IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILLAND

TEST AMENT OF CECILIA ESGUERRA COSICO

G.R. No. 246997, May 5, 2021
SECOND DIVISION, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:

Cecilia was born to Jose and Corazon Cosico. She was born with a physical disability and
was known in the locality as a "lumpo." Corazon passed away when Cecilia was just 1 year
old and the latter was left in the care and custody of her maternal aunt, Mercedes.
Mercedes raised together with Mercedes's legally adopted daughter, petitioner Thelma.
Because of her physical condition, Cecilia spent most of her days in her bedroom. She never
attended school nor learned to read or write

In 1996, when Cecilia was 64 years old, she decided to execute her last will and testament.
Through Thelma's balae Liberato. Cecilia asked Atty. Bueser, then a notary public, for
assistance in preparing the last will.

On September 8, 1996, Atty. Bueser and Liberato went to Cecilia's house. Atty. Bueser and
Cecilia talked inside the latter's bedroom while Liberato stayed outside by the door.
Liberato heard Cecilia call Mercedes whom she directed to collect documents from the steel
cabinet. Mercedes complied and handed over the documents to Atty. Bueser.

On September l 0, 1996, Atty. Bueser and Liberato returned to Cecilia's house with the
finished copy of her last will and testament denominated Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya
which consisted of 4 pages.

Reynaldo and Ricardo were also present at Cecilia's house that night upon her request.
Reynaldo was the son of Cecilia's helper, while Ricardo was a neighbor who regularly went
to the house to buy coconuts from Mercedes.

In the presence of Liberato, Reynaldo, and Ricardo who served as notarial witnesses to
Cecilia's Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya, Atty. Bueser read the contents of the
document to Cecilia and carefully explained to her its effects and consequences. He
then asked her if she fully understood its contents and whether it was done according
to her wishes. Cecilia confirmed.

After Atty. Bueser read and explained the contents of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya,
Cecilia affixed her thumbmark to the will on top of her printed name and on the lower
left portion of the first and second pages of the document - all in the presence of Atty.
Bueser and her notarial witnesses. Subsequently, in the presence of Liberato,
Reynaldo, and Ricardo, both Cecilia and Atty. Bueser signed on the left margin of the
first two pages ofthe Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya and at the end of the attestation
clause.

After all the preparations, Atty. Bueser handed over the signed copy of the Huling
Habilin at Pagpapasiya to Cecilia.

On March 22, 2006, Cecilia died at the age of 74. Following her death, Mercedes obtained a
copy of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya, had it photocopied and gave her spouse
Gomerciendo and Thelma a copy each. Subsequently on May 9, 2009, Mercedes died.

On July 6, 2010, Thelma filed a Petition for probate of Cecilia's will and for her appointment
as administrator of the latter's estate before the RTC of San Pablo City.

On September 23, 2010, Cecilia's half siblings from the same father, respondents Jose,
Manuel, Minerva, and Eleanor Cosico opposed the petition. They essentially alleged that the
formalities for the execution of a valid will under Articles 805 to 809 of the Civil Code were
not complied with. That Cecilia was not mentally capacitated at the time she purportedly
executed her will at all, she signed it under duress and improper pressure from the
beneficiary; the alleged thumbprint of Cecilia was procured through fraud; and Cecilia did
not intend the document denominated Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya to be her last will and
testament.

On October 28, 2010, Batubalani Realty and Development Corporation moved for leave to
intervene, claiming it had interest in Cecilia's properties. During their lifetime, Cecilia and
Mercedes supposedly entered into a Joint Venture Agreement. Under this Agreement,
Batubalani developed a subdivision project covering 35,000 square meters of land owned
by Cecilia and Mercedes. Batubalani then sold the developed lots. The proceeds were
shared by the company, Cecilia, and Mercedes.

RTC Ruling:

The trial court granted the motion to intervene and appointed Atty. Iligan as Special
Administrator of Cecilia's estate. Atty. Iligan prepared a Segregation Agreement with
Thelma. It also granted the Special Administrator's Motion for Segregation.

The trial court granted the Letters testamentary and/or administration in favor of Thelma
without posing any bond. It essential ruled that Cecilia freely and voluntarily executed the
will, during which time, she was of sound mind. The Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya was
executed in accordance with the formal and essential requisites of law.

CA Ruling:

The Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that Cecilia's Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya was
void since it violated Article 808 of the Civil Code. Article 808 not observed during the
execution of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya as it was read to Cecilia only once by Atty.
Bueser and lacked the second reading requirement by one of her notarial witnesses. With
the disallowance of the will to probate, the Segregation Agreement becomes devoid of
basis.

1st ISSUE: Whether or not Article 808 was complied with? YES.

HELD:

Article 808 of the Civil Code requires that the contents of a last will and testament be read
to the testator twice, once by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary, viz.
:

Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged. (n)

While the law imposes the requirement only when the testator is blind, the Court has
expanded its coverage to those who are illiterate.

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes ...

Here, Cecilia was not blind but a lumpo. The CA nevertheless applied Article 808 of the Civil
Code considering that Cecilia received no formal education and is incapable of reading or
writing, hence, illiterate.

Indeed, the purpose of a will is to grant the wishes of a person upon his/her death,
especially with respect to the disposition of his/her worldly possessions. Both law and
jurisprudence are consistent in allowing a degree of flexibility with the requirements in the
execution of wills, especially as to the formal aspect.

