Group 5

Public Corporation
A RE L L A NO U NI V ERSI TY SCHO O L O F LAW
AT T Y. TEN O RIO – MO ND AY S 7:30- 9:30PM
TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
 Manner and Date of Election
 Term of Office
 Rules on Succession
 Recall
 Resignation
 ADORMEO v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their COC for mayor of
Lucena City in the May 2001 elections. Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served
the full term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election
of May 2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the
1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground that the latter
was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of
office is considered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a
second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a
mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
ADORMEO v. COMELEC
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for
more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official shall serve for
more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.”

Issue:

WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City.
ADORMEO v. COMELEC
Held:

No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen.
The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for clearly it is
not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).

Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is
initiated only in the middle of the year.
SOCRATES v. COMELEC
Facts:

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto
Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of
Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of
the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall
election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
SOCRATES v. COMELEC
Issue:

WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the
recall election.

Held:

Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
SOCRATES v. COMELEC
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
LATASA v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992,
1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections.
He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the
position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny
petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms.
Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001
elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
LATASA v. COMELEC
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed
winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:

WON Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
LATASA v. COMELEC
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed
winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:

WON Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
 LATASA v. COMELEC
Held:

No. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will
govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of
choice of the people.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality.
This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office
of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of
the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. 
Rules of Succession
GAMBOA v. AGUIRRE
Issue:
GAMBOA v. AGUIRRE
Issue:
Sources:
https://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/06/adormeo-vs-comelec-76-scra-90-gr-147927-february-4
-2002/

https://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/06/socrates-vs-comelec-391-scra-457/

http://politicallawcasedigests.blogspot.com/2016/05/latasa-vs-comelec.html