BARRY - The Limits of The Shallow and The Deep

Environmental Politics
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The limits of the shallow and the deep: Green

politics, philosophy, and praxis
John Barry
To cite this article: John Barry (1994) The limits of the shallow and the deep: Green politics,
philosophy, and praxis, Environmental Politics, 3:3, 369-394, DOI: 10.1080/09644019408414152
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The Limits of the Shallow and the Deep:
Green Politics, Philosophy, and Praxis
JOHN BARRY
Although it is commonly held to constitute the dominant cleavage within

green politics, the convention of dividing green politics into 'shallow' and
'deep' aspects is problematic. Exclusive reliance on it to map out green
political theory can lead to a one-dimensional and incomplete conception
of the green political landscape. The distinction this division represents is
primarily philosophical rather than political. A related issue concerns
how the development of a realistic and coherent green politics is
hampered by the continuing hegemony of this axis, due principally to the
disproportionate influence of deep ecology. Green politics is about
values and the moral dimension of human/social-nature relations, but it is
also about political and economic change. There is a connection between
the two, but the deep/shallow dichotomy does little to make the character
of this relationship clear. Debate is needed on the relationship between
green philosophy and politics. In describing the nature of this relation-
ship, one is also prescribing a particular understanding of green politics.
The reconciliation of green philosophy and politics depends on seeing
that the normative basis of green politics includes a concern with the
human social world and its organisation, as much as a moral concern with
the non-human world. In questioning the utility of this dichotomy, issues
of political praxis and the undeveloped nature of a green political
economy should be highlighted. These concerns tend to be crowded out
by the over-emphasis on the ecocentric philosophical basis of green
politics engendered by the theoretical hegemony of the deep/shallow
cleavage.
Two recent articles in Environmental Politics dealing with the classifica-

tion of green political theory have raised some interesting questions
about how to understand its principal concerns. In an article entitled "The
Different Dimensions of Green Politics' [i992], Young offers a review of
John Barry teaches at the Department of Politics at Keele University. He would like to
thank Chris Berry, the referees for their perceptive comments and encouragement,
particularly Andrew Dobson, and the editorial assistance of Michael Waller.
Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 Autumn 1994, pp. 369-394

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
370 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
the gamut of green politics and presents the scope of what Environmental
Politics intends to cover [35-9], while Vincent [2995] offers both a critical
'typology of typologies' of green politics, together with his own particular
categorisation [254-69].
Both approaches are ultimately centred on the separation of green
political theory into two camps; the 'Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range
Ecology Movement', first explicated by Naess [1973]. They are not alone
in using this division to 'map out' green theory, which Young calls 'the
great divide' [1992:14]. For example, Dobson's differentiation between
'environmentalism' and 'ecologism' [1990: Ch. 1], or Eckersley's argu-
ment that 'emancipatory' or authentic green politics is 'ecocentric' [1992:
21-30], can both be considered as articulations of this ubiquitous distinc-
tion. Authentic or 'true' green politics is understood as deep, while all
else is shallow. This paper raises questions about the efficacy of this
distinction and argues that the future development of green political
theory lies in the transcendence of this increasingly artificial division.
While frequently taken to encompass a political partition between
'reformist' and 'radical' strategies, as in the Fundi-Realo split in green
political parties [Doherty, 1992; Hulsberg, 1988], this analytical
dichotomy refers, in essence, to an ecophilosophical dispute between
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Both Young and Vincent are sensi-
tive to the limited utility of such a dichotomy to capture the complexity
and variety of green theory. What follows is an exposition of the dangers
of a reductionist reading of the multidimensional character of green
politics, as a result of using a unidimensional methodological approach.
For example, Vincent's own typology works partly by interpreting green
writers, positions and ideas in such a way as to suit his typology, which by
replicating the deep/shallow divide can be read as a more comprehensive
version of other dualistic typologies which he criticises [1993:252-54].1
This distinction, as argued below, frequently creates inappropriate cate-
gories for the different dimensions of green politics.
Of the many problems with the deep/shallow divide, one of the biggest
is that it infers that only social and political change that is ecocentric, or
ecocentrically motivated, can be considered as 'really' green. At times it
seems that the ecocentric philosophical agenda is more important than
the green political one. For example, Eckersley explains that, 'In terms of
fundamental priorities, an ecocentric approach regards the question of
our proper place in nature as logically prior to the question of what are the
most appropriate social and political arrangements for human com-
munities' [1992: 29; emphasis added].2 This lexical ordering of green
philosophy and politics is problematic in that not only is ecocentrism a
weak normative basis for green political theory, but, by according more
THE LIMITS OF THE SHALLOW AND THE DEEP 371
weight to deep ecology, a concern with 'appropriate social political

arrangements' may be seen as less important.
The deep/shallow divide is insufficiently nuanced to discriminate
adequately - yet also to demonstrate the connection - between the
anthropocentric/ecocentric divide regarding green normative arguments
about interaction between the social and the non-human, and green
social and political claims. If so much energy is spent in criticising the
anthropocentric biases of the 'dominant social paradigm' or modern
world view, attention may be deflected from the pressing need for a
coherent green political theory and political economy. Ecocentrism, by
itself, does not commend the political and institutional transformation
that greens advocate, since it focuses on particular reasons for change
rather than those changes themselves. From a strictly ecocentric point of
view, for example, democracy is superfluous at worst or an optional
extra. It does have a role to play, but following Carter [1993] and Dobson
[1989,1990], this should not be at the expense of displacing the 'primacy
of the political' within green politics.
As a rather rough and ready identification of some green political
positions, the deep/shallow, dark/light dichotomy has its uses. It is a
serviceable way to differentiate green political theory from other political
theories. It stresses one of its defining characteristics, namely the attempt
to bring the non-human world within the ambit of moral considerability.
Unlike almost every other modern ideology, green politics is not just
concerned with human well-being, but also with the well-being of the
non-human world [Eckersley, 1992: Ch. 3; Dobson, 1990: Ch. 2]. The
moral concern greens may properly be said to have for the non-human
world has hitherto been assumed to be ecocentric [Dobson, ibid.: 63-6].
However, in terms of coherently relating green philosophical and politi-
cal claims this is a problematic assumption.
In mapping out the varieties of themes, concepts and principles of
green political theory, an uncritical acceptance of the deep/shallow
dichotomy may omit hidden dimensions of green political theory, or give
insufficient attention to salient aspects. What is at stake here is more than
a terminological issue, although this is a root cause of the confusion
surrounding the deep/shallow debate. This issue has ramifications
beyond mistakenly making deep ecology co-extensive with green politics.
It concerns the very status of the political within green theory, and the
relationship between its normative claims and political prescriptions. If
deep ecology represents what greens are really after, as Dobson's discus-
sion of the public and private pronouncements of green activists indicates
[1990:207-13], then we may end up with a political theory largely devoid
of the politics. What I mean by this is that the difficult task of establishing
how the 'sustainable society' is to be achieved, and the social (that is

intrahuman) principles and values associated with the latter, will not
receive the attention they deserve. The paucity of discussion about
institutional transformation within green political theory bears this out,
although there have been some notable exceptions [Dobson, 1990: Ch. 4;
Carter, 1993; Wall, 1990; Begg, 1991]. Part of the reason for this
deficiency is arguably the influence of deep ecology upon green politics,
and the idea that to be really green one must subscribe to the ecocentric
vision.
One way of conceiving this issue is to see that it involves two separate,
but related concerns. On the one hand there is the question of the status
of deep ecology itself as the philosophical basis of green politics [Dobson,
1989: 41]. On the other there is the relationship between deep ecology
and green political theory. In questioning the status of deep ecology as
the normative basis of green politics, one also breaks with the received
wisdom stipulating that non-deep conceptions of green politics are not
really green at all. In what follows some shortcomings of the deep/shallow
divide in understanding the internal dynamics and historical development
of green politics are examined. In Part I, the analyses of Young [1992] and
Vincent [1993] are used to illustrate some 'hidden dimensions' often
omitted by an exclusive use of the deep/shallow continuum. In Part II the
relationship between green politics and philosophy is discussed via a
critique of deep ecology.
Hidden Dimensions of Green Politics
Critiques of Growth: Towards a Green Political Economy?

