1. ABDHULLAHI vs. PFIZER 2. NO.
With regard to the forum non conveniens analysis, the
562 F.3D 163
FACTS: Pfizer, a pharmaceutical company, conducted drug
trials for an experimental antibiotic called Trovan in northern
Nigeria in 1996 during an outbreak of bacterial meningitis.
Pfizer gave one-hundred children at the local hospital Trovan
and gave another one-hundred children Ceftriaxone, the
established antiobiotic to treat bacterial meningitis, at lower
doses to allude to the success of Trovan.
Pfizer did not receive consent from the patients or their
parents to take the experimental drug, inform the patients or
their parents of the experimental nature of the study, or that
the effective drug to treat bacterial meningitis was being
administered in the same hospital.
Eleven of the children who took Trovan and the reduced doses
of Ceftriaxone died and several other children were left with
permanent impairments.
Now, petitioner sued Pfizer under the Alien Tort Statute for
violating international law for non-consensual medical
experimentation. The case, however, was dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiffs failed to identity a source of
international law that provides a proper predicate for
jurisdiction under the ATS and due to forum non-conveniens.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the prohibition on medical experimentation
on non-consenting human subjects was violated by Pfizer.
2. Whether or not the forum non-conveniens applies.
RULING:
1. YES. Pfizer, Inc. violated the non-consensual
medical experimentation on humans, it violated a universally
accepted norm of customary international law.
The status of the prohibition on nonconsensual
experimentation as a norm that states conceive as legally
binding–and therefore part of customary international law–is
confirmed by Article 2 of the accord, which requires that
“each State Party . . . undertake to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” ICCPR art.
2(1). The international community’s recognition in the ICCPR
of its obligation to protect humans, regardless of the source of
the action, is powerful evidence of the prohibition’s place in
customary international law.
district court declined to accept plaintiffs’ submissions
concerning Pfizer’s alleged bribery of Nigerian officials on the
ground that they were not based on personal knowledge.
Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to submit specific
evidence that the Nigerian judiciary would be biased against
its own citizens in an action against Pfizer, the district court
alternatively held that Nigeria was an adequate alternate
forum.
2. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 122191
FACTS: Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros
Morada (plaintiff) as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta,
Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer and Allah. Because it was almost morning
when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have
breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in
the room, Allah left on some pretext. Thamer then attempted
to rape Morada. A roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her. Thamer and Allah
were arrested by the Jakarta police. SAUDIA negotiated with
the Jakarta police for the release of the detained crew
members.
One year and a half later, a SAUDIA officer brought Morada
to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to
close the case against Thamer and Allah. A Saudi judge
interrogated Morada through an interpreter about the Jakarta
incident.
A few days later, to her astonishment and shock, the Saudi
Court rendered a decision sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. The Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found Morada guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, Morada was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi, its country manager. SAUDIA filed an
Omnibus Motion To Dismiss. It alleged that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. SAUDIA filed with
the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the petition and
ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering
that the Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages is
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Quezon City has jurisdiction to
hear and try the case.
RULING: YES. On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in
the case: A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines
and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is
said to contain a “foreign element”. The presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception. The forms in
which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties
to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a
contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element
may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact
that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts”
situation to arise.
COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a
domestic case. However, the court finds that the RTC of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney`y’s fees, litigation
expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred
Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the
venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional
Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo
found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused
to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff
(private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere,
i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown
by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff
(now private respondent) should be upheld.
The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
MORADA through her act of filing, and SAUDIA by praying
for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law
problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation where some of
the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact”
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and
in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due
and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed
to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.
For in our view what is important here is the place where the
over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant,
had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to
determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all
injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with
the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our
view, has been properly established.
3. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON
ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., vs.
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177 | November 23, 2007
FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon),
a Japanese consultancy firm entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) in Japan with respondent Minoru
Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the
project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) Project in the Philippines On 2000, petitioner
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the company
had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31,
2000, just in time for the ICA’s expiry.
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,
through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed
term.
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the
petitioners, respondent consequently initiated an action for
specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial
Court.
Petitioners contended that the ICA had been perfected in Japan
and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted
that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s
ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper
courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.
The RTC, denied the motion to dismiss invoking the ruling in
Insular Government v. Frank that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance.
The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere
in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put
in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct
in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of
Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by
foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, the “state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
RULING: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts
problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex for it will often coincide,
the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the
necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to
validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues
of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial
court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show
that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to
it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon does not claim that the RTC is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject
controversy for a civil case for specific performance and
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they
rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction
are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus,
and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The
Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the
ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made.
The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means
the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of
the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most
significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to
apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has
the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to
be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference
to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's
law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a
conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case
is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law
rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out
any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application
of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign
country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution
of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and
proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a
foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other State or States.
