1

LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON

TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

LOCGOV FINALS REVIEWER

1) Three-term rule
LGC Sec .43 (b) provides that no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

Mayor Abundo v. COMELEC

 This case points to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. During the
term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in Abundo’s
favor, he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30,
2007 or for a little over 1 year & 1 month. And so, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able
to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. While Abundo was
declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent Torres. Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term.
 An elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered.
 The intention behind the 3-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political
power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position” but also
to “enhance the people’s freedom of choice.”

Sandoval v. COMELEC*
 What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a
fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
 After three consecutive terms therefore, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like
a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
 In the case of Hagedorn, he was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998
elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the
2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who
had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor.
Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of
Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
 Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together
Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth
consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's
service as mayor.

Mendoza v. Familiara and COMELEC

 The 3 term limit provided under the LGC applies to barangay officials.
2
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

Montebon v. COMELEC
 Lonzanida vs. COMELEC: 2 conditions must concur to be disqualified: (1) Official concerned has
been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post; (2) He has fully served
3 consecutive terms.
 Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Under Sec. 44 LGC, if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest-ranking Sanggunian Member shall
become Vice Mayor. There is no way could it be considered voluntary renunciation. The legal
successor is not given any option under the law to accept or not.
 Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it
involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which
exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and
neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary.

Question: Municipality ABC was converted to a city – can a person already served 3 years of mayor in the
municipality can run again? No. because the constituency is still the same.

LATASA v. COMELEC (not in the outline but mentioned by Atty. Loanzon)

 A three term mayor of a municipality converted into a city on the third term of the mayor cannot
seek office as a city mayor in the first elections of city officials considering the area and
inhabitants of the locality are the same and that the municipal mayor continued to hold office until
such time as city elections are held. While the city acquired a new corporate existence separate
and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean that for the purpose of applying the
constitutional provision on term limitations, the office of the municipal mayor would be construed
as different from that of the office of the city mayor.

2) Regularity/observation of rules on appointments

For a valid appointment, these requisites must concur:
o Vacancy
o Publication
o Promotion and Selection Board (mayor, treasurer, minority party)

Sales v. Carreon Jr.

 During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Ruiz of Dapitan City, running for re-election,
was defeated by respondent Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. On June 1, 18, and 27, 2001, his last month
in office, then Mayor Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including those of herein petitioners.
 This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue
"midnight" appointments, which does not only cause animosities between the outgoing and the
incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote
their time and energy in defending their appointments instead of attending to their functions.
 Not all types of midnight appointments are illegal, but it is only when the appointments were made
en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried
maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety.
 En masse midnight appointments are illegal because it does not only cause animosities between
the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance.
 It is State policy that "opportunities for government employment shall be open to all qualified
citizens" as provided in Secs. 2 and 3 of RA 7041. These provisions provide that the CSC is
required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief
personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places. The
vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they have been reported to
the CSC as vacant and only after publication.
3
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete

 The 52 petitioners in this case were all bona fide employees of the City of Dumaguete appointed
to various positions by City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. sometime in June 2001, shortly
before the end of his term.
 The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees
already assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once.
There is no need to wait for the approval of the appointments by the CSC. The appointments
shall be effective until disapproved by the CSC.
 The CSC has a three-tiered organizational structure, i.e., the CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the
CSC Proper acting as a collegial body. The disapproval of the appointments by the CSC FO and
CSC RO is not final and executory until affirmed by the CSC Proper. Nevertheless, the
aforementioned general rules cannot be simply applied to the case at bar given its peculiar
circumstances.
 Section 3 above only applies if there was no violation of civil service laws but if there was, Section
4 states that: “The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of appointees
whose appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as the
publication requirement pursuant to RA 7041.”
 It is within the power of CSC to issue circulars and/or rules for the regularitzation/promotion of
LGU officials.

Montuerto v. Ty
 On March 17, 1992, Montuerto was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer by then
Mayor Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. Her appointment was approved as
permanent on March 24 by the Acting Civil Service Commission (CSC) Field Officer.
 In 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Almeria, Biliran passed a Resolution requesting the
CSC to revoke the appointment of Montuerto as Municipal Budget Officer for failure to secure the
required concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan.
 SC denied the petition. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government,  such  as  the
Municipal  Budget  Officer,  shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority
of all  Sangguniang Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
 The verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian is not the concurrence required and
envisioned under R.A. No. 7160.  The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an
ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply
with the mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid
appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even if
she had served as such for ten years.
 City Budget Officer, City Health Officer, City Assessor must have their appointments ratified by
the Sanggunian.