The critique of material economic growth is one of the sine qua nons of
the green argument, such that we can expect it to figure prominently in
any adequate typology of green politics [Dobson, 1990: 15-19, 205;
Eckersley, 1992: 23-5; Goodin, 1992: 99]. However, the discussion it
receives, particularly within deep/shallow characterisations, is often
rather cursory. For example, Vincent limits his discussion of the critique
of growth to sociological explanations of the rise of the green movement
and ecological concerns within western industrial societies. For him,
'Interesting though these sociological and economic views are they

express little concern for the ideology [of ecology] per se' [1993:250-1].
Yet a closer examination demonstrates the important place of this
sceptical perspective within green theory. Its almost canonical status can
be gauged from its acceptance across the green spectrum, from the deep
ecological concept of 'walking lighter on the earth' [Devall and Sessions,
1985:118], to green critiques of the social inequalities that conventional
material growth is premised upon [Barry, 1990], and ecoauthoritarian
concerns with survival [Ophuls, 1977].
Young on the other hand is well aware of the centrality of the critique
of economic growth [1992:10-14], and my main aim here is to bring into
sharper relief some lesser known green arguments concerning economic
growth. The complexities associated with this green argument are such
that it deserves more attention than can be offered here. Contrary to what
the majority of greens (of all hues) seem to think, the discipline of
economics is not as united around economic growth as it appears. Greens
must be wary of throwing the baby out with the bath water when they
sweepingly discount economic theory as being merely an expression of
the 'politics of self interest' and 'greedy values' [Irvine and Ponton, 1988:
2]. In the articulation of the outlines of a sustainable economy, and the
development of a green political economy, greens would do well to take
on board some of its insights, seeing this more as an immanent critique of
orthodox economics than the first step on the slippery slope of
revisionism. Showing how economic growth as a social ideal is flawed by
its own criteria and standards is a stronger approach for greens to take
[Barry, 1990].
Questioning economic growth enjoys a heretical, if muted, tradition
within economic theory, from Mill's eloquent description of the 'station-
ary state' in his Principles of Political Economy [Book iv: Ch. vi], to
economists such as Mishan [1967], Scitovsky [1976], Hirsch [1978], and
Georgescu-Roegen [1971, 1979]. The main figure I want to draw atten-
tion to here is the often overlooked contribution of the last of these. His
magnum opus, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, came out in
1971, that is, before the Club of Rome's report. In many ways the former
set out the physical or entropie limits to growth more clearly and
convincingly than the latter, which unfortunately received all the
publicity and became the basis of the debate about economic growth in
the early 1970s, and the touchstone of the nascent green movement.
What was unique about the original Limits to Growth study was that it
was the first, if flawed, attempt to use systems theory and computer
extrapolations to 'predict' possible future scenarios. The study itself was
based on five key factors, 'population, agricultural production, natural
resources, industrial production, and pollution,' [Meadows et al., 1972:

11-12]. In retrospect, it is regrettable that in the ensuing public and
academic debate, centred around the methodological weaknesses of the
report, and its general acceptance as the seminal work in this area of
green politics, attention was deflected away from Georgescu-Roegen's
analysis. This committed the early green movement to engaging in
Malthusian-inspired 'futurology', acting as a sort of negative palliative to
the techno-optimistic future scenarios popularised by Toffler [1970] and
Kahn [1969], amongst others.
The starting point for Georgescu-Roegen's thesis is the same as the
MIT study - that is, that there are absolute physical limits to economic
growth. His is arguably a stronger version of this thesis because he
avoided trying to 'predict' the future based on systems modelling (the
report's study was largely based on the 'systems dynamics' work of Jay
Forrester [1971]), and instead explicitly confined his theory to ther-
modynamics, especially its second or entropy law, and its implications for
economic science. Unlike the Limits thesis he also traced the develop-
ment of the concept of economic growth within economic theory. In
doing so, he linked economic growth as a social ideal to the social
dominance of economic science, and thereby contextualised and en-
riched the debate around growth. According to Georgescu-Rogen, as
economics has evolved it has become progressively removed from the
physical reality of scarcity with which it is supposed to deal [1971: Ch. 1],
He shows the historical specificity of economic growth and the
economist's cornucopian illusion of ever increasing levels of material
affluence. The obsession of economics with material affluence, may,
according to him, be partly explained by the fact that 'the absence of any
difficulty in securing raw materials by those countries where modern
economics flourished was yet another reason for economists to remain
blind to this crucial economic factor [nature's perennial contribution]'
[ibid.: 2].3
It may well be that because of the adoption of the terms of debate set
out by Limits to Growth, by greens and their opponents, the emerging
green movement lost an opportunity to develop a more persuasive and
defensible critique. It was only later on in the 1970s with economists such
as Boulding [1973], Daly [1973, 1977], Kerry Smith [1979], and
Georgescu-Roegen [1979] that the entropy-based critique was further
developed and, unlike the original MIT study, proposed far-reaching
social, political and economic changes, centring around the concept of a
'steady-state-economy'. In other words, whereas the MIT report was
broadly speaking 'reformist', in that although it too saw the inevitability
of a steady state economy [Meadows et al., 1972:170-84], its general
statements and injunctions were more technical than political [ibid. : 177].
It resonated with a neo-Malthusian emphasis on (non-Western) popula-
tion growth, which went so far as to claim that 'the greatest possible
impediment to a more equal distribution of the world's resources is
population growth' [ibid. :178], which seemed to abstract from the global
hegemony of Western capital, lifestyles and neo-colonial trade practices,
as early socialist critics were quick to point out [Enzenberger, 1974].
Although many would see that this reformist conclusion was inevitable
given that the Club of Rome was a collection of 'scientists, educators,
economists, humanists, industrialists, and national and international civil
servants' [Meadows et al: 9], this does not completely invalidate its
analysis. What it does show is that technocratic critiques of growth are no
guarantee of radical green politics, but are rather necessary conditions
that need to be supplemented by an explicitly political economy approach
to growth, as exemplified by Georgescu-Roegen and other green political
economists, mostly associated with an ecosocialist perspective [Martinez-
Alier, 1987; Gorz, 1989; Altvater, 1993; Mulberg, 1992]. The Limits
report and those that followed, share a basic reformist approach, because
they work within a self-limiting critique of existing economic and political
practices and institutions.4
Looking back, then, there are good reasons for positing that the
means-based critique of growth - that is, drawing attention to the limited
resource inputs of the planet and its assimilative capacity for pollution
outputs, and the articulation of a viable and positive political alternative -
was in many ways hindered by the attention lavished on the original
Limits thesis.5 Although following Young we may say that in some ways
the report marked the public beginning of green politics [1992:12, Box 2]
and the development of green parties [Box 5], one could contend that the
political entropie approach is a more appropriate foundation for the
green critique of growth. It avoids the pitfalls of attempting to predict the
future and offers the possibility of an immanent critique of growth and the
assumptions of orthodox economic theory. Such a political entropie
approach is also sensitive to the view that for the green analysis to have
some purchase politically, it must place economic growth and the
dominance of economic theory within a broader critique of the contem-
porary capitalist socio-political world.
Such an approach would also have the advantage of avoiding an over-
reliance on some of the more contentious normative arguments levelled
by deep ecologists against economic growth. Within the pluralist context
of modern societies appeals to the 'naturalness' or benefits of a green way
of life, 'simple in means, rich in ends', would not seem attractive from a
strategic or tactical point of view. Arguing that the dominant conception
of the 'good life' in these societies is both unsustainable, and is arguably

