Facility Siting Guideline

GUIDELINES FOR
FACILITY SITING
AND LAYOUT
Center for Chemical Process Safety

of the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
3 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10016-5991
Copyright © 2003
American Institute of Chemical Enginers
3 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016-5991
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use is prohibited without prior express written consent of the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers. To obtain appropriate license and permission for such use contact Scott Berger,
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CCPS Publication Number G-84
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Library of Congress Data Applied for
ISBN 0-8169--0899-0
It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this volume will lead to an even more impressive
safety record for the entire industry. However, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its
consultants, CCPS Subcommittee members, their employers, and their employers’ officers and directors
and Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants Cheryl A. Grounds and Joseph R. Natale disclaim making or
giving any warranties or representations, express or implied, including with respect to fitness, intended
purpose, use or merchantability, and/or correctness or accuracy of the content of the information
presented in this document. As between (1) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants,
CCPS Subcommittee members, their employers, and their employers’ officers and directors and Baker
Engineering and Risk Consultants Cheryl A. Grounds and Joseph R. Natale (2) the user of this document
accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequences of its use or misuse.
This book is available at a special discount when ordered in

bulk quantities. For information, contact the Center for
Chemical Process Safety at the address shown above.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xi
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Objectives 1
1.2. How To Use This Book 2
1.3. Layers of Safety 4
1.4. References 6
2
MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW
2.1. Implications of Siting and Layout 7
2.2. Management of Risks 8
2.3. Basis for Facility Siting and Layout 8
2.4. Changing World 10
3
PREPARING FOR THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS
3.1. Project Description 14
3.2. Assembling a Site Selection Team 16
3.3. Preliminary Site Size Determination 19
3.4. Preliminary Hazard Screening 20
3.5. Guidelines for the Survey and Data Collection Effort 26
3.6. Environmental Control Issues 29
v
vi Contents
4
SITE SURVEY AND SELECTION
4.1. Information Required to Select a Site 33
4.2. Transportation Issues 39
4.3. Utilities 44
4.4. Electrical and Communications Systems 47
4.5. Environmental Controls 49
4.6. Fire, Safety, and Security 51
4.7. Site Features 53
4.8. Multi-Chapter Example 55
5
SITE AND PLANT LAYOUT
5.1. General 64
5.2. The Site 66
5.3. Block Layout Methodology 71
5.4. Spacing Tables 72
5.5. Utilities 74
5.6. Electrical and Control Facilities 80
5.7. Process 82
5.8. Outside Battery Limits (OSBL) 85
5.9. Tank Storage 92
5.10. Occupied and Critical Structures 94
6
EQUIPMENT LAYOUT AND SPACING
6.1. Spacing Tables 101
6.2. General 103
6.3. Single- and Multilevel Structures 104
6.4. Enclosed Process Units 105
6.5. Layout and Spacing to Minimize
Vapor Cloud Explosion Effects 105
Contents vii
6.6. Relative Location of Equipment 106

6.7. Equipment with Air Intakes 107
6.8. Equipment-to-Equipment Separation Distances 108
7
OPTIMIZE THE LAYOUT
7.1. Layout Method Review 121
7.2. Layout Issues Resolution 123
7.3. The Right Answer 125
8
CASE HISTORIES 127
APPENDIX A. TYPICAL SPACING TABLES 139
APPENDIX B. SITE SELECTION DATA REQUIREMENT LIST 151
REFERENCES 179
GLOSSARY 183
INDEX 191
Preface
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) The Center for Chemical Pro-
cess Safety (CCPS) was established in 1985 by the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers for the express purpose of assisting industry in avoiding
or mitigating catastrophic chemical accidents. To achieve this goal, CCPS
has focused its work on four areas:
• Establishing and publishing the latest scientific, engineering and
management practices for prevention and mitigation of incidents
involving toxic, flammable, and/or reactive materials
• Encouraging the use of such information by dissemination through
publications, seminars, symposia, and continuing education pro-
grams for engineers
• Advancing the state of the art in engineering practices and technical
management through research in prevention and mitigation of cata-
strophic events
• Developing and encouraging the use of undergraduate engineering
curricula that will improve the safety knowledge and consciousness of
engineers
This book outlines a process for finding an optimal location for a chemi-
cal or petroleum processing site and then arranging the units and equip-
ment. It provides comprehensive guidelines on how to select a site, how to
recognize and assess long-term risks, and how to lay out the facilities and
equipment within that site. A survey guide is provided to aid site selection
teams in obtaining necessary data to select a new site. Site layout and equip-
ment spacing guidelines are provided based on historical and current data
including industry practices and standards. Spacing tables are provided
which can be used as a starting point in laying out a site. Case histories and
examples are included to illustrate both the appropriate manner in which to
address facility siting and layout as well as the consequences when the effort
is inadequate.
ix
Acknowledgments
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers and the Center for Chemical
Process Safety express their gratitude to all the members of the Facility
Siting and Layout Subcommittee for their generous efforts and valuable
technical contributions in the preparation of this Guidelines book.
Chairs:
Ephraim A. Scheier BP America, Inc.
Frank Worley, III Rohm & Haas Company
Authors:
Cheryl A. Grounds Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants
Joseph R. Natale Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants
CCPS Staff Consultant:

John A. Davenport
Subcommittee Members:
John A. Alderman RRS Engineering
Richard L. Alexander, Jr. formerly with Solutia
Michael P. Broadribb BP America
Chris R. Buchwald ExxonMobil
Christopher P. Devlin Celanese Chemicals Division
Brian R. Dunbobbin Air Products & Chemicals
Rodger Ewbank Rhodia
William Hague Honeywell Specialty Chemicals
Andrew P. Hart Nova Chemicals
John Marshall Dow Chemical
Michael D. Moosemiller formerly with Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
Henry Ozog ioMosaic Corporation
xi
xii Acknowledgments
Vanessa E Rodriguez US Environmental Protection Agency

John R Sharland FM Global
William E. Thornberg formerly with GE Global Asset
Protection Services
Tracy Whipple formerly with Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
Before publication, all CCPS books are subjected to a through peer review
process. CCPS also gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and
suggestions of the peer reviewers.
Don Connolley Akzo Nobel Chemicals Inc.

Kieran J. Glynn British Petroleum
Hal Johnson ConocoPhillips
Neal W Johnson ConocoPhillips
Neil Macnaughton British Petroleum
Jack McCavit Celanese
Lisa Morrison NOVA Chemicals, Inc.
Tim Overton Dow Chemical Company
Phil Partridge Dow Chemical Company
Janet L. Rose Bayer Polymers LLC
Scott Schiller ConocoPhillips
Orville M. Slye, Jr., PE Loss Control Associates
Anthony Thompson Monsanto Company
Jan Windhorst Nova Chemicals, Inc.
Jeff Yuill Starr Technical Risks Agency, Inc
1 Introduction
1.1. Objectives
The cost, complexity, and safety of process operation and maintenance is

highly dependent on site location and layout. Building inherent safety into a
site generally reduces both the cost and complexity. Siting and layout are
among the earliest steps in design, and are quite costly to modify once the
site is constructed. Optimum siting and layout minimizes material and con-
struction costs, but more importantly, minimizes the risk of losses through-
out the site’s life cycle.
What principles do you use to decide on the location and layout of a new
or expanded site? What information do you need to consider before selecting
a site location? How do you maximize inherently safer design with minimal
impact on cost and schedule? How do you manage siting issues when limited
space is available? How to you address security concerns in a new site?
This book addresses siting and layout in terms of the overall process of
finding an optimal location for the site and then arranging the units and
equipment. It provides comprehensive guidelines on how to select a site,
how to recognize and assess long-term risks, and how to lay out the facilities
and equipment within that site. Site layout and equipment spacing guidelines
are provided based on current industry practices and standards.
This book is applicable to the following types of facilities.
• Large and small.
• Petroleum and chemical facilities and other industries using petro-
leum or chemical products
• Within and outside of the US.
• Grassroots sites, brownfield sites, and expansions within a site.
• Open air sites
• Processes enclosed in a building (in terms of siting the building, not in
terms of process equipment layout inside of the building)
1
2 Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout
The objectives of these guidelines are to provide guidance on the follow-

ing points.
• Approaching siting and layout from a safety perspective
• Assembling a site selection team, compiling the issues they need to
consider, and determining what data they should collect (This infor-
mation is needed for selecting a location for a new grassroots site, a
brownfield site, or an expansion within a site.)
• Balancing infrastructure, environmental, security, population, and
process risk considerations with each other in the site selection pro-
cess.
• Anticipating outside factors that may affect the project cost and
schedule.
• Fitting a new expansion within an existing unit and compensating for
limited spacing by taking risk mitigation measures.
• Maximizing inherently safer design in siting and layout by gathering
data and conducting hazard analysis in the conceptual design and
layout stages of the site design.
• Maximizing ease of operations and maintenance as well as minimiz-
ing operating and maintenance risks to personnel and the surround-
ing site through layout and equipment spacing.
This book will benefit anyone responsible for making or advising on
siting decisions. Project developers will find the information they need to
collect and/or develop in order to select a site. Planners and those who eval-
uate the economic justification for a site will learn of the potential safety and
risk impacts of siting decisions. Designers and engineers will appreciate the
technical details included in specifics given on plant and equipment layout
and spacing.
1.2. How To Use This Book
This book may be considered the starting point for establishing the criteria
needed to make decisions on the location of a grass roots site or new unit
within an existing site, as well as the basic equipment layout and spacing
within the site. This book discusses the sequential steps taken in this process
as outlined in Figure. 1-1.
1 Introduction 3
Figure 1-1. Guidelines Book Flowchart
It is important to use consistent vocabulary when discussing the compo-

nents and subcomponents of a process complex. Figure 1-2 shows the ter-
minology used in this book.
A unit is a collection of process and/or manufacturing equipment that is
focused on a single operation. For example, a refrigeration unit supplying a
frozen food plant, a crude distillation unit, a water treating unit chlorinating
waste-water effluent from a waste disposal facility, a polyethylene unit, or a
batch reactor train.
A plant is a collection of process units with similar process parameters
or related by feeding or taking feed from each other. For example, a fuels
plant which produces materials for blending gasoline, a lubricating oil blend-
ing plant, a tank farm area supporting a refinery, chemical site or both, a
wharf receiving raw materials and loading products, a polypropylene pro-
cessing and plastic pellet silo storage area, a pipeline pumping station.
A site is a collection of plants typically owned by a single entity. A site
may have its own support facilities or share them with another site. Support
facilities may include parking, offices, maintenance, and warehousing facili-
ties, firehouse, medical, transportation, and security facilities. Examples of
Figure 1-2 . Guidelines Terminology
a site may include a petroleum refinery, or a manufacturing facility that pro-

duces a variety of products such as paints, synthetic rubbers for tire manu-
facturing, or petrochemicals.
A complex is a collection of sites that may or may not be owned by the
same business entity. A site within a complex may feed or take feed from
another site within the same complex or be totally independent.
This book provides a selection of examples throughout the text and case
histories in Chapter 8. These case histories and examples serve to illustrate
both the appropriate manner in which to address facility siting and layout as
well as the consequences when the effort is inadequate. These case histories
include actual events, scenarios based on real events but modified to
emphasize a point, and purely illustrative examples.
1.3. Layers of Safety
Siting and layout provide a fundamental aspect of risk management. It sepa-

rates sources of potential fire, explosion, or toxic incidents from adjacent
areas that might become involved in the incident or be harmed by its poten-
tial consequences. This is also a key component in inherently safer design.
1 Introduction 5
Inherently safer strategies can impact a potential incident at various

stages. The most effective strategy will prevent initiation of the incident.
Inherently safer design can also reduce the potential for an incident to esca-
late. Lastly, an inherently safer strategy can limit the incident sequence
before there are major impacts on people, property, or the environment.
(CCPS, 1996, no. 23)
There are many challenges to the ability to site and lay out a plant as will
be discussed in these guidelines. Layers of safety are utilized to compensate
for less than desired spacing and to implement additional aspects of inher-
ently safer design. This use of layers of safety or layers of protection is a tra-
ditional risk management approach and is illustrated in Figure 1-3. These
layers may include the inherently safer strategies of preventing the incident,
minimizing escalation, and minimizing impact. The layers may include using
a less hazardous process, separation distances, operator supervision, con-
trol systems, alarms, interlocks, physical protection devices, and emergency
response systems (CCPS, 2001).
Consider layers from inside to outside following inherently safer concepts:
1. Process design
2. Separation distance
3. Safety and process devices, instruments, alarms, and controls
4. Administrative processes and controls
Figure 1-3. Layers of Safety

1.4. References
1.4.1. CCPS Publications
Where appropriate, reference is made to other CCPS books for additional
guidelines and methodology for specific applications. The most relevant
CCPS Publications are listed here.
Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and Fires.
Chapter 5 provides general guidance on locating buildings within the site with
relation to other facilities (CCPS, 1996, no. 22).
Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment and Guidelines for
Hazard Evaluation Procedures provide additional guidance on conducting risk
assessments. Risk assessment may be applied in many siting decisions (CCPS,
2000 and CCPS, 1992).
Inherently Safer Chemical Processes—A Life Cycle Approach discusses inherently
safer design (CCPS, 1996, no. 23).
Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment describes layer of
protection analysis (CCPS, 2001).
Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical
Sites describes security measures and analysis techniques (CCPS, 2002).
Guidelines for Fire Protection in Chemical, Petrochemical, and Hydrocarbon Process-
ing Facilities describes fire protection measures that may be applied to the site
and the equipment on the site (CCPS, 2003, no.29).
1.4.2. Other References

Where appropriate, this book references pertinent American Petroleum
Institute (API) Practices, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes,
and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Codes. References
are generally made to US codes and practices; recognizing that when the site
is located outside the United States, there may be non-US codes and regula-
tions that override the references in this book. A complete list of all refer-
enced industry practices, including applicable CCPS books, is included in the
References at the end of this book.
2 Management Overview
Example
In 1969, the site started to produce the pesticide SEVIN. Methyl isocyanate
(MIC), an intermediate chemical, was imported from another location. In
the late 1970s, the site added a MIC production unit. [Originally] the site
was located approximately 3–4 miles outside the city center. At the time of
the incident, the site employed 630 people. The city had a population of
900,000 people with a community of squatters situated immediately out-
side of the site boundary. Just after midnight there was an accidental
release of approximately 40 metric tons of MIC into the atmosphere. Thou-
sands of people lost their lives, hundreds of thousands were injured, and
significant damage was done to livestock and crops. The plant was located
in Bhopal, India.
[Reproduced with the permission of the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investiga-
tion Board, CSB, 1999.]
Lesson
The siting of a new facility and the purchase of surrounding land to control
community encroachment is critical to risk management.
2.1. Implications of Siting and Layout

Appropriate siting and layout establishes a foundation for a safe and secure
site. A site that is well laid out will have a lower risk level than a poorly laid
out site. The potential for toxic impacts, fire escalation, and explosion
damage will be lower. The risk to personnel and the surrounding community
will be reduced. Additionally, maintenance will be easier and safer to per-
form. However, these benefits do not come without associated costs. Sepa-
ration distances translate to real estate that costs money. Tradeoffs between
initial capital investment, life cycle costs, and risk reduction are inherent in
siting and layout decisions.
7
2.2. Management of Risks
Consideration of siting and layout is an important aspect of risk manage-

ment. Managers must address several types of business risks, including the
risks from costly potential incidents. The approach in this book is to find a
site location and layout that will minimize risk to site and community person-
nel and property while maximizing the ease of safe operation and mainte-
nance. This approach may reduce the total life cycle cost. The guidance in
this book is aimed at maximizing the use of inherently safer strategies in the
design to build in safety and risk reduction.
Inherently safer design strategies may prevent initiation of an incident,
reduce the potential for incident escalation, and limit the incident conse-
quence before there are major impacts on people, property, or the environ-
ment (CCPS, 1996, no. 23). Appropriate siting and layout separates sources
of potential fire, explosion, or toxic incidents from adjacent areas that might
become involved in the incident or be harmed by its potential consequences.
Thus, siting and layout not only provide for a fundamental aspect of risk
management but are also key components in inherently safer design.
The many challenges associated with plant siting and layout are dis-
cussed in this book. Layers of safety are utilized to compensate for less than
desired spacing and to implement additional aspects of inherently safer
design. This use of layers of safety or layers of protection is a traditional risk
management approach and is illustrated in Figure 1-3. These layers include
the inherently safer strategies of preventing the incident, minimizing escala-
tion, and minimizing impact. The layers may include using a less hazardous
process, separation distances, operator supervision, control systems,
alarms, interlocks, physical protection devices, and emergency response
systems. Although safety protective systems are often necessary, they are
less reliable and more costly to maintain than the protection afforded by
inherently safer design strategies (CCPS, 2001).
2.3. Basis for Facility Siting and Layout
Building a new site or adding equipment to an existing one is often an excit-

ing, but daunting, proposition. If it is done well, capital is well invested, goals
are met, and the future looks promising. If it is done poorly, money may be
wasted, goals unachieved, and the future could be unwittingly compromised.
2 Management Overview 9
In designing and building a project, the difference between these two out-
comes is greatly influenced by consideration of siting, layout, and other
inherently safer design concepts early in the project evolution. If these fun-
damental issues are addressed too late, costly changes may be required,
opportunities for cost-effective protection may be unrecognized, and the
new site could actually increase company liability. The importance of timely
consideration of inherently safer principles is depicted in Figure 2-1.
Application of inherently safer design concepts to the design and layout
can identify the need for process modifications or alternative site arrange-
ments. The solution may cost more initially (more infrastructure, more land,
longer piping runs, and greater unit spacing); however, life cycle costs will be
lower. Some savings are realized through reduced losses due to potential fires,
explosions, or toxic releases. In addition there will be savings resulting from
lower costs for managing risk (fewer protection systems requiring mainte-
nance, ease of maintenance, ease of operations, and lower insurance costs).
Figure 2-1. Safety in Project Development

Figure 2-2. Guidelines Book Flowchart
It is helpful to follow a sequential process to site and lay out a new pro-
ject. This process is illustrated in Figure 2-2. This book will discuss and
follow this sequential process.
1. First a team should be assembled to determine what issues need to
be considered and what data to collect. This may seem obvious and
experience shows that the effort spent in selecting a team with the
right credentials for a specific project assures a more thorough
assessment of the sites under evaluation and will pay-off in the end.
Environmental, population, and process risk considerations must be
balanced with each other and costs in the site selection process.
Also, outside factors that may affect the project cost and schedule
should be anticipated.
2. Once the site is chosen, the various components of the plant can be
located with respect to each other. Issues such as topography, wind
direction, and process risk come into play. Fitting a new expansion
within an existing unit is often a challenge and may require additional
fire protection or other safeguards due to space limitation.
2 Management Overview 11
3. Finally, the individual unit equipment can be laid out. Equipment

spacing should maximize ease of operations and maintenance
thereby minimizing operating and maintenance risks to personnel
and the surroundings. This spacing will also aid in minimizing con-
gestion, which will reduce potential explosion overpressures. Site
security should be considered. Site layout and typical equipment
spacing guidelines are provided based on current industry practices
and standards.
2.4. Changing World
Societies increasingly demand higher standards for processing sites. These

standards include cleaner effluents and greater assurances of a safe opera-
tion. The demands for higher standards will continue resulting in the benefits
of a new or modified site being weighed against the risks to the community.
One must also be aware that attitudes to risk change with time. What
may be acceptable to a neighboring community today may be undesirable
tomorrow. Periodic review of risk tolerability is necessary as the technology
advances, the process changes, the site expands, the regulations change,
and the surroundings outside the fence change. Increased spacing provides
better flexibility as future demands evolve.
A damaging incident lowers the credibility of the engineering that went
into building the plant. It is worth investing a little more time and money up
front to proactively incorporate greater risk reduction measures into the
design than current regulations, codes, and standards identify, to ensure the
long-term viability of the facility.
3 Preparing for the Site Selection
Process
There is never any substitute for good planning and preparation when taking
on any complex task. Site selection is a very complex process fraught with
many unknowns and concerns that are difficult to resolve. From a safety per-
spective, choosing a site that is not adequately sized or where the impact on
adjacent sensitive neighboring sites has not been determined may result in
additional prevention or mitigation measures being required. These mea-
sures generally include the need for expensive, maintenance-intensive, and
attention-demanding protective systems to counter potential exposure
risks. This additional expense may have been avoided by an alternate loca-
tion or by a larger site. Thinking ahead about potential issues of concern and
identifying the information you need to develop before the site selection pro-
cess begins is a very cost effective effort.
What are we trying to achieve in the preparation phase of the site selec-
tion process?
Our objectives include the following:
• Identify, early on, issues associated with each site under consider-
ation that may become a concern later in design or operation;
• Collect critical information necessary to make decisions regarding the
location, size and layout of a site; and
• Ensure maximum opportunity to incorporate the principles of inher-
ently safer design and layout of a new or expanded site with minimal
impact on project cost and schedule.
This chapter provides guidance and discussion on a number of issues to
consider in preparing for the site selection process. It is presented as a list
addressing the objectives above. Guidance is provided on information to col-
lect or develop and where to find the information. Guidance is also provided
on how the collected information is likely to be used during the permitting,
design, construction, and future operation of the site.
The content is comprehensive and applicable worldwide. Much of the
information discussed will not necessarily be needed for all types of projects.
13
The information obtained using these guidelines should be sufficient to allow

feasibility or scoping studies for budget estimates and to anticipate potential
major downstream impacts on a project.
This chapter deals with the following steps listed in sequence:
1. Describe the new site and planned uses for the site
2. Define the team of experts needed to assess potential sites
3. Decide on the site size (How much land area do I need?)
4. List information required to assess the location with respect to
neighboring sites, e.g., preliminary hazard analysis
5. List information required prior to site surveys
6. Detail environmental considerations at pre-site selection stage
3.1. Project Description
A project description is needed to guide the selection teams. This will pro-
vide the information that will be needed in evaluating a potential site or sites.
This document should include as much information as is known and specifics
on what is desired at the new site. The following is a suggested content for
the project description:
• Project scope:
—What is the purpose of the new plant or facility?
—Who and where are key customers for the products?
—Who and where are the key suppliers for feed stocks?
—What is the planned level of staffing for operation and maintenance
of the site? Are specialized outsourced maintenance and/or
inspection skills required?
—What are the primary considerations for the anticipated sites
including locations, contacts, potential consultants, security con-
cerns, permit requirements, and climate conditions?
—Is a future expansion being considered? Should site selection antic-
ipate additional land for expansions or future facilities? Could the
same site and equipment be utilized for a new process involving
different chemicals and reactions?
• General site location information:
—Are qualified operations and maintenance staff available in the
region?
3 Preparing for the Site Selection Process 15
—Will the site be shared with another operation? If so, with whom?
List other shared or owned operations, staff, and/or facilities on
the new site (office buildings, day care facilities, warehousing, stor-
age facilities, utilities, security staff, maintenance staff, site man-
agement staff, and emergency response staff and equipment).
—What specific infrastructure is desired at the potential sites (e.g.,
are marine facilities required; is it intended that the site will pur-
chase power or is power generation a consideration; utilities, rail,
and roads)?
—Are there known security risks in the region (adversary character-
ization)?
—What is the availability of external firefighting resources and
mutual aid?
—Is there land surrounding the site to allow purchase of, or control
of, that land to provide a buffer zone?
—If the new plant is to be built on an existing site, what field data may
already be available to minimize the data collection effort?
—In what language is the local workforce fluent?
—What languages are used in communication and design documen-
tation?
—What standard system of units and measures should be used?
—What is the earthquake zone in the area?
—Is the area subject to hurricanes or typhoons or other severe
weather conditions?
• Detailed description of the plant and processes:
—List raw materials used, and intermediates and products made,
including any alternative raw materials, catalysts, or additives that
may be considered.
—Identify fundamental hazards of materials and products: e.g.,
flammability and toxicity.
—Tabulate production rates, expected inventory levels, and maxi-
mum hazardous material inventory levels.
—List known process technologies that will be employed. Are propri-
etary technologies planned or under consideration?
—Define the automation level that is envisioned. Will the plant be fully
automated versus manual? (This will affect spacing and layout.)
—Describe the means of feedstock and product transportation (truck,

rail, ship, pipeline, by company owned means or contract). List
cargo sizes and frequencies of shipments in and out of the site
—List the design concepts employed in developing the process that
may affect the layout and spacing of the site, i.e., enclosed loading
vs. outside loading.
—Identify the turnaround philosophy (shuts down once every two years,
or continued operation with individual process shutdowns as required).
—Identify the expected life of the plant (10 year, 20 year, or other).
—Identify the desired on-stream factor.
—Identify requirements for waste disposal.
• Points of special interest to include:
—Known process safety hazards associated with the process includ-
ing any past incidents from similar facilities.
—Regulatory issues associated with the chemicals.
—Experience at other similar facilities with community concerns or
productivity issues (e.g., noise, odors, traffic issues, or high per-
sonnel turnover).
—Special security or design measures required at the site due to the
materials used or produced (explosives, toxic agents, or precur-
sors to either), or to the proprietary nature of the site.
—Anticipated permitting concerns or environmental issues related to
the site construction and/or operation.
—Community concerns regarding potential site development or expansion.
—Activities at neighboring facilities that may impact on the new facility.
—Public infrastructure required such as an interstate interchange or
a railway bridge overpass.
—Potential environmental liability concerns associated with expan-
sion to existing or with former industrial sites.
The project description sets the stage for what the site survey team will
be looking for and what level of detail will be needed to select a site.
3.2. Assembling a Site Selection Team
Assemble a team to organize, collect and analyze data, develop information,

and conduct site surveys in order to form recommendations regarding the
selection of potential sites. The team make-up should provide the expertise
needed to meet the unique requirements for a specific type of plant as well
as a particular site location. The following is the type of expertise that may be
required for a specific site selection task:
• Knowledge of the types of plant and processes under consideration
for the new site
• Knowledge of site layout
• Knowledge of the specific areas where the new site is planned or
being considered
• Familiarity with the local language
• Familiarity with the local regulations
• Specialists (engineer, scientist, or other person with the appropriate
expertise):
—Marine design specialist who can evaluate potential sites along the
coast for deep water ports such as for Very Large Cargo Carrier
(VLCC) crude tanker access
—Environmental specialist who can evaluate wastewater, ground
water, and air issues.
—Civil specialist to evaluate sites with complex topography and soil
conditions
—Process safety or risk specialist who can assist with process safety
issues, on-site risk concerns, and off-site risk concerns.
—Security specialist who can assist in physical security consider-
ations.
This expertise may be from in-house resources or a third party consul-
tant firm. The following example demonstrates the team selection process.
Example
You are building a process site in an area where you have limited or no oper-
ations at present. Your team make-up includes a project engineer with
experience in the process operations, process safety engineer, security
expert, and a local manager with several years experience in the same state
but not with new construction. No one on the team has any experience with
local building officials or new construction regulations in the region where
the site is being evaluated. Your team needs local contacts and expertise.
Find someone within the company or hire a consultant that can help collect
and interpret the local regulations, and assist in preparing information
required for permitting. This expertise concerning the area, local govern-
ment, concerns that may exist regarding other industrial sites, and possibly
knowledge of useful contacts can save you much time and assure a faster
and more complete assessment of the site.
The new process site will require access to marine facilities for both
raw material import and product transfer. The new site will therefore be very
dependent on access to reliable marine facilities that meet the capacity
requirement for the new site. Your company has extensive marine facility
operating experience; however, there is no in-house expertise in marine
facility design or knowledge of the marine facilities in the area of the pro-
posed site. Utilize a marine engineering specialist to survey and evaluate
existing marine facilities for the team.
Lesson
Selecting a site involves consideration and analysis in many specialized
areas. Assure that the site selection team has the appropriate expertise to
evaluate the specialized needs required for that site.
Tasks like those described in the example may require hiring consultants
with specialized expertise. Two things to consider when identifying outside
resources:
• It is important to set aside adequate time to evaluate contractor
and/or consultant capabilities to assure your selection is a good fit for
the project.
• It is equally important to prepare a project description in sufficient detail
to assure the consultant understands the basis for his involvement and
exactly what his mission is in support of the site selection process.
This may seem obvious, but experience shows that the effort spent in
selecting a team with the right credentials for a specific project assures a more
thorough assessment of the sites under evaluation and will pay off in the end.
The site selection team should work to a schedule that allows enough time
to collect all data needed for the selection analysis. However, it is often not
possible to gather all the information desired in the time available at the site.
In this case, the team should develop a plan for acquiring the remaining data
at a later date. This follow-up plan needs to be considered in setting the time
schedule for the overall site selection process. In the case where a new plant
or facility is being located within an existing site, it may be beneficial to assign
a local company representative to forward information obtained at a later
date to the site selection team, or possibly have a local person on the team.
3.3. Preliminary Site Size Determination
Once the project description is written, a preliminary estimate can be made

for the size of the site to accommodate the facilities desired. Process plot
sizes may be based on similar existing process sites. However, when basing
a new design on an existing facility, one must consider the existing short-
comings in order to prevent repeating old mistakes. Many existing plants do
not have a layout to make them inherently safer. Preliminary plot sizes can
be estimated by the process licensor, engineering contractors, or in-house
engineering specialists that have experience in building similar processes.
An engineering and/or construction contractor can also estimate plot
sizes for other types of facilities, e.g., parking lots, buildings, warehouses,
storage tanks, and utility areas, if the task cannot be done in-house. Guide-
lines in Chapter 5 offer information regarding the typical spacing between
facilities and property lines.
As an example, if your site needs to contain one process area, offices,
and utilities, then a preliminary site size determination may result in a plot
area that looks like Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1. Preliminary Plot Area (1 ft equals 0.348 m; 1 acre equals 4074 m2 or
43,560 ft2)
This preliminary estimate provides an idea of the land area required to

fit all the facilities required on the site. Greater separation distances may be
employed to provide security clearances either inside or outside of the site
perimeter or to limit access to critical site areas.
3.4. Preliminary Hazard Screening
Identify and consider all potential exposures that may affect the location of a
new plant during the site selection phase. As stated in the last section, these
potential exposures may be to the new plant from an adjacent plant or from
the new plant to neighboring areas. The latter may include potential hazards
to community areas, other industrial sites, and/or environmentally sensitive
areas. Make an effort to ensure the location and land area chosen for the new
site is adequate to anticipate permitting, design, and layout concerns that
can arise later in the project.
A useful process for identifying the potential exposures to a new plant
from an adjacent hazard, or from the new plant to the surrounding area, is a
preliminary hazard screening. Early in the site selection process, it is not
necessary to conduct a detailed, costly risk assessment. A hazard screening
analysis will provide the information needed to determine if the site provides
adequate separation distance from neighboring areas. The preliminary
hazard screening analysis is based on the process data developed to-date
and the preliminary plot area.
In the preliminary hazard screening, focus on those events with the
potential for off-site consequences. The consequence analysis will identify
both on-site impacts and off-site impacts. The on-site events tend to drive
the spacing within units and plants. The off-site events tend to drive overall
layout and site selection. With the preliminary hazard screening as a basis,
the results will address the question at hand, which is whether the prelimi-
nary plot area is appropriately sized.
This preliminary hazard screening could show that the preliminary plot
area was a good estimate and only minor modifications are needed. How-
ever, the preliminary hazard screening could also show that the impact area
is larger than desired in which case increasing the plot area to add buffer dis-
tance could be an appropriate mitigation measure.
A toxic release, fire, or explosion may also be due to sabotage or a ter-
rorist action. The impact of these events should be considered in the prelimi-
nary hazard analysis and a security vulnerability analysis.
3.4.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis

