Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nige

Hussein Mohammed Gari
September 2017
Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nigeria
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract...............................................................................................................3
Introduction...........................................................................................................3
The Concept of Islamism and Militant Islamism................................................6
Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nigeria......................................................9
Pattern of the Development of Militant Islamic Groups..................................10
The Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio.........................................................................12
Maitatsine Group...............................................................................................20
The Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN).........................................................24
Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a (Yusufiyya/Boko Haram)........................................29
Conclusion..........................................................................................................45
Annexes
1. Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah wa Iqamatis Sunna..........................................48
2. Salafism and its Various Dimensions......................................................53
3. Jama’atu Nasril Islam..............................................................................55
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By
Hussein Mohammed Gari
Abstract
Northern Nigeria has a long history of rising of influential Militant Islamic
groups in its societies, shaped by conflicts with political overtones, even though,
were termed jihads to reflect religious, utilizing religiously justified violence.
These were notably the pre-modern jihad movements like that of Usman Dan
Fodio, the 20th century like that of Maitatsine and of El-Zakzaki Shiite Islamic
Movement in Nigeria and the 21st century of Mohammed Yusuf's Ahluls Sunna
wal Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunna and the Community of Muslims) known as
Yusufiyya/Boko Haram and that of Abubakar Shekau's Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna
Lidda’Awati wal Jihad (Sunni Community for Propagation of the Prophet’s
Teachings and Jihad). Abubakar Shekau, who took over the leadership of Boko
Haram following the extra-judicial execution of the group’s founder
Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, re-named the group in September 2010. The group's
members seemingly abhor the popular but derisive name of Boko Haram.
This paper studies the historical trends and dynamics associated with the
emergence of the militant Islamic groups in northern Nigeria, the conditions that
breed militant Islamic groups, roles do religious doctrine, ideology and socio-
political realities play. The paper aims to interrogate the increasing challenges
and threats posed to state authority by the growth and spread of these groups in
northern Nigeria, particularly since the 1980s.
Introduction
Religious violence in the form of militant Islamic groups of reform is an
important part of West African and northern Nigerian history. Beginning in the
late 17th century, a series of militant teachers criticized the pluralist mixture of
Islamic and indigenous cultures that characterized states and societies in the
region. They sought to create institutions and practices in accord with Islam as
understood in the more specialist terms of conservative scholars. Some of the
groups clashed with the political rulers in a series of jihads, creating a jihad
tradition of militant Muslim revivalism extending from the 17th century to the
end of the 19th century and beyond. While the jihad movements were distinctive
in their local manifestations, they were historically connected and shared many
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characteristics1. This jihad tradition provides an historic foundation for popular
acceptance of armed struggle in the cause of religious revival. The pre-modern
jihad movements like that of Usman Dan Fodio, the 20th century like that of
Maitatsine and of El-Zakzaki's Shiite Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and
the 21st century like that of Mohammed Yusuf's Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a
Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunna and the Community of Muslims) known as
Yusufiyya/Boko Haram and that of Abubakar Shekau's Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna
Lidda’Awati wal Jihad (Sunni Community for Propagation of the Prophet’s
Teachings and Jihad). After Mohammed Yusuf's extra-judicial execution in
2009, Abubakar Shekau immediately took power and led the group's members
who survived briefly went underground. The first reference to the name
Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad came, a year later, in the
aftermath of the Bauchi prison break in September 20102, when the group re-
emerged under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau with an attack on the Bauchi
prison, resulting in the escape of 700 prisoners, including 150 Boko Haram
members3. The group's members seemingly abhor the popular but derisive name
of Boko Haram.
The mentioned movements are inheritors to the jihad legacy and the similarities
and differences between the contemporary movement and the earlier tradition
help to show both the continuities and changes in the nature of religious
violence in the 21st century.
The jihad tradition was part of the long historic process of Islamization in West
African and northern Nigerian societies. The northern areas of the Nigeria are
predominantly Muslim due to centuries of contact with Muslim North Africa
through trans-Saharan trade and the agency of the Kanem-Borno Empire since
7th century. Islam came to the Kawar Oases in 667, through the Tripoli-Fezzan-
Kawar-Kanem trans-Saharan trade route, when Oqba Ibn Nafi leading an
Islamic propagation in North Africa came in contact with the traders and
itinerant scholars of Kanem4.
1
David Robinson, Revolutions in the Western Sudan, In The History of Islam in Africa, edited by Nehemia
Levtzion and Randall L. Powells, Ohio University Press, Athens, 2000, pp. 131–52. See also Philip D. Curtin,
Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-relations in Mauritania and Senegal, The Journal of African History
12 (1971), pp. 11–24.
2
International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict. Africa Report no. 168, 20 December
2010, p. 36 & U.A. ADAMU, Insurgency in Nigeria: The northern Nigerian experience, being the text of a paper
presented at Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting on Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria at National
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria, 28-30 August 2012, pp. 32-33,
3
Aminu Abubakar, Manhunt Begins After Prison Break, IOL News at :
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/manhunt-begins-after-prison-break-1.680173#.VBgRSPIdUYM
4
Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno under the Sayfuwa Dynasty: A Study of the Origin, Growth and Collapse
of a Dynasty, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1978.
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The Islamic beliefs and culture were rapidly and progressively carried by
migrants, traders and itinerant scholars through positive and effective cultural
interaction which paved way for the establishment of scholarship and learning
in the history of Bilad-as-Sudan5.
These early migrant Muslims became part of the local societies and the result
was a blending of Islamic and indigenous local elements in social and political
institutions. However, this development also meant that the people became
aware of and respected Islamic concepts and teachings, so general opposition to
oppressive rulers eventually could be expressed in Islamic terms. Muslim
scholars who were critical of the synthesis of Islamic and indigenous elements
became both reformers of religious life and leaders of political opposition with
the goal of establishing Islamic states. In this framework, violence against the
political authorities was legitimated in Islamic terms as jihad in the sake of
Allah. The basic message of radical militant Muslim scholars, whether in the
Middle East, North Africa, West Africa or northern Nigeria, is the same: it is
the duty of Muslims to revolt against and change traitor rulers and governments
in order to help re-establish a proper Islamic state.
Already in medieval times, Muslim scholars in West Africa discussed when
armed struggle in the form of jihad was appropriate and their works, especially
the writings of Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d. 1505), remained
influential in the following centuries. Al-Maghili wrote a major study in the late
15th century in response to questions posed by the ruler of the Songhay Empire,
the most powerful state in West Africa at the time. Al-Maghili explicitly
approved jihad against those who professed Islam but continued indigenous
local religious practices. These were people who have idols…and venerate
certain trees and make sacrifices to them, among other practices6. He stated that
they are polytheists without doubt and said that there is no doubt that jihad
against them is more fitting and worthy than jihad against born unbelievers7. In
this framework, jihad against corrupt self-identified Muslims took priority over
jihad against non-believers. Jihad was a movement of purification more than a
movement of conversion. Al-Maghili also viewed jihad as the means for
opposing unjust rulers, even if the struggle resulted in killing Muslims. In his
instructions, for example, in dealing with a land having an Amir from among
5
Bilad-as-Sudan or Land of the Blacks was the name given by medieval Muslim Arab geographers and
historians to the belt of African territory encompasses the broad expanse of savanna that stretches south of
the Sahara Desert to the north and the tropical rain forests of the Guinea coast to the south and extending
from the Atlantic ocean in the west to the Ethiopian plateau and the Red sea in the east. Historically, the name
was understood to point to the belt between the Sahara and the coastal West Africa.
6
John O. Hunwick, ed and trans, Sharīʽa in Songhay: The Replies of al-Maghīlī to the Questions of Askia al-Hājj
Muhammad, British Academy, London, 1985, pp. 76–77.
7
Muhammad, British Academy, London, 1985, p. 78.
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those chiefs whom you described as charging unlawful taxes and being
oppressive and evildoing and failing to set matters right, he says: (If you can
bring to an end his oppression of the Muslims without harm to them so that you
set up among them a just Amir, then do so, even if that leads to killing and the
killing of many of the oppressors and their supporters and the killing of many of
your supporters, for whoever is killed from among them is the worst of slain
men and whoever is killed from among your people is the best of martyrs)8.
These themes of opposition to mixing indigenous and Islamic practices and to
oppressive rulers who did not follow Muslim teachings are central to the West
African and northern Nigerian jihad tradition. Beginning in the later 17th century
with a movement led by Imam Nasir al-Din (d. 1674) in what is modern-day
Southern Mauritania, a chain of interconnected purificationist movements
developed. Jihads in Futo Toro and Foto Jalon in the Senegambia established
this chain. At the fundamental levels of Islamization, spreading literacy and
building a consciousness of a Dar-al-Islam (Islamic World). Futo Toro and Foto
Jalon influenced over the vast region stretching from southern Mauritania to
Sierra Leone. By their success in at least establishing regimes that could lay
claim to an Islamic identity, they solved the great problem of legitimation9.
Throughout the savannah region or Bilad-al-Sudan of West Africa in the
following centuries, a number of reformist teachers-led movements and jihads
which resulted in the creation of Islamically-legitimated states. They were often
directly connected by networks of students and teachers who were inspired by
previous jihads.
The Concept of Islamism and Militant Islamism

Studies on Islamism, jihad, fundamentalism and militancy are varied and
divergent, specifically in terms of their perceptions. Daniel Pipes, an editor of
the Middle East Quarterly views Islamism and fundamentalism as a belief
system, a form of political ideology that is every bit as dangerous as
communism and one that should therefore be confronted head-on, just as
America and the West confronted communism10. The strength of this argument
lies in the fact that even some Muslims consider Islamism and fundamentalism
as representing a threat to political stability in the countries where they are
active and by implication a threat to world peace in general. Daniel Pipes argue
that religious and civil law should be kept separate from each other and that
Islamic law is flexible enough to permit changes in tradition.
8
Muhammad, British Academy, London, 1985, p. 81.
9
David Robinson, Revolutions in the Western Sudan, In The History of Islam in Africa, edited by Nehemia
Levtzion and Randall L. Powells, Ohio University Press, Athens, 2000, p. 137.
10
Daniel Pipes, Is Islamic fundamentalism a threat to political stability? From same differences, National
Review, 7 November 1994.
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On the other side of the debate is John Esposito, who argues that Islamism or
Islamic fundamentalism does not pose a major threat to world political
stability11. He posits that there is a need to appreciate each case of
fundamentalism and Islamism independently in the country where it is found
and constitutes a political force, and to consider its developments in that
particular cultural context. John Esposito further maintains that talk of a
worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of civilizations12 in which Islam may
overwhelm the West is just a part of the search for a new enemy, something to
fill the threat vacuum created by the end of the Soviet Union and subsequent
discreditation of communism. His conclusions are that the fear of a unified
Islamist uprising is unnecessary. In the perception of Mahmood13 and scholars
such as Marty and Appleby14, the analysis of Islamism and religion in general is
reliable with the assumptions of the theories of modernization that distinguish
religion as opposing to the development of democratic, modern societies.
Islamism conceptually is about political movements that pursue Islamic
idealism, modern ideologies and a political programme. Islamism, which in
Arabic denotes al-Islamiyya, is a set of ideologies portray Islam not only as a
religion but also a political system comparable to socialism or capitalism and
which holds that modern Muslims must return to the roots of their religion and
unite politically by the formation of Islamic political movements (al-Harakat al-
Islamiyya as-Siyassiyya)15. However, this does not imply that there are
universally accepted conceptions of Islamism16. Islamism – which does not
necessarily imply militancy – is an umbrella concept applicable to diverse
Islamic movements that are often commonly grouped under the banner of Islam,
swelling together varied and different streams of Islamic groups17. Islamism as a
concept also increasingly indicates the political manifestations of Islam.
Leading Islamic thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani,
Sayyid Abul-A’la al-Maududi (Pakistan), Sayyid Qutb (Egypt) and Ayatollah
11
John L. Esposito, Political Islam: beyond the green menace, Current History, January 1994,
http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/articles/espo.html (Accessed 15 May 2010).
12
S. P. Huntington, The clash of civilisations?, Foreign Affairs 72(3) (Summer 1993), 22–28. Available at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-ofcivilizations (Accessed on 15
May 2010)
13
S. Mahmood, Islam and Fundamentalism, Middle East Report 191, 1994, pp. 29-30.
14
Martin E. Marty and R Scott Appleby, Introduction, in Martin E Martin and R Scott Appleby (eds),
Fundamentalism and the state, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, p. 3.
15
http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (Accessed 15 March 2009).
16
International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report 37, 2 March 2005.
Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/037-
understanding-islamism.aspx (Accessed 3 August 2010).
17
Trevor Stanley, Definitions: Islamism, Islamist, Islamiste, Islamicist, Perspectives on World History and
Current Events, July 2005. Available at: http://www.pwhce.org/islamism.html (Accessed on 19 March 2010).
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Khomeini (Iran)18 have aspired to apply many aspects of the Sharia, particularly
that dealing with reviving and revitalizing modern society, creating pan-Islamic
political unity19
These Islamic philosophical strengthening laid the basis and grounds for
contemporary Islamism. Islamism is therefore a form of identity politics that is
usually expressed through movements whose aim is to promote Muslim
identity. Examples of Islamist political movements are the Islamic Salvation
Front in Algeria, Jamaal Islamiyya in Egypt, the Justice and Development Party
in Turkey and Morocco, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan,
Kuwait, Sudan and Syria20. The militant Islamist movement is a modern
phenomenon that constitutes a part of a wider resurgence of religious identity
developing across the Muslim world. Militant Islamism – as well as radical
Islamism – is rooted in the recurring cycles of revivals characteristic of Muslim
history. It is also a reaction, more often than not very violent, to the severe crisis
of modernity meeting with the rise of charismatic visionary leaders. Militant
Islamism is a religious movement and a political ideology that encompasses a
social element of protest, engagement in a counterattack on secularism and an
identity for the have-nots of the Muslim world21. Militant Islamists seeks to
Islamize the social and political systems. These goals are to be realized through
revival or establishment of a worldwide Islamic state based on Sharia law. Their
emphasis is on the state, which is seen as the main instrument for actualizing the
Islamic religion that will guarantee the revival of and a total return to the Holy
Qu’ran and the Noble Hadith. Militant Islamists therefore seek to capture the
state through legal and democratic means or through a violent revolution, coup
d’état or secession22.
Militant Islamists radically interpret traditional Islamic concepts, particularly its
views of jihads, when mobilizing the faithful by warning them against enemies
of Islam and urging them to defend the faith. The faithful are encouraged to
train, organize and actively participate in the actualization of their goals by
employing tactics such as temporary withdrawal from society23. The faithful can
18
S. M. Abbas Zaidi, The fundamentalist distortion of the Islamic message, Athena Intelligence Journal 3(4)
2008, 59–75, http://www.athenaintelligence.org/aij-vol3-a18.pdf (Accessed 6 March 2009).
19
http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (Accessed 15 March 2009).
20
21 D. Zeidan, The Islamic fundamentalist view of life as a perennial battle, Moral economy of Islam 5:4, 2001,
p. 24.
22
D. Zeidan, The Islamic fundamentalist view of life as a perennial battle, Moral economy of Islam 5:4, 2001, p.
25.
23
D. Zeidan, The Islamic fundamentalist view of life as a perennial battle, Moral economy of Islam 5:4, 2001, p.
25.
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also be urged to target state institutions and symbols that are regarded as secular
or state instruments or agencies that are perceived to be tools of oppression and
domination.
There are three main variants of militant Islamism: the internal militancy
against Muslim regimes that are considered to be sinful, the irredentists fighting
to redeem the land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation and the global
militants waging a jihad against the West24.

Islam in northern Nigeria was largely propagated by the Qadiriya and Tijaniya
Sufi brotherhoods, which continue as the dominant Islamic orders in
contemporary Nigeria25. Early Islamic militants under the banner of the
Quadriyya accused the leadership of the then Hausa societies and their
associates of ungodly practices leading to polytheism and syncretism. This laid
the basis for Usman Dan Fodio’s Sokoto jihad, which challenged unjust and
corrupt rulers, particularly their distortions of the Islamic system26.
Contemporary Islamic movements can be identified by the manner in which
they pursue the principles of Islam. They seek to achieve their goals by
violently confronting the symbols and institutions of state power, authority and
legitimacy with the ultimate aim of taking over state power. Further, they seek
the strict application of Sharia Islamic law, the transformation of Muslim
society and the abandonment of Western cultural influences and innovations.
They belief that a charismatic Islamic leader would emerge to oust an existing
order of injustice and inequality and establish in its place one that is equal and
just, as preserved by the Holy Qu’ran and the Sunna or practices of the Prophet
Mohammed. It is common for the followers of such movements to refer their
leaders as mujaddid27 (reviver or reformer). Therefore, they have come to
encourage less devout Muslims to return to orthodox Islam and to define and
justify most and any attempts at reviving and purifying religion through militant
Islamism to fight injustice and oppression as part of the religious obligations.
One of the major trends that have characterized northern Nigeria from the early
19th century to the present is the emergence and resurgence of revivalists,
24
25
Mahmud, Sakah Saidu. 2013. Sharia or Shura: Contending Approaches to Muslim Politics in Nigeria and
Senegal, Lexington Books, New York, p. 18.
26
A. R. Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective, Macmillan, London, 1996.
27
I. Muazzam, New Islamic religious movements and democratic governance in Nigeria. A research report on
the Muslim Brothers, Research report submitted to the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD), Kano,
Nigeria, July 2001
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reformists, radicals, fundamentalists and revolutionary Islamist movements.