premised upon unjustified socio-economic inequalities, warrants equal if
not more attention than a critique inspired by a conviction that 'the search
for materialistic fulfilment is essentially self-defeating' [Porritt, 1984:
205]. It also merits more attention as a source of ideas, many of which are
relevant to the development of a green political economy.6 In this way a
means-based critique of growth is both normative, in terms of the
unjustified inequalities associated with economic growth nationally and
globally as well as across generations, and factuallmeans-based, in that it
utilises scientific language and arguments.7 But it is normative in a more
politically significant way than any ends-based critique.
Although deep ecology shares the general negative green reaction to
economic growth, deep ecologists have very different reasons from those
that most green politics and policies are premised upon. Whereas the
usual green critique of growth concerns the limits to the actual means to
that growth, that is the absolute finiteness of the earth and its assimilative
capacity, or the limited supply of low entropy [Georgescu-Roegen, 1971;
Dryzek, 1987:21], deep ecologists, and some other greens [Porritt, 1984:
205], base their critique on the ends or products of economic growth
[Barry, 1990: Ch.l; 1993]. This latter approach is largely a philosophi-
cally, and often spiritually, inspired critique of the materialism of modern
societies that economic growth propagates and depends upon, while the
former can be considered as a materialist critique. In other words, deep
ecology is not just concerned about the significance placed upon
economic growth but is more concerned with the values and moral status
of its products and processes. In short, even if continuous economic
growth were ecologically possible, deep ecology would not advocate it,
since for them it is undesirable that we should do so.
This ends-based critique, centred around the idea that what is 'natural'
is 'good' for humans, is regarded by Dobson as one of the definitive
features of green politics [1990:3] .8 The point here is that such ends-based
critiques are primarily metaphysical not political. At worst this comes
close to rendering the structural dimension of the political redundant, or
at best construes the nature of the political in a way that makes it difficult
to see how exactly it connects to political strategy and institutional
transformation. It also distracts attention from the means-based aspects
of the critique of growth as well as intrahuman-normative concerns of
distributive justice. This is not to deny the importance of prescriptive
imperatives within green political theory, but to argue that these must be
placed within a wider socio-economic perspective and context. And
within green political theory this wider perspective has to do with,
amongst other things, extending and deepening democratic practices,
restructuring the relationship between state and civil society, and creat-
ing a more egalitarian, humane and rational world.9
Ecoauthoritarianism
Although 'decentralisation, participatory democracy ... egalitarianism
... pacifism and internationalism' [Carter, 1993: 39], are commonly
thought of as central to green politics, there is a strand within green
thought that takes the ecological imperative, specifically the Limits
thesis, to very undemocratic conclusions. Theorists include Hardin [1968,
1977], Heilbroner [1980], Ophuls [1973,1977], and Ehrlich [1968,1971],
and some deep ecologists such as Abbey [1988], Foreman [1986] and
Goldsmith [1992]. What all these theorists share is the idea that the
ecological crisis is so bad that drastic action needs to be taken. The over-
riding imperative for these theorists ranges from the continued survival of
the human species, or of some favoured groups (Hardin and Abbey have
been criticised for being racist [Paehlke, 1989: 65-6; Bookchin, 1991:
123]), of 'wilderness', or 'Mother Earth'. Green politics as understood by
these theorists is associated with less not more democracy, or at best they
consider that the deepening and extension of democratic institutions and
norms is not an essential part of the green project.
Despite being depicted as a 'school' of green political thought, the
authoritarian strain can be more correctly regarded as a tendency within
green theory.10 It can be motivated by either ecocentric or anthro-
pocentric philosophical concerns, though it is usually tied to the latter. In
most discussions of this negative aspect of green politics the widespread
reach of the authoritarian possibility is obviated by associating it with a
few strongly human-centred theorists. The 'usual suspects' wheeled out
for compromising the progressive thrust of green politics include Ophuls,
Heilbroner, and Hardin, whom Eckersley claims make up the 'sur-
vivalist' school [1992:11-7], while for others they are 'eco-Hobbesians'
[Dryzek, 1987: Ch.8], But the coercive potential within the green vision is
not exhausted by this 'gang of three', as some commentators have shown
[Dobson, 1990:89-129]." An examination of this ecoauthoritarian possi-
bility brings out clearly, more than anything else, the tension inherent
within green theory between its ecological and social agendas [Saward,
1993]. Here 'ecological' can be understood either as the ecocentric goal of
deep ecology, or the articulation of 'ecological sustainability' indepen-
dent of other green political values. That is, ecoauthoritarianism can be
grounded on either strongly ecocentric concerns - aspects of the Earth
Firstl position being the clearest example - or strongly anthropocentric
grounds, as in Hardin and Ophuls. It is thus a possibility within green
politics that transcends the deep/shallow dichotomy. The prioritisation of

either of these interpretations of the 'ecology' pillar of green politics
[Capra and Spretnak, 1984: 30] highlights the potential within green
theory of its democratic aims being contingent rather than necessary
aspects.
Given the negative overtones associated with this tendency, it is
perhaps unsurprising that it is often simply passed over in descriptions of
green politics. The völkisch tradition within deep ecology that Vincent
discusses [1993: 266], can be understood as one expression of this
inclination within green politics, the tip of the iceberg, so to speak.
However, his discussion is limited to highlighting some historical antece-
dents of politics and practices inspired by a deep ecology vision, such as
aspects of German Nazism, and British high Toryism. However,
authoritarianism is not just an historical 'aberration' within the genealogy
of green politics, but constitutes a definite green theoretical perspective.12
A Critique of Bioregionalism: Deep Ecology as Politics