A preliminary hazard analysis is used to identify the main concerns associated
with a specific type of plant and does not require detailed design drawings
(CCPS, 1992). A preliminary hazard analysis is usually done during the early
stage of a project when the plant location and layout is being considered and
prior to development of any process design details. The information used in the
analysis is in the project description discussed in Section 3.1. The typical haz-
ards of concern include: toxic releases and flammable releases leading to fires
or explosions with potential consequences on people, property, and the environ-
ment. These typical hazards may also address potential security threat scenar-
ios involving explosions or release of toxic materials. Typical team composition
and analysis methods for preliminary hazard analyses are described in the
CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992).
The next step, then, is to identify the potential consequences. These con-
sequences include potential toxic exposures, fires, or explosions.
Methodologies for estimating the potential consequence of both toxic
and flammable vapor releases can be found in a variety of resources. The
CCPS book, Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases, pro-
vides information regarding how to evaluate the consequences from various
hazards including explosions, flash fires, and toxic releases (CCPS, 1999).
Computer-based models are available that estimate vapor cloud dispersion,
heat radiation from fires, overpressure from explosions, and toxic concen-
tration downwind of toxic releases. Many simple models overestimate the
consequence; however, these models provide adequate consequence esti-
mates for the site selection process.
A preliminary hazard analysis may also identify potential environmental
concerns to consider when choosing a plant site and deciding on the amount
of land area required for the plant facilities. Environmental control issues
are discussed later in this chapter.
In some locations, specific regulatory requirements may govern levels
of risk, as opposed to hazard, on the site and its surroundings. In these
cases, not only consequences but also likelihood must be evaluated.
3.4.2. Toxic Release Scenarios

Toxic releases, whether originally liquid or vapor phase, usually have their
most significant impact as a vapor cloud. The extent of the hazard depends on
the vapor properties and conditions at the time of the release. Large release
incidents for materials like anhydrous ammonia or chlorine can be lethal for
great distances downwind, particularly if initially released as a liquid.
Established design and operation guidelines help minimize the hazard of

large releases (for example, safe handling and transport). However, the site
selection team may not know at this point in time what safeguards will be
built into the plant to compensate for these toxic hazards. So what do you
need to consider in terms of siting when evaluating the hazards associated
with toxic releases?
Chemical and petroleum industry accident data show that most releases
involve equipment failures and occur from:
• Pump seal leaks
• Piping or hose leaks
• Piping or hose failures
• Sample points, vents, drains, plugs left open or broken off
During the preliminary hazard analysis, consider those more severe
incidents that may pose off-site exposure concerns to neighboring sites. At
this stage in the screening analysis, a range of scenarios can be selected
from the above list to provide insight on the adequacy of the plot area or the
size of buffer zone required. These potential exposures may affect the per-
mitting process and result in future costly prevention or mitigation systems
to compensate for separation distance.
The following examples illustrate how the potential consequences of
incidents are used to determine site land requirements.
Example
Site A
A new water treatment facility is being considered on a site that is located 1
mile from a residential area. The facility will use chlorine that will be stored
in 1-ton portable cylinders. Checking the industry standards, there is no
prescriptive guidance regarding the spacing requirements for using or stor-
ing chlorine cylinders with respect to exposure hazards to property lines or
other facilities on a site. A preliminary hazard analysis identifies a potential
hazard of the cylinder ¾-inch fusible blow out plug failing. The potential
consequence of the full cylinder release shows toxic chlorine exposure
levels beyond the property boundary.
Site B
A new site uses pressurized ammonia gas for making fertilizer. The site is
located in an area where a housing community is located 1968 feet (600 m)
away. A credible incident identified during the preliminary hazard analysis is
a vent line failure on the charge line to the process. The company uses Emer-
gency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) 3 as a screening criterion. The

ERPG 3 value for ammonia is used as a toxic endpoint exposure maximum at
the property boundary for the site. The potential consequence estimate for
the vent line release showed that the ERPG 3 level goes as far as 3300 feet
(1000 m) downwind based on total loss of the content of the tank when at
normal operating level. Risk reduction options are considered including
reduction of on-site inventory of ammonia and storage in smaller vessels.
These options however are not favorable from a processing viewpoint.
As a result of the consequence analyses, the owners of both sites may
want to consider the following:
1. Can an inherently safer chemical (e.g., using sodium hypochlorite
instead of chlorine in the first example) be used instead? If the original
chemical is the only choice, can smaller containers be used to store it?
Can the operation take place inside a containment area (building
enclosure) where releases can be mitigated more effectively?
2. Can good separation be achieved if the operation is located within
the site at the furthest point from the neighboring sites?
3. Can additional land area be acquired to provide a greater buffer area
between the facility and the neighboring sites?
4. Consider future land use around the new site. Will there be further
development around the site that will cause future off-site exposure
concerns?
5. Can a separate site be considered which is more remote to sensitive
neighboring sites?
Lesson
The release of toxic chemicals may have impacts on people and the envi-
ronment beyond the fence line. A preliminary hazard analysis and conse-
quence analysis may be used to determine the potential impact, site the
material handling appropriately, and prompt the consideration of hazard
reduction measures. There may be a number of possible reduction mea-
sures for a hazard. Consider inherently safer options first. Evaluate the
effectiveness and feasibility of all options.
3.4.3. Fire Scenarios

Fire is an example of a credible incident resulting in off-site exposures from
high radiant heat (thermal flux) levels. Scenarios for consideration may
include radiant heat from:
• A process unit fire.

• A truck or rail car loading rack fire resulting from hose failure.
• A pool fire in a dike or impoundment area resulting from the overflow
of a storage tank.
• The flare during maximum flare system loads due to a power failure,
loss of cooling water, or an emergency shutdown.
• A full surface area fire in flammable or combustible storage tanks.
A potential consequence estimate for a heat radiation (thermal flux)
exposure to a neighboring facility or community area can be estimated
quickly using typical process conditions and equipment sizes. Guidelines in
this book include spacing distances between equipment and facilities from
property lines. These spacing guidelines are generally sufficient to minimize
heat radiation exposures from tanks and process area fires.
With regard to exposures to other facilities on a shared site, this book
contains typical spacing and layout that will provide separation to minimize
exposure to the plant from most typical industrial site hazards. However,
consider severe hazard exposures identified in the preliminary hazard analy-
sis to determine if additional separation is required. Consider the potential
for business interruption as well as damage to equipment and exposures to
personnel in the determination of additional separation needs.
A methodology for estimating pool, flash, and jet fire heat radiation
levels is included in the CCPS Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemi-
cal Releases (CCPS, 1999). Criteria for safe heat radiation exposure levels
that can be used as criteria to estimate a safe distance to adjacent plants or
facilities may be found in API RP 521.
3.4.4. Explosion Scenarios

Damage from an explosion is caused by the resulting blast wave, thermal
radiation, flying debris, or toxic release. There are many different types of
explosions including a vessel rupture explosion and a vapor cloud explosion
(VCE). Explosion phenomena are discussed in the CCPS Guidelines for Eval-
uating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires, and
BLEVEs (CCPS, 1994) and Understanding Explosions (CCPS, 2003, no. 30).
Those facilities handling flammable vapors and reactive chemicals must
consider the impact of potential explosions on the site and surrounding com-
munity. Additionally, exposures from surrounding facilities impacting the new
site should be considered. VCE overpressures may be influenced by the size of
the vapor cloud and aspects of plant layout such as the openness of the area
and amount of equipment within the cloud. Explosion hazards may be miti-
gated by redesigning the process chemistry, relocating exposures, designing
blast resistant structures, and providing greater separation distances.
An explosion may also be due to sabotage or a terrorist action. The
impact on the surrounding community or the economic system should be
considered in the siting and layout.
For combustible solids handling operations it is common practice to
provide explosion venting on equipment operating with potentially ignitable
atmospheres. Since the fireball from these vents can extend large distances,
horizontally arranged vents should be arranged to minimize exposure to
adjacent areas. In some cases it may be necessary to move equipment, such
as large silos, to a remote corner of the operational block to make explosion
venting a viable option for explosion protection. Another option may be to
locate equipment outdoors if explosion venting is not feasible.
Typical explosion scenarios may include (CCPS, 1994):
• A physical explosion such as a vessel rupture or a BLEVE
• A chemical explosion caused by a decomposition or rapid exothermic
reaction of reactive chemicals
• A deflagration or detonation of a flammable vapor cloud
Example
A new $100 MM specialty chemicals plant is being considered on a shared
site with another chemical company that produces ethylene. The existing
chemical plant has ethylene cracking and separation facilities. The separa-
tion distance between the new plant site and the existing ethylene facility
property line is 250 feet (76 m). A preliminary hazard analysis of the new
plant identifies a potential for incidents involving fires due to release of flam-
mable liquids and tank fires. From an insurance perspective, the physical
damage loss for the new plant from these fires is estimated to be $10 MM.
The exposure hazard to the new plant from the ethylene cracking facility
is also considered in determining the amount of insurance required for the
new plant. The potential hazard and consequence associated with the ethyl-
ene facility is identified as an ethylene release and subsequent vapor cloud
explosion. The consequence of the explosion is destruction of the new spe-
cialty chemicals plant. The loss is determined to be the cost of a replacement
plant. The additional cost of the premium may provide justification to allow
more separation distance or consideration of an alternate site.
Lesson
Hazards may be posed either from a site onto its neighbors or from the
neighbors onto the site. In some cases, cost benefit analysis may show that
the benefit of greater separation distances to minimize the hazard is worth
the increased real estate cost.
3.4.5. Refinement of Preliminary Plot Area

With the potential consequence estimates completed, preliminary hazards
for off-site toxic, fire, and explosion consequences may be compiled. With
this data, the preliminary plot area size can be evaluated. The data may show
that the hazards meet the regulatory or corporate guidelines and therefore,
the preliminary plot area is appropriate. However, the hazards could be out-
side of the guidelines and measures to reduce the hazard may be warranted.
These measures could include reconsidering inherently safer strategies:
eliminating the problem by substituting chemicals, mitigating the potential
consequences by reducing storage quantities or changing storage location,
or mitigating the impact on the surrounding community by, adding a buffer
zone or choosing a different site entirely. When the hazards impact sensitive
populations, the latter is a very appropriate solution.
3.5. Guidelines for the Survey and Data Collection Effort

To make this book appropriate for a broad range of projects, each section
includes a variety of related topics that may or may not be applicable to a
specific project. The intent is to provide enough information to permit a good
survey and data collection effort for any type of new site or plant anticipated.
The reader will need to pick and choose those topics that apply to the specific
project of interest. In the end, the site survey effort should produce sufficient
information to permit development of a scoping level study based on a spe-
cific site for budget estimate.
The site selection team can develop a project-specific checklist for data
collection during the site survey. The checklist is used during the site survey
as a guideline to assure that data is complete and organized. The Site Survey
Data Requirement List in Appendix B and discussed further in Chapter 4 can
provide the foundation for developing a project-specific checklist.
The project-specific checklist should include the purpose of the project,
a process description, and a design philosophy as it relates to future expan-
sions and reliability of operation. This information will be available from the
project description discussed in Section 3.1.
3.5.1. Codes, Standards, and Local Requirements

The site selection and data collection effort will include acquiring copies of
codes, standards, and local requirements that pertain to various equipment
and design criteria. Codes and standards must be considered on the federal,
state, and local level. The federal codes and standards may not be the most
stringent. Of specific interest are those codes and standards for pressure
vessels, tanks, boilers and related equipment, piping, electrical design,
buildings (including architectural design), storage, plumbing and sanitary
facilities, structural steel, reinforced concrete, fire protection, and safety.
Where engineering is being performed in a country other than where the
site will be constructed, there may be different codes and standards. It may be
helpful to make a list that cross-references the applicable local codes and
standards between the countries. The list can then be used to identify the dif-
ferences between the codes and standards and any associated impact on cost
of compliance. Where there are differences in regulations, or if regulations do
not exist for a specific topic, determine what regulations are acceptable for
use in place of corresponding regulations. If not, which regulations must be
used? Is the local code more stringent? What is the impact on project quality
and cost? Is it possible to get a variance? How does one apply for a variance?
Other issues to consider include:
• Qualification requirements for specific crafts. For example, welders
in the United States must qualify based on specific codes. Can weld-
ers at the site location be qualified for the relevant codes?
• Local restrictions on import of foreign construction materials such as
a steel design code that may not permit the use of foreign steel.
• Specific local requirements regarding inspections, quality assurance,
hardness, and corrosion allowance.
• Specific local codes or standards regarding spacing of equipment and
distance to property lines.
• Fire protection requirements that are greater or more stringent than
in-house company or local codes and standards.
In addition to codes and standards, there may be local regulations, pro-
tocols, and procedures required to assure timely approvals and acceptance
at various stages of the design, construction, and operation of a new site or
plant. Ask the following questions regarding local requirements:
• Is there a requirement for approval by a local professional engineer
for buildings, structures, foundations, and/or other designs? What is
the approval schedule and specifics regarding the information that
needs to be reviewed?
• Is there a requirement for governmental approval of drawings and speci-

fications, risk assessment, inspection of construction site activities,
and/or inspection of equipment before startup approval is granted?
• Are there zoning regulations that limit the use of property? This may
have an impact on future intentions for the site. For example, are
there limitations on temporary use of the site for stock piling waste
material during the construction of the new site? Is part of the site not
usable because of future local government plans to expand commu-
nity housing in the surrounding area?
• Are there limitations regarding the maximum height of structures
such as buildings, flares, and towers? Are there local requirements
for limiting the visibility of the site for community housing and/or the
site property line? Are there limitations regarding the visibility of flare
luminescence or nighttime site lighting?
• What are the aircraft regulations regarding height limitations of struc-
tures and/or provision of warning lights at the site? Is the site within
an airport glide path?
• Are there specific language requirements that need to be considered
regarding the communication of documents and information to vari-
ous local authorities and inspectors?
• Are there other quantitative or qualitative risk standards that will
have to be met? Conducting an abbreviated risk assessment may be
prudent to assure the ultimate acceptability of the site.
• Do local regulations require any special security measures for build-
ings, roadways, and fencing?
• Are there building codes that address earthquakes, fires, or hurri-
canes or typhoons?
3.5.2. Maps and Surveys

Acquire maps and surveys of potential sites prior to visiting the sites includ-
ing the following:
• A large, overall map of the surrounding area showing adjacent towns,
highways, railroads, airports, and harbors.
• Detailed maps of the site area, including a topographical map with 1
to 2 foot (0.3 to 0.6 m) contours to provide good definition.
• If available, maps showing the location of streams, ponds, marshes,
steep slopes, buildings, or other structures on-site, and any present
or future right-of-way requirements, underground sewers, pipelines,

and old foundations.
• Survey information that identifies foundations, monuments, bench-
marks, and elevations related to standard base points and land eleva-
tions, and related to marine elevations if pertinent.
• Aerial photographs of the entire site showing the following:
—Surrounding community areas, town centers, malls and shopping
centers
—Sensitive populations such as schools, hospitals, day care facilities
—Nearby industrial sites and transportation centers
—Farms and agricultural centers
—Environmentally sensitive areas
—Location of services that may be subject to interference from a new
site or may interfere with the communication or operation of your
site. These may include radio, television, or microwave communi-
cation equipment.
3.6. Environmental Control Issues
Once sites to be evaluated are chosen, acquire information concerning envi-

ronmental regulations before site surveys are actually conducted. This infor-
mation can provide the survey team with guidance on what to look for and
what additional data to collect while at the site(s). This section outlines the
specific information of interest prior to the site selection process.
As discussed previously, a preliminary hazard analysis may also identify
potential environmental concerns to consider when choosing a site and the
land area required. If there are environmentally sensitive sites on the pro-
posed plot or in the area around the site, it may be prudent to relocate the site
to avoid costly environmental controls and permitting difficulties or increase
the size of the site to permit more rigorous environmental control facilities.
Example
A site is under consideration at a location where there is a known aquifer
beneath the site. An environmental survey identified the need for additional
wastewater treatment land area to accommodate more extensive treating
and retention facilities. The topography is also an issue. The area is very hilly
and will require costly civil work to control run off and retention of site rain-
water. Based on this information, the site area must be expanded to accom-
modate the additional wastewater treating facilities and the additional land
area required to allow good civil engineering design to prevent flooding.
This same site has been found to contain Native American burial
grounds. Although located on the purchased land, the burial grounds must
be secured with a buffer area around them as required by local regulation.
Since the burial grounds cannot be built upon, additional land area is
required to accommodate the facilities needed for the new site.
All these issues may not have been identified if the siting team had not
included an environmental specialist that investigated local regulations
regarding the burial grounds and aquifer.
Lesson
This example may seem overly simplified; however, there have been cases
where projects were never built due to unanticipated limitations on how a
selected site could be used.
Basic information is required at the site selection stage that may weigh
into the decision to choose one site over another. The first step is to obtain
copies of the federal, state, and local regulations. Determine if there is a
requirement to have environmental system design plans approved by
authorities. Determine if permits are required to operate the environmental
systems and what the requirements are for acquiring a permit. Identify
agencies that enforce the regulations. The enforcement agency can often be
helpful in providing clarification of various requirements in the regulation.
Acquire regulations on:
• Air quality control
• Wastewater volume limitations and quality of industrial discharge
• Solid waste disposal
• Noise level limitations
• Flood levels
• Luminosity levels
3.6.1. Air Quality Control

In the United States, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR Title 40) and the
Environmental Protection Agency publications are resources concerning air
quality regulations. Local consultants may be necessary to acquire codes

and regulations and provide interpretation of the requirements in foreign
locations. In foreign locations, it is also useful to investigate if there are any
national technical groups with an interest in air quality control, similar to API
for example, that may publish helpful data.
The information that is needed during the planning stage of the site
selection process regarding air quality control regulations follows:
• Determine what materials are regulated regarding discharge to the
atmosphere, specifically, the maximum discharge rates and quantities.
Following is a list of materials that are regulated in the United States:
—Particulate matter
—Hydrocarbon vapors
—Carbon monoxide (CO)
—Nitrogen oxides (NOX)
—Sulfur oxides (SOX)
—Photochemical oxidants
—Visible emissions
—Odors
• Determine if there are regulations regarding allowable industrial
stack heights and the criteria needed to determine minimum heights.
• Determine if there is any requirement for vapor recovery in storage
tank filling and emptying, tank truck loading operations and what cri-
teria established the requirement.
3.6.2. Wastewater Control

Specific to wastewater quality control, some basic information required
includes:
• Is an environmental impact statement required? If so, specific informa-
tion acquired during the site survey may help focus the issues of concern.
• What are the regulations regarding storm water discharge without
treatment?
• What do the regulations specify regarding the level of treatment
required for industrial wastewater?
• What are the performance requirements for the treatment facility? Is
there a requirement to submit treatment facility operating reports?
What data needs to be reported?
• Do the regulations specifying analytical methods to be used in deter-

mining the level of specific impurities in the effluent include hydrocar-
bon or toxic materials content? This is an operating cost issue.
3.6.3 Solid Waste Disposal

In the United States, solid waste disposal is regulated by the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Through RCRA, EPA has the framework
to develop regulatory programs to manage solid waste, hazardous waste,
and underground storage tanks. RCRA includes a system for controlling haz-
ardous waste from its point of generation to its final disposal, encourages
states to develop comprehensive waste management plans, and regulates
certain underground storage tanks. This Act also establishes performance
standards for new tanks and requires leak detection, prevention, and correc-
tive action at underground storage tank sites.
Clearly understanding the implications of RCRA or other applicable
waste disposal regulations is important to site planning. Solid waste dis-
posal handling needs may require additional facilities at one site compared
with trucking only to an existing disposal facility at another site.
3.6.4. Noise Control

Consideration of noise regulations at this stage is focused on the community
sound level limits that may be exceeded due to noise from the site as well as
noise due to increased truck traffic associated with the new site. Acquire
existing and pending specific regulations and ordinances to determine if
there are any community noise level limitations.
3.6.5. Flood Levels

Many states and local areas have zoning restrictions designed to minimize
potential damage from flooding. These regulations may limit the ability to
construct a facility in a flood prone area or may restrict the type of equip-
ment installed at certain elevations.
3.6.6. Luminosity Levels

Light levels are also regulated by many states and localities. This may impact
the size, height, and design of flare selected for a site.
4 Site Survey and Selection
Chapter 3 helped us to prepare for the site selection process. Now it is time
to actually visit potential sites, gather data, and evaluate the options. Which
site to select is rarely an easy decision. Each site will have advantages and
disadvantages that are comprised of varying elements of safety, cost, and
schedule. As in any major decision, carefully considering the options and
focusing on both the short-term and long-term objectives will yield the best
results.
A project-specific checklist may be developed for use during data collec-
tion based on the Site Survey Data Requirement List provided in Appendix B.
Once that data is compiled, the process of comparing the site attributes
begins. This Chapter provides discussion around site features including
topography, infrastructure, security, environment, and emergency response
capability. These discussions identify desirable and undesirable features.
These features may influence the capital cost, the life cycle cost, and the risk
(financial, safety, environmental, and public concern) of a particular site.
Balancing the costs and risks is a challenging effort with many potential out-
comes depending on the differing weights that a company places on costs
and various types of risks. At the end of the study, the site with the best cost
to risk balance for that company’s values is chosen.
4.1. Information Required to Select a Site
4.1.1 Maps and Surveys

Acquire maps and surveys of potential site areas prior to visiting the sites.
Much of the detailed information, however, will need to be gathered during
the site survey. The survey team can mark up maps with site-specific details
to provide the quality of information needed for a thorough evaluation of
each site. Refer to Section 3.5.2 for the types of maps and information
desired.
33
A survey of the surrounding area will be necessary to identify off-site

exposure concerns. Make notes on an area map identifying the following
types of existing and potential neighboring populations or facilities:
• Town centers, malls and shopping centers, housing areas
• Sensitive population centers such as schools, hospitals, day care cen-
ters
• Nearby industrial sites and transportation centers
• Farms and agricultural centers
• Sewers, water mains, and storm drainage
• Natural gas and other pipelines
• Environmentally sensitive areas, such as wetlands
• Future facilities that are in the planning stage, particularly if they may
present an external exposure to your site.
• Future population encroachment
• Location of services that may be subject to interference from a new
site or may interfere with the communication or operation of your
site. These may include radio, television, or microwave communica-
tion equipment.
• Points of national interest such as nuclear power plants, military
bases, or major historical sites.
• Note any specific zoning restrictions that may affect the new site.
• Nearby facilities that could affect the new site.
When selecting a site, an ideal choice would be one with no neighbors to
minimize off-site risk potential. Sites such as this exist but seldom have the
infrastructure required to efficiently run the site. From the off-site impact
point of view, the decision focuses on the density of population surrounding
the proposed site and the existence of any sensitive populations or areas. A
site in a rural area is preferable over a site in a highly populated urban area.
A rural site will not necessarily remain rural unless you have purchased the
surrounding land. An alternate to starting with a rural site is to buy addi-
tional land as a buffer zone or to have the land adjacent to the plant zoned
such that there is no residential housing or sensitive populations nearby.
4 Site Survey and Selection 35
4.1.2. Topography, Terrain, and Soil Properties

