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Instructions: You have 2 hours to complete the exam. There is only one correct answer for each question. You obtain
a point of 1 for each correct answer and a penalty of -0.25 for incorrect answers. Good luck with the exam!
SHORT QUESTIONS
(a) We cannot observe the same unit being treated and untreated at the same time
(b) The parallel trend assumption might not hold in certain circumstances
2. Which of the following is not a necessary condition for consistency of the OLS estimator?
(a) The data are random sample from the population of interest
(d) E(u | X) = 0
3. The model of taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1975) is built on the premise that:
(b) Individuals have a preference for some groups and an aversion towards others, even when these groups are
equally productive
(c) Firms have limited information on workers’ productivity and use observable characteristics (e.g. race, gender)
(d) Employers offer equal wages to workers of equal productivity in order to maximise profits
Labour Economics (BSc) Academic year 2019-2020
(a) Always
(b) Never
LONG QUESTIONS
1. Consider an individual whose preferences are described by U = C 1/2 + L1/2 , where C denotes consumption and
L corresponds to leisure. The average price of the consumption good is p = 2, the hourly wage is w = 4 and the
amount of available time is T = 24. The individual has no source of non-labour income (v = 0).
(a) What are the vertical and horizontal intercepts of the budget constraint if we place consumption of the y
(a) 2
(b) -2
(c) 1
(d) -1
(c) Everything else being equal, indifference curves will be steeper for an individual that:
(d) What is the optimal amount of consumption, leisure and hours worked (H) chosen by the individual?
(e) Assume that the individual now earns non-labour income v = 6. Derive the vertical and horizontal intercepts
(f) Derive the new optimal amount of consumption, leisure and hours worked (i.e. taking into account the
(g) How would you interpret the result on labour supply obtained in point (f) in terms of income and substitution
effects?
(a) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while the substitution effect has the opposite
(b) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while the substitution effect has the opposite
(c) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while there is no substitution effect
(d) The income and substitution effect perfectly compensate each other
(h) What is the minimum level of non-labour income that would induce the individual to withdraw from the
(a) v=186
(b) v=188
(c) v=190
(d) v=192
(i) Returning to the situation initially described in the exercise (i.e. v = 0), what happens to the optimal choice
of the individual in terms of consumption, leisure and hours worked if the wage rate now rises to w = 8?
(j) How would you interpret the result on labour supply obtained in point (i) in terms of income and substitution
effects?
(a) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while the substitution effect has the opposite
(b) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while the substitution effect has the opposite
(c) The income effect leads to a reduction in labour supply, while there is no substitution effect
(d) The income and substitution effect perfectly compensate each other
2. A labour market is composed of two types of workers: high and low skilled ones (denoted by H and L, respectively).
The productivity of high skilled workers is equal to 8 (ah = 8), while the productivity of low skilled workers is
equal to 4 (al = 4). The employer does not directly observe the productivity level of a worker, but knows the
overall distribution of workers’ types in the labour market. In particular, high skilled workers constitute 40% of
Labour Economics (BSc) Academic year 2019-2020
the total labour market while the remaining 60% is composed by low skilled workers. Finally, assume that all
workers can obtain utility u = 2 from an alternative activity. When indifferent between the wage offer and this
(a) Assume that the employer offers to all workers the same wage (w), corresponding to the average productivity
(a) w = 5.4
(b) w = 5.6
(c) w = 5.8
(d) w = 6
(b) What is the level of expected profit (π) made by the employer under this wage offer?
(a) π = 0
(b) π = 1
(c) π = 2
(d) π = 3
(c) The wage offer defined in (a) does not maximise expected profits for the employer. Maintaining the assump-
tion that the employer wants to offer a unique wage to all the workers (i.e. pooling equilibrium), what would
(a) w = 0
(b) w = 1
(c) w = 2
(d) w = 3
(d) What is the level of expected profits made by the employer under the wage offer obtained in (c)?
(a) π = 2
(b) π = 2.8
(c) π = 3.6
(d) π = 4.4
Labour Economics (BSc) Academic year 2019-2020
(e) From now on, assume that workers can signal their skill type by acquiring education. However, obtaining
e∗8
a degree is costly and workers face the following utility function: U = w − λi , where e is equal to 1 if the
worker decides to acquire education and 0 otherwise. λi is a parameter that captures the inverse of the cost
of acquiring education for a specific productivity type, with λh = 4 for high skilled workers and λl = 2 for
low skilled ones. Assume that the employer offers a wage equal to 8 to workers with education and 7 to
workers without education. Which type of workers will acquire education under these conditions?
(a) Both high and low skilled workers will acquire education
(b) Neither high nor low skilled workers will acquire education
(c) High skilled workers will acquire education, but low skilled workers will not
(d) Low skilled workers will acquire education, but high skilled workers will not
(f) Maintain the same conditions as above, but now assume that the employer offers a wage equal to 10 to
workers with education and 5 to workers without education. Which type of workers will acquire education
(a) Both high and low skilled workers will acquire education
(b) Neither high nor low skilled workers will acquire education
(c) High skilled workers will acquire education, but low skilled workers will not
(d) Low skilled workers will acquire education, but high skilled workers will not
(g) Finally, assume that the employer will offer a wage equal to 8 to workers with education and 5 to workers
without education. Which type of workers will acquire education under these conditions?
(a) Both high and low skilled workers will acquire education
(b) Neither high nor low skilled workers will acquire education
(c) High skilled workers will acquire education, but low skilled workers will not
(d) Low skilled workers will acquire education, but high skilled workers will not
(h) Assume now that the employer wants to favour the emergence of a separating equilibrium, where high skilled
workers acquire education while low skilled workers do not. Also assume that, when indifferent between
acquiring and not acquiring education, workers of all types decide to acquire education. Which are the wage
Labour Economics (BSc) Academic year 2019-2020
offers for workers with and without education that maximise expected profits and that are compatible with
(i) What is the level of expected profits made by the employer under the wage offer obtained in (h)?
(a) π = 2
(b) π = 2.8
(c) π = 3.6
(d) π = 4.4
(j) Compare your answers to points (d) and (i) and derive which type of equilibrium will emerge in the labour
market
Please do not turn over your sheet until all students have
Good luck!