Here I wish to raise some questions about the place of bioregionalism
within the green political vista that both Young [1992] and Vincent [1993:
265] allude to. For Young, 'Bioregionalism ... is the idea of people living
in harmony with the land and the seasons. The natural world, the local
environment, then determines the political, economic, and social life of
each community' [1992:18; emphasis added]. Vincent outlines some of
the characteristics of bioregionalism, population size, geographical
location, 'dwelling in place', without examining its possible negative
aspects for human social relations [1993:265]. The latter is important in
that Vincent is typical of many green theorists and commentators who
regard green politics as primarily concerned with social-nature relations,
along the lines of Eckersley's statement of the logical priority of the latter
mentioned above. Even though bioregionalism envisages profound
changes within human society, its environmental impact seems to be the
principal criterion by which it is judged: 'Within such bioregion there is a
sustainable ecosystem where humans can "live in place" without damag-
ing their environment' [ibid.: 265].
Bioregionalism represents in some ways the fusion of ecological
Utopian literature and the idea, first put forward by Commoner as the
third law of ecology, namely, that 'nature knows best' [1972: 37-41].
Gaining inspiration as much from novels such as Huxley's Island [1962]
and, especially, Callenbach's Ecotopia [1978], 'pre-modern' peoples
[Goldsmith, 1992], and nonanthropocentrism, bioregionalism proposes
that human communities 'reinhabit' their local bioregion, the 'natural'
habitat or niche for human communities [Eckersley, 1992: 167\." Bio-

regional reinhabitation, however, does not necessarily imply that these
bioregions will be democratic or just. The idea that we can 'read off, in
Dobson's phrase [1990:123], human social and political structures from
nature is extremely problematic and has the potential for some very
reactionary conclusions. It allows the possibility that social practices or
political structures, no matter how reactionary and undemocratic, can be
legitimated by appealing to their grounding in nature, in terms of what is
'natural' for humans, or beneficial to non-humanity. The main objection
to this 'reading off hypothesis is that there are no convincing reasons why
we ought to do so. Even if a society constructed on the basis of 'elective
affinities', or 'graded continuities' with nature, were in most respects
what greens wanted, this does not justify accepting literally that 'nature
knows best'.14 It may know best with regard to human-nature interaction,
but it is difficult to sustain the argument that it also knows what is best for
intrahuman interaction.15
For Sale, one of the leading bioregional theorists, 'Political principles
on a bioregional scale are also [along with economic principles] grounded
in the dictates presented by nature,' [in Dobson (ed.), 1991:80; emphasis
added]. This statement in and of itself should be enough to cause one to
question seriously the premise upon which bioregionalism is based. That
is, can we and ought we to follow nature? By elevating diversity to the
position of an absolute social axiom, the bioregional vision may under-
mine the democratic thrust of green politics, as seen in Sale's honest
admission that:
Bioregional diversity means exactly that. It does not mean that

every region ... will construct itself upon the values of democracy,
equality, liberty, freedom, justice, and other such-like desiderata
... Bioregionalism, properly conceived, not merely tolerates but
thrives upon the diversities of human behaviour, and the varieties of
political and social arrangements those give rise to, even if at times
they may stem from the baser rather than the more noble motives.
In any case, there is no other way to have it [1984: 80-1].
Allowing these 'desiderata' to be optional extras of green politics, as Sale

seems to suggest, elides to some extent the division between bio-
regionalism and ecoauthoritarianism, although the former may not be
quite as dystopian. One conclusion that can draw from this brief discus-
sion is that bioregionalism should not be considered as a principle of the
sustainable society, but should rather as relating to the issue of scale.
Bioregionalism may be best thought of as one particular articulation of
Young's first principle of the sustainable society, namely decentralisation

[1992:18]:6
Bringing the State Back In

Between the centralising tendencies of ecoauthoritarianism and the
decentralist 'distemper' that seems to be an integral element of bio-
regional visions, lies the issue of the green attitude to the state. The
question of the state is often bypassed by deep greens in their rush to
found pastoral Utopias." The moot issue here concerns not just the
question of a 'green theory of the state', but more significantly the
possible development of a theory of the green state.
Raising the issue of the state brings to light just how confused many
greens are about it. Although generally feeling themselves drawn to
anarchistic critiques of, and alternatives to, the state (as Young notes) the
reality of what a sustainable society would actually involve often brings
them back to the necessity of a green state, or state-like institutions [1992:
20-1]. For both ecological and democratic reasons there is a prima facie
case to be made for a principled (as opposed to a strategic or temporary)
acceptance of the state within green politics. There is a parallel here with
the argument concerning the modified anthropocentrism that best
coheres with both a defensible green moral theory and green politics. Just
as Dobson holds that 'there is room for a (weak) form of anthropo-
centrism in respectable ecological statements' [1990: 65], in a similar
vein, one can posit that there is room (and increasing need) for a theory of
a (decentralised and democratised) state within green politics.
Contrary to common perception of green politics as being anarchistic,
it is possible to find positive, or at least agnostic, stances towards the
state. For example, Irvine and Ponton envisage a green state with
departments dealing with resource conservation and planning, land,
environmental protection and health [1988: 31]. The 1987 general elec-
tion manifesto of the British Green Party [16], along with Porritt [1984:
164-8], stresses the idea of 'appropriate scale': the recognition that
decisions and structures should take place and be created at the lowest
level possible. Sometimes, as with the environmental regulation and co-
ordination that most greens accept as necessary to ensure sustainability,
the state is the lowest possible level. This argument for a state, or for
state-like co-ordinating institutions is especially strong when one con-
siders the global dimensions of the ecological crisis, [Goodin, 1992:157-
63], or the redistributive policies necessary to ensure the egalitarianism
greens posit [Eckersley, 1992:175]. The charge of theoretical inconsis-
tency involved in moving from an initial 'anarchist solution' of small-
scale, self-sufficient, participatory and egalitarian communities, to one
represented by some notion of a green state, could be pre-empted if

greens came out clearly stating that the sustainable society would involve
some centralisation, and a continuing role for the state. Young is there-
fore quite right to cut through much of the green anarchist posturing and
argue that 'serious greens' are not demanding that there should be no
state [1992: 21].
If we accept that the state will be an integral part of the 'sustainable
society', and that the concept of a 'green state' is not a contradiction in
terms, then the central concern for green political theory becomes the
type of state consistent with green principles. It is more true to say that
the démocratisation rather than the abolition of the state typifies green
politics [Pepper, 1993:449, Barry, 1994a\. Perhaps the greatest challenge
facing green political theory is to flesh out in more detail what a green
state would look like. And if there is a role for it in the eventual goal of
green politics, it would seem highly anomalous for it not to have a role in
the achieving of that goal. Thus, in addressing the centrality of the state in
both its critique and formulating alternatives, obliging greens to re-think
their anti-state proclivities may stimulate the development of a green
theory of transition.18
II
The Normative Basis of Green Politics

