LANDSLIDE BY DEFAULT: THE NEW ZEALAND

GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990

By Helena Catt

TWO and a quarter hours after the polling stations closed on Saturday
27 October 1990, Mike Moore, the Labour Prime Minister, phoned Jim
Bolger, the leader of the National Party, to concede defeat. New
Zealand's fourth Labour government was swept from power by a blue
avalanche. The change itself was expected but few foresaw the magni-
tude of the government's defeat. In the new Parliament 67 of the 97
MPs are National, twenty nine are Labour and one New Labour
compared to 40 National, 57 Labour and one New Labour in the
previous Parliament.
The difference between the parties in the share of votes received was
not as great as the differences in seats won. National gained 48% of
votes cast, Labour 35% and minor parties between them 17%. The
biggest change from previous elections was the number who did not
vote. Registration, although a legal requirement, was lower than usual,
meaning that the turnout rate of 84.4%, while the lowest since 1975,
disguises the fact that only 74.5% of the total voting-age population
voted, the lowest figure since the war. This indication of a general
dissatisfaction with politicians was one of the themes of commentary
throughout the campaign. The Maori Council of Churches added to
this when they advocated Maori abstention and the signing of a
'Register for Maori Sovereignty' as evidence of disenchantment and
distrust of political parties. Another sign that the voters were not overly
impressed with politicians was the result of the referendum on the term
of Parliament. New Zealand often holds a referendum at the same time
as the general election. The usual one concerning liquor licensing was
not held this time but one on extending the term of Parliament was.
The choice was between keeping the present three years or extending it
to four. The result was an overwhelming rejection of change. There had
been little discussion of the issue by politicians and the media: all that
voters received was an official leaflet setting out the main arguments for
each option.

© Chdbid Univenity Prai 1991 325

326 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

The Context
New Zealand is a small, intimate country with a strong democratic
tradition: it was the first country to widen the franchise to include
women. With a population of three million it equates with the popu-
lation of Wales; and a Parliament with 97 members equates with a
large city council. Constituencies thus contain far fewer people than in
Britain, indeed only twice as many as an English local government
ward. There is an expectation that MPs will be seen around the
constituency and will be generally available to their electorate. It is
even easy to make an appointment to visit ministers and discuss matters
relating to their departments' work. This, and the absence of a
nominated second chamber, leads to politicians being less of an elite
than they are in Britain. While there are a few 'political' families which
have supplied parliamentarians for generations, generally MPs come
from a broad range of backgrounds. In the present Parliament no
profession dominates and very few did not do somatype of work before
election.
Several themes in New Zealand's recent electoral history are relevant
to an understanding of the 1990 election. National has been in power
for 29 of the 45 years since the war leading to a general acceptance that
it is the natural party of government. It is almost as if Labour is
allowed the occasional term to implement some radical policies and to
allow National to recharge its batteries. Another recurring theme is the
convergence of economic policy. Under Robert Muldoon (1975—1984)
the National government slid towards the normally Labour line of
greater economic intervention. By the end of his time in office New
Zealand had fallen down the league table of prospering nations and
many felt that a new direction was needed. During the same period,
as happened throughout the western world, various people were con-
verted to monetarist policies. In New Zealand this transformation
happened across the political spectrum, affecting those interested in
finance within both Labour and National. Also, the New Zealand
Party, a small monetarist and libertarian party headed by a prominent
businessman, emerged in 1983 and won a fifth of the vote in 1984.
Monetarism, as a policy was not necessarily electorally unpopular in
the late 1980s. Generally, attitudes towards social policy and foreign
affairs have differentiated the two main parties more than their
approach to the economy. For instance, Labour has been more commit-
ted than National to gender and race equality through legislation,
trade-unionism, dealing with 'law and order' as a social problem, a
non-nuclear stance and sanctions against South Africa. But a tendency
towards consensus is still strong: National now shares the non-nuclear
stance.
The events of the previous six years are particularly important in
understanding the 1990 election. The fourth Labour government was
 THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990 327

