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NEW LAW COLLEGE

Name: Karishma Shah


Class: T.Y.LLB ‘D’
Roll No.: 349
Subject: Interpretation of Statute
Topic: Aids to Interpretation
Table of contents

Meaning ............................................................................................................................. 3

Internal Aid ................................................................................................................... 3-10

External Aid ................................................................................................................. 11-13

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Aids to Interpretation
Meaning
Interpretation means the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by Salmond, “By interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”
Jurists take the help of both Rules and Aids in the interpretation of Statutes. As stated by the
Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam, interpretation of statute
being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant
should be admissible. A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. There are three rules
of interpretation of statutes- Literal, Golden and Mischief. An Aid, on the other hand is a device
that helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court has to take
recourse to various internal and external aids.
Internal aids broadly consist of (1) Title (2) Preamble (3) Headings and marginal notes (4)
Sections and sub sections (5) Punctuation marks (6) Illustrations, inceptions, provision and
saving clauses (7) Schedules (8) Non obstaute Clause
On the other hand, external aid consists of (1) Dictionaries (2) Translations (3) R Travaux
preparation (4) Statutes in para (5) Contempronea expositus (6) Debates, inquiry commission
reports and law commission reports.
Each of such aid are discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

Internal Aids
Internal aids mean those aids which are available in the statute itself, court can interpret the
statute by employing such aids. Some of the key internal aids re discussed below:

Title

There are two types of Title viz.

Short title:

The short title of the Act is only its name and is given solely for the purpose of facility of
reference.
It is merely a name given for identification of the Act and not for description and generally
ends with the year of passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

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Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to play while interpreting a provision of
the Act. Neither can it be extended nor can it delimit the clear meaning of a particular
provision.

Long title:

A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a general description about the
object of the act. Normally, it begins with the words An Act to…

For instance, the long title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 says: ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the
prevention of corruption and matters connected therewith’.

In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the statute and was, therefore, not
considered an aid while interpreting it.

There has been a change in the thinking of courts in recent times and there are numerous
occasions when help has been taken from the long title to interpret certain provisions of the
statute but only to the extent of removing confusions and ambiguities. If the words in a
statute are unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.

In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274- the title of the Madras General Sales
Tax, 1939, was utilised to indicate that the object of the Act is to impose taxes on sales that
take place within the province.

In the case of Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa AIR 2014 SC 1716- the Court
has held that the title of a statute determines the general scope of the legislation, but the true
nature of any such enactment has always to be determined not on the basis of the label given
to it but on the basis of its substance.

In Manoharlal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418- it was held that no doubt the long title of
the Act extracted by the appellant’s counsel indicates the main purposes of the enactment but
it cannot control the express operative provisions of the Act.

Preamble
The Preamble to the Act contains the aims and objectives sought to be achieved, and is
therefore, part of the Act. It is a key to unlock the mind of the law makers.

Therefore, in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the preamble can be used by the courts to
interpret any provision of that statute. But there is a caution here. The apex court has held
in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya v. State of M.P. AIR (2013) 15 SCC

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677– the court cannot have resort to preamble when the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous.

Similarly, it has been held that help from preamble could not be taken to distort clear
intention of the legislature– Burrakar Coal Company v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954.

In Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was observed that the policy and purpose of the Act can be
legitimately derived from its preamble.

In Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission– it was held that the
object of legislation should be read in the context of the Preamble.

In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that


Preamble of the Act is a guiding Light to its interpretation.

Another important example is found in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC
1461– wherein the apex court strongly relied on the Preamble to the Constitution of India in
reaching a conclusion that the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under
Article 368 was not unlimited and did not enable the Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of
the Constitution.

In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC 913

• In this case, the appellant challenged his conviction under Section 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
• His main ground was that after the establishment of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, the anti-corruption department of the Delhi Police has ceased to have
power of investigating bribery cases because the preamble of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 pointed out to this effect.
• The court, however, held that no preamble can interfere with clear and unambiguous
words of a statue.
• Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, 1946 empowered the Delhi
Special Police also to investigate such cases.

