SOUTHERN LUZON STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ADMINISTRATION, BUSINESS, HOSPITALITY AND
ACCOUNTANCY
Academic Year 2022-2023
LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
Supplemental Outline
Atty. Mark Christian B. Apordo
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DEALING WITH LOCAL AND
REGIONAL
GOVERNANCE
a. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
i. Section 43 of the LGC
SECTION 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all
local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of elective Barangay officials: Provided,
That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately
following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected. (c) The term of office of Barangay officials and
members of the Sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of Barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1994.
1. Term shortened
2. Elected for Three Terms
a. ROMEO LONZANIDA vs.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EUFEMIO MULI, G.R. No. 135150,
July 28, 1999 (G.R. No. 135150 (lawphil.net))
DOCTRINE: To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate
may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of
Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest.
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May
8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof.
His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by opponent Juan Alvez
who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which declared
a failure of elections.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. COMELEC resolved the election
protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the
contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor.
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the
post, which obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the
term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. However, his opponent Eufemio Muli
timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of
San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three
consecutive terms in the same post. Meanwhile, on May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
First Division of the COMELEC then granted the petition for
disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore
disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the
expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in
computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was
affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11,
1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida now challenges the validity of the COMELEC
resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio
Zambales in the 1998 elections (certiorari Rule 65).
Petitioner’s Arguments: He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for
only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the
three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by
the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC no. 6-97
entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-
Appellant, wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Respondent’s Arguments: The public respondent (SolGen) contends that
petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995
to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was
later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the
term.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the
three-term limit for elective local government officials.
HELD: The petition has merit. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no
such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the
same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-
term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local
government official from running for the same position after serving three
consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in
office.
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.
First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment
of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate
may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of
Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest.
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected
to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with
finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term.
The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not
hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995
to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified
on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore
be set aside.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner.
The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction
over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is
without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21,
1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998
or after the petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs.
COMELEC and Trinidad that the proclamation nor the assumption of office
of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending
before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
b. RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002 (G.R. No.
147927 (lawphil.net))
Facts:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-
1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall
election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in
2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-
limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed
a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then
elected Mayor.
Issue:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had
already served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time
between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption.
Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the
disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption
when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000
recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could
constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term.
Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary renunciation”
contemplated by the law.
c. VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 154512, November 12,
2002 (G.R. No. 154512 (lawphil.net)) VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES
v. COMELEC, GR No. 154512, 2002-11-12
Facts:
barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium
The PRA was convened to... initiate the recall[2] of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's
mayor
The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president
of the
Association of Barangay Captains,... the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-
02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in
Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to
schedule the recall election for mayor... the COMELEC en banc[3]
promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition.
, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the
calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection
with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from
August 27, 2002 to September 5,... 2002 or a period of 10 days.
Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
("Adovo"... and
("Gilo"... filed a petition before the COMELEC,... to disqualify Hagedorn
from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of
candidacy.
The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive
full... terms
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice
to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA
members.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt
the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA
members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay
elections Issues:
whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election Ruling:
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the
COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the
Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members
were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections
scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant
consideration... considering that when the PRA members adopted the
Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all
de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that... respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second... part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the... interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a... recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the... continuity
of service.
what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection
is not immediately after the end of the third... consecutive term. A recall
election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term
of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently... show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the
immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent
election.
 If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within
the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should
also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term
following their two-term limit. The... constitutional provision on the term
limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local
officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."[11]... the period of rest would be three years at the least."
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after
only three years[15] following his completion of two terms. The framers
expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the
immediate reelection, and not to... any subsequent election, during the six-
year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did
not intend "the period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his
term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term
which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the... regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Socrates ran... and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001
elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,
Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not
because... of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition
d. ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO
SUNGA, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003 (G.R. No. 154829
(lawphil.net))
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During
petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component
city, to be known as the City of Digos. On February 28, 2001, petitioner
filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor. Private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a
candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner
Latasa.
Respondent Sunga alleged that petitioner falsely represented in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City
since he had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms
as mayor from 1992 to 2001. Petitioner argued that this fact does not bar
him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections
since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city
mayor. The COMELEC’s First Division issued a Resolution canceling
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy for being in violation of the three (3)-
term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which
remained unacted upon until the day of the elections. Petitioner was
proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of
votes.
