TOPIC 7: INJUNCTIONS

A- Nature of Injunctions

1. Hanbury and Mandsley – an order by court to a party to the effect that he shall do or refrain from
doing a particular act. An in personam order, directing the defendant to act, or to refrain from
acting specified way – Dobbs. Halsbury Laws of Malaysia – the object of an injunction is to
protect and preserve legal rights and interests and to prevent the commission or continuation of a
legal wrong
2. There are several statutes that give power to High Court to grant injunctions which are Specific
Relief Act 1950 – S4, S5, S50-S55; Rules of Court 2014 – O29; and Courts of Judicature Act
1964 – S25(2).

B- General Principles (for basic understanding)

3. Court will have regard to three main principles when deciding whether to grant an injunction:
a. The party applying for the injunction must have a valid underlying claim. To obtain an
injunction the claimant must be able to show that it has a substantive cause of action in English
law.
b. Injunctions are a discretionary remedy and will only be granted where it appears to be just and
convenient to do so. They are subject to the usual equitable bars:
– a delay in applying for an injunction can seriously damage the prospects of obtaining one
– the applicant must have acted properly himself
c. The court must be satisfied that damages are not an adequate remedy. If damages are
considered adequate, an injunction will not be granted. It is usually inappropriate to award
damages in lieu of an injunction where:
– The respondent is in breach of a restrictive covenant
– The injury cannot be compensated by money, or the respondent has acted in an oppressive or
high-handed manner
C- Types of Injunctions

4. Injunctions may be classified into a) temporary (or interlocutory or interim) and b) mandatory (or
prohibitory) injunctions.
5. Other types of injunctions such as Mareva Injunction and Erinford injunctions are created by case
law.
6. And Section 51(2) states that  A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the
hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the
assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the
plaintiff.

i) Perpetual Injunction

7. S.52(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in, or referred to by, this Chapter, a perpetual
injunction may be granted to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the
applicant, whether expressly or by implication.
(2) When such an obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and
provisions contained in Chapter II.
(3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of,
property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:

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 (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be
caused, by the invasion;
(c) where the invasion is such that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the invasion; and
(e) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
8. Damages must be inadequate relief is a well established principle as stated in Section 52(3)(c).
a. The general rule is that an injunction will normally be refused if future injury can be adequately
compensated by money.
b. In Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA, Sachs LJ, “The standard question is, “Are damages
adequately remedy?” might perhaps, in the light of the authorities of recent years be rewritten:
“Is it just, in all circumstances, that a plaintiff should be confined to his remedy in
damages?” ... Great difficulty in estimating these damages is one factor that can be and has
taken into account.”
c. As in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, the settled rule is that
mandatory injunction will not normally be granted, one reason being that damages are adequate
remedy.
d. In Hodgson v Duce, it is stated that an injunction ought to be made available to the plaintiff
where it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the invasion.
e. And as for the availability of injunction to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings, in
Angelidas v James Stedman Henderson’s Sweets Ltd, the injunction may be appropriate in
cases involving the commission of repeated acts which may require the claimant to pursue
consecutive actions.
9. In respect of the provision “When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s
rights” , the following propositions may be put forward:
a. The grant of injunction is dependent on the plaintiff showing some property, right ot interest in
respect of the matter in dispute as in Day v Brownrigg.
b. Where the cause of action requires the proof of special damage, this must be proved as in White
v Mellin.
c. In cases of breach of statutory duty, the AG may seek injunction as provided in AG v Sharp.

ii) Mandatory injunction

10.An award that orders the performance of an act/s as in Section 53, when, to prevent the breach of
an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable
of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained
of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. Read further illustrations in SRA.
11. In TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd, court may grant award for mandatory
injunction based on discretion but must see to it that the defendant knows what he has to do.
12. In Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, the House of Lords refused
to a mandatory injunction to compel a party to carry on a business; on the other hand, such a grant
may be justified in respect of orders requiring him to achieve a result.

iii) Prohibitory injunction

13. An award that prohibits the performance of an act/s, See Section 53 ILLUSTRATIONS
(e) A threatens to publish statements concerning B which would be punishable under Chapter XXI
of the Penal Code [Act 574]. The court may grant an injunction to restrain the publication, even
though it may be shown not to be injurious to B's property.

