Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LLB 4 t h SEMESTER
IMPORTANT CASES
SHORT ANSWERS
1. MEANING OF LITERAL (GRAMMATICAL, PLAIN, NATURAL, ORDINARY AND POPULAR) RULE, ITS
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.
Viscount Simon LC says, “The natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed
from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different
meaning”.
The term ‘grammatical construction’ was used by Salmond. He explains, interpretation is of
two kinds, which may be distinguished as ‘literal’ and ‘functional’. The literal interpretation is that
which regards exclusively the verbal expression of the law. It does not look beyond the ‘literal
legis’ (letter of Law). Functional interpretation, on the other hand, is that which departs from the
letter of the law and seeks elsewhere for some other and more satisfactory evidence of the true
intention of the legislature. It is essential to determine with accuracy the relation which subsists
between these two methods, in other words, we have to determine the relative claims of the
letter and spirit (legislative intent and, object of statute) of enacted law.
ANSWER:
The rule of harmonious construction plays a significant role in interpreting two or more statues
or two or more parts of a statute when they conflict with each other. It follows a very simple rule
that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read as a whole.
It is the duty of the courts to avoid “a head-on clash” between two sections of the same act
and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict possible so
that they harmonise”.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to the interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole should be the aim of the Courts and
construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of
the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a head-on clash”, in the words of the
Apex Court, between the different parts of enactment and conflict between the various provisions
should be sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should
not be assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken away by
the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely explained by the Supreme Court
thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each
other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, the effect should be given to both”. A
construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be avoided since
harmonization is not equivalent to destruction
Harmonious Construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid absurd
or unintended results. It should be resorted to making the provision meaningful in the context. It
should be in consonance (agreement, harmony) with the intention of Rule makers. Rule of
Harmonious construction is applicable to subordinate legislature also.
As stated by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.; “The rule of construction is well settled that when there
are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be
so interpreted that; if possible, the effect should be given to both. This is what known as the rule
of Harmonious Construction”.
That effect should be given to both is the very essence of the rule. Thus a construction that
reduces one of the provisions to a “useless lumber (disused or cumbersome)” or “dead letter” is
not harmonious. To harmonise is not to destroy. It is a settled rule that an interpretation which
results in hardship, injustice, inconvenience or anomaly should be avoided and that which
supports the sense of justice should be adopted. The Court leans in favour of an interpretation
which conforms to justice and fair play and prevents injustice. On a summary of the case-law, the
following principles are noticeable:
1. It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to
construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as
to harmonise them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,
the courts must interpret them in such a way so that effect is given to both the provisions
as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or a dead lumbar is not harmonious construction.
given to both and that construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should
not be adopted except in the last resort.
In D. Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1967, SC 1211, the election of the appellant to the
State Legislative Assembly was challenged by a petitioner who prayed that he be declared elected
in place of the Appellant. During the pendency of this petition, the appellant got elected to the
Rajya Sabha and so resigned from the Assembly. He filed a writ petition in the High Court with the
prayer of a direction to be issued to the Election Commissioner for proceeding with the holding of
a by-election of the seat vacated by him under Section 150 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951. The High Court dismissed his petition. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the decision of
the High Court, held that Section 150 could not be interpreted in isolation because the Court had
to keep in mind the other related provisions in the Act such as Sections 84 and 98 (c) If the
appellant's arguments that the Election Commissioner should start making arrangements for by-
election immediately after the resignation of a member even though an election petition against
that member is pending are accepted, the effect of it could lead to an absurdity never intended by
the Parliament. Such will be the case where, for instance, the election petitioner wins his petition
against the member vacating his seat and is declared elected. In such a situation there will be two
persons representing the same constituency which could never have been the will of the
legislature. Construing Section 150 harmoniously with Sections 84 and 98 (c), therefore, will lead
to the conclusion that while enacting Section 150 the Parliament did not intend that the election
petition should stand dismissed with the resignation of the member against whom the petition
has been brought.
The legislation can lay down legal definition of its own language, if such bodies are embodied in
the code itself, it becomes binding on the courts. When the Acts itself provides a dictionary for the
words used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. In Mayor of
Portsmouth v. Smith, the Court said that the introduction of the interpretation clause is a novelty.
There have been both the criticism and the appraisal made in reference to the inclusion of
definition clause in a statute. In Mayor of Portsmouth v. Smith, the Court observed: “the
introduction of interpretation clause is a novelty.” When the act itself provides the dictionary for
the words used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. And then, there
has been a criticism made as to the utility of definition clause or the interpretation clause. Despite
this, there has been an inclusion of definition clause in most of the statutes so created, whether in
the Indian Statutes or the statutes abroad.
Talking of the pros of adding definitions to a statute, these definitions help greatly to the one
who reads the statute. Following are the benefits that arise by adding meaning to the frequent
and important words of a statute:
1. It provides some kind of certainty and idea as to what extent is the meaning of the phrase
or the word so defined can be taken. Without having any definition to a word, it becomes
ambiguous as to what the statute or the legislature had the intention of the word so
added.
2. When a word has been defined in a statute, it saves the same word to be defined
everywhere in a statute, since the word so defined are frequently used. It is a great help to
those reading and making in use the statutes.
3. By adding definition to a word, it is helpful as one can easily understand as to what the
statute is intended to say. A statute thus may well provide with the definition of a word
which suits the legislation and can differ with the general meaning of the word and yet still
stand authoritative.
4. There are different meanings to a word when used as different dictionaries provide with
quite different meanings, hindering the interpretation of a word and, thus the provision in
a statute. Providing with a definition in the statute itself makes a lot easier to understand
of what the word in the statute really means and would help interpret further on if need
be, thus eliminating the ambiguity as to the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute.
As to the cons of adding meaning or definition to a word in legislation, there has been a
criticism made on it.
On drawing a balance between them while comparing both the pros and cons of adding a
definition clause to a statute, it seems the pros have a higher persuasive value of adding meaning
to a statute than of the cons of it.
To sum up, the object of a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in
describing the subject matter to which the word or expression defined is intended to apply. A
definition contained in the definition clause of a particular statute should be used for the purpose
of that Act. Definition from any other statute cannot be borrowed and used ignoring the definition
contained in the statute itself.