Subsequently, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON Latasa is qualified.
HELD: NO.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; THE FACT THAT THE NEW
CITY
ACQUIRED A NEW CORPORATE EXISTENCE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM
THAT OF A MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT MEAN THAT FOR THE
PURPOSE OF
APPLYING ARTICLE. X, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE
OFFICE OF THE
MUNICIPAL MAYOR WOULD NOW BE CONSTRUED AS A DIFFERENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT POST AS THAT OF THE CITY MAYOR. — The
Court notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of
Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials. True, the new city
acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as
that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC
RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF DIGOS, NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OCCURRED AS TO PETITIONER’S AUTHORITY AS CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OVER THE INHABITANTS THEREOF. — In Borja, the
private respondent therein, before he assumed the position of mayor, first
served as the vice-mayor of his local government unit. The nature of the
responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of
the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief executive over his
local government unit. In the present case, petitioner, upon ratification of
the law converting the municipality to a city, continued to hold office as
chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were changes in
the political and economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no
substantial change occurred as to petitioner’s authority as chief executive
over the inhabitants of Digos.
PETITIONER NEVER CEASED FROM ACTING AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT AND FROM DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES
AND
RESPONSIBILITIES. — In the present case, petitioner Latasa was,
without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he
then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason
of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes
that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However,
the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner
therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office,
petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
THE LAW CONTEMPLATES A REST PERIOD DURING WHICH THE
LOCAL
ELECTIVE OFFICIAL STEPS DOWN FROM OFFICE AND CEASES TO
EXERCISE
POWER OR AUTHORITY OVER THE INHABITANTS OF THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A PARTICULAR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT. — It is evident that in the above mentioned cases,
there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local elective
official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months
before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and
fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period
during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases
to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. This Court reiterates that
the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
e. MONTEBON vs. COMELEC, G.R.
NO.180444, April 8, 2008 (G.R. No.
180444 (lawphil.net))
QUICK FACTS:
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon
succeeded and assumed the position of vicemayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of
candidacy againas municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was
filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
FACTS:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for
the May 14, 2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor
filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC
alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007
elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified on the
ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term was interrupted
when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of
elected vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor
in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of
his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law (constitution
and LGC), voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the official
concerned was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for
disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor
should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His
second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus
not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent's assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal
councilor.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents’ assumption of the vice-mayor office, by
virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective disruption in his full
service of his second term as councilor.
HELD:
YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the
two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three
consecutive terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the
term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for
the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been
elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three
consecutive terms in the same position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept
of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for
three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have
fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-
mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44
of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall
become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor
due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with
law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January
2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor,
resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it
was by operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code
makes no exception. Only if the highest-‐ ranking councilor is permanently
unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be
considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law.
 Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is
characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public
duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said
official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty
and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary. (Montebon vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)
● The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor.
The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by
operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.
Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in
order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the higher office
cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his
position as councilor.
f. FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006 (G.R. No. 163295
(lawphil.net))
FACTS:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis
Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a
Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy3 of Francis. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the
three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in
the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3)
consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. the May 1998
elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office
of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being
subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No.
6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In
it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that
1998 mayoralty contest, 4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and
was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of
the municipality of San Vicente
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor
for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service
for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
HELD: YES
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; TERM OF
OFFICE;
THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE; PETITIONER’S PROCLAMATION AS THE
DULY
ELECTED MAYOR IN THE 1998 MAYORALTY ELECTION COUPLED BY
HIS
ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS EXERCISE OF THE
FUNCTIONS
THEREOF FROM START TO FINISH OF THE TERM, SHOULD BE
LEGALLY BE
TAKEN AS SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE
THREE-
TERM RULE. — The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found
in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local
Government Code restates the same rule. For the three-term limit for
elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. With the view we take
of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively
barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute
about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and
serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30,
2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001
mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for
mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question
that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July
1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in
the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such
assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet,
Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was
Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and,
therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and
value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest
did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor
in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view
is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would
— under the three-term rule — be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another
actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course
after an election.
g. ROBERTO L. DIZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO
P. MORALES, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009 (G.R. No. 182088
(lawphil.net))
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a
case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent
mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully
served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the
Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor
in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been
allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the
same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified
to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said
position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not
elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be
reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his
second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the
petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated
on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of
Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in
an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void).