elected in 1984 after nine years in opposition. They almost immediately

implemented monetarist economic policies (known as Rogernomics as
they were initiated by Roger Douglas, the Finance Minister) which had
not been mentioned in the election manifesto. In the pre-crash boom
fever it all seemed palatable: unemployment was a temporary cost of
restructuring. However, as the traditional Labour sacred cow of social
policy increasingly took second place to the economic sphere, divides
within the parliamentary party, within the Cabinet and between the
party in and outside Parliament became increasingly apparent. As the
1987 election approached, tension within the party was growing,
membership was decreasing and morale was not high. Discontent
outside Parliament also grew: the promised Camelot did not materialise,
putting many people off politics.
Despite this situation, Labour won the August 1987 election. This
success was largely due to a divided opposition, a thriving economy and
a widespread feeling that the government, deserved another term to
achieve its economic objectives. Winning just before the stock-market
crash, Labour's popularity in the polls began to fall in early 1988.
Tension and disagreement grew: Prime Minister Lange and Finance
Minister Douglas were publicly at odds, ending in the resignation of
both. Several disagreements between the government and the Labour
Party outside Parliament were publicly known. The wider party decided
it had the right to disagree publicly with government actions and did so
over such policies as the buying of frigates, privatisation and the drive
for greater efficiency in the public sector (exemplified by the extensive
closure of community post-offices). The public increasingly shared this
dissatisfaction with a government that did not want to listen. By
September 1990 opinion polls were looking so bad that the Labour
MPs, led by several ministers, decided a change of leader was the only
hope of avoiding total destruction. Opinion polls suggested that Labour
would lose fewer seats if the Minister for External Relations, Mike
Moore, was at the helm. So Geoffrey Palmer resigned in his favour and
Mike Moore served as Prime Minister for two months, most of which
were spent campaigning. Labour had given New Zealand the unpre-
cedented experience of three Prime Ministers in thirteen months,
monetarist economics and major restructuring. The naturally conserva-
tive people were plainly unenthusiastic about all this change. On
election night Moore said, 'Essentially I think people thought a couple
of years ago they'd had enough, we'd been too tough on them, so that
was it.'
During Labour's six years in office National was also undergoing
internal ructions: its defeat in 1984 had left it shell-shocked and in
disarray. Its members, and the country, tend to think of National as the
natural party of government. Arguments about direction, especially in
economic policy, plus changes in leader followed. Eventually in 1986
328 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

Jim Bolger, a traditional 'Tory', was chosen as a leader to heal the

internal divisions and to return the party to power. He elevated Ruth
Richardson, a key right-winger, to the finance shadow portfolio. This
appointment simply exacerbated the lack of dear economic direction
within the National Party and reinforced the tendency just to shadow
Labour, waiting for it to lose rather than trying to present a positive
alternative. As the Labour government became increasingly unpopular
in its second term, there was a growing feeling that National could
'sleepwalk to victory'.
Minor parties are also important players on the political scene.
Although New Zealand has far greater daim to call itself a two-party
system than Britain, there were more third parties at the 1990 dection
than at any previous one. The average number of candidates in the
European seats was 7; in the Maori seats it was 3.5. The three most
successful minor parties were the Greens, New Labour and the Demo-
crats. The Democrats are the metamorphosis of Sodal Credit which
had been contesting elections since 1954. They started as a monetary
reform party but have since added other polides and now concentrate
most heavily on the introduction of proportional representation and
titizen initiated referenda. The Greens were formed only months before
the election and had neither a leader nor an agreed policy on issues
apart from the environment. New Labour, as the name suggests, is a
breakaway from the Labour Party formed when an MP and former
party President, Jim Anderton, left due to disagreements over the
government's monetarist polides. It describes itself as the 'traditional
labour party'. Mana Motuhake, the Maori party stood candidates in
the four Maori seats. It was formed in 1979 by Matiu Rata, a former
Labour minister, to promote the welfare of the Maori people and
biculturalism. The rump of Sodal Credit, not happy with the Demo-
crats, also stood, as did Christian Heritage, which wants to return to
Christian family values. Another small party, the New Zealand Party,
wants monetarism but more so and has various libertarian leanings.
New Zealand's equivalent of The Monster Raving Loony Party,
McGuillicuddy Serious, which wants to take a 'great leap backwards'
to the dan system, also stood candidates in 60 seats. The one policy
shared by the serious minor parties is, not surprisingly, the introduction
of proportional representation.