CONCLUSION
The definition clause so added in an Act provides with a lot of help in determining the meaning of
a word in a statute. Whereas it becomes cumbersome to find the correct contention of a word
used in a statute, the inclusion of definition or interpretation clause becomes helpful by providing
the required context or meaning of the word so used in a statute, either once, or several times.
Express repeal
Express repeal is an expression which means the abolition of the previously enacted statute by the
newly enacted provisions of a statute through expressed words embedded under the new statute
enacted. The statute which has been repealed is called repealed statute and the one which
replaces the earlier statute is called the repealing statute. In general, when an earlier statute or
some of its provisions are repealed through express words embedded under the newly enacted
statute stating that the provisions are now of no effect is called the express repeal.
Implied repeal
The term implied means implicit or hinted. So when a statute becomes obsolete and it is inferred
that it is no longer and shall be repealed with the newly enacted statute then this process of
repealing is called implied repeal.
For example, if we enter a car showroom it is intended that we are there to buy cars. It is implied,
similarly, if there arises any inconsistency in the statute and due to certain circumstances it
becomes necessary to repeal the statute with the new one though such situation is not expressly
stated, then it is implicit for the implication of repeal.
When the subject of the earlier act is covered by the act and is Test of the Implied Repeal
There is the assertion against the repeal by implication. The reason for making such an assertion is
that legislature while making or enacting the law has full knowledge about the current laws on the
subject matters. If the legislature has no provision regarding the repeal of the statute then it is
asserted that the legislature has no intention to repeal the existing statute.
Municipal council, Palari v. T.J. Joseph AIR 1963 3C 1561, p. 1564
In the instant case, it was held that if an act or provision enacted is inconsistent from the act
previously enacted and one of the acts must be obliterated. The presumption, in this case,
rebutted and the implied repeal is inferred.
For the implied repeal of a statute following points are to be considered:
Whether the previously enacted laws are in direct contradiction to the later enacted laws.
The conflict between the laws is of such a nature that can’t be resolved and reconciliation
between the laws is not possible.
Whether the newly enacted act is not consistent with the previously enacted act and one
has to be obliterated.
When both the laws are of such a nature that occupy and deals with the same field.
Delhi Municipality V. Shivshanker, [AIR 1971 SC 815]
In the instant case, it was held by the supreme court of India that the test which is applied in case
of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Indian constitution while resolving the conflicts arising
between the laws enacted by the parliament and the laws created by the state legislature, this
test of determining repugnancy shall be applied in case of implied repeal of a statute. This test
includes:
Whether there exists a direct contradiction between the two statutes or provisions.
When the law tends to occupy the same field.
When the legislature explicitly focused on the code of the particular subject matter
replacing the earlier law.
Ratanlal Adukia v Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 104)
In the instant case, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of implied repeal is loosely based
on the statement that the legislature assumed the current state of the law did not intend to
generate any vagueness by retaining the conflicting provisions. The court while implicating this
doctrine examines the nature and scope of the two enactments by giving effect to the legislative
intent.
Answer: Substantive law is the statutory or written law that defines rights and duties such as
crime and punishments (in the criminal law), civil rights and responsibilities in civil law. It is
codified in legislated statutes or can be enacted through the initiative process.
Substantive law is a statutory law that deals with the legal relationship between people or the
people and the State. Therefore, substantive law defines the rights and duties of the people.
1. Strict Interpretation:
It is a sound rule of construction that the substantive law should be construed strictly so as to
give effect and protection to the substantive rights unless the statute otherwise intends.
Strict construction is one which limits the application of the statute by the words used.
According to Sutherland “strict construction refuses to extend the import of words used in a
statute so as to embrace cases or acts which the words do not clearly describe.
2. With reference to the purpose and object of the statute (mischief rule):
As long ago as Heydon’s case, Lord Coke said, that it was resolved that for the sure and true
interpretation of statutes four things are to be recognized and considered:
A. What was the common law before the making of the Act,
B. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide,
C. What remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth,
D. The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the Judges are always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
B. Harmonious Construction:
Maxim: injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejusparticula proposita judicare vel
raspondere (It is unjust to decide or respond to any particular part of law without examining the
whole of the law).
Harmonious construction is the interpretation of statutes. It is a recognised rule of
interpretation of Statutes that the expression used therein should ordinarily be understood in a
sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object
of the statute and the legislature.
In a statute like the Code of Civil Procedure with its large number of sections with its numerous
orders and still more numerous rules thereunder, it is of great importance that, if possible,
construction of a particular section is not so made as to be in conflict with other specific section,
rules or orders.
Introduction
The General Clauses Act, 1897 is a consolidating and amending Act as is clear from the long title
of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to avoid superfluity and repetition of language; and to place
in a single Act, provisions as regards definitions of words and legal principles of interpretation
which would otherwise have to be incorporated in many different Acts and Regulations.
5. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)
The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ lays down it is better for a thing to have an effect
than to be made void. A statute should be interpreted to make it effective and operative.
In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v. State of Assam, the Supreme Court observed that a
statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and
operative. However, if a statute is absolutely vague and its language is wholly intractable and
absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness.
6. Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another (expressio unius est
exclusio alterius):
The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ indicates that if one or more things of a
particular class are expressly mentioned in an enactment that means that other things belonging
to the same particular class are excluded from the domain of the enactment. Again, where two
expressions have been used in a statute one of which generally includes the other, the more
general expression excludes the less general.
In India, the fundamental rights under Articles 15, 16 and 19 are available to the citizens of
India and not to other persons and non-citizens thus are expressly excluded, as they are not
citizens. However, Indian citizens may claim these freedoms through their legal persons because
the relief ultimately goes to the citizens and not to the legal persons.
restricted to edibles only. Thus, ‘etc.’ here may mean ‘biscuit’ or ‘cake’ since they are also edibles
but it cannot mean an ‘apple’.
According to Maxwell, "The golden rule is that words of Institute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning.
According to the golden rule in the construction of a statute, the Court must adhere to the
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction of the words used.
the golden rule can be used in a narrow sense and wider Sense.
2) the courts adopt the golden rule of interpretation in order to arrive at a perfect interpretation which
would bring out the true meaning of the language, in the process of giving effect to the real intention of
the Legislature.