Utilize topographical maps. In addition to elevation changes, note aspects
such as waterways and site terrain (sand, rock, marsh). A site with signifi-
cant elevation changes may be a challenge to lay out. Gravity will take any
liquid or heavy gas release and carry it downhill to the lower elevations of the
site. On the other hand, gravity flow may be used to facilitate product trans-
fer and reduce energy costs.
Example
In Tacoa, Venezuela on December 19, 1982 an explosion blew the top off a
large oil storage tank at the electricity company in Caracas, Venezuela. The
oil in the tank caught fire and, eight hours later, boiled over. Topography
played a key role in the events that followed the boilover of the tank. The
tank sat on a steep hillside, which allowed for gravity feed to the equipment
below. When the boilover occurred, the oil overflowed the tank dike. Fire-
men and spectators were caught in a downhill flow of burning oil. The inci-
dent resulted in 153 fatalities including 40 firefighters.
[From Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2E by F. P. Lees. Reprinted by permission of
Elsevier Science Ltd., Lees 1996]
Lesson
Consider topography in site selection and layout as it can have an impact on
the potential consequences of an event. Also, although the phenomenon of
boilover is rare, when it does occur, it can do so with significant conse-
quences. Carefully consider the storage location of materials with the
potential to boilover.
Terrain will influence the cost of construction. Dry, solid earth is less
expensive to manipulate than rock or marshy areas. If blasting is antici-
pated, investigate if blasting will be allowed in the area, what restrictions if
any, and how to obtain government permits.
Investigate the soil properties to anticipate the need for remediation,
document current contamination levels, and identify any potential problems
with major foundations for structures and equipment. This may require
taking a number of samples in various locations. The team will need to deter-
mine what the local experience has been with neighborhood structures or
industrial facilities regarding soil load bearing, settlement, and need for
piling. If there is a concern with spreader footings or heavy mobile equip-
ment, conduct a preliminary soil investigation to determine the basic foun-
dation requirements. Take soil samples to determine its potential corrosive
properties to underground pipe. Collect enough soil samples to assess the
need for, and potential extent of, remediation on the site. Soil investigation
reports may be available from local authorities.
The need for extensive piling can significantly increase the cost of a pro-
ject. From a site selection point of few, the less piling needed, the better.
Additionally, sites with low load bearing capacity may have a higher inci-
dence of structures settling. This settling may lead to shifting of equipment,
cracked equipment, and spreading flanges that may result in incidents.
Review the location of local aquifers and water extraction points. These
are sensitive features that may impact site selection and preparation.
Acquire groundwater levels and area flooding history to ascertain
whether protective dikes or spillways are necessary. A history of water levels
from any existing water wells in the surrounding area up to 4 miles (6.4 km)
away may be helpful in determining groundwater level history. Collect a
sample of ground water at the site or from a nearby location if necessary,
and test to determine the properties of the water. Properties such as high
sulfates in groundwater can cause underground deterioration of foundations
unless special concrete is used.
Flooding is an issue in terms of potential property damage and opera-
tional downtime. Selecting a site without the potential for flooding is the first
choice. An alternative is to identify grading and dikes to minimize potential
impact and to layout the site with those operations not impacted by flooding
in the areas subject to flooding.
Example
A chemical site was being planned for construction in the Middle East. Two
arid desert sites were being considered. One site was near a small town and
was selected based on the use of the local industry and contractors for
lower site construction costs.
During the survey it was noted that the sand in the area was useful in
making concrete. Contractors in the area use the local sand in building
foundations and other masonry construction. The local contractor was
required to make the appropriate quality assurance inspections of the mate-
rials used for the site foundation work.
Years later, after construction was completed and the site was in opera-
tion, unusual settlement and degradation of the foundation rings under the
storage tanks were found during inspection. The foundation settlement was
believed to significantly increase the risk of leaks at the floor to shell seam,
and potentially result in collapse of a tank.
Samples of the concrete foundation and local sand were analyzed and
found to contain a high salt content which interfered with the concrete
curing process causing the foundations to weaken and crack. Nothing could
be done to the existing foundations to arrest settlement therefore slip piles
were installed at each tank to provide the added foundation support needed
to arrest the settlement.
Lesson
The company did not analyze soil samples before the site was constructed.
Although this would not likely have changed the location of the site, it may
have provided insight regarding the selection of contractors or improved the
quality control of the foundation activities during construction. The cost
benefit of local concrete materials for the selected site may not have been as
significant a factor had information regarding the sand quality been avail-
able during site selection.
4.1.3. Site Specific Meteorological and Geological Data

Site-specific meteorological and seismic data will be required for a variety of
activities including permitting, equipment design and layout, and construc-
tion of the new site. Identify the sources of data, indicate the span and dates
of the recording period, and identify where the data was recorded in relation
to the location of the new site. Meteorological data listed in the Site Survey
Data Requirement List is available from various sources: local weather sta-
tions, local airports, and weather agencies including National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Site impacts of meteorological conditions may impact project design as
well as life cycle costs. Temperatures will have an impact on air-cooled heat
exchangers and other heat exchange equipment efficiency and energy
requirements. It will also have an impact on metallurgical requirements in
severe cold climates. The location of the frost line will impact foundation and
underground piping design.
The prevailing wind direction will be used in siting potential release
points downwind of potential ignition sources. The wind speed will translate
into loading on large or tall structures such as buildings, pressure vessels,

piping, storage tanks, air-cooled heat exchangers, cooling towers, and
stacks. Additionally, the wind will serve to carry pollutants and potential
releases downwind. Identifying potentially impacted areas and populations
downwind may help determine whether or not a site is appropriate or if addi-
tional separation to these areas is advisable.
Rainfall on the site will typically require water treatment. This may
translate into the need for large water treatment facilities. Additionally, large
amounts of rain in short periods as may be seen in the tropics and semi-trop-
ics will impact the drainage design systems. Failure to address this issue
could result in flooding of the site with potential operational, safety, and
environmental impacts.
Precipitation in the form of snow will translate into higher loadings on
structural members requiring more costly, stronger, designs.
One form or another of severe weather including significant rain or
snowfalls, lightning storms, or tornadoes can occur almost anywhere. Con-
sequently, all sites have a weather issue of some type. However, some sites
are subject to additional weather threats such as hurricanes or typhoons
along coastal areas. Selecting a site with the potential for a hurricane or
typhoon will require greater site emergency preparedness, stronger struc-
tural design, and consideration of business interruptions due to storm
watches, the storms themselves, and cleanup activities. Hurricanes or
typhoons, as well as significant rainfalls, can lead to flooding concerns. Sites
in low lying areas subject to flooding may require higher building and equip-
ment elevations which may require significant amounts of landfill and
additional structural support.
Example
In 1998, an entire refinery was shut down for three months after being
struck by Hurricane George. The hurricane left the entire site submerged by
more than four feet (1.2 m) of salt water from the Gulf of Mexico. Although
the hurricane was only a Category 2 storm, its slow movement subjected
the refinery to 17 hours of high wind and rain. The storm surge overtopped
the dikes built to protect the refinery, which is located close to the shore of
the Gulf of Mexico. In all, 2,100 motors, 1,900 pumps, 800 instrument
components, 280 turbines, and some 200 miscellaneous machinery items
required replacement or extensive rebuilding. Newer control buildings and
electrical substations sustained little or no damage as they had been built

with their ground floors elevated approximately five feet (1.5 m) above
ground (Marsh, 2001).
Lesson
Consider meteorological and severe weather conditions in siting. Although
these conditions cannot be controlled, appropriate siting and layout of criti-
cal equipment and structures may minimize the potential damage.
Seismic Data are available from various sources including the US Geo-
logical Survey (USGS), local regulatory authorities, and in the United States
from zone maps in the International Building Code (IBC). The zone map pro-
vides an Earthquake zone number (1 indicating the lowest severity up to 4
indicating the highest severity). The zone number is a measure of the fre-
quency and intensity of earthquake activity at a specific location. It is used in
applying the IBC to develop the forces resulting from an earthquake for
design of equipment and structures. Local building codes may have supple-
mental criteria to the IBC concerning earthquake design. Therefore, obtain a
copy of the local building code as well as any state or local exceptions or
additional requirements. The potential for seismic activity at the site may
impact construction design and costs and may increase the potential for loss
of containment incidents.
4.2. Transportation Issues
4.2.1. Product and Materials Handling

The method by which raw materials and feedstock will be brought into the
site and products, by-products, and waste will be removed from the site will
be specific to a selected site. Portions of this information may be included in
the project description discussed in section 3.1; however, specific data for
each potential site must be evaluated. A transportation risk assessment may
be warranted to consider the chemicals, volume, frequency, and risk of
potential traffic accidents and chemical exposure on the surrounding com-
munity. The CCPS Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis
(CCPS 1995, no.21) provides information on this topic.
Example:
There was a proposal to build a 60,000 bbl/day (9,600,000 l/day) onshore
crude oil production facility with potential to increase to 100,000 bbl/day
(16,000,000 l/day) in the future. Transportation options included transport
of the crude oil by railroad or by a 100 mile (160 km) pipeline to the refin-
ery. Initially, the pipeline was not considered a feasible alternative due to
permit concerns considering the environmentally sensitive areas that the
pipeline would traverse.
A transportation risk assessment was conducted. The railroad option
required 12 jumbo tank cars per hour every day of the year. The access to the
site from the main line was via a single 10 mile (16 km) rail spur. On this same
rail spur, transportation also included 3 additional trains with 28 cars of LPG.
The risk assessment showed a significant risk of rail accidents and potential
chemical consequences. A concern was the pressure on the operators to com-
plete their tasks in the tight schedule of loading a train of 12 railcars every
hour. These tasks included spotting the cars, performing pre-loading safety
checks, loading, and performing post-loading safety checks. Additionally, the
top loading of rail cars introduced personnel risks during loading. Given this
risk level, the pipeline alternative was reconsidered.
The routing of the pipeline around the environmentally sensitive areas was
evaluated. Also, the pipeline route was carefully laid out through the neighbor-
ing farmland and away from populated areas. A transportation risk assessment
was then conducted of this proposed pipeline layout to determine the risk on
the environmentally sensitive areas and surrounding communities.
The risk assessments were presented at the public enquiry. Eventually,
the pipeline alternative was approved and permits granted.
Lesson
Consider transportation risks during the site evaluation phase. Conducting
a transportation risk analysis will provide a better understanding of the risk
and the potential prevention and mitigation measures that may be required.
TRUCKS
Where trucks will be utilized for import and export of materials, obtain infor-
mation regarding designated hazardous transportation routes, access
roads, and connecting highways. Estimate probable traffic patterns during
peak and off-peak loading and unloading hours to assess the impact on the
road systems. The need to strengthen or build new site and/or public roads
accessing the site may impact site selection. The routing of materials over
public roads may also increase risks if traveled through populated and/or
sensitive areas. A site where traffic routing minimizes this risk is desirable.
Determine support facilities required. Will site plot space be required for
a scale or is one commercially available? Is a vapor recovery system
required for loading operations of volatile products? Obtain copies of local
regulation regarding vapor recovery.
Example:
A refinery was considering a change of process technology for production of
a high-octane gasoline-blending component called alkylate. The present
technology used a highly toxic catalyst (hydrofluoric acid) that has the
potential for undesirable off-site exposure effects in the event of a large acci-
dental release. A risk assessment study was performed and several risk
reduction alternatives were identified. The risk assessment was specific to
the transportation issues of this site and considered the life cycle of the pro-
cess. One such risk reduction consideration was converting the HF
alkylation process to sulfuric acid (H2SO4) alkylation. However, to make the
conversion, sulfuric acid regeneration facilities needed to be provided. Two
alternatives were considered.
Alternative 1—Build on-site H2SO4 regeneration facilities
Alternative 2—Use off-site H2SO4 regeneration facilities and bring in
fresh acid and return spent acid by truck.
Local regulations and local planning authorities eliminated the possi-
bility of Alternative 1, building on-site regeneration facilities. Therefore,
Alternative 2 was considered.
Traffic routes for the increased truck traffic were evaluated. The number
of trucks required included 900 fresh H2SO4 and 900 spent H2SO4 trucks
per month. All truck route options required a substantial increase in truck
traffic through the community area around the refinery. In comparison, the
current process required 1 HF truck per month for acid make-up. Therefore,
a risk assessment was conducted to determine the risk associated with the
increased truck traffic to the community.
As a result of the analysis, it was determined that the conversion to sul-
furic acid and the associated increased truck traffic actually posed a higher
risk to the community than the presence of the existing HF Alkylation with
alternate risk reduction measures employed. Therefore the process change
was not implemented and the alternate risk reduction measures were installed.
Lesson
Process hazard analysis conducted in supporting the siting decision must
consider transportation risks as well as process unit risks. The combined
risk may prompt a different risk management decision than considering the
process risk alone.
PIPELINES
Where pipelines will be utilized for product transfer or materials delivery,
determine the location of pipeline corridors and options for routing the pipe-
line into the site. Record the conditions of the pipeline including the line
length on the site, pipeline diameter, operating pressure and temperature of
the pipeline, and batch handling arrangements. If an existing pipeline is con-
sidered for reuse, consider the overall pipeline suitability for purpose (based
on process conditions). Note whether the site terrain will allow burying of
pipelines or require pipelines to be laid aboveground. Determine whether
cathodic protection is required and if it will interfere with other systems
nearby. The pipeline routing will impact the site selection in terms of layout
of site equipment, risks associated with pipeline leaks, and potential security
concerns.
RAILROAD
Where product shipments are to be made by railroad tank car, are rail facili-
ties available both leading to and on the site to accommodate this need? If
not, consider the possible routing and cost of rail facilities as well as clear-
ances required by regulation from operating facilities. As in road transporta-
tion, assess the risks of routing toxic or pressurized flammable materials by
rail through the surrounding community. Additionally, the potential impact
of new or increased rail traffic on the surrounding traffic patterns, emer-
gency response routes, and noise levels may make one site more desirable
than another in terms of ease and probability of success of getting permits
for new rail lines. Railway issues that may require clarification with the rail-
road company include:
• Train length with respect to distance between crossings and the
potential impact on emergency response vehicle traffic
• Condition of the railroad

• Increased rail traffic
• Emergency firefighting access to the railroad lines in and near the site
Example
A chemical plant was constructed in 1916 on the East Coast adjacent to a
small town. The location was ideal as the chemical plant was bordered on
the north by a navigable river, and on the south by the railroad right-of-way.
As the town grew, it expanded to the other side of the railroad tracks. Now
the railroad dissects the town with only four street crossings that cross the
tracks and connect both sides of town. Today expanded community hous-
ing, the school, daycare centers and industry all share the land on the north
side of the tracks bordered by the river. To the south of the tracks are the
town center, emergency services, and access to the main highways.
The trains utilizing this railroad track are 60 to 100 cars long. Trains
use the tracks frequently to make scheduled freight car drop-offs and pick-
ups during which the four street crossings may be blocked for up to 15 min-
utes at a time. No access (including emergency access) to the north side of
town and industry is available during the period when the train is blocking
the road crossings.
This situation continued for many years. Finally, the town considered
options including a bridge in place of one of the railroad crossings. The
bridge now provides a single point access to the north side of town and
industry when the train is blocking the remaining rail crossings.
Lesson
Transportation routes and increased traffic on them may present a risk to
the community and to the chemical or refinery site by limiting access and
egress. Ensure that sufficient emergency response access will be available
after the addition of roads and railways for the new site and take into
account the increased traffic on these road and railways.
Local requirements or practices regarding methods of loading and mea-

suring cargo for hazardous products such as LPG, gasoline, light fuel oils,
and toxic chemicals may impact spacing and location of these facilities from
property lines and other on-site facilities.
MARINE FACILITIES
Where existing marine facilities are to be utilized, obtain a detailed descrip-
tion of available port facilities. Research specific port requirements such as
operating hours, tugboat escort requirements, and hazardous cargo restric-
tions that may impact operational and safety issues. The channel and harbor
must be of sufficient width and depth to safely accommodate the ships antic-
ipated for the site or modifications may be necessary. Investigate severe
weather impacts on the marine facilities to determine their potential impact
on safe mooring and product transfer. Also, investigate the availability of
mooring sites at the port. Demurrage associated with waiting to moor, wait-
ing out a storm or frequent cessation of product transfer may make a site
undesirable. Another marine consideration is the availability of, or require-
ment to provide, on-site support services such as for bunkering, debal-
lasting, cargo tank cleaning, and ship repairs.
4.2.2. Special Transportation Requirements
During the construction phase of the project, it may be necessary to trans-

port large heavy loads to the site. For sites where heavy or large loads will be
brought in by water, determine if the site port facilities can support the maxi-
mum weight and size of the cargo to be transferred, if they have floating
cranes to transfer the material, and if they require special unloading ramps?
Where heavy or large equipment are anticipated to be brought in by
truck or railroad, will there be enough highway and railroad clearance,
including bridge and tunnel clearances, sufficient to allow passage of the
vehicles?
4.3. Utilities
The existence of utility infrastructure at a proposed site will reduce project

cost. However, before a project proceeds, verify that the quality, quantity,
and reliability of that utility is adequate for the project needs. Specific data of
interest is listed in the Site Selection Data Requirements List in Appendix B.
The availability and reliability of the existing utilities may be critical to
facilitate a safe plant shutdown in an emergency situation.
4.3.1 Water Supply

Determine possible sources of drinking water, boiler feed water, firewater,
closed cooling water makeup, and service water at the site. Check availabil-
ity, reliability, and cost of municipal water, river water, and well water. If
these supplies are not available at the site, additional plot space may be
required to provide storage facilities.
Note restrictions regarding location, quantity, quality, and temperature
of warm cooling water returns. These requirements may lead to the need for
additional heat exchange equipment that translates into more plot space.
Consider design problems that might be encountered with rights-of-way,
water intake stations, icing, or suction conditions. Review requirements
imposed by environmental codes.
Example
An industrial complex was being considered for the location of a new process
plant. The complex was located along the coast, had marine access and facil-
ities and provided various utilities including water for cooling water, firewater,
and boiler feed water. One of the attractions advertised by the complex was
the cost reduction associated with the elimination of independent firewater
tanks and pumping systems. This firewater supply met the 150 psig (1000
kpag) minimum firewater requirement at the battery limit. The complex loca-
tion was selected and the cost reduction was assumed in the project funding.
During early construction and design of the new process plant a follow-
up site survey was conducted. During the survey it was noticed that most of
the other complex occupants had an independent firewater tank and fire-
water pumps. On further discussion, it was determined that the sites within
the complex often competed for water demand from the pipeline during cer-
tain periods. During these periods, the water pipeline pressure dropped and
sufficient water supply might not be available for hours. Further, even at
normal water demand, the pressure often dropped below 100 psig (690
kpag).
As a result, firewater and boiler feed water tanks as well as the pumping
systems were added to the project requiring the acquisition of additional funds.
Lesson
Analyze site features in sufficient detail during the site selection process to
accurately determine what the site does provide and what additional facili-
ties will be required.
4.3.2 Steam Supply
Steam-generating facilities include boilers, boiler feed water, condensate

collection and handling, boiler blow-down, piping, waste heat recovery, con-
trol, and environmental protection systems. Determine the codes, rules, reg-
ulations, and standards governing the construction and operation of steam-
generating facilities and acquire copies.
Are there adjacent sites, such as public utilities or municipal installa-
tions, from which steam could be purchased during shutdowns or emergen-
cies? Provide details regarding pressures available, reliability, and variable
and fixed costs.
The information above will primarily provide an understanding of the
economics for steam generation at one site versus another. From a safe
siting viewpoint, however, the reliability of the steam generation facilities
does play a role in the reliability and safety of the future operating site.
4.3.3 Fuel
Determine the availability, reliability, supply points, heating values, costs,

and analysis of fuel commonly used in the area. Include details of supply
facilities, pressures, temperatures, and fuel specifications, if available. Iden-
tify and review state, local, and national environmental codes (if any) regard-
ing fuel specifications. Also, consider the future use of fuel supplies from
remote locations, including substitute fuels such as coal, natural gas, and
others.
Once again, the evaluation of fuel supply has a large economic compo-
nent. It also impacts site safety in terms of providing a reliable supply to min-
imize unplanned shutdowns. Consider the needed fuel supply facilities
(storage tanks, pipelines, and unloading facilities) in terms of plot space
required and location. A specific area of interest where fuel is imported to or
exported from the site is the risk posed by the metering facilities.
Example
A facility was being proposed in a remote semi-tropical area. Fuel gas
(methane through pentane) and nitrogen were being supplied by an outside
source via pipeline. Metering stations were located outside the new site
property line and owned and controlled by the supplier.
To secure the use of the utilities, the company and supplier agreed to
terms early in the project life, and a location and tie-ins for the meters were
fixed. Due to the high reliability of the supplied fuel gas, back-up power gener-
ation facilities were minimized resulting in a significant project cost reduction.
The probability of failure within a fuel gas metering facility is relatively
low. There is, however, exposure risk to the Fuel Gas Metering facility from
the new site process area. The consequence of losing the fuel supply to the
electrical generation equipment is substantial. It was decided that the risk
of this loss was not acceptable and should be mitigated.
Relocating equipment within the new site was not feasible due to the
minimal land area available and other concerns resulting from different
equipment arrangements. Ideally, locating the metering stations further
away from the new site was feasible before the meters were installed, how-
ever, the cost of relocating this already installed equipment was substantial.
As a result, the risk reduction option chosen was to add the back-up power
generation facilities back into the project. The cost of this later addition was
substantially higher that the costs would have been to site the metering sta-
tion in a different location prior to installation.
Lesson
Understanding the availability and reliability of fuel gas and other utilities
during site selection and their potential vulnerabilities may avoid late design
changes to add costly utility back-up facilities.
4.4. Electrical and Communications Systems
4.4.1. Electrical Systems

Contact the local electrical utility to determine if they can provide an ade-
quate and reliable power supply to the site. Note the location of the incoming
supply to the site as this will impact siting and layout. If commercially avail-
able power is not adequate, site plot space will be required for power gener-
ation facilities.
Example
A company was planning to build a process in the Midwest in an area sub-
ject to freezing temperatures and ice storms. The local utility stated that
they were able to supply the quantity of power required from two independ-
ent power plants. Based on this supply and reliability, the company decided
to utilize fully purchased power and not construct an on-site power genera-
tion facility. This resulted in significant cost savings to the project.
Two years after the plant was constructed, the area experienced an ice
storm that caused loss of total power. Investigation showed that the lines
from the power plants to the process plant were both located above ground
and ran in parallel, adjacent paths the last 1500 ft (460 m). This path ran
along the river and therefore often subjected to the icing effects during a
cold winter rain or snow. A hazard analysis might have identified this
common cause failure and led to alternate siting or routing.
Lesson
Analysis of utility reliability should include a thorough review of all utility
supplies to ensure that they are fully redundant and independent such that
a single cause will not lead to failure in both supplies.
4.4.2. Communications Systems

Conduct an assessment of site communication requirements. The site occu-
pants and their needs will dictate the equipment required. A small installa-
tion may have much smaller and simpler needs than a site housing
engineering offices.
When building on a greenfield site, there may be no communication
facilities available. Thus all infrastructure would have to be developed. In an
existing site, there may be infrastructure in place; however, it may require
expansion or upgrading. Ensure space is available on the site to allow for
communication line right-of-ways either above or below grade.
The prime issue regarding communication is defining the requirements
for safety and emergency response. Understanding the assets and limita-
tions of available communications systems will provide a sound basis for
establishing the communication links needed during construction and future
operations for emergency response and notification. Following are the types
of issues that help evaluate the effectiveness of communication systems
available at a potential site.
TELEPHONE SYSTEMS
Describe the local telephone system (manual or automatic), length of time
required for installation, compatibility, and regulations for a site-owned
exchange switchboard. What arrangements can be made for tie lines or for
long distance phone calls?
INTERNET SYSTEM
Determine what internet communication support is available: phone lines,
broadband, cable, ISDN. These systems may be used to support e-mail, and
current or future e-commerce applications.
MICROWAVE COMMUNICATIONS
If telephone and internet are not available or are not reliable, microwave sys-
tems may be an alternative. This requires substantial initial investment for
the installation of towers and other equipment.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
For two-way radio communications, determine the authority responsible for
control of local in-plant systems, local regulations, frequencies and types of
transmission permissible, power sources, and licenses required. Determine
what other radio frequencies are in use in the vicinity and the possibility of
instrumentation interference. What arrangements can be made for company
communications by radio to other parts of the country?
MAIL SYSTEM
Determine the location of the nearest post office and the major mail sorting
facility, as well as the frequency and source of mail pickups and deliveries.
4.5. Environmental Controls
As mentioned in Chapter 3, toxic materials may be released to the atmo-

sphere, ground, or waterways. These releases may be modeled to determine
the potential consequences and risks on neighboring environmentally sensi-
tive areas and surrounding communities. Consider this in site selection as
these potential exposures may affect the permitting process and the need for
future costly prevention and mitigation systems to address the potential of
releases to the environment.
4.5.1. Wastewater Quality Control

As stated in Chapter 3, acquire national, state, and local regulations con-
cerned with industrial wastewater discharge and any volume limitations.
Firewater runoff may also be a siting consideration if this volume must be

addressed as wastewater. Define any national, state, or local regulations
controlling discharge quality.
A site where it is permissible to discharge clean storm water without
treatment will require smaller treatment facilities, hence less plot space.
Successful wastewater quality control is highly dependent on the unique
features at any particular site location. Questions to ask in order to develop a
thorough understanding of the potential costs and problems associated with
a particular site regarding wastewater quality control are provided in the
Site Survey Data Requirement List provided in Appendix B.
Local requirements in terms of quantity, quality, and permitting may rule
out a proposed site. Assess general governmental trends regarding
wastewater control. If there is any indication that existing regulations will
become more restrictive, or that new regulations will be adopted, obtain a
forecast or timetable. This may impact future site expansions.
With respect to the site, identify the existence and the location of envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas. A site surrounded by sensitive areas down-
stream of its water effluent may not be as desirable as one without these
areas.
4.5.2. Air Quality Control

Air quality control regulations may impact the site selection process.
National, state, and local regulations may control the discharge of sulfur
oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants,
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, other applicable chemicals, and odors. This
may impact the ability of a site to be located in a specific area as well as the
separation distances from the site to the surrounding areas.
What is the general trend regarding air quality control? Are there any
indications that existing regulations will be tightened or that new regulations
will be adopted where there are none at the present time? This may reduce
the opportunity for future site expansions.
In relation to the facility site, what are the locations and proximity of res-
idential areas, farming areas, hospitals and health resorts, business areas,
industrial areas, public parks, and airports? Adequately separate the site
from these areas to reduce risk of off-site impacts as well as nuisance odors.
Topographical features, such as hills or valleys, can effect dispersion of
air pollutants and should be considered in site selection.
4.5.3 Sanitary Sewage Collection and Treatment
Obtain regulations regarding collection and treatment of sanitary sewage

and consider them in site selection. If public facilities are not available, ade-
quate, or able to be used, then site facilities will need to be provided. This will
have an impact on plot space and project cost.
4.5.4. Noise and Luminosity Level Design Limitations
The site survey team should collect current day and night noise level data in
the surrounding areas. This will aid in determining if appropriate noise levels
will be achievable at reasonable cost to the new site or if consideration of an
alternate site is warranted.
Sound waves travel through most materials. The typical concern is
sound traveling through air to the adjacent community. Sound may also be
transmitted through the earth, specifically along water tables and subterra-
nean rock formations, causing noise concerns in unexpected places and
great distances away.
Luminosity is also a consideration for plant siting. The light levels pro-
duced by the general site lighting may be regulated either in terms of level or
line-of-site visibility. Siting may take advantage of set back from the fence
line, hills, or foliage to block the light. Specific pieces of equipment, such as
the flare, may be impacted by luminosity requirements. Luminosity require-
ments may impact the height of the flare or necessitate using a ground flare
design that will require greater plot space and siting considerations.
4.6. Fire, Safety, and Security
The site selection should consider the availability and adequacy of existing
local emergency response capabilities including firefighting, rescue, site
security, police, and medical capable of handling the hazards associated
with the site operations.
If local capabilities are considered, are they available all day, every day?
The opportunity to share response personnel and equipment through mutual
aid arrangements will reduce the facilities required on each individual site.
Do local regulations require the site provision of emergency response facili-
ties or the use of local emergency response teams?
Are there any governmental or local requirements for medical facilities

or ambulance service? Inspect the area within a reasonable radius of the site
and report on the availability of first aid facilities, hospitals, burn centers,
doctors, and medical examination laboratories. Does a mutual aid emer-
gency organization exist, and is there a local radio system linking ambulance
services with hospitals or other medical facilities? The availability of ade-
quate medical facilities, or lack thereof, may impact site selection. Where
adequate facilities are not available, provisions for emergency response use
of helicopters may be an alternative that would require plot space for the
helipad and the helicopter’s safe approach free of overhead lines and tall
structures.
There are numerous site attributes that may impact security. Many of
these features do not act as a positive or negative in the site selection pro-
cess, but will require consideration during the site layout process. At the site
selection stage, the concern is to assure adequate site plot space is provided
to allow flexibility in the placement and control of site access points, safe
routing of transportation corridors, and provision of reliable utilities.
• An additional consideration is that toxic releases, fires, and explo-
sions may also be due to sabotage or a terrorist action. The impact of
these events should be considered in the preliminary hazard analysis
or a security vulnerability analysis and in siting of the facility.
• Transportation of materials to and from the plant may provide access
for undesired persons or materials to enter the site or for theft of
materials. Controlling the access and routing of transportation corri-
dors away from highly occupied buildings and critical facilities will
minimize these risks.
• Railway sidings may traverse site property but may be under the own-
ership of a railway company. This minimizes the opportunity to con-
trol the access, personnel, and materials that are within the site
property.
• Piers, wharves, and shorelines may be difficult areas to control
access due to the limited personnel attending these areas, the sepa-
ration from the remainder of the site, and the fluctuating river or tidal
levels.
• Utilities that are provided from a single source reduce the reliability in
a sabotage scenario given the ability to significantly impact, or shut
down, plant production by interfering with a single power feed or

water intake.
• Sites with dense development immediately adjacent to the perimeter
may provide more challenges in controlling access than those with a
buffer zone around the site.
• The ease by which a site can be seen and identified from a major
transportation route may increase the probability that it is randomly
selected for sabotage.
• The proximity of a site to major population areas may increase the
probability of potential sabotage from outside sources.
4.7. Site Features
4.7.1. Personnel
The long-term safety and operability of the site is dependent on the quality
and capability of the support staff needed to maintain and operate the site. If
these resources are not available close to the site, then bringing in quality
personnel and contractors will need to be factored into the site selection pro-
cess. It is necessary to determine the availability of local contractors or per-
sonnel for handling day-to-day site maintenance and for supplying special
crews for major shutdowns. The craftsperson qualifications, experience
level, training, equipment, and tools that local contractors can supply must
be determined. For example, are code-certified welders available or are per-
sonnel available to become operators.
Obtain information on the educational level of the local population, as
this level will affect the training facilities to be incorporated into the site. It
will also have bearing on the sophistication of the instrument and control
equipment to be selected for the facility.
Example
Several international locations were being considered for a lubrication oil
blending facility. The facility’s primarily purpose was to supply an increas-
ing international demand in automotive lube products. Locations were con-
sidered in three countries. Each country site was evaluated to determine
the level of education and capability of the local work force. For two of the
countries, the typical current lube plant design was used as a template for
the new site design. It included a DCS based control system and automated
blending and packaging facilities utilizing current technology. For the third
country, it was decided that using the current technology for a lube blending
plant would not be practical given the skill base at the site. A less auto-
mated design, providing the same level of safety, was chosen to be the best
alternative for this location to match the capabilities of the local work force.
Lesson
Consider human factors issues in site selection and plant design.
4.7.2. Housing
When a remote site is under consideration, investigate the surrounding area
to determine the availability of housing and amenities for permanent person-
nel. In remote locations where company housing is provided, finding a suit-
able location for company housing is as important an issue as finding a
suitable location for the new site. Temporary housing may also be required
during the construction phase to support the surge in manpower require-
ments. If the temporary housing is to be located on the site, consider the sep-
aration distances between temporary facilities, construction activities, and
plant start-up.
Site selection may be influenced by the availability of transportation to
the site, schools, shops, and recreational facilities.
4.7.3. Site Support Facilities

