US-led alliance expansion is over.

Russia wants an
iron-clad deal to stop NATO
theprint.in/opinion/us-led-alliance-expansion-is-over-russia-wants-an-iron-clad-deal-to-stop-nato/822079

February 5, 2022

After submitting to five rounds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
expansion between 1997 and 2020, Russia has finally thrown down the gauntlet to the
United States (US). Declaring Russia’s endgame, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
in early January 2022 bluntly remarked, “We don’t trust the other side … we need iron
clad legally binding guarantees” that Ukraine and Georgia will “never ever” become
members of the NATO.

It has been asked why has Russia decided to make a big deal about the NATO now? The
simplest answer is that any further enlargement of the US-led alliance would bring it to
within literally marching distance of the Russian heartland. The NATO troops are today
deployed within 100 miles of Saint Petersburg. Throughout the Russian history, except for
the brief conflicts with Japan and China in the Far East, the main threat to Russia’s
security—and on at least two occasions, its very survival as a state and civilisation—has
emanated from the heart of Europe. Although on each occasion Russia repulsed those
threats and ultimately emerged victorious, the costs in blood and treasure were
astoundingly high. Haunted by this history, creating a periphery zone of states friendly to
Russia, or at the very least not aligned against it, has therefore always attracted its leaders
as a safeguard against external meddling and aggression.

During the Cold War, this buffer zone was the natural culmination of the Soviet war effort
against the Third Reich. As the Nazi war machine was pushed 1,000 miles back from its
massive ingress into Russia, the Red Army soon found itself as the only liberating force

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across a large swathe of territory in Eastern and Central Europe. When the guns fell silent
in May 1945, Soviet armies held sway over at least seven European states, including much
of Germany. The Kremlin vowed to never allow the repeat of the horrific 28 million Soviet
casualties suffered during World War II.

Also read: Biden scours globe so Europe can get natural gas if Russia invades Ukraine

Belied Assurances on the NATO Expansion

The end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany—previously divided between
the US and Soviet spheres of influence—was based on a pledge that the NATO would not
exploit the political–military vacuum in Eastern Europe after the retrenchment of the Red
Army. The broader theme during those critical negotiations with the Soviet leadership in
1990 was that the West would strive to create an inclusive pan-European architecture
with a transformation of the NATO into a far less militarised organisation with a more
political orientation. It was this unambiguous assurance from the Western policymakers
that persuaded the Soviet leadership to enable and support the peaceful political
transitions in Europe.

We now know from declassified records that the Western policymakers went out of their
way to assuage deep apprehensions and fears among Soviet leaders on the NATO’s role in
the post-Cold War era. It is worth recalling some of these instances because they continue
to shape Russian attitudes on how Moscow was misled about the NATO’s role in the post-
Cold War era.

As early as January 1990, West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in a

major speech, remarked that

the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an
“impairment of Soviet security interests.” Therefore, the NATO should rule out an
“expansion of its territory towards the east, that is, moving it closer to the Soviet
borders.”

In his conversation, a few days later, with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd,
Genscher said, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish
Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join the NATO the next.”

The US policymakers then proceeded to directly reassure the Soviets. In a now famous
meeting between the US secretary of state James Baker and Soviet supremo Mikhail
Gorbachev, Baker notes:

“The President (Bush) and I have made clear that we seek no unilateral advantage” in
the process of German unification. “We understand the need for assurances to the
countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of

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the NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one
inch to the east.” Gorbachev: “It goes without saying that a broadening of
the NATO zone is not acceptable. Baker: We agree with that.”

The extent of Soviet apprehension on the NATO is also apparent from Gorbachev’s
remarks to Douglas Hurd in April 1990. Gorbachev spoke “about a common dialogue
about a new Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals,” as “one way of dealing with
the German issue.” A unilateral process, on the other hand, that is, a united Germany in
the NATO would find few takers in the Soviet leadership.