4) Macalingcag v. Chang
 PD 807 (Civil Service Law) Sec 41 governs Preventive Suspension: The proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from service
 There is NOTHING in the said law which requires designation of a replacement in order to give
effect to the preventive suspension
 But, BP Blg. 337 (LGC) Sec. 156, Art 5, Ch 3, Title II provides for the automatic assumption of the
assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal
treasurer. Sec 233(2) is the general repealing provision of the LGC (“nothing in this code shall be
4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

understood to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions of… all presidential decrees and
issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila”).
 The OPS then is effective upon receipt of Chang. Such is presumed when he filed a complaint in
the trial court preventing the implementation of such OPS.
 Control and supervision over local treasurers by the DOF Secretary.
 COA findings as basis for DOF Secretary to put a local treasurer under preventive suspension.
 Preventive suspension is NOT a penalty; it is a means to preserve integrity of evidence and to
avoid the superior officer to have any influence on the outcome of the case.

5) Bayantel / Smartcomm / ABS-CBN rulings on Taxation

QC v. Bayantel
 The power of QC to tax is limited by §232 of the LGC. Under the said provision, the Legislature
highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of the LGU.
 PLDT v. City of Davao: The grant of taxing powers to local government units under the
Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions.
 Aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption, Congress opted to pass
RA 7633 using exactly the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” which was the basis
for Bayantel’s exemption prior to the LGC. The Court views this subsequent legislation as an
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s
delegated taxing power all of Bayantel’s properties that are actually, directly exclusively used in
the pursuit of its franchise.

QC v. ABS-CBN
 Is ABS-CBN exempted from local franchise tax by virtue of its congressional franchise? NO
 The congressional franchise granting exempting payment of taxes under the phrase “in lieu of
other taxes” cannot be worked against QC because the congressional franchise did not specify
the taxes.
 The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from payment of
local franchise tax. First, The present controversy essentially boils down to a dispute between the
inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated authority to tax of local governments under
the 1987 Constitution and effected under the LGC of 1991.
 The power of the local government of Quezon City to impose franchise tax is based on Section
151 in relation to Section 137 of the LGC. Such taxing power by the local government, however,
is limited in the sense that Congress can enact legislation granting exemptions. In the case of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, the SC has upheld
the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose
taxes.
 "Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC
does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply
means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations."
 Congress has the inherent power to tax, which includes the power to grant tax exemptions. On
the other hand, the power of Quezon City to tax is prescribed by Section 151 in relation to Section
137 of the LGC which expressly provides that notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law
or other special law, the City may impose a franchise tax. It must be noted that Section 137 of the
LGC does not prohibit grant of future exemptions.

Smart Communications v. Davao City

5
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

 The “in lieu of all taxes” clause in a legislative franchise should expressly and categorically state
that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes; otherwise, it only applies to national
internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes.
 R.A. No. 7294 is not definite in granting exemption to Smart from local taxation. Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7294 imposes on Smart a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts
of the business transacted under the franchise and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes
on the franchise or earnings thereof. R.A. No 7294 does not expressly provide what kind of taxes
Smart is exempted from. It is not clear whether the “in lieu of all taxes” provision in the franchise
of Smart would include exemption from local or national taxation.
 The uncertainty in the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 must be construed strictly
against Smart which claims the exemption. Smart has the burden of proving the exemption.
However, it failed to do so.
 Thus, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The “in lieu of all taxes” clause
applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes. 

6) “Victoria Court cases”

City of Manila v. Laguio
 Under Sec. 458 of LGC w/ respect to cafes, hotels, etc. the only power of the City Council is to
regulate them to promote general welfare.
 “Overbreadth Doctrine”; an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of property rights of
individuals.