The Campaign
Opinion polls were much used by die big parties and die media.
Newspapers published details of ten opinion polls and television news
made deven reports on them during the campaign, giving heavy
coverage to them, esperially diose in key marginal seats. Bodi Labour
and National based the style and content of their campaign upon die
findings of private opinion polls, in-depdi interviews and opinion
 THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990 329

tracking. However, in most other ways the campaign was run on old
style lines: addressing a hall from the rostrum, staged debates, and
leaders meeting small groups of people at work, in old people's homes
or clubs. Both major parties launched their campaign at a public
meeting, but not the highly stage-managed type now seen in Britain. It
was thus generally a traditional-style campaign but with strong faith in
opinion polls. The latter was responsible for many of the other interest-
ing aspects of the campaign: heavy concentration on leaders; negative
adverts, emphasis on the economy.
The New Zealand-based polling companies did pretty well in predict-
ing the result, except for an eve of poll one which picked up a swing
back to Labour. Overall, there was little real movement during the
election campaign. Undecideds were the main area of interest in the
polls at between 15% and 33%. Most people seem to have voted as they
told the pollsters they would weeks previously, so either the undecideds
did not vote or they split across the parties as the rest of the population
had.
The style and personal qualities of the two main leaders, Mike Moore
and Jim Bolger, were seen as very important by both the parties and
the media. There were three televised leaders debates, two with live
audiences. Both leaders toured the country, shook hands everywhere
and looked as if they were trying personally to persuade every voter in
New Zealand. Except for the Greens who eschewed a leader, all parties
made heavy use of their leaders in political advertisements. The rest of
the 'team' seemed to have disappeared in television coverage and
advertisements. New Zealand opinion polls ask respondents to choose
any politician as the best Prime Minister, not just the party leaders, so
non-leaders feature. Both leaders had competition from within their
own party: from ex-leaders and prominent backbenchers. Moore was
the favourite choice among Labour MPs; but within National, Winston
Peters, a charismatic and outspoken Maori, invariably did better than
Bolger. There was also more dissatisfaction with Bolger than with
Moore (48% and 20% respectively). Moore consistently polled better
than Labour and Bolger less well than National.
Labour was primarily responsible for starting the heavy concentra-
tion on the leader, partly because of his good showing in the polls. After
all, the party had replaced Palmer close to the election because of poll
evidence showing that Moore was more popular. To make use of this
change, and knowing that many of the government's policies were
unpopular, more was made of Moore's own record than that of the
government. There were two key personas. On the one hand, Moore,
'the great negotiator', stressing his success as Minister for External
Relations and Trade and a last-minute wage accord struck with the
unions. On the other hand, Moore the normal Kiwi: a man of working-
class origins who had known financial hardship and so could identify
330 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

