G.R. No. 149736.

  March 25, 2003]

IBARRA vs. COMELEC
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 25 2003.
G.R. No. 149736 (Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, petitioners, vs. Commission on
Elections and Leonardo B. Roman, respondents.)
For resolution is the motion for reconsideration dated January 24, 2003, filed by petitioners
Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, of the December 17, 2002 resolution herein which
dismissed the petition.
Petitioners-movants argue that:
1.                 The application of the constitutional ban in Art. X, § 8 cannot be made to depend on
the vagaries of election results, and
2.                 The resolution is inconsistent with the statement and ruling of the Court in the
Hagedorn case (Socrates v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, 12
November 2002) that a recall term is itself one term.
After due deliberation, eight Justices voted to deny the motion for reconsideration.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., is of the view that as revealed by the records of
the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and uninterrupted
service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a
recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served
prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term
limit.
MENDOZA, J., joined by QUISUMBING, J., reiterates his opinion to dismiss that, in
accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 133639, October 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a
local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining
whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He believes
that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall
election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously
served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his
election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. For this reason, he
votes to deny the motion for reconsideration.
 PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., maintains his position that a recall term should not be
considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the
elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to
prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’
obvious preferences who, in the present case, is Roman received 97 percent of the votes cast.
He explains that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because
in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders freely
chosen by them in credible elections. He concludes that, in election cases, when two conflicting
legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the
people’s overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., holds the view that the Hagedorn case is different
from the present one. There, the proscription had attached, since three full and consecutive
terms had been served. The issue was whether, after serving three full consecutive terms,
Hagedorn could run in the recall election, there having been an interruption by way of the
regular election next following the end of his third term in which he did not run. He was
deemed not disqualified to run in the recall election because the remaining portion of the term
following the recall election was held not consecutive to his third term, in view of the
interruption aforementioned. Whereas, in the present case, the question is whether there has
been service of three consecutive terms so that the proscription would apply, and the
resolution held that there was none because the service after the recall election is not service
for a full term, and the constitutional ban applies only after full and continuous service of three
consecutive terms. Stated otherwise, Hagedorn was not disqualified because his service after
the recall election is not service of a consecutive term; whereas, here, Roman is not disqualified
because his service after the recall election does not constitute service for a full term. Finally,
the principle of supremacy of the sovereign will was cited in the resolution as an aid in the
interpretation of the provision of the Constitution, in the sense that in election cases involving
conflicting legal positions of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should tilt in favor of the
people’s overwhelming choice.
On the other hand, seven Justices voted to grant the motion for reconsideration.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, CORONA,
and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent
Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one
term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998
to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, § 8
of the Constitution. For this reason, she votes to grant the motion for reconsideration.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES J., also dissented and voted to grant the motion. He
holds that a recall term constitutes one term and that totally to ignore a recall term in
determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine
consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He
contends that respondent Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term
limit imposed by the Constitution.
 WHEREFORE, by the same vote stated in the resolution of December 17, 2002, petitioners’
motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court