To assess the advantages of one site location versus another, inspect local
shops, service stations, garages, and other industrial facilities. This will help
to determine if site maintenance activities can be handled on a contract
basis or if facilities must be provided within the site. Services inspected
include the types of construction equipment that can be rented or contracted
locally, such as cranes, scaffolding, heavy trucks and lowboys, concrete
mixers, temporary electric generators, and welding machines. It is impor-
tant during this inspection to assess the quality of workmanship and consis-
tent quality of work product to assure that the local services will meet the
expectations of the new site.
Construction activities typically include provision of trailers, laydown

yards, and welding areas to name a few. Location of occupied buildings
should be considered using API RP 752 and CCPS Guidelines for Evaluating
Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and Fires. Laydown yards
should be located such that traffic will not be routed through sensitive plant
areas. Areas involving hot work should be located so as not to be a potential
ignition source to operating process units.
Review the capability of local sources for providing maintenance and
repair parts, materials, equipment, and supplies. Determine restrictions, if
any, on importation of such parts and materials. Determine delivery times
and possible causes of delays. Recommend a plan for site warehousing of
materials, supplies, and spare parts.
4.8. Multi-Chapter Example
In order to illustrate the progression of a project through site selection to

major facility layout and eventually to individual equipment spacing, the fol-
lowing example will be carried through Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Example
Your company decides to build a new petrochemical site at an existing com-
plex. The new site will include:
• Process Plants
—Ethylene
—Low Pressure Polyethylene
—Ethylene Glycol
• Pelletizing and packaging facilities
• Offsites
—Flare
—Ethylene Feed Pipeline
—Tankage
—Warehouses
—Control room
—Cooling tower
—Port facilities for transport of finished products
The company planners have identified three existing locations with
comparable project viability economics. Initial descriptions of these loca-
tions are as follows.
Location 1 – This petrochemical complex is situated in an inland loca-
tion with river access. There is land at the complex edge that is a
level elevation with no flooding potential. This complex is located in
the middle of farm country with no population centers nearby.
Location 2 – This petrochemical complex was once in farm country but
the nearby city has grown and now surrounds the complex. There is
dense population immediately adjacent to the complex. The com-
plex has river access. There is plot space available.
Location 3 – The petrochemical complex is located in an industrial
complex well separated from residential or urban population cen-
ters. It has a marine facility. There is property adjacent to the com-
plex but it is a significantly sloped site.
A site selection team is assembled including:
• Process engineering to provide details of the unit temperatures, pres-
sures, chemicals involved
• Civil and marine engineering to provide insight on structural issues
and marine facilities
• Process safety engineers and fire protection engineers to ensure
inherently safer design considerations are addressed
• Environmental engineering to ensure environmental issues are
addressed in site selection
• A representative from the local facility to ensure the local perspective
is provided
• A project representative to address cost and schedule issues
This team completes its task of gathering detailed information on each
potential location. The process engineer and process safety engineer make
an initial report. Based on their best understanding of the process units
design as they are currently planned, there are both fire and vapor cloud
explosion potentials. The fire hazard area would be within the site bound-
aries; however, the 1-psi (6.9 kpa) explosion overpressure contour extends
900 feet (270 m) from the edge of the process unit. They also identify that
ethylene oxide (EO) will be produced as an intermediate stream in the ethyl-

ene glycol process unit. Although this is an inherently safer design since the
EO is contained within the process and does not have to be stored in quan-
tity, there is the possibility for loss of containment in the unit piping contain-
ing EO. Ethylene oxide has a long-term exposure limit of 5 ppm.
A drawing of each location and summary of this information gathered
on each location is provided as follows.
Location 1
The petrochemical complex is located in farm country with the nearest pop-
ulation center, a rural town, located 7 miles (11 km) away. The site with
ample plot space is located at the edge of the existing complex. It is level
and able to support the plant structures without significant piling require-
ments. The site is within the 100-year flood zone but is well outside of the
50- and 10-year flood zones. The process safety engineer estimates that
the off-site risk will be low given the location in farm country with the near-
est farmhouse 1-mile (1.6 km) distant. The environmental engineer has not
identified any local conditions or regulations that may cause concern for the
project. There is a river access but further investigation has shown that cur-
rent facilities are designed for small barges. The civil/marine engineer has
identified that the current channel is neither deep enough nor wide enough
to permit safe berthing of the size vessel required for economic transport of
the product. The project engineer has researched costs for widening and
dredging the channel and, while it is feasible, the cost is significant and
added time in the schedule would be required.
Figure 4-1. Proposed Location 1

Location 2
The site available in this complex has adequate plot space and is located
near the edge of the existing complex between the existing flare and the
property line. There are no flooding concerns at this location and the plot
space is level and able to support plant structures without significant piling
requirements. Houses are located 700 ft (210 m) away and an elementary
school is located 1600 ft (490 m) from the property line. The proximity of
these populations causes the process safety engineer to estimate the risk as
being relatively high. The environmental engineer has raised the concern
that permitting is becoming more restricted in this local area and he thinks
the local council will likely require additional environmental control mea-
sures to reduce project air and noise emissions. The complex has a dock on
the river with adequate channel depth and width to safely berth the size
vessel required.

Location 3
The petrochemical complex is located within an industrial complex that is
17 miles (27 km) from the nearest town. The proposed location is between
the existing chemical plant and a fertilizer unit. There is no separation
between sites – just a fence. The complex has access to the marine facilities
that are designed to safely accommodate ships larger than those proposed.
The proposed site is one of the last ones remaining in the complex. It has a
significant slope and has a dry creek bed that turns into a torrent when
heavy rains run off the hillsides. The process safety engineer estimates the
risk as being relatively low since the surrounding population is industrial
and it is located away from the nearest town. The environmental engineer
has identified no concerns with permits or sensitive areas but is concerned
with water treatment facilities given the runoff into the location. The
civil/marine engineer is pleased with the marine facilities but concerned
with the amount of site preparation required to address the steep slope on
the site. The cost engineer is concerned that addressing the issues associ-
ated with the slope will add to the cost of the project.

In a perfect world, the site selection team would have a choice of sites
with ample real estate, adequate infrastructure, and no surrounding popu-
lations. However, the more typical situation is that the site selection team is
faced with a difficult choice considering the trade offs of each location.
The site selection team considers each site in turn. The specific positive
and negative aspects of each site are presented in Table 4-1. Location 1
seems best from the safety point of view but may not be economically feasi-
ble with the river port concerns. Location 2 has residential areas and a sen-
sitive population (an elementary school) nearby and, thus, poses a
significant concern from the risk of vapor cloud explosions. Location 3 has
no residential neighbors as it is located in an industrial complex and has
adequate marine facilities; however, the site is challenging due to the steep
slope.
Considering all the locations, the team eliminates Location 2 due to
concerns of risk on the surrounding populations. Locations 1 and 3 both
have attributes that will add to project cost: marine facilities and the steep
slope, respectively. The selection team recommends Location 3 based on
an estimation that the site slope issues will be easier to control since they
are on the site property, will be easier to engineer, and will likely cost less in
the end to address.
TABLE 4-1
Location Comparison
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3
Plot space Ample Adequate Adequate
Marine facilities Inadequate Adequate Adequate
Estimated cost to modify site Highest Average Above average
Distance to sensitive populations 1 mile 700 ft (210 m) 17 miles (27 km)

(residence); 1600 ft
(490 m)(school)
Permitting Issues Small Restricted No Concerns
Potential flooding 100-year None Intermittent

flood creek bed
flooding
Potential off-site risk Low High Low

Lesson
Selecting a site includes consideration of many specialized areas. The
selection team must include personnel that can adequately address all of
these areas. Typically the proposed locations will include a mix of both posi-
tive and negative attributes from the viewpoints of risk (safety, environmen-
tal, financial, and public concern) and both capital and life cycle cost. The
challenge is in balancing all of these considerations to choose the most
appropriate location.
6 Equipment Layout and Spacing
The previous chapters have described how to select a site and lay out the
major building blocks of process, utilities, OSBL, and buildings. Now it is
time to lay out the individual pieces of equipment within the process units.
Data from a major property insurance broker highlight the importance
of considering fire and explosion events (see Table 6-1) (Marsh 2001).
The layout and spacing of equipment can reduce potential fire and explo-
sion impacts (see Table 6-2 on the following page).
As Tables 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate, significant losses are possible. The pro-
cess safety goals of layout are to design a workplace that will minimize the
risk of injuries, environmental damage, overall property damage, and
related business interruption resulting from potential toxic releases, fires,
and explosions. The goals of the capital project team are to design and build
the new unit within cost and schedule constraints. The challenge is to bal-
ance all of the goals: health, safety, environmental, cost, and schedule while
keeping in mind the lifecycle of the unit and the operational goals.
TABLE 6-1
Property Losses by Type of Event
Property Losses Exceeding $150 Million between 1970 and 1999

Numbers of Losses by Type of Event
Petrochemical
Refineries Plants Total Percent
Explosions including vapor cloud 57 65 122 51
Fire 60 27 87 37
Mechanical breakdown 4 9 13 6
Other 7 7 14 6
Total 236 100
101
TABLE 6.2
Property Losses by Type of Equipment
Property Losses Exceeding $150 million Between 1970 and 1999

Numbers of Losses by Type of Equipment
Petrochemical
Refineries Plants Total Percent
Vessels and columns 25 23 48 21
Piping 25 5 30 13
Reactors 22 22 10
Tankage 15 7 22 10
Pumps and compressors 11 4 15 6
Furnaces 5 4 9 4
Other 42 42 84 36
Total 230 100
6.1. Spacing Tables
Typical separation distances between various elements in open-air process

facilities are cited throughout this chapter and are provided in the Appendix
A Tables. These distances are based on historical and current data from
refining, petrochemical, chemical, and insurance sectors. The data were
developed based on experience and engineering judgment (not always on
calculations) and were updated based on incident learnings. Such numbers
are frequently used in industry and are included in industry codes and prac-
tices. The separation distances cited are based on potential fire conse-
quences. Highly reactive and exotic chemicals, such as alkyls or hydrazine,
may require greater spacing or protection. Explosion concerns will also
require further analysis and possibly increased spacing to meet specific
design goals and to limit explosion damage.
The separation distances in Appendix A and Chapters 5 and 6 are typical
distances based on a review of the above data and were not arrived at by a
statistical analysis of this data. Frequently the data offered a range of num-
bers from which a representative value was chosen.
These typical separation distances assume a minimal level of site fire
protection such as fire hydrants, manual firefighting capabilities, and ade-
quate drainage to prevent flooding during a major firefighting effort. Dis-
6 Equipment Layout and Spacing 103
tances may be reduced or increased based on risk analysis of site-specific

conditions or when additional fire protection, safety measures, or other
layers of protection are implemented. Fire protection measures include:
fireproofing, automatic water-spray systems, fire detection systems, emer-
gency shutdown systems, and mobile firefighting equipment. Utilize conse-
quence analysis of potential fire, explosion, and toxic impacts to determine
the adequacy of substituting additional layers of protection for spacing.
As stated in previous chapters, applicable codes, standards, and local
regulations should be researched. If they contain more stringent spacing
requirements than those quoted in these Guidelines, then they take
precedence.
6.2. General
Certain siting and layout guidelines apply to the entire site and have been
discussed previously but are worth repeating with respect to unit layout.
• Provide firefighting access from at least two directions in a path that
does not require crossing an adjacent unit. Accessways should be
provided at least every 200 ft (61 m). An accessway should be at least
20 ft (6 m) wide and should not pass under pipeways, equipment, or
other structures. These will serve as firebreaks and permit fire fight-
ers to safely approach a process fire from two directions with 100 ft
(30 m) lengths of hose connected to hydrants located at accessways.
• Consider the electrical area classification which is based on the
chemicals handled in the surrounding area. Nonelectrical ignition
sources may be included in the risk analysis for purposes of separat-
ing ignition sources from potential releases.
• Determine if the operation will be single train or multitrain. Where
units are shut down for maintenance independently, separate them
from each other to permit the safe performance of maintenance work.
• Provide access for maintenance by allowing clearance above, below,
and between equipment. Locate equipment subject to frequent main-
tenance and cleaning to provide ease of access. Consider lifting
arrangements for pumps, heavy valves, and other equipment in
equipment layout.
• Lay out equipment groups with like characteristics together. Taking
this approach allows equipment posing a similar risk to be located
together while being separated from other types of risks (such as

locating all the high temperature pumps handling flammables in one
group separated from a group of vessels).
• Consider the drainage of the plot in laying out the unit. When laying
out the unit, locate vessels or equipment with the potential to acci-
dentally release large inventories of flammable liquids so as to drain
away from and not pool under process equipment, means of egress,
or in areas that could cause significant downtime if the liquid was
burning. (An example of a poor layout might be locating a catch basin
under the main power and control cable trunk for the unit.)
6.3. Single- and Multilevel Structures
When laying out process unit equipment, it is preferable to do so with all

equipment located at grade on a level plot. This may minimize the complexity
of firefighting, potential explosion severity, and will facilitate drainage
design and emergency egress.
In some cases, process unit equipment is located on levels above grade
for reasons of limited plot space, gravity feed, or need for equipment proxim-
ity. Where equipment is located on an elevated level, provide drainage to con-
tain and divert any releases such that they do not pool under equipment or
spill down from elevated levels to the levels below. The use of solid decking to
prevent uncontrolled drainage from upper levels must be balanced with con-
cern of minimizing confinement to reduce potential explosion overpressures
as discussed in Section 6.5. One way to reduce confinement is to use drain
pans directly under equipment and open grating in all other areas.
Another design is a skid-mounted design. This design offers the ability to
construct most of the unit off site, haul it in on skids, and make the last few
connections on site thus saving time and money. The safety and environmen-
tal challenge with skid-mounted designs is that the overall width and length
are limited which increases the need to trade spacing for reduced cost. This,
combined with the additional aspect that the skids are often installed on top
of each other, can produce a process unit that is the opposite of that prefera-
ble, single elevation layout described in the first paragraph of this section.
The potential solution here is diligence in layout and design: adhering to
company layout and spacing guidelines, utilizing risk analysis to consider
alternatives, and providing additional layers of protection where warranted.
The spacing values provided in Appendix A are for horizontal distances

between equipment. Where equipment is located on multiple levels, deter-
mine the vertical spacing based on firefighting and personnel safety consid-
erations.
6.4. Enclosed Process Units
Process units may be totally enclosed in buildings or structures due to the

climate or the toxicity of the materials being handled. The spacing tables
should not be used for enclosed process units. Spacing should be based on
hazard and risk analysis.
6.5. Layout and Spacing to Minimize

Vapor Cloud Explosion Effects
Explosion effects are significantly influenced by the confinement and con-

gestion in the area of a vapor cloud. Confinement refers to the installation of
solid floors, walls, or rows of equipment that effectively act as walls. Con-
gestion is a combination of the amount and proximity of obstacles (vessels,
pumps, or piping) that are included in an area. Minimizing the confinement
and congestion will serve to minimize the potential explosion effects. Con-
sider the following list when there is a potential for vapor cloud explosions
(WBE, 1998).
• Separating groups of process equipment (such as a pump row, a bank
of exchangers, or a cluster of small vessels) from one another within a
process unit may minimize the severity of a vapor cloud explosion.
This separation distance should be 15 ft (4.6 m) or greater. This also
applies to separating large vertical and horizontal vessels by one or
more diameters from each other and from walls.
• Avoid repeated obstacle patterns with close spacing, such as rows of
heat exchangers, as this increases congestion.
• Avoid long, narrow runs of semi-enclosed spaces (such as a corridor
with equipment spaced close together on either side and a nearly
solid deck of piping above). This geometry can increase the intensity
of a vapor cloud explosion.
• Make the spacing of stacked piping, such as multi-level pipeways, as

large as possible. Allow as much unobstructed area of the layers both
horizontally and vertically as possible.
• Eliminate solid decks wherever possible in favor of metal grating or
light weight metal panels. If the solid decking cannot be avoided, ele-
vate the deck to at least three times the height of the vapor cloud that
might accumulate beneath it. As a rule of thumb, a deck height of 45 ft
(14 m) is sufficiently high for most applications.
• If possible, do not enclose process units or portions of units. If enclo-
sures are used, minimize confinement and congestion within enclo-
sures, consider damage limiting construction, use the appropriate
electrical area classification, eliminate ignition sources, and evaluate
ventilation (to dilute flammable releases).
• Weather breaks such as compressor shelters and pump houses serve
as confinement. Eliminate them where possible. If required, space
them from the equipment to minimize confinement and permit some
ventilation. Consider leaving the lower portion of the weather break
open for heavier than air releases (e.g., LFG), and the upper portion
for lighter than air releases (e.g., hydrogen).
• Air-cooled heat exchangers are a source of both confinement and tur-
bulence. Elevate them as much as possible with significant venting
around all sides. If possible, elevate the air-cooled heat exchangers to
above 3 times the height of a potential vapor cloud.
6.6. Relative Location of Equipment
Another item to keep in mind when laying out the unit is the relative location
of one piece of equipment with respect to another.
Separate equipment with a high skin temperature that may be a poten-
tial ignition source from potential sources of flammable releases. This equip-
ment includes internal combustion engines, combustion gas turbines, high
temperature piping, chemical dryers, and others.
Certain chemicals warrant special attention during layout such as those
that autoignite, self-ignite, or are static accumulators. Locate these chemi-
cals based on their chemical properties and separate them from the main
portion of the process area or other areas containing flammable materials.
The equipment distances provided in the Tables in Appendix A and those

depicted on plot plans typically show the distance from equipment edge to
equipment edge. It must be recognized that piping, valving, and controls will
be located within this separation distance; thus, the net space available for
access will be reduced.
Example
A refinery was built in 1960 based on an innovative design approach. This
approach was to build a totally integrated refinery, which would minimize
pipe lengths and plot space. This approach was taken due to very limited
plot space available and the desire to minimize capital investment. Ten
years into operation, there was a pump fire. Due to the tight design, the
pumps and equipment were located directly under the air-cooled heat
exchangers. Firefighting was difficult due to limited access and the fire
quickly escalated beyond the firefighter’s capability to control the fire. The
entire process area was a loss. The refinery was never rebuilt.
Lesson
Capital costs and fire, explosion, and toxic risks must be balanced. The
inability to combat an emergency, either through automatic fire protection
systems or manual firefighting efforts, can lead to loss of the entire project
and potential high risk to the surrounding area.
6.7. Equipment with Air Intakes

When locating air intakes for the equipment listed below in relation to adja-
cent equipment, consider wind directions, a clean air source, and the conse-
quences of toxic or flammable gas flowing into the air intake. Consider a
shutdown system triggered by gas detection for the equipment listed below.
Equipment of concern includes the following:
• Internal combustion engines and turbines
• Air compressors and blowers
• Inert gas generators
• Furnaces and boilers
• Buildings using a pressurization system for electrical area classifica-
tion purposes
• HVAC units for buildings

• Air separation units
6.8. Equipment-to-Equipment Separation Distances
This section addresses flammable materials. Materials that are toxic, reac-
tive, or pose a dust explosion potential may require additional consideration
in layout and additional layers of protection to provide control in the case of
an incident. Locating equipment handling toxics inside of a ventilated enclo-
sure may be considered as discussed in Section 6.4. Further information on
handling of these materials may be found in the CCPS Guidelines for Safe
Storage and Handling of Reactive Materials (CCPS, 1995, no. 19).
6.8.1. Process Unit Spacing

Separate equipment in a process unit by at least 100 ft (30 m) from equip-
ment handling flammable materials in adjacent units or offsite equipment.
This spacing is required to minimize risks due to maintenance activities in
one unit while the adjacent unit or offsite equipment remains in service. This
spacing applies to situations where both or only one of the units contains
flammable materials. In instances where neither unit contains flammables,
this spacing may be reduced to that required for maintenance and emer-
gency access.
The typical distance separating a process-unit battery limit from an
onsite roadway with unrestricted access is 50 ft (15 m). This spacing may be
reduced with the implementation of access controls on the roadway.
As stated in Section 6.2, provide emergency access to units from two
directions in a path that does not require crossing an adjacent unit.
Accessways should be provided at least every 200 ft (61 m). An accessway
should be at least 20 ft (6 m) wide. These access ways will permit emergency
egress, facilitate firefighting, serve as firebreaks, and serve as separations
between equipment groups to minimize potential explosion overpressures.
6.8.2. Equipment Handling Inert Materials

There are no separation distances stated in Table A for equipment handling
inert materials (nonflammable, noncombustible, nonreactive, or nontoxic)
such as nitrogen, steam, or water. When locating this type of equipment,

consider: maintenance access, the equipment criticality (i.e., equipment
necessary to safe shutdown or emergency response), replacement cost, and
potential downtime.
6.8.3. Vessels
Consider the potential effects of a spill fire from vessels with large liquid vol-
umes when locating adjacent equipment. Large liquid volumes can be found
in towers, pressure vessels, reactors, surge drums, accumulators, tanks,
and desalters. Separate these types of vessels from fired heaters and
reboilers that are not associated with that vessel. Separation from unit
pipeways will provide portable firefighting access. Do not locate these ves-
sels beneath pipeways or air cooled heat exchangers.
The spacing distances between smaller diameter equipment handling
material that does not present a hazard due to its chemical properties may
be reduced from the 15 ft (4.5 m) provided in Appendix A to 5 ft (1.5 m).
However, access for maintenance and firefighting must be provided.
6.8.4. Reactors
Reactor spacing can be reduced from the values given in Appendix A when
the reactor and the other piece of equipment both handle the same material,
are of the same level of construction, and pose the same hazards. Mainte-
nance access must be provided. Reactors in identical service may be located
as close as maintenance access and firefighting needs permit.
Locating a reactor close to associated equipment may be preferable in
cases where highly hazardous materials (such as acetylene or hydrofluoric
acid) are involved as this minimizes the piping lengths between equipment.
Greater fire protection may be warranted where separation distances are
reduced.
No separation distance is provided here or in the tables for reactors con-
taining toxic materials that are neither flammable nor explosive from other
process equipment. Base distances to occupied areas on risk analysis.
The spacing distances in Appendix A do not apply to reactors located
inside of bays or containment walls. In this case, explosion analysis should
be used to determine the location and dictate the design requirements.
6.8.5. Scrubbers and Catch Tanks

Scrubbers and catch tanks may contain volumes of flammable materials.
Treat them as process vessels for spacing considerations.
6.8.6 Heat Exchangers

When locating heat exchangers, provide sufficient access to permit safe
blinding and tube bundle removal. Other than stacked exchangers, do not
locate equipment above heat exchangers containing flammable liquids, or
combustible liquids that are heated above their autoignition temperature.
6.8.7 Air Cooled Heat Exchangers

Updraft air-cooled heat exchangers draw air through the cooler and may also
draw the heat and fire in the same direction. The additional heat input to the
cooler from the fire can cause high temperature and overpressure of other
equipment. Additionally, the metallurgy that makes the fins appropriate for
heat transfer also makes them highly susceptible to damage from heat. Do
not locate vessels or pumps containing flammable or combustible liquids
beneath air-cooled heat exchangers. , Do not locate heat exchangers con-
taining flammables or combustibles that are heated above their autoignition
temperature beneath air-cooled heat exchangers. Do not locate multiple
flanges and valves, such as in control stations, under air-cooled heat
exchangers. Separate air-cooled heat exchangers from ignition sources such
as fired heaters.
6.8.8 Fired Heaters

Fired heaters are a continuous ignition source. Locate them upwind of
potential flammable vapor release sources to minimize the potential for fires
and explosions. Locating fired heaters at the unit battery limits provides
good access and maximizes separation. Separate fired heaters from equip-
ment containing flammable liquids and vents that might release vapors. An
exception to this distance is when heaters are feeding reactors and it is
desirable to minimize the length of the large diameter transfer line.
6.8.9 Unit Flares

Unit flares may include thermal oxidizers, ground flares, and elevated flares.
Locate unit flares upwind from process equipment to minimize the potential
for ignition. Flare spacing depends on the flare height, load, and the radiant
heat level permitted. Maximum permissible thermal radiation, luminosity,
and noise levels are typically mandated. Distances to these levels can be
based on consequence modeling or on calculation methods such as those
provided in API RP 521.
Consider the risk of windblown embers from an elevated flare tip. They
may ignite materials below the flare. Locate the flare at a safe distance from
equipment and storage tanks containing flammable or combustible materi-
als to avoid this concern.
6.8.10. Gas Compressors and Expanders