Most of these movements have, at various stages of their development and
during almost every period, opposed and in some cases totally rejected
established and existing Islamic scholarship. More often than not, the militant
and extremist variants of these movements have become very critical of the
nature, character and constituent order of the state in Nigeria28. A brief
examination of the recorded history of the resurgence of Islamism and militant
movements in northern Nigeria reveals that they are a recurring phenomenon
that is similar to the 19th-century jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. The key to
understanding contemporary militant Islamism in northern Nigeria is to
comprehend the role and place of the Sokoto jihad.
The most recent militancy has been urged by both the economic crisis and
governance deficiencies at all levels of the Nigerian government, as well as by
opportunities provided by the opening up of the democratic space. But it is
mainly based on the traditional protest agenda of challenging and undermining
the post-colonial secular state. This has been accompanied by anti-Western
sentiments fuelled by external influences that included financial support for
Sunni/Salafi style preaching, the regression of the Nigerian economy and the
Middle East conflicts29. Militant Islamist groups and their organizations are
spread across a wide range of demographics and scenes in northern Nigeria.
Central to understanding these movements is the Sokoto jihad and caliphate,
founded by Usman Dan Fodio, which serve as a framework, an inspiration and a
model for present-day movements, both Sunni/Salafi and Shia30.
Pattern of the Development of Militant Islamic Groups

In the histories of the pre-modern militant groups, the pattern of events followed
a standard format, in four stages, that dates back to at least 1775-1800 AD. The
first is the gathering of a group of dedicated students around a particular
teacher, sees an Islamic scholar on the make, who is distinguished from the
other teachers at the time by an emphasis on the need for reform. Such teacher-
student circles were and are common throughout Muslim West Africa and most
do not become movements or organized groups. Some of these circles attract a
small following; the local ruler supports him in order to win his political
28
Roman Loimeier, Patterns and peculiarities of Islamic reform in Africa, Journal of Religion in Africa 33(3),
Islamic thoughts in 20th century Africa (2003), 237–262, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581849 (Accessed 25
February 2009).
29
P. Lubeck, R. Lipschutz and E. Weeks, The Globality of Islam: Sharia as a Nigerian Selfdetermination
movement, Paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Self-Determination, QEH Working Paper
Series – QEHWPS106, London, April 2003.
30
John N. Paden, Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a pivotal state in the Muslim world, United States
Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 2008, pp. 27-38. Available at: http://www.usip.org/resources/faithand-
politics-nigeria (Accessed on 15/05/2015)
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backing. Some sons of the local elite join and protect the emerging community.
However, in the second stage some of these circles attract larger number of
followers, which become a more consciously organized group, while the teacher
continues to develop a distinctive message. The teacher’s following grows so
large that the local ruler and his officials get seriously alarmed and try to limit
the scholar’s following. If the emerging organization experiences resistance
from the local population or the ruler, the group tends to withdraw from direct
involvement in society. Sometimes the leader and his followers may move to a
more isolated area, often citing the example of the Prophet Mohammed who
undertook the migration (hijra) from Makka to Medina. In this stage, the
movement becomes a more formally organized association with an emerging
ideological identification of Muslim revival and reform. Again, such self-
contained groups are part of Muslim life in West Africa and many do not move
to the next stage, open conflict with religious and political establishments. The
third stage sees open conflict, subordinates from the ruler’s polity get involved
in a major violent quarrel with subordinates from the teacher’s community, the
confrontation often involving the release of prisoners. It is in the third stage that
the mission of the group becomes a jihad and the movement becomes one of
legitimized armed struggle. Large organizations of opposition become a threat
to rulers and attempts at suppressing the groups can lead to warfare. The leader
declares a jihad and the movement becomes an army as well as a movement of
religious reform and purification. As an organization of opposition to the ruler,
the group becomes an alternative state. In fourth stage all-out war is formally
declared between the local ruler’s state and the teacher's community. This stage
of development depends upon the results of the jihad. When the group wins the
jihad, a new state is established; when they lose, the organization disappears but
usually the memory and teaching survive to inspire later movements. In
northern Nigeria, usually the teacher losing out, but on at least one famous
occasion the teacher’s community eventually won after a four-year jihad and set
up a new state, the Sokoto caliphate.
Many reform-minded Muslim teachers and students were active in the second
half of the 20th century. The great diversity of these groups and organizations in
northern Nigeria that were active at the time of the beginning of Boko Haram
and many are still active today. Few actually became militant in their actions31.
Teacher-student networks resulted in a number of groupings around locally
prominent teachers. Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was one
such teacher. He was associated with important teachers, and was a leader in
reformist student groups in Maiduguri, where he became a preacher in major
31
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mosques. When local religious leaders opposed his teachings, he established his
own school and then built a mosque which became a centre for radicals holding
Salafi views with literalist interpretations of the Holy Qur’an and advocates of
activist purification of state and society. He named the mosque after Ahmad Ibn
Taymiyya, a 13th-century Muslim thinker whose strict interpretations influenced
later activist reformers from Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to 20th century
and 21st century jihadists.
The Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio

In what is modern northern Nigeria, movements of jihads go back to the onset
of the first Islamic movement in the region which has advocated jihad (in the
sense of an armed struggle) as strategy to implement its programme, the
movement of jihad that started by Usman Dan Fodio in the beginning of the 19th
century.
A superficial examination of the recorded history of the resurgence of Islamic
movements in northern Nigeria reveals that they are a recurring phenomenon
that is similar to the 19th century jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. The key to
understanding contemporary Islamic movements in northern Nigeria is to
comprehend the role and place of the Sokoto Jihad.
In the early 19th century, Usman Dan Fodio, the most famous scholar and
jihadist reformer in pre-colonial Nigeria and member of the Qadiriyya Sufi
brotherhood, preached a message of reform that led to conflict with local rulers
and the declaration with his followers of a jihad between 1802 and 181232, led to
the removal of the Habe33 of Hausa rulers in Hausaland whom he saw as corrupt
and as indulging un-Islamic practices34 and the established a federation of
Islamic states known as the Sokoto Caliphate under the leadership of the Sultan
of Sokoto35. The Sultan ruled through a network of Emirs. This development
established the rule of Muslim religious scholars who consequently strove to
legitimate their rule through theological argumentation. Since then, recourse to
theological argumentation became a precondition for political action among
Muslims in northern Nigeria. A sound education in Islamic law and theology
has consequently become a sine qua non for participation in public/political
debates. The jihad and the Caliphate that he established through a series of
conquests became centre in the networks of scholars leading later jihads and the
32
Michael Olufemi Sodipo, Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria, African Security Brief, no. National
Defense University D.C., 2013, p. 3.
33
Habe: a Fulani term in 18th and 19th century jihadist terminology referred to the pre-jihadist (and allegedly
jahiliyya or pre-Islamic paganism).
34
Sodiq Yushau, A History of Islamic Law in Nigeria: Past and Present, Islamis Studies, 31:1, 1992, pp. 85-108.
35
Raymon Hicky, The 1980 Maitatsine Uprising in Nigeria: A note, The Royal African Society 83, no. 331: 251,
1984.
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model examples of the northern Nigerian jihad tradition. Official accounts of
Islamic history still portray Usman Dan Fodio as role model of a religious
reformer, and the caliphate he founded is represented as the conclusion of
Islamic civilisation36. Usman Dan Fodio was a religious teacher, writer, Islamic
promoter and revolutionary reformer, born in 1754 in the village of Maratta,
Gobir, Hausaland in what is today northern Nigeria and died 1817 in Sokoto.
He was a descendant of the early Fulani from the Torokawa clan, which had
emigrated from Futa Toro in Senegal and settled in Hausaland in the 15th
century37. Dan Fodio38 was one of a class of urbanized ethnic Fulani living in the
Hausaland. He was a leader who followed the Sunni Maliki school of
Jurisprudence and the Qadiri branch of Sufism39. Nevertheless, there was about
the doctrine of Dan Fodio and his adherents a strong flavour not merely of
reform but of radical or fundamental reform.
While he was still young, Usman Dan Fodio moved south with his family to
Degel, a division developed between his substantial community and the Gobir
ruling dynasty, where he studied the Qur'an with his father. Subsequently he
moved on to other scholar relatives, travelling from teacher to teacher in the
traditional way and reading extensively in the Islamic sciences. One powerful
intellectual and religious influence at that time was his teacher in the southern
African Saharan city of Agadez, in present Niger Republic, Jibril Ibn Umar, by
whom Dan Fodio was admitted to the Qadiri Ṣufi order and gave him a broader
perspective of Muslim reformist ideas in other parts of the Muslim world. Jibril
Ibn Umar was concerned about the level of corruption in the Hausa society,
argued that it was the duty and within the power of religious movements to
establish an ideal society free from oppression and vice. Usman Dan Fodio was
influenced by the concerns of his teacher and he dedicated himself to address
these problems, as regards, some issues preoccupied the mind of Dan Fodio,
including belief and atheism, local customs and traditions and mass ignorance
of Islam. Thus, his teaching focused towards addressing these areas with a view
to reform them so that people’s life style can conform to the Islamic Sharia law.
He established his own school in Degel and began his active life as a teacher,
together with his brother Abdullahi they started going to different towns and
cities to preach. For the next twelve years he combined study with travelling
36
Alkali M. N., A. K. Monguno & B. S. MUSTAFA, Overview of Islamic actors in northeastern Nigeria, NRN
Working Paper No. 2, 2012. Available at: http://www.3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/WP2Alkali.pdf (Accessed 11
February 2013).
37
B. G. Martin, Mulis Brotherhoods in nineteenth-century Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1976 and http://www.rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/usman-dan-fodio (Accessed 01/02/2017)
38
The name Fodio is a nickname, which is a Fulfulde word meaning (the learned) and the word Dan is a Hausa
word meaning (so of)
39
http://www.britannica.com/EBckecked/topic/620352/Usman-dan-fodio (Accessed on 8 October 2015).
Page | 13
teaching and preaching in Kebbi and Gobir, followed by a further five years in
Zamfara. During this latter period, though committed in principle to avoiding
the courts of rulers, he visited Bawa, the Sultan of Gobir, from whom he won
important concessions for the local Muslim community, including his own
freedom to propagate Islam. He also appears to have taught the future Sultan
Yunfa. Dan Fodio used his influence to secure approval for creating a religious
community in his hometown of Degel that would, Dan Fodio hoped, be a model
town. He stayed there for twenty years, writing, teaching, and preaching. Dan
Fodio wrote more than a hundred books concerning religion, government,
culture and society in both his native Fulfulde and Arabic languages, some of
his works were later translated into Hausa. He developed a critique of existing
Muslim scholars for what he saw as their greed, violation of standards of Sharia
Islamic law, justification of corruption of rulers and use of heavy taxation. He
encouraged literacy and scholarship for men and women as well, several of his
daughters emerged as scholars and writers.
Dan Fodio’s reputation increased, as did the size and importance of the
community that looked to him for religious and political leadership.
Particularly, closely associated with him were his younger brother, Abdullahi
and his son, Mohammed Bello, both distinguished teachers and writers.
Significant support appears to have come from the Hausa peasantry. Their
economic and social grievances and experience of oppression under the existing
dynasties led some followers to consider Dan Fodio to have been a mujaddid
(renewal), a divinely inspired reformer of Islam40 or Mahdi (Divinely Guided
One), a legendary Muslim redeemer whose appearance was expected at that
time. Although, he rejected this identification, he did share and encourage their
expectations. The origins Mahdi thought, can be traced to a messianic doctrine
that proffered that at the turn of each century, a Mahdi would emerge with
powers to strengthen Islam and make justice triumph. The doctrine holds that
when the Mahdi emerges, he would attract a large followership of Muslims in
his quest to establish justice and equality in society. Muslims look towards the
arrival of the Mahdi for deliverance from inequalities, unjust leadership and bad
governance.
As a result of the preaching, Dan Fodio started attracting followership. Degel
became a centre of learning because people are coming to take lessons from
him. However, this created inconvenience for the scholars of the time and Bawa
Jan Gwarzo started becoming uncomfortable with the teaching of Usman Dan
Fodio while at the same time Dan Fodio's students became tired of the
persecution and decided to call for confrontation with the authorities but, he
requested them to be patient for a while. While this is going on, Bawa Jan
Gwarzo died and his successor, Nafata, who was aware that Usman Dan Fodio
had permitted his community to be armed. He was no doubt feared that it was
40
John O Hunwick, African and Islamic Revival in Sudanic Africa: A journal of Historical Sources, No: 6, 1995.
Page | 14
acquiring the characteristics of a state within the state. Nafata, alarmed by
Shehu’s teaching, reversed the liberal policy had adopted toward Dan Fodio ten
years earlier and issued his historic declaration, imposing three new rules; no
one should preach except the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio himself, no more
conversion to Islam of sons from the religion of their fathers and men should
not wear Turban and women should not wear veil. In 1802 Yunfa succeeded
Nafata as Sultan of Gobir, but, whatever his previous ties with the Dan Fodio
may have been (he was one of Dan Fodio's students), he did not improve the
status of Dan Fodio’s community. The breakdown, when it eventually occurred,
turned on a confused incident in which some of Dan Fodio’s followers forcibly
freed Muslim prisoners taken by a Gobir military expedition. Dan Fodio, who
was opposed by the local religious establishment and attacked by the armed
forces of the Sultan of Gobir, seems wished to avoid a final break, nevertheless
agreed that Degel was threatened. Like the Prophet Mohammed, whose
biography frequently noted as having close parallels with his own, Dan Fodio
and his followers withdrew to a safer place, carried out a hijrah or migration to
Gudu, forty eight kilometres to the northwest, in February 1804, as symbolic of
the Prophet Mohammad’s migration from Makka to Medina in 621. From Gudu
they declared jihad against Gobir. This was a new beginning, a new Muslim
space. Now the past of Hausaland was classified as Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic
paganism), the true Muslim community had performed hijra, pledged allegiance
to Dan Fodio, formed the Islamic community, and declared the jihad of the
armed struggle41 Goir and against the kings of Hausaland, although claimed to
be Muslims, he considered them enemies of Islam.
Despite his own apparent reluctance, he was elected Amir al-Muminin or
commander of the faithful and the new Caliphate was formally established. This
made him a political as well as religious leader, giving him the authority to
declare and pursue a jihad, raise an army and become its commander. A
widespread uprising began in Hausaland. This uprising was largely composed
of the Fulani, who held a powerful military advantage with their cavalry. It was
also widely supported by the Hausa peasantry, who felt over-taxed and
oppressed by their rulers. During the next five years (Feb.1804-Oct.1808) the
Dan Fodio’s primary interests were necessarily the conduct of the Jihad and the
organization of the Caliphate. He did not himself take part in military
operations, but he appointed commanders, encouraged the army, handled
diplomatic questions and wrote widely on problems relating to the Jihad and its
theoretical justification. On this, his basic position was clear and rigorous: the
Sultan of Gobir had attacked the Muslims, therefore he was an unbeliever and
as such, must be fought and anyone helping an unbeliever was also an
unbeliever. This last proposition was later used to justify the conflict with
Kanem-Borno Empire, the oldest Islamic polity in the central Sudan, on the
41
David Robinson, Muslim Societies in African History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 144.
Page | 15
grounds that the Mai of Borno had sided with the enemies of Islam. The ruling
dynasty of the Borno Empire had been Islamic for more than 700 years; in fact,
it has the longest Muslim dynasty tradition in Africa42. In the 16th century,
Kanem-Borno was seen as one of the four main sultanates in the Islamic
world43, other being Baghdad, Egypt and Mali44. Borno's political and religious
leader in the early 19th century, Shehu Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Kanemi, who
was born to a Kanembu father and an Arab mother near Murzuk in what is
today Libya45, was a scholar, a soldier and an administrator, wrote letters to
Sokoto, protesting the invasion of his country, arguing that both empires, Borno
and Sokoto, were Islamic and should not fight each other. Al-Kanemi
concluded his first letter by: (We are astonished that you should permit such
things when you claim to be reforming our religion and we perceive that your
true object is the power to rule over others. Though you may conceal this aim,
even in your own hearts, it is, we believe, your real ambition).The debate
between the leaders of Sokoto and Borno over the legitimacy of the jihad is
summarised in Brenner, Jihad Debate46. In 1808, the jihadists destroyed
Ngazargamo, the ancient capital of Borno, and devastated the whole western
half of the empire47.
Although the Mai (the King) of Kanem-Borno Empire was overthrown and
Birni Gazargamu destroyed, Borno did not succumb. The reason, primarily, was
that Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Kanemi, formed a strong resistance that
eventually forced those jihadist in Borno to retreat west and South. In the end,
Al-Kanemi overthrew the centuries-old Sayfawa Dynasty of Kanem-Borno
Empire and established his own lineage, Al-Kanemi, as the new ruling house. In
his book, Tanbih al-ikhwan ’ala ahwal al-Sudan, Dan Fodio’s wrote: The
government of a country is the government of its king without question. If the
king is a Muslim, his land is Muslim, if he is an unbeliever; his land is a land of
42
.7 ‫ ص‬، ‫م‬1975 ،‫ الهيئة المصرية العامة للكتاب‬،‫ إمبراطورية البرنواإلسالمية‬،‫ إبراهيم علي طرخان‬.‫د‬
43
J. E. Lavers, Kanem and Borno to 1808, in O. Ikime, ed., Groundwork of Nigerian History, Second Edition,
Heinemann, Ibadan, 1984, pp. 187-209.