The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under
Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in
the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap
and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicable here
 for: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even
considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to serve the
entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished
the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to
the end of his supposed term.
ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he
was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be
considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
HELD:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated
Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy
dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from
being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales
were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of
Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July
1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30
June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004
elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously
ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there
was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the
1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4
July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance
from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next
day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice
mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June
2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no
matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to
30 June 2007. (4th term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO.
Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
periods:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998
1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30
June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to
16 May 2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of
mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have
served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position
of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed,
the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30
June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-
term limit rule.
● Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor
through lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the rule on
three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit
from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." To this,
we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
“The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest
between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about
three years and resultantly extended the petitioner’s incumbency in an
office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot
be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither specific allegation nor proof
that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong
his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal
recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was
pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution
of the regional trial court’s decision declaring the position of mayor vacant
and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have
been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office
cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his
chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.”
h. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009 (G.R. No. 184836
(lawphil.net))
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for
three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In
September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued
an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the
Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007.
His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation
of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term
in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of
Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted
the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason
to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term
 limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.
i. BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998 (G.R. No.
133495
(lawphil.net))
Doctrine: It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to
apply.
FACTS:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for
a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja. On May
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended
on June 1995. On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of
three years. On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections. However, Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms.
ISSUE: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by
operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
HELD:
No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the
limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials
running for the same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term. The purposes of said limitation
are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of
enhancing the freedom of the choice of people. Indeed, a fundamental
tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to
choose those whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a
local official because he has already served three terms, although the first
as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle.
3. Start and end of term
4. Terms not extendible
a. GOVERNOR EMILIO M.R. OSMEÑA, et al., vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et at., G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991 (G.R. No.
100318 July 30, 1991 - EMILIO M.R. OSMENA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (chanrobles.com))
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of
Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding
elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running
 for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration,
majority overturned the original decision.
a. MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., et al.,
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 96859 (lawphil.net)) Facts:
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of
office of elective local officials… …shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 71) which states that “…no local elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected….”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned]
was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention
of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because
he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not
withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
. ALEX L. DAVID, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No.
127116, April 8, 1997 (G.R. Nos. 127116 and 128039 April 8, 1997 - ALEX
L. DAVID v. COMELEC, ET AL. (chanrobles.com))
5. Term and Tenure Distinguished
Article IX, Section 67
'Any elective official whether... national or local running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso...
facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself by the mere
act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of
the House of Representatives; and, therefore,... his name has not been
carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the
House.
virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified
congressman from his district.
members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective
public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office,
except for President and Vice-President.
Issues:
he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881... not operative under the... present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.
Section 2, Article XVIII
"the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992;"
Section 7, Article VI states
"The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected... for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other
hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
"a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;... b) Section 16
(3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;... c)
Section
17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal
in an election contest; and,... d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary
renunciation of office."... repugnant to these constitutional provisions in
that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution.
of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as
Congressman
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY,
'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE
ROLLS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM
FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING
HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS
SUCH?"
Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary... renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. petitioner's
filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
"Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his... certificate of candidacy." "term"
with "tenure" Ruling:
Section 2 of C.A. No. 666,[5] which reads:
"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office,
other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy."
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this
wise:[6]
"Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or
city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually
holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the
filing of his... certificate of candidacy."
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective
officials as follows:[7]
"Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, sub-
provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso... facto resigned from his office from the moment of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of
office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said
proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of
office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture... of his right to the
new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or
causes beyond his control." The 1978 Election Code[8] provided a
different rule, thus:
"Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors,
members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing
of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office." The 1978 Election Code[8] provided a different rule, thus:
"Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors,
members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing
of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office." Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers"
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest... lives."