If a united Germany was going to be incorporated into the NATO, why accelerate the
process of reducing Soviet armed forces? That could upset the balance of security, which
would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

A few experts warned Gorbachev not to be blissfully naпve about the US intentions. A
memorandum from the Soviet Central Committee’s senior-most expert on Germany
foretells the story that would unfold later:

The West is outplaying us, promising to respect the interests of the USSR, but in
practice, step by step, separating us from “traditional Europe” … Instead of a stable
Europe with a guaranteed peaceful future and mutually beneficial cooperation in a
variety of spheres, the apologists of the “Cold War” are imposing … a regrouping of
forces in order to prolong the era of confrontational politics.6

One of the clearest insights into the Soviet thinking on pan-European collective security,
including Gorbachev’s idea of having a multi-aligned Germany, is reflected in his
conversation with the US President George H W Bush in May 1990.

Bush: the NATO is the anchor of stability.

Gorbachev: But two anchors are better. As a seaman, you should be able to understand
it.

Bush: And where will we find the second anchor?

Gorbachev: In the East … It is possible that the NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WTO) will
continue to exist in some form during a longer period of time than we can imagine it
now. (They) could conclude some kind of agreement, accounting for the creation of
united Germany and the metamorphoses of their own organisations as well. At the same
time, there would be an option of an associated [simultaneous] membership in
the WTO and the NATO. Because if we want to put an end to the split of the continent
once and forever, then the military–political structures too should be synchronised in
accordance with the unifying tendencies of the all-European process …

I hope nobody here believes in the nonsense that one of the sides won the victory in the
Cold War. Thoughts like these just glide on the surface grasping only the tip of the
iceberg. The conclusion must be completely different: 50 years of confrontation have
proven its absurdity and that it only leads to self-destruction … Now about trust. You

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assert that we do not trust the Germans. But then why would we give the green light to
their aspiration to unification. We could have given them the red light, we had
appropriate mechanisms. However, we gave them the opportunity to make their choice
by democratic means. You, on the other hand, are saying that you trust the FRG, but you
are pulling her into the NATO, not allowing her to determine her future on her own after
the final settlement. Let her decide on her own what alliance she wants to belong to.7

In the event, with the US driving the agenda and events unfolding too rapidly for Moscow
to control, Gorbachev finally agreed to the unification of Germany in July 1990, armed
only with assurances but no concrete guarantees or a security treaty on
the NATO’s future. In the following year, the Soviet Union itself had disappeared from the
scene.

What followed—from the Russian perspective at least—was a brazen disregard of those

assurances as the US helped itself to the newly independent states of the erstwhile Soviet
bloc. In five waves of expansion since 1997, the NATO absorbed 14 states in Central and
Eastern Europe into the US-led alliance.

Also read: What’s NATO, and why does Ukraine want to join?

Resisting the NATO

Moscow’s pushback began in words and then in deeds in the 2000s, as Russia’s economy
and military gradually rebuilt itself. The 2008 Georgian conflict was the first major
intervention by Russia to counteract perceived NATO’s meddling in a key state in the
South Caucasus. Although Tbilisi’s effective chances of entering the alliance plummeted
after 2008—today a large number of Russian peacekeepers are permanently deployed
inside the Georgian territory on provinces that Russia has recognised as independent—
the US shrugged off the setback.

Ukraine became the next main target in the 2014 revolution or a US-supported coup
d’état, depending on whether it is the US or Russia describing the dramatic regime change
in Kiev. Again, events followed a similar pattern. Moscow promptly intervened in eastern
Ukraine that is populated with mainly ethnic Russians, as well as rapidly secured the
strategically located Crimean Peninsula. Crimea was subsequently absorbed into the
Russian Federation after a referendum among its predominantly Russian population. In
short, another NATO target was on the verge of disintegration. Today, the ceasefire or
contact line that runs across Ukraine is ultimately unwritten by the Russian military.

Despite these coercive actions, the US policy seemed stubbornly impervious to change.
Since 2014, the US adopted tough sanctions on the Russian economy and doubled-down
on the NATO. Since Ukraine’s membership became unviable in the near term, military
linkages were pursued bilaterally, with the US and the UK leading the Western effort to
shore up Kiev as a frontline state.

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Although Ukraine has remained a thorn in the US–Russia ties, in 2021, timed with a new
administration in Washington and troubling political changes in Kiev, Moscow began a
fresh military build-up near Ukraine’s border. The disposition of forces, including
advanced offensive weaponry and ground forces, suggested Russia was once again raising
the stakes. In May 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted how

Ukraine is being turned, slowly but steadily, into an antipode of Russia, an anti-Russia
… and our Western partners have not batted an eyelid, or have even supported these
decisions.