Treat steam- or motor-driven gas compressors the same as pumps in regard
to spacing. Locate all flammable gas compressors downwind and separated
from fired heaters. Do not locate equipment above gas compressors. Sepa-
rate suction knockout drums, intercoolers and intercooler accumulators
from the compressor to provide firefighting and maintenance access.
Example
An engine driven compressor with a large flywheel was located near a tank
containing a highly toxic chemical. The attachment of the flywheel to the
shaft failed and the flywheel came loose and rolled toward the tank. The fly-
wheel was stopped by a steel post designed to restrict vehicle traffic near
the tank.
Lesson
Consider the orientation of rotating equipment to reduce the possibility of
mechanical failures impacting adjacent equipment.
6.8.11. Pumps
Pumps pose a fire potential due to the leaks from the seals, temperatures of
pumped fluids, and the discharge pressures. Pump fire likelihood may be
reduced through the use of higher integrity seals (e.g., double seals) and reg-
ular monitoring programs. Although a pump fire may be detected early and
controlled quickly with effective fire protection and firefighting, significant
damage to adjacent equipment and the pump may occur depending on the
pump location. Locating pumps under pipeways carrying flammable materi-
als, controls cabling, and air-cooled heat exchangers can lead to significant
damage and downtime from a relatively small pump fire.
When a pump and its spare are exposed to a common fire hazard, addi-
tional separation between them may be justified especially if there is a signifi-
cant business interruption concern. NFPA classifies a material as flammable or
combustible based on its flash point. The operating temperature of the pumped
fluid should also be used in this classification. Any combustible fluid heated
above its flash point will have the characteristics of a flammable liquid and
should be considered a flammable liquid in spacing and laying out equipment.
Group pumps handling flammables above their autoignition tempera-
ture and self-igniting materials together and separate from other flammable
pumps. This serves to group similar hazards and separate hazard levels to
minimize damage due to spill fires.
TABLE 6.3
Pump Separation Distances
Liquid Temperature Pump location

Below flashpoint Adjacent to but not under fireproofed pipeways and air cooled
heat exchangers
15 ft (4.6 m) from nonfireproofed pipeways
At or above flashpoint 10 ft (3 m) from fireproofed pipeways where the pump is
protected by a firewater spray system
15 ft (4.6 m) from non-fireproofed pipeways and air-coolers
where pump is protected by a firewater spray system
15 ft (4.6 m) from fireproofed pipeways where the pump is not
protected by a firewater spray system
For nonfireproofed pipeways and air-coolers where pump is
not protected by a firewater spray system, use consequence
analysis to determine spacing
Note: Where the pump is handling materials that are self-igniting or above their autoignition
temperature, conduct a hazard analysis to determine if greater spacing or additional layers of
protection are required.
Note: Where the pump is handling materials that are close to their flashpoint, good practice
dictates that they be considered to be above their flash point or additional calculations are
performed since there is significant variability in referenced flashpoint values.
Separation distances between pumps and pipeways based on pump

parameters and fire protection are described in Table 6.3.
Locate transfer pumps outside of tank dikes. Treat transfer pumps as
process equipment and separate from unit substations by at least 50 ft
(15 m), and from main substations by at least 200 ft (61 m).
Example
A typical 1950s or 1960s refinery unit layout located the charge pump at
the beginning of a pump row. The pump row would be located in the center
of the unit with the unit pipeway located above. The pipeway was also a
convenient avenue to run the power and instrument control lines. In many
cases, the charge pump was located near the control room or instrument
house. The main power and instrument runs for the entire unit were in a
single run back to the control house and were located in the pipeway
directly above the charge pump. Many otherwise non-significant pump fires
have resulted in significant downtime because of the damage to the power
and instrument lines. In many units, these power and instrument cables are
fireproofed. Typically instrument fireproofing is designed to ensure safe
shutdown of the unit, which is estimated at 10 to 30 minutes whereas the
pump fire might burn for an hour or more.
Lesson
The fireproofing served its design to allow for a safe unit shutdown. How-
ever, because the power and instrument cables ran directly above the
pump, a small fire led to a long downtime. Locating critical facilities away
from likely fire sources can minimize potential for extended downtime
caused by small fires.
6.8.12. Cogeneration Facilities

Cogeneration facilities include gas turbine-driven generators with waste
heat steam boilers and alternative fuel fired boilers such as those burning
petroleum coke. Treat cogeneration facilities as utility units for separation
distance considerations.
6.8.13. Unit Isolation Valves

Install unit isolation valves or battery limit valves in a safe, well-lit, accessi-
ble location near the process-unit battery limits. Locate the valves or the
remote actuation point outside of the fire risk area.
6.8.14. Water Spray Actuation Valves

Locate manual actuation valves for water spray outside of the fire areas of
the hazards they are protecting. Locate manual water-spray actuation
valves near the battery limits in a well-lighted and easily accessible area.
Also, manual or automatic water-spray deluge valves should be located near
the battery limits in a location convenient to the operators or emergency
responders and in the expected path of travel. This location should be pro-
tected from fire and explosions.
6.8.15. Emergency Shutdown Valves

Locate a manually operated emergency shutdown valve in an accessible
location at least 50 ft (15 m) from the outer edge of a potential pool fire that
might be associated with the equipment the valve is isolating. Locate
remotely operated valve actuation stations at least 50 ft (15 m) from poten-
tial fire sources. Automatic valves may be located anywhere as long as they
are fire protected so that they operate when needed.
6.8.16. Vents and Relief Vents to Atmosphere

Vents, pressure relief, and rupture disk discharge points should be located to
vent to a safe location. Locate these discharge points such that they do not
create a hazard for operators or maintenance personnel on walkways or
platforms. Location of these vents should be a safe distance from building
HVAC intakes. Consequence modeling may be utilized to determine the dis-
tance from the vent that a hazardous concentration may exist.
6.8.17. Fire Pumps

Fire pumps are required to be fully functional in emergencies. Consequently,
locate them, and their source of motive power, away from potential fire or
explosion impact areas and areas prone to flooding.
6.8.18. Fire Hydrants and Monitors

Space fire hydrants protecting process units no greater than 200 ft (61 m)
apart around the process unit perimeter. Locate hydrants at the unit
accessways to facilitate manual firefighting in the unit with hoses. In tank
farms, space fire hydrants no greater than 200 ft (61 m) apart with at least
one on each quadrant. It is a good practice to locate a fire hydrant next to

each foam fire truck connection point on storage tanks to provide a minimal
distance between the foam fire truck and the hydrant.
Place monitors as fire protection assessments dictate. Typically they are
located 50 ft (15 m) from the fire risk area they are protecting. Additional
firewater monitors may be necessary if large equipment obstructs their
range of projecting firewater.
6.8.19. Pipeways
Pipeways are structures that support pipes, power leads, and instrument
cable trays. They are referred to as pipeways, piperacks, or pipebands. The
piping they support may contain process fluids or utilities.
Main pipeways transfer material from the unit pipeway to storage or
utility areas. Unit pipeways are located within the battery limits and transfer
material between the unit process equipment. Pipeways may be elevated or
at grade.
Main pipeways should be located outside of process unit battery limits.
Separation distances from main pipeways are based on substantially all
welded pipe in the pipeway. Treat sections of the pipeway containing numer-
ous flanges, process control valve stations, vents, drains, or other release
sources as process area pipeways in regard to spacing.
Evaluate pipeways handling high hazard chemicals (such as MIC, chlo-
rine, or acetylene) to consider their safe layout. Pipes handling highly corro-
sive materials such as aqueous HCl should be located on the bottom
piperack tier to prevent damage to other pipes and cables if there is a loss of
containment. Do not locate pipeways where they might put emergency
response equipment (including fire pumps) at risk. Route to avoid damage
from cranes. Consider routing incompatible materials in separate pipeways.
6.8.20. Tanks Inside Battery Limits
This section applies to in-process tanks and storage tanks containing flam-
mable or combustible liquids within battery limits. Limit storage tanks
within battery limits in number and size. Separate storage tanks from pro-
cess equipment. Treat smaller storage tanks (less than 10,000 gallons
(38,000 l) as process vessels (such as towers, drums, and KO pots) for spac-
ing concerns.
For tanks larger than 10,000 gallons (38,000 l), the values provided in
Appendix A may be used as a starting point with further definition provided
through a hazard analysis.
6.8.21. Unit Substations and Electrical Switch Racks
For fire considerations, separate unit substations from process equipment

handling flammables. Do not locate the switchgear room either above or
below the control room. Do not locate HVAC on the roof of a control building
unless it is provided with independent support.
All switch racks should meet electrical classification requirements. Sep-
arate electrical switch racks supporting shutdown or emergency functions
from equipment handling flammables by at least 20 ft (6 m) and from fired
heaters or gas compressors by at least 50 ft (15 m).
6.9. Multi-Chapter Example
Continuing with the example presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the topic of

laying out equipment within a process unit is the next step.
Example
Although all the process details are not yet defined, the Process Engineer
has a good understanding of the pieces of equipment and their sizes. Based
on this information the first pass at laying out the unit within the plants can
begin. Locate the pieces of equipment the appropriate distances from each
other as noted in the tables in Appendix A.
The ethylene plant is divided into separate units: the cryogenic unit,
the furnace cracking unit, and the product unit. The ethylene plant layout is
presented in Figure 6-1. For the purposes of illustration, we will develop the
layout for only one of the processes within the ethylene plant, the furnace
cracking unit.
Hydrocarbon feedstock streams supplying the ethylene process can
include: ethane, propane, or butane. The feedstock streams are sent to the
tubes of a cracking furnace that is heated by burning fuel gas. Steam injec-
tion is utilized in the tubes to control yields and prevent coke formation.
Figure 6-1. The Ethylene Plant Layout
Subjecting the feedstock to high temperatures results in a partial con-

version of the feedstock to ethylene and hydrogen. After the cracking fur-
nace, the process stream is compressed to a higher pressure using “cracked
gas compressors” and is then sent to a cryogenic plant for separation and
purification. The predominant products of this process are ethylene and
propylene.
The major pieces of equipment in the cracking furnace unit are listed
below:
• The superheater and five ethylene cracking furnaces are located
together on the upwind side of the process and are separated from
the pipeway.
• The process includes two cracked gas compressors. As these are a
potential release point, they are located on the opposite side of the
unit from the furnaces. This maximizes separation and puts them
downwind of the potential ignition sources
• As in most processes, there are a large number of pumps. These are

grouped according to their risk level. For instance, the pumps han-
dling hydrocarbons at high temperatures and pressures comprise
one group. The boiler feedwater pumps comprise another group.
These pumps are located in a row along an accessway to permit lift
equipment to access the pumps for maintenance purposes.
• The quench process equipment, comprised of various vessels, is
grouped together and located downwind of the furnaces. The heat
exchangers are laid out providing access for pulling tube bundles
during maintenance operations.
• The pump row is located adjacent to the unit pipeway. The pipeway
is fireproofed and the pumps are protected with a firewater spray
system. This will minimize the probability of a small pump fire dam-
aging the air-cooled heat exchangers or electrical cables within the
pipeway and causing significant downtime.
• A number of firewater spray systems are specified by the fire protec-
tion or safety engineer. The actuation station for these systems is
located in a bank at the edge of the unit in the direction of the control
room. This places the actuation points outside of the fire hazard
areas, makes them easily accessible, and places them on a likely
path of travel in case of an emergency.
• All equipment is separated from adjacent equipment based on the typi-
cal spacing tables provided in Appendix A. The fire protection or safety
engineer is consulted when it is a challenge to meet the tables and addi-
tional fire protection and loss prevention measures are identified.
Typical spacing distances between the equipment listed above is
obtained by utilizing Table A in Appendix A. The cracking furnace unit layout
is developed based on this information and is presented in Figure 6-2.
Lesson
Laying out the individual pieces of equipment within a unit may be accom-
plished by utilizing the typical spacing tables provided in Appendix A. The
process parameters including the materials being handled and their tem-
perature and pressure will impact the spacing distances and should be
understood before the layout is begun. The concept of grouping like risks
together (pumps, furnaces) will facilitate the layout and optimize real
estate. Prevailing wind direction must be considered when locating poten-
tial ignition sources and equipment with the potential to release flammable
materials.
Figure 6-2. The Furnace Cracking Unit (1 ft equals 0.304 m). NM: no minimum;
NA: not applicable
7 Optimize the Layout
7.1. Layout Method Review
Laying out a complex, site, plant, or unit can be a challenging exercise. There
are safety, environmental, financial, and public concern risks to balance with
project cost and schedule goals.
Layout development involves many different areas of expertise. The
layout development process is an iterative one that develops as various
needs are recognized and changes suggested. It will help to involve as many
experts as early as possible in project development so that they can work
together as information becomes available to optimize the layout. Making
changes on paper during project design is much easier and more cost-effec-
tive than changing steel in the field. This multi-discipline early involvement
will lead to a site that poses fewer risks, fewer changes in project develop-
ment, and a more cost-effective project life cycle.
This need for early involvement is heightened in fast-track projects,
where a normal project timeline is compressed. In these projects there is
even less time to involve specialists, complete studies, and make changes.
The earlier specialist input is sought, the easier it will be to incorporate
change in the project design.
Safety and environmental engineering should be involved throughout
the development process to ensure that hazards and risks are managed to
corporate and or regulatory expectations. Often there are decisions to be
made on how best to balance the various types of risk and costs. Many com-
panies have corporate guidelines available to assist in this effort. Also, there
are CCPS Guideline books listed in the reference section of this book that can
assist with risk management efforts. In general, risks can be more cost-
effectively managed when they are addressed early in project development.
This is because early in the project there are more prevention and mitigation
options available to the project team.
121
There is a large amount of both site and process data to be gathered and
considered in the layout and spacing process. This data may be used to
group plants, units, and equipment items with similar risks and segregate
these risk groups from one another. This is a cost effective way to manage
risk. This minimizes the probability of an incident occurring or escalating
because higher risk equipment is located away from lower risk equipment. It
also allows risk minimization measures (e.g., fixed protection systems, con-
tainment systems, detection systems) to be installed efficiently around the
higher risk equipment rather than across the entire site.
Once these blocks are laid out, the separation distances between the
blocks and between the individual pieces of equipment may be determined
through either of two methods or a combination of the two. The two methods
are:
• Utilizing spacing tables
• Utilizing fire, explosion, and toxic release consequence modeling.
Although spacing tables may not provide an exact, analytical answer,
they are a means to quickly, and thus cost-effectively, lay out a site while
taking advantage of significant experience contained in the spacing table.
When spacing tables are used, exercise care to ensure that the spacing table
is applicable for the subject process and hazard. If the spacing table is not
applicable to the process being built, or if the concern is an explosion or a
toxic release, then use the second method as described in the following
paragraph.
The second method is to develop spacing distances for the site’s specific
layout and process parameters through fire, toxic, and explosion conse-
quence modeling. This can be a time consuming endeavor given the large
numbers of equipment items involved in a site layout. The basic steps when
taking this approach are described in Chapter 5.
The best solution is likely a combination of the two approaches and is
depicted in Figure 7-1, which is a repeat of Figure 5-2. Use the spacing tables
for the first layout. This will suffice for most equipment spacing. Follow with
a more detailed layout for those distances of concern (i.e., because the real
estate is not available or there is a specific high-risk operation). Toxic con-
cerns and explosion concerns related to buildings will require consequence
modeling to develop a site-specific spacing distance as described in API RP
752 or the CCPS Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for Exter-
nal Explosions and Fires.
7 Optimize the Layout 123
Figure 7-1. Site Layout Flowchart
7.2. Layout Issues Resolution
Frequently, even with a long project schedule and appropriate specialist

involvement, there are equally appropriate site layouts. There may also be
challenges in finding an acceptable layout design because plot area is not
adequate for the spacing desired. At this point, additional consequence mod-
eling and risk assessment can be utilized to assist in quantifying the con-
cerns, balancing the risks, and identifying potential prevention and
mitigation measures. Some examples are provided below.
• Fire consequence analysis can be used to estimate the extent of the
potential fire area given the specific equipment parameters (e.g., area
drainage to minimize liquid pool accumulation or the type of release
fire that is likely). This may allow a reduction in spacing between
equipment.
• Toxic consequence analysis can be used to estimate the downwind

concentration of a material, which could be helpful in locating a “vent
to safe location”.
• Explosion and toxic consequence analysis can be used to estimate the
extent of potential hazard areas, which could assist in determining
the distance from the process unit to the property line.
• Risk analysis can be used to estimate the financial impact of reducing
spacing and potentially increasing the extent of a loss from a fire.
• Layer of protection analysis can be used to consider all types of pro-
tection (such as spacing, instrumented systems, and fire protection)
to assist in providing appropriate levels of protection where spacing
may not be adequate and additional protection is prudent.
Example
A refinery decided to install additional LPG processing facilities and pres-
surized LPG storage. An analysis was conducted to determine if the pro-
posed location for the new equipment presented a risk to off-site or in-plant
personnel.
The consequence analysis included process unit vapor cloud explosions,
flash fires, jet fires, pool fire, catastrophic sphere failure and vessel BLEVEs
(boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions). This data was used to qualita-
tively determine the magnitude of the increased risk associated with the
project. The following is a description of a few of the scenarios evaluated
and the results.
Propylene Unit Piping Failure—This scenario assumes a 4-inch (10
cm) hole resulting in the release of propylene and a subsequent vapor cloud
explosion. The blast impact at the nearest building is determined to be of
negligible concern. If the release resulted in a jet fire, the jet could impact
the nearest building. For this reason, a recommendation was made to relo-
cate the building.
BLEVE—This scenario assumes that a fire impinges on a propylene
sphere and the sphere undergoes a BLEVE. The calculated thermal radia-
tion levels at the property line indicate that there would be minimal off-site
impact. It was qualitatively considered that the off-site impact from shrap-
nel from a BLEVE posed a low risk based on the distance of the sphere to
the community.
7 Optimize the Layout 125
Catastrophic Sphere Failure—This scenario evaluated a catastrophic

failure of one of the propylene spheres and the resulting vapor cloud conse-
quences. Although a very large flammable cloud would form in this sce-
nario, there would be no expected off-site impact since the hazard zone was
well within the 1 mile (1.6 km) distance to the property line. If the resulting
cloud travels toward the process area, an explosion or fire could result. The
distance from the sphere storage to the closest process is approximately
200 m (660 ft). The probability of this scenario is determined to be very
low and the distance is judged to be appropriate.
Based on this analysis, the proposed locations of the propylene unit
and the propylene spheres were determined to not significantly increase the
existing in-plant and off-site risks and the proposed siting was endorsed
with the provision of relocating the one building of concern in a jet fire sce-
nario.
Lesson
Use risk analysis to assist in quantifying the concerns, balancing the risks,
and identifying potential prevention and mitigation measures. The jet fire
consequence prompted the relocation of a building. The sphere failure, with
a low probability and thus low risk, did not warrant a change in layout.
7.3. The Right Answer
Laying out a complex, site, plant, or unit is a challenging exercise. One must
also be aware that what may be acceptable today may be unacceptable tomor-
row. Societies increasingly demand higher standards for processing sites.
Periodic review of risk is necessary as the facility technology changes,
the process changes, the site expands, the regulations change, and the sur-
roundings outside the fence change. Increased spacing provides better flexi-
bility as future demands evolve.
What is the right answer in siting and laying out a complex, site,
plant, or unit? There isn’t just one answer that fits every site. The
site selection and layout must facilitate maintenance, operations,
emergency response, corporate goals, and the needs of the commu-
nity. The answer that is appropriate for your project is one that bal-
ances the risks and costs of today. It must also anticipate the needs
of tomorrow.
8 Case Histories
This chapter provides a selection of case histories to illustrate both the

appropriate manner in which to address facility siting and layout as well as
the consequences when the effort is not done well. These case histories
include both actual events and illustrative scenarios.
Case History 1: Consider BLEVE potential in siting of LPG storage

At approximately 05:35 hours on 19 November 1984 a major fire and a
series of catastrophic explosions occurred at the government owned and
operated PEMEX LPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City.
Three refineries supplied the facility with LPG on a daily basis. The
plant was being filled from a refinery 248 miles (400 km) away. Two large
spheres and 48 cylindrical vessels were filled to 90% and 4 smaller spheres
to 50% full.
A drop in pressure was noticed in the control room and also at a pipe-
line pumping station. An 8 inch (20 cm) pipe between a sphere and a series
of cylinders had ruptured. Unfortunately the operators could not identify the
cause of the pressure drop. The release of LPG continued for about 5–10
minutes when the gas cloud, estimated at 660 ft×490 ft × 6.6 ft (200 m
× 150 m × 2 m) high, drifted to a flare stack. It ignited, causing violent
ground shock. A number of ground fires occurred. Workers on the plant
tried to deal with the escaping LPG and the emergency response, taking
various actions. At a late stage, an emergency shut[down] was initiated.
About fifteen minutes after the initial release, the first BLEVE occurred.
For the next hour and a half there followed a series of BLEVEs as the LPG
vessels violently exploded. LPG was said to rain down and surfaces covered
in the liquid were set alight. The explosions were recorded on a seismo-
graph at the University of Mexico (HSE, 2002, Skandia, 1985).
[From Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2nd ed. by F. P. Lees. Reprinted by permis-
sion of Elsevier Science Ltd., Lees 1996.]
127
This incident resulted in 650 fatalities, more than 6400 injuries, and
destruction of the terminal and many of the homes in the neighborhood
located adjacent to the terminal.
Lesson
LPG vessels have the potential to BLEVE, which can have consequences at
great distances.
• Consider the surrounding areas and future development when siting
LPG vessels. The population was likely not near the site when it was
constructed which is often the case. However, acquiring additional
land beyond that needed for the plant facilities at the time of siting
the plant would have provided a buffer area between the LPG Ves-
sels and future surrounding community.
• Consider all potential credible incident scenarios when laying out the
equipment on the site. The many LPG vessels at the PEMEX site were
closely spaced. Providing more land area to better space vessels and
permit good drainage and LPG spill containment could have reduced
the consequences of the failure (e.g., less chance of BLEVE and
reduced amount of LPG released). Better access could have permitted
a better chance of controlling the fire and containing the release. This
equates to more land area or reduced numbers of vessels on the land
available. Manage the total number of LPG storage vessels located in
an area by addressing the potential magnitude of the consequences.
• Consider the orientation of LPG cylindrical vessels as they may
launch in the direction of their axis during a BLEVE and escalate the
incident. The cause of some of the damage to the spheres may have
been due to shrapnel from exploding horizontal vessels. Note in
Figure 8-1, some of the horizontal storage tank ends were pointed
toward the spheres.
• Consider the hazard of the facility and assure that adequate fire pro-
tection is provided.
8 Case Histories 129
Figure 8-1. LPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec before and after (Skandia, 1985)
Case History 2: Separate occupied buildings from equipment

with runaway reaction potential
Unit 1, a relatively small process unit was located near one end of a chemi-
cal complex. The feedstock for Unit 1 came from the large process units
located in the center of the complex. All of the process units were well
spaced for fire hazards. The majority of the occupied buildings including
administration, engineering, shipping/receiving, and warehousing were
generally arranged along the plant main entrance at the opposite end of
complex from Unit 1. These buildings had good separation from the process
units. However, the Maintenance Shop and the Contractor Building (a small
building that contractors used for a workshop) were situated approximately
250 ft (75 m) from Unit 1. The tank farm was located beyond the Mainte-
nance Shop from Unit 1, with the closest tank being about 410 ft (125 m)
from Unit 1. The closest tanks contained toxic, non-flammable materials in
an assortment of atmospheric and pressurized storage tanks.
Unit 1 suffered a runaway reaction resulting in catastrophic failure of a
reactor. Fragments from the reactor were thrown over 3300 ft (1000 m).
Large pieces of structural steel, piping and neighboring vessels were thrown
up to 980 ft (300 m). The blast collapsed the Maintenance Building, result-
ing in several fatalities. Metal panel siding was torn from the Contractor
Building, but the structure remained standing. The Maintenance Building
and Contractor Building were both enveloped in the plume.
Damage to buildings at the main entrance included cracked walls,
buckled metal panels, broken windows, bent doors, and dislodged false
ceilings. However, none of the buildings collapsed and all but one were put
back into immediate use during emergency response.
The complex was situated in a rural area with only two nearby struc-
tures, both more than 980 ft (300 m) from the nearest plant fence.
Lesson
Although the site was well spaced for fire considerations, the runaway reac-
tion potential and resulting overpressure was not adequately addressed in
the siting. The siting and layout minimized the impact on most buildings
and permitted emergency response activities, but the maintenance and
contractor buildings were damaged resulting in injuries and fatalities.
A preliminary hazard analysis may have identified the possibility for
runaway reaction and its potential consequences. Consideration could then
have been given to the location of the reactor with respect to the toxic mate-
rial storage area and the location of the buildings with respect to the reactor.
A different site arrangement may have reduced the risk of fatalities and inju-
ries resulting from the reactor failure. It is important to consider all potential
consequences in site layout including fires, explosions, and toxic releases.
Case History 3: Consider siting of high volumes of reactive

chemicals
In 1987 the PEPCON Ammonium Perchlorate plant in Henderson, NV
experienced a fire and one of the largest industrial explosions in history.
Ammonium perchlorate is the oxidizer used in solid rocket motors. The
PEPCON explosion occurred about 1 year after the Challenger space shuttle
accident. PEPCON had a very large inventory of ammonium perchlorate
due to a halt in production of shuttle motors by NASA. However, Morton
Thiokol had PEPCON continue ammonium perchlorate production knowing
that NASA would resume production. They had in excess of 10 million
pounds (4.5 million kilograms) of ammonium perchlorate in storage.
Ammonium perchlorate was classified as an oxidizer prior to the
PEPCON accident. All of the transportation and safety tests for classifica-
tion of hazardous materials had been performed, primarily by the military.
Thus, no precautions were being taken for a detonable material.
The PEPCON plant was located in the desert outside of Las Vegas, with
good separation from neighbors except one food processing plant, a marsh-
mallow plant that immediately adjoined PEPCON’s property. Although the
large separation was not the result of planning for off-site consequences, it
proved critical in minimizing off-site damage and injuries.
The PEPCON site had experienced neighborhood encroachment. A
new residential area was being developed a few miles from PEPCON. An
entire subdivision was built, and the opening weekend at which the houses
would be sold was planned for just one or two weeks after the time of the
explosion. All of the brand new houses were vacant.
There is a debate about the cause of this accident and why the ammo-
nium perchlorate fire was difficult to extinguish. Ammonium perchlorate by
itself burns poorly and is easily extinguished with water. The PEPCON plant
was built over a 16-inch (41-cm) natural gas main. This pipe was found to
have a flaw in a weld. Ammonium perchlorate in the presence of any fuel
causes a very aggressive fire. PEPCON personnel could not stop the initial
fire with water, which was very unusual. One theory was that a natural gas
leak provided fuel. From a siting standpoint, putting an oxidizer plant over a
natural gas main may not have been the best decision.
The final explosion had a TNT equivalent on the order of 2 million
pounds (0.9 million kilograms). The nearby homes suffered damage ranging
from extensive window breakage to broken roof joists. Minor injuries would
have resulted had the area been populated. The PEPCON plant was essen-
tially leveled. The marshmallow plant was still standing, but had severe
damage. There were only two fatalities one of which was the PEPCON plant
manager who gave the evacuation order early after fires started, and who
remained in the Administration Building calling emergency responders. A
critical decision the plant manager made was for staff not to use cars; he
instructed them to evacuate on foot into the desert which proved to be much
quicker. The ability to evacuate quickly saved many lives.
Lesson
It is important to know the site characteristics as well as the characteristics
of the materials being handled. Materials that react with one another
should be separated from each other on the site, such as the ammonium
perchlorate and the natural gas main. Recognizing the potential for offsite
damage and siting a facility in a remote location is only the beginning.
Ensuring that the public cannot encroach on the facility boundaries will
ensure that the risk of offsite impact is managed.
Case History 4: Understand and consider the potential of highly

reactive chemicals in facility siting
At 8:14 pm on February 19, 1999, a process vessel containing several

hundred pounds (over one hundred kilograms) of hydroxylamine (HA)
exploded at the Concept Sciences, Inc. (CSI), production facility near Allen-
town, Pennsylvania. Employees were distilling an aqueous solution of HA
and potassium sulfate, the first commercial batch to be processed at the
new CSI facility. After the distillation process was shut down, the HA in the
process tank and associated piping explosively decomposed, most likely
due to high concentration and temperature.
Four CSI employees and a manager of an adjacent business were
killed. Those injured included CSI employees, people in nearby buildings,
firefighters, and security guards. The production facility was extensively
damaged. The explosion also caused significant damage to other buildings
in the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park and shattered windows in several

nearby homes. Estimated property damage in February 1999 was $3.5 to
$4 million (see Figure 8-2).
CSI’s design and safety review was inadequate given the hazards of
highly concentrated HA. A critical evaluation of process materials, condi-
tions, equipment, and development experience would have indicated that
credible scenarios presented the potential of a catastrophic HA explosion.
Facility siting evaluations typically include process safety analyses and
reviews of government regulations, industry guidelines, and local emer-
gency planning requirements. CSI was located in a multiple-tenant building
within a suburban industrial park. Fortunately, the timing of the explo-
sion—8:14 pm on a Friday—limited the number of fatalities and injuries.
[Reproduced with the permission of the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investiga-
tion Board, US CSB, 2002.]
Lessons
Facility siting should consider all potential hazards (e.g., fire, explosion,
toxic material release) to people, property, and the environment. Siting eval-
uations should be an integral part of process design. If CSI had performed
an adequate Process Hazards Analysis for the planned HA manufacturing
operation, it would have recognized the danger to the public. Management
could have selected an alternate site where no one at neighboring facilities
would be exposed to such a substantial risk.
Figure 8-2. Concept Sciences, Inc. Site