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 (f) A, being B's medical adviser, threatens to publish B's written communications with him,
showing that B has led an immoral life. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the publication

iv) Interlocutory / Interim / Temporary Injunction

14.Section 51(1) of SRA 1950 states that temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a
specified time, or until the further order of the court. They may be granted at any period of a suit,
and are regulated by the law relating to civil procedure.
15.Interim injunctions are usually granted to maintain the status quo until trial. A full interim
injunction may continue in force until judgment or further order. An interim injunction is one
given prior to trial and is intended to last until the trial itself or some earlier event. Such an
injunction is intended to cure some abuse prevent some act pending full trial. An applicant may
apply for an injunction at any stage but in the vast majority of cases it will be made very early in
the case, typically at the same time as the claim is issued.
16.AG v Punch Ltd - Issued before the proper trial to preserve the status quo. Purpose is to protect the
plaintiff against damage or loss that cannot be adequately compensated in damages if the trial ends
in his favour.
17. The procedural aspects of the application are governed by the Rules of Court 2012.
18. It is to be noted that there is distinction between interlocutory and interim injunction as discussed
in the case of Arab Malaysian Corp Builders Sdn Bhd v ASM Development Sdn Bhd:
(a) Interlocutory injunction: An order to preserve a particular set of circumstances pending a
full trial of the matters in dispute. (b) Interim injunction: An order in the nature of an
interlocutory injunction butrestraining the defendant only until after a named day or further
order
19. In granting interlocutory injunctions, the Malaysian courts have consistently applied the principles
as decided in the case of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd.
20. The law prior to American Cyanamid:
a. He or she then had to show that damages would be an inadequate remedy and that the balance
of convenience favoured the grant. In other words, he or she had to show that it was more likely
than not that he or she would succeed in securing a final injunction at the trial.
b. This is seen in Series 5 Software Ltd v Clarke, as the per judicial dictum: “The prospects of
success was one of the most important factors taken into account in assessing the balance of
convenienve. The court would be less willing to subject the plaintiff to the risk of irrecoverable
loss which would befall him if an interlocutory injunction refused in those cases where it
thought he was likely to win at the trial than in those cases where it thought he was likely to
lose.”
c. Also in Hubbard v Vosper, judge should look at the whole case not only to the strength of the
claim but also the strength of the defence, then decide what is the best to be done.
21.The principles have been laid down by the authority of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd.  The
case outlines certain criteria to be considered by the courts prior to grant of an injunction. Two
elements:
(i) Application is not frivolous and there is a serious question to be tried.
Where the claimant is relying upon an action unknown in law, the condition would not be satisfied.
-It must be a serious case to be tried as reaffirmed in Dora Phua Siaw Yen v Shaw Brothers.
-As stated in Sivapreuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd, The material available to the court
at the hearing for the injunction should disclose that the plaintiff has real prospect of succeeding in
securing a permanent one at the trial, failing which the application ought to be rejected. An
application would be denied if the applicant has no valid cause of action.