Heading

Headings are prefixed to sections or a group or set of sections. These headings have been
treated by courts as preambles to those sections or sets of sections. The rule of interpretation
is that the heading can't control the plain words of the provision but if after the plain reading
of the section more than one meaning is possible, only then the court may seek guidance from
the headings.

A heading to one set of sections cannot act as an aid to interpret another set of sections– Shelly
v. London County Council, 1949 AC 56

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But chapter heading can be used to interpret ambiguous provisions– Bullmer v. I.R.C.

In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, it was held that sectional headings
have a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. The heading of Ch. XXXVI, Cr.P.C.
is not an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is the date on which limitation period
commences.

In Novartis Ag. v. Union of India, the sectional headings were relied on while interpreting
Section 5, 3(d), 2(1) (j) and (ja) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970.

In Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank

• It was held that the heading of a section can be regarded as key to interpretation of
the operative portion of said section.
• If there is no ambiguity in the language of the provision or if it is plain and clear,
then heading used in said section strengthens that meaning.

In N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, it was held that “Heading” can be relied upon to clear the
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent.

Marginal Note

Marginal notes are inserted at the side of the sections in an act which express the effect of the
section but they are not part of statute.
They are also known as Side notes and are inserted by drafters and not legislators.

The rule of interpretation is that in olden times a help is used to be taken from marginal notes
when the clear meaning of the provision is in doubt but as per modern view of the court,
marginal notes doesn't have any role to play because either they are inserted by legislators nor
does they form the part of the statute.

However, for interpreting constitution many times marginal notes are referred because they
are made by constituent assembly.

Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that the marginal notes
of Article 286 is the part of the Constitution of India which talks about Restrictions as to
imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods therefore, it could be relied on to
furnish a clue to the purpose and meaning of the article.
In Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India, it was held that marginal notes to a section of the statute
cannot take away the effect of the provisions.

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In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh AIR 2015 SC 1420 – the apex court held that
marginal note appended to Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1955 makes it clear that idea of section 47 was
not to discriminate against employees who acquire disability during service.

In S.P. Gupta v. President of India

• The Supreme Court held that if the relevant provisions in the body of a statute firmly
point towards a construction which would conflict with the marginal note, the
marginal note has to yield.
• If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute,
the marginal note may be looked into as an aid to construction.

Punctuation marks

Punctuations are put in the form of colon, semi colon, comma, full stop, dash, hyphen,
brackets etc
In earlier times statutes are passed without punctuations and therefore, the courts were not
concerned with looking at punctuations but in modern times statutes are passed with
punctuations.

The rule of interpretation is that while interpreting the provision in punctuated form, if court
feels repugnancy or ambiguity the court shall read the whole provision without any
punctuation and if the meaning is clear will so interpret it without attaching any importance.

In Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, the Supreme Court held that a punctuation cannot be
regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.

Therefore, in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme court held that the
word ‘which’ used twice in Article 22(7) of the Constitution, followed by a comma after each,
was to be read conjunctively because the context so required.

In Mohammad Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra

• Interpretation of Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was in question.
• This provision says that whoever ‘manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for
sale or distributes’ a drug without licence would be liable to punishment.
• The Supreme Court held that mere stocking of a drug is not an offence and an
offence is made out only when stocking is for sale.
• There is no comma after the word ‘stocks’ which means that the words ‘stocks or
exhibits’ are both qualified by the words ‘for sale’ used thereafter.

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In Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu, the Supreme Court held that the punctuation marks by themselves
do not control the meaning of a statute where its meaning is otherwise obvious.

In the English case of I.R.C. v. Hinchy, it was held that it is very doubtful if punctuation marks
can be looked at for the purposes of construction.

In Bihar SEE v. Pulak Enterprises, it was held that punctuation mark (comma) is a minor
element in the interpretation of statute, especially in case of subordinate legislation.

In Director of Public Prosecution v. Schildkamp, LORD REID agreed that punctuation can be
of some assistance in construction.

Illustrations
Illustrations are examples provided by the legislature for better understanding of the statute.

Example- Section 378 of theft in IPC has 16 illustrations attached to it.

The Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma observed that illustration
is a part of the section and it helps to elucidate the principle of the section.