with traditional Labour voters. National, although using Bolger as the

prominent figurehead, did not create a corresponding 'Bolger the man'.
Yet, despite the appeal of Moore and the heavy emphasis on leaders,
the more popular leader lost. Although Moore outpolled Bolger,
National continued to outpoll Labour. Clearly the voters were making
a distinction between the leaders and the party. Also National contained
Winston Peters who did very well in the 'best Prime Minister' polls,
usually coming a close second. Perhaps the key is that many people felt
strongly opposed to Labour, and a new leader, however appealing, was
not going to change that desire to punish an uncaring government.
Feelings against Labour were probably the most important ingredient
in both the campaign and the election result. Private polling told both
parties that there was a pool of undecideds who were disenchanted with
Labour but not really inclined towards any of the other parties. This
was a crucial factor in the way both major parties campaigned. National
aimed to consolidate the feeling that people wanted to get rid of the
Labour government, so it ran a 'knocking campaign'. While achieving
this, it never managed to move on from there persuading people to
favour National. However, it knew that its 1987 level of support was
sufficient to win as long as the discontented did not return to Labour.
Moore complained that the voters had 'taken the phone off" the hook'
and were not listening to messages about the good the government had
done. Opinion polls showed that messages about improvements in social
policy areas had not been received. Labour campaign managers knew
they had little positive appeal to build on, so it was easier to attack
National. If the pool of undecideds could be persuaded not to go to
National, then Labour had a better chance of keeping a rump of seats,
whether those voters abstained or voted for one of the minor parties.
The negative campaign was particularly noticeable in the political
advertisements. Parties are allowed to buy advertisement time on
television and radio. So voters are sold political parties next to soap
powder, cheese and worming tablets. While Labour had a few adverts
that pushed the idea of a caring, sharing society and National presented
the idea of a 'Green taskforce', most of the adverts were negative. In
particular, a series by National, based upon Sir Humphrey in 'Yes
Prime Minister' suggested the government had not behaved in an
honourable manner. Both major parties asked for some of their oppo-
nents' adverts to be banned, claiming misinformation. The civil ser-
vants' association was also unhappy about the implication that they
behaved like Sir Humphrey. However, despite the nightly rash of
political adverts, opinion polls could find few voters who remembered
any of them.
Few adverts concentrated on explaining specific policies but manifes-
tos are still seen as important documents in New Zealand elections and
the government is meant to fulfil the promises contained within its
 THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990 331

party's manifesto. One of the big and frequently heard criticisms of the
Labour government was that it had been deliberately vague about the
monetarist policies it was about to implement in 1984 and did not even
bother to present a manifesto until after the election in 1987. National's
1990 manifesto, 'Creating a Decent Society', was sent to 70,000 targeted
'swinging voters'. Under the headline 'A Programme for Positive
Action', the Shadow Cabinet members outlined their policy areas, 14 in
all. The main areas covered were ways of boosting the economy and
reducing unemployment; making health care and welfare benefit cost
effective; improving pensions; helping the environment by setting the
unemployed to work on conservation projects; improved race relations
through an emphasis on education; freeing up industrial relations;
increasing tourism. Despite the fact that each area was outlined by the
shadow minister, some did not make Cabinet and not all of those who
did were given the same portfolio that they had held in opposition.
Labour, in 'Leading Us into the Future', did not focus on any particular
areas. Separate policy documents were released in the early part of the
campaign, before the manifesto was published, but there was no pattern
to them.
Neither party really highlighted any issues within its manifesto to
concentrate on. Both gave some prominence to the economy, unemploy-
ment and health, but there were no big pushes to control the agenda.
Thus, much of the agenda setting was left to the media. Television
treatment of policy areas was another ironical aspect of the campaign.
The economy was given a high profile despite it being one area where
most perceived no real difference between the major parties. Other
issues where a big difference was seen, such as race relations or gender
pay equity, were not highlighted. The television producers seemed to
have given up their usual desire for adversarial conflict on the campaign
screens. Again the opinion poll results had a role to play in this decision.
Polls showed that most people saw unemployment as the most
important issue (51%) followed by the economy in general (14%) and
government (10%). However, those worried about unemployment were
not necessarily concerned for the same reasons. Further questioning
reveals that the aspect of unemployment which people thought needed
to be dealt with varied a great deal: law and order implications;
stopping bludgers (dole claimers who are not looking for work); getting
the economy going; implications for the future of New Zealand society.
Perceptions of why unemployment was a problem reflected existing
beliefs about society, as Alan Simpson showed in a recent paper. On
most aspects of the economy there was little difference between the
major parties. This was shown nicely by a disagreement within the
National Party. Winston Peters' comment that his party's policy of
0-2% inflation by 1992 was 'drivel' was not appreciated by National,
so now he just criticised Labour's policy of 0-2% inflation by 1993. As
332 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