1. With the help of golden rule errors in drafting can be corrected immediately.
2. Decisions are made more in line with Parliament intentions.
3. It helps to give a rational result.
4. It helps in closing any loophole.
5. It brings common sense to the law.
6. It allows the court to make sensible decisions
7. It prevents parliament from having to pass amending legislation
8. It respects the authority of parliament because it only allows wording to be altered in very limited
situations where the outcome would be absurd or repugnant
In this case, the interpretation of the word 'stop' was involved. Under section 77(1) of
the road traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall stop after the accident. In this
case, the driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then moved away.
Applying the golden rule the Court held that requirement of the section had not been followed
by the driver as he had not stopped for a reasonable time of period requiring interested
persons to make necessary inquiries for him about the accident.
In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. the State of Punjab, AIR 2001, SC 2524, the question of
interpretation of the words ‘abuse of his powers’ in the expression ‘abuse of his powers or
habitual failure to perform his duties’ in Section 22 of Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was involved.
The Supreme Court observed that to find the meaning of a word not defined in an enactment the
Courts apply the ‘subject of the enactment where the word occurs and have regard to the object
which the legislature has in view. In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word regard
must always be had to the context. ‘Abuse of power’ in the context implies a wilful abuse or an
intentional wrong. An honest though the erroneous exercise of a power or indecision is not an
abuse of power.
Answer:
Introduction
The mischief rule is the third rule of statutory construction traditionally applied by English
Courts. The other two are the ‘Plain meaning rule’ (also known as ‘primary rule’ or ‘literal rule’ or
‘grammatical rule) and the golden rule.
The Mischief rule is narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in that
it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute was passed
to remedy a defect in the common law. The application of the Mischief rule gives the Judge more
discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s
intent.
Heydon’s Rule
The Mischief Rule was first laid in Re Heydon’s case. In this case, a college had certain
properties in its own name. The management had given certain lands to W and his son for their
lives and after them to S and G. In England, during 16 th Century, there existed a system called
‘Doubling of Estates’ and the giving of property in the above way were valid. During those days
misappropriation of the properties of ecclesiastical and religious institutions was going on through
the system of doubling of estates. To prevent the doubling of estates, the England parliament
enacted “The Statute-31 Henry-VIII”. Under this Act, the properties of the college were taken
away by Crown and also the previous leases and instruments were cancelled. Heydon challenged
it in the Court. The Court took the guidance of the mischief rule of interpretation and upheld the
Statute-31 and also the act of the Crown.
The object of the Parliament was to protect the properties of ecclesiastical (relating to the
Christian Church or its clergy) and religious institutions. The Statute-31 provided the remedy to
protect with that object.
In Heydon’s case, the Court ruled that there were four points to be taken into consideration
when interpreting a Statute. In this case, Lord Coke observed the following “That for the sure and
true interpretation of all statutes in general (by the penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the Common Law) four things are to be considered:
Ist: what the Common Law before the Act?
2nd: What was the mischief and effect for which the Common Law did not provide?
3rd: What remedy the Parliament hath (had) resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth? And
4th: The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and ‘pro privato commodo’ and to
add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the cure and remedy according to the true
intention of the makers of the Act ‘pro bono Publico’.
Mischief Rule was applied in Smith v. Hughes. It deals with the Street Offences Act, 1959,
where it states that the common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street for the purpose of
prostitution, where a street indicated that it was a place and not a person. The overall case was to
deal with cleaning up the street for people to walk along the streets without being molested or
solicited by prostitutes. The prostitute would be penalised and arrested and would be found
guilty of the offence if they were to be soliciting in the streets. In this case, the question was
whether a woman who had tapped on a balcony and hissed at men passing by was guilty of an
offence under the Act. Parker LCJ found her guilty. He says, “I approach the matter by considering
what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean
up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by
common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting
while in the street or standing in a doorway or on a balcony”.
Purposive Construction
The mischief (Heydon’s) rule is also known as the rule of ‘purposive construction’ since it
emphasizes advancing the purpose and the object of the statute.
Relevant cases in India:
In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR, 1965, SC 881, the officers of the respondents,
while rounding up stray cattle, were beaten up by the appellants the owners of the cattle. When
prosecuted for an offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code the appellants pleaded right of
private defence of property. They also contended that the cattle were not abandoned within the
meaning of Section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 in that abandoned means
completely leaving a thing as a final rejection of one's responsibilities so that it becomes
ownerless as have been described in the dictionaries. The Supreme Court, while rejecting this
argument, held that it is not necessary that the dictionary meaning of a word is to be always
adhered to even if the context of an enactment does not so warrant. In the present instance, to
know the mind of the legislature, it is expedient to see what mischief was intended to be
suppressed and what remedy advanced. So interpreted, the word abandoned must mean let loose
or left unattended.
10. RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES, ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Answer:
coupons as required by clause 27A of the Order. On being prosecuted for these illegal omissions,
the appellant proved that on the day of the occurrence he was out of the station. Consequently, in
the absence of mens rea, he could not be punished. The Supreme Court held that mens rea was an
essential element to be proved under clauses 5 and 22. Since the appellant was out of the station
on the day, he could not be held responsible for the mistakes of his servant who should have
taken coupons from the customers. But the appellant was guilty under clause 27A because this
provision casts a strict liability on the petrol dealer. The object of this enactment was that the
petrol dealer should set up complete machinery to ensure that necessary endorsements are made
on the coupons against which petrol is supplied. Even if the endorsements could not be made
because of the fault of the servant, the appellant could not escape liability because he has failed
to ensure the compliance of the law.
In Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954, SC 496, an offence under an Act punishable with
imprisonment or fine or both was committed by the appellant in 1947. The Act was amended and
the punishment in the form of the fine was enhanced to the tune of an amount equivalent to the
amount procured by the offender through his offence. The Supreme Court held that this enhanced
punishment could not be meted out to the offender in view of clear provisions of Article 20(1) of
the Constitution which says that no penal statute should be given a retrospective operation.
A Socio-economic statute is one which is made with the object of securing social and economic
welfare of the deprived classes of society and the economic development of the nation.
The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV (Articles 36 to 51) of the Constitution are
beneficial legislation to the citizens. As per Directives, the Indian Government enacted several
statutes for the benefit of people. Some of them are the Employees’ Provident Fund and other
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948, the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995, the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972, the Payment of Bonus Act, 1972, the Employees’ Family Pension Scheme, 1971,
the Right of Children to Free Remuneration Act, 1976 etc.