Here, we find that upholding respondents' position and the Court of Appeals' ruling would
only frustrate Cecilia's will. A review of the document itself, the testimonies of the
witnesses, and the record shows that the intention of the testator had been
established and protected from fraud or trickery.

Notably, Atty. Bueser read and explained the contents of the Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya to Cecilia. Meanwhile, Liberato and Reynaldo listened and understood
the explanation ofAtty. Bueser. It is also undisputed that Cecilia made no denial or
correction to what she had heard. As such, we are convinced that the underlying
protection of Article 808 had been fulfilled here.

At any rate, the Court refuses to entertain such a possibility of fraud because Atty. Bueser,
aside from having observed all other formalities, handed copies of the Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya to the notarial witnesses for their signatures. This gave them the opportunity
to read a short four page document which they all flipped through from pages one through
four to affix their respective signatures, essentially negating any possibility of fraud,
trickery, or misrepresentation.

More, the notarial witnesses heard Atty. Bueser read and explain to Cecilia her Huling
Habilin at Pagpapasiya which gave both Cecilia and themselves the opportunity to object to
any provision in the will that may not have been according to her wishes. As it was, no
objections were made. To be sure,· Reynaldo knew and understood Cecilia's testamentary
act and disposition ofher properties.

Verily, Cecilia's Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya and Reynaldo's testimony are consistent on
the most material point in the will - that her properties shall be inherited by her aunt,
Mercedes.

In sum, Article 808 is meant to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but is never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy testamentary
privilege. Here, the danger that Article 808 is designed to prevent is undoubtedly
nonexistent. As such, the trial court correctly ruled that the Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya had substantially complied with its spirit for the purpose of admitting it
to probate.

2ns ISSUE: May the probate court approve the Segregation Agreement? NO.

HELD:

Trial court, acting as a probate court has limited jurisdiction, relating only to matters
involving the probate of the will, i.e. the proceedings in determining the validity of a will.

Here petition filed below is for probate. The question is limited to determining the
validity of a will for its allowance - not the distribution of the estate yet. Thus, we
cannot concur in the trial court's reasoning that the issue on the approval of the
Segregation Agreement was mooted by Thelma's eventual inheritance of Cecilia's entire
estate. For the properties under Cecilia's ownership would still be subject to accounting,
collation, and even payment of loans or setting off liabilities.

DR. NIXON L. TREYES V. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L.
LARLAR, ET AL,
G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
EN BANC, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:

On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes wife of Petitioner Treyes, did not bear any children
with petitioner Treyes, died intestate without issue. She was survived by her widower (the
petitioner) and by her seven siblings (the respondents). At the time of her death, Rosie left
behind 14 real estate properties which she owned together with Treyes as their conjugal
properties. The controversy arose when petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and have it registered in his favor. The first Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was
registered with the Register of Deeds while the second was registered with the RD. In these
two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, Treyes trasferred the estate of Rosie unto himself,
claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie. The siblings sent a letter to
petitioner Treyes requesting for a conference to discuss the settlement of the estate of their
deceased sister, Rosie but the latter refused to heed.

Thus, respondents filed before the RTC a complaint for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication, Cancellation of TCTs, Reconveyance of Ownership and Possession, Partition,
and damages against petitioner Treyes.

SIBLINGS’ Contentions: They alleged that petitioner Treyes fraudulently caused the
transfer of the subject properties to himself by executing the two Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication and refused to reconvey the shares of the private respondents who, being the
brothers and sisters of Rosie, are legal heirs of the deceased.

TREYES’ Contention: Through his counsel, Treyes filed an Entry of Special Appearance
and Motion to Dismiss. He contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate special proceeding is a
prerequisite to an ordinary suit for recovery ow ownership and possession of property
instituted by the legal heirs.

RTC Ruling: The trial court held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint's
third cause of action, i.e., partition: x x x A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of
action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance (3)
Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over the first, second and
fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition and the
said cause of action should be dropped from the case.

Unsatisfied with the aforesaid Resolution of the RTC, petitioner Treyes filed an Omnibus
Motion however the RTC denied it and directed petitioner Treyes to file his responsive
pleading.

Treyes then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari asserting that the RTC's denial of his
second Motion to Dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

CA Ruling:

The CA held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner
Treyes' second Motion to Dismiss. Since the Complaint primarily seeks to annul petitioner
Treyes' Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, which partakes the nature of an ordinary civil
action, the CA found that the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the private
respondents' Complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a necessity of a prior determination of Heirship in a

Separate Special Proceeding. NO.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that no prior judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before
an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property or properties forming part
of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs
of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the
compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the
nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in
the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of their status as such.
The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the
ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or
reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the
parties.

In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed
by the private respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination
of their status as heirs, as it was their position that their status as heirs was already
established ipso Jure without the need of any judicial confirmation. Instead, what the
Complaint alleges is that the private respondents' rights over the subject properties,
by virtue of their being siblings of the deceased, must be enforced by annulling the
Affidavits of Self- Adjudication and ordering the reconveyance of the subject
properties.

Lastly, the Supreme Court ruled that despite the promulgation of Ypon, Yaptinchay,
Portugal, Reyes, and other cases upholding the rule that a prior determination of heirship
in a special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action involving heirs, such rule
has not been consistently upheld and is far from being considered a doctrine. To the
contrary, a plurality of decisions promulgated by both the Court En Banc and its Divisions
firmly hold that the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence
ordinary civil actions arising out of their rights of succession, without the need for a
separate prior judicial declaration of their heirship. provided only that there is no pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.