Case History 5: Understand and consider expansion issues and

design options
A plastics company decided to increase resin manufacturing capacity at the

plant in Figure 8-3. The expansion included two new reactors, new cooling
towers, a new peroxide storage building and expansion of the catalyst prep-
aration building.
Design reviews and the preliminary hazard analysis identified the fol-
lowing issues:
• Expansion of the reactor building to the east would impair plant
maintenance access. Expansion to the south is preferred but radiant
heat from the flare in an emergency situation was a concern.
• Existing pipeways were at capacity. The cooling tower and the associated
distribution piping needed to be located to not interfere with plant access.
• The new peroxide storage building needed significant separation dis-
tance due to the potential for decomposition of stored catalyst. NFPA
432 ”Storage of Organic Peroxide Formulations” was consulted for
safe separation distances.
• The catalyst preparation process included the opening and closing of
vessels that contained flammable liquids which resulted in a Class I,
Division 1 electrical area classification. Expansion of the catalyst
Figure 8-3. Original Layout

preparation building would have resulted in expanding the classified

area surrounding the catalyst preparation building. The control
building needed to remain in an unclassified area.
The following analysis and changes were made to accommodate the
layout shown in Figure 8-4.
A flare loading and radiant heat study was completed. The radiant heat
in an emergency was judged to be moderate so the reactor building was
expanded to the south. The roofing materials on the reactor building were
changed to aluminum to assure that extended exposure to radiant heat from
the flare would not damage the roof.
The cooling towers were located to the south so that a new pipeway
would not impair plant access. Excess capacity was designed into the
pipeway support structure to allow for future expansion.
An inherently safer design approach was taken to analyze the peroxide
decomposition hazard. A change in catalyst formulation allowed a less
reactive peroxide to be used in the process. A reduction in peroxide hazard
classification reduced the safe separation distances.
Increased automation of the catalyst solution preparation process
reduced the electrical classification to Class I, Division II and allowed the
catalyst preparation building to be expanded without encroaching on the
nonclassified control building.
Figure 8.4. Layout after Expansion Project

Lesson
Design reviews and preliminary hazard analysis can identify areas for con-
sideration both in terms of the site constraints and the material properties
and handling needs. Inherently safer design concepts and these analyses
can aid in identifying other potential layers of protection in addition to spac-
ing and separation.
Case History 6: Consider jet fire consequences on adjacent

buildings
A clean out operation of a batch still, known as “60 still base,” was orga-
nized in order to remove residues. This vessel had not been cleaned since it
was installed in the nitrotoluenes area in 1961. An operator dipped the
sludge to examine it and reported the sludge as gritty with the consistency
of soft butter to management. No sample was sent for analysis nor was the
atmosphere inside the vessel checked for a flammable vapor. It was mistak-
enly thought that the material was a thermally stable tar.
In order to soften the sludge, which was estimated to have a depth of
14 in. (34 cm), steam was applied to the bottom heating element. Advice
was given not to exceed 194°F (90°C). Employees started the clean out
operation using a metal rake. The material was tar-like and had liquid
entrained in it. Approximately one hour into the cleaning process a longer
rake was used to reach further into the still.
The vessel’s temperature gauge in the control room was reported to be
reading 118°F (48°C). Instructions were given to isolate the steam. A number
of employees involved in the raking left the still base to get on with other tasks.
One person left on the scaffold had stopped raking and noticed a blue light,
which turned instantly to an orange flame. As he leapt from the scaffold an
incandescent conical jet erupted from the manhole. This projected horizontally
toward the control building. A vertical jet of burning vapor shot out of the top
rear vent to the height of the distillation column nearby.
The jet fire lasted for approximately one minute before subsiding to
localized fires around the man-lid and buildings nearby. The force of the jet
destroyed the scaffold, propelling the manhole cover into the center of the
Meissner control building. The jet severely damaged this building and then
impacted on the north face of the main office block causing a number of
fires to start inside the building.
Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the
Queen’s Printer for Scotland. HSE, 2002.
Lesson
Knowing the identity of the chemicals being handled and understanding
their properties is imperative in the safe handling and siting of materials.
Without knowing what the chemical is, the risks of fire, explosion, and toxic
impact cannot be considered. Different from pool fires, jet fires involve pres-
sure and velocity thus causing them to extend great distances, though fre-
quently for a limited time. These potential distances for significant damage
must be considered in siting especially relative to occupied structures.
Case History 7: Consider siting and layout in management of

change
A plastic company that manufactures resins was considering adding a pro-
cess that includes hydrofluoric acid (HF) as a raw material. The HF would
enter the plant by rail car and the cars would need to be unloaded and
cleaned. The initial hazards review identified releases of HF during unload-
ing or rail car cleaning as potential concerns.
The company undertook consequence analysis to better define the haz-
ards. The dispersion analysis identified that a moderate size release at the
unloading pressure and temperature could impact onsite and offsite loca-
tions. Cleaning the rail cars was expected to be less of a concern due to
lower pressures and much smaller quantities available for release.
Several engineering solutions were considered including not adding the
HF process. A cost benefit analysis was performed and the decision was made
to unload and clean the railcars within a large enclosure constructed for the
purpose. The unloading enclosure was temperature and ventilation controlled,
included HF detection, and fitted with vent scrubbers and water deluge.
Lesson
Changes such as process modifications including changing the materials
being handled, their temperature, pressure, or volumes can have a major
impact on the risks associated with the existing site. The existing site may
have been laid out based on less severe hazards and risks. Thus, the dis-
tances to populations, structures, and equipment may not be adequate for
the new hazards and risks being introduced. In this case, the hazards and
risks associated with the process modifications were assessed. Additional
spacing was considered but found to be either cost prohibitive or not feasi-
ble. Therefore additional layers of protection were incorporated into the
design of the new process to compensate for the increased risk.
Case History 8: Use similar measurement unit systems on

projects sited together
Here is a historical example of what can go wrong when plants use several
different measurement units. A Far East refinery was built in the late 1960s
by a US engineering design and construction company. All design informa-
tion on drawings and in project documentation as well as specifications for
instrumentation and process equipment was documented in English units.
About 10 years later, an expansion project using a Far East engineering
design and construction company built new process units on the same site.
The new units were integrated into the original process operation requiring
some changes and additions to the older units. The contractor used the
CGS metric system for design and equipment specification as per the cur-
rent company standard for all overseas operations. The new unit control
console was located in the same control room as the original refinery con-
sole with the new instruments measured in CGS metric units located along-
side older instruments measured in English units for these integrated units.
Another 5 years passed, and the refinery was expanded a second time.
This new expansion was designed to SI metric system, as was the practice in
industry at the time. Again, the control equipment was located in the same
control room building. Due to the integration of the processes, SI metric
instruments were mounted alongside CGS metric and English instruments.
As you can imagine, the control panels were very confusing to look at
but the real problem was in training the operators and maintenance crews
to understand and convert from one set of units to another. To simplify oper-
ations and data communication, the operators and maintenance staff put a
mark on each instrument to indicate normal operation. They began to oper-
ate according to the marks on the gauges instead of the actual process
information. During an upset, the various measurement systems made fast
response questionable. The problem was finally resolved years later with
the installation of a new DCS system for the refinery. However operation
and maintenance struggled with this confusion for years.
Lesson
The benefits from using a central control room for site expansions needs to
take into account human factors issues. Using different units of measure
can cause human factors issues that can lead to errors and even incidents.
Appendix A. Typical Spacing Tables
The following comments should be applied to the Tables contained in Appen-

dix A.
NA = Not applicable. No measurable distance is appropriate.
NM = No minimum spacing requirement has been established for rea-
sons of fire protection. Use engineering judgment for spacing and
provide access for fire fighting and maintenance.
S = Spacing is based on security needs and not on fire, explosion, or
toxic concerns.
CAUTION:
1. Tables A through E include typical spacing values. Explanatory text
is included in Chapters 5 and 6.
2. The typical spacing distances cited in Tables A through E are based
on potential fire consequences (explosions and toxic concerns may
require greater spacing). Variations in spacing may be warranted
based on site-specific hazards and risks. Distances may be reduced
or increased based on risk analysis or when additional layers of pro-
tection are implemented (such as: fire protection or emergency shut-
down systems).
3. These tables are not applicable to enclosed process units.
Miscellaneous typical spacing values are included in Table E.
NOTES:
1. Distances are measured horizontally.
2. Typical horizontal distances between buildings, process equipment,
and property lines are shown and apply to the closest edge to closest
edge dimensions.
3. Where unusual conditions require closer spacing, appropriate risk
reduction measures should be considered.
139
Appendix A. Typical Spacing Tables 143
Appendix A. Typical Spacing Tables 145
ter
.
.
Appendix B. Site Selection Data
Requirement List
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1. INFORMATION TO SELECT A SITE
1.1. Maps and Surveys
1.2. Topography, terrain and soil properties
1.3. Site Specific Meteorological and Geological Data
2. TRANSPORTATION ISSUES
2.1. Product and Material Handling
2.2. Trucks
2.3. Pipelines
2.4. Railroad
2.5. Marine Facilities
2.6. Special Transportation Requirements
3. UTILITIES
3.1. Water Supply
3.2. Steam Supply
3.3. Fuel
4. ELECTRICAL AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
4.1. Electrical Systems
4.2. Communication Systems
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
5.1. Wastewater Quality Control
5.2. Air Quality Control
5.3. Sanitary Sewage Collection and Treatment
5.4. Noise and Luminosity Level Design Limitations
6. FIRE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
6.1. Fire and Safety
151
6.2. Security
7. SITE FEATURES
7.1. Personnel
7.2. Housing
7.3. Site Support Facilities
8. SYSTEMS OF MEASUREMENT
9. CODES, STANDARDS, DESIGN FACTORS, UNITS
INTRODUCTION
This site survey guideline is designed to assist survey groups investigating

locations for a new site in obtaining the data needed to select the new site.
The subject information is intended to address all sites including a remote
new site location, where the availability of materials may be questionable
and engineering services limited. In locations where these services are easily
available, the survey group may disregard certain questions that appear
obvious.
1. INFORMATION TO SELECT A SITE
1.1. Maps and Surveys

1.1.1. To expedite the initial layout and design, certain information
should be obtained with least delay. This includes property
survey data obtained either from existing civil engineering
drawings or from property deeds obtained from local registra-
tion authorities.
1.1.2. Establish the following features regarding the location of the
new site through a general inspection of the property.
1.1.2.1. Nature of the terrain (hilly, wooded, marshy, rocky)
including natural drainage conditions and slope in
relation to adjoining property. If possible, obtain
contours of surrounding areas to determine storm
water contributed to the new site.
1.1.2.2. Buildings or other structures on the new site, their
condition, settlement.
Appendix B. Site Selection Data Requirement List 153
1.1.2.3. Highways, roads, railways, waterways, swamps, or

lakes that may affect the site layout.
1.1.2.4. Industrial buildings, farms, reservoirs, sewers,
water mains, electric cables, etc. adjacent to the site
that may affect layout considerations.
1.1.3. Determine the elevation above sea level at the site.
1.1.4. Obtain a general map of the area showing boundaries of the
new site, elevations, contours, location and elevation of
benchmarks.
1.1.5. Obtain a map of the area showing the following:
1.1.5.1. Highways
1.1.5.2. Railroads and sidings
1.1.5.3. Streams
1.1.5.4. Surrounding communities
1.1.5.5. Airports
1.1.5.6. Town centers, malls and shopping centers, housing
areas
1.1.5.7. Sensitive population centers such as schools, hospi-
tals, day care centers
1.1.5.8. Nearby industrial sites and transportation centers
1.1.5.9. Farms and agricultural centers
1.1.5.10. Sewers, water mains, and storm drainage
1.1.5.11. Dumping grounds or buried tanks or pipes on the
site
1.1.5.12. Natural gas and other pipelines
1.1.5.13. Environmentally sensitive areas (e.g. wetlands)
1.1.5.14. Future facilities that are in the planning stage, par-
ticularly if they may present an external exposure to
your site.
1.1.5.15. Future population encroachment
1.1.5.16. Location of services that may be subject to interfer-
ence from a new site or may interfere with the com-
munication or operation of your site (these may
include radio, television, or microwave communica-
tion equipment)
1.1.5.17. Note any specific zoning restrictions that may affect
the new site.
1.1.6. Develop or obtain an enlarged section of the site showing con-

tours, if possible, to 1 to 2 ft (25 to 50 cm) and defining area
and boundaries in relation to the true north and magnetic
north.
1.1.7. Obtain an aerial topographical map of the area with adjacent
surroundings. Show what areas are available for future expan-
sion.
1.1.8. Determine the cost for land required for the site and right-of-
ways. Describe right-of-ways that are required.
1.1.9. Determine the type of vegetation and precautions necessary to
prevent soil erosion.
1.1.10. Determine if there is a suitable area where soil can be dis-
carded.
1.1.11. Determine if dredging or fill will be required.
1.1.12. Determine if bulkheads be required to prevent soil slumping
and what the estimate dimensions will be (How long? How
high?)
1.1.13. If the new site is to be located within an existing complex, pro-
cure all pertinent and available drawings of the existing units,
buildings, and facilities.
1.1.14. Procure aerial and ground photographs of the entire site,
including adjacent plants or sites, structures, docks, and
roads. The ground photographs should be made from two or
three directions to define the facility.
1.2. Topography, terrain and soil properties
1.2.1. Obtain soil data on nearby sites, if available.
1.2.2. Obtain data on nearby heavy structures regarding loading, type
of foundations, settlement, etc., if available.
1.2.3. Determine if the site’s natural soil has sufficient load bearing
capacity to support heavy construction equipment. If not, then
determine what type of compacted fill or sand, will be required
to prepare the site for construction. Obtain the opinion of local
contractors in this regard if possible.
1.2.4. Once the site has been chosen, a follow-up soils investigation
will be required. The survey team should determine if reports
on soil conditions are available for the site being surveyed
through local contractors or land survey offices. Specific infor-
mation to look for includes borings and soil bearing tests. This
information can provide insight into potential construction dif-
ficulties associated with foundations, underground piping and

structures.
1.2.5. Determine the quality of the ground water (salt or fresh) and
the pH value.
1.2.6. Determine the depth to the frost line (if any). Frost penetration
for determination of minimum foundation depths and under-
ground piping designs. Also determine the dates for earliest
and latest frost recorded.
1.2.7. If available, acquire information regarding the potential for in-
ground corrosion of pipes and foundations. Measurements
may be available from local contractors, local industry, or land
survey firms regarding:
1.2.7.1. Stray electrical ground currents produced up to 20
miles (30 km) away (an example is the electrical cur-
rent from electrified railways that could cause electro-
lytic corrosion of buried steel pipe or support piles),
1.2.7.2. Experience using cathodic protection in the area
around or on the new site.
1.2.8. Determine if excavation will require sheet pilings or well point
systems. Local contractors or inspectors may have informa-
tion regarding how excavation work is presently performed in
the area.
1.3. Site Specific Meteorological and Geological Data
Whenever possible, meteorological data collected should be based on
records covering a period of ten years. The specific items listed below are
needed for various design purposes. It is also useful to collect specific
records for certain climatic conditions to provide a clearer picture on the
extremes for the area. For example, develop a plot of daily maximum and
minimum temperatures for a calendar year. For air temperature and humid-
ity, what might be termed “average extremes” is more significant than abso-
lute extremes.
In all cases, give the source of data and specify where the data was
recorded relative to the site for the following.
1.3.1. Elevation Above Mean Sea Level for the site measured in feet
or meters. This is used for calculating atmospheric pressure at
the site.
1.3.2. Temperature conditions for the site. These are available from
the US Department of Commerce or local weather stations.
Temperatures of interest include:
1.3.2.1. Annual Average Temperature (used in air cooler

design and insulation thickness calculations)
1.3.2.2. Coldest Month Average Temperature (used in heat-
ing design work)
1.3.2.3. Lowest One-Day Mean Temperature (used in calcu-
lating minimum metal design temperatures for pres-
surized equipment) 1.3.2.4. Extreme Low
Temperature (used in design of weather protection
requirements)
1.3.2.5. Heating and Cooling Criteria (Summer Wet Bulb and
Dry Bulb Temperatures, and Winter Dry Bulb Tem-
perature)
1.3.3. Humidity for the site. Gather the average readings for each
month.
1.3.4. Wind Conditions from local weather stations or ANSI A58.1 (for
USA locations) which include the following data points:
1.3.4.1. Basic Wind Speed (Table A-7 of ANSI A58.1) (used
for design of structures, buildings, pressure vessels,
piping, storage tanks, air coolers, cooling towers,
and stacks)
1.3.4.2. Mean Wind Velocity (used for air pollution calcula-
tions, stack considerations, and insulation thickness
requirements)
1.3.4.3. Prevailing Wind Direction—generally in the form of a
wind rose indicating the percent of time the wind
blows in 16 radial directions (N, NNE, NE, ENE, E).
An analysis by season is most useful. This informa-
tion is needed for developing environmental impact
assessment, stack designs, flare designs, flare loca-
tions, cooling tower designs, air quality control, risk
assessment, and equipment locations.
1.3.5. Precipitation categories including:
1.3.5.1. Rainfall usually given as 10 year average and maxi-
mums for one month, 24 hours, one hour and 30
minutes (this information is used in determining
drainage system and water treating system designs
capacities)
1.3.5.2. Maximum Snow Load based on local code design
requirements (used in building roof designs, struc-
tural platform design, and storage tank designs)
1.3.5.3. Ice load if available can be useful in design of struc-

tures and buildings.
1.3.6. Severe weather conditions by season that may cause interrup-
tion of plant operation including the following information:
1.3.6.1. Is area subject to fog? If so, what are the frequency
and intensity of fog alerts?
1.3.6.2. Tornados—frequency and worse case recorded
severity
1.3.6.3. Hurricanes or typhoons—frequency and historic
worse case scenarios (maximum winds and rain fall
1.3.6.4. Floods—including dates, total rainfall, and flood
depth at the site. If there is a flood control organiza-
tion for the area, determine who is responsible for
maintenance and operation of the flood control
equipment (locks, pumps, and levee)? Has there
been a flood model developed for the area and has it
been validated?
1.3.6.5. Drought—recorded history should be collected to
determine the water availability during a drought
and impact on the area from the plant in a drought
situation.
1.3.6.6. Dust Storm—activity, frequency, and records of pre-
vious storms.
1.3.6.7. Lightning strike frequency, which is useful in the
design of lightning protection for processing and
storage tank facilities.
1.3.7. Is the area subject to earthquakes? If so, what design and seis-
mic coefficient is used by local authorities or structural engi-
neers? (In the U. S., five percent of the dead load is applied
horizontally at the center of gravity for an earthquake Zone 1.)
2. TRANSPORTATION ISSUES
2.1. Product and Material Handling

2.1.1. Describe in detail the anticipated methods of bringing
feedstock into the site and distributing products from the site.
State the limitations regarding the number and grades of prod-
ucts that can be handled by barge, pipeline, tank car, and tank
truck.
2.1.2. Discuss any laws or regulations governing the handling, ship-
ping, loading, and unloading of products from the site.
2.1.2.1. Will feedstock be required to go into bonded tanks?
2.1.2.2. Will customs inspectors be at the site?
2.1.2.3. Will tanks be gauged or will meter readings be
accepted?
2.2. Trucks
2.2.1. Describe the highways and roads in the locality. Can the exist-
ing highway handle the anticipated construction loads and the
increased traffic loads?
2.2.2. Will a new road have to be built to connect the site with the
local highway system?
2.2.3. Determine the maximum allowable loading on roads and
bridges.
2.2.4. Estimate the distance to nearest express and freight yard.
2.2.5. Are there any restrictions or curfews on the use of the roads?
2.2.6. Can local roads accommodate the width required for trucks,
including for making right turns?
2.2.7. What are the pertinent regulations on ownership and use of
passenger and truck vehicles in the area?
2.2.8. What public transport is available to and from the site?
2.2.9. What private trucking services are available?
2.3. Pipelines
2.3.1. If pipelines are required for feedstock or products, submit
information on the following.
2.3.1.1. Determine the preferred route and entry into the
site.
2.3.1.2. Are there right-of-way requirements (must be con-
sidered in total land area required for the site)?
2.3.1.3. Should lines be buried or aboveground?
2.3.1.4. What regulations apply to pipelines? What are the
local minimum clearance requirements from roads
and highways? If buried, the depth required?
2.3.1.5. Are there any unusual problems, such as rock exca-
vation, quicksand, or corrosion protection?
2.4. Railroads
2.4.1. Furnish copies of any regulations covering permissible proxim-
ity to tanks or existing site equipment including operating
units.
2.4.2. Obtain copies of regulations regarding LPG, toxic gases or liq-
uids, etc.
2.4.3. Determine the names and types of railroads (electric, diesel,
steam) serving the potential site area.
2.4.4. Length of spur that would have to be constructed to the site.
2.4.5. Submit drawings showing proximity and extent of marshalling
facilities.
2.4.6. Determine the gauge of track in the area, spacing of tracks, and
weight of rails. Submit a sketch showing design of rails and
railroad ties (wood or concrete) that should be used within the
site.
2.4.7. Determine the minimum clearance for railroads between
tracks, from structures, and overhead.
2.4.8. Determine the normal platform height and clearance between
car and platform or building for loading and unloading.
2.4.9. Obtain the normal load-carrying capacity of rail cars that may
be required during construction and/or for shipping product.
(both by weight and by volume).
2.4.10. Maximum axle loading permitted on rail cars.
2.4.11. Furnish outline drawings with dimensions of cars handling spe-
cial materials such as catalyst, cement, caustic, ammonia,
acid, SO2, and the like (list possible items which may be
hauled). Give published data and regulations on handling the
above.
2.4.12. Obtain a schedule of freight rates.
2.4.13. Discuss arrangements that can be made with the railroad com-
pany for trackage inside the site. For example, will the railroad
company:
2.4.13.1. Supply material and install trackage?
2.4.13.2. Handle movements of rolling stock with their own
locomotive during construction and/or during site
operation?
2.4.13.3. Rent the site a locomotive for temporary use during
construction? If so, furnish rental rates and charac-
teristics of rental locomotive (draw bar pull and axle

loads).
2.4.13.4. Will the site buy a locomotive for permanent use? If
the site purchases a locomotive, can it operate on
the railroad company tracks? Are there any limita-
tions or conditions?
2.4.13.5. Will the company or railroad operate the site siding?
Who will provide marshalling yards or drill service?
2.4.13.6. If the site must supply a locomotive, how far will the
railroad’s locomotive come inside the site gate? And
will it push a train to where the site locomotive then
handles it?
2.4.14. What is the minimum and maximum number of filled or empty
cars that could constitute a direct train from the site siding?
How often could the cars be spotted (number of deliveries per
day) and what is the average size train?
2.4.15. If necessary, can a locomotive be purchased locally? Can it be
maintained and serviced locally?
2.4.16. Will the rail yard spacing be open enough to prevent creation of
a congested potential explosion scenario?
2.5. Marine Facilities
2.5.1. Information regarding feedstock and products shipments may
be site location sensitive and affect the viability of a specific
site.
2.5.1.1. How many and what type of vessels will be required
to move feedstock and products (including ocean-
going tankers of various types, coastal tankers,
barges, or bunkering vessels).
2.5.1.2. What is the size (length, draft, and beam) of typical
available vessels that might be employed?
2.5.1.3. What specific requirements will need to be provided
by the new site to support the vessels, for example,
ballast water or bunkering systems?
2.5.2. Furnish pertinent information (published data, if available) on:
2.5.2.1. Current measurements.
2.5.2.2. Soundings.
2.5.2.3. Tides and/or flood conditions.
2.5.2.4. Traffic conditions.
2.5.2.5. Silting conditions and type of harbor bottom.