Illustrations
1. In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, AIR 1978, SC 12, the question before the Court was the
interpretation of Section 5 of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 under which an expectant mother
employee could take a maximum of twelve weeks of maternity leave, pre-birth and post-birth, on
full salary. The facts, in that case, were that a woman worker who went on maternity leave was
paid seventy-two days wages calculated on the basis of the six-day week for twelve weeks
omitting twelve Sundays. She contended that she should be paid wages for eighty-four days as a
week consisted of seven days. The Supreme Court ordered to pay wages for eighty-four days and
stated that the statute is a beneficial piece of legislation intended for the purpose of achieving
social justice for women workers. Article 42 of the Constitution has recognised it as a Directive
Principle of State Policy. The policy behind Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 is that the
mother worker should not only be able to meet her both ends during the leave period but also be
able to revitalise some of her diluted energy with a view to maintaining her efficiency as a worker
as also to be able to nurse her new-born child. Being beneficial legislation with such a noble
object in view, the enactment has to be interpreted beneficially.
2. In Spring Meadows Hospital v. H. Ahluwalia, the Supreme Court has held that if the parents
have hired the services of a hospital for the benefit of their child they and the child can maintain
independent actions against the hospital for deficient services.
3. In Andhra University v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of Andhra Pradesh and other,
and Osmania University v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another, AIR 1986, SC 1234,
the Supreme Court held that the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 is a beneficent piece of social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the well-
being of the employees and the court will not adopt a narrow interpretation which will have the
effect of defeating the very object and purpose of the Act. Once it is found that there is an
establishment (in the instant cases the Department of Publications and Press of the University)
which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and employing twenty or more
persons, the provisions of the Act will get attracted to the case and it makes no difference to this
legal position that the establishment run by a larger organisation which may be carrying on other
additional activities falling outside the Act.
Jurists take the help of both Rules and Aids in the interpretation of Statutes. As stated by the
Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum, interpretation of statute
being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should
be admissible. A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. There are three rules of
interpretation of statutes- Literal, Golden and Mischief. Aid, on the other hand, is a device that
helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court has to take recourse to
various internal and external aids.
Internal Aids
Internal aids mean those aids which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part
of enactment. Some Internal Aids are-
In recent times, the long title has been used by the courts to interpret a certain provision of the
statutes. However, it is useful only to the extent of removing the ambiguity and confusions and is
not a conclusive aid to interpret the provision of the statute.
Cases
1. In Re Kerala Education Bill, the Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be
deduced from the long title and the preamble.
2. In Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab, the Long title of the Act is relied upon as a guide to decide
the scope of the Act.
Although the title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful in
case of ambiguity of the enacting provisions, is ineffective to control their clear meaning.
Short Title – The short title of an Act is for the purpose of reference & for its identification. It
ends with the year of the passing of the Act. For e.g. Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, says –“This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It shall come into force
on the first day of January 1909.”
Even though the short title is a part of the statute, it does not have any role in the interpretation of
the provisions of an Act.
2. Preamble
The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. It is a
preparatory statement and contains the recitals showing the reason for the enactment of the Act.
E.g. the Preamble of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is “Whereas it is expedient to provide a general
Penal Code for India; it is enacted as follows”. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the
interpretation of an ambiguous act.
Parliamentary practise to include the preamble as part of the Act was discontinued since the
long and generally long title has replaced it. The preamble of a statute is a prefatory statement at
its beginning, following the title and preceding the enacting clause declaring the policy and
purpose, the reasons and motives for, and the objects sought to be accomplished by the Act.
References to the statement of objects and reasons are permissible for understanding the
background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the
statute and the evil, which the statute was sought to remedy. The preamble being a part of a
statute can be read along with other portions of the Act to find out the meaning of words in the
enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. The preamble is a key
to open the minds of the makers of the Act and the mischief, which they intended to redress.
Cases
In Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. Ltd., Chitty, LJ .held: "it is a settled rule that
preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactment themselves where they are expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms. The preamble affords a clue to the scope of the statute where the
words construed in them without the aid of preamble are capable of more than one meaning. One
must not create or imagine an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of the preamble.
A definition contained in the definition clause of a particular statute, not from any other statute,
should be used for the purpose of that Act.
Cases
In Krishnaiah v. State of A.P. and Others, it was held that headings prefixed to sections cannot
control the plain words of the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt, heading or sub-
heading may be referred to as an aid in construing provision.
6. Illustrations
An Illustration to a section has the purpose to illustrate the principle enshrined in the statutory
provision, it does not exhaust the full content of the section, which it illustrates but equally, it can
neither curtail not expand its ambit. Illustrations are examples provided by the legislature for
better understanding of the statute.
Case: In Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma, it was held that illustrations are parts
of the Section and help to elucidate the principles of the section.
7. Exceptions
An ‘exception’ means an omission or leaving out. An exception exempts something
which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute. An
exception exempts absolutely from the operation of an enactment. An exception is intended
to carve out or take out it was from the main enactment, a portion which but for it, would fall
within the main enactment.
Exception: This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given by a
wife to her husband.
8 Proviso
The name of a clause inserted in an act of the legislature, a deed, a written agreement, or other
instruments, which generally contains a condition that a certain thing shall or shall not be done, in
order that an agreement contained in another clause shall take effect.
It always implies a condition, unless subsequent words change it to a covenant; but when a
proviso contains the mutual words of the parties to a deed, it amounts to a covenant.
A proviso differs from an exception. An exception exempts, absolutely, from the operation of an
engagement or an enactment; a proviso defeats their operation, conditionally. An exception takes
out of an engagement or enactment, something which would otherwise be part of the subject-
matter of it; a proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or excuse.
A proviso is to provide examples of a specific case which would otherwise fall within the general
language of the main enactment. It excludes, excepts and restricts the application of a section and
its effect is confined to that case.
Cases
In CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd, it was held that whether a proviso is construed as restricting the
main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it
stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.
9. Explanations
An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words
appearing in the section. The purpose is not to limit the scope of the main section but to explain,
clarify, subtract or include something by elaboration. Thus, the object of an explanation is to
provide additional support to the dominant object of the main provision in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful.
10. Schedules
The schedule forms an important part of the statute. This should be read along with section
enactment. Schedules at the end contain minute details, which add information to the provisions
of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule, however, cannot override the
provisions of the express enactment.
11. Punctuation
Punctuation is one of the minor elements of the statue. It should be given importance only when
there is proper punctuation used and when there is no doubt about its meaning.