One of the major problems with deep ecology vis-à-vis green political
theory is that at root it is more a metaphysical than a moral theory. And
by itself, such a metaphysical basis is insufficient to sustain green politics.
It claims too much and delivers too little. According to Mathews, 'Deep
ecology is concerned with the metaphysics of nature, and of the relation
of self to nature. Its sets up ecology as a model for the basic metaphysical
structure of the world' [in Fox, 1990:236]. Perhaps the clearest evidence
of what Dobson has called deep ecology's 'ontological turn' [1989:44], is
Naess's statement that 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm
interested in how we experience the world' [1989:20]. However, green
politics requires moral more than metaphysical grounding, otherwise it
stands in danger of simply being green spirituality by other means. For
example, Kelly's statement that 'Anyone who does not comprehend
within him- or herself this essential [holistic spiritual] unity cannot
achieve political change on a deep level and cannot strive for the ideals of
the greens' [in Porritt, 1984: 233; emphasis added] is, to say the least, a
rather narrow and problematic conception of green politics.19 There is no
prima facie reason why green politics (or philosophy) should adopt such a
spiritual and metaphysical commitment as central to its concerns, particu-

larly within the context of a post-metaphysical social world. In other
words, there needs to be a distinction between the normative and moral
basis of green politics on the one hand, and green spiritual or meta-
physical claims on the other. If the 're-enchantment of the world' is a
primary goal of green politics, then it is likely to be dismissed as an
incoherent protest against the rationalised world of modernity, without
seeing that it is, or ought to be, an immanent critique of the failed
potentials of modernity [Barry, 1993: 45-48].
Deep ecology's metaphysical character is difficult to reconcile with the
political-normative ends of green politics. Construing deep ecology as the
true green position assumes that only green politics that expresses a
spiritual component is 'really' green. It is arguably this spiritual dimen-
sion that leads Dobson to comment that 'Greens believe that lives in the
growth economy will tend away from the elegant and towards the grubby
and materialistic' [1990: 88]. This type of 'greener than thou' position
severely and unnecessarily restricts the meaning and scope of green
politics, as well as perpetuating the disjunction between its moral and
political dimensions. The reason for this misgiving about green politics
resting on deep ecology's metaphysics is that, unlike moral claims, there
is less room for the essentially social dimension of morality within
metaphysical approaches. Within a deep ecology perspective the
relationship between humans and nature is either presented as an undif-
ferentiated, ahistorical 'humanity', relating to an equally undifferen-
tiated, ahistorical 'nature', or the lone, sick, immature ego undergoing a
therapeutic transformation through 'wilderness experience' to emerge as
the healthy, mature, 'ecological self [Mathews, 1991; Zimmerman,
1992]. The social, the intersubjective, these intermediate categories
between the species and the individual are conspicuous by their absence.20
Yet it is at this social level that green politics operates as a normative
theory about how we organise the political and economic conditions of
our common life, including ecological conditions. In other words, the
political-normative character of green politics requires a social rather
than a subjective (self/nature) or objective (species/nature) normative
basis. That is, a focus on moral praxis, which is coterminous with political
activity, rather than metaphysical contemplation.21
Green politics is about nature, its moral status, and ecological sus-
tainability, but it is also about egalitarianism, justice, decentralisation,
and participatory democracy, amongst other things. The normative basis
of green political theory includes a concern with the freedom and
(relative) autonomy of humans as much as extending moral considera-
tions to regulating society-nature exchanges. It is the concern with human
freedom and autonomy that grounds the green commitment to distribu-

tive justice, participatory democracy and egalitarianism, a concern with
the social embeddedness of the individual that motivates its desire for
community. This two-fold nature of the normative basis of green political
discourse can only be adequately captured under the category of the
moral rather than the metaphysical - through demonstrating how the
practice of morality can contextualise the human moral situation through
the discursive process of arguing the relative as opposed to the absolute
autonomy of humans, and through demonstrating also that the moral
community of which the individual is a part extends beyond the human
species. It is not just that 'the politics of ecology does not follow the same
ground rules as its philosophy', as Dobson remarks [1990: 68], but that
the metaphysical and spiritual substance of this philosophical dimension
crowds out the less esoteric and more mundane task of translating green
ideas into political practice, due to its failure to connect the ecocentric
agenda to the intrahuman socio-political claims of green politics. One
way of putting this would be that deep ecology may result in the
undermining of green politics by green metaphysics.
Appealing to 'naturalness' of particular social practices and norms
does not obviate justifying these practices in terms of (human) intersub-
jective moral and political discourse - that is, bracketing the relationship
between human society and the non-human world. Contra bio-
regionalism, the authority of nature is not the final or most appropriate
arbiter in determining how we ought to live and organise our common
life, but the green point is that we dismiss it out of hand at our peril. To
repeat: democracy, egalitarianism, and freedom do not need to be 'read
off from nature for greens to endorse them. Although observing
relations within the non-human world may yield 'technical' examples of
how to interact materially with the environment, there are no moral or
political readings of natural interaction that cannot be accused of
ideological bias. Nature may reveal, through being interpreted by
science, certain knowledge about ecological sustainability, or carrying
capacity, but even this knowledge must be reinterpreted in the light of
human interests, which are socially and historically specific. This human-
social dimension is the primary context for the elaboration of intrahuman
moral and political principles. Although 'nature' cannot, without
distortion, be banished from the human moral sphere - that is, our moral
discourse must be consonant with what we are as human beings with a
particular nature - non-human nature gives us no determinate prescrip-
tions about how we ought to live, despite the attempts of some deep
ecologists and bioregionalists to argue otherwise [Sale, 1984]. The
'nature' of primary significance to intrahuman moral concerns is 'human
nature', rather than the deduction of ethical imperatives from the non-
human world.22
This reading of 'human nature' back into moral and political discourse,
highlighting the finite, dependent and contextualised character of the
human moral agent is, as some eco-feminists have argued, an essential
step in the transcendence of the ideological separation of the public and
the private which is, they remind us, simply a gendered articulation of the
split between 'culture' and 'nature' [Mellor, 1992: Ch 2]. Of course, as
argued below, this does not mean that the 'moral' is co-extensive with the
'human'; the non-human can, and ought to be, included within the scope
of moral reasoning. A practical as opposed to a contemplative approach
to our non-material relations with the natural world has a number of
advantages. On the one hand, it would demonstrate the range of human
interests in the world and the fact that some aspects of our environment
are already included in the moral sphere, animal welfare receiving some
measure of legal protection being a prominent example. On the other
hand, it is up-front about the fact that we cannot expect all of nature to be
included within the class of morally considerable entities, partly because
what is distinctive about human culture is the particular ways in which we
interact with our environment. Cultural diversity is thus premised on the
legitimacy of different cultural-moral valuations of the natural world and
its entities. A universal or global moral position on human-nature
relations does great violence to the multiplicity of human interests,
practices and articulations of what it means to be 'human-in-society-in-
environment', the latter being one way of stating the subject-matter of
green political theory.
Although in many other respects Vincent's [1993] typology of political
ecology is comprehensive, there is little analysis of its democratic or social
values and claims. The four 'broad themes', which he concludes
constitute the common grounds of ecology, are notable for the absence of
any specifically intrahuman content. His themes are: the interdepen-
dence of species and environment; a positive attitude to nature;
scepticism about the supreme position of humans on the planet; and
anxiety about what industrial civilisation is doing to the planet [1993:
270]. They refer to the existential relationship between culture and
nature, not to the question of the internal political and economic
organisation of human society. The philosophical question of how 'we'
(in an abstract, universal sense) ought to live within the world is
prioritised over how 'we' (in a concrete, historical sense) ought to live
with each other in relation to, and within the context of, that world.23 The
strongest argument against deep ecology is that there is no universal,
transcendental principle or pattern by which we can judge relations
between humans and non-humans. This is all the more damaging for
green political theory if we accept that the root of the problematic
relationship between our species and nature lies not with an undifferen-
tiated, ahistorical 'humanity', but within human society. To cast the
problem in terms of the humanity/nature dichotomy leads one to focus on
effects rather than causes. As C.S. Lewis once said 'Man's power over
nature often turns out to be a power exerted by some men over other men
with nature as its instrument'. Our species' relationship with the planet
cannot be fully understood without seeing that it takes many forms,
particular variations on a universal theme, which exhibit our social
relationships. Humans do not interact with an undifferentiated world that
can be assigned an undifferentiated value and significance independently
of our historical relationship to that world, and neither is it an
undifferentiated 'humanity' that interacts with that world.
Deep ecology adopts a contemplative attitude towards nature rather
than beginning from a practical, that is, material relationship between
humans and the rest of the world. A typical instance is Devall who notes
that:
In some publications I have seen supporters of deep ecology called
the 'quiet people'. I consider this an honorific title. In silence is the
beginning of ecosophy. In silence we can begin to listen and thus be
more receptive to that which is [1990: 111].
It is perhaps this profoundly philosophical 'openness to Being', to use
Heideggerian terminology, that accounts for both deep ecology's holistic,
ecosystemic and planetary perspective, as well as its tendency to grade
into the cosmological and the spiritual and metaphysical. The latter offer
little practical moral guidance to concrete action in the world. They are
meta-ethical, yet Green political theory needs a moral basis to moralise
how we live in and with our environment, more than injunctions about
authentic 'being in the world'. Deep ecology's ontology does not have a
place within it to encompass the ontological character or nature of human
beings as transformers and active agents in, of, and on the world. It is by
virtue of being socially active agents that the human moral order can arise
from and within the order of nature. Morality cannot be contemplative,
but is above all else a practical matter, an expression of human praxis, one
that is flexible in the face of contingent events, neither timeless nor
transcendental. In short, deep ecology in its reverence for nature is firstly
a reverence for an 'idea of nature', and secondly this idea of nature is
nature viewed under the aspect of eternity, rather than history [Barry,
1994b]. And one consequence of a historical-moral perspective is that the
flexibility mentioned above should be understood in terms of extending
moral reasoning and the moral community, rather than searching for a
'new ethic' [Passmore, 1980: 40].
Beyond the Anthropocentric-Ecocentric Divide
For Fox, 'The term deep ecology can therefore be seen as one that does a
double duty, referring on the one hand to a whole class of approaches
(that is, all nonanthropocentric approaches) and on the other to a
particular kind of approach within this class' [1990:75]. This definition of
deep ecology can be criticised as there are many ecophilosophers who
subscribe to nonanthropocentrism and yet do not consider themselves
deep ecologists, such as Rolston [1982,1988], Callicott [1982] and Taylor
[1986], as well as animal rights theorists such as Singer [7975] and Regan
[29&?j. Deep ecology is co-extensive neither with nonanthropocentric
approaches to moral theory in particular, nor green moral philosophy in
general.
To be green does not involve a commitment to ecocentrism, but it does
require a critical attitude to anthropocentrism. This is largely because the
latter is an ineliminable aspect of any political theory, and the
instrumental valuation and use of the non-human world is part of the
'human condition'. This is not a 'trivial' sense of the term in that
everything we as humans see and do must be anthropocentric, that
Dobson [1990: 62-72] and Fox [1990: 20-1] allude to. It delimits the
parameters of any normative political theory, including green theory.
Formulating an 'ethics of use' is one way to create a moral context within
which human agents interact with the world. Distinguishing between
human-based and human-centred within anthropocentrism offers a
possible way of decreasing the dissonance between it and ecocentrism.
Whereas we cannot but construe our relationship to nature in human
terms, language, and reasons, this does not mean that this relationship
must reduce to purely human interests, or that these human interests
must be purely instrumental-material. It does mean however, that those
who argue for a qualitatively different conception of social-environment
affairs cannot avoid providing reasons to justify their claims. And it is on
these reasons that the strength of the green moral argument depends.
Intuition, upon which deep ecology in large measure rests, is simply
insufficient to ground green politics normatively.
A general feature of most deep ecology theories is that a prima facie
ecocentrism often shades into a pragmatic anthropocentrism. For
example, the dropping of 'biospherical egalitarianism-in principle'
[Naess, 1973: 96], can be cast in terms of an acceptance of an
anthropocentrism that goes beyond the trivial or weak sense mentioned
above. In admitting that 'in situations of genuine value conflict, justice is
better served by not subscribing to the view of ecological egalitarianism'