44
.9 ‫ ص‬، ‫م‬1975 ،‫ الهيئة المصرية العامة للكتاب‬،‫ إمبراطورية البرنواإلسالمية‬،‫ إبراهيم علي طرخان‬.‫د‬
45
Elizabeth Allo Isichei, A History of African Societies to 1870, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997,
pp. 318-320.
46
L. Brenner, The jihad debate between Sokoto and Borno: An historical analysis of Islamic political discourse
in Nigeria, in, J. F. A. Ajayi & J. D. Y. Peel, eds, People and empires in African history: Essays in memory of
Michael Crowder, Longman, London/New York, 1992, pp. 21-43.
47
L. Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa: A history of the Al-Kanemi dynasty of Bornu, Clarendon, Oxford, 1973,
pp. 25, 32.
Page | 16
unbelievers. In these circumstances it is obligatory for anyone to leave it for
another country48.
Dan Fodio did exactly this when he left Gobir in 1802. Yunfa then turned for
aid to the other leaders of the Hausa states, warning them that Dan Fodio could
trigger a widespread jihad49. With support from Hausa and Fulani peasants,
Usman Dan Fodio succeeded an Islamic political order governed by the Amir
ul-Muminin (commander of the faithful), who later transformed himself into the
Sarkin Musulmi (Ruler of Muslims) known as Sultan of Sokoto. The Dan
Fodio's forces won a series of decisive battles and within four years had gained
control of almost all of Hausaland and much of neighbouring Kanem-Borno. At
its height in the mid-1800s, the caliphate covered northern Nigeria and parts of
southern Niger50.
The new caliphate derived cohesion from Islam but consisted of autonomous
emirates, each with its emir and administration. At the apex was the caliph,
based in Sokoto, who doubled as both political leader and spiritual guide. The
caliphate retained the pre-jihad feudal system, replacing the Hausa aristocracy
with royal Fulani families. Communities paid tithes to the emirs, who in turn
paid tribute to the caliph. Between the capitals of the emirates, trade flourished,
transport routes were relatively secure and the cities attained considerable
wealth51. The rulers entrenched Islamic values and practices in most of the
region52. Although this was sometimes met with passive resistance from
sections of the population, it was crucial to fostering a common culture that
transcended ethnicity and held the caliphate together. Sharia was applied more
widely53 and indigenous religious practices, such as traditional Hausa
ceremonies (Bori), were suppressed, or at least became less visible. However,
the Fulani rulers also incorporated many elements of Hausa culture, thus
48
Usman dan Fodio: Encyclopædia Britannica Online, www.britannica.com/eb/article-9074522/Usman-dan-
Fodio, retrieved 18 October 2015.
49
Abu Alfa Muhammed Shareef bin Farid, The Islamic Slave Revolts of Bahia, Brazil: A Continuity of the 19th
Century Jihaad Movements of Western Sudan?, Sankore Institute of Islamic African Studies. Available at:
http://www.africandisporastudies.com/downloads/bahia_slave_revolt.pdf (Accessed on18 October 2015).
50
Michael Olufemi Sodipo, Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria, African Security Brief, no. 26, National
Defense University Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington D.C., 2013, p. 3
51
On the Sokoto Caliphate, see H.A.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, London, 1967, A. M. Kani and K.
A. Gandi (eds.), State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate, Sokoto, 1990 and Johannes Harnischfeger,
Democratisation and Islamic Law, Frankfurt, 2008.
52
Steven Pierce, Looking like a State: Colonialism and the Discourse of Anticorruption in Northern Nigeria,
Comparative Studies in History and Society, 2006, p. 902.
53
J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, London, 1955, cited in Philip Ostien and Sati Fwatshak, Historical
Background, in Philip Ostien (ed.), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook,
Ibadan, 2007, p. 3. Available at: www.sharia-in-africa.net
Page | 17
creating the basis for what some see as a progressively homogeneous Hausa-
Fulani identity. A prominent scholar observed that the caliphate also promoted a
culture of knowledge and intellectualism, such that education became the
yardstick for all opportunities in the state and knowledge a ladder for climbing
heights of respect and dignity54. At its beginning, the Caliphate state
emphasized justice, the removal of unfair taxes and an Islamic education for the
Hausa communities. The Jihad challenged and questioned the management of
religious and political power in northern Nigeria and succeeded in replacing the
Hausa aristocratic group with intellectual and scholarly elite that led the
emirates across the region. To date, the Jihad has represented one of the major
landmarks in the political history of events of Islam in northern Nigeria and
provided the inspiration for some religious reformers in northern Nigeria.
The Caliphate remained intact until 1903, when overthrown by British
colonization. However, even under colonization, the implementation of indirect
rule by the British allowed for more continuity than disruption in the caliphate’s
internal legal authority structures55.
Following independence, the formal political power of the Sultan of Sokoto was
removed; however the position maintains a status as the leader of Nigeria’s
Muslims. While the sultan has no formal political powers, his influence is
considerable56. The jihad challenged and questioned the management of
religious and political power in northern Nigeria and succeeded in replacing the
Hausa aristocratic group with intellectual and scholarly elite that led the
emirates across the region. The administrative structures put in place after the
jihad represented the symbolic importance and place of the Sokoto caliphate
today57. The jihad continues to exert a great cultural influence in northern
Nigeria. At its inception, the caliphate state emphasized justice, the removal of
unfair taxes and an Islamic education for the Hausa communities. The jihad was
also a challenge to the polytheism and syncretism that was prevalent in the
Hausa states at the time58. To date, the jihad has represented one of the major
54
Muktar Umar Bunza, The Sokoto Caliphate after 200 years: A Reflection, conference paper, Usman dan Fodio
University, Sokoto, 2004.
55
Jonathan T. Reynolds, The Politics of History: The Legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria, Journal of Asian
and African Studies, 32:1‐2, 1997, pp. 50‐65.
56
Jonathan N.C. Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter‐Radicalization? Strategic Studies Institute,
Carlisle, 2010, p. 15.
57
A. R. Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective, Macmillan London, 1996.
58
Page | 18
landmarks in the political history of events of Islam in northern Nigeria. It was a
turning point that shaped the history of West Africa in the 19th century59.
Under colonialism, the greatest challenge to the colonial authority came from
the rise of the Mahdist militant Islamist movement (Mahdiyya), with Mahdism
as its guiding philosophy and principle. The Mahdist movement evolved as a
trans-Saharan anti-colonial Islamic fundamentalist movement. Its origins can be
traced to a messianic doctrine that proffered that at the turn of each century, a
Mahdi would emerge with powers to strengthen Islam and make justice
triumph. The doctrine holds that when the Mahdi emerges, he would attract a
large followership of Muslims in his quest to implement Islamic Sharia law and
establish justice in society. Most Muslims look towards the arrival of the Mahdi
for deliverance from inequalities, unjust leadership and bad governance. The
Mahdist militant Islamist movement considered British colonial rule and the
amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates as satanic and evil.
The movement was inspired by the resistance of Sultan Attahiru and his
rejection of British rule by undertaking the hijra or migration to Sudan as
symbolic of the Prophet Mohammad’s hijra from Makka to Medina in 621 AD,
after the sultanate fell to British imperial and colonial rule in the 1900s60.
British occupation of the caliphate began with the sacking of Bida in 1897 and
was completed with the occupation of Sokoto in 1902. By 1903 all emirates had
been conquered, even though there were still pockets of resistance. For the
leadership of the caliphate there was the problem of how to respond to this new
anomalous situation by resistance, collaboration or migration. On the debate as
to whether to collaborate or migrate, the Gwandu jurist Ahmad Ibn Sa’id
compared the situation in Sokoto to the Qaramanthian invasion of Makka in 930
CE and the Mongolian invasion of Baghdad in 1258 CE and concluded that an
interim compromise with the colonial state was possible as long as they did not
interfere openly with practice of the faith. Collaboration with the British, he
posited, did not amount to unbelief as long as the resident does not himself
become an unbeliever. It is disobedience if done voluntarily, but permissible if
done under compulsion61. Thus, for most of the early colonial period a policy
of non-cooperation, known as taqiyya (dissimulation), became the main pillar of
resistance against colonial rule.
The ruling aristocracy in Sokoto (predominantly Qadiriyya) aligned with the
colonial rulers, its members were increasingly accused of collaboration, build
59
A. R. Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective, Macmillan London, 1996.
60
S. Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge: the Nigerian shiite movement. Available at:
http://www.conflictprevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=1#author
(Accessed15 May 2010).
61
M. A. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria, PhD Thesis, Abdullahi Bayero College, Ahmadu Bello
University, Kano, 1973, p. 162.
Page | 19
up power and wealth and ignoring corrupt Western influences. In reaction,
leaders in different parts of the region began to align with Tijaniyya, attracted
by the brotherhood’s apparent anti-colonial anti-Western stance62.
In 1907 concerted efforts were made by the Mahdist movement to regain the
Sokoto Sultanate, but it failed to match the superiority of British power and
military might. However, some of the members of the ruling aristocratic elite
and Islamic scholars compromised by entering into some form of understanding
with the British to recognize and allow the emirs and their subjects to practice
the Islamic faith and religion unhindered63. In spite of the British assurances that
it would not interfere with the way of life of caliphate society, the British
colonial state and emirs were threatened and challenged by the Mahdist
movement for several years.
The British Colonial administrators (1903-1960) controlled northern Nigeria
through indirect rule, governing the region through indigenous traditional rulers
who agreed to their directives, which set clear limits on the activities of
traditional rulers64. This practice involved restructuring local traditional
authorities and deposing those office holders who resisted, so as to create a
compliant local power base that furthered British interests. Local rulers were
used to control the populace and raise revenue but were supervised by British
officials who could veto their decisions. Although they restructured many
emirate authorities, seeking more compliant office holders, the British also
sought to avoid any direct disruption of the region’s social structures, including
its dominant religion and culture. Yet, colonial rule introduced significant
political, judicial and cultural changes. Politically, the defeat of the caliph and
establishment of Kaduna as the region’s new capital diminished the authority
and influence of the Sultan in Sokoto. He retained spiritual leadership of
Muslims in the region, but a partial transfer of power from the aristocracy to a
new political class had begun.
Maitatsine Group
Contemporary Islamist movements in northern Nigeria frequently claim the
legacy of Usman dan Fodio’s jihad, with the re-establishment of a caliphate
with formal political power as well as religious authority as the ultimate goal65.
62
John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, London, 1986).
63
64
65
Paul M. Lubeck, Nigeria: Mapping a Shari’a Restorationist Movement, in Shari’a Politics: Islamic Law and
Society in the Modern World, editd by Robert Hefner, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, IN, 2011, p. 255.
Page | 20
Northern Nigeria has seen the rise of significant militant Islamic groups; the
most prominent of these have been Maitatsine, the Islamic Movement of
Nigeria and Boko Haram. Central to each of these groups was desire to reform
religious and political institutions and critique of traditional religious elites.
The Maitatsine movement was established by Mohammed Marwa, a
Cameroonian religious teacher from Marwa, in northern Cameroun66, who
settled in Kano, in northern Nigeria in about 1945, and established a large
community of supporters there and he became known for his controversial
preaching on the Holy Qur'an67. The British colonial authorities sent him into
exile, but he returned to Kano shortly after independence. He had had a long
history as a radical preacher in Kano; he was also imprisoned and then deported
in 1962 for his radical preaching, but later returned68.
Marwa, who was nicknamed Maitatsine69, saw himself as a mujaddid in the
image of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio70. He preached the radical rejection of all
non-Quranic innovation71, which included practices from relying on hadith to
the use of wristwatches72. Although a Qur'anic scholar, many of his teachings
were heterodox, including rejection of the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed73.
66
Paul M. Lubeck (1985). "Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine Explained". Africa:
Journal of the International African Institute. 55 (4): 369–389.
67
Elizabeth Isichei, The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980‐1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited, Journal of
Religion in Africa, 17:3 1987, pp. 194. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580874 (Accessed on
10/06/2012).
68
Elizabith Isichei, The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited, Journal of Religion in
Africa, Vol. 17, Fasc, October 1087, pp. 194-208. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580874 (Accessed
on 10/06/2012).
69
Maitatsine is translated as one who damns, a moniker earned through Marwa’s fierce condemnation of
practices he deemed un‐Islamic, in particular Nigerian state institutions and Western technologies. See
Abimbola O. Adesoji, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the
Nigerian State, Africa Today, Indiana University Press, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Summer 2011), p. 101.
70
Abimbola O. Adesoji, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of
the Nigerian State, Africa Today, Indiana University Press, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 99-119. Available
at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.57.4.99 (Accessed on 28/05/2012).
71
Roman Loimeier, Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria, Africa
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, 140 ‐ 141.
72
Religion in Africa. 17:3, 1987, p. 196 and Niels Kastfelt, Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in
Northern Nigeria, African Affairs, 8: 35, 1989, p.83.
73
Religion in Africa. 17:3, 1987, p. 196 and Niels Kastfelt, Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in
Northern Nigeria, African Affairs, 8: 35, 1989, p.83.
Page | 21
Maitatsine recruited from the urban poor, in particular the almajiris74, who came
to Kano as a centre of Islamic learning75. In 1972 he had notable and
increasingly radical followers known as Yan Tatsine76 who were involved in a
clash at the mosque in Kano's Sabongari ward. In 1975 he was arrested by
Nigerian police for insult and public abuse of political authorities, but in that
period he began to receive acceptance from religious authorities, especially after
performing hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Makka77. As his followers increased
in the 1970s, so did the number of confrontations between his supporters and
the police and there had been an increasing number of clashes and arrests in
1979 and 198078. His preaching attracted largely followers of youths,
unemployed and those who felt that mainstream Muslim teachers were not
doing enough for their communities.
The Maitastine radical militant Islamist movement became very popular in the
early 1980s in the city of Kano and other areas of northern Nigeria. It came to
the limelight as a result of its prolonged armed and violent confrontation with
the security and military agencies, hence the reference to the 1980 Maitastine
civil disturbance in Kano in December 1980, When Marwa and his followers
tried to storm a major mosque79, and Yan Tatsine's continued attacks on other
religious figures and police, the Governor Abubakar Rimi, who had initially
sought Maitatsine’s support and give him lunch, eventually sent in the tanks80 to
kill more than 4177 people81, including Mohammed Marwa himself82.
74
Almajiris are young boys who attend Qur'anic schools under the tutelage of Islamic scholars. The Nigerian
government has attempted to modernize the system of Islamic education, integrating Qur'anic schools with
Western‐style education. However, numerous unregulated schools and scholars persist.
75
Spectrum, 47:2‐3, 2012, pp. 140 ‐ 141.
76
J. Peter Pham, In Nigeria False Prophets Are Real Problems, World Defense Review. Available at:
https://archive.is/20130209115602/http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml (Accessed on
10/06/2012)
77
Paul M. Lubeck (1985). "Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine Explained". Africa:
Journal of the International African Institute. 55 (4): 369–389.
78
Religion in Africa. 17:3, 1987, p. 194.
79
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, 140 ‐ 141.
80
Murray Last, The Pattern of Dissent: Boko haram in Nigeria 2009, Annual Review of Islam in Africa ( ARIA)
Issue No. 10, 2008 2009, p. 8.
81
K Z Skuratowicz, Religious fundamentalist movements: social movements in the world system? Case study of
the Maitatsine movement in Nigeria, 1980–85, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, Philadelphia, 12 August 2005. Available at:
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/3/2/5/1/pages32519/p32519–1.php
(Accessed 13 March 2009)
Page | 22
Maitatsine’s rising in Kano late in 1980 was an example where the scholar lost.
However, Mohammed Marwa’s death did not lead to the end of his movement;
clashes erupted in 1982, 1984, 1985 and 199383 in multiple locales in northern
Nigeria, including Yola, Gombe, outside Kaduna, and near Maiduguri84. In
October, 1982 a new rising broke out at Bulumkutu, fifteen kilometres from
Maiduguri in Borno, over three thousand were killed. Fighting also broke out in
Rigasa village, near Kaduna, which spread into the city. In March, 1984 there
was an outbreak of violence in the Jimeta ward of Yola, the capital of Gongola
State, which left between five hundred and one thousand dead. In April, 1985,
there was yet another rising in Gombe, in Bauchi State, when over a hundred
were killed85
The Maitastine was an anti-status quo movement driven by Islamic
fundamentalism. Its members are anti-establishment who challenge both the
dominant religious and political authorities, and indeed the larger Muslim
community. The movement has been classified as radical with a millenarian
belief largely because of its expressed perceptions that the dominant Muslim
population is derailing from the doctrine of the Holy Qu’ran and getting richer
and more westernized to the detriment of the lowly, poor and non-westernized
segment of society86.
The Maitastine movement represents a radical shift from other forms of Islamist
movements because it operated at variance with established or accepted beliefs
or theories, especially with regard to Islamic beliefs and injunctions (Heterodox
movement). The Maitastine movement believed that it should be constituted
only of genuine Muslims and righteous servants of Allah. The members rejected
other Muslims for having gone astray while maintaining that their beliefs are the
most realistic because they revolve around Holy Qu’ran only, a tendency
towards an obsession with the Holy Qu’ran and a rejection of the Hadith and
Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed and other related sanctioned sources of
Islamic law.