It is usual with the minister or promoter of a bill in the legislature to attach a Statement of
Objects and Reasons when he introduces it in the legislature. It is not a part of the bill. It explains
the objects and reasons which necessitates the passing of the Statute in the legislature. It is only
the expression of the mover. The objects and reasons seek to propound the objective which it
stands for, so that the members of the House may be convinced of the necessity of introducing the
bill.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons might be admissible not for construing the Act but for
ascertaining the conditions which prevailed when the legislation was enacted.
2. Legislative Debates [Proceedings in Legislature]
Minister, while introducing the Bill gives a Statement in the Legislature. Later section-wise
discussion takes place. Legislature gives their opinion through their statements. Some members
propose amendments. A detailed debate takes place in the legislature and the Bill will be passed
by the majority vote and becomes a Statute.
P.V.Narsimha Rao v. State, it has been observed that “It would be seen that as per the decisions
of the Supreme Court, the statement of the Minister who had moved the Bill in Parliament, can be
looked at to ascertain mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and
purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the Minister is not taken into
account for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the enactment.”
3. Historical Setting [The events leading up to the introduction of the bill]
The ‘historical settings’ means the course of events which give rise to the enactment. It is also
called ‘Historical Facts’, ‘Historical background’, ‘Parliamentary History’, History of Legislation’ and
Surrounding Circumstances’.
The state of affairs existing at the time when a law was enacted, are called ‘historical facts’.
The Court is entitled to look into such historical facts as may be necessary to understand the
subject-matter of the statute or to consider the surrounding circumstances or the course of events
influencing the introduction of the bill. The Court may take into account such facts or the events
of the time which may help it to consider whether the statute was intended to alter the law or to
leave it exactly where it stood before.
The rule laid down in Heydon's case, that to a certain extent the surrounding circumstances
which led to the passing of the Act can be considered for the purpose of construing a statute – are
now well-recognised.
In Kashmir Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed that the Courts while
construing an ongoing statute must take into consideration the changes in the societal condition.
The Courts should also take into consideration development in science and technology.
4. Reference to other statutes
A. Reference to Statutes in Pari Materia
‘Pari’ means ‘same’, ‘Materia’ means subject-matter. Hence, ‘pari materia’ means ‘same
subject-matter’ and ‘Statutes in pari materia’ would refer to the statutes on the same subject
matter. The two statutes are said to be in pari materia when they deal with the same subject,
person or thing.
The rule of construction of statutes in ‘pari materia’ means the rule to the exposition of one Act
by the language of another act. According to Maxwell, “light may be thrown on the meaning of a
phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same
subject matter.”
Lord Mansfield states, “Where there are different statutes in pari materia made at different
times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed
together, as one system and as explanatory of each other”.
Unless there is an indication of any change in the meaning, as may be deduced from the
purpose of the Act, the words as used in the Act deals, with the similar matters would be
construed as having the same meaning.
The Statutes in pari materia can be lawfully referred to determine the meaning of an
ambiguous word. In other words, in order to resolve an ambiguity, help can be taken from other
statutes also, provided that they are in pari materia i.e., on the same subject matter. The meaning
of an uncertain word cannot be imported from any other statute. Only the statute in pari materia
could be legitimately called in aid.
The rule of construction of statutes in ‘pari materia’ may be called as a further extension of the
basic principle of ex visceribus Actus. According to ex visceribus actus, while interpreting any
provision of a Statute, the Court is required to see that statute as a whole. The rule of pari
materia permits to refer to the other statutes on the same subject matter.
B. Previous Legislation [Assistance of an earlier Statute]
The legislature is the competent authority to enact the Statutes on concerning subject to
remove the mischiefs. Society changes from time to time. When the society changes, the
circumstances also change. If the changed circumstances require, the Legislature may amend the
existing Act, and sometimes, it brings a fresh Act in place of the existing Act. Sometimes Courts,
while interpreting the existing Act, look towards the previous Act for its interpretation when the
intention of the legislature is not changed.
C. The assistance of later Statutes [Help from subsequent Legislation]
There are conflicting opinions relating to Assistance of subsequent statutes. One opinion is that
it is not permissible to refer to a later statute for construction of an earlier statute. According to
Coke, “such an Act should not be construed by any strained sense against the latter of the
previous Act, for of any exposition should be made against the direct letter of the exposition made
by Parliament, there would be no end of expounding”.
D. Incorporation of earlier Act into later
While law-making, legislature adopts a device of incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act
for the sake of convenience. In order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provision of the
earlier Act into the later, the legislature incorporates the required provisions of earlier Act or
referred to in the later Act and they form part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily
transposed into it. It is presumed that such incorporation is with all the amendments made in it
till the date of incorporation.
E. Constitution of Consolidated Statutes
The primary rule of construction of a consolidation Act is to examine the language used in the
Act itself without any reference to the repealed Statutes.
It is only when the consolidation Act gives no guidance as to its proper interpretation that it is
permissible to refer to the repealed enactments for guidance and it is never legitimate to have
recourse to repealed enactments to make obscure or ambiguous that which is clear in the
Consolidation Act.
F. Codifying Statutes
Codifying statute is a statute which presents an orderly and authoritative statement of the
leading rules of law on a given subject.
Sutherland states, “statute incorporation into a Code is presumed to be incorporated without
change even though it is re-worded and re-phrased and in the organisation of the Code its original
sections are separated. Where, however, the legislative intent is clear that a change in the law is
intended, the new provision prevails. In case of ambiguity, it is permissible to resort to the prior
legislative history of the Act, the form and language of the prior statute, prior interpretation and
all matters in pari materia in order to arrive at the true meaning of the Code’s provision.
4. Foreign Decisions
Where the Indian Statute practically reproduces the English enactment, it would not be proper
to neglect the judicial decisions in England which have decided the proper construction of the
section to be one thing and not another.
5. Contemporanea Expositio [Contemporaneous exposition, or construction]
The word ‘Contemporanea’ means ‘of the same time or period’ and ‘expositio’ means
‘explanation’. The rule ‘contemporanea expositio’ is that ‘interpreting a statute or any other
document by referring to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority. In other
words, the meaning attributed to the words of a statute at the time of passing of that Statute shall
be retained by those words even subsequently.
6. Text-books
Where the language of a Statute is not precise and words employed therein are capable of
bearing more than one meaning, the textbooks may be referred to resolve the ambiguity.