2.5.2.6. Type of harbor bottom
2.5.2.7. Dredging.
2.5.2.8. Bulkheads.
Tidal information should include yearly average high and low and
extreme high and low tides on record with discussion of meteorological con-
ditions causing the extremes. Include a copy of tide tables for the area, if
available.
2.5.3. Supply map of harbor showing harbor boundaries, pier head
lines, channels, soundings, and river velocity.
2.5.4. Is protection (such as traveling screens) required against
harbor debris?
2.5.5. Marine Accommodations, Regulations
2.5.5.1. Describe the port facilities. What draft, length, and
beam ships or barges can be accommodated?
2.5.5.2. Describe the site docking facilities if available? What
space is available for piers or docks? Are any alter-
ations desirable? Will a harbor basin need to be con-
structed?
2.5.5.3. What are the waterway conditions: details regarding
harbor boundaries, channels, soundings, current
measurements, tides and flood conditions, tidal
waves, and peak waves from storms.
2.5.5.4. If there are any government-owned or other marine
facilities which will be utilized by the company, fur-
nish a complete description, outline basis on which
company will rent them, and give design stresses,
allowable pull on bollards, and details of dock con-
struction.
2.5.5.5. Discuss availability of, regulations regarding, and
need for tugboats.
2.5.5.6. What are the pilot regulations and how will the site
accommodate the regulations?
2.5.5.7. Any regulations on clearances between adjacent
tanks or barges at piers or with regard to onshore
buildings? For example, can barges be loaded side-
by-side?
2.5.5.8. Estimate average demurrage associated with await-

ing tide, fog, weather conditions, or any other fac-
tors.
2.5.5.9. If required, is steam, electric power, or firewater
available at the piers or barge sites? If so, in what
quantities?
2.5.6. Cargo Handling
2.5.6.1. Are barges available for construction purposes?
What is the maximum size and weight vessel that
can be handled by barge? By railroad? By truck via
highway?
2.5.6.1.1. ___________ Diameter
2.5.6.1.2. ___________ Length
2.5.6.1.3. ___________ Weight
2.5.6.2. What facilities are available for unloading and stor-
ing construction materials and equipment? How will
ships’ stores be handled, if required? Fresh water?
Crew amenities?
2.5.6.3. Submit information on cargo-handling facilities
available, such as floating cranes, lighters, steve-
doring charges.
2.5.6.4. Are there any regulations as to hours when tankers
or barges can enter or leave, or during which they
can unload or load? What are the demurrage
charges?
2.5.6.5. Is railroad siding available near the dock?
2.5.7. Marine Repair Facilities
2.5.7.1. What marine repair facilities are available in the
vicinity?
2.6. Special Transportation Requirements
2.6.1. Where is the nearest cargo and passenger airport? What is the
distance to the site?
2.6.2. What is the availability and prospect for using helicopter trans-
port to the site?
2.6.3. Describe in detail the manner in which material will be handled
from shipside direct to the site, from shipside via highway to
the site, or from railroad to the site.
3. UTILITIES
3.1. Water Supply

3.1.1. Give volume available from various sources and types such as:
3.1.1.1. Salt.
3.1.1.2. Brackish.
3.1.1.3. Fresh.
3.1.1.4. Well.
3.1.1.5. Municipal supply (particularly for drinking, boiler
makeup, and firewater)
3.1.2. Provide daily water temperatures for the hottest month and
monthly temperature ranges for the balance of the year.
3.1.3. If available, furnish analyses of water from each possible
source of supply, including hardness, suspended solids, pH
value, and amount of corrosive agents. Determine if the water
will require chemical protection against algae.
3.1.4. If water wells are to be drilled, determine information for:
3.1.4.1. Whether there are regulations limiting the amount
or use of well water.
3.1.4.2. Aquifer water pressure to determine if the water
wells will be free flowing, at the pressure and
volume required.
3.1.4.3. Depth to the aquifer.
3.1.4.4. Allowable spacing between adjacent water wells.
3.1.5. What is the cost of municipal water? What is the maximum
amount of municipal water that may be purchased?
3.1.6. Local regulations on water supplies for drinking.
3.1.7. Local practice regarding height and protection from air pollu-
tion for water towers or standpipes.
3.2. Steam Supply
3.2.1. Is steam available from sources outside the site? If so, at what
pressures, quantities, and cost?
3.2.2. If steam is purchased, furnish drawings showing location of
steam plant in relation to the planned site.
3.2.3. Will an outside source utilize fuel or burnable waste products
generated by the new site?
3.2.4. Are there any rules, regulations, or standards that may apply
for steam plant construction. These may include piping, boil-
ers, exhaust systems, and condensate handling.
3.3. Fuel
3.3.1. Determine the availability, reliability, supply points, heating
values, costs, and analysis of fuel commonly used in the area.
3.3.2. Determine supply facilities, pressures, temperatures, and fuel
specifications, if available.
3.3.3. Determine the needed fuel supply facilities (storage tanks,
pipelines, and unloading facilities).
4. ELECTRICAL AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
4.1. Electrical Systems

4.1.1. Name and address of the utility. Name and position of
person(s) to contact there for information.
4.1.2. Present and future power availability and reliability.
4.1.3. Applicable rate schedules, including fuel adjustment clauses,
demand charges, labor and power factor clauses, government
taxes, and contract duration.
4.1.4. Is it permissible to generate all or a portion of its power
requirements with the public utility system providing the bal-
ance? What are the rates and charges for provision of both par-
tial and full standby power for in-plant generation?
4.1.5. Will the new site or the utility will be responsible for providing
the main substation facilities, including real estate and civil
work?
4.1.6. Applicable investment charges for site utility-installed facili-
ties.
4.1.7. Type and voltage level of the utility service feeders, and
whether the feeders will be radial or loop type. Where the radial
feed system is to be installed, will the utility install two inde-
pendent feeders?
4.1.8. Maximum and minimum interrupting level (kVA or MVA) of
incoming service.
4.1.9. Type and main substation transformers to be installed, and
whether transformers will have automatic load tap changers or
manual no-load tap changers.
4.1.10. Availability of construction power, the applicable rate sched-

ules, and the necessary facilities to be provided.
4.1.11. Maximum allowable voltage-drop on motor starting or group
reacceleration.
4.1.12. Regarding public utility power, determine:
4.1.12.1. Amount available: ____________ kW
4.1.12.2. Characteristics: ____________ phase
4.1.12.3. ____________ cycle
4.1.12.4. ____________ volts
4.1.13. What is the minimum and future maximum short circuit level
kVA at the source and/or the adjacent site (s) that will be shar-
ing the utility power?
4.1.14. Reliability of power supply based on past performance
(unplanned outages per year, planned outages per year, length
of outages, and percent voltage variation)
4.1.15. What is the distance from the new site property limits to sub-
station(s) from which utility would supply power?
4.1.16. How many feeders would the utility install from substation(s)
to the new site limits?
4.1.17. What are the feeder characteristics regarding construction
method? Are feeders underground or overhead?
4.1.18. Would the new site have exclusive use of feeders?
4.1.19. If feeder voltage were too high for the new site, would the cost
of this substation be borne by the utility or the new site?
4.1.20. What voltage will the new site require for:
4.1.20.1. Lighting
4.1.20.2. Small motors [below ____________ kW (hp)]
4.1.20.3. Large motors [above ____________ kW (hp)]
4.1.21. What are the nominal standard secondary distribution voltages
available in the range of 400 volts to 11,000 volts?
4.1.22. Local power distributor equipment.
4.1.23. What are the characteristics of available power transformers
as to:
4.1.23.1. Voltage ratings and sizes in the 300kVA to 2,500-kVA
range?
4.1.23.2. Impedance of various sizes and ratings?
4.1.24. What are characteristics of available switchgear as to:
4.1.24.1. Standard voltage ratings in the 400-volt to 11,000-

volt range?
4.1.24.2. Continuous current, interrupting current, and
momentary current ratings of various-sized circuit
breakers?
4.1.25. Will the public utility provide power during construction?
4.2. Communication Systems
4.2.1. Telephone systems—Provide the following information.
4.2.1.1. Describe local system as to type (manual or auto-
matic) and adequacy to handle increased traffic.
4.2.1.2. Give information on rental rates and opinion as to
advisability of installing a site-owned intra-site tele-
phone system or renting a system installed and
owned by the telephone company. If rental basis is
feasible, would it include private, automatic or
manual, exchange switchboard, cable plant, and
instruments? What facilities would have to be pro-
vided by the site?
4.2.2. Internet Systems—Determine what internet communication
support is available: phone lines, broadband, cable, ISDN.
4.2.3. Microwave Communications—Are microwave systems
required due to the lack of telephone and internet support?
4.2.4. Radio communications—What laws govern its use? Are there
available frequencies? What other users could provide inter-
ference? How secure are the channels?
4.2.5. Mail—Is there mail service or will the site have to develop its
own service? How far is the nearest mail service?
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
5.1. Wastewater Quality Control

5.1.1. What governmental regulation is in effect that must be applied
to industrial wastes and the quality of the effluent discharged
into natural water bodies?
5.1.2. Are there any similar regulations for sanitary sewage?
5.1.3. Obtain copies of regulations that apply to both industrial
wastes and sanitary sewage. In addition, obtain copies of
approved designs of sanitary sewage treatment facilities.
5.1.4. Furnish data giving pertinent information regarding local and

state regulations for all types of buildings regarding sanitary
and plumbing requirements.
5.1.5. If such copies cannot be obtained, the following information
should be sought from proper sources.
5.1.5.1. What degree of treatment is specified for sanitary
sewage?
5.1.5.2. What quality standards are imposed on sanitary
sewage and industrial wastewater effluents?
5.1.5.3. Will septic tanks be permitted for remote areas, for a
small number of occupants? Is there a point where
septic tanks are not permitted and other, more-
expensive methods of disposal required?
5.1.6. What agency enforces the regulations and what is the organiza-
tion of the agency?
5.1.7. In the event that waste discharge is not controlled by definitive
legal measures enforced by an official body, is there any gov-
ernmental control, local or otherwise, and what is the extent of
this control?
5.1.8. What is the general trend regarding waste discharge control?
5.1.8.1. What is the attitude of the control officials?
5.1.8.2. Is there any indication that existing regulations will
be tightened or new regulations adopted where none
exist at the moment?
5.1.9. What natural water body will receive the wastewater effluent
from the new site?
5.1.9.1. Obtain quantitative and qualitative data on seasonal
flow if discharge is to a stream.
5.1.9.2. Obtain information on currents and tidal variations
if discharge is to a lake or harbor.
5.1.10. Are the natural receiving water bodies contaminated at pres-
ent? If so, to what extent?
5.1.11. Give locations of the following with respect to the site:
5.1.11.1. Commercial fishing areas
5.1.11.2. Recreational areas for swimming, boating, or fishing
5.1.11.3. Residential areas
5.1.11.4. Domestic and industrial water supply intakes down-
stream of the proposed facilities.
5.1.11.5. Municipal sewage and industrial waste treatment

plant outfalls both upstream and downstream of the
proposed facility
5.1.12. If available, provide analytical data (sufficient to show seasonal
variation) on receiving water as listed:
5.1.12.1. Temperature
5.1.12.2. Turbidity
5.1.12.3. Color
5.1.12.4. Suspended solids
5.1.12.5. Odor—concentration of concern
5.1.12.6. Dissolved solids
5.1.12.7. Dissolved oxygen
5.1.12.8. Chemical and biochemical oxygen demand
5.1.12.9. Total sulfur
5.1.12.10. Oil content
5.1.12.11. Phenol content
5.1.12.12. Acidity, alkalinity, pH
5.1.13. What is the attitude of the general public towards waste dis-
posal control as reflected by civic group activity and newspaper
publicity?
5.1.14. Is local industry organized into a group for exchange of infor-
mation on water contamination?
5.1.15. Do any national technical groups exist which have an interest in
water contamination control?
5.1.16. Could sanitary sewage from the new site be discharged to
municipal sewers?
5.1.17. Could sludge from sanitary sewage treatment be disposed of
through local companies?
5.1.18. Describe existing sanitary sewerage and drainage systems in
the area of the new site. Provide the size of main lines and the
proximity of main lines to the site.
5.1.19. Identify potential means of disposing of site effluent (dirty pro-
cess water and sanitary sewage) and storm water. Consider
the level of contamination and that the source of cooling
waters should not be affected by the site effluent.
5.1.20. Is it permissible to discharge clean storm water without treat-
ment?
5.1.21. What degree of treatment is specified for industrial

wastewater?
5.1.22. What water quality standards are imposed on industrial
wastewater effluents? Are effective water standards controlled
by receiving water quality or by discharge effluent quality?
5.1.23. What requirements are there regarding submission of plan for
treatment facilities for approval of control authorities?
5.1.24. What requirements are there for permits, and where they are
obtained, for operation of approved treating facilities.
5.1.25. What requirements are there for qualification by test of treat-
ment plan performance?
5.1.26. What requirements are there by control authorities for submis-
sion of treatment plant operating reports and the data to be
provided?
5.1.27. Are there regulations specifying analytical methods to be used
in determining the level of specific impurities in the effluent,
including hydrocarbon or toxic materials content?
5.1.28. Are penalties included in those regulations, the method of
assessment, and recourse available to the owner or operator?
5.1.29. Assess general governmental trends regarding wastewater
control. If there is any indication that existing regulations will
become more restrictive, or that new regulations will be
adopted, obtain a forecast or timetable.
5.1.30. Assess the impact from off-site water effluent by determining
the following:
5.1.30.1. Determine which natural body of water will receive
the drainage and wastewater effluent from the site.
5.1.30.2. Can natural drainage from adjacent areas be
diverted around the site, or must it be treated as
storm water entering the site?
5.1.30.3. What are the water quality criteria for the receiving
water?
5.1.30.4. In the case where receiving water is a stream,
acquire quantitative and qualitative data on sea-
sonal flow if available. The data should reflect sea-
sonal variations in receiving water quality for all
parameters used in evaluating effluent discharge
quality.
5.1.30.5. In the cases of lakes or harbors, information on cur-

rents and tidal variations or lake water elevations is
desirable.
5.2. Air Quality Control
5.2.1. What are the national, state, and local regulations in effect for
discharge of sulfur oxides, particulate matter, carbon monox-
ide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide,
other applicable chemicals, and odors? Obtain a copy of rele-
vant regulations with the latest addenda, if available.
5.2.2. If a copy of these regulations cannot be obtained, the following
questions should be answered.
5.2.2.1. What are permissible limits of pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide, solids, smoke, and others that can be
discharged to the atmosphere?
5.2.2.2. What control, if any, governs the height of industrial
stacks?
5.2.2.3. What is the average height of industrial stacks in the
general vicinity?
5.2.2.4. Must plans for air control facilities be submitted to
control authorities for approval?
5.2.2.5. What penalties are included in the regulations, how
are they assessed, and what legal recourse does the
accused have?
5.2.2.6. What is the process for and time required to obtain a
waiver or exception?
5.2.2.7. Are operating permits required to run air quality
control equipment?
5.2.3. What agencies enforce regulations? Outline their organiza-
tions. How is the law enforced? What are the powers of control
officers? Where air quality is not regulated by the central gov-
ernment, to what extent does the local government control
emissions?
5.2.4. In the event that air contamination is not controlled by defini-
tive measures enforced by an official body, is there any govern-
mental control, local or otherwise, and to what extent?
5.2.5. What is the general governmental trend regarding air contami-
nation control?
5.2.5.1. What is the working relationship with the control
officials?
5.2.5.2. Is there any indication that existing regulations will

be tightened or new regulations adopted where none
exist at the moment?
5.2.6. What is the perception of the general public toward air contam-
ination as reflected by civic groups and newspaper publicity?
5.2.7. Is local industry organized into a group for exchange of infor-
mation on air contamination and air quality control?
5.2.8. Do any national technical groups exist which have an interest in
air contamination control?
5.2.9. What is the nature of industrial emissions to the atmosphere
near the site?
5.2.10. Obtain data on existing levels of atmospheric pollutants such
as sulfur dioxide, dust falls, hydrogen sulfide, and smoke. Odor
should be included. Example: Concentration of dust particles:
_________ ppm (normal); _________ ppm (maximum).
5.2.11. In relation to the new site, give the location and proximity of the
following:
5.2.11.1. Residential areas
5.2.11.2. Schools
5.2.11.3. Prisons
5.2.11.4. Farming areas.
5.2.11.5. Hospitals
5.2.11.6. Resorts.
5.2.11.7. Business areas.
5.2.11.8. Manufacturing areas.
5.2.11.9. Public parks.
5.2.11.10. National treasures or landmarks
5.2.11.11. Airports.
5.2.12. Are there any special topographical features such as nearby
hills or valleys that can affect dispersal of air pollutants?
5.2.13. What are the requirements for vapor recovery in tank loading
operations?
5.2.14. Is a standby supply of low-sulfur plant fuel required should an
air pollutant alert or emergency occur?
5.3. Sanitary Sewage Collection and Treatment
5.3.1. Obtain regulations regarding collection and treatment of sani-
tary sewage.
5.4. Noise and Luminosity Level Design Limitations

5.4.1. Determine if noise levels are regulated in the area. If so, collect
data on the current noise levels for day and night levels.
5.4.2. Determine if luminosity levels are regulated in the area. If so,
collect data on the current levels.
5.4.3. Does the site have hills or trees or other features to block the
light from the site?
6. FIRE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
6.1. Fire and Safety

6.1.1. Describe local firefighting facilities. Obtain drawings of nearest
municipal fire mains showing size, capacity, and pressure. Indi-
cate the location of firefighting facilities relative to the site.
6.1.2. What regulations govern the provision of firefighting equip-
ment for tankage or other site facilities?
6.1.3. What emergency services are available in the area?
6.1.3.1. Hospital
6.1.3.2. Medical Clinic
6.1.3.3. Burn Center
6.1.3.4. Ambulance
6.1.3.5. Air lift to major medical centers
6.1.4. What is the quality of the emergency services?
6.1.5. Are shared services available from the complex or adjacent
sites?
6.1.6. Does the road structure permit good emergency access to the
site?
6.2. Security
6.2.1. What local police protection is available in the surrounding
area, at the docks, and near the refinery site?
6.2.2. To what extent can the local police or shared site security be
used on a construction project and when the site is developed?
6.2.3. Will fences and additional guards be needed at the site?
6.2.4. Is there much pilfering done in the area?
7. SITE FEATURES
7.1. Personnel
7.1.1. Engineering Firms
7.1.1.1. List firms available to handle site construction engi-
neering work for:
7.1.1.1.1. Soil investigation
7.1.1.1.2. Process Units’ construction
7.1.1.1.3. Utilities construction
7.1.1.1.4. General Facilities (buildings or, roads)
7.1.1.1.5. Dock, Marine, Wharf Terminal Facilities
7.1.1.2. To what extent are these firms familiar with interna-
tionally accepted practices and standards (for
instance, ANSI standards)? What similar jobs have
they performed? For whom have they performed
these jobs? How many people are employed?
7.1.2. Contractors
7.1.2.1. List firms that will be available locally to handle:
7.1.2.1.1. Site preparation (hydraulic fill or earth-
moving)
7.1.2.1.2. Erection of tankage
7.1.2.1.3. Dock and terminal facilities
7.1.2.1.4. General field labor contracts for process
and offsite work
7.1.2.1.5. Housing, buildings
7.1.2.2. To what extent can the site organization handle con-
struction supervision?
7.1.2.3. Identify any laws governing the use of foreign or
expatriate contractors.
7.1.2.4. Are any of these contractors or engineering firms
affiliated with international engineering and con-
struction firms?
7.1.3. Construction and Maintenance Labor
7.1.3.1. Obtain estimates for the cost of construction at the
site. Examples may be available from local contrac-
tors or adjacent sites. These may include the cost of
civil work, site preparation, tank erection, and build-
ings of different construction.
7.1.3.2. For each of the following crafts, what are the avail-
ability of skilled craftsmen and is there a history of
labor issues impacting cost and schedule?
7.1.3.2.1. Common labor
7.1.3.2.2. Carpenters
7.1.3.2.3. Bricklayers.
7.1.3.2.4. Welders (acetylene)
7.1.3.2.5. Welders (electric)
7.1.3.2.6. Pipe fitters
7.1.3.2.7. Boilermakers
7.1.3.2.8. Structural ironworkers (riveters)
7.1.3.2.9. Cement workers
7.1.3.2.10. Electricians
7.1.3.2.11. Instrument men
7.1.3.2.12. Insulators
7.1.3.2.13. Crane operators
7.1.3.2.14. Truck drivers
7.1.3.2.15. Mechanics
7.1.3.2.16. Machinists
7.1.3.2.17. Painters
7.1.3.2.18. Plumbers
7.1.3.2.19. Riggers
7.1.3.3. Will a premium need to be paid to attract workers to
the area?
7.1.3.4. Discuss availability and source of supervisors and
foremen. What amount of outside (of the area)
supervision will be required?
7.1.3.5. What is the estimated optimum ratio of outside (of
the area) to native labor for site construction work?
7.1.3.6. Will it be necessary or desirable to establish training
programs in the crafts required for construction work?
7.1.3.7. Are there any racial problems or discrimination that
need to be taken into account?
7.1.3.8. What percentages of local workers speak or under-
stand English?
7.1.3.9. Review the cost records of other large local projects
to get an idea of productivity.
7.1.3.10. Is night work permitted?

7.1.4. Operations Personnel
7.1.4.1. Discuss the availability of people required for the
permanent site staff in categories such as the fol-
lowing:
7.1.4.1.1. Support staff (Accountants, clerks,
draftsman, typists)
7.1.4.1.2. Engineers (process, mechanical, civil)
7.1.4.1.3. Laboratory assistants
7.1.4.1.4. Process operators
7.1.4.1.5. Doctors and nurses
7.1.4.1.6. Police
7.1.4.1.7. Craftsmen (see craft listing above)
7.1.4.2. To what extent will permanent housing be required
for employees? Where will this housing be located?
7.1.4.3. To what extent can personnel speak and write the
language used for site labeling and documentation?
7.1.4.4. What languages are used?
7.2. Housing
7.2.1. For remote sites, is housing available for construction person-
nel? And for site employees?
7.2.2. Are other features available such as schools, shops, and recre-
ational facilities?
7.3. Site Support Facilities
7.3.1. List the prices of heavy construction equipment and tools that
can be made available by the site organization, local contrac-
tors, or manufacturers. Are guy derricks available locally?
7.3.2. What is the rental cost for such equipment? Is the operator
included? Are qualified operators available for the equipment?
7.3.3. Are garage services and spare parts available locally for inter-
national equipment?
7.3.4. Are there any restrictions against the use of heavy mechanical
equipment?
7.3.5. Shop Facilities
7.3.5.1. To what extent can site maintenance work be han-
dled by outside contractors?
7.3.5.1.1. What type and class of work can be done

by outside shops?
7.3.5.1.2. What is the location of outside shops rel-
ative to the site?
7.3.5.1.3. What is the local manpower availability
for turnaround work?
7.3.6. Construction Materials and Equipment
7.3.6.1. Indicate the quantities and types of construction
materials that are locally available, for example, what
facilities are available locally for mixing concrete?
7.3.6.2. Are any of these materials available as surplus in
nearby affiliate sites?
7.3.6.3. What restrictions are there on importing any of
these materials and other site equipment such as
pumps, exchangers, drums, towers, and motors?
Are any of the latter made locally?
7.3.6.4. Is warehouse space for materials available or must
this be erected?
7.3.6.5. What material and equipment required for construc-
tion can be purchased locally. Are foundries, boiler
shops, machine shops, and steel fabricating facili-
ties available locally, and in what capacity?
7.3.6.6. What governmental restrictions, regulations, priori-
ties, or allocation supply may impact availability of
goods?
7.3.6.7. Provide information on the availability and method
of supply for various materials required for site
operation and maintenance, particularly chemicals
for example:
7.3.6.7.1. Ammonia.
7.3.6.7.2. Calcium chloride.
7.3.6.7.3. Inhibitors.
7.3.6.7.4. Nitrogen
7.3.6.7.5. Oxygen.
7.3.6.7.6. Sodium carbonate.
7.3.6.7.7. Sodium hydroxide.
7.3.6.7.8. Sulfuric acid
7.3.6.7.9. Etc.
8. SYSTEMS OF MEASUREMENT
8.1. What system of measure will be used for calibrating instruments?

(Metric?)
8.2. What weights and measures system is used in area or site?
8.3. What system of measure will be preferred by local inspectors and local
engineering firms to develop and approve construction drawings?
8.4. What system of measure is likely to be preferred locally for site instru-
mentation, drawing and procedure development?
9. CODES, STANDARDS, DESIGN FACTORS, UNITS
9.1. Furnish copies of any local codes or regulations which must be fol-
lowed with regard to:
9.1.1. Structural steel and reinforced concrete
9.1.2. Architectural design
9.1.3. Pressure vessels
9.1.4. Electrical design
9.1.5. Piping
9.1.6. Boilers
9.1.7. Plumbing and sanitary facilities (architectural)
9.1.8. Working conditions such as air changes, working temperatures
in building, or safety requirements
9.1.9. Spacing of process units, tank firewall capacity, and sewer con-
nections
9.1.10. Permissible noise level. What is present noise level in decibels?
9.1.11. Health ordinances

9.2. Are the following American standards applicable in place of the corre-
sponding local codes?
9.2.1. NFPA: For site design, tank spacing, and layout
9.2.2. API, ASME: For pressure vessels and tanks
9.2.3. Joint Committee for Specifications on Reinforced Concrete: for
foundations
9.2.4. American Institute of Steel Construction Code: For structural

steel
9.3. What are local approval requirements for building designs? Identify the
prevailing type of architecture and typical materials of construction.
Are codes applicable for temporary constructions?
9.4. Can imported steel be used instead of steel made to local specifica-
tions? Obtain booklets on local shape, weight, and standard sizes.
State whether Bessemer or open-hearth steel will be required.
9.5. Are there any local piping preferences, codes or standards which will
affect design according to the company standards?
9.6. What is the local regulation or practice regarding wind load used in
design? What wind velocity do local authorities require? What snow
loads are used in design?
9.7. Is a corrosion allowance used locally in structural steel design?
9.8. Are there any aircraft regulations that would limit the height of struc-
tures? Are warning lights required?
9.9. What zoning regulations govern the use of property and the height of
flares, structures, and buildings?
9.10. Do regulations permit use of two-way radios in facility and in truck
cabs?
References
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27. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2001. Guidelines for Layers of Pro-
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28. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2002. Guidelines for Analyzing and
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29. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2003. Guidelines for Fire Protection
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30. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2003. Understanding Explosions.
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31. Chemical Safety Board. 1999. “Bhopal Disaster Spurs U.S. Industry, Legislative
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34. Dictionary.com
35. Encyclopedia.com
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Glossary
Air Quality Control: The control of the level of pollutants prescribed by reg-
ulations that may not be exceeded during a specified time in a defined
area. (Association of Engineering Geologist’s online dictionary)
Atmospheric tank: A storage tank that has been designed to operate at
pressures from atmospheric through 0.5 psig measured at the top of the
tank. (NFPA30)
Atmospheric dispersion: The low momentum mixing of a gas or vapor with
air. The mixing is the result of turbulent energy exchange, which is a
function of wind and atmospheric temperature profile. (CCPS, 1999)
Autoignition temperature: The minimum temperature at which combus-
tion can be initiated without an external ignition source. (CCPS, 1996,
no. 22)
Battery Limit: The perimeter of a specific manufacturing process area. It is
often defined by the roads around the perimeter. This area will include
process equipment, and may include in-process tankage.
Blast: A transient change in the gas density, pressure, and velocity of the air
surrounding an explosion point. (CCPS, 1994)
Blast resistant buildings: Buildings that are structurally designed to with-
stand an explosion generated load (pressure and impulse) while sus-
taining a predetermined amount of damage.
Blast wave: The overpressure wave traveling outward from an explosion
point. (CCPS, 1996, no. 22)
BLEVE: A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion is a blast resulting from
the sudden release and nearly instantaneous vaporization of a liquid
under greater-than-atmospheric pressure at a temperature above its
atmospheric boiling point. The material may be flammable or nonflam-
mable. A BLEVE is often accompanied by a fireball if the contained liquid
is flammable and its release results from vessel failure. (CCPS, 1996,
no. 22)
Blowdown drums: Separators or accumulators used to separate liquids
and vapors in pressure-relieving and emergency systems.
183
Brownfield: An industrial or commercial property that is abandoned or

underused and being considered as a potential site for redevelopment.
(Dictionary .com)
Boil over: A violent expulsion of contents caused by a heat wave from the
surface burning at the top of the tank reaching the water stratum at the
bottom of the tank. Oils subject to boilover contain components having a
wide range of boiling points, including both light ends and viscous resi-
dues. These characteristics are present in most crude oils. (Draft NFPA
Understanding Fire Protection for Flammable Liquids)
Combustible liquids: Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point at or
above 100ºF (37.8ºC), as determined by the test procedures defined in
NFPA 30. Combustible liquids are classified as Class II or Class III as fol-
lows:
(a) Class II Liquid. Any liquid that has a flash point at or above 100ºF
(37.8ºC) and below 140ºF (60ºC).
(b) Class IIIA. Any liquid that has a flash point at or above 140ºF (60ºC),
but below 200ºF (93ºC).
(c) Class IIIB. Any liquid that has a flash point at or above 200ºF (93ºC).
(NFPA 30)
Combustion: exothermic chemical reaction with oxygen as a primary
reagent. (CCPS, 1996, no. 22)
Conceptual design: The initial design of a project when basic parameters
are known but design details have yet to be developed.
Consequence: The direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usu-
ally involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence
descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects
of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss,
and environmental damage. (CCPS, 1995, no. 17)
Consequence analysis: The analysis of the expected effects of incident out-
come cases independent of frequency or probability. (CCPS, 1999)
Cryogenic liquid: A refrigerated liquid gas having a boiling point below
–130°F (–90°C) at atmospheric pressure. (NFPA 30)
Detection systems: A mechanical, electrical, or chemical device that auto-
matically identifies the presence of a material or a change in environ-
mental conditions such as pressure, temperature, or composition.
(Bartleby.com)
Dike: An embankment or wall built to act as a barrier blocking passage of
liquids to surrounding areas. (Dictionary.com)
Glossary 185
Emergency shutdown (ESD) system: The safety system which overrides

the action of the basic control system when predetermined conditions
are violated. (CCPS, 1993, no. 14)
ERPG: The American Industrial Hygiene Institute defines Emergency
Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) levels.
• The ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is
believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr
without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects
or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor.
without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual’s ability
to take protective action.
without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
Environmental Impact Statement: The analysis of the impact that a pro-
posed development, usually industrial, will have on the natural and
social environment. It includes assessment of long- and short-term
effects on the physical environment, such as air, water, and noise pollu-
tion, as well as effects on employment, living standards, local services,
and aesthetics. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 as well as
many state and local laws enacted during the late 1960s and early 1970s
mandate that these statements be completed before major develop-
ment projects can begin. (Encyclopedia.com)
Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs): Areas requiring special man-
agement attention to protect important scenic values, fish and wildlife
resources, historical and cultural values, and other natural systems or
processes. ESAs for forestry include potentially fragile, unstable soils
that may deteriorate unacceptably after forest harvesting, and areas of
high value to non-timber resources such as fisheries, wildlife, water, and
recreation. (Province of British Columbia Ministry of Forests online dic-
tionary)
Explosion: A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast
wave. (CCPS, 1999)
Explosion Overpressure: Any pressure above atmospheric caused by a
blast. (CCPS, 1994)
Facility: A portion of or complete plant, unit, site, complex or any combina-
tion thereof.
Fire: A combustion reaction accompanied by the evolution of heat, light, and

flame. (CCPS, 1996, no. 22)
Fire protection: Methods of providing for fire control or fire extinguish-
ment. (NFPA 850)
Flammable liquids: Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below
100ºF (37.8ºC), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA
30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at
100ºF (37.8ºC), as determined by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test
for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Flammable
liquids are classified as Class I as follows:
(a) Class IA liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points
below 73ºF (22.8ºC) and boiling points below 100ºF (37.8ºC).
(b) Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points
below 73ºF (22.8ºC) and boiling points at or above 100ºF (37.8ºC).
(c) Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or
above 73ºF (22.8ºC), but below 100ºF (37.8ºC).
(NFPA 30)
Flash fire: The combustion of a flammable gas or vapor and air mixture in
which the flame propagates through that mixture in a manner such that
negligible or no damaging overpressure is generated. (CCPS, 1994)
Flash point: The temperature at which the vapor-air mixture above a liquid
is capable of sustaining combustion after ignition from an external
energy source. (CCPS, 1996, no. 22)
Frequency: The number of occurrences of an event per unit of time. (CCPS,
1999)
Fuel gas: Gaseous fuels consisting of natural gas and various manufactured
or by-product gases.
Geotechnical: Relating to the engineering field which combines geology and
engineering. (Merriam Webster’s Collegiate online dictionary)
Grassroots: Totally new facility that may be built upon a greenfield or
brownfield site.
Greenfield: Undeveloped property that is being considered as a site for con-
struction. (Dictionary.com)
Hazard: A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing
damage to people, property, or the environment. (CCPS, 1999)
Hazard evaluation: The analysis of hazardous situations associated with a
process or activity, using techniques to identify weaknesses in design
and operation. (CCPS, 1993, no. 15)
Hazardous material: In a broad sense, any substance or mixture of sub-
stances having properties capable of producing adverse effects on
Glossary 187
people, property, or the environment. Such materials may be flamma-

ble, combustible, toxic, reactive, unstable or corrosive. (CCPS, 1988)
Hazardous waste: A solid waste, or combination of solid waste, which
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infec-
tious characteristics may (a) cause, or significantly contribute to, an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapaci-
tating reversible, illness; or (b) pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. (RCRA )
Incident: An unplanned event with the potential for undesirable conse-
quences. (CCPS, 1993, no. 15)
Inert: A chemical that does not react chemically with other substances.
(Cambridge online)
Infrastructure: The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for
the functioning of a site such as transportation and communications
systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including emer-
gency response organizations. (Dictionary.com)
Inherently safer: A condition in which the hazards associated with the
materials and operations used in the process have been reduced or
eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is permanent and insepa-
rable. (CCPS, 1996, no. 23)
Jet fire: A fire type resulting from the discharge of liquid, vapor, or gas into
free space from an orifice, the momentum of which induces the sur-
rounding atmosphere to mix with the discharged material. (CCPS, 1999
and CCPS, 1994)
Knockout pot: a vessel used to separate liquids from vapors.
Layout: The relative location of equipment or buildings within a given site.
(CCPS, 1996, no. 22)
Likelihood: A measure of the expected probability or frequency of occur-
rence of an event. This may be expressed as a frequency, a probability of
occurrence during some time interval or a conditional probability.
(CCPS, 2000)
Low pressure tank: A storage tank designed to withstand an internal pres-
sure above 0.5 psig but not more than 15 psig measured at the top of the
tank.
LFG (Liquefied Flammable Gas): Any flammable gaseous material or mix-
ture of materials that is in liquid form under pressure.
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas): A fluid in the liquid state composed predomi-
nantly of methane and that can contain minor quantities of ethane, pro-
pane, nitrogen, or other components normally found in natural gas.