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 -There must also be a valid cause of action, otherwise the application will be denied as seen in
Sarkawi bin Sadijo v BMG (M) Sdn Bhd.
-In many local cases, courts have emphasised the principle that at this stage the court should not
embark upon anything resembling a trial of the action upon the conflicting affidavits as reaffirmed
in AG v Punch Ltd.
(ii) Balance of convenience
The balance of convenience ought to be considered in the following sequence:
a) If the applicant could be adequately compensated, no interlocutory injunction even if claim
appears to be strong as in Perbadanan Setiausaha Kerajaan Selangor v Metroway.
b) If application could not be rejected on account of (a) but defendant wins at trial, defendant
would receive monetary compensation from plaintiff and plaintiff has to compensate. If the
answers to both are in the affirmative, interlocutory injunction may properly be granted.
c) If there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the respective remedies available to either party, the
injunction can be considered.
The court considers which party the balance of convenience favours taking into account the status
quo immediately before the application. Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid listed considerations
in determining the balance of convenience:
a) Preservation of the status quo as said by Lord Diplock, “If the defendant is enjoined temporarily
from doing something that he has not done before, the only effect of the interlocutory injunction in
the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date at which he is able to embark upon a
course of action which he has not previously found it necessary to undertake whereas to interrupt
him in the conduct of an established enterprise would cause much greater inconvenience to him
since he would have to start again to establish it in the event of his succeeding at the trial.”
b) Strength of case in relation to the opponent. Where the balance of inconvenience arising from
uncompensatable disadvantage to each party appears to be matched the court can take into account
the relative strength of each party’s case as revealed in the affidavit evidence submitted in the
application for the interlocutory injunction.
c) Other special factors. It is neatly illustrated in American Cyanamid case itself where the
defendant intended to launch in the British market surgical suture and the plaintiff contended that
this was an infringement of its patent and on appeal to House of Lords, it was held that, on the
affidavit evidence, their Lordships agreed that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the
injunction because the products were yet to be marketed.
-In Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd v Cheong Fatt Sze Mansion Sdn Bhd, the COA considered as
relevant a building being a heritage buiding in an application for injunction founded on nuisance.
Public interest may be a ground to take into consideration to tip the balance of convenience as seen
in Kenidi bin Sima v The Gov of the State of Sabah.
-In Dunia Raya v Ganesan, supervision on a continuous basis is a good ground to tip the balance of
convenience.
22. The Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor @ Harun bin Abdullah & 2
Ors referring to the classic decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon
Ltd held that a Judge hearing an application for an interlocutory injunction should:
(i) Ask himself whether the totality of the facts presented before him disclosed a bona fide serious
issue to be tried;
(ii) Having found that an issue has been disclosed that requires further investigation, he must
consider where the justice of the case lies;

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 (iii) Have in the forefront of his mind that the remedy he is asked to administer is discretionary,
intended to produce a just result between the date of the application and the trial proper and to
maintain the status quo.
23. The balance of convenience test should be considered on a step-by-step basis which this leads to
the third case by COA in Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd v Chase Perdana Bhd, the plaintiff was
engaged by the defendant to build a building under a contract and the payment was guaranteed by
means of irrevocable bank guarantee. The plaintiff failed to complete on time and carried the
remedial works. The plaintiff contended that in spite of the shortcomings that remained, the
building had practically completed but defendants disagreed. The COA stated that the manner
intended by American Cyanamid is a step-by-step basis as the first step is to ask whether the
applicant could be adequately compensated by damages and is the answer is the affirmative, the
following steps were not to be followed. Thus, in Pekeliling case, COA conluded that COA is
satisfied if the plaintiff succeeds at the trial it will be adequately compensated, so the application
for the injunctions should have been refused no matter how strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to
be.
24. Interim mandatory injunction as provided by Section 53 of SRA.
a. The general law may be found in Tinta Press Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd: “such
discretion must be exercised and an injunction granted only in exceptional rare cases ... the case
must be unusually strong and clear in that the court must feel assured that a similar injunction
would probably be granted at the trial”.
b. In Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agroexport, Mustill LJ accepted the propositions from
Halsbury’s Laws of England as stated: “A mandatory injunction can be granted on an
interlocutory application as well as at the hearing ... if the case is clear and one which the court
thinks can be easily remedied or if the defendant attempts to steal a march on the plaintiff.”
c. In Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham, Megarry J said: “... in a normal case, the court must feel a
high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that an injunction was rightly granted,
and this is a higher standard that that which is required for a prohibitory injunction.”