However, a reference to textbooks shall not bind the Court in any manner. It shall be the
discretion of the Court either to accept or to reject the meaning given in the textbook.
14. WHAT ARE THE WAYS TO RESOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENT LEGISLATION AND
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION?
Answer:
Now when there is a conflict between Parent Legislation and Subordinate Legislation, what
happens?
If the subordinate or delegated legislation goes beyond the scope of authority conferred on the
delegate or it is in conflict with the parent or enabling act, it is called substantive ultra vires. The
validity of the subordinate or delegated legislation may be challenged before the Courts on this
ground.
When a piece of delegated legislation is declared to be ultra vires, it is void and becomes
unenforceable. It cannot affect the rights and duties of any person. Until a rule is declared invalid
by a court, it is presumed to be valid. If the valid and the invalid parts of a rule can be severed,
only then the invalid portion of the rule is quashed and the valid portion can continue to remain
operative. However, if the valid and the invalid parts are inextricably mixed up, then the entire
rule has to go.
CASES
15. Grammatical Interpretation
A. Sales of Green ginger were subjected to sales tax and it was contended that they were not
so liable as they constituted ‘vegetable’ which were exempted from sales tax. The
expression ‘vegetable’ is not defined in the Act. Decide whether green ginger falls within
the meaning of the term ‘vegetables’ or not. (July-2019, May-2017)
B. Vegetables are exempted from the levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act. A vegetable
vendor is selling betel leaves. He contends that betel leaves fall within the scope of
‘vegetables’. Discuss (Aug-18).
C. The Sales Tax Act exempted ‘vegetables’ from the levy of sales tax. Sales of betel leaves
were subjected to sales tax by the authority. It was contended that betel leaves were not
taxable as they constituted ‘vegetables’ which were exempted from tax. Decide (May-14).
D. Under the Sales-tax Act, ‘Vegetables’ were exempted from the purview of tax. A vendor
of vegetables was selling coconuts. The tax authorities levied tax from the sale of
coconuts. The vendor pleaded the exemption on the ground that coconuts fell within the
term ‘vegetables’. Can he succeed? Discuss (May-2015).
E. The Sales Tax Act exempted ‘green vegetables’ from assessment to sales tax. Sale of
sugar-cane was subjected to sales tax by the authority. The question was whether sugar-
cane fell within the term ‘green vegetables’. Decide (Aug-2013).
Answer: In the above-stated cases only green ginger comes under the vegetables and all the
remaining e.g. betel leaves, coconuts and sugar-cane do not come under vegetables. To decide
whether a given item comes under vegetable or not is very simple, here we should not go for the
dictionary meaning or botanical meaning of that item, we should use simple common sense
whether that item is used in our foods frequently or not if it is used frequently then it becomes
vegetable.
ISSUE:
Whether green ginger, chilly and lemon are vegetable or not? Yes, Green ginger, chilly and lemon
is vegetable.
Whether betel leaves, coconuts and sugar-cane are vegetables? No, they are not vegetables.
who would regard betel leaf as a vegetable. So the definition depends upon who asks the
question. For a botany student, betel leaf is a vegetable, but not so for a tax collector.
Even after this definition was available, controversies arose on other so-called vegetables too.
Some which travelled up to the SC are coconut, green ginger, chilly, lemon etc. Coconut was the
subject matter of the SCs decision in the case of P A Thillai Chidambar Nair vs State of Tamil Nadu
reported in AIR 1985 SC 1644. In this case under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the
question was whether a coconut (neither tender nor dried, but a ripened one with or without
husk) could be exempted from sales tax. Justice V D Tulzapurkar and Justice Ranganath Misra held
that it was well-known that the kernel of the coconut was used as an ingredient for enhancing the
taste of food, but was hardly used as a substantial article of food on the table. On this ground,
they held that it was not a vegetable.
However, Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee observed that it could not be categorically said that
ripened coconut could never be considered a vegetable. However, the assesse could not adduce
enough evidence to prove it. He gave the legal verdict that the burden of proof that coconut was a
vegetable was on the person who claimed it to be so. And since he was not able to discharge the
burden of proof, it could not be regarded as a vegetable in law. On this basis, the SC finally
decided that ripened coconut was not a vegetable.
Chilly and lemon were the subject matter of a decision by the SC in the case of Mangulu Sahu
Ramahari Sahu vs Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam, Orissa reported in AIR 1974 SC 390. In this case, under
the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 the question was whether chillies and lemons were vegetables. The
HC had held that they were not vegetables. It had gone on the basis that before an item could be
considered a vegetable, it had to be a principal item of food. It also considered the botanical
meaning of the word. The SC observed that technical or botanical meanings should not be
considered for tax purposes. So while the HC said they were not vegetables, the SC said they were.
Green ginger came up for decision before the SC in the case of State of West Bengal vs Wasi
Ahmed reported in AIR 1977 SC 1638. In a case under the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, the issue
was whether green ginger was to be regarded as a vegetable as obtained in the description
vegetable, green or dried, commonly known as sabji, tarkari or sak in item 6 of Schedule 1. If it
was treated so, it would be exempt from sales tax. The SC relied on the fact that in common
parlance green ginger was known as a vegetable. It was grown in the kitchen garden or on a farm
and was used for the table. It did not accept the view of the Sales Tax Tribunal that it was a
flavour.
CONCLUSION:
When an item is used frequently it comes under the category of vegetables and items like betel
leaves, sugar-cane, coconut etc. do not come under vegetables because they are not used widely
in our kitchens. We should not go for a dictionary or botanical meaning of the item but usage
decides whether that item qualifies to be called as a vegetable or not.
RULE:
Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959: It is an offence for a prostitute to solicit men ‘in a
street or public place’.
APPLICATION:
The above-given case is similar to the case of Smith vs. Hughes (1960), and the interpretation
should be done by applying mischief rule.
Smith vs. Hughes (1960), under the Street Offences Act, 1959, it was a crime for prostitutes to
solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution, it includes all the acts to attract them. In this
case, the prostitutes were calling men in the street from their balconies by making signs to them.
The prostitutes claimed that they are not guilty of any offence because they are not doing this act
of soliciting from streets. The judge applied mischief rule to conclude that they were guilty as the
intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.
