Metaphysica of Aristotle

With Commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas

(Book Epsilon)

A Research Paper Presented to Rev. Fr. John Carl Robles, PhL - MA

Sancta Maria Mater et Regina Seminarium

Cagay, Roxas City

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements

For Subject course of Metaphysics

BY

Sem. Dale Andrew S. Aguihap

January 2022
Outline of Study:

I. Short Introduction

II. The Method of Investigating Being as Being. how This Science Differs from the Other

Sciences

-  Distinction of ‘theology’, the science of being as such, from the other theoretical

sciences, mathematics and physics.

III. The Being Which This Science Investigates

-  Four senses of ‘being’. Of these, accidental being is the object of no science.

IV. Refutation of Those Who Wished to Abolish the Accidental

- The nature and origin of accident.

V. The True and the False as Being and Non-Being. Accidental Being and Being in the

Sense of the True Are Excluded from This Science

- Being as truth is not primary being.

VI. Conclusion

VII. Bibliography and Sources

Short Introduction

Aristotle himself described his subject matter in a variety of ways: as ‘first philosophy’, or ‘the

study of being qua being’, or ‘wisdom’, or ‘theology’. A comment on these descriptions will help

to clarify Aristotle’s topic.

These causes and principles are clearly the subject matter of what he calls ‘first philosophy’. But

this does not mean the branch of philosophy that should be studied first. Rather, it concerns

issues that are in some sense the most fundamental or at the highest level of generality. Aristotle

distinguished between things that are “better known to us” and things that are “better known in

themselves,”

In Book Epsilon (6), Aristotle adds description to the study of the causes and principles of beings

“qua” beings. Whereas natural science studies objects that are material and subject to change,

and mathematics studies objects that although not subject to change are nevertheless not separate

from matter, there is still room for a science that studies things that are eternal, not subject to

change, and independent of matter. Such a science, he says, is theology, and this is the “first” and

“highest” science.

Aristotle’s identification of theology, so conceived, with the study of being “qua” being has

proved challenging to his interpreters. With the help of St. Thomas Aquinas, he was able to come

up with his own commentaries and knowledge regarding with Aristotle’s Metaphysics which was

letr on used by many philosophers.

Chapter 1

In Chapter 1 of this brief book, Aristotle compares the science of nature, mathematics, and

theology. The science of nature, or natural science, is that which studies natural organisms and

processes. All rational activity, or all activity using the intellect, "can be divided into the

practical, the productive and the theoretical"

We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them

qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of

mathematics have first principles and elements and causes1 (1025b)

The principles and causes of beings are the object of our search, and it is evident that [we

must investigate the principles and causes of beings] as beings. For there is a cause of

health and of its recovery; and there are also principles and elements and causes of the

objects of mathematics; and in general every intellectual science, to whatever degree it

participates in intellect, deals with principles and causes: either with those which are

more certain or with those which are simpler.2

The science of nature investigates those things that have within themselves a principle of change

—that is, something within them that determines their growth, locomotion, and reproduction.

The science of nature is a theoretical science, as it is not directly aimed at practice or production

but rather aims for theoretical understanding. Mathematics is also a theoretical science, though

its objects, unlike those of the science of nature, are unchanging. That is, mathematical objects

such as numbers and theorems are not subject to change.

1
Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
2
Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company.
 But all these sciences single out some one thing, or some particular class, and confine

their investigations to this, but they do not deal with being in an unqualified sense, or as

being. Nor do they make any mention of the “whatness” itself of things. But proceeding

from this, some making it evident by means of the senses, and others taking it by

assuming it [from some other science], they demonstrate with greater necessity or more

weakly the essential attributes of the class of things with which they deal.3

Since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that

sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself,

evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the

principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of

things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are

the same.4 (1025b)

Now at the end of this chapter, we are introduced to the idea that First Philosophy, metaphysics,

is ultimately the same as theology.

There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we

may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present

in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus,

while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more

to be desired than the other theoretical sciences.5 (1026a)

3
Ibid, Page 365
4
Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
5
Ibid, Page 58
 He gives the second reason why this science is called theology; and the reason is this: the

most honorable science deals with the most honorable class of beings, and this is the one

in which divine beings are contained.6

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 examines accidental being. Accidental being is that which exists not of necessity and

not for the most part—that is, neither that which exists always nor that which exists most

frequently. The whiteness of a man, Aristotle says, is accidental being because "men are not

always or for the most part white." However, he adds, "it is not an accident that he is an animal."

That a man is an animal is a necessary part of his being; that a man is white is an accidental part

of his being.

since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen’ to be the

accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there

are the figures of predication (e.g. the ‘what’, quality, quantity, place, time, and any

similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which

‘is’ potentially or actually: being’ has many meanings, we must say regarding the

accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. (1026a-1026b)7

Hence, there is no science of accidental being. If someone studies humankind, for instance, the

object of study encompasses humankind's essential rather than accidental essence.

Therefore, since there are some beings which always are in the same way and of

necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot

6
Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company.
7
Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
 be otherwise), and others which are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part,

this is the principle and this the cause of the accidental.8

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 discusses that you cannot refute the accidentals and that they are a certain chain

reactions which leads to a certain point of time.

That there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever

being in course of being generated or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will

be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which

is not accidentally its cause. (1027a)9

Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to

something further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have

nothing else as cause of its coming to be. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort

of cause we thus refer the fortuitous – whether to matter or to the purpose or to the

motive power, must be carefully considered. (1027b)10

Chapter 4

In Chapter 4 we could find that for Aristotle, truth is the expression of what is. In other words,

truth is the expression of being.

8
Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company.
9
Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
10
Ibid, Page 60
 For we have sufficiently determined its nature. But since that which is in the sense of

being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation,

and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory

judgements. (1027b)11

Having drawn his conclusions about accidental being, the Philosopher now settles the

issue about the being which signifies the truth of a proposition; and in regard to this he

does two things. First, he determines the meaning of this kind of being. Second, he

excludes it from the principal study of this science12

Therefore both being in the sense of the accidental and being in the sense of the true must

be excluded from this science. For the cause of the former—being in the sense of the

accidental—is the indeterminate, and therefore it does not come within the scope of art,

as has been shown13

Conclusion

Aristotle’s description ‘the study of being qua being’ is frequently and easily misunderstood, for

it seems to suggest that there is a single subject matter “being qua being” that is under

investigation. But Aristotle’s description does not involve two things; first, a study and second, a

subject matter (being qua being) for he did not think that there is any such subject matter as

‘being qua being’. Rather, his description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter

or being, and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being).

11
Ibid, Page 61
12
Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company.
13
Ibid, Page 390
Of course, first philosophy is not the only field of inquiry to study beings. Natural science and

mathematics also study beings, but in different ways, under different aspects. The natural

scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and

undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (they are subject to

change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The metaphysician, on

the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract way “qua” beings. So first philosophy

studies the causes and principles of beings qua beings.

Bibliography and Sources

Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised

Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.).

Oxford University Press.

Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II.

Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.