecute
election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of
its authority to the city prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 745721 dated 4 April 2005.
The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 7457 states:
‘Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to APPROVE and ADOPT the recommendation of the Law
Department as follows:
1. To revoke the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Parañaque to investigate and prosecute election offense cases
insofar as I.S. Nos. 04-2608 and 04-2774, entitled “Renato
Comparativo vs. Remedios Malabiran and Pablo Olivarez” and
“Bienvenido et al. vs. Sally Rose Saraos, et al.,” respectively, are
concerned; and
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 22-23.

18 Id., at pp. 77-78.
19 Id., at p. 25.
20 Id., at pp. 112-121.
21 Id., at pp. 125-133.
565
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 565

Diño vs. Olivarez
2. To direct the Law Department to handle the prosecution of

these cases and file the appropriate Motion and Manifestation before
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, to hold in
abeyance further proceedings on Criminal Case Nos. 1104 and 1105
until the Commission has acted on the appeal of respondents.
Let the Law Department implement this Resolution.’
Thus, the Law Department of the COMELEC moved (1) that the
RTC hold in abeyance further proceedings in Criminal Cases No.
04-1104 and No. 04-1105 until the COMELEC has acted on
respondent’s appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority of the city
prosecutor of Parañaque to prosecute the case, designating therein
the lawyers from the Law Department of the COMELEC to
prosecute Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105.
On 8 April 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
89230, assailing the Orders, dated 12 January 2005, 9 March 2005
and 31 March 2005 of the RTC. The appellate court granted the
appeal in a Decision dated 28 September 2005 declaring that the
COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same. As
such, the COMELEC may delegate such authority to the Chief State
Prosecutor, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors. The
COMELEC, however, has the corresponding power, too, to revoke
such authority to delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the
COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of the case before the RTC
effectively deprived the city prosecutor of the authority to amend the
two informations. The appellate court also pronounced that Judge
Madrona erred in admitting the amended informations, since they
were made in excess of the delegated authority of the public
prosecutor, and his orders to arrest the respondent and
566

Diño vs. Olivarez
to confiscate the latter’s cash bond were devoid of legal basis.22 The
fallo of the Decision reads:
“UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition

at bench must be, as it hereby is, GRANTED. The impugned Orders of the
public respondent Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of Branch 274, Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City dated 12 January 2005, 9 March 2005, and 31
March 2005 are hereby VACATED and NULLIFIED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued in the instant petition is made PERMANENT.
Without costs in this instance.”23
Hence, the present petition under Rule 65 where the petitioners
enumerate the following assignments of error, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING
THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO AS IT BASICALLY ERRED IN
ITS APPRECIATION THAT THE TWO AMENDED INFORMATIONS

WERE FILED AT A TIME WHEN THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HAD
NO MORE AUTHORITY TO DO SO;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO ACCUSED’S ALLEGATION THAT COMELEC
RESOLUTION WAS RECEIVED BY THE PROSECUTOR “DAYS
BEFORE THE (sic) FILED THE AMENDED INFORMATIONS;”
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING AS
PERMANENT THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EARLIER
ISSUED.24
This Court finds merit in the present petition.
_______________
22 Rollo, pp. 10-29.

23 Id., at p. 28.
24 Id., at pp. 40, 42 and 44.
567
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 567

Diño vs. Olivarez
At the outset, it should be noted that the appropriate remedy for

petitioners is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
as petitioners aver in their Manifestation and Motion dated 9 January
2006. However, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, this Court has decided
to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under
Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within the
reglementary period for the same. Petitioners received the Court of
Appeals’ Resolution on 24 November 2005 and filed an Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal on 6 December 2005,
within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari. This Court granted the motion of petitioners
for an extension of 30 days from 9 December 2005, the expiration of
the reglementary period, and the petitioners were able to file their
petition on 6 January 2006 within the period for extension granted
by this Court. It cannot therefore be claimed that this petition is
being used as a substitute for appeal after the remedy has been lost
through the fault of the petitioner.25
The main issues in this case are (1) whether or not the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Parañaque had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it filed the Amended Informations, and whether
Judge Madrona had acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he
admitted the said Amended Informations and denied the
respondent’s motion to quash; and (2) whether or not Judge
Madrona had acted in accordance with law when he issued the
warrant for the arrest of respondent and ordered the confiscation of

his cash bond due to the latter’s failure to appear for arraignment.
There is no dispute that the COMELEC is empowered to
investigate and prosecute election offenses, and that the Chief
_______________
25 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075; 268
SCRA 597, 605 (1997).
568