The overall case was to deal with cleaning up the street for people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by prostitutes. The prostitute would be penalised and
arrested and would be found guilty of the offence if they were to be soliciting in the streets. In
this case, the question was whether a woman who had tapped on a balcony and hissed at men
passing by was guilty of an offence under the Act. Parker LCJ found her guilty. He says, “I
approach the matter by considering what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows
that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter
little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or standing in a doorway or on a
balcony”.
CONCLUSION:
In the given case the act of the prostitute soliciting men is illegal. Even though the prostitute
soliciting from her balcony or windows, by using mischief rule the intent of the legislature is to
stop the prostitutes from attracting the men, and the acts of the prostitutes from their balconies
also comes under this section and illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether a student is a consumer or not? It depends on the services.
RULE:
APPLICATION:
The functions of university/educational institutes can be divided into two main categories:
The core function of the university/educational institution such as imparting education and
advance knowledge by providing instructional and research facilities to educate and train
manpower for the development of the country for the welfare of the people, their intellectual,
academic and cultural development. Here the core functions and the activities associated with it
are inseparable and this is the statutory duty of the university/educational institutes as defined in
the Central University Act.
Secondary/Ancillary services like providing hostel or accommodation facility, auditorium, library,
laboratory, gymnasium, canteen, transport service to and from campus, internet service etc. In
addition to the above, university supplies various goods to the students like textbooks, study
materials, notes, video CD, other electronic material including software programmes etc. The
ancillary services provided by the university, undoubtedly, fall within the category of those
services and provision of goods as per the Act. For example, the hostel or accommodation facility
falls within the meaning of board and lodging, transport facility provided to the student is also
within the scope of service. The foods and beverages provided to the students through canteen
facility, the laboratory equipment, video CD, software programmes etc., obviously come within
the purview of goods as per the Act.
Commercial Activities such as consultancy, transfer of technology to the company through the
patent right and thereby enjoying royalty, handling private projects, and Entrepreneurship
incubation are some of the commercial activities performed by the universities/educational
institutes in order to earn the profit. It is clearly reflected from Central University Act, 2009 that
university may enter into the partnership with industry and non-Government agencies and
establish a corpus of funds out of the profits of such partnership.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa
(Bangalore Water Supply), had considered among other things, that educational institutes are
classifiable as ‘Industry’ as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while
determining the import of the aforementioned term.
Reference of words like service, business, profit, and industry-partnership is available within the
Central University Act, 2009, itself which clearly proves that university is not a non-profit body
rather it has some business characteristics inherent in the Statutes and Acts which govern the
functions of the university.
In this respect three court decisions are available and those contradicting to each other. In Taneja
v. Calcutta District Forum, it is held by Calcutta High Court that the relationship between teacher
and student in an educational institute is not one of service-provider and consumer.
The same principle was almost followed in Central Academy Educational Society v. Gorav Kumar
where it was held by the court that teaching is not capable of marketization as opposed to the sale
of books or provision of accommodation is marketable and can be considered as service as per the
Act, 1986.
Critical Analysis of Three Decisions Delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court to Restrict the Scope of
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 with respect to Educational Activity
Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha
The issue was raised regarding the issuance of the same roll number to three different candidates
by the Bihar Board of Secondary Education and failure to declare the result of one of the
candidates. In this case, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 is not applicable with respect to statutory functions statutory bodies. Here, the Board is
a statutory body and conducting the examination is in the exercise of discharging its statutory
function.
Therefore, in this case, the Bihar Board of Secondary Education is not providing any service. The
examination fee paid by the candidates is also not considered as consideration. It is true that
conducting an examination is not a marketable service.
However, the findings in case of functions performed by statutory bodies outside the scope of
service under the Act, 1986 is not supported by the earlier Supreme Court decision in the Lucknow
Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta where the Supreme Court held that the activity of the
statutory body is not exempted from the definition of service as per the Act, 1986.
Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa
had considered among other things, that educational institutes are classifiable as ‘industry’ as
defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while determining the import of the
aforementioned term.
Therefore, when there is negligence in performing the statutory duty it should not be exempted
from the purview of the consumer law. When students pay the examination fee then he/she is
entitled to get correct roll number, admit card, question paper, paper for writing the answer, the
chance of scrutiny or review of the answer sheet being a candidate of examination and other
facility provided by the examination board to every student. If there is any deficiency in the
processing of the registration number, roll number, admit card, allotment of examination centre
etc. it amounts to deficiency in service on the part of examination board because the equal
opportunity is the right of every candidate appearing in the examination.
Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur
In this case, a student had enrolled in two courses simultaneously, one full-time course and one
correspondence course. Such enrolment being in contravention of the rules, the university
directed her to unenroll from one of the courses, pursuant to which she unenrolled from the
correspondence course. However, she participated in the supplementary exam in respect of the
correspondence course, despite having cancelled her enrolment therein, and passed it. However,
her having taken the exam for the correspondence being in contravention of the university rules,
the university refused to confer the degree on her.
University has the statutory power to enact laws, make ordinances in respect of the functioning of
the university. If any action taken by the student in contravention to the existing rules and
regulation of the university enforced at the time of the action then the student is liable to face the
consequences as per the existing rules. In those circumstances, the student cannot claim relief
available in the Act 1986 as a consumer of service. It should be borne in mind that the statutory
laws of the university and the rights provided in the consumer law should not contradict each
other. Statutory laws of the university and consumer protection law both are enacted in order to
make the functional activity of the university effective and at the same time to protect the right
and interest of the student safe so these two laws should reinforce each other to protect the
interest of both student and university.
Conclusion:
In view of the above discussions, it is proved that with regard to the application of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 is justified in case of educational activity or service rendered by the
University/educational institutes. It is supported equally well on legal and logical grounds.
Students are direct consumer or beneficiary of the service or facility provided by
University/educational institutes. All kinds of activities performed by University/educational
institutes may not be classifiable as marketable service because of the nature of those particular
services but it does not support the complete exclusion of the University/educational institutes
from the scope of Consumer Protection Laws.
At the same time, a student should not get the opportunity to get any undue privilege in
contravention of the existing rules and regulations specifically mentioned in the statute and Acts
of the university with illegitimate demands as a consumer of service. Therefore, in conclusion,
University/educational institutes come within the ambit of consumer protection law as long as the
complaint is genuine on the ground that a legal right or interest of the student is prejudiced due to
inefficient and deficient service or unethical trade practice by the University/educational
institutes.
18. RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES (TOLARAM Vs. THE STATE OF BOMBAY)
(SECTIONS 82 & 83 OF IPC)
A PROVISION OF PENAL STATUTE IS CAPABLE OF TWO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS. ONE
INTERPRETATION LEADS TO CONVICTION OF ACCUSED AND THE OTHER INTERPRETATION LEADS
TO ACQUITTAL. WHICH INTERPRETATION HAS TO BE PREFERRED? GIVE REASONS (JULY-2019 &
MAY-2014).
ISSUE:
Which rule of interpretation is applicable in this case? The strict rule of interpretation
because it is a penal statute.
RULE:
The rule is stated by Mahajan C.J. in Tolaram v. State of Bombay, is that “If two possible and
reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that
construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes a
penalty. It is not competent for Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the
legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature.
In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, the Supreme Court held that it is settled rule of
interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and
followed.
APPLICATION:
The basic rule of strict construction of a penal statute is that a person cannot be penalized
without a clear letter of the law. Presumptions or assumptions have no role in the interpretation
of penal statutes. They are to be construed strictly in accordance with the provisions of law.
Nothing can be implied. In such cases, the Courts are not so much concerned with what might
possibly have been intended. Instead, they are concerned with what has actually been said.
In criminal cases, strict construction is the general rule of construction.
If the Penal Section covers only some cases of persons, their essence cannot be extended to
cover other persons. Section 82 of IPC deals with an act done by a child below 7 years of age and
exempts them from all criminal liability. Section 83 deals with acts of children who are above
seven but below 12 years of age. The two sections make no provision for an infant who is of exact
7 years. It is submitted that such an infant should be dealt with under Section 82 of the code
because penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly. In order to warrant a conviction for an
offence a case must fall within the ambit of the definition of the offence charged and the rule is
that the benefit of all reasonable doubts must always go the accused.
CONCLUSION:
The given case pertains to the penal statute and the penal statutes have to be constructed
strictly.
According to Lord Esher, “If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in
any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions,
we must give a more lenient one”.
The accused in the given case is eligible to get the lenient approach and should not be punished.
ISSUE:
Is the Legislature having the right to repeal an Act? Yes.
Can the trial of the accused be continued after the repeal of the Act? No, prosecution of the case
will come to an end.
RULE:
A previous law may be repealed either expressly or by implication. In both the cases, the
consequences are the same. Following are the effects of the repeal of enactment as per Section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897:
1. Later Act abrogates prior one.
2. Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect from the date of
repeal.
3. As per general law, except in relation to the past and closed transactions, a statute after
repeal is completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted.
4. When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed unless there is a saving
provision.
5. No Proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after its repeal. However,
those cases remain unaffected by such repeal in which the proceedings have been brought
to finality before the repeal of the statute.
APPLICATION:
In Gajraj Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court has held that “when
an Act is repealed it must be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had
never existed. The effect thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of the
Parliament as if it had never been passed, if never existed except for the purpose of those actions,
which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was existing law.
CONCLUSION:
In the given case the prosecution against Mr. ‘X’ cannot be continued because the Act under
which the charges were framed was repealed before his case is finished hence the prosecution will
come to an end and Mr. ‘X’ is free of all earlier charges.
20. INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW, WHICH WILL PREVAIL?
If there is any inconsistency between a provision of substantive law and a provision of procedural
law, which shall prevail over the other? Discuss (Aug-2018, May-2017 and May-2016).
Issue:
If there is a head on clash between the substantive law and procedural law, which should be
considered? Answer: the substantive law will prevail over procedural law.
Rule:
Substantive law: It is part of statutory law which creates and defines rights. It deals with the legal
relationship between people or the people and state. It is codified in legislated statues.
substantive law deals with the substance of the case, how the charges are to be handled and how
the facts are to be dealt with (In layman's term it tell you what an individual can or cannot do)
E.g. Indian penal code, Law of Contracts, Law of property, Specific relief Act etc.
Procedural law: It comprises the set of rules that governs the proceedings of the court in criminal
cases as well as civil and administrative proceedings. It basically provides the state with the
machinery to enforce the substantive right on the people. Procedural law will give a step by step
action plan on how the case is supposed to proceed in order to achieve the desired goals.
E.g., Criminal Procedure Code, Evidence Act, Civil procedure Code
Let’s take an example. Suppose there is a murder that happened. But what exactly is murder as
per law and what its punishment is? All this is written in IPC which defines murder and prescribes
the punishment for the same.
But you need to file an FIR in a police station after which the police will arrest the accused. It's just
common knowledge that you need to file an FIR for rape, murder, theft or any other crime. It's
actually prescribed in the Criminal procedure law. How the FIR will be filed, how many witnesses
are required etc. After that how the police will arrest the accused (suppose there is a female
involved she cannot be arrested after 6 p.m. and before 6 a.m. and a female constable must be
present while arresting her) all these rules are prescribed in Criminal Procedure Code
When the case is going in the court what all evidence will be admitted, who all can be called as
witnesses etc. are dealt with by evidence act. Since this law also governs the proceeding it is also
part of the procedural law.
Illustration: The question of whether an individual is competent to enter into a contract is dealt
under Substantive Law, whereas the question of the time within which one party may sue another
is dealt under Procedural Law.
The substantive part of law establishes the rights, duties and liabilities of individuals. Procedural
law establishes the methods, practices and ways in which a court proceeding takes place.
Substantive law consists of written statutory rules passed by the legislature that governs how
people behave, they also define our rights and responsibilities as citizens, on the other hand,
Procedural law governs the mechanics of how a legal case flows, including steps and processes of a
case, it adheres to due process.
Application:
In the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Meerut vs. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, the
distinction between Substantive and Procedural Laws was made clear. “As a General Rule, laws
which fix duties, establish rights and responsibilities among & for persons natural or otherwise are
“Substantive laws”, while those which merely prescribe the manner in which such rights &
responsibilities may be exercised & enforced in a Court are ‘Procedural Laws’.”
In the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court has held
that all those laws which affect the substantive and vested rights of the parties have to be taken as
substantive law, whereas any provision of the law dealing with the form of the trial, mechanism of
the trial or procedure thereof, has to be treated as procedural in nature.
Conclusion: When a clash takes place between substantive law and procedural law, substantive
law will prevail over procedural law.