(NFPA 59A)
LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas): Any material having a vapor pressure not
exceeding that allowed for commercial propane composed predomi-
nantly of the following hydrocarbons, either by themselves or as mix-
tures: propane, propylene, butane (normal butane or isobutane), and
butylenes. (NFPA 58)
Mitigation: An act that causes a consequence to be less hazardous (CCPS,
2001)
Mitigation factors: Systems or procedures, such as water sprays, foam
systems, and sheltering and evacuation, which tend to reduce the mag-
nitude of potential effects due to a release. (CCPS, 1999)
On-stream factor: The fraction of the time that a process unit is operating
Off-site exposure: People, property, or the environment located outside of
the site property line that may be impacted by an on-site incident.
OSBL: Outside of battery limits
Piperack, pipeway, pipeband: a structure that supports pipes, power
leads, and instrument cable trays.
Pool fire: The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid at
the base of a fire. (CCPS, 1993, no. 25)
Predominant wind direction: The compass direction from which the wind
blows the majority of the time.
Probability: The expression for the likelihood of occurrence of an event or
an event sequence during an interval of time, or the likelihood of the suc-
cess or failure of an event on test or on demand. By definition, probabil-
ity must be expressed as a number ranging from 0 to 1. (CCPS, 2000)
Property boundary: The boundary that is or can be built upon including the
opposite side of a public way. (NFPA 30)
Radiant heat: the heat transferred from one body to another not in contact
with it but by means of wave motion through space.
Refrigerated liquid: A gas that is maintained as liquid at temperatures at
or below ambient temperature to reduce the storage pressure. This
includes fully refrigerated LP-Gas for pressures near atmospheric pres-
sure but not exceeding 15 psi (103 kPa) and semi refrigerated LP-Gas for
pressures above 15 psi (103 kPa). (NFPA 58)
Risk: A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss
in terms of the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or
injury. (CCPS, 2000)
Glossary 189
Risk analysis: The development of a quantitative estimate of risk based on

engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques for combining
estimates of incident consequences and frequencies. (CCPS, 2000)
Risk assessment: The process by which the results of a risk analysis are
used to make decisions either through a relative ranking of risk reduc-
tion strategies or through comparison with risk targets. (CCPS, 2000)
Risk management: The systematic application of management policies,
procedures, and practices to the tasks of analyzing, assessing, and con-
trolling risk in order to protect employees, the general public, and the
environment as well as company assets while avoiding business inter-
ruptions. (CCPS, 2000)
Roll over: The spontaneous and sudden movement of a large mass of liquid
from the bottom to the top surface of a refrigerated storage reservoir
due to the instability caused by an adverse density gradient. Rollover
can cause a sudden pressure increase and can affect vessel integrity.
(API 2510)
Safe haven: A building or enclosure that is designed to provide protection to
its occupants from exposure to outside hazards
Satellite Instrument House (SIH): A structure containing instrument and
process control equipment for one or more process units.
Self-igniting: The ignition and sustained combustion of a substance without
introduction of any ignition source besides thermal energy or heat of
reaction resulting when combined with other substances in the sur-
rounding environment. Self-igniting materials include materials above
their autoignition temperature, chemicals that ignite due to heat of reac-
tion with oxygen in air, and chemicals that are unstable and spontane-
ously combust when released.
Siting: The process of locating a complex, site, plant, or unit.
Turnaround: A time during which a unit is shut down for repair and mainte-
nance after a normal run, before it is returned to operation. (Har-
court.com)
Vapor cloud explosion (VCE): The explosion resulting from the ignition of a
cloud of flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds accelerate
to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant overpressure.
(CCPS, 1994)
Index
A Coal piles, outside battery limits (OSBL),

Access, process units, site/plant layout, 83 site/plant layout, 92
Air compressors, site/plant layout, 77 Codes
Air cooled heat exchangers, equipment site selection data requirements, 177–178
layout and spacing, 110 survey and data collection guidelines, 26–28
Air intake equipment, equipment layout and Cogeneration facilities, equipment layout
spacing, 107–108 and spacing, 113
Airports, 164 Communication systems
Air quality site selection data requirements, 168
site selection, 30–31 site survey, 48–49
site selection data requirements, 170–171 Complex, defined, 4
site survey, 50 Compressed gas storage, outside battery
limits (OSBL), site/plant layout,
B 91–92
Bhopal, India disaster, 7 Compressors, equipment layout and spacing,
BLEVE potential, case history, 127–129 111
Block layout methods, site/plant layout, Construction phase
71–72 support facilities, 55
Blowdown drums, site/plant layout, 91 transportation requirements, 44
Boundaries, site/plant layout, 69–70 Control facilities. See Electrical and control
Bulk storage, compressed and liquefied gas facilities
storage, site/plant layout, 91–92 Cooling towers, site/plant layout, 77–78
Critical structures, site/plant layout, 94–97
C
Carbon dioxide, site/plant layout, 80 D
Case histories, 127–138 Data collection guidelines. See Maps and
BLEVE potential, 127–129 surveys; Site selection data require-
expansion issues, 134–136 ments; Site survey; Survey and data
fire hazards, 136–137 collection guidelines
management of change, 137 Distance. See Separation distance
measurement units, 138 Drainage, site/plant layout, 68
reactive chemicals siting, 131–133
runaway reaction potential, 130–131 E
Catch tanks, equipment layout and spacing, Earthquake, seismic data, site survey infor-
110 mation requirements, 39
Chemical storage, site/plant layout, outside Electrical and control facilities
battery limits (OSBL), 90–91 site/plant layout, 80–82
191
Electrical and control facilities (cont.) reactors, 109

site selection data requirements, 164–166 scrubbers and catch tanks, 110
site survey, 47–48 tanks inside battery limits, 115–116
Electrical switch racks, equipment layout unit flares, 111
and spacing, 116 unit isolation valves, 113
Emergency access, process units, site/plant unit substations and electrical switch
layout, 83 racks, 116
Emergency response capabilities vents and relief vents, 114
site/plant layout, 70–71, 85 vessels, 109
site survey, 51–53 water spray actuation valves, 114
Emergency shutdown valves, equipment example, 116–119
layout and spacing, 114 general guidelines, 103–104
Enclosed process units, equipment layout optimization of, 121–125
and spacing, 105 relative location, 106–107
Environmental controls single- and multilevel structures, 104–105
site selection, 28–32 spacing tables, 101–103
air quality, 30–31 vapor cloud explosions, 105–106
flood levels, 32 Expanders, equipment layout and spacing,
generally, 28–30 111
luminosity levels, 32 Expansion issues, case history, 134–136
noise, 32 Expertise, site selection team, 15–17
solid waste disposal, 31–32 Explosion scenarios, hazard screening,
wastewater, 31 23–25
site selection data requirements, 166–172
air quality, 170–171 F
noise and luminosity levels, 174 Fired heaters, equipment layout and spacing,
sanitary sewage collection/treatment, 110
173 Fire hydrants, equipment layout and spacing,
wastewater, 168–172 114–115
site survey, 49–51 Fire monitors, equipment layout and spac-
air quality, 50 ing, 114–115
noise and luminosity levels, 51 Fire pumps, equipment layout and spacing,
sanitary sewage collection/treatment, 114
51 Fire safety
wastewater, 49–50 case history, 136–137
Equipment layout and spacing, 101–119 hazard screening, 22–23
air intake equipment, 107–108 site selection data requirements, 174
enclosed process units, 105 site survey, 51–53
equipment-to-equipment, 108–116 Fire training areas, site/plant layout, 91
cogeneration facilities, 113 Firewater ponds, outside battery limits
emergency shutdown valves, 114 (OSBL), site/plant layout, 92
fired heaters, 110 Flares
fire hydrants and monitors, 114–115 site/plant layout, 78–79
fire pumps, 114 unit flares, equipment layout and spacing,
gas compressors and expanders, 111 111
heat exchangers, 110 Flooding
inert materials handling, 108–109 environmental control issues, 32
pipeways, 115 site survey information requirements, 36
process unit spacing, 108 Fuel supply
pumps, 111–113 site/plant layout, 77
Index 193
site selection data requirements, 166 L

site survey, 46–47 Landfills, outside battery limits (OSBL),
site/plant layout, 92
G Layers of safety, siting and layout, 4–6
Gas compressors and expanders, equipment Layout, optimization of, 121–125. See also
layout and spacing, 111 Equipment layout and spacing;
Gases, site/plant layout, 80 Site/plant layout
Geological data Light levels. See Luminosity levels
site selection data requirements, 155–157 Liquefied gas storage, outside battery limits
(OSBL), site/plant layout, 91–92
site survey information requirements,
Local guidelines, survey and data collection
37–39
guidelines, 26–28
Geotechnical studies, site/plant layout, 66.
Location. See Equipment layout and spacing
See also Soil properties
LPG storage, BLEVE potential, case history,
Grading, site/plant layout, 68
127–129
Groundwater
Luminosity levels
site/plant layout, 68 site selection, 32
site survey information requirements, 36 site selection data requirements, 174
site survey, 51
H
Hazard screening, 18–25 M
explosion scenarios, 23–25 Mail system, site survey, 49
fire scenarios, 22–23 Maintenance access, process units,
overview, 18–20 site/plant layout, 83
preliminary plot area refinement, 25 Management of change, case history, 137
toxic release scenarios, 20–22 Maps and surveys
Heaters, fired, equipment layout and spac- site selection data requirements, 152–154
ing, 110 site survey information requirements,
Heat exchangers, equipment layout and 33–34
spacing, 110 survey and data collection guidelines, 28
Helicopter transport, 162 Marine facilities
Housing piers and wharves, site/plant layout, 89–90
site selection data requirements, 175 site selection data requirements, 158–160
site survey, transportation, 44
site survey, 54
Material handling, site selection data
Hydrocarbons, site/plant layout, 80
requirements, 155–156
Measurement units
I
case history, 138
Inert gases, site/plant layout, 80
site selection data requirements, 177
Inert materials handling, equipment layout Medical response capabilities, site survey,
and spacing, 108–109 51–53
Infrastructure. See Utilities Meteorological data
Inherently safer design site/plant layout, 68–69
layers of safety, 4–6 site selection data requirements, 155–157
siting and layout, 9 site survey information requirements,
Inside battery limits, tanks, equipment 37–39
layout and spacing, 115–116 Metering stations, pipeline, site/plant layout,
Instrument air compressors, site/plant outside battery limits (OSBL), 86
layout, 77 Microwave communications, site survey, 49
Internet system, site survey, 49 Minimization, site/plant layout, 64–65
Moderation, site/plant layout, 64 Piers, outside battery limits (OSBL),

Multilevel structures, equipment layout and site/plant layout, 89–90
spacing, 104–105 Pigging stations, site/plant layout, outside
Multi-unit blowdown drums, site/plant battery limits (OSBL), 86
layout, 91 Pipeline metering stations, site/plant layout,
outside battery limits (OSBL), 86
N Pipelines
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric site selection data requirements, 160
Administration (NOAA), 37 transportation, site survey, 42
Neighbors, site/plant layout, 69–70 Pipeways
Nitrogen, site/plant layout, 80 equipment layout and spacing, 115
Noise control site/plant layout, outside battery limits
site selection, 32 (OSBL), 87
site selection data requirements, 174 Plant, defined, 3
site survey, 51 Police capabilities, site survey, 51–53
Portable containers, compressed and lique-
O fied gas storage, site/plant layout,
Occupied structures 91–92
runaway reaction potential, case history, Ports
130–131 site selection data requirements, 162–164
site/plant layout, 94–97 site survey, 44
On-site shipping facilities, process units, Process control buildings, site/plant layout,
site/plant layout, 84 95–96
Optimization, of layout, 121–125 Process units
Outdoor electrical switch racks, site/plant equipment layout and spacing, 105, 108
layout, 81 site/plant layout, 82–84, 83–84
Outside battery limits (OSBL), 85–92 Product handling, site selection data
buildings for, location of, 97 requirements, 157–158
compressed and liquefied gas storage, 91–92 Project description, site selection process,
emergency response facilities, 85 12–15, 17
fire training areas, 91 Pumps
miscellaneous, 92 equipment layout and spacing, 111–113
multi-unit blowdown drums, 91 fire pumps, equipment layout and spacing,
piers and wharves, 89–90 114
pipeline metering stations, 86 transfer pumps, site/plant layout, outside
pipeways, 87 battery limits (OSBL), 86–87
site support facilities, 85
toxic and reactive chemical storage, 90–91 R
transfer pumps, 86–87 Radio communications, site survey, 49
transportation, 85–86 Railroad
truck and rail loading and unloading racks, loading and unloading racks, site/plant
88–89 layout, 88–89
underground piping, 87–88 site selection data requirements, 159–160
wastewater separators, 90 transportation, site survey, 42–43
Oxygen, site/plant layout, 80 Reactive chemicals
siting, case history, 131–133
P storage, site/plant layout, 90–91
Personnel Reactors, equipment layout and spacing, 109
site selection data requirements, 173–175 Receiving facilities, process units, site/plant
site survey, 53–54 layout, 84
Index 195
Relative location, equipment layout and block layout methods, 71–72

spacing, 106–107 electrical and control facilities, 80–82
Relief vents, equipment layout and spacing, example, 97–100
114 general guidelines, 64–66
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act occupied and critical structures, 94–97
(RCRA), 31 optimization of, 121–125
Risk assessment, transportation, site survey, outside battery limits (OSBL), 85–92
39–40 compressed and liquefied gas storage,
Risk management, siting and layout, 8 91–92
Road systems, transportation, site survey, emergency response facilities, 85
40–42 fire training areas, 91
Runaway reaction potential, case history, miscellaneous, 92
130–131 multi-unit blowdown drums, 91
piers and wharves, 89–90
S pipeline metering stations, 86
Safety pipeways, 87
site selection data requirements, 174 site support facilities, 85
site survey, 51–53 toxic and reactive chemical storage,
Sanitary sewage collection/treatment 90–91
environmental controls, site survey, 51 transfer pumps, 86–87
site selection data requirements, 171 transportation, 85–86
Satellite instrument house (SIH), site/plant truck and rail loading and unloading
layout, 81–82 racks, 88–89
Screening. See Hazard screening underground piping, 87–88
Scrubbers, equipment layout and spacing, wastewater separators, 90
110 overview, 63–64
Security process units, 82–84
site selection data requirements, 172 site factors, 66–71
site survey, 51–53 emergency response support, 70–71
Seismic data, site survey information geotechnical studies, 66
requirements, 39 groundwater, grading, and drainage, 68
Separation distance. See also Equipment neighbors, 69–70
layout and spacing topography, 66–68
equipment layout and spacing, 101–103 weather, 68–69
site/plant layout, 63–66 spacing tables, 72–74, 75
spacing tables, 72–74, 75 tank storage, 92–94
Sewage. See Sanitary sewage collec- utilities, 74, 76–80
tion/treatment cooling towers, 77–78
Shelters, site/plant layout, 97 flares, 78–79
Shipping facilities, process units, site/plant fuel gas and liquids, 77
layout, 84 gases, 80
Ships instrument air compressors, 77
piers and wharves, site/plant layout, 89–90 steam supply, 76–77
site selection data requirements, 160–162 wastewater facilities, 76
site survey, transportation, 44 water supply, 76
Simplification, site/plant layout, 64 Site selection data requirements, 151–178
Single level structures, equipment layout and codes and standards, 177–178
spacing, 104–105 communication systems, 166
Site, defined, 3–4 electrical systems, 164–166
Site/plant layout, 63–100 environmental controls, 166–172
Site selection data requirement (cont.) Site support facilities. See Support facilities
air quality, 170–171 Site survey, 33–61
noise and luminosity levels, 172 communications systems, 48–49
sanitary sewage collection/treatment, electrical systems, 47–48
171 environmental controls, 49–51
wastewater, 166–170 air quality, 50
fire and safety, 172 noise and luminosity levels, 51
maps and surveys, 152–154 sanitary sewage collection/treatment,
measurement systems, 179 51
meteorological and geological data, 155–157 wastewater, 49–50
security, 172 example in, 55–61
site features, 173–176 fire, safety, and security, 51–53
housing, 175 information requirements, 33–39
personnel, 173–175 maps and surveys, 33–34
support facilities, 175–176 meteorological and geological data,
topography, terrain and soil properties, 37–39
154–155 topography, terrain, and soil properties,
transportation, 157–162 35–37
marine facilities, 160–162 site features, 53–55
pipelines, 158 housing, 54
product and material handling, 157–158 personnel, 53–54
railroads, 159–160 support facilities, 54–55
special requirements, 162 transportation, 39–44
trucks, 158 marine facilities, 44
utilities, 163–164 pipelines, 42
Site selection process, 11–32 railroad, 42–43
environmental control issues, 28–32 risk assessment, 39–40
air quality, 30–31 special requirements, 44
flood levels, 32 trucks, 40–42
generally, 28–30 utilities, 44–47
luminosity levels, 32 fuel supply, 46–47
noise, 32 steam supply, 46
solid waste disposal, 31–32 water supply, 45
wastewater, 31 Siting and layout
example in, 55–61 basis for, 8–10
hazard screening changing standards for, 10
explosion scenarios, 23–25 definitions, 3–4
fire scenarios, 22–23 facility types, 1
overview, 18–20 guidelines, 2
preliminary plot area refinement, 25 implications of, 7
toxic release scenarios, 20–22 importance of, 1
overview, 11–12 layers of safety, 4–6
project description, 12–15 risk management, 8
size determination, 17–18 Size determination, site selection process,
survey and data collection guidelines, 17–18
25–28 Soil properties
codes, standards, and local require- geotechnical studies, site/plant layout, 66
ments, 26–28 site selection data requirements, 154–155
maps and surveys, 28 site survey information requirements,
team assembly, 15–17 35–37
Index 197
Solid waste disposal site survey information requirements,

site selection, 31–32 35–37
site survey, 51 Toxic release scenarios, hazard screening,
Spacing tables 20–22
equipment layout and spacing, 101–103 Toxic storage, site/plant layout, outside bat-
examples of, 139–151 tery limits (OSBL), 90–91
site/plant layout, 72–74, 75 Traffic, transportation, site survey, 40–42
Standards Trailers, outside battery limits (OSBL),
site selection data requirements, 179–180 site/plant layout, 92
survey and data collection guidelines, Trains
26–28 loading and unloading racks, site/plant
Steam supply layout, 88–89
site/plant layout, 76–77 site selection data requirements, 161–162
site selection data requirements, 163–164 transportation, site survey, 42–43
Transfer pumps, site/plant layout, outside
site survey, 46
battery limits (OSBL), 86–87
Storage
Transportation
compressed and liquefied gas, site/plant
site/plant layout, outside battery limits
layout, 91–92
(OSBL), 85–86
tank storage, site/plant layout, 92–94
site selection data requirements, 159–164
toxic and reactive chemicals, site/plant
marine facilities, 162–164
layout, 90–91
pipelines, 160
Substitution, site/plant layout, 64
product and material handling,
Support facilities
159–160
site/plant layout, 70–71, 85
railroads, 161–162
site selection data requirements, 177–178 special requirements, 164
site survey, 54–55 trucks, 160
Survey and data collection guidelines, site survey, 39–44
25–28. See also Maps and surveys; marine facilities, 44
Site selection data requirements; Site pipelines, 42
survey railroad, 42–43
codes, standards, and local requirements, risk assessment, 39–40
26–28 special requirements, 44
maps and surveys, 28 trucks, 40–42
Switch racks, equipment layout and spacing, Trucks
116 loading and unloading racks, site/plant
layout, 88–89
T site selection data requirements, 160
Tanks transportation, site survey, 40–42
inside battery limits, equipment layout and
spacing, 115–116 U
site/plant layout, 92–94 Underground piping, site/plant layout, out-
Team assembly, site selection process, side battery limits (OSBL), 87–88
15–17 Unit, defined, 3
Telephone systems, site survey, 48–49 Unit flares, equipment layout and spacing,
Temporary trailers, outside battery limits 111
(OSBL), site/plant layout, 92 Unit isolation valves, equipment layout and
Terrain and topography spacing, 113
site/plant layout, 66–68 Unit spacing, process units, site/plant
site selection data requirements, 154–155 layout, 83–84
Unit substations, equipment layout and equipment layout and spacing, 105–106
spacing, 116 hazard screening, 23–25
US Geological Survey (USGS), 39 Vents, equipment layout and spacing, 114
Utilities Vessels, equipment layout and spacing, 109
site/plant layout, 74, 76–80
cooling towers, 77–78 W
flares, 78–79 Wastewater
fuel gas and liquids, 77 site/plant layout, 76
gases, 80 site selection data requirements, 168–172
instrument air compressors, 77 site selection process, 31
steam supply, 76–77 site survey, 49–50
wastewater facilities, 76 Wastewater separators, site/plant layout,
water supply, 76 outside battery limits (OSBL), 90
site selection data requirements, 165–166 Water spray actuation valves, equipment
site survey, 44–47 layout and spacing, 114
fuel supply, 46–47 Water supply
steam supply, 46 site/plant layout, 76
water supply, 45 site selection data requirements, 165
site survey, 45
V Weather. See Meteorological data
Valves, equipment layout and spacing, Wharves, outside battery limits (OSBL),
113–114 site/plant layout, 89–90. See also
Vapor cloud explosions Marine facilities

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GUIDELINES FOR

Center for Chemical Process Safety

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

This book is available at a special discount when ordered in

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

6.6. Relative Location of Equipment 106

APPENDIX A. TYPICAL SPACING TABLES 139

APPENDIX B. SITE SELECTION DATA REQUIREMENT LIST 151

CCPS Staff Consultant:

Vanessa E Rodriguez US Environmental Protection Agency

Don Connolley Akzo Nobel Chemicals Inc.

The cost, complexity, and safety of process operation and maintenance is

The objectives of these guidelines are to provide guidance on the follow-

1.2. How To Use This Book

Figure 1-1. Guidelines Book Flowchart

It is important to use consistent vocabulary when discussing the compo-

Figure 1-2 . Guidelines Terminology

a site may include a petroleum refinery, or a manufacturing facility that pro-

1.3. Layers of Safety

Siting and layout provide a fundamental aspect of risk management. It sepa-

Inherently safer strategies can impact a potential incident at various

Figure 1-3. Layers of Safety

1.4.2. Other References

2.1. Implications of Siting and Layout

2.2. Management of Risks

Consideration of siting and layout is an important aspect of risk manage-

2.3. Basis for Facility Siting and Layout

Building a new site or adding equipment to an existing one is often an excit-

Figure 2-1. Safety in Project Development

Figure 2-2. Guidelines Book Flowchart

3. Finally, the individual unit equipment can be laid out. Equipment

2.4. Changing World

Societies increasingly demand higher standards for processing sites. These

The information obtained using these guidelines should be sufficient to allow

3.1. Project Description

—Describe the means of feedstock and product transportation (truck,

3.2. Assembling a Site Selection Team

Assemble a team to organize, collect and analyze data, develop information,

3.3. Preliminary Site Size Determination

Once the project description is written, a preliminary estimate can be made

This preliminary estimate provides an idea of the land area required to

3.4. Preliminary Hazard Screening

3.4.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis

3.4.2. Toxic Release Scenarios

Established design and operation guidelines help minimize the hazard of

gency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) 3 as a screening criterion. The

3.4.3. Fire Scenarios

• A process unit fire.

3.4.4. Explosion Scenarios

3.4.5. Refinement of Preliminary Plot Area

3.5. Guidelines for the Survey and Data Collection Effort

3.5.1. Codes, Standards, and Local Requirements

• Is there a requirement for governmental approval of drawings and speci-

3.5.2. Maps and Surveys

or future right-of-way requirements, underground sewers, pipelines,

3.6. Environmental Control Issues

Once sites to be evaluated are chosen, acquire information concerning envi-

3.6.1. Air Quality Control

quality regulations. Local consultants may be necessary to acquire codes

3.6.2. Wastewater Control

• Do the regulations specifying analytical methods to be used in deter-

3.6.3 Solid Waste Disposal

3.6.4. Noise Control

3.6.5. Flood Levels