D- When injunctions cannot be granted

25.Section 54 of SRA:

(a) to stay a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought,
unless such a restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings;
(b) to stay proceedings in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought;
(c) to restrain persons from applying to any legislative body;
(d) not tested in final exam
(e) not tested in final exam
(f) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced;
(g) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a
nuisance; (h) to prevent a continuing breach in which the applicant has acquiesced;
(i) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding,
except in case of breach of trust;
(j) when the conduct of the applicant or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance
of the court; or
(k) where the applicant has no personal interest in the matter.

E- Injunction to perform negative agreement as provided by Section 55 of SRA:

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“Notwithstanding paragraph 54(f), where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a
certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the
circumstance that the court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement
shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement:

Provided that the applicant has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is binding on him.”

*read illustrations as provided in the SRA

26. Injunction may be granted as to restrain breaches of negative covenants as provided in Lumley v
Wagner but in common law, court will not normally grant an injunction to restrain a defendant
from acting in breach of a negative undertaking if doing so would enforce an agreement that is
unenforceable in equity.

27. In Dayang Nurfaizah bte Awang Dowty v Bintang Seni Sdn Bhd, court found that the
management agreement entered into by the parties was essentially a contract for personal services
and was thus unenforceable.

28.While under English Law, it is a prerequisite that the contract should contain express negative
provisions, this is not a necessity in Malaysia as provided in Broome (Selangor) Rubber Plantation
v RH Whitley which in this case, no implied negative covenant.

29. In Pertama Cabaret Nite Club Sdn Bhd v Roman Tam, the court granted an interim injunction
restraining the defendant from singing in any place in KL given that the contract with plaintiffs,
the defendant had covenanted not to perform in the stipulated area during the validity of the
contract. Court observed that the contract consisted an affirmative undertaking to sing in the
plaintiff premises, which cannot be enforced. Just because court could not enforce specific
performance of the affirmative agreement, did not preclude it from granting an injunction to
compel performance of the negative undertaking.

30.In Grocott v Ayson, an injunction for negative contract can be denied if it is a contract in futility is
quite clear or there exists disproportionate hardship to the defendant as to make appropriate
remedy.

F- Injunctions from Case law

i) Erinford Injunction

31. A form of temporary injunction which is put in force to preserve the status quo pending on appeal.
An Erinford injunction pending an appeal or an application for leave to appeal, like a stay of
execution pending an appeal, is ordinarily granted by the court which made the decision that is the
subject of the appeal.

32. Erinford injunction was explained in Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Council, “a judge
who feels no doubt in dismissing a claim to an interlocutory injunction may, perfectly consistently
with his decision, recognise that his decision may be reversed and that the comparative effects of
granting or refusing an injunction pending an appeal are such that it would be right to preserve the
status quo pending the appeal.”

33. In Celcom (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Inmiss Communication , judge explained that the order is
designed to see that an appeal is preserved and not rendered nugatory.

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ii) Quia Timet Injunction "because he fears”

34. Quia Timet Injunction is an injunction to restrain wrongful acts which are threatened or imminent
but have not yet commenced. Where right is proved, injunction may be granted even if it has not in
fact occurred but is merely feared or threatened. This may be granted in a perpetual or
interlocutory, prohibitory or mandatory basis.

35.In Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris, it is stated that there are two kinds of quia timet actions:

a. Defendant threatens to cause harm to Plaintiff, thus normally involve negative injunction.

b. Plaintiff was compensated for the harm but further alleges that Defendant’s earlier actions may
lead to future causes of action, thus normally requires the defendant to perform some positive
work.

In this case, the judge stated that every case must depend on its particular circumstances, taking
into consideration:

a)Plaintiff must show a very strong probability that he will suffer grave damage in the future.
b) Damages will not be sufficient or adequate remedy.

c) Must take into account the cost upon the defendant to do works to prevent future damage. In
Woodhouse v Newry Navigation, where defendant has acted reasonably, the cost he bears in
repairing is important because plaintiff has not suffered any damages as of yet, may not even
suffer any damages at all.

d) Court must ensure that defendant knows exactly what he has to do with proper instructions.