people were clearly worried about the economy and particularly unem-
ployment, the media concentrated on this; but because there was little
to choose between the parties here, it was improbable that voters were
deciding how to vote on this issue.
There were instances of other issues being covered. A series of Sunday
televised debates featuring a selected live audience concentrated on
health and social welfare, the economy and unemployment and justice,
law and order. Each had the major spokespeople from National and
Labour and the economy also had Jim Anderton, the leader of New
Labour. News stories looked at some other issues but none dominated
campaigning nationally. The newspapers did cover a wider range of
issues and looked at differences between the major parties. However, as
election surveys have consistently shown, most people gain their cam-
paign information from the television.
The other aspects of the campaign that were discussed related to
armchair perceptions of the campaign. In particular, the marginalisa-
tion of minor parties by the media and the shallowness of the television
coverage. Broadcasting plays an important role in dissemination of
information. However, there was a feeling amongst many of the political
players that television trivialised a lot of the process: it paid more
attention to ratings than good coverage. For instance, the first leaders
debate was cut to fit around normal advertising slots. The newspapers
and radio provided less shallow coverage but more people attend to
television. In part, the perceived superficialness of television coverage is
a problem of the system: parties respond to the television producers'
desire for sound bites and the producers use what they are given. Many
involved in the election campaign felt that this trivialisation helped
increase general feelings of cynicism toward the political process.
Although between them minor parties received over a sixth of the
vote, they were not given heavy coverage on television. Frequently they
were lumped together and dealt with as a whole regardless of how many
votes they could be expected to receive or how serious they were about
influencing government. In a half hour programme looking at the minor
parties the leader of New Labour was given as much coverage as the
New Zealand Representative Party whose two candidates received 173
votes. New broadcasting legislation was partly to blame because it
restricted the buying of advertising time to those parties with more than
ten candidates. This meant that the Maori party were barred from all
advertising. The minor parties also suffered from a lack of finance and
could not take great advantage of such advertising in any case. On the
three big televised debates, only one minor party member was included.
This is just one example of the way that the contest was portrayed as
being between the two big parties. Television was clearly reflecting the
widely held idea that an election is a time to decide which of two
competing teams should be the next government.
 THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990 333

The Results
As was the case in the defeats of the three previous Labour govern-
ments, the government lost rather than the opposition winning. With
non-registration higher than usual, it is useful to compare the 1987 and
1990 results as a percentage of those living in New Zealand over the age
of eighteen (i.e. eligible voters). The non-vote category saw an increase
to such an extent that in 1990 there were only slightly less of them than
there were Labour voters. Comparing 1987 and 1990 in this way
National's vote went up by less than 0.5% but Labour's vote went down
by 12%. Quite clearly, Labour lost the election and National won a
landslide by standing still. Minor parties and non-voting were the
gainers, going up by 6% and 5% respectively. Labour received the
lowest number of votes since 1975 and the lowest percentage since 1931;
National had the highest number of votes ever and the highest share of
the vote since 1951. Halfway through the campaign an opinion poll
found that of those who voted Labour in 1987, just over half intended
to do the same in 1990 (56%), almost a fifth (19%) were undecided,
while 83% of 1987 National voters were saying they were staying with
that party.
In vote terms the minor parties did well, receiving 17% of the vote
between them. The new ones did especially well: 6.9% for the Greens
and 5.2% for New Labour. Mana Motuhake receoved 23% of the vote
in Maori seats and just missed winning one of them. McGuillicuddy
won more votes than three of the 'serious' minor parties: Social Credit,
Christian Heritage and New Zealand Party. The last receiving only 477
votes. Anderton is the first New Zealand politician to resign from a
party and successfully stand for another. He claimed his victory was a
watershed and that New Labour would be a viable alternative govern-
ment by 1993. Although neither the Greens nor New Labour contested
all 97 seats, they each received over 5% of the overall vote and so would
have gained seats, if everyone had voted the same way, had the election
been held under the proportional representation system suggested by
the 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System.
The media had heralded the Greens as being potential spoilers of the
Labour vote. However, the percentage of the vote received by the
Greens in former Labour and National seats is very similar: if anything,
they did better in National seats. Their two highest levels were in
National areas and four lowest in Labour ones. The Green vote shows
no significant correlation with the Labour, National or New Labour
vote but does with other minor parties. The Greens failed to win any
seats, coming nearest in Coromandel with 20% and only 83 votes away
from beating Labour into second place. More patterned was the vote
for New Labour, ranging from 48% in Sydenham, where Jim Anderton
was returned, to 1% in more rural areas. Generally, New Labour did
well in the places where Labour did well. Vote level seems to interact
334 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