White Light Corp. v City of Manila

 Bill of Rights v. Police Power
 All 22 provisions in Art. 3 Constitution are so sacred any interference is prohibited:
o Right to property (vested rights)
o Right to privacy (no presumption of malice)
 The police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities
and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the LGC through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
 Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitution or drug dealers through
active police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause. It may prescribe
reasonable regulations to protect lives, health and property of constituents.
 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law. The test of a
valid ordinance is as follows:(1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) Must not
be unfair or oppressive; (3) Must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) Must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) Must be general and consistent with public policy; (6) Must not be
unreasonable.

7) Liability of Local Government

A. Gen Rule: Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property. (Sec. 24, RA 7160)

Exceptions as provided by law.

6
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

Art. 34 of Civil Code: The LGU is subsidiarily liable for damages suffered by a person by reason of the
failure of refusal of a member of the police force to render aid and protection in case of danger to life and
property.

Art. 2189 of Civil Code: LGU is liable in damages for death or injuries suffered by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works.

Teotico v. City of Manila

 Section 4 of the Charter establishes a general rule which regulates the City’s liability for damages
or injury to persons or property arising from the negligence or failure of city officers to enforce or
attempt to enforce the provisions of the Charter or any other law or ordinance.
 Article 2189 of the Civil Code is a particular prescription making provinces, cities and
municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury of persons due to the defective condition
of public works under their control or supervision.
 Thus, in this case, Section 4 of the Charter is a general rule despite being technically classed as
a special law, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code is the exception despite being technically
classed as a general law. Since the cause of action of this case is based on the defective
condition of a road, the exception espoused by Article 2189 must apply.
 Maintenance of roads/streets is the responsibility of the LGU.

Guilatco v. City of Dagupan

 The manhole where the Court Interpreter (plaintiff) fell, was located on a sidewalk in Perez Blvd.
over which the City of Dagupan exercises supervision and control.
 Liability of the city for injuries due to defective roads attaches even if the road does not belong to
the LGU, as long as the City exercises control or supervision over said road.

B. Liability for torts

Art. 2180 of Civil Code (6th par): The State is responsible when it acts through a special agent.

If the LGU is engaged in governmental functions: NOT LIABLE

Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
 Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of the Ilocos Norte provincial government, for the office
of the District Engineer. On Sept. 30, 1948, Torralba ran over Proceto Palafox while he (Torralba)
was driving his freight truck in the performance of his duties. Palafox died. (Palafox is the father
of the petitioner-appellants)
 SC denied petition. A declaration must first be made that Torralba was a special agent of Ilocos
Norte for the said province to be held liable for Torralba’s negligence and not merely one on
whom the duty of driving the truck was assigned.
o Merritt v. Gov’t of the Philippines - There was no such finding as the driver was not a
special agent of the government.
o Also, this principle applies only to the Insular government (i.e., the national government)
and does not apply to the provincial or municipal governments.
 Liability arising from respondeat superior only arises if the act is in furtherance of an employee’s
or agent’s corporate or proprietary business function.
o If the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of governmental duties, the
state (or the province, in this case) is not liable.
o The driver here worked for the construction or maintenance of roads, which are
governmental activities, and as such, the death caused by the negligence of the said
driver and the liability arising therefrom cannot be imputed to the province of Ilocos Norte.
 Performance of government function of employees of LGU exempts LGU from the death or
injuries of victims.

If the LGU is engaged in proprietary functions: LIABLE

7
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

C. Liability under contracts

Rule: A municipal corporation, like an ordinary person, is liable on a contract it enters into, provided that
the contract is intra vires. If the contract is ultra vires, the municipal corportation is not liable.
A private individual who deals with a municipal corporation is imputed constructive knowledge of the
extent of the power or authority of the municipal corporation to enter into contracts. Ordinarily, therefore,
the doctrine of estoppels does not lie against a municipal corporation.

Vice Mayor Vicencio v. COA Chairman Villar

 Issue: W/N a vice mayor can enter into consultancy contracts pursuant to an ordinance expressly
granting the former mayor power? NO
 Under Sec. 456 of the LGC, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
Hence his power to enter into contracts must be expressly granted by ordinance.
 Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a continuing authority for any person who
enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
 Vicencio does not benefit from the ordinance allowing then Vice Mayor Yambao. Ordinance was
enacted only for a limited period and specific funds were allocated for the contracts.

Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito

 In this case, there was an engagement of services of private counsel (contract between the
Municipality of Tiwi and Atty. Betito.
 Issue: Can private counsel claim payment of professional fees under the contract to represent the
Municipality of Tiwi in the RPT case? YES. LGU was bound by contract when the Mayor was
authorized to do so.
 Sec. 444 (b)(l)(vi) of LGC requires municipal mayor to secure prior authorization of the
Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In the instant
case, the SB of Tiwi unanimously passed a Resolution authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer
of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of the Court’s decision.
 The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local
chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit.

Fajardo v. Lim
 Issue: W/N the city government may be compelled to honor an obligation under a contract
executed by his predecessor? YES. Mayor Lim must honor the duly executed contract.
 LGU is mandated to faithfully comply with its contractual obligations with third parties. Since a
valid contractual agreement was entered between petitioners and respondents, the succeeding
Mayor, Mayor Lim, is bound by said agreement. Therefore, the petition of mandamus will lie.

D. Doctrine of implied municipal liability contra personal liability

Gen Rule: There is no personal liability in the discharge of official functions but bad faith on the part of the
public official may make him personally liable.

Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability: A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to
pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general
power to contract.

8) Suspension of an elective official (w/ a twist)

Miranda v. Sandiganbayan
 The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of
offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public
8
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

funds or property. Nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only
to acts involving fraud on public funds or property.
 Fraud upon the government was committed when Miranda allegedly assumed the duties and
performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position. His acts
resulted to a disruption of office functions. When Miranda appointed persons in various positions,
he indirectly dealt with the city’s funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective
salaries and other monetary consideration which will be paid mainly out of the city’s funds.
 Sec. 63 of the Loc. Gov. Code does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the
Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive
branch of government.
 Sec. 63 (b) of the Local Government Code (which provides that local elective officials can be
suspended for a maximum period of 60 days) was only meant as a cap on the discretionary
power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions.
The Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was not meant to be governed by it.
The President, governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility of
extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The
Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the
office which is protected by no less than the Constitution.
 Effect of preventive suspension: you will not receive benefits. It is only to preserve integrity of
evidence and prevent moral ascendancy.

Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan
 Antonio Bolastig was the governor of Samar. An information was filed against him and two
others (the provincial treasurer and property officer) for the overpricing of 100 reams of onion
skin paper in violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
 Section 13 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against
whom a valid information charging violation of RA 3019, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds/property is filed. It is not the
discretion or duty of the court to determine whether preventive suspension is required.
 Grounds for preventive suspension: the suspension operates on the presumption that unless
the accused official is suspended, he may
o Frustrate his prosecution, and/or
o Commit further acts of malfeasance
 Preventive suspension of a maximum of 90 days is mandatory under Section 13 of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The duration of preventive suspension is affected by the time
it takes to decide a case but not by any discretion of the court.

9) Power to expropriate
- Remedies of property owner
- Simon v. CHR

4 Essential Requisites that must concur before an LGU can exercise power of eminent domain:
1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriaton proceedings over a particular
private property;
2) Power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, welfare/purpose, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless;
3) Payment of Just Compensation (Sec. 9, Art. III)
4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.

Expropriation proceedings have two stages:

1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit;
9
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

Henry Sy v. QC
 Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking of the property.
 A government agency’s prolonged occupation of the private property (expropriated from Henry
Sy) without the benefit of expropriation proceedings entitled the landowner to damages.

Ortega v. City of Cebu

 Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases.
 An ordinance appropriating public funds is required for the payment of just compensation. The
remedy for collecting just compensation (absent any ordinance appropriating funds) is through
mandamus, not garnishment.
 The proper remedy of the Spouses Ortega is to file a mandamus case against Cebu City in order
to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction
of their claim.

Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights

 Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia does not fall within the compartment of “human
rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.—In the particular
case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land
which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving
civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.