36. Where the applicant cannot prove a strong probability of the alleged threatened harm, an award
should normally be refused as in AG v Nottingham Corporation.

iii) Mareva Injunction

37. It is a court order which freezes assets so that a defendant to an action cannot dissipate their assets
from beyond the jurisdiction of a court so as to frustrate a judgment or to restrain defendant from
disposing or dealing with any of their asstes within jurisdiction of court.

38. Mareva or freezing injunction is passed when there is evidence or material to show that the debtor
is acting in a manner or is likely to act in a manner to frustrate subsequent order/decree of the court
or tribunal.

39. It is to protect and defend the court’s process from abuse acts as to protect and defend the interests
of potential judgment creditor as mentioned in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd.

40.In Z Ltd v A-Z, Mareva injunction is not only removal of assets from jurisdiction but extends to
their dissipation within jurisdiction as well. Kerr LJ, speaking for the Court of Appeal laid down
detailed guidelines for deciding on the liability of a third party for violating a Mareva Injunction.
Six principles emerged from the appeal, viz are follows: (1) A third party that has been given
notice of the injunction, if he knowingly assists in a breach of the order, will be guilty of contempt
of court, irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the injunction. A bank must, therefore,
dishonor any cheque or refuse any transfer of money once it has received notice of the injunction;

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 (2) If a bank is under an obligation to another party to make payments on behalf of the defendant,
for instance under a bank guarantee, the bank may violate the injunction and debit the defendant's
account irrespective of notice. The bank must, however, as far as possible, consider withdrawal of
such facilities from the defendant; (3) the plaintiff must indemnify any reasonable expense
incurred by a third party in complying with the injunction, and is required to give the court an
undertaking to this effect. These costs can, however, be recovered from the defendant at trial, if the
plaintiff is successful; (4) It is the duty of the plaintiff to give the third party such information as is
needed to allow it to comply with the injunction. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient
information and is unable to identify the assets of the defendant, he may request the third party to
conduct a search. The cost for this, however, is to be borne by the plaintiff; (5) the injunction
restrains the defendant from dealing with his assests only to the extent of the claim. In very
exceptional cases alone can the entire estate of the defendant be frozen; (6) Provisions for the day
to day living expenses of the defendant may be made, expressly in the injunction or otherwise.

41. Pre-Mareva Position: before and after the case of Lister & Co v Stubbs, an injunction to restrain a
defendant from parting with his assets was refused, so that they may be preserved in case the
plaintiff’s claim succeeds.

42. The decision in the Mareva was preceded by about one month by Nippon Yusen v Karageorgis
and another [1975] 1 WLR 1093 where the Court of Appeal (comprising Lord Denning MR,
Browne LJ and Lane LJ) reversed the decision of the High Court and granted an injunction in
favour of a Japanese shipowner to restrain two Greek charterers from removing funds in a bank
account in London pending trial.

43. In Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA, The plaintiffs were the owners
of a vessel, the Mareva. They let it to the defendant charterers for a trip out to the Far East and
back. The vessel was to be put at the disposal of the charterers at Rotterdam. Hire was payable
half-monthly in advance at the rate of US$3,850 a day from the time of delivery.

The defendants sub-chartered the vessel to the President of India. Under that voyage charter the
vessel was loaded at Bordeaux with a cargo of fertiliser consigned to India. The Indian High
Commission, in accordance with its obligations under the voyage charter, paid 90% of the freight
amounting to £174,000 to a bank in London to the credit of the charterers. The charterers paid the
plaintiffs the first two instalments of the half-monthly hire out of those moneys but failed to pay
the third instalment.

It was evident from the exchange of telexes that the charterers were not in a position to pay. They
said they were unable to fulfil any of their obligations under the charter and had no alternative but
to cease trading.

The plaintiffs treated the defendants’ conduct as a repudiation of the charter. They issued a writ
and applied for service out of the jurisdiction. The plaintiffs believed that there was grave danger
that the moneys in the defendants’ bank account in London would be dissipated and accordingly,
applied for an ex-parte injunction to restrain the disposal of those moneys. The High Court granted
an interlocutory injunction for a limited period of time which they refused to extend. The plaintiffs
appealed.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that there was a danger that the defendants may dispose of their
assets which would result in the shipowners not getting their charter hire. Lord Denning MR
stated:

“There is money in a bank in London which stands in the name of these charterers. The charterers
have control of it. They may at any time dispose of it or remove it out of this country. If they do so,
the shipowners may never get their charter hire … In the face of this danger, I think this court

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 ought to grant an injunction to restrain the charterers from disposing of these moneys now in the
bank in London until the trial or the judgment in this action.”

The grant of the injunction by the Court of Appeal in the Mareva in effect prevented the
defendants from removing their assets out of the Court’s jurisdiction before the trial and thereby
preserved those assets for the benefit of the plaintiffs in the event that they succeeded in their
claim against the defendants.

According to the learned judge, the jurisdiction of the English courts to grant a Mareva injunction
is found in Section 45 of the English Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act
1925 which inter alia permits the High Court to grant an injunction by an interlocutory order in all
cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so. This power has been
preserved in Section 37(1) of the English Senior Courts Act 1981 (previously called the Supreme
Court Act 1981).

The order could be made even though it dealt with assets in which the plaintiff claimed no direct
right. Lord Denning M.R state that:

“ There is jurisdiction to grant injunction if there is danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets
so as to defect the debts before judgement”

44. This lead to developing law which has provided the principles governing the grant of the order,
the guidelines for the grant are, from the Mareva case:
a. The applicant must have a good cause of action.
b. It must be a good arguable case because Mareva is an interlocutory injunction as in In  Ninemia
Maritime Corp v Trave & Co, Mustill J explained that a “good arguable case” is “one which is
more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one which the judge
believes to have a better than 50% chance of success.”
c. The applicant must make full and frank disclosure of all material matters.
d. Must satisfy the court that defendant has assets as stated in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad v
Lorrain Osman.
e. There is a real risk that defendant will deal with the assets. The test for the risk of dissipation is
an objective one and is an assessment of whether the judgment may be rendered worthless as in
Ang Chee Huat v. Thomas Joseph Engelbach, the court held, “…Having considered the
evidence, I am of the view that the conduct of the appellant in this matter is lacking in probity
and honesty. In the circumstances, I conclude that there is a real risk that the assets of the
appellant will dissipate should the respondent succeed at the trial…”
f. The applicant must give undertaking in damages or the balance of convenience must be in
favour of the plaintiff being granted the injunction.

45. The application of Mareva injunction into Malaysia is via Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abdul Rahman
v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd. Based on a liberal interpretation of the expressions “cause” or
“matter” in Section 3 of the Malaysian Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Raja Azlan Shah CJ (as
His Highness then was) held that the High Court in Malaysia has the jurisdiction to grant a
Mareva injunction under Paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which
confers various powers on the High Court including:

"Power to provide for the interim preservation of property the subject-matter of any
cause or matter by sale or by injunction or the appointment of a receiver or the
registration of a caveat or a lis pendens or in any other manner whatsoever."

Thereafter, the Malaysian Courts have in appropriate circumstances granted Mareva injunctions. 

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46. In fact, Mareva injunction is a temporary injunction so it is applicable into Malaysian cases via
Section 51(1) of SRA which states, Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a
specified time, or until the further order of the court. They may be granted at any period of a suit,
and are regulated by the law relating to civil procedure.

47. In Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi sets out the requirements the respondents must
satisfy the court in order to get a Mareva injunction which is that the respondents must satisfy the
court, first that they had a good arguable case, secondly, that the first appellant had assets within
the jurisdiction, and thirdly, that there was a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed
before judgment in that there must be solid evidence to establish the risk.

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