Diño vs. Olivarez
State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city prosecutors,

acting on its behalf, must proceed within the lawful scope of their
delegated authority. Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides:
“Section 265. Prosecution.—The Commission shall, through its duly

authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from
his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal
or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.”
Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

provides for the continuing delegation of authority to other
prosecuting arms of the government, an authority that the
COMELEC may revoke or withdraw in the proper exercise of its
judgment.
“Section 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution

Arms of the Government.—The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and
City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are herby given continuing
authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election
laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to
them by the Commission or its duly authorized representative and to
prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time
by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal
is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the
common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case
can be done by the Commission.”
Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

provides that the COMELEC is empowered to revise, modify and
reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or

provincial/city prosecutors.
596

Diño vs. Olivarez
“Section 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor,

Provincial or City Fiscal.—Appeals from the resolution of the State
Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution
of investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within ten
(10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided, however
that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio
review, revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor
and/or provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said
appeals shall be immediately executory and final.”
Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in

filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority
delegated by the COMELEC. Resolution No. 7457, which
effectively revoked the deputation of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque, was issued on 4 April 2005, after the
Amended Informations were filed on 28 October 2004. The letter
dated 11 October 2004, written by Director Alioden D. Dalaig of the
COMELEC Law Department, did not revoke the continuing
authority granted to the City Prosecutor of Parañaque. It simply
reads:
“In this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit the entire records
of the case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros,
Manila by the fastest means available. You are further directed to suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of
said appeal by the Comelec En Banc.”26
The filing of the Amended Informations was not made in

defiance of these instructions by the COMELEC; rather it was an act
necessitated by the developments of the case. Respondent filed a
Motion to Quash on 11 October 2004 on the ground that more than
one offense was charged therein. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, provides:
_______________
26 CA Rollo, p. 50.
570

Diño vs. Olivarez
“Section 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. x x x.” (Emphasis provided.)
Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert
the dismissal of the complaints on the ground that more than one
offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended
Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC, in the letter dated
11 October 2004, were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to
reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution, not to have the public
prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently
allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus,
leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the
appeal before it. By filing the Amended Informations, the public
prosecutor had avoided such an undesirable situation, which would
have forced the COMELEC to re-file the cases, waste government
resources, and delay the administration of justice. Thus, the
precautionary measure taken by the public prosecutor was clearly
not intended to disobey the COMELEC, or to flout its authority or
diminish its powers to review the appealed Joint Resolution. As
such, the filing of the Amended Informations cannot in any way be
considered improper. Consequently, Judge Madrona acted in
accordance with law when he admitted these Informations and
dismissed the respondent’s Motion to Quash, as the ground stated
therein—the informations charged more than one offense—could no
longer be sustained.
Moreover, no abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge
Madrona when he issued the Orders, dated 9 March 2005 and 31
March 2005, for the arrest of the respondent due to his failure to be
present for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond.
These Orders are consistent with criminal procedure.
571
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 571

Diño vs. Olivarez
The filing of an information in the trial court initiates a criminal

action. The trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
After the filing of the complaint or the information, a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court. When the accused
voluntarily submits himself to the court or is duly arrested, the court
then acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.27 In this
case, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused Carmelo Jaro, Remedios Malibaran, and the respondent,
who posted bail bonds after the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest
on 4 October 2004. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court, once the case has been brought to court,
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should
be addressed to the consideration of the trial court.28
Thereafter, arraignment shall follow as a matter of course.
Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
enumerates the instances that can suspend the arraignment of the
accused:
“Section 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion of the proper

party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided,
That the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.”
_______________
27 Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 469-470.
28 Advincula v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 641, 652; 343 SCRA 583, 590-591
(2000); Crystal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 83635-53, 28 February 1989, 170
SCRA 822, 825; Republic v. Sunga, G.R. No. L-38634, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA
191, 202-203; and Crespo v. Mogul, id.
572