The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be
used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it
is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.
Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on
the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of
the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
4. SMALL vs. UNITED STATES
THIRD CIRCUIT No. 03750.
Argued November 3, 2004 Decided April 26, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court
of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that
country. He served five years in prison and then returned to
the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities
subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1),
which forbids any person convicted in any court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to
possess any firearm. (Emphasis added.) Small pleaded guilty
while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the
ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside
§922(g)(1)s scope. The Federal District Court and the Third
Circuit rejected this argument.
ISSUE: Whether or not Small is correct in arguing that his
earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside §922(g)(1)s
scope which punishes any person convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year to possess any firearm
RULING: YES. Section 922(g)(1)s phrase convicted in any
court encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.
In considering the scope of the phrase convicted in any court it
is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns
in mind. This assumption is similar to the legal presumption
that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic,
not extraterritorial, application.
The phrase convicted in any court describes one necessary
portion of the gun possession activity that is prohibited as
a matter of domestic law. Moreover, because foreign
convictions may include convictions for conduct that
domestic laws would permit, e.g., for engaging in economic
conduct that our society might encourage, convictions from
a legal system that are inconsistent with American
understanding of fairness, and convictions for conduct that
domestic law punishes far less severely, the key statutory
phrase convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year somewhat less
reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of
U. S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic
convictions, are at issue. In addition, it is difficult to read the
statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional
distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To
somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that
meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the
statutes language; it is not easy for those not versed in
foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those
previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic
crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. These
considerations provide a convincing basis for applying the
ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented
statutes here. Thus, the Court assumes a congressional
intent that the phrase convicted in any court applies
domestically, not extraterritorially, unless the statutory
language, context, history, or purpose shows the contrary.
There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The
statute's language suggests no intent to reach beyond domestic
convictions. To the contrary, if read to include foreign
convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies. For
example, in creating an exception allowing gun possession
despite a conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory
crime, §921(a)(20)(A) speaks of Federal or State antitrust or
regulatory offenses. If the phrase convicted in any court
generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language
causes no problem. But if the phrase includes foreign
convictions, the words Federal or State prevent the exception
from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory
conviction is at issue. Such illustrative examples suggest
that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase
convicted in any court applies to foreign convictions.
Moreover, the statutes legislative history indicates no intent to
reach beyond domestic convictions. Although the statutory
purpose of keeping guns from those likely to become a
threat to society does offer some support for reading
§922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions, the likelihood that
Congress, at best, paid no attention to the matter is
reinforced by the empirical fact that, according to the
Government, since 1968, there have fewer than a dozen
instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as
a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution.
5. KIOBEL vs. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM.
CO. - 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)
No. 10–1491. Argued February 28, 2012—Reargued
October 1, 2012—Decided April 17, 2013
FACTS: After residents in Nigeria began protesting the
environmental effects of the corporations' practices, Nigerian
military and police forces allegedly attacked the residents, and
the corporations allegedly violated the law of nations by
aiding and abetting the Nigerian Government.
Petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States,
filed suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),
alleging that respondents—certain Dutch, British, and
Nigerian corporations—aided and abetted the Nigerian
Government in committing violations of the law of nations in
Nigeria. The ATS provides that “the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.”
The District Court dismissed several of petitioners’ claims, but
on interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint, reasoning
that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under
the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.
 ISSUE: Whether the presumption against extraterritoriality
apply to claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding
that the Nigerian nationals' case seeking relief for violations of
the law of nations occurring outside the United States was
barred because the presumption against extraterritoriality
applied to claims under the ATS, and nothing in the ATS
rebutted that presumption.
Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute that creates no causes of action. It permits
federal courts to “recognize private claims [for a modest
number of international law violations] under federal common
law.” In contending that a claim under the ATS does not reach
conduct occurring in a foreign sovereign’s territory,
respondents rely on the presumption against extraterritorial
application, which provides that “when a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” The
presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord.” It is typically applied to
discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies
abroad, but its underlying principles similarly constrain courts
when considering causes of action that may be brought under
the ATS. Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in
this context, where the question is not what Congress has done
but what courts may do.
The presumption is not rebutted by the text, history, or
purposes of the ATS. Nothing in the ATS’s text evinces a
clear indication of extraterritorial reach. Violations of the
law of nations affecting aliens can occur either within or
outside the United States. And generic terms, like “any” in the
phrase “any civil action,” do not rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Petitioners also rely on the common-law
“transitory torts” doctrine, but that doctrine is inapposite here;
as the Court has explained, “the only justification for allowing
a party to recover when the cause of action arose in another
civilized jurisdiction is a well-founded belief that it was a
cause of action in that place.”
The historical background against which the ATS was enacted
also does not overcome the presumption. When the ATS was
passed, “three principal offenses against the law of nations”
had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.