because 'cows do scream louder than carrots' [1984: 199-200], Fox
explicitly makes human agents the distributors (if not the creators) of
value in the non-human world. If we understand morality to be a human
practice, then moralising our exchange with nature will involve accepting
an axiological hierarchy of the world. This expresses an attitude that can
act as a bridge between the anthropocentric and the ecocentric. What
deep ecology often amounts to is ecocentrism in theory, but reconstituted
anthropocentrism in practice, as Vincent notes [1993: 251]}* In short,
though greens may endorse the deep ecology critique of the 'arrogance of
humanism' [Ehrenfeld, 1980], it is the attitude rather than the perspective
that ought to be their target.25 Normatively what green politics stands in
need of is the articulation of the full range of human interests in the non-
human world from within, rather than from without, the anthropocentric
position. That these interests can range from the crudely materialist to
the aesthetic and moral as Pepper [7995] points out, is the most
appropriate normative basis for a viable and coherent green politics. In
terms of the practical effects on social-nature exchanges, and the
protection of parts of the non-human world, as anthropocentrism moves
in the direction of integrating the aesthetic, non-material use of nature
with a moralised material-instrumental use, there may be little practical
difference between such a reconstituted, enlightened anthropocentrism
and the aims of ecocentrism.26
Conclusion: Forty Shades of Green?

The dominance of the deep/shallow dichotomy graphically illustrates the
continuing belief that only a rejection of anthropocentrism can guarantee
the type of change greens envisage - that is, suffices as the normative
basis of green politics. Critically questioning this dualism is both a starting
point for a more accurate overview of the variety of green political
positions and also constitutes a basis upon which a coherent and critical
green political theory can be developed. The original deployment of the
deep/shallow division was motivated by a desire to inscribe a line within
political ecology between authentic and deviant forms. However, its
recent development and the proliferation of different green positions has
meant that in understanding green politics this dichotomy is of limited
utility. In the first instance this requires recognising the legitimacy,
strength and flexibility of anthropocentrism as the actual, practical moral
basis of green political theory. One cannot be neutral in choosing what is
and what is not an expression, policy or tendency of 'green' as opposed to
some other politics. The border between conceptualising green politics
and offering particular conceptions is very porous indeed. In this respect,