However, illustrations cannot be used to defeat the provision or to modify the language of the
section. This is reflected by a legal maxim “Exampla illustrant, non-restringent legem” which
means examples only illustrate but do not narrow the scope of rule of a law.

In Mudliyar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., it was observed that in construing a section,
an illustration cannot be ignored or brushed aside.

In Mohommed Sydeol Ariffin v. Yeah Ooi Gark, it was held that the illustrations are of
relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section, although they donot form part
of the section. Therefore, they should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the sections.

Proviso

A proviso is to provide examples of a specific case which would otherwise fall within the
general language of the main enactment. It excludes, excepts and restricts the application of a
section and its effect is confined to that case.

In Union of India v. Sanjay Kumar Jain, the function of proviso was declared that it qualifies
or carves out an exception to the main provision.

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In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, the Supreme Court held that a proviso cannot be permitted
by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision.

In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, it has been held that though a proviso does not travel
beyond the provision to which it is appended, golden rule is to read the whole Section, inclusive
of the proviso in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a
harmonious construction.

It has been held in R. v. Leeds Prison (Governor), that the main part of an enactment cannot be
so interpreted as to render its proviso unnecessary and ineffective.

In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal v. M/s. Shelly Products, the Supreme Court:

• While interpreting the proviso to Section 240 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 clarified
that where a proviso consists of two parts, one part may be declaratory but the other
part may not be so.
• Therefore, merely because one part of the proviso has been held to the declaratory,
it does not follow that the second part of it is also declaratory.
• Since proviso (b) to Section 240 of the Act is declaratory, it was held to be
retrospective in operation.

In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, the Apex Court held that a proviso should be construed in
relation to the main provision.

But, in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. V. State of Tamil Nadu, the apex court clarified
that where the main provision is clear and unambiguous, recourse to the proviso cannot be
taken to interpret it.

In State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, the Supreme Court held that the proviso has to read as an
exception to the main provision of a section.

Saving Clause

Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute.

By this the rights already created under repealed enactment are not disturbed nor new rights
are created by it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing statute.

In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, the Supreme Court did
not allow the use of a saving clause, which was enacted like a proviso, to determine whether a
section in an Act was retrospective in operation.

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In Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Union of India, the Supreme Court while
interpreting the saving clause in the Export Control Order, 1988 held that the clause only saved
the rights which were in existence before the order was issued and it did not confer any new
rights which were not in existence at that time.

Schedule

Schedules attached to an Act generally deals with as to how claims or rights under the Act are
to be asserted or as to how powers conferred under the Act are to be exercised. The Schedules
are appended towards the end of the enactment.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain some subjects in the form of a list as is the case with the
Constitution of India to enable the Union and the states to legislate in their respective fields.

Schedules are parts of the Statute itself and may be looked into by the courts for the purpose
of interpreting the main body of the statute.

Similarly, while interpreting the schedules help may always be taken from the main body of
the Act to find out the true spirit of the Act.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain transitory provisions also to enable an Act to remain in
existence till the main provisions of the Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth Schedule of the
Government of India Act, 1935.

In M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that
in case of a clash between the schedule and the main body of an Act, the main body prevails
and the schedule has to be rejected.

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan and others, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose
of a schedule is to advance the object of the main provision and deletion of schedule cannot
wipe out provisions of an Act in effect and spirit.

Non obstaute clause

Non-obstante' is a Latin word which means 'notwithstanding anything contained'. That means
this clause empowers the legislation or a provision in which it contains, to override the effects
of any other legal provisions contrary to this under the same law or any other laws

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External Aid

External aids are the aids which are not available inside the statute but outside the statute, the
court may seek help to the external aids in case of repugnancy or inconsistency in the
statutory provision which are as follows:

Dictionaries

When a word used in the statute is not defined therein or if defined but the meaning is unclear
only in such situation, the court may refer to the dictionary meaning of the statute to find out
meaning of the word in ordinary sense.

The meaning of such words shall be interpreted so to make sure that it is speaking about the
particular statute because words bears different meaning in different context.

In the case of Motipur Zamindary Company Private Limited v. State of Bihar, the question
was whether sales tax can be levied on Sugarcane.