within two distinct groups: National, Labour and New Labour on the
one hand, Greens, Democrats and McGuillicuddy Serious on the other.
The undecideds were an important group who received much media
attention. In some polls taken during the campaign over a quarter of
voters were uncommitted and this number increased as the campaign
continued. However, with all the media coverage of this group there
was some feeling that such attention was helping to maintain their
existence. One commentator wrote, 'There are now signs that "unde-
cided" or "don't know" is becoming a considered response, indeed, the
fashionable means of protest'. Uncommitted voters were predominantly
women and former Labour supporters: over a third were ex-Labour,
less than a third were ex non-voters. Two particular groups were
identified: young mothers on low income and elderly women living
alone. National knew it could not easily attract these women and relied
on the fact that Labour's economic policy had hit them particularly
hard. The choice of Moore as Labour leader was also relevant to the
undecideds. Support for Moore is unusual in that it is not spread across
the gender gap: he is much more popular among men. Even among
Labour voters, men are more in favour of him than women. So a new
leader who was chosen because of opinion polls was actually a liability
with one of the key groups showing up in polls: uncommitted ex-Labour
women.
More women and Maori MPs were elected than in previous parlia-
ments, 16 and six respectively in a Parliament of 97 members. National
has half of the women and a third of the Maori MPs. The number of
women Labour MPs has decreased by three, the number of National
ones increased by five. There had been fears that a National win would
result in a decrease in female representation but the increase was in
large part due to the unexpected extent of National's victory. Female
candidates were concentrated in National no-hope seats: of the 17, three
were in safe National areas but 13 were in safe Labour seats and one in
a traditional weathervane seat. Four of these 'safe' Labour seats were
won by National.
The extent of National's win had other consequences. Eight consti-
tuencies went blue for the first time. These included areas that had been
red since before the second world war. Labour is now concentrated in
the Maori seats and the metropolitan areas. Six of the Labour MPs
come from the capital, Wellington, and eight from Auckland. The four
MPs from Maori seats aside, only three of the remaining 22 do not
represent large cities, and they represent towns rather than rural areas.
National, on the other hand, can almost claim to represent the entire
country, having MPs from all types of electorates except inner cities and
the four Maori seats.
Several prominent Cabinet ministers lost their seats, leading to media
suggestion that ministers were being more heavily voted against.
 THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1990 335