Diño vs. Olivarez
From the foregoing, it is clear that the arraignment of the accused

is not indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an appeal before
the Department of Justice or, in this case, Law Department of the
COMELEC; rather, the reviewing authority is allowed 60 days
within which to decide the appeal. In this case, respondent filed his
Appeal of the Joint Resolution at the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Parañaque on 7 October 2004. Thus, the arraignment that was
scheduled on 11 October 2004 was re-scheduled to 13 December
2004, approximately 60 days thereafter. On 1 December 2004, the
arraignment scheduled on 13 December 2004 was reset to 1
February 2005 because of the pending Motion to Quash. When the
respondent failed to appear on the scheduled arraignment, Judge
Madrona nonetheless reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with
the warning that the court would impose the appropriate sanctions,
should respondent still fail to appear therein. It was only on 9 March
2005, or five months after the respondent filed his appeal before the
Law Department of the COMELEC that Judge Madrona held the
arraignment and issued the Bench Warrant of Arrest against
respondent.29 Five months, which far exceeded the sixty days
provided by the rules, was ample time for the respondent to obtain
from COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution.
In pronouncing that Judge Madrona acted in grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to defer the arraignment of the respondent,
the Court of Appeals cited Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge

How,30 wherein this Court cautioned judges to refrain from
precipitately arraigning the accused to avoid any miscarriage of
justice. However, this case was decided before the Rules of Criminal
Procedure were revised on 1 December 2000; and the rule setting
the 60-day period for the suspension of the arraignment of the
accused pending an appeal or a petition for review before a
reviewing authority was not yet applicable. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that
_______________
29 CA Rollo, pp. 151-152.

30 393 Phil. 172, 180; 338 SCRA 511, 518 (2000).
573
VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 573

Diño vs. Olivarez
even in Solar, this Court did not sanction an indefinite suspension of

the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing
authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest
possible time was anchored on the rule provided under Department
Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that
the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall
be 75 days.31
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89230 is REVERSED. This Court orders the continuation of the
proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105 before
the RTC, the prosecution of which shall be under the direction of the
Law Department of the COMELEC. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and

Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed.
Note.—Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure mandates that the arraignment shall be suspended for a
period of not exceeding 60 days from the filing of a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Reyes-Rara vs. Chan,
497 SCRA 616 [2006])
——o0o——
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 185-186; pp. 522-523.
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9/8/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 590

Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a

G.R. No. 170447. June 23, 2009.*

BIENVENIDO DIÑO and RENATO COMPARATIVO, petitioners,

Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Filing of an information in the trial

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Diño vs. Olivarez

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

2 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Lucas

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 561

Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against

Criminal Case No. 04-1104

named accused, Remedios Malibiran and Pablo Olivarez, conspiring and

The arraignment of the respondent was initially set on 18 October

4 Id., at pp. 33-34.

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On 7 October 2004, respondent filed before the Law Department

Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash,

6 Id., at pp. 35-48.

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 563

tions.10” The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear before the RTC.

‘Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

17 Id., at pp. 22-23.

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 565

2. To direct the Law Department to handle the prosecution of

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition

ITS APPRECIATION THAT THE TWO AMENDED INFORMATIONS

This Court finds merit in the present petition.

22 Rollo, pp. 10-29.

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 567

At the outset, it should be noted that the appropriate remedy for

warrant for the arrest of respondent and ordered the confiscation of

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city prosecutors,

“Section 265. Prosecution.—The Commission shall, through its duly

Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

“Section 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution

Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Section 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor,

Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in

The filing of the Amended Informations was not made in

26 CA Rollo, p. 50.

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Section 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 571

The filing of an information in the trial court initiates a criminal

“Section 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion of the proper

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

From the foregoing, it is clear that the arraignment of the accused

the Court of Appeals cited Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge

29 CA Rollo, pp. 151-152.

VOL. 590, JUNE 23, 2009 573

even in Solar, this Court did not sanction an indefinite suspension of

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and

Petition granted, judgment reversed.

Note.—Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

31 Id., at pp. 185-186; pp. 522-523.