Solicitor General:[12]
"The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an
officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of said... officer. Tenure may be shorter than
the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the
duration of the term of office
Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12
State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing
Monrov vs. Court of Appeals
Castro vs. Gatuslao
'The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not
make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable, since the... vacating is expressly made as of the moment
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
b. Synchronization of Elections Reaffirmed
c. Three-year term too short
d. Term of Elective Barangay Officials
i. R.A. No. 6653
R.A. No. 6653 May 6, 1988 AN ACT TO POSTPONE THE MAY 9, 1988
BARANGAY ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND MONDAY OF NOVEMBER
THIS YEAR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of
May this year, as provided by law, is hereby postponed and reset to the
second Monday of November this year and the subsequent barangay
elections to be held every five (5) years thereafter. Section 2. The term of
office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the first day of
January following their election: provided, however, that no kagawad shall
serve for more than two (2) successive terms. Section 3. The Omnibus
Election Code shall as far as practicable apply to barangay elections. The
Commission on Elections shall promulgate such necessary resolutions,
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act. Section 4. All
elected incumbent barangay official shall remain in office, unless sooner
removed for cause, until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified. Designated or appointed incumbent barangay officials shall be
subject to a performance audit to determine their fitness to continue in
office to be conducted by the Secretary of Local Government may solicit
the assistance of other government agencies may organizations.
Vacancies created by resignation or removal of barangay officials shall be
filled by incumbent kagawads with due recognition of their succession;
provided, however, that in default there, the Secretary of Local
Government shall appoint officers-in-charge taking into consideration the
integrity, competence and persons shall be appointee: provided, further,
that no person shall be appointed as a barangay official unless he is an
actual voting resident of the barangay to which he will be appointed.
Section 5. There shall be a Sangguniang Barangay in every duly
constituted barangay which shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to
be elected by the barangay electorate. The seven barangay kagawads
shall, on the first day of their term of office by a majority vote of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay who shall ipso facto be its
presiding officer. In the event of failure of electing a Punong Barangay
after two ballotings, the election shall be by mere plurality of votes. Section
6. The Punong barangay may be recalled for loss of confidence by an
absolute majority of vote of the Sangguniang Barangay embodied in a
resolution which shall necessarily include his successor, likewise elected
by an absolute majority of vote of the Sangguniang Barangay: provided,
that the Punong Barangay recalled shall continue to retain and assume his
position as kagawad: provided, that no recall shall take place within the
period of one (1) year immediately following his election as Punong
Barangay and one (1) year immediately preceding the next barangay
election. Section 7. All laws, decrees, executive orders, orders or
resolutions or any part thereof which may be inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. This Act shall take
effect upon its approval. Approved: May 6, 1988.
ii. R.A. No. 8524
February 14, 1998 AN ACT CHANGING THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
BARANGAY OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN FROM THREE (3) YEARS TO FIVE (5) YEARS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 43 OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Sec. 43 of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is
hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 43. Term of office. – (a) The
term of office of all elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date
as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials
and members of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, That all local
officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
"(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. "(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after
the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May
1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan members who were
elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election
of barangay officials." Section 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to
the incumbent barangay officials and members of the sangguniang
kabataan. Section 3. All laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of
instructions, letters of implementations, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with any provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly. Section 4. This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days from its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation. Approved: February 14, 1998
iii. R.A. No. 9164
R.A. No. 9164 March 19, 2002 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
SYNCHRONIZED
BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS,
AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991", AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1.
Date of Election. – There shall be synchronized barangay and
sangguniang kabataan elections which shall be held on July 15, 2002.
Subsequent synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections
shall be held on the last Monday of October and every three (3) years
thereafter. Section 2. Term of Office. –The term of office of all barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That
the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected. Section 3. Registration. – For
purposes of the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections provided under this Act, a special registration of voters
for the sangguniang kabataan shall be fixed by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Subsequent registration of barangay and
sangguniang kabataan voters shall be governed by Republic Act No. 8189.
Section 4. Assumption of Office. – The term of office of the barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials elected under this Act shall commence on
August 15, 2002. The term of office of the barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials elected in subsequent elections shall commence at noon
of November 30 next following their election. Section 5. Hold Over. – All
incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang kabataan officials shall
remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified. The provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code relative to the failure of elections and special
elections are hereby reiterated in this Act. Section 6. Section 424 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of
1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 424. Katipunan ng
Kabataan. –
The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of Filipino citizens actually
residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but
less than eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the election, and who
are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary." Section 7. Section
428 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 428.
Qualifications. – An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be
a Filipino citizen, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident
of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at
least fifteen (15) years but less than eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of the election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect,
and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude."
Section 8.