However, there was no great difference between ministers and back-

benchers in the decline in the number or share of the vote compared to
1987. With the extent of Nationals win, it was inevitable that some
ministers would lose, especially as safeness of seat is not a prerequisite
for entering Cabinet. Half of the last Labour Cabinet are not in the new
Parliament: two resigned, eight were defeated. Added to this, 39 MPs
are new to the game, 33 of them for National. So the new Parliament
looks different from previous ones in a great variety of ways.
The 1990 election has implications for the way politics is conducted
in New Zealand. Both of the major parties could face problems in
Parliament because of the number of MPs they have. In New Zealand
politics the parliamentary party, known as the caucus, has weekly
discussions of policy with ministers and therefore some power.
The small Labour caucus will be hard pressed to fulfil all the functions
of an Opposition: sitting on committees, asking questions, voting against
the government. There are 13 select committees (equivalent to British
standing committees) which each require two Labour MPs. On any
given parliamentary day, eight of these are likely to meet, so occupying
over half of the Labour MPs. The Labour Party as a whole also has
problems: it needs to rise from the ashes if it has any wish to form
another government this century. The rebuilding of confidence has
started already with a party conference in November which managed to
stay away from bitter recriminations. However, there is still disagree-
ment within Labour ranks about whether their defeat was due to
implementing monetarist policies or not going far enough with them:
did the voters reject the policies or the way they were carried through.
Perhaps this inability to agree on a cause of defeat is the most telling
explanation of that defeat. The internecine war within Cabinet, caucus
and party, since Lange rejected his Finance Minister's flat tax proposal
in late 1987, has to be a major factor in the heavy Labour loss.
Disagreements within all parts of the Labour Party remain, in particular
regarding the privatisation programme which was especially unpopular
with many voters and party members (current and lapsed). The
November 1990 conference voted, amongst other things, for no privatis-
ation of state assets if they are monopolies or serve a social function and
for the active redistribution of wealth.
The big National caucus will also have problems, as several commen-
tators pointed out on election night. Some of the MPs are willing to vote
with Labour against the government on certain issues, in particular the
targeted inflation rate and proportional representation. Backbenchers
outnumber ministers and so will have the weight to influence ministers
(the system gives them greater power than in Britain). They will also
have the time to pursue other activities. There will be enough National
backbenchers to form several factions, to feel leftout and to agitate.
There are several rallying points other than the Prime Minister, most
336 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

noticeably Robert Muldoon, the former leader, and Winston Peters, the
charismatic and outspoken Minister for Maori Affairs. Whilst the whips
are trying to keep many backbenchers busy with minor matters, they
might do well to remember that children left alone to play can start
fires. They will have a hard time controlling the backbenchers when the
government's majority is not really at stake. Already there have been
calls from National backbenchers for a reappraisal of the whipping
system.
The electoral reform issue has been rumbling in New Zealand for
some time. Geoffrey Palmer established a Royal Commission to study
the matter in 1985: it proposed the adoption of the Federal German
voting system. Lange promised a referendum on the matter but it never
materialised. The National government has also promised a referendum
to contain a question on reintroducing an upper house, changing to
proportional representation and giving a choice of various voting
systems. The media ran several stories on this matter soon after the
election. Various aspects of the result led to a questioning of the validity
of the first-past-the-post system. For instance, the government has over
two-thirds of the seats but received less than half of the votes cast and
the backing of just over a third of elegible voters. Also, it was thought
that the minor parties had been hard hit: New Labour and the Greens
crossed the 4% threshold but only Jim Anderton won a seat.
Two aspects of the campaign and election result are of particular
general interest: use of opinion polls; reactions to another convergence
in economic policy. At times, opinion polls seemed to be taking over or
at least providing the sole justification for specific actions. However,
this led to several anomalies. The Labour Party changed leaders due to
opinion poll ratings but chose a new leader who would not attract an
identified target group of undecided voters. The attention paid to the
number of undecideds helped make such an option acceptable in a
country with a tradition of participation. Opinion polls and the way
they are reported must now be considered major players in an election
campaign.
On the central issue of the economy, New Zealand saw the two major
parties behaving in a classic Downsian way, as they have done
repeatedly since the war. In An Economic Theory of Democracy Downs said
that parties will come together to compete for the middle ground.
Labour and National were very close on the key planks of economic
policy but the voters did not respond as Downs suggested and the two-
party vote went down. The real winners from a convergence of policy
were minor parties and abstention. Many people clearly did not like the
economic policy pushed by both parties and so opted out of the major
decision. In the end, the main message was that voters were interested
in punishing the old rather than welcoming the new. So by standing
still the National party won its biggest victory ever.