as both Young [1992] and Vincent [1993] point out, green political theory
is no different from other political theories.
Although categorisations and genealogies of green politics are
important, one must be aware of the dangers of a strict compartmentalist
approach. To describe green politics is at the same time, either implicitly
or explicitly, to prescribe a particular understanding for green politics.
However, this does not mean we cannot 'map out' the green political
landscape, or conceptualise green politics. In the debate between
competing conceptions of green politics we may expect both the character
and the dimensions of green political theory, that is, the full range of the
concept of green politics, to emerge.
NOTES
1. For example, the subdivision of deep ecology into four, namely deep ecology, eco-
conscious, eco-sensibility, and religious/Buddhist approaches [Vincent, 1993:256-57] is
rather artificial. They are all, properly speaking, tendencies within deep ecology,
simply different means to the same substantive ends such as the 'ecological self', self-
realisation, and the priority of ontology and metaphysics over axiology and morality.
Similarly, at the eco-political level the separation of the deep position into Earth First!,
ecofascists, ecoright, ecofeminists and bioregionalism [ibid.: 264-7] can be criticised.
First, there is little substantive theoretical (as opposed to historical) difference between
ecoright and ecofascists. Both are examples of ecoauthoritarian theories, discussed
below, and are usually premised on strong anthropocentric assumptions, not ecocentric
ones. Earth First! adopts the bioregional perspective, particularly the latter's goal of
'reinhabiting the land'. Ecofeminism, which itself is a broad church with many, often
incompatible positions [see Mellor, 1992], is particularly problematic as a deep
ecopolitics. Not only is it more an ecophilosophy that defies categorisation, but in so far
as it makes political claims, they are more likely to be closer to ecosocialism than to
deep ecology [Mellor, 1992: Ch.3]. Thus the five-fold typology of deep ecopolitics can
be reduced to ecoauthoritarianism and bioregionalism. His claim that 'there is a fairly
close correlation between deep philosophers and deep political practitioners' [ibid.:
267], only holds for bioregionalism, which should be considered as the political
expression of deep ecology. One way to avoid this category mistake would be to view
these ecoauthoritarians as a non-ecosocialist version of his ecological 'statism' [ibid.:
268]. A final point is that Vincent's distinction within ecosocialism between statist and
pluralist forms [ibid.: 268], seems to present these as incompatible, whereas most
ecosocialists see an immanent connection between pluralism, a vibrant civil society and
a democratised and decentralised state [Dryzek, 1990; Pepper, 1993].
2. Pepper misrepresents Eckersley's position to a large extent by claiming that for her 'the
general principle of biological egalitarianism... effectively "takes care" of all concerns
of social justice' [1993: 438]. If this is true, why does she put forward an argument for
the retention of the state on the grounds that 'insisting too emphatically on
decentralisation ... and direct democracy can ... compromise the ecocentric goal of
social justice' [7992: 175]? 'Biospheric egalitarianism' was always a prima facie attitude
of respect for nature not intended as a literal regulative principle [Naess, 1973:95], and
it was never intended to be extended to the intrahuman sphere.
3. As other green economists, such as Pearce [1989], have argued, modern economics is
premised on the idea that nature's products and services are free, in that there are
unproduced, which gives the impression that the human economy can 'free ride', as it
were, on the economy of nature.
4. This could also characterise some global analyses of the interaction between economy
and ecology [Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980;
World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987].
5. Perhaps the strongest objections that can be levelled at the Club of Rome's study is the
'eco-doomsaying' and futurology it bequeathed to the green movement, and how the
ensuing public dispute over its methodological weaknesses detracted from its
underlying thesis. For Dobson 'A principle role of green politics has been to point out to
us that every silver lining has a cloud, and the clouds are gathering' [1991: 7]. However,
for some this neo-Malthusianism has been responsible for much of the political
impotence of the green movement. According to Paehlke, 'The Malthusian perspective
is neither necessary nor helpful in engendering positive change. An environmental
perspective and policies must seek to create a preferable world,' [1989: 55]. A fuller
analysis would have to focus on the recent shift within green theory to the idea of
'sustainable development', and how this, rather than the Limits-type argument more
accurately captures green macroeconomic concerns. From a public-policy point of view
sustainable development has more advantages in terms of being positive, where
original green arguments were negative. Some commentators have argued for the
compatibility of economic growth with green values [Goodin, 1992: 99-105].
6. Lauber's argument that 'The main motivation for growth ... is not the pursuit of
material gratification by the masses, but the pursuit of power by elites' [1978: 200], is a
good example of the type of critical analysis that greens need to engage in.
7. Although beyond the scope of this present article, there are good grounds for thinking
that this type of political economy argument is sufficiently flexible to comport with
critiques of material growth from moral concerns regarding our interaction with the
non-human world. That is, it is normative in two senses, the first relating to intrahuman
concerns, the other with social-environment relations.
8. It is worth noting that recent deep ecology thinking, particularly around the concept of
the 'ecological self' [Naess, 1989; Mathews, 1991; Fox, 1990], makes very strong claims
about human psychological development. In claiming that the ecological crisis is due to
an inadequate identification with non-human nature, and positing the ecological self or
'Big Self', as a solution, deep ecology is not just positing a particular view of the good,
but stipulating the 'correct' or 'natural' path for human moral development. The deep
ecology argument seems to be that the ecological crisis is a collective 'pathology' due to
an 'immature' conception of the self.
9. Pepper's argument of the 'latent anti-humanism' within 'ecologism', citing Weston that
it is biased towards 'hedgerows, butterflies and bunny rabbits' [1993: 437], is as unfair as
it is polemical.
10. Ecoauthoritarianism ghosts green politics, and can take many forms as noted by
O'Riordan, namely, a 'new global order', 'centralised authoritarianism', or
'authoritarian communalism' [1981: 303-7].
11. This latent authoritarianism most frequently exhibits itself when greens discuss the
question of population, as Paehlke's critique of 'neo-Malthusianism' demonstrates
[1989: 55-75]. This is also the case within deep ecology positions. For example, Earth
First! published an article on AIDS by a Miss Ann Thropy (claimed by some to be
Christopher Manes [Bookchin, 1991: 123]), in which the author stated 'To paraphrase
Voltaire: if the AIDS epidemic did not exist, radical environmentalists would have to
invent one' [ibid.: 123].
12. A full examination of the ecoauthoritarian impulse would need to take account of its
roots in the romantic (often expressing an aristocratic disposition) backlash against
'modernity' in general, and the industrial revolution in particular.
13. One way to understand the bioregional position is to see it as a the most recent
manifestation of the 'back to the land' argument which has figured prominently within
the historical development of ecological theory and practice. For example, according to
Gould, in the closing decades of the last century, there was an upsurge in this type of
political struggle, which represented an early green critique of capitalism, [1988: Chs. 6
& 7]. It has surfaced periodically throughout this century and is strongly associated with
previous manifestations of ecological political thought and action, in the interwar years
[Bramwell, 1989: 104-161; Vincent, 1993: 266], and the 1960s counter-culture
movements [Bookchin, 1971; Roszak, 1970].
14. We can discern two versions of this 'reading off hypothesis. A benign one would be that
suggested by Eckersley's prioritisation of resolving our place in nature over particular
human social arrangements. Here, once we answer the former we can (re)construct the
latter consonant with it. A less benign reading is the more familiar one of literally taking
the regulative principles of the non-human world and applying them to human social
organisation. Vincent's discussion of Bookchin is illustrative of the latter. According to
Vincent, Bookchin's anarchism is grounded in his belief that 'Nature is ... intrinsically
anarchic' [1993: 269]. However, unlike bioregionalists, Bookchin sometimes distances
himself from the 'reading off argument. For example, he has emphasised that 'Social
ecology, while viewing nature as a ground for an ethics of freedom and individuation,
does not see an inexorable "lawfulness" at work that derives the human from the non-