Appropriation. – The amount of one billion one hundred million pesos
(P1,100,000,000.00) needed for the purpose shall be charged from the
appropriation of the COMELEC authorized under Republic Act No. 9162,
otherwise known as the FY 2002 General Appropriations Act. In addition,
the savings of the COMELEC not exceeding three hundred million pesos
(P300,000,000.00) shall be used to augment said appropriations as
authorized under COMELEC Special Provision No. 2 of the Republic Act
No. 9162. The funds mentioned above may be augmented by an amount
not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the sangguniang kabataan funds
reserved pursuant to Section 532 (c) of Republic Act No. 7160. Section 9.
Applicability of Other Election Laws. – The Omnibus Election Code and
other existing election laws, as far as practicable, shall apply to barangay
and sangguniang kabataan elections. Section 10. Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate such rules and regulations
necessary to implement this Act. Section 11. Separability Clause. – If any
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such sections or
parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. Section 12.
Repealing Clause. – All decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. Section 13. Effectivity Clause. – This Act
shall take effect seven (7) days after its complete publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation
ii. Section 44 of the LGC
• Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. −
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vicegovernor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of
his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vicegovernor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be
filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined
herein. (b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
 sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay. (c) A tie between or among the highest
ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots. (d) The successors as defined
herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors. For purposes of this Chapter, a
permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the
Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election
1. Permanent vacancies defined
a. AURELIO D. MENZON vs. LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA, G.R. No. 90762,
May 20, 1991 (G.R. No. 90762 (lawphil.net))
Facts:
In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor
Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no
Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte.
Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for
the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath of office.
In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary
Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to
act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to
succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary
vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is
not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the
functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both
offices.
As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued
Resolution No. 505 where it invalidated the appointment of Menzon as
acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that
the latter issued. Rubillar replied that Menzon was merely designated to
act as vice governor. He was not appointed to the post since there was no
vacancy of the office to speak of.
As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested
Governor Petilla that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified
so that Menzon would be able receive his salary as vice governor, if he
was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian refused to
correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the
emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine
whether he is entitled to the emoluments for his services rendered as
designated acting vice‐governor. During the pendency of this case, the
issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal
was proclaimed Governor of Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy
Held: Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no
vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent.
A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully
authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was
left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was
appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he
was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the
duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a
Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More
so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's
automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of
Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need
to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department
Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial
Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is
doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an
appointment made by a higher authority.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority
to make temporary appointments
Held: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in
the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor.
However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a
remedy in law is wanting.
The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for
the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the
governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for
the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not
yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the
Commission on Elections.
The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view
of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the
delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of
the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is
incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy
was ever intended by the Local Government Code.
Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the
Local Government Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the
dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the
President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local
Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary
appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The
exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that
Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous
position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor.
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in
appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in
the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend
that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument
has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen
few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there
will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice
the province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases,
for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in this case where for about two
years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the
province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle
provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might
happen to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have
to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to acting Governor
Petilla during the two-year period. The contingency of having simultaneous
vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to
have a full-time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the
public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous
duty unbridled by any political considerations.
The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent
behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49
in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly
the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the
Vice-Governor.
The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case
of a permanent vacancy, viz:
Section 49:
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the
Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies,
is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang
panlalawigan member who obtained the highest number of votes in the
election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the
unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of
succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in
case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a
need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes.
The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary
appointment.
Issue: Whether or not Menzon is entitled to be paid the salary attached to
the Office of the Vice Governor
Held: In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary
attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The
compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, must only be
such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed
the salary authorized by law for the Office of the ViceGovernor.
Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very
least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-
Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records,
the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President,
 the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office
before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local
Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.
Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents
themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and
dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No.
505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting
Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was
made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to
the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people
of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine
is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to
now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as
the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyt
b. BAQUIT S. UNDA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 94090,
October 18, 1990 (G.R. No. 94090 (lawphil.net))
Facts:
Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji Acmad
Ditangongan Rangiris were the rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao
del
Sur in the local elections
Hadji Minandang Guiling was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of
Masiu,... along with herein petitioner who was proclaimed as the duly
elected vice-mayor of the same municipality. Both officials duly took their
oaths of office and entered upon the performance of their duties.
private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said
proclamation... private respondent received the... decision of the
COMELEC dismissing his aforesaid petition, without prejudice to the filing
of an election contest within ten days from receipt thereof.
Mayor Minandang Guiling passed away and, the following day, petitioner
took his oath of office as mayor and forthwith assumed and exercised the
duties of said office.
private respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor
Minandang Guiling with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Sur,... The summons issued to Mayor Minandang Guiling was returned
unserved on December 8, 1988 since protestee Minandang Guiling had
already been... dead for over a month.