The Biden White House responded by initiating a summit with Putin in the summer at
Geneva. In substance, however, little changed. Washington did not rethink its
confrontation with Russia. Since 2014, the US has committed $2.7 billion in security
assistance to Ukraine, with $650 million in 2021. In August 2021, the US signed a
Strategic Defense Framework agreement with Ukraine aimed at “bilateral security
cooperation and US assistance that effectively helps Ukraine to counter Russian
aggression, including through a robust training and exercise program.” In September
2021, in a publicised meeting at the White House, Biden told Ukraine President
Volodymyr Zelensky,

The US remains firmly committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in

the face of Russian aggression and our support for Ukraine’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations.

Having failed to get Washington to respond to the Russian signals, Moscow began
another round of military deployments aimed at concentrating a large combined-arms
combat force of over 1,00,000 troops to Ukraine’s north, east, and south capable of
undertaking a wide range of interventions in Ukraine. It is widely accepted, including by
the US policymakers, that Russia holds an overwhelming military superiority over
Ukraine even after accounting for the limited US commitment and military support to
Kiev.

We do not need to read any tea leaves to discern Russia’s paramount goal. In a series of
pronouncements and press statements by Putin, the foreign minister Sergei Lavrov as
well as other senior officials, Russia has articulated a series of demands, all aimed at
resetting the security architecture in Europe. Moscow has also proposed two agreements
to the US and the NATO outlining the essence of its thinking. In its draft agreement to
the US, Russia has urged cooperation “on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and
undiminished security.” The most pertinent section is Article 4,

The US shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the NATO and deny
accession to the Alliance to the States of the former USSR. The US shall not establish
military bases in the territory of the states of the former USSR that are not members of
the NATO, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral
military cooperation with them.

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In a second draft document to the NATO and also intended for the European audiences,
Russia has asked for the rollback of military forces and weaponry deployed by
the NATO after 1997 in Eastern Europe and the Baltics (Article 4). Article 6 again spells
out the central iss9ue of the NATO’s expansion,

All member States of the NATO commit themselves to refrain from any further
enlargement of the NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.

So, together, through these treaties Russians are calling for a fresh approach to Europe’s
security architecture upon which they believe to hold significant leverage and influence
similar to the US. As Russia’s red lines are being debated, what is clear is that any further
expansion of the NATO in Eastern Europe or the US or its members’ bilateral military
assistance to Ukraine, particularly on the development of offensive weapon systems,
would almost certainly invite a retaliatory response. The formal US written reply to the
Russian draft agreements has sidestepped all the central issues outlined by Moscow,
which means the crisis remains at a serious impasse.

Also read: Stopping Putin means hitting him where it really hurts

Kennan’s warning

The perils of the NATO expansion and the creation of an enemy out of the post-Cold War
Russia was predicted, ironically, by none other that the principal author of the Cold War
containment doctrine, George F Kennan, who warned that it would be a “strategic blunder
of potentially epic proportions.” the NATO expansion, Kennan wrote in 1997,

would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post-Cold War era. Such a
decision may be expected … to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to
our liking.

As we have seen, the system of collective security in Europe after the Cold War developed
at the expense of Russia. History attests, as Dmitry Trenin eloquently sums it up,

if a large, defeated power has not been incorporated into the post-war order, or if it has
not been offered a place in it that it finds acceptable, then over time it will begin to take
action aimed at destroying that order or, at the very least, significantly altering it.

Europe finds itself at this juncture today.

The US and the NATO’s exorbitantly overgrown ambitions have led to the creation of
commitments in Eastern Europe that might not be worth the paper they are written on. It
would not be an exaggeration to claim that the Russian geostrategy over the past decade
has contributed profoundly to the end of the unipolar age.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is an adjunct fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and
the author of Powershift: India-China Relations in a Multipolar World. He tweets
@Z_DauletSingh. Views are personal.

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This article was first published by the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW). It has been
reproduced here with permission.

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