human or society from nature' [1986: 13; emphasis added]. On this issue, as on others,
Bookchin's ambiguity seems to shade into contradiction.
15. This relates to the distinction and relationship between 'culture' and 'nature'. Although
greens are keen to stress the commonalities humanity shares with the non human world,
it is the distinctiveness of human social life that allows a moral recognition of these
commonalities. Human culture is not 'unnatural' or outside the order of nature if we
regard humans as naturally cultured creatures, and if we see culture as a differentiation
within rather than a separation from nature [Kovel, 1988]. Bookchin's idea of human
culture as 'second nature' is a useful starting point for a green debate on the relationship
between culture and nature [1986].
16. Along these lines, one could reinterpret the bioregional position as arguing that for
certain ecological problems, the most appropriate human constituency for decision-
making is often given by a bioregion or watershed. In other words. bioregionalism does
not mean that nature determines human 'social life', but rather that ecological
conceptions of territory ought to be taken into account in deciding the particular demos
affected by a particular environmental problem. In terms of the international
dimensions of ecological problems, dealing with them democratically implies that green
politics be problem-sensitive but boundary-indifferent [Barry, 1994a].
17. An ecocentric exception is Eckersley [1992: 170-86]. For an overview of the issues, see
Dobson [1990: 122-29], Goodin [7992: 146-68], and Frankel [1987].
18. Two possible elements of such a theory are the recent debates around 'ecological
modernisation' [Weale, 1992], and whether this can be integrated with a green political
economy, which takes into account the fact that although ecological problems are often
borne by a majority (both human and non-human), only a minority (of humans) enjoy
the benefits of the particular use of nature that results in the degradation of the
ecological commons.
19. Further evidence of the metaphysical character of deep ecology can be found in Devall
and Sessions [1985: 194], Zimmerman [1992], DeChappelle [1992]. This may account
for the common perception that within deep ecology the personal [subjective] is more
important than the political [intersubjective]. A striking instance of this is the statement
that from a deep green perspective, 'The proper territory for action is the psyche rather
than the parliamentary chamber' [Dobson, 1990: 143]. One interpretation of the recent
psychological turn of deep ecology and its concern with ecological consciousness and
the 'ecological self [Mathews, 1991; Fox, 1990] is that it constitutes a logical extension
of a central conviction of deep ecology; namely, that if you cannot change the world,
change yourself.
20. The one consistent intersubjective practice that some deep ecologists allude to is the
importance of ritual in 're-connecting' humans to the world [Zimmerman, 1992; De
Chapelle, 1992; Seed, 1988]. And though we can cast politics and political activity, as
normally understood, as ritual, it is ritual of a completely different (epistemic, moral)
nature to that proposed by deep ecology. This connection between politics and ritual
may be a useful way of analysing the political activity of so-called 'New Age travellers'
in their struggle against the government and its rural road-building programme.
21. Political theories with strong metaphysical bases seem to have a tendency to become
dogmatic ideologies. In this sense there may be a link between aspects of eco-
authoritarianism and a metaphysical or religious green perspective. This connection
between metaphysics and authoritarianism is of course not limited to green politics, as
the examples of political-religious fundamentalism from Iran to America demonstrate.
22. The 'ethical naturalism' of green theory is worth noting. The normative claims of green
politics can be understood as reasserting both the moral considerability of the non-
human world as well as reminding us that we too are animals with a particular nature.
Our 'autonomy' upon which so much post-Kantian ethical theory is premised is relative
for greens, that is grounded and contextualised within the 'givens' of our
'heteronomous' nature. See Midgley [1983] and Hampshire [1989], Hayward [1992]
and Benton [1995] for further reading.
23. It must be remembered that the natural world is a socially constructed one, as Pepper
points out [1993: 442]. Epistemologically, humans cannot relate to nature 'in itself, or
any 'Ding an sich', of nature or anything else, as Kant pointed out. Humans can only
know something from their perspective. Even an ecocentric view of the world is a
particular human understanding of the world from this perspective, not in-itself. Here
green politics is perhaps insufficiently sensitive to the distinction between 'environ-
ment' and 'nature' in how humans relate to the external world. Although commonly
assumed to be synonymous, the concepts of 'nature' and 'environment' are not
interchangeable. The latter can be understood as the 'environment is where you live',
that is, the complete and interconnected ensemble of milieux within which humans
exist, whereas 'nature' is a particular milieu, that not created by humans. Using
'environment' in this sense may be a way to construct a continuum from urban, working
and global ecosystemic environments, thereby connecting the concerns of eco-socialists
and greens [Pepper, 1993: 437]. In other words, the 'environment' unlike 'nature' can
encompass both the human and non-human aspects of what we often mean by
'environment'.
24. This retreat to axiological hierarchy when faced with the practical interaction of human
and non-humans is not confined to deep ecology [Fox, 1990: 182], but can be found in
other non-anthropocentric green theories. For example, although professing a
'biocentric' approach, Taylor concurs with Fox stating that 'When there is a choice
between killing plants and killing animals, it will be less wrong to kill plants if animals
are made to suffer when they are taken for food' [1986: 295].
25. For some greens there may be a residual 'arrogance' within Pepper's eco-socialist
humanism, when he states that 'nature [is] our own creation' [1993: 443], without
specifying whether this relates to the [implied] Marxian project of the 'humanisation of
nature', or the social construction of nature-for-humans discussed above, footnote 23.
Here we need to distinguish the epistemological and the ontological aspects of 'nature-
in-itself'. Whereas epistemologically humans can never discover nature-in-itself
[perhaps poetry comes closest to the 'disclosure of Being', as Heidegger concluded], the
ontological existence of nature-in-itself is an indisputable fact, as Pepper notes 'nature
is not 'a projection of ... human ... consciousness or will' [ibid.: 442]. Whether this
ontological status of nature confirms it as a 'value-in-itself is more problematic and is at
the heart of environmental ethics, given that it implies the transformation of an 'is' into
an 'ought' in a rather radical manner. Accepting this line of argument seems to imply
that value can exist independently of a human valuer, but since it is accepted by both
ecocentrics and anthropocentrics that only humans create the moral sphere, the status
of this 'value' is indeterminate. In other words, given that only with the arrival of
humans does the moral sphere come into being, how can this intrinsic value of nature
which preceded the latter be interpreted as a moral value?
26. Putting it very crudely, from the whale's point of view it does not matter why we protect
it, the important thing is that it is protected. However, from a human and political point
of view, anthropocentrism rather than ecocentrism is a more convincing form of moral

reasoning.
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BARRY - The Limits of The Shallow and The Deep

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Environmental Politics

ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fenp20

The limits of the shallow and the deep: Green

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Two recent articles in Environmental Politics dealing with the classifica-

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Hidden Dimensions of Green Politics

Critiques of Growth: Towards a Green Political Economy?

'Interesting though these sociological and economic views are they

resources, industrial production, and pollution,' [Meadows et al., 1972:

of the 'good life' in these societies is both unsustainable, and is arguably

politics that transcends the deep/shallow dichotomy. The prioritisation of

A Critique of Bioregionalism: Deep Ecology as Politics

habitat or niche for human communities [Eckersley, 1992: 167\." Bio-

Bioregional diversity means exactly that. It does not mean that

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Young's first principle of the sustainable society, namely decentralisation

Bringing the State Back In

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The Normative Basis of Green Politics

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of view, anthropocentrism rather than ecocentrism is a more convincing form of moral

Mathews, F. (1991), The Ecological Self, London: Routledge.

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