Thereafter, the protest filed by private respondent was brought to the
COMELEC three times on certiorari.
The first was SPR No. 4-89 in which the COMELEC declared null and void
the order of the aforesaid regional trial court denying petitioner's motion for
intervention, and ordered the trial court to admit the intervention and
proceed with the trial of the... case on the basis of the protest and
petitioner's answer in intervention.
The second was SPR No. 17-89 wherein the COMELEC reversed the
resolution of the trial court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and affirming the order of the same court denying petitioner's motion for
inhibition and manifestation, and ordered... the court a quo to proceed with
the hearing on the affirmative defenses raised by herein petitioner.
The third is SPR No. 1-90 wherein the COMELEC issued the resolution,
now subject of this petition, ordering the court below to proceed with the
trial of the case on the ground, among others, that the death of the
protestee does not divest the court of... jurisdiction over the election
protest.
the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 at Marawi City, to cease and
desist from taking further... action on the election case pending before him.
[2]
Petitioner argues that there is no law which allows a deceased person to
be sued as a party defendant, much less as a protestee in an election
contest; Issues:
the jurisdiction of the trial court over an election protest filed against a
protestee who had died prior to the filing thereof.
Ruling:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule
recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by... mere technical objections.
An election case, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest
since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the... electorate with respect to who shall
discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift.
It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and
delay the trial of an... ordinary action.[6]
On the procedural aspect, it is established that amendments to pleadings
may be permitted by this Court even for the first time on appeal in order to
substitute the name of the real party in interest, provided that such an
amendment would not involve a change in... the cause of action or result
in undue prejudice to the adverse party.
It follows, therefore, that the election protest filed by private respondent
can and ought to be amended by striking out the name of Hadji Minandang
Guiling, as the protestee, and substituting, in his place,... petitioner Baquit
S. Unda. Besides, we do not find that such a course of procedure will be
productive of any undue substantial prejudice to herein private respondent.
For that matter, said procedure should... have been inceptively adopted by
the trial court under the circumstances of the election case before it.
We agree with private respondent that Vda. de De Mesa, as well as the
other cases invoked and relied upon by public respondent, do not present
the same factual situation... obtaining in the case before us. In the
decisions cited by public respondent, the protestees had been duly served
with summons and died either during the pendency of the election protest
or on appeal, which is not so in the case at... bar wherein the protestee
was already dead at the time of the filing of the election protest.
substitution of parties, applies to election contests to the same... extent
and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions.
under the Local Government Code,[8] the vice-mayor stands next in the
line of succession to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the
latter's position. Upon the death of the... protestee mayor in the case at
bar, petitioner, as then incumbent vice-mayor, succeeded by operation of
law to the vacated office and is ordinarily entitled to occupy the same for
the unexpired term thereof. The outcome of the election contest...
necessarily and primarily bears upon his right to his present position and
he is the person directly concerned in the fair and regular conduct of the
election in order that the true will of the electorate will be upheld. His
status as a real party in... interest in the continuation of said case cannot
thus be disputed.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. AFFIRMING the resolution of public respondent Commission on
Elections promulgated on July 12, 1990 in SPR No. 1-90;
2. ORDERING the court a quo to forthwith appoint petitioner as the legal
representative of the deceased protestee, and cause the amendment of
the pleadings and processes concerned to substitute petitioner therein in
the name and... stead of the late protestee;
3. ALLOWING petitioner to file an answer in said election case within ten
(10) days from receipt of this resolution, failing which his aforestated
answer in intervention shall stand as his answer to the amended protest;
and
4. DIRECTING the lower court to grant full representation of and
participation by petitioner Baquit S. Unda as protestee in all proceedings
and incidents in Election Case No. 77-88 of said court.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case is LIFTED, and the
court a quo is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial and adjudication
of said election case with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
2. Time when right of succession
not recognized
3. Automatic succession
4. Vacancy in Punong Barangay’s
Office iii. Section 45 of the LGC
• Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a)
Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where
automatic succession provided above do not apply
shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner: (1) The President, through the Executive
Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities; (2) The governor, in the case of the
sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and
the sangguniang bayan; (3) The city or municipal
mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay
concerned. (b) Except for the sangguniang
barangay, only the nominee of the political party
under which the sanggunian member concerned
had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy
in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner
hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come
from the same political party as that of the
sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination
and a certificate of membership of the appointee
from the highest official of the political party
concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any
appointment without such nomination and
certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall
be a ground for administrative action against the
official responsible therefore. (c) In case or
permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian
member who does not belong to any political party,
the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned,
appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. (d) In
case of vacancy in the representation of the youth
and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy
shall be filled automatically by the official next in
rank of the organization concerned
1. How permanent vacancies in Sanggunian
are filled
2. Party nomination
3. General Rule: Two certificates required
a. Exception: When certificates not
required
4. Matters to be cleared in 45 (c)
a. GOVERNOR RODOLFO C.