82
J. Peter Pham, In Nigeria False Prophets Are Real Problems, World Defense Review. Available at:
https://archive.is/20130209115602/http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml (Accessed on
10/06/2012).
83
Spectrum, 47:2‐3, 2012, pp. 140 ‐ 141.
84
Religion in Africa. 17:3, 1987, p. 194.
85
A. O. Omotosho, Religious Violence in Nigeria – the Causes and Solutions: an Islamic Perspective, Swedish
Missiological Theme, 2003, P. 15-31. Available at: http://unilorin.edu.ng/publications/omotoshoao/Religious-
Violence -in-Nigeria.pdf (Accessed on 28/05/2012).
86
A report of a commissioned study on the Ulama in contemporary northern states of Nigeria, Centre for
Democratic Research and Training (CDRT), Bayero University, Kano, 2005, Report submitted to the Federal
Government of Nigeria.
Page | 23
Members of the movement live in secluded quarters isolated from other
members of society while rejecting everything that is Western, especially
education, schools and material things like radios and wristwatches 87. They are
opposed to affluence and as such condemn material wealth and the rich. The
members exhibit intense hatred for agents of the state such as the police and
armed forces. These feelings partly contributed to the recurrence of violent
confrontations with the security and military agencies in Kano and other parts of
northern Nigeria in the 1980s88.
It was believed that the group had been completely suppressed by the state
in1980, but it resurfaced in 2005 in the Jigawa and Kano states of northern
Nigeria. This implies that the Maitastine movement must have been operating
underground in northern Nigeria for years. The members are scattered all over
northern Nigeria, as far as Jalingo in Taraba State89. It is difficult to identify its
leaders and current ideological underpinnings because of its covert and
clandestine manner of operation and the fact that it has gone unnoticed in
society in northern Nigeria.
Maitatsine represented a classic example of millenarianism occasioned by the
destruction of traditional socio-economic networks on which the itinerant
mallams (teachers) and their students…depended for their survival90.
The Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN)

The awakening and rising tide of contemporary militant Islamist tendencies -
apart from the 19th-century Dan Fodio jihad and the Maitastine, are closely
linked to the perception of the successful Iranian revolution of the 1970s. The
Iranian revolution provided a symbolic orientation to radical scholars such as
Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, that revolutionary change can lead to a replacement of the
secular state order with an Islamic caliphate state. It radicalized Muslim politics
in northern Nigeria, as exemplified in the intensification of the demand for the
87
Niels Kastfelt, Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria, African Affairs,
Volume 88, Issue 350, 1 January 1989, Pages 83–90.
Available at: https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/88/350/83/15279/RUMOURS-OF-MAITATSINE-
A-NOTE-ON-POLITICAL-CULTURE, J. Peter Pham, In Nigeria False Prophets Are Real Problems, World Defense
Review. Available at: https://archive.is/20130209115602/http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml
(Accessed on 10/06/2012).
88
Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge: the Nigerian shiite movement. Available at:
89
90
Peter Clark, Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and Aims, Third World Quarterly 10: 1988, p.
525.
Page | 24
inclusion of Islamic Sharia laws in the Nigerian constitution during the
constitutional conference of the 1970s. The Iranian revolution occurred at a time
when most scholarly endeavours were directed at debating the acceptance of
either capitalism or socialism. Islamism served as a third option, but the
perception was that it was dominated and suppressed by the other two. Islamism
was also linked to the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN)91 in the
1970s92. The Muslim Student Society of Nigeria (MSSN) branch at Ahmadu
Bello University, Zaria, was under the charismatic leadership of Ibrahim El-
Zakzaky93 who, was a student in Ahmadu Bello University at the time of the
1970 Iranian revolution and was inspired by it to lead the MSSN. El-Zakzaky
used the MSSN to mobilize Muslim students to advocate in 1978 for the
inclusion of the Sharia penal code law in the Nigerian constitution and later for
a revolution that would lead to a transformation of the Nigerian secular state
into an Islamic one. While he admired the activism of the leftist student on
campus, El-Zakzaki was trying to wake the Muslim students up from what he
believed was excessive complacency and was aiming to develop a more
politically active wing of the organization. These firebrand revolutionary
tendencies led him to confront the agencies of the state, which ultimately led to
his expulsion from the university94. His role models were originally the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Sayyed
Qutb (d. 1966), but in 1980 he visited Iran for the first time and gradually
became enmeshed in the geo-political system of that country. Upon his return to
Nigeria, he started to advocate for the transformation of Nigeria into a purely
Islamic form of government under the platform of Muslim Brotherhood . The
Muslim Brothers, do not regard themselves as members of an organization, but
claim total commitment to Islam. As such their aim is to establish a nation
which should be wholly Islamic; Islamic in the sense that it considers Allah as
91
The MSSN was founded in 1954 in Lagos. From 1956, it was based at the University of Ibadan. The society
which was initially dominated by Yoruba students from the south-west of Nigeria, later opened branches in the
north, starting with Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and Abddullhi Bayro College, Kano, both in 1963. By 1970,
there were four hundred branches of the society throughout Nigeria, located at secondary schools and
universities.
92
S. L. Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system: some reflections, in, A. Imam, J. Morgan
and N. Yuval-Davis (eds), Warning signs of fundamentalisms, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML),
Nottingham, UK, 2004.
93
Ibrahim El-Zakzaky was born on 5 May 1953. First he attended a provincial Arabic school, where the Native
Authority (NA) at that time used to train Arabic teachers for its primary schools. Then, he moved to the School
for Arabic Studies (SAS) in Kano (1971-1975) and the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria from 1976 to 1979.
94
Page | 25
the Lord of the nation. To the Muslim Brothers, no Muslim can be a Muslim
and a secularist at the same time; in fact, secularism is disbelief95.
The Muslim Brothers attracted members from mainly the youthful segment of
society, particularly from universities and other tertiary institutions and from
secondary schools. Initially, it was more of an elite Islamic vanguard in its
membership and recruiting style. It saw itself as a disciple and radical group that
sought to address the ills of Muslim society. Its initial doctrine, among others,
focused on the ills of the Muslim community in Nigeria, including moral laxity,
un-Islamic practices, dissatisfaction with governance by Muslim leaders, and
the lack of access to political expression, particularly participatory politics,
under an authoritarian regime. The situation in Nigeria – particularly under
military rule – was exacerbated by serious economic and social crises that
resulted in the vast majority of people suffering poverty, unemployment and
hunger. The Muslim Brothers offered the anxious youths seeking change, a
brighter future. The Muslim Brothers was a purely Sunni group. However, the
close association of its leadership with Iran subsequently brought about the
infiltration of the movement by Shiite doctrines, and el-Zakzaky later identified
with the Islamic doctrine of Shiism.
It is not clear exactly when El-Zakzaki converted to Shiism. However, in 1994,
he made his Shia convictions public, causing, a fracture of the Muslim
Brotherhood members into a Sunni group and a Shiite group, the Shiite group
led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Some of the Sunn inclining more towards Salafiyya
and some who formed a group called Jama’at ul-Tajdeed Al-Islami (Community
of Islamic Revival) which remained on a similar course as that of the Muslim
Brotherhood96.
The Sunni group went into decline and was reduced to mainly da’awa
(propagation) activities. Its membership further minimized as a result of the
growing influence of the mainstream Sunni/Salafi movement of Jama’atul
Izalatul Bid’ah wa Ikamatus Sunnah known as Izala in northern Nigeria.
The fracture within the Muslim Brothers changed forever the face of El-
Zakzaki's group, leading to an even more explicit embrace of Shiism by El-
Zakzaki and his closest associates. To this end, El-Zakzaki decided to form a
new organization, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), with the aim of
spreading and coordinating the Shia ideology in Nigeria.
The Sunni group differed fundamentally from el-Zakzaky on issues of doctrine
and rejected the injection of Shiite doctrine and theology into the movement. It
95
I. Muazzam, New Islamic religious movements and democratic governance in Nigeria. A research report on
the Muslim Brothers, Research report submitted to the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD), Kano,
Nigeria, July 2001.
96
Tahir Gwarzo, Islamic Civil Society Associations and the State: A Kano State Case Study, 1994-2004, PhD
thesis, Bayero University Kano, Kano, 2006, pp. 188-189.
Page | 26
has continued to retain its commitment to a radical process of Islamisation
under the Sunni doctrine97.
In the past, the disregard for state authority of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria
(IMN) was exhibited in a number of confrontations with the state. Its leader, el-
Zakzaky, spent in total about nine years in nine different prisons from 1981 to
1998, during the military rule of Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha (1993-
1998). The Shiite denounced the state and government, disregarded party
politics and elections, was contemptuous of Nigeria’s constitution, refused to
recognize its laws, refused to respect the national anthem and national pledge,
and disregarded the Nigerian flag. In other words, the Shiite rejected every
symbol of Nigerian statehood98.
Shiism was practically nonexistent in Nigeria until the 1980s99 with fewer than
five percent of Nigeria’s Muslim population that is Shi’a100. Despite the
demographic weakness of the Shi’a, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) is
a significant player in the Nigerian landscape 101. Inspired by the success of the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, Zakzaky began to promote the cause of Islamic
revolution in Nigeria, beginning in the 1980s to the present.
The Shiite faction had open confrontations and running clashes with security
agents of the state for several years that often resulted in the loss of lives and
property. Bloody confrontations and clashes have characterized its relationship
with the state and the mode of state responses until 1999, the beginning of the
era of democratic enterprise in Nigeria.
Over time, the IMN has re-strategized and changed tactics. It is no longer
confrontational and, as such, has shed its militant garb. However, it retains its
ideals and goals of an Islamic state. This was aptly captured in its condemnation
of the introduction of Islamic Sharia laws and penal code, especially with regard
to punishment in what it regards as an unIslamic state. In the Shiite view, the
politicians who started the reform do not have a history of Islamic activism and
97
Nottingham, UK, 2004.
98
http://www.conflictprevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=1#author (Accessed
on 15 May 2010).
99
Farouk Umar and Estelle Shirbon, Tensions between Muslims Simmer in Nigerian City, Reuters, 19 March
2008. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/20/us‐nigeria‐muslims‐idUSL1880839220080320
100
Forum on Religion & Public Life, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and
Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population, Pew Research Center, October 2009, pp. 40. Available at:
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf
101
Jonathan N.C. Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter‐Radicalization?, Strategic Studies Institute,
Page | 27
are seen as opportunists102. In recent times, the leaders of the movement have
been co-opted by dominant state elements such that they are espousing and
using the same symbols of power that they had denounced in the past. In fact,
between 1999 and 2007 the leader of the movement was a senior special adviser
to the governor of Kaduna State, which guaranteed him direct access to the
corridors of power rather than the corridors of prisons.
The militant Islamic Movement in Nigeria has a well-organized structure and a
clear strategy. They have centres known as Halaga in different areas. Each
halaga has its leader who is responsible for overseeing the activities of the
group. These halaga are usually named after the Shia Imams or leaders and
various personalities who are sacred to the Shia such as Rasulul Akram, Amirul
Mominin, az-Zahra, Imam Hassan al-Mujtaba, Imam Hussein, Imam Ali Zain
al-Abdin, Imam Bagir, Imam Jaafar as-Sadiq and so on. They run schools which
are known as Fudiyya. These schools named after Usman Dan Fodio, the leader
of the Sokoto jihad, even though he was a Sunni and a scholar of the Qadiriyya
Sufi order103. The militant Islamic Movement in Nigeria has also a website,
clinics and publishes newspapers, it also possesses the characteristics and nature
of an organization like Hezbollah (with which it is linked and which operates
like a state within the state in Lebanon). The IMN has appealed for the full
implementation of Islamic Sharia law, arguing that secular authorities were not
fit to hold power, and that the traditional religious rulers, either through
cowardice or self-serving interest, facilitated their abuses by refusing to stand
up to them104.
The IMN reportedly recruited among the most radical elements of the Islamic
community, calling for campaigns against the West, Christians, the Izala and the
military governments105.
In July 2014, a clash between the Shiite movement and soldiers during a pro-
Palestinian rally in Zaria left 35 people dead, including three of Zakzaky’s sons,
as reported by the Punch Newspaper106. The UK Islamic Human Rights
102
Nottingham, UK, 2004 and Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge: the Nigerian shiite movement. Available at:
103
Kabiru Haruna Isa & Sani Yakubu Adam, The Shia and its Factions in Nigeria: The Case-Study of Kano, 1980-
2011, Annual Review of Islam in Nigeria, Issue No. 12/1, 2013-1014, p.56.
104
105
Paul M. Lubeck, Nigeria: Mapping a Shari’a Restorationist Movement, In Shari’a Politics: Islamic Law and
Society in the Modern World, editd by Robert Hefner, Bloomington, Indiana University Press,2011, p. 266.
106
http://www.punchng.com/news/solders-killed-three-of-my-sons-32-others-el-zakzaky (Accessed on
28/08/2015).
Page | 28
Commission published the report: Zaria Massacres and the Role of the Military
in October 2014107. The army claimed at the time that it had acted in self-
defence108.
In December 2015, Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in
Nigeria (IMN) was arrested after clashes between group members and the
military allegedly resulted in multiple deaths, the BBC reported109. He was
arrested after his followers clashed with Nigerian soldiers in Zaria, a Shiite holy
city in the northern state of Kaduna. The military said that Zakzaky’s followers
had tried to assassinate the Nigerian chief of army staff, Lieutenant General
Tukur Buratai, and had barricaded roads being used by Buratai’s motorcade.
Zakzaky’s home and the IMN’s main mosque in Zaria were also destroyed in
the violence and hundreds were killed. Since then, Zakzaky has remained under
state detention in the nation's capital pending his release, which was ordered in
late 2016110.
The Shiite and Maitastine groups were emerged at about the same time, and it is
likely that the same conditions dictated the logic of their emergence. In addition,
they both have a radical and revolutionary anti-establishment stance and share
the total rejection of the existing state order. This was prominent in the
continuous and pervasive confrontations and very often violent armed conflicts
with constituted authority or its agencies, and also in the concerted pursuit and
desire to change the secular state order through a jihad or Iranian-styled
revolution that would ultimately replace the corrupt, Western-styled secular
state with an Islamic state. Apart from these similarities, there was no
distinctive link between the two groups in terms of Islamic doctrines and
principles. It seems that the Shiite movement took a lesson from the state
handling of the Maitastine movement to realign its strategy and approach
towards the state, while not rejecting or throwing away its ideals and principle
of a revolution or jihad for establishing an Islamic state.
Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a (Yusufiyya/Boko Haram)

Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunna and the Community of
Muslims) known as Yusufiyya/Boko Haram provides an important case study in
how a longstanding historic framework of Islamic militancy is reshaped and
rearticulated in the conditions of the 21st century and exhibits continuities with
pre-modern jihad movements, like that of Usman Dan Fodio, 20th movements
107
http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/report/11219-nigeria-the-zaria-massacres-and-the-role-of-the-military
(Accessed on 28/08/2015)
108
http://www.newsweek.com/nigeria-shiites-clashes-army-leader-arrested-404661(Accessed on 22/08/2017)
109
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/africa-35092138 (Accessed on 25/12/2016)
110
http://pulse.ng/local/ibrahim-el-zakzaky-court-orders-dss-to-release-shiite-leader-pay-him-n50m-
compensation-id5844119.html (Accessed on 22/08/2017)
Page | 29
like that of Maitatsine and that of Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) of
Ibrahim El-Zakzaky.
Evolution of Boko Haram

The original Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf (1970-2009), was born in
Girgir, Jakusko local government area, Yobe State, north-eastern Nigeria. He
was a member of the Borno State Sharia Implementation Committee under
Governor Mallah Kachallah (1999-2003) and was active in debates on Islamic
issues on local radio and television stations. Borno and Yobe states used to be
one until they were separated as a result of creation of more states in the country
in August 1991, by the president Babangida administration. Mohammed
Yusuf’s participation in religious activities can be traced back to the early
1990s, when he joined the radical Sunni group, the Muslim Brotherhood led by
Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, its members known as Muslim Brothers. His role models
were originally the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders Hassan al-Banna (d.
1949) and Sayyed Qutb (d. 1966). The revolutionary ideas of the Islamic
Movement derived from Sayed Qutb’s famous jihadi book Ma’alim fi-ttariq,
which has been rendered in English under the title of Milestones111.
The 1980s witnessed a proliferation of Iranian revolutionary literature in
Nigeria, which inspired the Muslim Brotherhood Movement leadership and
associated them with Iran, which subsequently brought about the infiltration of
the movement by Shiite doctrines, and Ibrahim El-Zakzaky later identified with
the Islamic doctrine of Shiism. This ultimately led, in 1994, to a fracture of the
Muslim Brotherhood members into groups some of whom went with the Shiite
group led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, some others inclining more towards
Salafiyya and some who formed a group called Jama’at ul-Tajdeed Al-Islami
(Community of Islamic Revival) which remained on a similar course as that of
the Muslim Brotherhood. Mohammed Yusuf joined the Jama’at ul-Tajdeed Al-
Islami in Borno State. He was influenced by the split of the Muslim
Brotherhood movement in Nigeria and became one of the leaders in the
aftermath of that split and continued teaching and guiding them.
In 1995, Abubakar Lawan established the Salafi, Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a
Group, and Mohammed Yusuf was chosen as leader in the youth (Amir al-
Shabaab) wing of the group in Maiduguri, Borno State. In 2002, shortly after
the original founder of the group, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies in
Saudi Arabia, a committee of high member preachers appointed Mohammad
Yusuf as their leader. Afterwards, Mohammad Yusuf ousted those who
appointed him on allegations of their failure to properly interpret the teaching of
the Holy Quran. His preaching attracted followers from Yobe and Borno states,
and even from neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. It was around
111
Sayed Qutb, Milestones, no publisher, Cairo, Egypt, 1964.
Page | 30
this time that the Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a group became known as the
Yusufiyya movement. The group adopted Sunna and Salaf related lexicons in
their self-characterization. Mohammed Yusuf, the leader in the youth (Amir al-
Shabaab) wing of the Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a group in Maiduguri identified
and then became very close to the Salafi group: Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah wa
Iqamatis Sunna (Community for the Eradicating Innovation and Establishing
Sunnah), more commonly known as Izala, which admired Mohammed Yusuf
prior to his armed insurgency, as an expressive and promising youth leader of
their loosely allied group, an Amir as-Shabab means leader of the youth as they
fondly called him. Mohammed Yusuf was initially enjoying their patronage and
given time in their major centres and mosques to display his oratorical skills in
support of their common doctrines. Mohammed Yusuf was reported to have
been mentored by Jafaar Adam Mahmud112, who had been a close contact and a
teacher of Mohammed Yussuf113. Ja'afar Mahmud Adam114 who was born in
Daura in Katsina State, was a prominent, popular northern Nigerian, Salafist
Islamic scholar and preacher aligned with the Jama’atu Izalatul Bid’ah Wa
Ikamatus Sunnah a.k.a. Izala. He was a member of the Ulama Consultative
Forum in Zamfara and Bauchi states in northern Nigeria. He was regular
preacher at the Ndimi115 and Daggash mosques in Maiduguri, located in the
prestigious GRA ward where wealthy businessmen, influential people and high
profile government officials inhabit, although he was expelled from both by
112
Femi Owolade, Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria, Gatestone Institute, 27
March 2014. Available at: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria# (Accessed on
01/9/2015)
113
Andrea Brigaglia, Ja'far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust: Reflection on
the Genesis of Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria, Annual Review of Islam in Africa, Issue No. 11, 2012.
114
Ja'afar Mahmud Adam (1961-2007) was among the prominent young and middle-aged Izala leaders. The
development of the Izala has been characterized since the 1990s by the emergence of this generation of
leaders. Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, had gone through both Islamic education (madrasa) and Western education
(boko) in Kano and Hadeja and was a passionate Izala follower in the 1970s and 1980s (initially in Kaduna and
later in Kano). In 1988, he won the Nigerian Qur'an recitation competition and subsequently (in 1989) went to
Saudi Arabia in order to continue his education in the Islamic University in Medina. He returned to Nigeria in
1993, only to leave again for Sudan, where he continued his studies at the International University of Africa
(former African Islamic Centre) in Khartoum. Finally, in 1996, he returned to northern Nigeria and became
imam of the Dorayi mosque in Kano and a leading Ahlus Sunna representative.
115
Alhaji Mohammed Indimi is a businessman from Maiduguri, Borno State in north-eastern Nigeria. He
founded Oriental Energy in 1990, of which he is still a chairman. He is an in-law of the former Nigerian
president and retired Nigerian Army, General Ibrahim Babangida as well as an in-law of the current Nigerian
president retired Nigerian Army, General Muhammadu Buhari. Dr. Mohammed Indimi is a humanitarian and a
charity donor, who has received numerous awards as well as honorary doctorate degrees from notable
Universities in Nigeria, Ireland and the United States. He is a member of the Board of Trustee, International
University of Africa in Khartoum, Sudan. He donated to establish the Indimi Faculty of Mineral and Petroleum,
International University of Africa.
Page | 31
2002 due to his increasing extremism116. He was assassinated while was praying
at the mosque he administered in Kano. Adam and Yusuf both preached in
Maiduguri's Indimi Mosque117, which was attended by the then Deputy
Governor of Borno, Adamu Dibal. Mohammed Yusuf and Ja'afar Mahmud
Adam were reported to have split off as too extreme118 when Yusuf’s ideology
gradually moved away from the Salafi ideal, radicalised and developed into a
discourse characterised by the systematic rejection of all secular aspects of
Nigerian society119 and introduced amendments which he viewed as progressive
in the realm of da’wah (propagation), Ja’afar Mahmud Adam began to criticize
the group for its hard-line ideology, predicting a clash with the state, then the
Izala group barred him from preaching at certain occasions because, according
to Izala scholars, he did not possess a certificate from a university in Saudi
Arabia or some other prestigious Islamic institution120 So, Mohammed Yusuf
embarked on the process of establishing the group’s own mosque in Maiduguri.
The new mosque, named after a key icon of many Salafist advocate: the 14th
century Damascene scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328). Ibn Taymiyyah wrote
much on jihad and even elevated it above the Islamic pillars of fasting and
pilgrimage. Many modern scholars have used his fatwas (rulings) urging
Muslims to rise against the Mongols, to justify suicide bombings today121.
The Ibn Taymiyya Centre in Maiduguri was located in Goni Damgari quarters
(some time the alternate name (bayan quarters) is used) in North Maiduguri
where the group’s main centre and mosque situated. It was built on land donated
by Mohammed Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed who was
executed like Mohammed Yusuf himself in the 2009 war against Boko Haram
in Borno. The Ibn Taymiyya Centre in Maiduguri was their headquarters, even
though the group spread out to many areas of the city to propagate their views,
very often near the homes of their followers. The group was apparently left
116
Femi Owolade, Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria, Gatestone Institute, 27
March 2014. Available at: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria# (Accessed on
01/9/2015)
117
Andrew Walker, What is Boko Haram? United States Institutes of Peace, Special Report 308, June 2012, p. 3.
118
Murray Last, The pattern of dissent: Boko Haram in Nigeria 2009, Annual Review of Islam in Africa, Issue No.
10, 2008/2009, p. 9.
119
Anonymous, The popular discourses of Salafi radicalism in Nigeria: A case study of Boko Haram, Journal of
Religion in Africa 42 (2), 2012, pp. 118-144.
120
Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram et le terrorisme islamiste au Nigeria: Insurrection religeuse, contestation
politique ou protestation social? Centre d’études et de recherches international, pp. 6,8,16. Available at:
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.cerf/files/qdr40.pdf
121
David Bukay, The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings Islamist Ideology, Middle East Quarterly, 2006,
Fall, 27-36. Available at: www.meforum.org/1003/the-religiousfoundations-of-suiside-bombings (Accessed on
11 June 2012).
Page | 32
alone by the authorities, and it expanded into other northern states. As a result,
their leader Mohammed Yusuf was able to mobilize groups of enthusiastic
youth who to pledge loyalty to him.
In 2002, a more radical faction split from the Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a, called
themselves Ahlas-Sunnah wa al-Jama’a ala Minhaj as-Salaf (People of the way
of the Prophet and the community according to the approach of the Salaf). A
small group of presumed Mohammed Yusuf students who withdrew from the
urban landscape of Maiduguri to rural Kanama in the Yunusari local
government area of Yobe State in north-eastern Nigeria and installed a camp
between two bodies of water near the Nigeria and Niger border, to live an
austere life away from modern immorality. There were rumours that they were
lifting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the camp, thus the local
community given them the nickname Taliban, although the group has no
established link with the Afghan Taleban of the late 1990s. Members of the
group were mostly young people in their twenties. This was a very diverse
group, which also included females assigned to domestic chores such as
cooking and fetching firewood and water.
The movement recruits its followers from unemployed youth and is based on a
cell network to ensure adequate training and skills in the use of weapons as well
as ideological orientation122.
Some of them were from influential and affluent backgrounds, for instance
children of notable public figures, including a nephew of the then serving
Governor of Yobe State, a son of the secretary to Borno State government, and
five children of a local wealthy contractor123. The group initially lived in peace
with the community but misunderstandings over fishing rights soon developed,
which forced the police to mediate on several occasions. The police frequently
intervened, arresting and questioning group members as a result of local
complaints from community members. The militants then launched attacks on
police stations and government buildings and generally caused chaos on the
Yunusari, Tarmuwa, Borsari, Geidam and Damaturu local government areas of
Yobe State between 21 December 2003 and 1 January 2004.
The group had gained press attention in Nigeria, and interest from the U.S.
Embassy, because of the catchy name locals had given it: the Nigerian Taliban.
It also caught the attention of the Nigerian media because many of the group’s
122
IRIN - Humanitarian News and Analysis, Nigeria: Muslim fundamentalist uprising raises fears of terrorism,
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 16 January 2009. Available at:
http://www.irinnews.org/Reort.aspex?ReportId=82382. A similar report can be found at:
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000727.php-3/1 and at:
http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/Talebanofnigeria.html.
123
Nephew of Bukar Abba Ibrahim, Governor of Yobe State (1999-2007), now a serving Senator, son of Abba
Gana Terab, Secretary to the Borno State government and five sons of Alhaji Kambar Adam. See, Kyari
Mohammed, The message and methods of Boko Haram, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, ed, Boko
Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria, African Studies Centre, Leiden, 2014, p. 12.
Page | 33
members were the sons of wealthy and influential people in Nigeria’s northern
establishment. In a 2004 U.S. State Department cable, revealed by Wikileaks,
the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded the group did not present an international
threat and likely had no links to international jihadist organizations124.
The radicalization process of the Kanama community may have encouraged
Mohammed Yusuf to further strengthen his own rhetoric. Although most of
them are thought to be former students of Mohammed Yusuf, the nature of the
relation between members of the Kanama community and the Boko Haram
leader have not been fully clarified. It seems, however, that after the
government repression in 2004, few survivors of the group returned to
Maiduguri, where they settled back with others from the youth group that had
originated at the Ndimi mosque. Mohammed Yusuf was neither an active
physical participant nor a prominent figure at Kanama. Mohammed Yusuf’s role
was talent spotting, recruitment and indoctrination of members, however he
escaped to Saudi Arabia and remained there throughout the uprising125, it seems
he shared the same ideology as the group. The remainder of those who survived
the Kanama misadventure joined Mohammed Yusuf upon his return from exile
in Saudi Arabia in 2005 to enlarge the group. Mohammed Yusuf returned from
his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia after a rapprochement with the state,
brokered by Borno State deputy governor, Adamu Shettima Dibal and Sheikh
Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during the 2005 pilgrimage in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.
According to Sheikh Ja’afar, Mohammed Yusuf had assured them that he was
not a party to the Kanama uprising and swore never to espouse such violent
jihadi ideology126. This was the basis upon which Mohammed Yusuf was
permitted to return to Nigeria, where he continued to preach in and around
Maiduguri. The survivors of Kanama became the hawks within the Mohammed
Yusuf's movement. This just beginning group, was seems in part responsible for
initiating Mohammed Yusuf into militant jihadi ideology and world view.
Yusuf’s conversion from the mainstream Islam prevalent in his area of
operation to the fringe Islamic movement which he nurtured and led occurred
around 2005. Even though the group was the dominant influence in the
indoctrination of Mohammed Yusuf, it was the years under the Salafist scholar,
Ja’afar Mahmud Adam that radicalized.
Thus the group became known in the media by a series of nicknames such as
the Yusufiyya, Taliban and finally Boko Haram. Despite the Ahluls Sunna wal
Jama’a and Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a ala Minhaj as-Salaf mention in their self-
124
Andrew Walker, What is Boko Haram? Unites States Institute of Peace, Special Report 308, June 2012, p. 4.
125
Interaction with Muhammad Abdullahi Moduri, an in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, Damaturu, 05 June 2012.
126
Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam, taped sermon on his relationship with Mohammed Yusuf, dated 06 June
2006. The tape released by Mohammed Yusuf. However, it seems have been released by Ja'afar earlier in 2004
or 2005.
Page | 34
appellation name, which provides interesting information, it is rarely used by
commentators.
The word boko in classical Hausa language literally means deception or fraud,
as used in the Hausa term amaryar boko, which means fake bride or literally
bride of deception. This sometimes a feature in the traditional Hausa wedding
where, a grandmother usually dresses up like the bride as part of a practical joke
on the groom127. The term boko as known in the northern Nigeria, used to
designate the western oriented education institution in all its results, along with
anything it is associated with. The word now popularly used to refer to the
formal public and private educational system in Nigeria. It was believed that
boko was a deception used by the colonial power in order to convert younger
generations to Christianity. The early missionary schools were similar in
content and method to the Islamic schools wherever rote-learning predominated
and the teacher taught practically everything from one textbook. The Holy Bible
like the Holy Qur'an, was the master text book and that every subject had to be
connected in some way with the Holy Bible. The fundamental goal of education
in the early stages therefore, was to teach Christianity with the view to
converting all those who came within the premises of the mission schools128.
The relationship between British colonial western education and the Christian
missionaries heightened the suspicion and fears the Muslins in Northern Nigeria
had, that western oriented system of education was going to be used to convert
their children to Christianity. British colonialism had several distinct effects on
Northern Nigeria. First, colonialism resulted in the introduction of Western
forms of education into an arena that had been a focal point of Islamic education
for centuries, with its own traditions and elites. Thus, Western education was
seen as both a threat and a symbol of the increasing impact of an alien, colonial,
Christian, materialist and corrupt process of Westernization129
The western oriented education tradition was set up with the coming of British
colonialism into Nigeria in the 19th century. The system prevailed almost intact
after independence. Through its products, it provides the country’s elites who
run the post-colonial political, economic and educational systems left by the
British rules when the country became independent in October 1960. During the
colonial period in Nigeria, most of those promoting western oriented education
traditions were Christian missionaries, most of who used their schools to also
propagate Christianity and convert Muslim children. It was seen as evangelism
127
The Boko Haram Tragedy, Da'wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, Minna, 2009, p. 2.
128
Proffessor Aliyu Dauda, State of Education in Northern Nigeria, 2nd Edition, Gidan Dabino Publishers, Kano,
Nigeria, 2012, p. 22.
129
Spectrum, 47:2‐3, 2012, pp. 139.
Page | 35
in the appearance of western education. Western education was therefore seen
by some Muslim scholars as deceptive.
Some often explain the word boko as a derivation of the English word book,
which was associated with western education, but according to linguist Paul
Newman, boko does not come from English and never meant book, it is that
boko is a native Hausa word, originally meaning sham, fraud, un authenticity,
and such which came to represent western education and learning, karatun boko
in Hausa and not a loan word coming from English book130.
Haram is an Arabic word means prohibited, forbidden or illegitimate. While
Boko Haram may therefore be interpreted as meaning that the western oriented
education traditions is prohibited, it could also be interpreted to mean that
evangelism deceptively as western education is illegitimate.
In his preaching, were distributed widely throughout northern Nigeria via audio
tapes, CDs, DVDs and through open-air sermons, Mohammed Yusuf used to
repeat that: Boko da aikin gomenati haram, which means that receiving a
secular western oriented education, as well as working for the secular
government, was forbidden for Muslims, hence the nickname Boko Haram
given to the movement by outsiders.
Boko Haram is the nickname given to the followers of Mohammed Yusuf's
movement by outsiders, just like a less catchy one Yusufiyya, sometimes used
locally echoing the last name of Mohammed Yusuf. The movement had no
official name for itself. It referred to itself as da'awa, identified its mission as a
return to, the Salafi ideal, the Ahlus-Sunna wal Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunna
and the Community of Muslims), and referred to its members as brothers.
The name Boko Haram was made prominent around 2009 by the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Hausa service, increasingly used by the global
media and has become the generic appellation of the group, although it has
never called itself so.
Boko Haram arose out of a complex cluster of Islamic reformist scholars and
followers in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. Muhammad Yusuf, the leader
of Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a known as Yusufiyya/Boko Haram was one of these
scholars who gained visibility as an advocate Salafi doctrine that characterized
by being literalist and puritanical in its interpretation of the Holy Qur’an and
Hadith. Boko Haram is a description of its position that Western education
(Boko) is forbidden (Haram), rather than the formal name of the group. The
group was unknown to most people outside Maiduguri before 2009, when
federal forces launched a military offensive against its headquarters. Some
Boko Haram members died, some escaped, and Yusuf was arrested and extra-
judicially executed.
The remainder of those who survived the Kanama misadventure joined
Mohammed Yusuf upon his return from exile in Saudi Arabia in 2005 to
130
Paul Newman, The etymology of Hausa boko, Nanterre: Mega-Chad Research Network, 2013, p. 11.
Page | 36
enlarge the group. Mohammed Yusuf returned from his self-imposed exile in
Saudi Arabia after a rapprochement with the state, brokered by Borno State
deputy governor, Adamu Shettima Dibal and Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam,
during the 2005 pilgrimage in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.
The group’s main centre and mosque, the Ibn Taymiyya Centre, situated in
Goni Damgari quarters (some time the alternate name (bayan quarters) is used)
in North Maiduguri. It was built on land donated by Mohammed Yusuf’s father-
in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed who was executed like Mohammed Yusuf
himself in the 2009 war against Boko Haram in Borno. The Ibn Taymiyya
Centre in Maiduguri was their headquarters, even though the group spread out
to many areas of the city to propagate their views, very often near the homes of
their followers. The group was apparently left alone by the authorities, and it
expanded into other northern states and directed cell networks with cell
commanders in many cities of northern Nigeria. As a result, their leader
Mohammed Yusuf was able to mobilize groups of enthusiastic youth who to
pledge loyalty to him.
In 2009, when the leader of the movement Mohammed Yusuf was captured by
the Nigerian Armed Forces, there was a widely but unofficially and informally
circulating video clip through mobile telephony in which he was interviewed by
the army. The Officer interrogating him asked: you are opposing western
education (boko) yet we found products of such education like computers when
we captured your headquarters. Mohammed Yusuf responded that those were
products of technology and not western education (boko). The point made by
the officer and many others that, those products were produced in the western
oriented school system and yet western education is condemned not just by the
term Boko Haram, which the movement did not create but also by verbal and
written discourse of the leadership of the movement. The implication of
Mohammed Yusuf’s response is that it is the cultural climate of western
education rather than its ultimate technological products that his movement
opposed. In fact not only the technological products of western oriented
education enjoyed by the movement, whose leader, for instance, gave
interviews and engage in debates in technological set ups like media houses. In
addition, the movement even enjoyed the patronage of human products of
western oriented education like Buji Foi, a cabinet member in the Borno State
Government who defected to the movement and was executed like Mohammed
Yusuf himself in the 2009 war against Boko Haram in Borno. The interview
with the Armed Forces was a unique and accidental opportunity to Mohammed
Yusuf to clarify the appearance of contradiction in the phrase Boko Haram
means western oriented education is illegitimate. The movement dose not only
dissociates itself, both in that interview and a few other occasions, with the idea
that it rejects western education in totality including the system's technological
products, but also dissociates itself with names like Boko Haram and less
Page | 37
flamboyant ones like Yusufiyya, sometimes used locally echoing the last name
of Mohammed Yusuf.
This opposition to Western education and civilization could be seen in the light
of the class consciousness of the group, in that the elites of northern Nigeria had
failed to live up to expectations and deliver on promises made, especially
regarding the establishment and enactment of the Sharia and principles in
Muslim-dominant states in northern Nigeria. The group's ideology and strategy
focus on advocating for a strict compliance with Islamic principles and
condemning Western education and secularism. It also targeted northern elites
and Islamic scholars who have adapted to and followed Western-styled
democracy and secular ideology. Boko Haram did not really change its doctrine
from its earlier one of opposition to all forms of Western education and
civilization. The movement denounces as illegitimate the western oriented
education tradition (boko) as opposed to the traditional system of Islamic
oriented education. Boko is seen as a way of life, a set of behaviours identified
with modernity and the political culture of modern Nigeria.
Although the movement was hostile to the Nigerian state, agitating for an
Islamic state and railing against western oriented education system as non-
Islamic, it remained generally non-violent until 2009. It wasn't yet calling for
the violent overthrow of the Nigerian government, but it was increasingly at
odds with local authorities. Its members were occasionally arrested and
sporadically clashed with police in several cities in north-eastern Nigeria which
revealed that it had grown in size and membership.
In 2009, a confrontation was provoked by new laws regarding motorbikes,
including a ban on driving at night and requirement to wear a helmet. A bike-
helmet law, of all things, played a role in Boko Haram transformation into what
we know it as today: an armed ISIS-linked insurgency whose battles with
security forces and violent operations have left thousands dead and prompted
the U.S. to dispatch troops to the region. It's a largely forgotten incident: In
January 2009, the Nigerian government began enforcing a law mandating that
motorbike drivers and passengers wear helmets. The authorities were
responding to a serious public-health hazard, Nigeria's roads are among the least
safe in the world, and by 2009 motorcycle crashes accounted for more than half
of all road-traffic injuries. Police checkpoints were used to enforce the new
rules. Following the refusal by allegedly, the group's members to follow the new
law, a clash erupted with police in Bauchi state in which 17 members were
shot131, setting off series of attacks and counter-attacks132. The violence spread
131
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, p. 151.
132
Daniel E. Agbiboa, Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 37: 56, 2014.
Page | 38
from Bauchi to four additional northern Nigerian states and the government's
bike-helmet drive soon took a far darker turn.
On Thursday, 11 June 2009, officers in an anti-robbery security unit known as
Operation Flush detained several of Yusuf's followers, who were riding on
motorbikes in a convoy to bury a group member who had died in an earlier
automobile accident, and asked them why they weren't wearing helmets. The
group members did not take kindly to the enquiry, which they thought was a
provocation given that they were in a funeral procession133. For reasons that
remain unclear, the confrontation quickly escalated. Nigerian security forces
opened fire, injuring 17 people.
The fact that an anti-robbery task force chose to stop motorcyclists during a
funeral procession for traffic violations and riding without helmets is curious,
the U.S. embassy wrote.
Here's how officials at the U.S. embassy in Abuja described the developments
in a 12 June 2009 cable released by WikiLeaks134:
(The Islamic group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was in Kaduna at the time of
the incident, but the Mohammed Yusuf Islamic Movement members reportedly
met at their headquarters, the Ibn Taimiyya Mosque. According to Guardian
Newspaper the Muslim scholar's followers have vowed to fight back.....
Comment: Post will continue to monitor the situation as there is a risk of
additional violence in Maiduguri following Friday prayers. Additionally, if any
of the wounded MYIM members should die, we believe the risk of violence
would increase significantly, as the sect will likely retaliate. The fact that an
anti-robbery task force chose to stop motorcyclists during a funeral procession
for traffic violations and riding without helmets is curious, and suggests the
possibility that the officers of Operation Flush were deliberately seeking to
provoke the group. Mallam Mohammed Yusuf is often referred to as the
spiritual leader of the Jama'at Hijra Wa Taqfir, also known as the "Nigerian
Taliban" (and we believe that the MYIM is another name of the same
organization), which has long had very tense relations with government of
Nigeria security forces in the northeast of the country. Whatever the origin of
this incident, it illustrates the prevailing tensions in the North, which can
become violent at short notice).
The additional violence that the U.S. embassy feared didn't materialize
immediately, but it didn't take long to arrive, either. Just over a month after the
bike-helmet incident, police raided the home of a Boko Haram member135,
seizing bomb-making materials. Five days after that, Boko Haram militants
133
http://allafrica.com/stories/200906120007.html (Accessed on 10 June 2012)
134
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA1053a.html.
135
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover.pdf (Accessed on 7 Dec. 2010)
Page | 39
attacked a police station in Bauchi State136. In a matter of days, hundreds of
people had died across northern Nigeria in a welter of tit-for-tat exchanges
between Boko Haram and security forces, with at least 900 killed in Maiduguri
alone137.
Yusuf was taken into police custody and extrajudicially executed138 in police
custody. The moment of Yusuf’s killing by Nigerian security agents is widely
seen as the critical turning point in the evolution of Boko Haram139.
(Yusuf was the dove of Boko Haram. Once he was killed, you have killed the
dove. You have killed the structuring element of the group, which would
disintegrate into small autonomous cells and clandestine groups. The vultures
immediately took power after his extrajudicial execution in 2009), says Marc-
Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, professor at the French Institute of
Geopolitics140.
Extremely violent, the crackdown eventually resulted in the transformation of a
limited in scale but well-structured Islamic movement into an underground,
clandestine and armed organization with possible connections to the ever-
changing jihadist scene in Africa and beyond. Following Yusuf’s death the
handful of Boko Haram members who survived briefly went underground.
Nigerian authorities announced victory over the group. However, a year later, in
September 2010, the group re-emerged under the current leader Abubakar
Shekau with an attack on a Nigerian prison, resulting in the escape of 700
prisoners, including 150 Boko Haram members141 and with a new self-
characterized name: Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna Lidda’Awati wal Jihad (Sunni
Community for Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). The group's
members seemingly abhor the popular but derisive name of Boko Haram.
Graduating from Da’awa (propagation) to Jihad, the Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad has either abandoned Da’awa and assumed Jihad or
adopted the two in a parallel way. Abubakar Shekau is an ethnic Kanuri born in
136
http://www.reuter.com/article/2009/07/26/us-nigeria-riots-idUSTE56P0MA20090726 (Accessed on 7 Dec.
2010)
137
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, p. 151.
138
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, p. 151.
139
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, p. 151.
140
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2016/11/book-haram-rise-nigeria-armed-group-
16110114550150.html (Accessed on 13 May 2017)
141
Aminu Abubakar, Manhunt Begins After Prison Break, 9 September 2010, IOL News. Available at:
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/manhunt‐begins‐after‐prison‐break‐1.680173#.VBgRSPldUYM
Page | 40
Shekau village on the border with Niger in Tarmuwa local government area,
Yobe State in north-eastern Nigeria. He took over the leadership of Boko
Haram following the extrajudicially execution of the group’s founder
Mohammed Yusuf in 2009.
Taking up arms under Abubakar Shekau’s more radical and aggressive and
atrocious leadership, Boko Haram has grown more violent and less open to
dialogue Boko Haram has grown more violent Boko Haram has grown more
and transformed from the initial radical small group of young Islamic reformist
oratory preachers in Maiduguri, Borno State in northeast Nigeria to the world’s
deadliest militant group142 and became one of the most lethal terrorist
organizations in the world143. This development, transformation from a band of
radical preachers to a brutal group and global visibility make Boko Haram an
important example of the combination of religion and violence in the 21st
century.
Boko Haram directed campaign of attacks against security forces and
government officials, but later expanded a deadly insurgency that
overwhelmingly targeted civilians to include attacks on critical Muslim scholars
who opposed their ideology, traditional leaders who it believes helped troops
identify members, politicians from Borno State All Nigerians Peoples Party
(ANPP), who they claim reneged on promises, students, teachers, health
workers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) among others. Abubakar
Shekau was designated a global terrorist by the United States in 2012 and is
subject to a $7 million reward for information on his whereabouts144.
Boko Haram is classified as terrorist organization by the UN Security Council
on 22 May 2014 and the United States Department of State designated it as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization. In 2014, Boko Haram acquired the notorious
title of the world's deadliest terrorist organisation145. Boko Haram became
internationally identified with groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) as the poster boys of extremism and radicalization146.
142
http://Europe.newsweek.com/book-haram-ahead-isis-world-deadliest-militant-group-new-study-says-
396144 (Accessed on 23 June 2017)
143
Corina Simonelli, Michael Jensen, Alejandro Castro‐Reina, Amy Pate, Scott Menner, and Erin Miller, Boko
Haram Recent Attacks, START Background Report. May 2014. Available at:
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf
144
https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/abubakar_shekau.thml (Accessed on 23 June 2017)
145
Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index, New York, 2015.
146
Thomas Daniel, Radicalism, Extremism and Militancy, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Malaysia (ISIS), March 2015, p. 5. Available online at: www.isis.org.my/files/IF_2015/IF3/ISIS_Focus_3_-
_2015_2.pdf (Accessed on 29 September 2015).
Page | 41
One the most dangerous innovation of the insurgency is the introduction of
suicide bombers into its combat rank. Initially the suicide bombers were largely
male combatants, but well before the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria and
up to the present, the suicide combatants have been almost exclusively very
young burqa or hijab-wearing female teenagers. The group, along with whatever
combat options available to the insurgents, have constituted a horrible spectacle
of random and brutal bombing of public squires, mosques, churches, markets,
educational institutions, security settings and camps for internally displaced
persons (IDPs) have all been attacked by Boko Haram militants. In many of its
attacks, the extremist group has used children, particularly young girls, as
suicide bombers, a UNICEF report published in April 2016 stated that one-fifth
of the group’s suicide attacks were carried out by children, 75 percent of whom
were girls.
Boko Haram’s campaign of attacks led former Nigerian President Goodluck
Jonathan to impose a state of emergency in the northeast in early 2013, as the
militants seized territory and displaced hundreds of thousands of people in its
bid to create an Islamic caliphate. The militants reportedly controlled an area
similar in size to Belgium147 but, since in early 2015, have been pushed out of
most of the territory by Nigeria's army and troops from neighbouring countries.
However, the insurgents continue to carry out attacks in the northeast and
neighbouring Cameroon and Niger148.
Boko Haram has also used mass abductions as a tactic for bargaining with the
Nigerian government. Perhaps the best-known incident in Boko Haram’s
insurgency was the April 2014 kidnapping of more than 250 schoolgirls from
Chibok, a town in Borno State in northeast Nigeria149. The vast majority of the
girls remain in captivity, and Boko Haram released a video in August claiming
to show scores of the girls. In the video, one of the captives is interviewed and
urges the Nigerian government to release Boko Haram members from prison in
exchange for the girls’ freedom.
The group is affiliated to ISIS since 8th March 2015, when a significant shift
was witnessed in the conduct of the group's leadership. The transformation was
communicated by Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader. He pledged
allegiance (Bai’a or Mubaya’a was read in Arabic) to the leader of the
religiously-identified group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Abubakr Al-
Baghdadi. The pledged of allegiance (Bai’a), was a twitter audio message in
delivered in Arabic as follows: ‫نعلن مبايعة الخليفة ابراهيم بن اواب بن ابراهيم الحسيني‬
‫ القرشي على السمع والطاعة في المنشط والمكره وفي العسر واليسر‬The message may be
147
http://www.wsj.com/article/boko-haram-overruns-villages-and-army-base-in-northeast-nigeria-
1420467667 (Accessed on 23 June 2017)
148
http://news.trust.org/item/20170618144826-j9j37/ (Accessed on 19 June 2017)
149
http://Europe.newsweek.com/wole-soyinka-chibok-our-minds-396144 (Accessed on 23 June 2017).
Page | 42
approximately rendered as follows: (We are pledging to the Caliph Ibrahim Ibn
Awwab Ibn Ibrahim Al-Qurashi Al-Husseini in complete obedience under all
conditions of joy and sadness, difficulty and comfort).
The leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria endorsed the allegiance and
then ISIS accepted Boko Haram as its province in West Africa. On 13 March
2015, Islamic State (IS) accepted the pledge of allegiance from Boko Haram,
according to an audio message, a man who described himself as IS spokesman
Mohammed al-Adnani, says: We announce to you to the good news of the
expansion of the caliphate to West Africa because the caliph... has accepted the
allegiance of our brothers of the Sunni group for preaching and the jihad150. This
development represents a re-branding of Boko Haram. Consequently, Jama’atu
Ahlus-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad otherwise known as Boko Haram
identified as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram’s
merger with the Islamic State was consistent with a broader transnational trend
whereby militants have switched sides in favour of the territorial-focused
Islamic State151.
Boko Haram's armed campaign launched since 2009 has killed more than
20,000 people and over 2.7 million people fled their homes as a result of the
group's attempt to create an Islamic state152. Boko Haram continues to carry out
deadly attacks despite the government's declaration in 2016153 that the
extremists had been crushed, according to associated press report on 26 July
2017154.
Boko Haram provides In the framework of northern Nigerian history, Boko
Haram can be seen as part of a centuries-old tradition of jihad or of militant
opposition to rulers viewed as non-Islamic and rejection of social practices
judged not to be in accord with Islam. However, Boko Haram’s militant
approach is not just a continuation of older religious militancy; it also is a
product of contemporary Muslim radical beliefs identified as Salafism. In this
way, in teaching and practice, Boko Haram shows significant departures from
150
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31862992 (Accessed on 2 June 2017).
151
Jacob Zenn, A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bayʽa to al-Baghdadi, CTC Sentinal 8 (2015), pp. 17–21.
152
http://newsweek.com/boko-haram-isis-abubakar-shekau-abu-musab-al-barnawi-496615 (Accessed on 23
June 2017)
153
In December 2016 Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari declared that the group, which has ties with the
Islamic State militant group (ISIS), was done for as a fighting force in the Lake Chad Basin, an area that borders
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. See also: http://www.newsweek.com/has-nigerias-buhari-finished-boko-
harm-529309 (Accessed on 23 June 1017)
154
http://abcnews.go.com/international/wireStory/boko-haram-ambushes-oil-convoy-nigeria-killing-soldiers-
48854216
Page | 43
the historic Muslim understandings of both jihad and caliphate. Its relationship
to contemporary Salafism and historic jihadism is part of the ideological and
political conflicts in contemporary Nigeria an example of two intertwined types
of religious violence: the general religiously-legitimized violence that in the
Islamic tradition is associated with jihad, and the more specific modern and
contemporary manifestation of religious violence as religious terrorism,
although analysts tend to use a variety of definitions of terrorism155.
Boko Haram exhibits continuities with past militant Islamic groups and gives an
example of the new-style groups of religious violence that have emerged in the
age of the new transnational activism156. It provides an important case study in
how a longstanding historic framework of religious violence is reshaped and
rearticulated in the conditions of the 21st century and reflects the realities of the
globalized world. Boko Haram had a profile very similar to the early stages of
Maitatsine, with a central reformist teacher and a large number of followers
who crystallized into an activist community. Both were hostile to aspects of
modernity associated with the westernisation of everyday life in northern
Nigeria and had their headquarters in a major city, taking over a run-down
quarter; groups that come to the city are openly challenging the legitimacy of
the government and its policies, especially its adopting of western values and
commodities157, but there was no distinctive link between the Boko Haram and
Maitatsine groups in terms of Islamic doctrines and principles.While Boko
Haram draws supporters from similar social level as did Maitatsine, it is more
closely related doctrinally to, Sunni-Salafi reform group, Jama’atu Izalat
al‐Bida'a wa Iqamat as-Sunna, commonly known as Izala. Izala is an outspoken
opponent of the established Sufi orders158 in northern Nigeria.
Maitatsine received little attention outside of Nigeria in the days before Internet.
Even much of the Nigerian public information about the group was the product
of popular rumours159. When the founder of Maitatsine was killed, the
movement ended to be a significant element in religious violence. In contrast,
the successor to Muhammad Yusuf, in Boko Haram, namely Abubakar Shekau
was able to transform the local group into a globally visible jihad group,
although many thought the group would end to exist after the killing of
155
Alex Thurston, Nigeria’s Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State, Islamic Africa 6 (2015), pp.
109-34.
156
Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
157
Murray Last, The Pattern of Dissent: Boko haram in Nigeria 2009, Annual Review of Islam in Africa (ARIA)
Issue No. 10, 2008 2009, p. 8.
158
Spectrum. 47:2‐3, 2012, p. 143.
159
Niels Kastfelt, Rumors of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria, African Affairs 88:
1989, 83–90.
Page | 44
Muhammad Yusuf. An important element in this was the increasingly effective
use of the global social media by Boko Haram in the second decade of the 21st
century. Through the use of information technology, Nigerian militants now
have access to material and other resources that they can use to create
organizations and networks, proselytize radical ideas and recruit new members.
The instantaneous nature of electronic media, with its immediate global
visibility changes the role of the networks which are important in both the old
jihad traditions in West Africa, northern Nigeria and in contemporary Islamic
militancy. Boko Haram is an example of the developing social media mode of
religious violence. Rather than simply being the means for communication of
ideas among jihadists, the networks have become part of the militant operations
themselves, transforming at least part of the jihad efforts into new style internet-
war jihads. Boko Haram joins ISIS and other similar groups in this new mode of
religious violence. In many areas of life, the 21st century is a time of major
transformations and religious violence is part of these changes.
Boko Haram claims to be engaging in a true jihad to establish a new caliphate.
In the framework of West African and northern Nigerian history, Boko Haram
can be seen as part of a centuries-old tradition of jihad of militant opposition to
rulers viewed as non-Islamic and rejection of social practices judged not to be in
accord with Islam. However, Boko Haram’s militant Islamism is not just a
continuation of older religious militancy; it also is a product of contemporary
Islamic radical beliefs identified as Salafism. In this way, in teaching and
practice, Boko Haram shows significant departures from the historic Muslim
understandings of both jihad and caliphate. Its relationship to contemporary
Salafism and historic jihadism is part of the ideological and political conflicts in
contemporary Nigeria160. Its distinctiveness, reflecting the new global modes of
religious violence, is that it is the first Islamic group in Nigeria to carry out an
ideological hybridization and synthesis of the theologico-juridico resources of
the global jihadi-Salafism coupled with the cultural framing of the historical
tradition of tajdid (reform) in northern Nigeria, specifically the jihadi legacy of
Usman Dan Fodio161.
In broader historical terms, Boko Haram can also be viewed as a renewal of an
old style of opposition to unjust rule. In the West African jihads of the 19th
century, once the initial tajdid (reform) efforts were frustrated, the jihadists
struggled for the creation of a new political system, not just the replacement of
an unjust ruler. This transition from revivalist-reform to a millenarian vision is
160
Alex Thurston, Nigeria’s Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State, Islamic Africa (6) 2015, pp.
109–34.
161
Abdulbasit Kassim, Defining and Understanding the Religious Philosophy of jihadi-Salafism and the Ideology
of Boko Haram, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2015. Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2015.1074896 (accessed on 29 September 2015).
Page | 45
also part of the development of Boko Haram. However, in the 21st century, it
represents a new form of militant opposition to the existing state system.
Boko Haram is also seen as a terrorist organization, and represents an important
example of new types of terrorism that have emerged in the 21st century.
Religious militias may be violent in their methods but they are not necessarily
terrorist, although analysts tend to use a variety of definitions of terrorism. New
violent religiously-identified groups have emerged and represent new
organizations of religiously-identified violence. The most prominent of these is
the so-called Islamic State or ISIS, reflecting the changing nature of these
militant organizations, ISIS has a large military force and controls and
administers territory. ISIS is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army162 Boko
Haram is similar to ISIS in these terms.
Conclusion
Rising of Militant Islamic groups in northern Nigerian societies, shaped by
conflicts with political overtones, even though were termed jihads to utilize
religiously justified violence are an important part of northern Nigerian history.
The pre-modern movement of Usman Dan Fodio, the 20th century groups of
Maitatsine and of El-Zakzaki Shiite Islamic Movement in Nigeria and the21st
century of Boko Haram are the prominent militant Islamic revivalism groups
involving jihads. Modern groups frequently claim the legacy of Usman Dan
Fodio’s jihad, with the re-establishment of a caliphate with formal political
power as well as religious authority as the ultimate goal. These groups have
created something new: a synthesis of religion and modern politics163.
In the modern era, militant Islamic groups have taken many forms and in the
21st century, distinctive new types have developed, reflecting both continuities
with past groups of religious violence and new characteristics shaped by
contemporary globalizing developments and new technologies. Boko Haram
provides an important example of these trends and by the second decade of the
21st century, it became a part of a proclaimed caliphate with a non-state military
force. Like ISIS and other new groups, Boko Haram's religious violence is a
part of its operational jihad that attempts to convert globalization into a process
of global Islamization, imposing an extremist interpretation of Islam. Violence
by religiously-identified groups is an increasingly important element of global
affairs and local social hostilities around the world. In the words of a major
162
Audrey Kurth Cronin, ISIS is not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist
Threat, Foreign Affairs 94 (2015), p. 88.
163
Mark Juergensmeyer, Religious Terror and Global War, in, Religion, Terror and Violence, Religious Studies
Perspectives, Edited by Brynan Rennie and Philip L. Tite, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 236.
Page | 46
study of global religious conflict in the 21st century, religiously motivated
violence has become a pervasive element of modern conflicts164.
Boko Haram arose out of a complex cluster of Islamic reformist scholars and
followers in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf, the leader
of Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’a known as Yusufiyya/Boko Haram was one of these
scholars who gained visibility as an advocate Salafi doctrine that characterized
by being literalist and puritanical in its interpretation of the Holy Qur’an and
Hadith. Boko Haram is a description of its position that Western education
(Boko) is forbidden (Haram), rather than the formal name of the group. The
group changed course in 2009 when Mohammed Yusuf was killed by the
police, and moved steadily in the direction of militantly violent campaigns to
gain control of the region. Mohammed Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau,
led the group into more international networking in an effort to establish an
extremist Salafi-style state with ties to a global jihad and caliphate.
Militancy, extremism and fundamentalist means or ideologies are used to fill
alternative spaces that the state has either failed to provide or closed; or they are
a reaction against alienation from modern institutions of governance that fail to
deliver social services and other benefits to the people. In such circumstances,
religion becomes a feasible alternative for social discourse and identity, as well
as a means to achieving social justice and equality.
164
Gregory F. Trevorton, Heather S. Gregg, Daniel Gibran and Charles W. Yost, Exploring Religious Conflict,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, p. 1.
Page | 47
Annex 1
Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah wa Iqamatis Sunna
Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah wa Iqamatis Sunna (The Islamic Organization for

Eradicating Innovation and Establishing Sunnah), commonly known as Izala, is
a reform group in northern Nigeria and an outspoken opponent of the
established Sufi orders165. Founded in 1978 in Jos, Plateau State by a group
student led by a former army Imam named Isma'ila Idris (1937-2000), who were
motivated by their most influential mentor Abubakar Gumi's charismatic
political and religious ideologies, to support and promote the Salafi-oriented
ideology under Gumi's spiritual leadership. Izala embraces a legalist and
scripture-centric understanding of Islam, with a goal of removal the practice of
Islam of foreign ideas and practices. To accomplish this, Izala proponents
encourage the faithful to live by its quite literal interpretation of the Holy
Qur’an, Sunna and Hadith to imitate the Salafs166.
Izala is often associated with the charismatic personality of Abubakar Gumi
(1922-1992)167 who was one of the key early Salafist a reformer and preacher
with overtly anti-Sufi tones in post-colonial northern Nigeria. Although he was
the co-founder of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in
the early 1960s with Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto and Premier of the
Northern Nigeria Region, Abubakar Gumi gradually broke away from the Sufi
order leadership, especially after the breakup of the northern region in 1967.
At the national level, Abubakar Gumi was a former member of the Judicial
Service Commission, a former Grand Kadi (Chief Justice) of the then Northern
States of Nigeria, a former chairman of the National Pilgrims Board. And at the
international level, he had been a member of the Muslim World League in the
1960s, a member of the Consultative Council of the Islamic University of
Medina in the 1970s and was the winner of the popular King Faisal Award for
Service to Islam in 1987. He viewed with favour by the ruling circles of Saudi
Arabia, who helped encourage the accusation of Wahhabism levelled at his
followers.
165
Roman Loimeier, Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria.” Africa
Spectrum, 2012, 47:2‐3, pp. 143.
166
167
For his biography, see: Tsiga and Gumi, Where I Stand, Spectruem Books Limited, Ibadan, 1994, p. 161
Page | 48
The founder of the group, Isma'ila Idris was born in 1937168 in Gwaskwarom, a
small town in what is now Bauchi State in northern Nigeria. Isma'ila Idris
started to work as a teacher in a local government school in Bauchi. He moved
to Kano in 1963 to join the prestigious School of Arabic Studies (SAS). After
graduating from there in 1967, he returned to Bauchi as a primary school
teacher. He then moved to Kaduna to work as a preacher and primary school
teacher under the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam. During his time in Kaduna, he decided
to join the army and occupied a position of imam in the Nigerian Army169. In the
army, Isma'ila Idris had to be transferred repeatedly because of the many
controversies generated by his views on religious practices and education: from
Kaduna he was sent to Ibadan (Oyo State), then Kontagora (Niger State) and
then Jos (Plateau State). In Jos, Isma'ila Idris’ success in establishing an active
network of followers, combined with Abubakar Gumi’s unsuccessful attempts
to mobilize the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam structures for his campaigns against the
Sufi brotherhoods, led to the establishment of an independent body devoted to
the promotion of Salafi-style reformism; Isma'ila Idris became the leader of that
body and Abubakar Gumi was entrusted with the role of official Grand Patron.
As had already occurred elsewhere, Isma'ila Idris was transferred, in the late
1970s, to Potiskum (now in Yobe State; it was part of Borno State at that time).
He would not remain long in this position, however, as he soon decided to leave
the army. It is not clear whether Isma'ila Idris decided to resign from the
Nigerian Army in order to found the Izala and to devote himself to preaching170
or whether he was dismissed from the Nigerian Army in 1978171. Idris Isma'ila’s
life was marked by protest and rebellion172. The image that Izala rapidly gained
among its admirers was that of a movement of Islamic revivalists inflexibly
devoted to truth, while its opponents considered it as a sectarian crowd of
trouble-makers impudently challenging established religious authority; these
perceptions owe much to Isma'ila Idris’ charismatic personality173. His career as
168
In some BA and MA dissertations, 1936 is given as the year of birth of Shaykh Idris. A few publications
produced by the headquarters of the Izala organization in Jos mention 1937 as his year of his birth.
169
Jamila Adam, The role of J.I.B.W.I.S in the development of Arabic and Islamic culture in Jos, BA dissertation,
Department of Arabic Studies, University of Jos, Jos, 2005, pp. 19-20.
170
Muhammed Muhammed, Sadis Muhammed, Late Sheikh Ismaila Idris Bin Zakariyya: His contribution to the
development of Jama’atu Izalatil Bid‘a Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S) in Nigeria, BA thesis, Religious Studies
Department, University of Jos, Jos, 2001, pp. 22-23.
171
Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Northwestern University Press,
Evanston, Illinois, 1997, p. 214.
172
Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Northwestern University Press,
Evanston, Illinois, 1997, p. 212.
173
In Kano city, where the Sufi brotherhoods are dominant, Isma'ila Idris was known by the nickname of
Benjamin Netanyahu, which he gained due to his allegedly harsh personality and his provocative speeches in
which he used to target the Sufis as kafirai (unbelievers).
Page | 49
a public preacher started within the army, but his influence rapidly expanded
beyond the confines of the barracks. He was constantly under the supervision of
the Nigerian Security Service and was interrogated and jailed on several
occasions174. From his early years as an imam and public preacher, Isma'ila
Idris was outspoken and he openly criticized Sufism and the Sufis. He was the
first scholar to lecture publicly the controversial teachings of Abubakar Gumi’s
book, al-Aqida as-Sahiha (1972), and to preach its message to the
congregation175 at the Ahmadu Bello Mosque in Kaduna. The group's teachings
centre on serious campaign against Sufism, opposed to what it terms bid'ah
(innovation) practiced by the Sufis, such as pilgrimage to, or intercession at the
tombs of saints, recital of praise-songs to the Prophet Mohammed, a range of
local customs and traditions and obedience of the faithful to the authority of
Sufi Orders scholars. According to the group, all that the Sufis teach is
associating somebody else with Allah in worship. The Izala almost attracted not
only many members among the western educated young Muslims but also
sometimes violent opposition from supporters of Sufi Orders, particularly for
their policy of establishing separate mosques, this has earned them nicknames
as Whhabi and Kwarij from their critics.
Izala appealed to youth, especially unemployed graduates, with its emphasis on
individual, unmediated examination of the Sunna176. Additionally, with its focus
on purifying Nigerian Islam from un-Islamic practices, Izala rejected many
social customs that youth, in particular, found constraining, including marriage
payments177. Thus, while joining Izala may mean breaking with parents and
traditional practices, it also allowed for greater individual freedom and agency
for some178. Izala, despite its Salafist stance, also attracted significant female
participation. Unlike some of its ideological colleagues, Izala has promoted
Islamic education for women and the participation of women in the public
sphere (although under limitations of separate but equal activities). Izala
174
Among others, Shaykh Idris was jailed in Kano after preaching on the radio against Sufism. He was also
jailed in Cross River (see Muhammed Muhammed, Sadis Muhammed, Late Sheikh Ismaila Idris Bin Zakariyya:
His contribution to the development of Jama’atu Izalatil Bid‘a Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S) in Nigeria, BA
thesis, Religious Studies Department, University of Jos, Jos, 2001, pp. 23-26.
175
Gomi and Tsiga, Where I Stand, 1992, p. 145.
176
Society in the Modern World, editd by Robert Hefner, IN: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2011, p. 264.
177
Loimeier, Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria.” Africa Spectrum,
2012, 47:2‐3, pp. 141 and Paul M. Lubeck, Nigeria: Mapping a Shari’a Restorationist Movement, In Shari’a
Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World, editd by Robert Hefner, IN: Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 2011, p. 265.
178
Page | 50
therefore represents a more individual autonomy-cantered Islamist option in
some senses than traditional Islamic practices in northern Nigeria179.
The Izala network has been very influential in the political, social and
educational spheres. Izala focused mainly on grass-roots oral preachings and
modern education, avoiding (when not directly opposing) the very circles of
Islamic knowledge and Sufi loyalty which used to provide traditional scholars
with the skills and motivation to write. This is why Izala's impact on the literary
history of the country has been insignificant when compared to its numerical
strength and its social and political impact. So they have fewer publications than
the Sufi Orders or the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam. However, its spiritual leader
Abubakar Gumi has some writings to his credit. Izala claims to be the orthodox
Sunni and hence its usage of the term Ahulus Sunna wal Jama’a i.e.
brotherhood for the Sunni/Salafi to describe and distinguish itself from the Sufi
orders who equally claim orthodoxy.
Despite its development, the Izala group already started to experience regional
divisions in the early 1980s, since many outspoken representatives of the
movement, while accepting the overall spiritual leadership of Abubakar Gumi,
rejected the rather authoritarian style of Isma'ila Idris. Kano was a breeding
ground of rebellion against the central leadership of the group; here, an
influential businessman, A. K. Daiyyabu, managed to marginalize, since 1986,
the existing leader ship of the group under Mallam Sulaiman180 Daiyyabu
particularly criticized the loyalist attitudes of the Izala group with regards to the
Nigerian government under General Ibrahim Babangida. Both Abubakar Gumi
and Izala leadership were highly supportive of the Babangida government,
despite its agenda of economic liberalization and its conservative foreign
policies. Daiyyabu's authoritarian style, however, triggered his own deposition
in 1990 by the central committee in Jos. However, Daiyyabu's termination did
not put an end to the internal disputes. The 1990s saw a growing number of
rebellions against the Jos leadership, which was accused of financial
mismanagement and embezzlement of funds and working together with
Nigeria's corrupt political elites. They criticized Isma'ila Idris and questioned
the source of his income. In June1991, Musa Mai Gandu (1930 – 2011), the
Chairman of the National Committee of Patrons, suspended the National
Steering Committee of the Izala in Jos, accusing it of embezzlement of funds. In
direct reaction to this, Isma'ila Idris and the Izala National Steering Committee
removed Musa Mai Gandu and his supporters from all official functions. As a
result, Musa Mai Gandu Kaduna group and the Isma'ila Idris Jos faction of Izala
started a bitter dispute that has continued to divide the Izala group despite
179
180
Ousmane Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for the Removal of
Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, Brill, Leiden, 2003.
Page | 51
repeated efforts at reconciliation Even after Isma'ila Idris's death in 2000, his
successor Mohammed Sani Yahya Jingir (b. 1950) continued to fight Musa Mai
Gandu Kaduna group, although both factions advocated the introduction of
Sharia in twelve northern Nigeriai states in 2000.