10) Maquiling case / Talaga case

Macquiling v. COMELEC
 It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also
indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least
six times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of
his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation
must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It
devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
 There is no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it
recognizes the person named therein as its national.—Indeed, there is no doubt that Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local
elective positions. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration
that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
10
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

 If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these
dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code.—It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are
exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run
for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking
the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
 If at the time the CoC was filed and the candidate is not qualified, the CoC must be considered
void. Macquiling should be proclaimed winner because from the start, the CoC is void.
 RA 9225 (Repatriation)
o File an application for recognition of Filipino citizenship
o Take his oath as a Filipino citizen

Mayor Talaga v. COMELEC

 To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law.
o Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Section 8. The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
o Section 43 of the Local Government Code provides: “Section 43. Term of Office.—x x x
No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.”
 To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded
from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term.
Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect
consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.
 All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy
in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called
“substitute” to file a “new” and “original” certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing
thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution. Thus, Barbara Ruby did not validly substitute her husband to run for City Mayor of
Lucena.
 The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate
is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still
cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with
the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the exception did not apply in
favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City
were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011,
or a full year after the elections.
 A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy
should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:
11
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

“Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and

Vice-Mayor.―If a permanent vacancy occurs in the Office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x”

11) Elective Officials

Moreno v. COMELEC
 Convicted of a crime; applied for probation; effect of probation is suspension of sentence and
conviction is not final.
 Service of probation faithfully will allow a candidate for an elective post.
 Moreno's sentence was NOT served. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally
disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
 Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation should not be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility
under Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code has not even begun to run.
 The LGC does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.
 The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) LGC covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision
does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission
is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a
distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC
 A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
least, a charge has already been filed.
 Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985 which arrival preceded the
filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance
on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was
clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at
the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less
conviction — to speak of yet at such time.
 Rodriguez can still run because he was never arraigned/indicted.

12) Repatriation cases and analogous cases:

Valles v. COMELEC
 The mere fact that a person is a holder of a foreign passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against his/her claim of Filipino citizenship.
 The phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in RA 7160, Section 40(d) and in RA 7854, Section 20 must be
understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification.
 For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the
filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. A
declaration in the COC that one is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, which is under oath, operates as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Maquiling v. COMELEC [supra]

Mercado v. Manzano
12
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

 A candidate still has interest in the matter of litigation if at the time he sought to intervene there
was no proclamation yet.
 Dual citizenship under §40 of the LGC means dual allegiance
 By filing a certificate of candidacy, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
 The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which
he has been elected.
 Elected as Gov of Bicol; Oppositors contend: How can he be the governor when he is a
naturalized American citizen? When does one become a Filipino citizen when applying for
candidacy? On the DAY of the election.

Labo v. COMELEC
 Ramon Labo, Jr., and Roberto Ortega filed their candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the last
May 11, 1992. A disqualification proceeding against Labo was filed by Ortega before the
COMELEC seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a
false representation when he stated therein that Labo is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v. COMELEC (1989) declaring Labo not a
citizen of the Philippines as evidence.
 SC held that Labo’s election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. Despite his
application for repatriation filed with the OSG, the same was not yet acted upon by the Committee
on Naturalization. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a
mere application for repatriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of
the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
 Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification required for the contested
office under Section 39 of the LGC.
 The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the
candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
 The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
 While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor,
the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

BONUS QUESTION: Ruling of SC in Batangas CATV case

 Issue: W/N a LGU can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV (cable tv) operators within
its territorial jurisdiction? NO
 For more than two decades the NTC has assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry.
Presidential issuances have reinforced the NTC’s powers. However, this does not mean LGUs
are stripped of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of
the LGC. The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and
property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. 
 Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause, primarily because the CATV system uses public properties. The physical realities of
constructing CATV system allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
However, in enacting Resolution No. 210, the respondents strayed from the well recognized limits
of its power because it violates the mandate of existing laws.
13
LOCAL GOVERNMENT | ATTY. LOANZON
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR – DLSU LAW

 Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting as an agent of the national legislature.
Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. Said resolutions
contravenes EO 205 and EO 436 insofar as it permits respondent Panlungsod to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators.
 EO 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by
the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
Municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance
in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be
invalid. Municipal government is only an agent of the national government. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal (Magtajas v. Pryce)
 As a specialized agency, the NTC is in a better position than the LGU to regulate given the
complexities that characterize the CATV industry.
 When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule
otherwise is to render the State’s policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs
cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. In the case at bar,
petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents’ approval.
 Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt
ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a
municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by
a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid.