Addressing the multiple dimensions of

Poverty and Inequality in Zambia

UN Zambia Signature Issues Series - # 1

June 2013
Zambia

Authors: George Lwanda [UNDP] and Paul Quarles van Ufford [UNICEF] for the United
Nations Country Team, Zambia, 2013.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
Zambia has published its 2013 MDG report, which highlights areas of progress and likely
achievement in parallel with areas where progress has stalled and achievement of MDG targets is
unlikely. The MDG status is predominantly based on national averages. This raises the question
about the extent to which progress towards MDG targets hides inequalities between different
socio-demographic and wealth segments of the population and how these, in turn, relate to the
distribution of and trends in poverty, in particular as the effects of poverty (MDG 1) are echoed
throughout the subsequent goals.
It is commonly acknowledged that consistent and strong macroeconomic growth in Zambia has
not been accompanied by concomitant reductions in poverty. Despite registering a robust GDP
growth averaging over 5.5% annually over the last decade and 7.3% in 2012, poverty levels
remain stubbornly high. In fact, evidence continues to show that growth in Zambia is not
trickling down. This is largely because of the capital-intensive sectors it concentrates in.
Additionally, the concentration of economic activity in urban areas and its inability to expand
especially to the small-holder agriculture sector is exacerbating the situation. This raises the
question of how and to what extent persistent poverty has shaped and driven inequality – both in
terms of access to opportunities and in terms of outcomes.
This paper posits that in order to address the stubborn nature of extreme poverty and this growing
state of inequality experienced in the country, apart from macroeconomic and investment policy
is to increase pro-poor, progressive and targeted public spending. This needs to be informed by
data and analysis that identifies the nature and drivers of inequality in Zambia – hence, the
attempt to address this issue.
And in this context, the paper attempts to address the following questions:
1. What are the main socio-demographic and economic variables that characterise patterns of
poverty and inequality in Zambia?

2. How do the patterns and distribution of poverty relate to patterns of inequality in terms of
access to opportunities and development outcomes? Is poverty the main driver of inequality?

3. To what extent are public policies and public expenditure addressing poverty and inequality?
What other social policies bear relevance for addressing economic and, eventually, social
inequalities?

4. What are the specific research questions and key messages that emerge from this initial
analysis and that deserve to be explored by the UN in the coming time, in order to underpin
on-going advocacy and technical assistance as well as to contribute to laying an analytical
foundation for the 2016-2020 UNDAF?

WHY INEQUALITY?
The twin effects of poverty and inequality are globally recognised as a major detractor of
development in general and of human development in particular. Whilst economic growth as a
facilitator of development is uncontested, increasing evidence shows that growth accompanied by

1|Page
increasing inequality is unsustainable and inefficient.1 Equality was identified as a fundamental
value in the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN in 2000. Human rights principles such as
universality, participation, or non-discrimination on the one hand and the set of individual social,
economic, civil, cultural, and political rights on the other provide an unequivocal normative
framework and guidance for the eradication of inequalities. States have an obligation to take
proactive measures that address the drivers of inequality and ensure equality of access,
opportunity, and outcomes.
Economic inefficiency largely is a result of the fact that the “interconnections and resilience of
these inequalities imply that some groups have consistently inferior opportunities … than their
fellow citizens2”. Additionally, increasing inequality, through polarisation, undermines stability
and solidarity. More importantly, inequality sustains and grows poverty through the transmission
of intergenerational poverty. It is therefore vital that the nature and location of inequality in a
country be understood in order to implement appropriate interventions to mitigate and reverse
poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, it must also be pointed out that this paper is not an
exhaustive analysis of inequality but an initial analysis aimed at enriching on-going policy
advocacy and technical assistance as well as to contribute to laying an analytical foundation for
the 2016-2020 UNDAF. It further facilitates a focus on trends ‘beneath the averages’ as far as
progress towards the achievement of MDGs is concerned.
The paper focuses primarily on socio-economic inequalities. These include poverty, income and
expenditure inequality, as well as inequality in access to a basic set of goods and services necessary
for dignified living (such as access to health, safe drinking water or electricity). Inequalities in the
distribution of wealth are seen as both a cause and consequence of other inequalities, such as in
health status or in access to education. The paper tentatively explores these linkages and uses
spatial and demographic dimensions to demonstrate how patterns of inequality play out. Yet, it
does not analyse and cover other equally important inequalities such as those related to power,
politics and prestige (social inequality) or environmentally driven inequalities, and ethnic/tribal
inequalities. We recognise, however, that these multiple drivers of inequalities often intersect and
mutually reinforce each other.

1
For example, the countries of Libya and Tunisia were classified as high HD countries and Egypt as medium HD, when the
upheavals in the countries started. All countries were however accompanied by high inequality with Gini-coefficients at
least higher than 0.66 in 2011 (UNDP HDR database).
2
World Bank (2006), World Development Report. P.7

2|Page
PATTERNS OF POVERTY IN ZAMBIA

MDG target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty
MDG indicator: Proportion of population living in extreme poverty
MDG status for Zambia: 42.3 per cent
MDG 2015 goal for Zambia: 29 per cent

There has not been any significant overall level of poverty reduction between 2006 and 2010. As
seen by the graph below, overall poverty remains high at 60.5% in 2010. This, however,
represents a slight reduction from the overall poverty level of 62.8% in 2006. Whilst the levels of
the extremely poor have almost remained unchanged, there has been a slight reduction (1.9%) in
the proportion of the ‘moderately poor’.3 Of concern is the fact that despite a slight percentage
point decline in poverty, the absolute number of people living below the poverty line has actually
increased, together with population growth. In absolute numbers, in 2010, around 7.9 million
people lived in poverty, with 5.5 million among them living in extreme poverty. Moreover, since
1991, the number of poor people increased from about 6 million to 7.9 million in 2010.

Figure 1: Change in poverty levels 2006-2010, Zambia

Source: LCMS 2010

3
Extreme poverty is also referred to as the food poverty line: it uses a Cost of Basic Needs approach to estimate the
minimum daily basic needs requirements – which then represents the extreme poverty line. Moderate poverty refers to a
set of food and non-food items (shelter, clothing, health and education) to establish a poverty line.

3|Page
THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF POVERTY: THE RURAL URBAN DIVIDE

Figure 2: Breakdown of rural and urban poverty status by year – 2006-2010, Zambia
90
80.3 77.9
80 72.5
70.3
70
58.5 57.7
60
50
40
29.7 27.5
30 21.8 22.1
20.2 19.6
20 16.7 14.4
13 13.1
10
0
Extremely Poor -2006/10 Modarately Poor-2006/10 Non-Poor-2006/10 Total Poor-2006/10
Rural Areas Urban Areas

Source: based on 2010 LCMS data

It is clear that in Zambia poverty is largely a rural phenomenon. Overall, poverty headcount rates
are around the 80 per cent line. Extreme poverty in rural areas exceeds extreme poverty in urban
areas by a factor of 4, which indicates that the rural poverty gap is significantly deeper than that
in urban areas. Compared to 2006, poverty reduction overall was low and slightly stronger in
urban areas (7 per cent) compared with rural areas (3 per cent). This is indicative of the urban-
based nature of economic growth, albeit with the caveat that trickle down effects are minimal,
and mostly reach those already living close to the poverty line.
The poverty reduction that has taken place (refer Figure 2) has exclusively occurred among the
‘moderately poor’ (14%). Data from the 2010 LCMS indicates that markets and off-farm livelihood
activities have driven this decline, as the most noticeable percentage point overall poverty
headcount decline occurred among non-agricultural households in rural areas, accounting for a
reduction of around 15 points (22 per cent) between 2006 and 2010. Interestingly, this trend also
occurred among the extreme poor with a 12 percentage point decline (26 per cent). In contrast,
poverty reduction among small and medium scale farming households was negligible (for the
overall as well as for the extreme poor), which points to the difficulties of these families to access
income-earning opportunities or increase productivity in farming. In urban areas, poverty
reduction occurred mostly among households residing in better-serviced neighbourhoods.

THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF POVERTY: BY PROVINCE

The graphs below (refer Figure 3a and 3b) illustrate changes in the incidence of extreme poverty
and poverty headcount by province between 2006 and 2010. In 2010, overall poverty levels were
lowest in the provinces of Lusaka (24.4%) and Copperbelt (34.3%). These are the only two
provinces in Zambia in which the proportion of non-poor is higher than the proportion of poor
people. Elsewhere in the country, poverty levels ranged from 61% in Central Province to 80.5%
and 80.4% in Luapula and Western Provinces, respectively.

4|Page
 Figure 3a: Headcount Poverty rate by province (2006 and 2010)

90 80.5 83.3
78.5 78.5
80 70.7 77.9 73 80.4
73.9 75 70.7
70 60.9 67 67.9
60
50
37.3
40
34.3 Pov 2006
30 24.7
24.4 Pov 2010
20
10
0

Source: based on 2010 LCMS data

Figure 3b: Headcount and Extreme Poverty rates, by province (2006 and 2010)

70 64.9 64.6
56.4 57.5
60 53.6
48.8 58.7 50.9 64
50 55.8 44.6
36.7 47.3
40 46.1
30
19.5 Ex Pov2006
20 18.3
10.3 Ex Pov 2010
10 11.5
0

Source: based on 2010 LCMS data

The incidence of extreme poverty followed the trend of overall headcount poverty. Extreme
poverty was lowest in Lusaka (11.5%), Copperbelt (18.3%) and Central Province (36.7%). In the
remaining provinces it ranged between 46.1% (North-western province) and 64.9% (Luapula
Province). Poverty levels by province also reveal very little variation between 2006 and 2010,
with two notable exceptions. First, extreme poverty in Luapula Province increased by more than
10 percentage points (or 21 per cent), which stands in sharp contrast to stagnant levels in almost
all other provinces. Second, the data reveals a 12 percentage point (or 25 per cent) decline of
extreme poverty in Central Province. It is worth exploring further what explains these province-
specific poverty trends. In particular, given its geographical location at reasonable distance from
certain urban centres, it would be interesting to analyse the extent to which poverty reduction in
Central province occurred among agricultural or non-agricultural households.

5|Page
THE POVERTY GAP RATIO

MDG target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty
MDG indicator: Poverty Gap Ratio
MDG status for Zambia: 28 per cent
MDG 2015 goal for Zambia: 31.1 per cent

Figure 4, below, provides Zambia’s poverty gap ratio broken down by province and rural and
urban areas. The poverty gap ratio is an important indicator of how far below the poverty line the
poor actually are, and hence how unequal the incidence of poverty is. The higher the ratio, the
more resources are required to reduce poverty. On an overall basis, the depth of poverty has
progressively reduced from 31.5% in 2006 to 28% in 2010 – an 11 per cent reduction. Between
2006 and 2010, the poverty gap reduction in urban and rural areas occurred at a similar pace. The
reduction of the poverty gap, however small, is a significant finding that puts into perspective the
status quo observation for overall poverty levels: it points to some households actually moving
closer to the poverty line.

Figure 4: Poverty gap ratio by province and rural-urban area, Zambia 2010

60
48.9
50
42.7 41.6 41.3 42.7
37.5 38.1 37.9
40 34.3 35.3
31.4 31 41.3 38.2 31.5
37.2 28
30 25.1
2006
20 15
12.1 10.6 2010
8.58.2 9.3
10

Source: LCMS 2010

From the graph, it can be seen that poverty is much deeper in those provinces that are more rural
than it is in urban areas. More specifically, it is deepest in Western (42.7%), Luapula (41.3%),
Eastern (38.2%) and Northern (37.2%) provinces of Zambia. The poverty gap ratio declined
between 2006 and 2010 in all provinces except for Luapula where it rose 3.2 percentage points (8
per cent). Central Province registered the largest decline in the poverty gap between 2006 and
2010 (10 percentage points or 29%). The situation of Central Province reveals that the proportion
of moderately poor people (i.e. closer to the poverty line) increased, which likely reflects a
gradual closing of the poverty gap (with the proportion of extreme poor reducing). As already
stated, the poverty gap declined in all other provinces as well, albeit at a slower pace.

6|Page
POVERTY BY GENDER AND BY AGE
Data shows that the proportion of women and men who live in poverty – extreme or moderate –
is the same. However, the 2010 LCMS does show that poverty is higher in female-headed
households.
Table 1: Poverty rates by sex of household head, Zambia 2010
Overall poverty Extreme poverty Moderate poverty
2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010
Male-headed 61.7 60.1 41 41.9 20.7 18.2
households
Female-headed 67.4 62.4 49.8 44.4 20.7 18
households
Source: 2010 LCMS

The data reveal that, in 2010, poverty rates are higher in female-headed households (62.1 per cent
versus 60.1 per cent for male-headed households). However, more importantly, the table shows
that this differential has been reduced from close to six percentage points in 2006 to slightly over
3 percentage points in 2010. Virtually all of this reduction can be attributed to the decline in the
proportion of female-headed households living in extreme poverty, which reduced by 5.4
percentage points – compared with a slight increase for male-headed households. Moderate
poverty rates have remained stable and reveal gender differentials. Reflecting the overall pattern,
poverty is highest in rural areas, affecting about 80 per cent of female-headed households and 77
per cent of male-headed households.
On the basis of LCMS 2010 data, we can estimate that around 65% of children between 0-18 years
lived in poor families. Of those, 46% lived in a situation of extreme poverty. These figures are
higher than the overall poverty figures, reflecting a situation in which poor families typically
have a larger number of children on average. In absolute numbers, 4.6 million children live in
poor families in Zambia. Out of all children in poor families, 85% live in rural areas. Taking into
account that children 0-18 years represent approximately 54% of the country’s population, this
translates into children having a stronger representation among both the extreme and moderately
poor groups of the population – as shown in the following Table 2.

Table 2: Poverty figures distributed by age, Zambia 2010

0-18 years 19+ years Total
Extremely Poor 59% 41% 100%
Moderately Poor 55% 45% 100%
Total Poor Pop 58% 42% 100%
Non Poor 48% 52% 100%
Source: UN Zambia calculations, based on 2010 LCMS data

7|Page
When disaggregating the percentage of people living in poverty by age (Figure 5), it is noticable
that the proportion of poor children (below 18 years of age) and the proportion of the elderly
poor (above 60 years of age) are the two groups consistently above the country’s average poverty
line.
Figure 5: Proportion of people living in poverty by age, Zambia, 2010

Source: UN Zambia calculations, based on 2010 LCMS data

While in percentage terms the poverty numbers for the 0-18 age bracket are similar to other
groups – for example for the population over 45 years – in absolute terms, the differences are
striking (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Absolute number of poor people by age, Zambia, 2010

Source: UN Zambia calculations, based on 2010 LCMS data

8|Page
In terms of district-level poverty, analysis conducted by UNICEF in 2011-2012 revealed that
poverty is significantly deeper (furthest below poverty line) in districts with more poor people. In
the least poor districts, poor people on average are about 10% from the poverty line. In contrast,
in the very poorest districts, this figure is about 60%.4 At district level, poverty among children is
evident.
 In 61 out of the 72 districts in the country, 50% or more of the overall population is
living in poverty;
 In 62 districts, 50% or more of the children population (0-18) is living in poverty;
 In 69 out of the 72 districts, the percentage of children living in poverty is higher than
the percentage of adults living in poverty;
 In 71 districts, the percentage of children living in poverty is higher than the country’s
average (60%).

Figure 7: Proportion of the population 0-18 years living in poverty by district,

Zambia 2010

Source: calculations, based on 2010 LCMS data

In general, orphan-hood typically is a strong predictor of poverty and a proxy for estimating the
relationship between poverty and HIV-prevalence. An orphan is most commonly defined as a
child below 18 years of age who has lost one or both parents. In Zambia in 2010, according to the
LCMS data, about 16 per cent of children had lost at least one parent – 14 and 20 per cent in rural
and urban areas respectively.5 Nearly 60 per cent of orphans are paternal orphans. The 2010
LCMS data provide no clear-cut trend between orphan status and poverty. In rural areas, the
proportion of orphans does not vary with farm size (which is used as a poverty proxy) and is
slightly higher among non-agricultural households. In urban areas, the proportion of orphans is

4
UNICEF Zambia (undated) Reaching the MDGs with equity: Identifying Zambia’s most excluded people.
5
The LCSM calculates this percentage among all young people below 20 years of age.

9|Page
slightly higher in neighbourhoods qualified as ‘medium-cost’ (low, medium, and high-cost strata
are used as poverty proxy) and ‘low-cost’ and ‘high-cost’ areas having roughly equal proportions.

POVERTY BY EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD

When the incidence of poverty is analysed based on the education of the household head, as
illustrated in Figure 8 below, it is apparent that there is a positive relationship between increased
levels of education and reduced levels of poverty.

Figure 8: Poverty headcount (%) by education level of household head, Zambia 2010

90 83.5
79.3
80
70
60
48.8
50
40
30
20 11
10
0
None Primary Secondary Tertiary

Source: based on 2010 LCMS data

Poverty is highest amongst households in which the head of the household has no formal
education (83.5%) whereas only 11% of households in which the head of the household has
reached tertiary education are poor. Additionally, households headed by someone with primary
school education also exhibit high poverty levels whilst almost half of the households headed by
someone with secondary education are poor. A lack of education increases the likelihood of
poverty being perpetuated and transmitted across generations. In fact, the odds are high that a
child who lives in a poor household in which the head has none or only primary education, will
experience a high risk of non-attendance or drop-out of school early (cf. below).

KEY FACTS AND FINDINGS ON POVERTY IN ZAMBIA

1. Poverty in Zambia remains stubbornly high at around 60%. The relative decline over the
past eight years is insignificant (2 percentage points since 2006) and the absolute number
of poor people continues to rise (from about 6 million in the early 1990s to 7.9 million in
2010).

2. Only Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces have a non-poor population that is larger than the
poor population in that province. All other provinces have a majority who are poor.

10 | P a g e
3. There are two provincial exceptions to overall stagnant poverty levels: in Luapula
Province, poverty increased by 8 per cent and in Central Province, poverty declined by 29
per cent. The reasons underlying these two opposing patterns should be investigated
further.

4. Central Province registered the largest decline in the poverty gap ratio. This could be
linked to developments in commercial farming, including through backward and forward
linkages. However, national poverty data and trends vis a vis households showed that
where there was a decline in rural poverty, it was observed most notably among non-farm
households.

5. The education level and gender of the household head are strong predictors of poverty.
Households in which the head has no or only primary education are twice as likely to be
poor compared with households in which the head completed secondary education, and
seven times more likely to be poor than households in which the head has tertiary
education. Female-headed households are more likely to be poor than male-headed
households but this gender differential was significantly reduced since 2006, a
phenomenon that is mainly attributed to a reduction of extreme poverty among female-
headed households.

6. The proportion of children living in poor households (65%) is higher than the overall
headcount rate. In all, this adds up to approximately 4.6 million children living in poverty
in Zambia.

11 | P a g e
PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY IN ZAMBIA
This section focuses on patterns of inequality, in particular with regard to access to education, safe
drinking water, and electricity. The selection of these areas has been driven by data availability
correlated with priority areas of action for the UN. It is certainly worth expanding the analysis to
cover inequalities in access to opportunities in the areas of health and nutrition, when the data
becomes available to do so. The various inequalities are highlighted by bringing out spatial,
gender and age dimensions. A link is also established with the patterns of poverty as outlined
previously.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY

MDG target: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty
MDG indicator: Gini coefficient
MDG status for Zambia: 0.65
MDG 2015 goal for Zambia: 0.34
At the macroeconomic level, inequality in Zambia, just like poverty, is unsustainably high. The
UNDP Human Development Index estimates the income Gini coefficient for Zambia at 0.55
(2007), one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and the world6. The 2013 Global HDR notes that
when Zambia’s human development index is adjusted for inequality, it drops by 36.7%. This
clearly demonstrates that Zambia’s progress in human development is significantly skewed and
also limited based on inequality. According to the 2010 LCMS, the income Gini coefficient stands
at 0.65 whilst the expenditure Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.55. So the income inequality gap
has kept rising. The figure below provides the income Gini-coefficient at provincial level. Income
inequality is relatively higher in urban areas than it is in rural areas, albeit marginally and with a
4 basis points difference. On the other hand, income inequality is lowest in the provinces were
overall and extreme poverty are highest: these are Western (0.47), Luapula (0.4), Northern (0.43),
and Eastern (0.41) Province. Income inequality is highest in North-Western (0.62) and Lusaka
(0.51) Provinces.
Figure 9: Gini-coefficient at province Level, Zambia, 2010

Source: World Bank, June 2012

6
In the SADC region, only South Africa (0.63), Namibia (0.64) and Angola (0.59) have higher income Gini-coefficients than
Zambia, whilst Malawi (0.39), Tanzania (0.38) and Ghana (0.43), which share similarities with Zambia, have lower Gini-
coefficients.

12 | P a g e
Figure 10 below shows the percentage share of expenditure by quintile in Zambia in 2010 based
on the 2010 LCMS. The expenditure share in Zambia is dominated by the highest quintile which
accounts for 60% of total expenditure whilst the lowest quintile is estimated to account for only
4% of total expenditure. The national quintile expenditure ratio in Zambia is 15, which means
that, on average, the expenditure of the richest 20% of the population is 15 times that of the
average expenditure of the poorest 20%. The 2013 UNDP Human Development Report estimates
the quintile income ratio, which is the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% of the
population to the average income of the poorest 20% of the population, at 16.6. This means that
on average, the income of the richest 20% of the population is 16.6 times more than that of the
poorest 20% of the population, reflecting deep and further deepening income and expenditure
inequalities in the country.
Figure 10: Percentage share of total expenditure by quintile, Zambia, 2010

4%
7%
11% Lowest
Second
60% 18% Third
Fourth
Highest

Source: 2010 LCMS

INEQUALITY IN HIV PREVALENCE

Figure 11: Inequality in the prevalence and incidence of HIV/AIDS

Source: ZDHS 2007

13 | P a g e
Figure 11, above, illustrates the differences in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the different
provinces in Zambia. From this, it can be seen that although Zambia achieved its national MDG
target of an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of below 15.6% in 2007, which was highly commendable,
there remain disparities in the HIV prevalence rates amongst the provinces. Provinces such as
Lusaka, Copperbelt, Southern and Western all have prevalence rates above the national average
rate of 14.3%. In addition, it can be seen from the graphs below (Figures 12) that HIV prevalence
is higher among women than men regardless of whether they live in rural or urban areas. The
data also shows that HIV prevalence rates in Zambia in urban areas (20%) are twice that of rural
areas (10%).
Figure 12: HIV Prevalence among adults age 15 – 49

23.1

Women Men Total 19.7

16.1 15.9
14.3
12.3
11.0 10.3
9.4
Percent

Zambia Rural Urban

Source: ZDHS 2007

The graph below (Figure 13) shows HIV prevalence rates by education. From this it can be seen
that prevalence rates amongst both men and women increase with education with prevalence
rates amongst women that have attained post-secondary education being almost twice as high as
those without formal education. Additionally, the 2007 ZDHS postulates that there is a positive
relationship between the percentage of people engaging in high risk intercourse and the wealth
quintile, with high risk intercourse increasing amongst higher wealth quintiles. HIV prevalence is
therefore disproportionally skewed and higher amongst women. It is also remarkably higher in
urban areas, and highest amongst the educated and wealthy.
Figure 13: HIV prevalence by education

Women 15-49 Men 15-49 21

17 18
16
13
11 11
Percent

No education Primary Secondary More than secondary

Source: ZDHS 2007

14 | P a g e
INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION
MDG target: Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to
complete a full course of primary schooling
MDG indicator: Primary school net enrolment ratio
MDG status for Zambia: 93.7% (according to Ministry of Education statistics)
MDG 2015 goal for Zambia: 100%
Figure 14, below, shows school attendance in the 5 to 24 year age bracket, using 2010 Census
data. Inequality in school attendance is apparent. In rural areas, a third of this age group (31%)
have never attended school, whilst the figure is 11% in urban areas. Overall, 50% of children and
youth between 5 to 24 years and living in the rural areas have never attended or were not
attending school at the time of the survey (2010).
Figure 14: School attendance among children and youth 5-24 years of age, Zambia,
2010

70% 64%
60% a 56%
50%
50%
40% 31%
30% 23% 21% 25%
19%
20% 11%
10%
0%
Never attended Currently attending Not Currently Attending

Source: based on 2010 Census data National Rural Urban

In analysing this data, it must be noted that 60% of people between the ages of 5 and 24 years old
reside in rural areas whilst 40% reside in urban areas. When the actual numbers are analysed, it
shows that whilst in urban areas approximately 269,000 children and youth between 5 and 24
years have never attended school, and the number in the rural areas is 4.2 times higher (1.13
million).
Figure 15: Proportion of children and youth that have never attended school or are
currently not attending school, by age and location, Zambia, 2010

70% 63%
60% 54%
50% 41%
40% 36% 35%
28%
30% 21%
20% 16%
9%
10%
0%
5 - 9' 10 - 14' 15 - 19'

National Rural Urban

Source: based on 2010 Census data

15 | P a g e
When the age group is further disaggregated between 5 and 19 years of age, the nature of the
inequality becomes clearer.7 Whereas 36% of the urban population aged between 5 and 9 years
old has never been to school or was not attending school in 2010, this percentage was almost
double (63%) in rural areas. In the 10 to 14 years age group, the percentage of people not
attending school in the rural areas (21%) is 2.3 times that of the urban areas (9%). This further
reiterates the inequality in school attendance.
A gender bias related to age is revealed when the percentages of those who have never attended
school in Zambia are disaggregated (by age and gender). Figure 16, below, illustrates that in
general, a higher percentage of females have never attended school in Zambia. However, it can be
observed that up to the age of 14 years, there is a higher percentage of males who never attended
school. This trend then changes from age 15 years and above where the percentage of women that
have never attended school becomes higher than that of men and the gap keeps worsening with
advancing age.
Figure 16: Proportion of the population who have never attended school by age and
gender, Zambia, 2010

60% 53%50%
49%
50%
40%
28%
30% 24% 22% 24%
19% 18% 18% 20% 20%
20% 15%
12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 12%
10% 7% 9% 9%
10%
0%
Total 5 - 9' 10 - 14' 15 - 19' 20 - 24' 25 - 29'30 - 34' 35 - 39' 40 - 44' 45 - 49' 50 - 54' 55+

Male Female

Source: based on 2010 Census data

A key driver of these levels of inequality in school attendance is poverty. Based upon the 2010
LCMS, the following table provides a breakdown of school attendance by poverty status.
Table 3: School attendance rates by age and poverty status, Zambia 2010
Poverty status/rural/urban/sex Pre- Primary school Secondary Higher
2010 primary age age school age education age

5-6 yrs 7-10 11-13 14-15 16-18 19-22 yrs

yrs yrs yrs yrs
Extremely poor Total 11.5 69.3 88.4 84.4 66.0 30.1
Male 11.4 66.9 88.8 83.4 74.8 42.3
Female 11.6 71.5 87.9 85.5 56.8 18.2
Rural 11.0 69.1 88.4 84.4 65.6 30.4
Urban 15.4 70.4 88.0 83.9 69.5 27.5

7
The 19+ years age group has been left out as it is not normally a school going age and therefore has a large
percentage of people not going to school.

16 | P a g e
Moderately poor Total 13.1 78.2 91.9 88.9 65.1 28.2
Male 12.0 77.5 92.4 87.8 73.5 40.8
Female 14.3 78.9 91.5 90.0 57.5 17.6
Rural 11.0 76.1 90.9 88.9 63.2 28.4
Urban 18.9 83.8 94.3 89.1 69.7 27.7
Non poor Total 34.0 88.4 96.5 92.6 73.8 24.2
Male 33.7 87.1 96.4 94.3 80.0 32.6
Female 34.4 89.7 96.6 91.1 68.7 17.8
Rural 24.0 83.2 95.3 91.9 71.8 24.8
Urban 41.6 91.8 97.2 92.9 74.9 23.9
All Zambia Total 19.1 77.1 91.8 88.2 69.0 27.1
Male 18.7 75.3 92.0 87.9 76.5 37.8
Female 19.5 78.8 91.7 88.5 62.0 17.9
Rural 13.5 73.0 90.2 86.7 66.4 28.6
Urban 32.9 86.8 95.3 91.1 73.4 24.8

Source: 2010 LCMS

The data indicates the extent to which different dimensions of inequality determine school
attendance. In general, attendance rates increase concomitantly with a decrease in poverty and
are highest for the primary and secondary education levels. Inequality is most pronounced at
primary level (for instance: attendance among children living in extremely poor families is at 69%
for 7-10 years) and from 15-16 years onwards - in particular for girls for whom attendance in
extremely and moderately poor strata comes down to 56-57 per cent, from well over 80 per cent
in the 11-15 years age bracket. Eastern Province has lowest rates for primary school attendance
(7-10 and 11-13 years) at 67 and 69 per cent respectively. Luapula province actually experienced a
decline in school attendance for the 14-18 year age group (while none of the other provinces had)
– pointing to specific issues in this province (cf. poverty figures above), which had highest
attendance in this age bracket in 2006. The largest increase in school attendance was observed for
Western and Central Provinces.
Education is expensive and poverty remains an obstacle to children form poor households
completing a full primary, secondary and higher education cycle. The growth of private education
at college level (37% of all college students attend private colleges) and university level (22% of
all University students attend a private institution) have provided alternative education
opportunities, but only for those who can afford it. Figure 17, below, highlights the share of
income quintiles in household education expenditure according to the level of education. The
data clearly reflects the patterns of inequality highlighted earlier.
In fact, where basic education expenditure is relatively equally spread among the expenditure
quintiles, expenditure for secondary and tertiary education reveal a sharp rise in the share
accounted for by the two highest income quintiles. Interestingly, the data points to the
observations that despite the education policy of tuition exemption, education remains a
significant cost to the poorest segments of the population. This needs to be reviewed in detail, to
look at the cost items and how such can be alleviated for the poor.

17 | P a g e
 Figure 17: Distribution of household expenditure on education, by expenditure
quintile and level of education, Zambia 2010

100%
16% Q5
80% (Riches
Quintile participation
41%
t 20%)
60% 85%
Q4
40%

20%
21%
Q3
2%
7%
0%
Basic High Tertiary
Source: calculations based on 2010 LCMS data

INEQUALITY IN HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY

Figure 18, summarises access to electricity in Zambia. The disparity in access to electricity
between urban and rural areas is marked. There are at least 12.7 times more households with
access to electricity in urban areas than there are in rural areas.
Figure 18: Number of households with access to electricity by rural/urban area,
Zambia 2010

450,000 417,945
387,507
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000 30,438
0
Zambia Rural Urban

Source: 2010 Census

Although there is no available data to enable credible analysis of the link between access to
electricity and poverty in Zambia, the link between access to electricity and poverty is supported
by literature that links access to electricity and poverty via the broader link between energy and
poverty. Electricity, a form of energy, therefore lies within this. Summarising the link between
access to energy and poverty, the UNDP World Energy Assessment (WEA, 2000) notes that:
“Energy supports the provision of basic needs such as cooked food, a comfortable living
temperature, lighting, the use of appliances, piped water or sewerage, essential health care
(refrigerated vaccines, emergency and intensive care), educational aids, communication (radio,

18 | P a g e
television, electronic mail, the world wide web), including agriculture, commerce,
manufacturing, industry and mining conversely, lack of access to energy contributes to poverty
and deprivation and can contribute to economic decline8”.
The Johannesburg Plan on Implementation, one of the outcomes of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, also emphasises on the links between
access to energy and poverty. This view is also supported by the 2005 UN publication “The
Energy Challenge to Achieving Millennium Development Goals” which opines that although
there is no separate MDG on energy, energy is an integral part of achieving the MDGs and that
“higher quality and larger quantities of energy services than current approaches are required to
meet the MDG challenge”9.

INEQUALITY IN HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER

MDG target: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation
MDG indicator: Proportion of the population without access to an improved water source
MDG status for Zambia: 36.9%
MDG 2015 goal for Zambia: 25.5%
Figure 19, below, summarises household access to safe water in Zambia between 2006 and 2010.
The chart illustrates that household access to safe water is higher in urban areas than it is in rural
areas. In addition, whereas access to safe water in rural areas increased with over 8 percentage
points between 2006 and 2010, access to safe water in urban areas actually declined 3.8 percentage
points between 2006 and 2010. This could reflect a relationship between urbanization on the one
hand and insufficient expansion of water access points in urban and peri-urban areas on the other.
LCMS data also reveals that access to safe drinking water is, like access to education and
electricity, disproportionally skewed against the poor in general and the extremely poor in
particular. Whereas 75.7% of non-poor households have access to safe water, just over half
(55.7%) of moderately poor and only 49.2% of extremely poor households have access to safe
drinking water.
Figure 19: Proportion of households with access to safe drinking water by urban-rural
area, Zambia 2006 and 2010
100
88.2
90 84.4
80
70 62.3
58
60 50.3
50 41.9 2006
40 2010
30
20
10
0
All Rural Urban
Source: 2010 LCMS
8
UNDP (2005) The Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Available from
http://esa.un.org/un-energy/pdf/un_energy_overview.pdf (accessed July 19 2010).
9
Ibid.

19 | P a g e
RE-DRAWING THE LINES ON PUBLIC
POLICY AND EXPENDITURE TO
ADDRESS POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
To what extent do national policies and public expenditures in Zambia effectively and efficiently
address poverty and inequality? Macroeconomic and micro economic policies, linked to pro-poor
investments and expenditures, have a significant role to play in correcting the poverty and
inequality imbalances. This leads to choices on social protection, tax policy and administration,
social and economic infrastructure that are critical instruments that directly impact on levels of
inequality and poverty. No one measure alone can make the change. It is the combined and
appropriate application of these development instruments that will lead to effective and
sustainable poverty and inequality reduction. International evidence, for example, has taught us
that social protection measures have optimum impact when linked to quality, affordable, and
accessible basic social services – requiring, among other things, accompanying supply side
infrastructure investments. Also, social protection policies have proven to lay a solid foundation
for linkages with livelihood and economic empowerment support programmes (micro finance,
savings programmes, feeder roads, and agricultural support and extension services). On the other
hand, market infrastructure investment that has not enabled the poorest to take advantage of the
new roads, transport, credit and supply chain opportunities will only increase the divide. A pro-
poor and inequality reducing set of interventions cuts across sectors and must be designed and
implemented as a whole. The proceeding section goes on to identify four required areas of
intervention in Zambia.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS AN EQUALISER

Apart from the analysis of overall coverage and the extent to which development programmes are
pro-poor, they can be viewed from the public expenditure or Government budget angle. Data on
budgets and expenditure for pro-poor policies and programmes are not readily available, and this
is certainly an area for further inquiry and support under the current UNDAF Zambia, including
the cross-country comparative analysis that can be provided on pro-poor budgeting, budget
allocation criteria and tracking of its delivery for results. National agriculture inputs and maize
subsidies fall under the category of social assistance expenditures. An observation with regards
spending on these subsidies is that, in 2011, the combined expenditure for FRA and FISP
accounted for 2.6% of GDP. This contrasts with an estimated 0.6% of GDP for other social
transfer programmes, most notably the Public Welfare Assistance Schemes (PWAS) and Social
Cash Transfers (SCTs), 2% of GDP for total health expenditure, and 4% of GDP for total
education expenditure. In light of the weak pro-poor coverage of these programmes, this is
indicative of the regressive nature of a large component of social transfer spending in the country.
A second observation relates to the extent to which education expenditure addresses the
inequalities highlighted in the previous section. According to a recent paper from the World
Bank, ‘public education spending in Zambia […] is dramatically regressive’.10 On the basis of 2010
LCMS data, the paper attributes this to the extreme concentration of tertiary education benefits

10
Ibid., p.28

20 | P a g e
among the top income quintiles. In fact, whereas primary education spending is fairly equal,
members of the richest income quintiles attend universities, colleges, and technical schools ‘at a
rate that vastly exceeds that of the poor’.11
The pro-poor targeting of public expenditures remains questionable. The FISP and FRA subsidies
reach to 800,000 and 390,000 households respectively. Altogether, they only make a weak dent in
view of the overall number of poor households, even when only the extreme poverty line is
considered (around 5.2 million households). The targeting efficacy of one of the larger social
transfer programmes, the FISP, is illustrated by the graph below which shows that nearly two-
thirds of the beneficiaries of this transfer programme are in the top three income quintiles and
about 36% of benefitting households in the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution, i.e.
under the extreme poverty line.
Figure 20: Distribution of maize-growing households benefitting from FISP and FSP
30%
Distribution of all beneficiaries

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%
16% 20% 26% 24% 14%
0%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
(Poorest 20%) (Richest 20%)

Source: adapted from Cuesta, Kabaso, and Suarez-Becerra (2012)

This observation is substantiated by findings from a report on the FISP referenced in a recent
study on social spending in Zambia, highlighting that 59% and 53% of farmers with large-scale
cultivated areas, 5-10 hectares and 10-20 hectares respectively, receive fertilizer under the FISP.
This figure is 14% and 31% respectively for farmers with small-scale cultivated areas (up to 1
hectare and between 1 and 2 hectares).12 The latter account for nearly a million farms, whereas
the former account for some 55,000 farms.

JOB AND WEALTH CREATION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE WITH A

RURAL BIAS
Ninety per cent of Zambia’s employment is in the informal sector (Labour Survey, 2010). There is
an urgent need for Zambia to accelerate the rate at which jobs in the formal sector are created
whilst simultaneously investing in new infrastructure and the maintenance of existing
infrastructure enables such job growth. The focus on rural infrastructure, in a geographically vast
country with very dispersed thin population density, is a public good that will have a direct
impact on improving productivity in areas ‘left behind’ by the country’s decade long positive
economic growth. Related to this expansion, investments in an industrialization strategy and

11
Ibid., p.35
12
Cuesta, Kabaso, and Suarez-Becerra (2012); How pro-poor and progressive is social spending in Zambia? The World Bank:
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit.

21 | P a g e
related capacities, that are directly linked to Zambia’s vast agriculture and extractives sectors, will
ensure new jobs are created at a more rapid pace and wealth further distributed.
Given the limited public resources as well as a shrinking fiscal space, it is imperative that the
country develops innovative ways in which to incorporate the active participation of the private
sector in such infrastructure and human resource capacity investments. The establishment of an
enabling and productive investment climate that is focused on growing small, micro and medium
scale enterprises (SMME) is a proven strategy that has eased levels of poverty and inequality, both
in urban and rural communities. Global evidence has shown that in low income and low middle
income country contexts the highest numbers of new jobs are often created through a vibrant
SMME sector.

EXPANDING SOCIAL PROTECTION

Zambia has a number of social assistance and social transfer programmes and most notable among
them are the following: the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS), the Social Cash Transfer
schemes (SCTs), the Food Security Pack (FSP), the School Feeding Programme, the Tertiary
Bursary Scheme, an OVC programme, the Farmer’s Input Support Programme (FISP), and the
Food Reserve Agency. All these measures provide either in-kind or cash transfers to specifically
targeted groups in the population. The programmes have in common an objective of protection or
promotion from poverty or vulnerability. They all have redistribution potential. In addition to
this, the policies of tuition exemption up until Grade 7 and of free Primary Health Care can also
be considered policy measures with a social protection intention.
Among the various components of social protection, the paper focus on social assistance or social
transfer instruments which potentially have a strong impact on poverty and inequality through
their redistribution, protective and human capital investment effects. Two parameters are central
to the question posed at the outset of this section. The first relates to the adequacy in terms of
coverage and the second relates to the extent to which public spending on social transfers is
actually pro-poor and progressive – i.e. adequately targeting people under the poverty line and
reaching them with a proportionally higher share of spending than for people in the higher
income quintiles. A recent report from the World Bank provides insight into the coverage of
these programmes.13 In fact, overall coverage is low in terms of absolute number of poor people
covered (both below the food and overall poverty lines). In light of the 7.9 million poor people
(based upon the 60% headcount poverty rate), the coverage of the main core social assistance
programmes (with an explicit poverty reduction objective) is low: the PWAS, the FSP and SCTs
cover 59,000, 14,400 and 50,000 households respectively (although the latter aims to cover
100,000 households by 2015). The School Feeding Programme covers approximately 850,000
students at primary school age.
An equally important coverage question relates to whether these programmes effectively target
poor people. The paper already referred to agricultural input support inadequately reaching poor
farm households. In addition, the Ministry of Community Development has recently
commissioned a targeting assessment of its core transfer programmes (PWAS, FSP, and Social
Cash Transfers mainly), which will provide further evidence on the targeting efficacy of social
protection measures. The School Feeding Programme targets districts on the basis of education
enrolment, drop-out, and extreme poverty rates. Although a detailed assessment is lacking based

13
World Bank (2013) Using Social Safety Nets to Accelerate Poverty Reduction and Share Prosperity in Zambia. Human
Development Department; Social Protection Unit; Africa Region.

22 | P a g e
upon the ultimate beneficiaries, it can be assumed that the programme likely benefits the poor
households at a somewhat larger extent than in proportion to their share in the overall
population, which is an indication of the progressive nature of the programme.

SPECIAL MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY AND EQUALITY

The achievement of gender equality and equity for the overall improvement of human
development and human rights simply cannot be overemphasised. The 2012 World Economic
Forum (WEF) Gender Gap report reiterates that, with almost half of the world’s population being
female, a determining factor for any one country’s future success is the extent to which it is able
to develop, retain and attract talent in a manner that is not skewed in favour of or against any
gender. Zambia’s progress in achieving gender equity and equality has been very slow. The 2012
SADC gender protocol barometer report for Zambia, for example notes with concern at the fact
that despite signing the SADC Gender Protocol, Zambia has not yet ratified it. This is despite the
fact that the protocol has a 2015 deadline which means Zambia currently has less than 3 years to
ratify and implement the protocol.
Whilst considerable advancements have been made in achieving gender parity in primary school
enrolment rates, gender inequalities in school attendance persist in the country. These
inequalities also rise when the focus moves from primary education to secondary and tertiary
education. Additionally, child and maternal mortality are characterized by marked spatial
inequalities. The 2013 MDG provincial profiles show that child mortality rates, whilst generally
high in Zambia, are extremely high in the provinces of Western, Luapula and Central. Maternal
mortality is also high in these provinces especially in Western province where the maternal
mortality ratio is almost double that of Lusaka. High child and maternal mortality are, in
themselves, symptoms of an unequal society in which children and women bear a
disproportionally greater health burden.
The 2013 national MDG Report identified specific accelerators for government and its partners to
support in this context. These include:

 Developing a costed gender action plan in each sector that specifically addressed
interventions to close the primary gender gaps in that sector.

 Priority to addressing gender-based violence and early marriages through a

combination of implementing legislation, advocacy campaigns and community
support mechanisms.

 A focus on attaining gender parity in secondary schools, with attention to

stemming the high drop-out rate for girls in this age cohort.

 Interventions aimed at improving maternal and child health, through improved

health, nutrition, and family planning services targeted to the poorer and most
vulnerable households, per the recent census, poverty, inequality and HDI data for
Zambia.

23 | P a g e
A QUALITY PUBLIC EDUCATION
The achievement of universal quality education and its accompanying and far-reaching
development benefits are globally undisputed. The UNESCO 2012 education for all policy paper14,
reiterates these benefits and how quality universal education unlocks other MDG, human rights
and human development gains. In summary, quality universal education reduces poverty and
promotes economic growth. The policy paper observes that education provides an escape route
out of poverty for the poor. It estimates that in low income countries, each additional year of
education adds about 10% to an individual’s average income. A similar trend can also be observed
for Zambia. In Zambia, poverty is highest amongst households in which the head of the
household has no formal education and is considerably low amongst households whose head has
tertiary education (eight times lower). In addition, quality universal education also improves
maternal health by delaying early marriages, reducing fertility rates and encouraging good health
practices which, amongst other things. It also reduces child mortality; promotes gender equality.
Quality education in Zambia is however expensive which means that poor are denied an
important escape out of poverty. An important reason for this identified by UNESCO is the fact
that Zambia has one of the lowest percentages of public expenditure in education in the world.
The UN recommends countries to spend, at minimum, an amount equivalent to 5% of their GDP
on public education. Zambia is estimated to have spent 1.4% of its GDP on public education
between 2005 and 200915. This amount is negligible if the country is to effectively address the
challenges at hand, especially given the country’s high number of children out of school and
exacerbated by over a decade of very low investments in education during the eighties and
nineties.

14
UNESCO. 2012. Education for all global monitoring report: Policy paper 4
15
Acosta A. 2012. Using natural resource revenues for education. Background paper prepared for the education for all
global monitoring report 2012. P17

24 | P a g e
IN CONCLUSION: A FOCUS ON THE
GAME CHANGERS FOR A ‘MORE EQUAL’
ZAMBIA
This paper, on the basis of available data and research, has shown that poverty and inequality in
Zambia are closely linked and exacerbate each other. Poverty in Zambia is deep (42 per cent food
poverty), rural (close to 80 per cent), and remains stagnant (minimal reductions since 2006).
Higher levels of poverty are found among children (65% as opposed to 60% overall), elderly, and
in female-headed households, despite a significant reduction in extreme poverty among the latter.
In addition, poverty is a key dimension driving inequality and results in some groups consistently
having inferior opportunities. Inferior access to opportunities is typically transmitted over time
resulting in intergenerational poverty and inequality. For instance, the level of education of heads
of poor households is usually low and this correlates with a reduced opportunity to access to
education for the children living in that household.
The paper has also shown that inequalities in the country mirror the characteristics and patterns
of poverty and have an income, spatial and gender bias. Income inequality is generally higher in
the provinces with relatively higher levels of formality in their economy and lower in more
informal economy provinces. However non-income inequality, mainly in terms of access to
opportunities, is pronounced and reflected in lack of access to basic services such as safe drinking
water, education, electricity and sanitation amongst the poor. This inequality is then exacerbated
by spatial conditions with poor households in rural areas being worse off than those in the urban
areas. Additionally, the provincial variations are also significant with, for example, Luapula
province exhibiting the highest levels of poverty and inequality in access to basic services. These
factors must be taken into account in scoping policy and investments.
International experience demonstrates that a policy mix that combines targeted transfers with the
provision of quality education, affordable and quality basic social services and infrastructure, and
the reduction of gender imbalances, can be a powerful mix of instruments to reduce both poverty
and inequality in the short and long run. With regards to targeted transfers, Zambia can use the
on-going development of a comprehensive national social protection policy to formulate bold
policy intentions on the expansion of social assistance for the extreme poor. This includes the
rationalisation of the existing and multiple social protection schemes. Adequately targeting the
extreme poor is not an easy exercise and one where data and information has to be constantly
monitored and updated. However, when done well, it has the potential of significantly reducing
poverty and inequalities. In this context, the National Social Protection Policy should, ideally,
link to efforts to improve the pro-poor targeting of agricultural subsidy support programmes.
Measures to shift budgetary resources to ensure adequate coverage through targeted school
feeding, public education and health services for the poor, and social cash transfers are means
through which well-resourced and implemented social policy effectively contributes to
narrowing the gap between the rich and poor.
The need to re-direct national policy and expenditures to inequality and poverty reducing goals
are necessary if Zambia is to shift gear to have a real impact on the relatively static high levels of
poverty and the growing inequalities the country is experiencing. In order to further substantiate
the paper’s findings and recommendations, and provide a useful and responsive guide to the both

25 | P a g e
policy makers and partner support, the analysis of poverty and inequality needs to be tracked
with current and composite data and household surveys. It should also encompass additional
sectors such as health & nutrition, to get a full picture. In addition to this sector specificity, the
analysis has also highlighted the need to further investigate location-specific trends, such as the
poverty decline in Central Province, the steep increase in Luapula Province, or the decline among
non-farm households in given rural areas. Applied research that facilitates policy and programme
direction towards context-specific pathways of poverty and inequality reduction is valued.
For the UN in Zambia, there is a clear need to invest policy and programme resources in
supporting initiatives that aim at reducing poverty and inequality in the country, with a focus on
interventions detailed in the preceding sections that are most likely to have the deepest positive
and cascading effect. These are the promotion of quality public education (with a focus on early
learning through secondary); reducing gaping gender imbalances in economic, social and political
opportunity; strengthening better targeted social protection schemes and a cohesive social
protection policy; the creation of jobs and distribution of wealth through technical advisory
services that support pro-poor public policy and expenditures; and the expediting of programmes
and partnerships that invest in raising the productive capacities and infrastructure in vulnerable
communities. To do so with optimal impact, the UN must continue and intensify its collective
efforts at data gathering and impartial analysis to ensure an accurate and current picture of
poverty and inequality in Zambia; share this information and continue to advocate for the issues
in the public domain; ensure on-time policy support to national decision-makers; and invest its
programme resources to support national initiatives that aim directly at reducing poverty and
inequality in the country.

26 | P a g e
REFERENCES
Acosta A. 2012 Using natural resource revenues for education: Background paper prepared for the
education for all global monitoring report 2012.
Ayisi R. et al. 2013. 2012 Zambia SADC gender protocol barometer report.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2006 & 2010.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Census 2010.
Central Statistics Office Zambia Demographic and Health Survey 2007.
Cuesta et al. (2012) How pro-poor and progressive is social spending in Zambia? Policy Research Working
Paper 6052. The World Bank.
IFC. 2013. IFC jobs study: Assessing private sector contributions to job creation and poverty reduction.
UNDP and Ministry of Finance (2013) Mellennium Development Goals Progress Report 2013. Edited by
Camilla H. Buus, Lusaka. New Horizon Printing Press
UNDP (2005) The Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Available from
http://esa.un.org/un-energy/pdf/un_energy_overview.pdf (accessed July 19 2010).
UNESCO. 2012. Policy paper 04: Reaching out of school children is crucial.
UNICEF and UN Women (2013) Addressing Inequalities: synthesis report of global public consultation.
UNICEF (undated) Reaching the MDGs with equity: Identifying Zambia’s most excluded people.
UNICEF (2013) Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Zambia – Draft.
World Bank (2006) World Development Report.
World Bank (2012) Zambia Economic Brief: Recent economic developments and the state of basic human
opportunities for children.
World Bank (2013) Using social safety nets to accelerate poverty reduction and share prosperity in Zambia.

27 | P a g e