The Gulf War in 1990 was probably the final incident that divided the Izala into
two, one faction popularly referred to as Bush Izala with its base in Jos led by
Isma'ila Idris and the other Saddam Izala based in Kaduna under Musa Mai
Gandu181, when the Bush camp argued that the war was not a religious one
because of its belief that Saddam Hussein did not deserve Muslim sympathy.
The reason advanced was that Saddam had earlier on attacked Kuwait, a fellow
Muslim country. The Saddam faction, on the other hand, saw the Gulf War as
an attack on Muslims by the USA and her allies. In addition to disputes over
leadership, authority and regional autonomy, the development of Izala has been
characterized since 1990s by the emergence of young and middle-aged
generation. With that, generational conflicts within the Izala as well as disputes
over the question of proper Islamic education have arisen.
Gumi’s death in September 1992 left Izala without a charismatic leader, a void
still not filled. Since this time, Izala can no longer be considered a structured
group, but as a set of ideas, it retains a profound influence over northern
Nigeria, as well as among Muslims in the south and in neighbouring countries.
With a general revival of public religiosity, its reformist ideas have a
considerable hold on many sections of society, and its adherents have gained
positions of power and influence in many states.
The Izala were treated with great suspicion by the ulama of the caucus182 and
the Sufi orders. It was noted that Izala preaching was similar to those of
Wahabism which originated from Saudi Arabia. In fact, the Ulama of the caucus
and the Tijjaniya Sufi order even went further to assert that those militant
groups of the 1980s such as Maitatsine and lately Yusufiyya (Boko Haram)
were spiritual off shoots of the Izala, given the similarities in their militancy,
aggressive preaching styles, and over simplified ritual practices.
Izala has been at the forefront of the movement for the implementation of sharia
in northern states of Nigeria in 2000, and in some cities (such as Kano) its
members make up the core of the Islamic police (the Hisba)183. Furthermore, as
181
The Bush faction is named after George W. Bush. While the Saddam faction is named after Saddam Hussein.
NB: the two groups have again agreed to come together as one body on 21st December 2011 with Sheikh Sani
Yahaya Jingir (Bush faction) as Chairman Council of Ulama and Sheikh Yusuf Sambo Rigachikun (Saddam
faction) as Deputy.
182
Ulama of the caucus are Islamic scholars who play advisory roles on religious matters to the traditional
rulers. Some of them also belong to the Turuk. Their advice are based strictly on the Maliki School of Islamic
thought.
183
Spectrum, 47:2‐3, 2012 , p. 146.
Page | 52
mentioned, Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf was influenced by the
teachings of Izala, and Boko Haram’s earliest recruits reportedly came largely
from Izala.
Annex 2
Salafism and its Various Dimensions
The idea of upholding As-Salaf al-Salih (devout predecessors) as exemplary
models for later generations of Muslims did not emerge in recent times. It is not
invented by later generations as an aftermath. It is rather based on the
admonishments of the Qur’an and Sunna to always regard the foundation of
Islam established by the Prophet Mohammed and the immediate succeeding
generations after him as the principal guidelines for the continuity of Islam. In
several Chapters, the Qur’an has urged obedience to Allah and the Messenger of
Allah184. The Prophet Mohammed has stated that the best generation was the
one in which he lived followed by the two subsequent ones in order of nearness
to his own generation. In a related statement the Prophet has also urged
Muslims to firmly hold on to his path and that of the rightly guided successors
after him. Similarly he had also condemned as hell bound all relative
innovations that disobey the boundaries of his prohibitions. All these statements
indicate that using the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet, that of the rightly
guided successors and the general record of the earliest generations from the
Prophet Mohammed as the modular motivation for subsequent Muslim
generations in their endeavors to establish the Islamic way of life is an early
principle.
Terminologies like Salafism185 maybe frequently resorted to in recent times. But
the principal idea behind the term, namely using the past record of the early
generations as model for subsequent future establishment or revival of Islam is
as old as Islam itself.
Ever since the end of the early centuries of Islam, taking that early period as a
model has been the focus of vision for those involved in the revival of Islam.
Phrases like (following the path of the Sahaba), (adopting the methods of
AhlusSunna wal Jama’a), (following the path of the Prophet), (following the
path of the Salaf) and many other terminological symbols for Islam revivalists
who often exhibit conflicting doctrinal interpretations and mutually discordant
implementations of those concepts. However, the effort in developing concepts
that evoke backward compatibility with the pioneer generations was informed
by the earlier Qur’nic and Prophetic admonishments to stick to the guidance of
184
See for instance: The Holy Qur’an, 3:32, 4:59, 8:1, 8:20 etc.
185
For a collective of articles of Salafism, see: Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam's New Movement, Hurst and
Company, London, 2009.
Page | 53
the early generations so as to preserve the early models of Islam and sustain
doctrinal authority by ensuring backward compatibility of later Islamic revivals
with the past.
Salfism is one of those terminologies whose advocates claim to seek backward
doctrinal compatibility with the path of the worthy predecessors. The term has
been in existence for centuries but in the 20th and 21st centuries it became a
subject of intense interest and varied applications.
While the Salafiyya or Salafism as terminologies seeking to organize a trend
may be subjected to interpretive differences, the word Salaf itself refer to that
community whose general acceptance by the Muslim Umma (community) is a
mainstream attitude in the Muslim world. Even if a particular Muslim may not
accept views of a particular group that may call itself Salafist he accepts the
Salaf as a model community and most likely considers himself their followers.
Salafism is a terminology that link the past with the present at the lexical level.
It is a bridging lexicon that removes alienation of later generation from the early
pioneer generations of Muslims referred to by the Prophet Mohammed as the
best of generations. While the term Salaf literally means predecessors,
technically it is the concept of seeing those generations as models of imitation.
Striving to uphold those generations as models of imitation is often viewed by
advocates as compliance both with the Qur’anic order of obedience to Allah and
the Messenger of Allah and compliance with the Messenger of Allah’s
testimony to the exemplariness of the pioneer generations.
The Salaf therefore constitute a historical model community upon whom there
is a general Sunni Muslim consensus. Salafism itself refers to the movements
that later emerged claiming to revive their legacy. They may not be based on the
consensus of the Muslim Umma or community. Salafist movements can have
diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives. But they almost all agree that
the Salaf constitute a worthy historical model of imitation. The Salaf and
Salafism can be compared to a text and its diverse interpretations. It is like the
Qur’an which is a basis of universal Muslim consensus and its interpretations on
which Muslim scholars may have diverse and at times conflicting views. It may
also compare Salaf and Salafism to history and interpretation of history.
There may be a consensus that a particular historical event taken place, but the
interpretation of that historical event may not be governed by consensus.
Similarly, a destination and the many routes that lead to that destination may be
compared to Salaf and Salafism. The Salaf were at a historical community
made up primarily of the first three generations referred to by the Prophet as the
best of communities. Salafism itself is a later phenomenon brought about by
revivalists, writers, activists, jihadists, politicians and general followers who
claim to be adopting the Salaf record as a model for imitation while the Salaf
did leave a record worthy of imitation, the imitators bear full responsibility for
their utterances, actions and the imperfections that may emerged through the
claims to imitate the Salaf.
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Like all great ideas, Salafism is characterized by multiple perceptions. Salfism
supporters exhibit highly diversified visions of their Salafist endeavour.
Because of the vastness, richness and widely varied lifestyles of the Salaf
generations, later Salafists (who often demonstrate diverse and sometimes
conflicting perspectives on determination of what constitutes compatibility with
Salaf heritage) find enough historical precedence to justify their approach of
interpreting the Salaf record. As it is universally the case with all human
behavior, there was no uniformity in style and approach of the Salaf even during
the life time of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sahaba (the companions of the
Prophet) had diverse orientations. However, there were sufficient concrete
common factors binding them all together which made them an exemplary
community for later generations. These later generations include the Salafists
whose principal claim is that of upholding the Salaf record in their revival of
Islamic values. They have various areas of focus. Depending on their
orientations, they have different visions of their Salafist mission. Some focus on
intellectual endeavor with much concern for scholarship especially around the
Qur’an and Sunna without serious political advocacy for an Islamic State.
Quest for doctrinal purity through scholarly retrieval of the Salaf legacy as
viewed by such Salafist is their main motivation as exemplified by Nasir ad-Din
Al-Albani and others of similar persuasions. Others engage in intense political
advocacy to revive the Salaf political legacy. While the intellectually oriented
Salafists find refuge in scholarship and puritanist propagation, the political
Salafists advocate for political change as their expression of compatibility with
the Salaf al-Salih. More recent of such Salafists have even formed political
parties for example, in the pre-Sisi Egytian political dispensation where some of
them were loosely allied to Muslim Brotherhood and its presidential flag bearer
Mohammed Mursi. Quite apart from the above two, are the third Salafi trend
that has become prominent especially after 9/11, namely Jihadi Salafists.
The three main Salafi currents, all claim to relate to the early foundation of
Islam in different ways. The intellectually oriented and scholarship based
Salafist, primarily focus on retrieval of the Salaf legacy through scholarship and
documentation without entrapping themselves in denying the necessity of
changing societies seen to be incompatible with the legacy of the Salaf.
Retrieval of legacy naturally leads to advocacy for applying the retrieved Salaf
legacy. The advocacy of applying the Salaf tradition to society is the main
preoccupation of those Salafists who advocate for change of society based on
the Salaf tradition. The third, jihad oriented Salafist current advocates jihad to
bring about change, thus going beyond retrieval of legacy and advocacy for
returning to the Salaf tradition. The jihadi Salafists analyze incumbent power
structure as Tagut (evil) and go about to take up arms against it and allies. This
wave of insurgency has engulfed many parts of the world.
Page | 55
Annex 3
Jama’atu Nasril Islam
In 1961, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the leader of the Northern
People’s Congress (NPC) political party, who was Premier of the Northern
Region in the Nigeria's First Republic until his assassination in 1966, in concert
with his religious advisor Abubakar Gumi186, who was close to the established
Sufi orders, established Jama’atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Victory for
Islam) as an umbrella body to unite the Muslims, propagate Islam and provide
an ideological base for the NPC Party. Ahmadu Bello and northern leaders
priority was to promote Islam, both as a unifying instrument and as a means of
preserving the region’s cultural identity. However, in terms of forging Muslim
unity, his efforts achieved limited results. More successful were the campaigns
intended to convert un-Muslim minority groups to Islam. Supported by state
resources and sometimes led by Ahmadu Bello himself, these led to the
conversion of hundreds of thousands non-Muslims, particularly in Zaria and
Niger provinces. Ahmadu Bello was also a frequent participant in collective
pilgrimages to Makka and used the networks of the region’s Sufi orders to
bolster his power. Predictably, these efforts at boosting the Dar al-Islam
(Muslim World) drew strong support from the Muslim majority; but among
non-Muslim minorities and Christian migrants from the south, Ahmadu Bello’s
campaign – and his election as vice president of the Muslim World League in
1963 – raised fears of Islamic domination. This alarm, whether reality or merely
perception, affected community relations and contributed to the first military
coup against the Northern Region-dominated federal government, in January
1966.
In 1962, Ahmadu Bello and Abubakar Gumi founded a mosque that its affairs
were directed by Jama’atu Nasril Islam, which at the time, was the only
recognized body to represent Islam in the country. On completion, the mosque
was inaugurated on 26 January 1962. Moddibo Mohammed Gieri, who was
appointed the imam of the mosque, was a native of Adamawa Province
(Adamawa State), a student of Abubakar Gumi and graduate of the School for
Arabic Studies, Kano. During that year, daily prayers and other activities were
started, and these include periodic preaching and, most importantly, the month
of Ramadan oral tafsir (exegesis of Qur'an) in Hausa language by Abubakar
Gumi187. This style of oral tafsir modelled on the one that the Senegalese
scholar Ibrahin Niasse used to perform in the evening during the month of
Ramadan in Medina-Baye, Kaolack (in Senegal) and popularised in northern
186
For his piogaphy, see: Tsiga and Gumi, Where I Stand, Spectruem Books Limited, Ibadan, 1994.
187
For more on Gumi's tafsir, see, Andrea Bregaglia, The Radio Kaduna Tafsir (1978-1992) and the construction
of Public Image of Muslim Scholars in the Nigerian Media, Jurnal for Islamic Studies, 27,2007, pp. 173-210
Page | 56
Nigeria by his followers, Nigerian scholars of the Tijaniyya Sufi order and later
a simulation of almost all scholars regard less their ideological affiliation.
Gumi's oral tafsir, in particular, became legendary, as he had used the arena to
express and popularize a comprehensive critique of Sufism, he also expressed a
criticism of the values of traditional Qur'anic education (labeled as irrational),
which suited the ideology of first generation of religious but Western-educated
northern Nigerian Muslims188. During his first cycle of the Qur'ani exegesis,
Gumi did not publicly differ from the views of other northern Nigerian scholars,
and limited himself to using the well-known Tafsir al-Jalalayn by the late 15th
century scholars Jalal al-Din al-Mahalli and Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti and translated
it into Hausa, as most northern Nigerian oral exegetes did. Gumi's more open
attacks on Sufi practices only started after about four years of the performance
of his tafsir, after having won a circle of students and audience among the
administrative cadres of Kaduna, who able to reach a wider public, when he felt
confident enough to state his mind freely and to disseminate his Salafi-oriented
ideology that he was exposed to, in the 1950s, when he accompanied Ahmadu
Bello in his various trips to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage. In the late 1960s,
therefore, Gumi started to use his own notes for his tafsir, which would later be
published as an independent book titled Radd al-Ath'han ila ma'ani al-Qur;an189.
Apart from that tafsir held yearly during the month of Ramadan, Gumi
conducted other programmes in the mosque. These included a Hausa
programme known as Hasken Musulunci which was held every Friday and
Saturday after the afternoon (asr) prayer, and a daily reading of Islamic books
especially on jurisprudence and Hadith, which was held between the sunset
(maghrib) and the night (isha) prayers. Gumi's policies of religious reform and
political unity among all Muslims in northern Nigeria to support an introduction
of federal Sharia court have been contested by resistance from representatives
of religious and political establishment. In that context, debates over Sharia,
which Usman Dan Fodio first introduced in the 19th century, have been a
permanent feature of politics in northern Nigeria.
The British retained the Islamic Sharia law established by the Sokoto Caliphate
but over time, limited it to civil cases. They restricted the application of
punishments such as lashings and scale down enforcement of Islamic Sharia law
to the jurisdiction of local-level native courts. Throughout the colonial period, a
somewhat vague division of labour operated between the emirate legal councils,
which applied common law principles to issues such as commercial property,
and the Islamic judges (locally called Kadi and/or Alkali), who ruled on family
188
Andrea Brigaglia, Note on Shaykh Dahiru Usman Bauchi and the July 2014 Kaduna Bombing, in Annual
Review of Islam in Africa, No: 12/1 2013-2914, p.40.
189
Andrea Brigaglia, Note on Shaykh Dahiru Usman Bauchi and the July 2014 Kaduna Bombing, in Annual
Review of Islam in Africa, No: 12/1 2013-2914, p.132.
Page | 57
issues. Islamic principles of compensation for violence and murder were
frequently applied190.
In the final period of colonial rule, in 1959, the British expunged Sharia content
on the grounds that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of
all citizens in a religiously plural society. Under pressure from the colonial
government191, and in a context where the Alkali had become somewhat
discredited by playing an increasingly political role against the new pro-
independence parties, the Northern Region’s government accepted a
compromise code (called the Penal Code) that established a Sharia court of
appeal with jurisdiction only for Muslim personal law.
Jama’atu Nasril Islam based in Kaduna is the largest Islamic organization in the
northern Nigeria. It is closely associated with the Nigerian Supreme Council for
Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), headed by the Sultan of Sokoto, and with the Supreme
Council for Sharia in Nigeria. Although the Jama’atu Nasril Islam attempted to
place itself above sectarian division with the Islamic community, it became
heavily identified in the popular mind with the old Qadiriyya establishment.
While this perception has been less true since the assassination of the Sardauna
Ahmadu Bello in the first coup of 1966, the JNI is still seen by many as the
voice of the Qadiriyya establishment and may be seen as a quasi official actor
being largely controlled by the traditional rulers. It works closely with the
federal and various state governments, even now to approve textbooks for
Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) classes in the public schools, and it engage
in various Islamic da'awa (propagation) by supporting a network of activists
across the northern Nigeria.
To a large extent JNI had played the role of Northern Nigeria Muslims’
spokesperson in the 1960s and 1970s. This could not be sustained in later years,
due to the proliferation of so many Islamic organisations. Some of its objectives
include (i) propagating the principles of Islam to win adherents, (ii) reviving
and maintaining Islamic moralities among Muslims and encouraging intellectual
religious activities, (iii) promoting good relationships among Nigerian Muslims
and Muslims worldwide, and (iv), establishing and running schools to propagate
Islam and the Arabic language. JNI also provides relief materials to disaster
victims, holds regular consultation with Islamic and Christian organizations to
avert crisis and carries out advocacies in the area of conflict management and
making health programmes acceptable to Muslims especially with respect to
HIV test before marriage and child immunisation.
190
See, Allan Christelow, Islamic Law and Judicial Practice in Nigeria: An Historical Perspective, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 22, 2002. See also, M. Sani Umar, Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of
Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule, Leiden, 2005.
191
Ahmadu Bello later said he was told in very clear terms that the region would never be able to attract the
foreign investment it needed for development, unless it amended its laws in accordance with Western
principles of justice.
Page | 58

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Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nige

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