The applicant argued that it is green vegetable and should be exempted from tax. The
dictionary meaning of vegetable said anything which derived or obtained from the plants. The
SC rejected dictionary meaning and held that in common parlance vegetable is something
which is grown in kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner and held that sugarcane is
not vegetable.

R Travaux preparation

The literary meaning of this French term is preparatory works. It constitutes the materials
used in preparing the ultimate form of an agreement or statute, especially of an international
treaty. The materials constitute a legislative history. Travaux preparatoires contain the
various documents including reports of discussions, hearings and floor debates that were
produced during the drafting of a Convention, treaty or an agreement. Travaux preparatoires
of a statute or treaty are usually recorded so that it can be used later in order to interpret that
particular statute or treaty.

Contempronea expositus

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissinia in lege: meaning Contemporaneous


exposition is the best and strongest in law. It is said that the best exposition of a statute or any
other document is that which it has received from contemporary authority. This maxim has
been confirmed by the Apex Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. Delhi Stock Exchange Asson.
Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1049, 1054. Contemporanea exposito is a guide to the interpretation of
documents or statutes. It is one of the important external aids for interpretation. How ever
great care must be taken in its application. When a document was excecuted between two

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parties, there intention can be known by their conduct at the time and after the execution of
the instrument. Where the words of the deed are ambiguous, the court may call in the acts
done under it as a clue to the intention of the parties. Their acts are the result of usages and
practices in the society.

Therefore their acts are useful as an external aid to interpretation of the deed. This principle
may also be applied in case of statutes. Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissinia in
lege means usage or practice developed under a statute is indicative of the meaning ascribed
to its words by contemporary opinion.

The maxim Contemporanea expositio as laid down by Lord Coke was applied to construing
ancient statutes, but usually not applied to interpreting Acts or statutes which are
comparatively modern. The meaning publicly given by contemporary or long professional
usage is presumed to be true one, even where the language has etymologically or popularly a
different meaning. It is obvious that the language of a statute must be understood in the sense
in which it was understood when it was passed, and those who lived at or near that time when
it was passed may reasonably be supposed to be better acquainted than their descendants with
the circumstances to which it had relation, as well as with the sense then attached to
legislative expressions. Usages and practice developed under a statute is indicative of the
meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary opinion and in case of an ancient statute, such
reference to usage and practice is admissible.

He said a uniform notorious practice continued under an old statute and inaction of the
legislature to amend the same are important factors to show that the practice so followed was
based on correct understanding of the law. According to Lord Ellenborough, Communis
opinio is evidence of what the law is. When the practice receives judicial or legislative
approval it gains additional weight and is to be more respected.

According to Martin B, in construing old statute it has been usual to pay great regard to the
construction put up on them by the judges who lived at or soon after the time when they were
made, because they were best able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time. The
doctrine of stare decisis may also be applied when the law is settled in a state for over 100
years by considered view of the High Court of that state.

This principle of ‘contemporanea exposito’ was applied by the Supreme Court in National
and Grindlays Bank v Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, AIR 1969 SC 1048 while
construing Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The apex court also referred to the
actual practice in the matter of appointment of judges of Supreme Court and High Court in
the context of interpreting Articles 74 and 124 of the Constitution and observed that the
practice being in conformity with the constitutional scheme should be accorded legal sanction
by permissible constitutional interpretation. (Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Association v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268.)

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Debates

It is referred as to debates or speeches which are made in the course of passing a bill in the
parliament by the parliamentarians to put forth their view.

It is not considered as a conclusive aid to interpretation and is therefore, not admissible


because many times speeches are influenced by the political pressure or maybe incorrect to
rely upon.

Commission Report

Before the framing of the Bill, usually the matter is referred to a committee to consider it in
detail and give its report thereon.

These reports of the commissions and committee have been referred to as evidence of
historical facts or of surrounding circumstances and used for interpreting the Act. When there
is an ambiguity in the meaning of a provision and the act was passed on the recommendation
of a committee report, aid can be taken from that report to interpret the provision.

Example: the criminal amendment act was based on the recommendation by J.S. Verma
Committee Report such report can be referred in case of any ambiguity in amendment.

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