FARIÑAS, et al., vs. MAYOR
ANGELO M. BARBA, et al., G.R.
No. 116763, April 19, 1996 (G.R.
No. 116763 April 19, 1996 -
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, ET AL. v.
ANGELO M. BARBA, ET AL. : April 1996 - Philipppine Supreme Court
Decisions (chanrobles.com)) Facts:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without
leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the mayor, respondent
Angelo M. Barba, recommended to the Governor of the province,
respondent Rodolfo C. Fariñas, the appointment of respondent Edward
Palafox. A similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox
was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the
recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the
recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with §56 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160).1
On June 8, 1994, petitioner Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and
swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor
Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position on June
8, 1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox took his oath as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition against Mayor Angelo M.
Barba, Vice Mayor Manuel S. Hernando, Jr. and Edward D. Palafox.
Issue:
Whether or not the power to fill a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan is
vested in the provincial governor upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
Held:
No, under Sec.45 (c) of the Local Government Code states that in case the
permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person
to fill the vacancy.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al
Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner
indicated in the preceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al
Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed
him.
Therefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, insofar
as it dismisses petitioners’ action for quo warranto and prohibition, should
be affirmed.
5. Vacancies in the
Sangguniang Barangay iv. Section 46
of the LGC
Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief
Executive. - (a) When the governor, city or municipal
mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or
legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of
absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office,
the vice-governor, city or municipal vicemayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member
shall automatically exercise the powers and perform
the duties and functions of the local chief executive
concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend,
or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if
the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty
(30) working days. (b) Said temporary incapacity
shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief
executive concerned that he has reported back to
office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is
due to legal causes, the local chief executive
concerned shall also submit necessary documents
showing that said legal causes no longer exist. (c)
When the incumbent local chief executive is
 traveling within the country but outside his territorial
jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3)
consecutive days, he may designate in writing the
officer-in-charge of the said office. Such
authorization shall specify the powers and functions
that the local official concerned shall exercise in the
absence of the local chief executive except the
power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief
executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such
authorization, the vice-governor, the city or
municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, as the case may
be, shall have the right to assume the powers,
duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth
(4th) day of absence of the said local chief
executive, subject to the limitations provided in
subsection (c) hereof. (e) Except as provided above,
the local chief executive shall in no case authorize
any local official to assume the powers, duties, and
functions of the office, other than the vicegovernor,
the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the
case may be
1. Temporary vacancies in Local Chief Office
2. Certain powers withheld
3. Termination of temporary incapacity
4. Vacancy caused by travel
5. Travel beyond three days
6. General Rule: Designation of OICs
Prohibited
a. Exception: When allowed
7. Subordinate local executive need permission
v. Section 47 of the LGC
Approval of Leaves of Absence. (a) Leaves of
absence of local elective officials shall be approved
as follows: (1) Leaves of absence of the governor
and the mayor of a highly urbanized city or an
independent component city shall be approved by
the President or his duly authorized representative;
(2) Leaves of absence of vicegovernor or a city or
municipal vice-mayor shall be approved by the local
chief executive concerned: Provided, That the
leaves of absence of the members of the
sanggunian and its employees shall be approved by
the vice-governor or city or municipal vicemayor
concerned; (3) Leaves of absence of the component
city or municipal mayor shall be approved by the
governor; and (4) Leaves of absence of a punong
barangay shall be approved by the city or municipal
mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of
sangguniang barangay members shall be approved
by the punong barangay. (b) Whenever the
application for leave of absence hereinabove
specified is not acted upon within five (5) working
days after receipt thereof, the application for leave
of absence shall be deemed approved.
1. Time limit to act on leave applications
2. Reason for the Rule