Prominent contemporary examples of the first two offenses—
immediately before and after passage of the ATS—provide no
support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of
action to be brought under the statute for violations of the law
of nations occurring abroad. And although the offense of
piracy normally occurs on the high seas, beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or any other country, applying
U. S. law to pirates does not typically impose the sovereign
will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the
territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore
carries less direct foreign policy consequences. A 1795
opinion of Attorney General William Bradford regarding the
conduct of U. S. citizens on both the high seas and a foreign
shore is at best ambiguous about the ATS’s extraterritorial
application; it does not suffice to counter the weighty concerns
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality. Finally,
there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the
United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement
of international norms.
6. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs. MA.
JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO
G.R. No. 198587 |January 14, 2015
Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum
court) is called upon to respect the parties’ choice of
governing law, such respect must not be so permissive as to
lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy that underlie the contract
central to the controversy. We emphasize the glaringly
discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As argued by
respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the
risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that
pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from
and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.
FACTS: Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a
foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents (complainants
before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia
as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
Respondents continued their employment until they are
separated from service on various dates in 2006. Respondents
contended that the termination of their employment was
illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely
because they were pregnant. They allege that they had
informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone
through the necessary procedures to process their maternity
leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later
informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it
required respondents to file their resignation letters.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity
leaves and demand for their resignation on its “Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified
Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the employment of a
Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It
claimed that all the determining points of contact referred to
foreign law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be
dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
ISSUE: Whether forum non conveniens is applicable.
RULING: NO. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum
shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of
addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules
of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are
designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a
single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised
to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal’s desistance
in exercising jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens
is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It
is a measure that prevents the former’s having to interfere in
affairs which are better and more competently addressed by
the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition
not only that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on
and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are
better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to
dispense justice.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not
operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to
require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes
forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the
stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require
the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. Forum non
conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing
law. That forum non conveniens may ultimately result in
the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its
application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is
not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration
in this case.
Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual
choice of law provisions. Where such provisions exist,
Philippine tribunals, acting as the forum court, generally defer
to the parties’ articulated choice. This is consistent with the
fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts.
Article 1306 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “[t]he
contracting parties may establish ‘such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.”
Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum
court) is called upon to respect the parties’ choice of
governing law, such respect must not be so permissive as to
lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy that underlie the contract central
to the controversy.
We emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia’s
policy. As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the
termination of employment of flight attendants who become
pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an
occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s
policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of
no other consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present
physical limitations that may render difficult the performance
of functions associated with being a flight attendant.
Nevertheless, it would be the height of inequity to view
pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it
must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear to
us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to
exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However,
we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an
impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the
complete termination of the means through which a woman
earns a living.
Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental
equality before the law of men and women, it is settled that
contracts relating to labor and employment are impressed with
public interest. Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides that
“[t]he relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that
labor contracts must yield to the common good.”
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege
to be) the illegal termination of respondents’ employment, this
case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and
jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find application in and
govern this case. ‘Moreover, as this premise for Saudia’s
insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been
shattered, it follows that Philippine tribunals may properly
assume jurisdiction over the present controversy.
7. THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA
HOTEL INTL. LTD. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER
CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G.
SANTOS
G.R. No. 120077, October 13, 2000
FACTS: During his employment with the Mazoon Printing
Press in the Sultanate of Oman, respondent Marcelo Santos
received a letter dated May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R.
Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China
informing Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor
Buenio, a friend of his. Mr. Shmidt offered Santos the same
position as printer, but with a higher monthly salary and
increased benefits. Santos was deemed resigned from the
Mazoon Printing Press, on June 30, 1988 and started to work
at the Palace Hotel on November 5, 1988.
Subsequently, Santos signed an amended "employment
agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effective November 5,
1988. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of
petitioner MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the
employment agreement under the word "noted". However, due
to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in
China, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of
respondent.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and
Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel
was impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is
a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50%
of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages
the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled
the case ruled in favor of Santos. The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC is a convenient forum to
hear the case.
RULING: NO. The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient
forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two
foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign
elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the
case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The
Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all
cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. — Respondent Santos was hired
directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through
correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where
respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without
the intervention of the POEA or any authorized
recruitment agency of the government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or
agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. The conditions
are unavailing in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the NLRC is a
convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case —
from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal
occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is
compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the
Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the
Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the
Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt
and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an
intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the
employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil.
This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made).
The employment contract was not perfected in the
Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by
writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This
letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of
China.
No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC
determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal
dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing,
People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position
to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly
adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify
respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. —
Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the
NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the
employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served
with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no

power to solve controversies involving foreign employers.
Neither are we saying that we do not have power over an
employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos
were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum,
specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He
is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits
with conviction.

Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on
the merits, the NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.