ETHICS - Consolidated Case Digests 2014-June 2016

LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS 2014 - June 2016
LEGAL ETHICS
PRACTICE OF LAW
ALVIN S. FELICIANO vs. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA

A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
It is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband and actively
participated in the proceedings therein within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this
Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will
always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members
of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the
Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings,
it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
Facts:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution suspending Atty.
Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.
However, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled “Edilberto
Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified
true copies of the minutes of the hearings, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the
counsels, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted
direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the
Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the
rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good
faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a
victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to
give him legal assistance.
The Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her
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suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended
the disbarment of Atty. Lozada. However, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors finding Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending
the his disbarment should be adopted.
Ruling:
The Court adopts the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no
doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf
of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and
cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would
disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-
July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was
suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the
very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty.
Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively
participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension,
she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time
she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed
to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if
she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her
husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she
is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and
extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering
that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence,
she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness of her penalty.
Thus, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rulesof Court, and is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
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SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA ESTAQUIO vs. ATTY. EDGAR R.

NAVALES
A.C. No. 10465, 8 June 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As
such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
FACTS:
Complainant spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria Estaquio are the owners of the
apartment leased to respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales. During the term of said lease, respondent
failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and was requested to vacate
the leased premises. However, despite the repeated oral and written demands of the
complainants, respondent failed to vacate the leased premises. This prompted the complainant to
refer the matter to barangay conciliation, wherein the parties amicably agreed that respondent
will pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on 16 July 2009 and vacate the leased premises
on 31 July 2009. Respondent, however, reneged on his obligations.
In light of the foregoing, complainants filed a Complaint before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which ruled in its Resolution dated 15
September 20 to suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months. This
Resolution became final and executory on 16 October 2015.
Despite respondent’s suspension from the practice of law, it was later discovered that
respondent has been appearing before the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, as an Assistant City
Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator
(“OCA”) indorsed the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for appropriate action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held liable for continuing to act as an Assistance City
Prosecutor despite the Court’s resolution suspending him from the practice of law.
RULING:
Respondent is liable for failing to comply with the Court’s resolution
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority
to practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
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application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing
acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In the instant case, the OBC pointed out that the Court's Resolution dated 15 September
2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final
and executory on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have already commenced serving his
six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the suspension order against him
as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as
evidenced by the Certification issued by the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up
to the present.
Verily, a plain reading of Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071 shows that the
government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice
law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law
and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension against him.
MOAMAR PANGANDAG vs. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1877, 8 June 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
Complainant Moamar Pangandag was criminally charged with grave threats for allegedly
threatening to commit the crime of murder against a certain Monaoray "Nahara" Abdullah and
her companions. The Information was filed before the sala of Presiding Judge Abinal of the
Mulondo, Maguing, Lumba-Bayabao, and Taraka MCTC in Lanao del Sur. Upon finding the
existence of probable cause, he issued a warrant of arrest against Pangandag and two others.
However, 15 days later, Judge Abinal voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the case because
of his relationship to Abdullah, who was his niece. The case was eventually transferred to the
presiding judge of the Marawi City MTCC.3 The criminal complaint was later on dismissed in light
of the prosecution's Motion to Withdraw Information based on the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the private complainant.
Pangandag is now before this Court to complain against the actions of Judge Abinal. He
insists that the MCTC did not have jurisdiction over the case, since the crime he was charged with
carried the penalty of reclusion temporal, a prison term that exceeded six years. Further, it is
argued that Judge Abinal should have disqualified himself from hearing the case in light of his
relationship to the private complainant, who was his third-degree relative by consanguinity.
In his Comment, Judge Abinal explained that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the criminal case, since the Information did not contain any allegation that the accused
demanded money or imposed a condition. Because of the absence of this assertion, he was of the
opinion that Pangandag was only being charged with the second form of grave threats, which
merely carried the penalty of arresto mayor. With regard to the second issue, while Judge Abinal
admits that private complainant was indeed his niece, he stresses that this relationship was the
reason why he voluntarily inhibited from the case immediately after issuing the warrant. He
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argues that he did not have to inhibit himself from deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest,
as it was his ministerial duty to do so.
ISSUE:
RULING:
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA ESTAQUIO vs. ATTY. EDGAR R.

NAVALES
A.C. No. 10465, 8 June 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
Complainant spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria Estaquio are the owners of the
apartment leased to respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales. During the term of said lease, respondent
failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and was requested to vacate
the leased premises. However, despite the repeated oral and written demands of the
complainants, respondent failed to vacate the leased premises. This prompted the complainant to
refer the matter to barangay conciliation, wherein the parties amicably agreed that respondent
will pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on 16 July 2009 and vacate the leased premises
on 31 July 2009. Respondent, however, reneged on his obligations.
In light of the foregoing, complainants filed a Complaint before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which ruled in its Resolution dated 15
September 20 to suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months. This
Resolution became final and executory on 16 October 2015.
Despite respondent’s suspension from the practice of law, it was later discovered that
respondent has been appearing before the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, as an Assistant City
Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator
(“OCA”) indorsed the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for appropriate action.
Issue:
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Ruling:
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority
to practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing
acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In the instant case, the OBC pointed out that the Court's Resolution dated 15 September
2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final
and executory on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have already commenced serving his
six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the suspension order against him
as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as
evidenced by the Certification issued by the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up
to the present.
Verily, a plain reading of Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071 shows that the
government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice
law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law
and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension against him.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo
(both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa,
Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo vs. Atty.
Victorino T. Lacaya
G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014
J. Brion
As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own
account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a
portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The rule of the profession that
forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for
conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an
interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to
"acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest
in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his
client’s cause."
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Facts:
The petitioners and respondent entered into a contract with the following stipulation: “That due
to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if
they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for
attorney’s fees.”
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in the contract is valid
Ruling:
This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common
law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.The doctrine of maintenance was
directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the
intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification
or excuse."Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the
proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler."Some common law court decisions, however, add a
second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his
own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of
assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that
such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for
which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."
"In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance
were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed,
striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on
the grounds of public policy."
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations. As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct
the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and
to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The rule of
the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in
litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the
lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to
enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him
to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might
take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."
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Edgardo Areola Vs. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza

A.C. No. 10135. January 15, 2014
J. Reyes
The conduct of a lawyer ought and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by lawyer, even pursuant to his
client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Areola in behalf of his co-detainees against Atty.
Maria Vilma Mendoa for alleged violation of her attorney’s oath of office and violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility. The complaint stated that during respondent’s lecture, she stated the
following:
“O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.”
The complaint also alleged that respondent demanded money from Areola’s co-detainees.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements made my respondent during her speech renders her unfit to be a
member of the Bar
Ruling:
The Court finds that the complaint lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. Furthermore, Areola is not the proper party to file the complaint since he himself is not a
client of Atty. Mendoza and no document was submitted to show that he was authorized to file
the complaint. However, the remarks made by respondent during her speech though
inappropriate and unbecoming, her remark is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause
dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. The complained filed by Areola is baseless and was only
given consideration due to respondent’s own admission.
Atty. Emmanuel Agustin et al. vs. Alejandro Cruz-Herrera

G.R. No. 174564. February 12, 2014
J. Reyes
A lawyer’s claim for his unpaid attorney’s fees cannot nullify a joint compromise agreement
entered into between the party-litigants. A compromise agreement is binding only between its
privies and could not affect the rights of persons who were not parties to the agreement. However, as
the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the payment of the
lawyer’s adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by reason of the
settlement.
Page 8 of 370
Facts:
The complainants were assemblers and line leaders assigned at the production department of
Podden. By reason of the Podden’s financial reverses, the complainants were terminated from
their employment. However, upon verification with the DOLE, no such report of financial
reverses or even retrenchment was filed. This prompted the complainants to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal, monetary claims and damages against Podden and Herrera. Atty. Augstin
handled the case and had a verbal agreement with the complainants that he will be paid on a
contingency basis at the rate of 10% of the final monetary award or such amount of attorney’s fees
that will be finally determined.
After the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the complainants obtained a favorable ruling.
Since no appeal was taken from the judgment, a motion for execution was filed. Later on, Herrera
filed a Manifestation and Motion to deny issuance of the writ stating, among others, that nine of
the eleven employees have executed Waivers and Quitclaims rendering any execution of the
judgment inequitable. Atty. Agustin opposed the motion and claimed that the alleged Waivers
and Quitclaims were part of a scheme adopted by Podden to evade its liability and defraud the
complainants. In resolving the conflict, the LA issued its Order denying the motion for the
issuance of the writ of execution and sustained as valid the Waivers and Quitclaims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA Order and declared the quitclaims invalid based on the
unconscionably low amount received by each of the complainants. After the denial of the motion
for reconsideration, Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. During the pendency of
the petition, a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the CA. Finding the terms and
conditions of the agreement not contrary to law, public order and public policy, the CA dismissed
the case and admitted the agreement.
Displeased, Atty. Agustin, with the complainants as his co-petitioners, filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the SC. He argued that the NLRC Resolution on the basis of an unconscionable
compromise agreement was executed without his knowledge. Atty. Agustin prays that the joint
compromise agreement be set aside and Herrera be ordered to pay him P335,844.18 as attorney’s
fees pursuant to the final and executory monetary award originally obtained by the complainants
before the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer’s claim for his unpaid attorney’s fees can annul the compromise
agreement entered into by the party-litigants.
Ruling:
Petition Denied.
Atty. Agustin’s claim for his unpaid attorney’s fees cannot nullify the subject joint compromise
agreement. A compromise agreement is binding only between its privies and could not affect the
rights of third persons who were not parties to the agreement. One such third party is the lawyer
who should not be totally deprived of his compensation because of the compromise subscribed by
the client. Otherwise, the terms of the compromise agreement will be set aside, and the client
shall be bound to pay the fees agreed upon with his lawyer. If the adverse party settled the suit in
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bad faith, he will be made solidarily liable with the client for the payment of such fees. The
following discussions in Gubat v. National Power Corporation elaborate on this matter, viz:
As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be

the payment of a lawyer’s adequate and reasonable compensation for his services
should the suit end by reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise
subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire
deprivation of his lawyer’s fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee
basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot bind the lawyer as a third
party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the
part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in
a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he

himself secured for his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the client’s
own volition should never completely deprive counsel of any legitimate
compensation for his professional services. In all cases, a client is bound to pay his
lawyer for his services. The determination of bad faith only becomes significant
and relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable in shouldering the
attorney’s fees.
There is truth to Atty. Agustin’s argument that the compromise agreement did not include or
affect his attorney’s fees granted in the final and executory LA Decision dated September 27, 1998.
Attorney’s fees become vested right when the order awarding those fees becomes final and
executory and any compromise agreement removing that right must include the lawyer’s
participation if it is to be valid against him. However, equity dictates that an exception to such
rule be made in this case with the end in view that the fair share of litigants to the benefits of a
suit be not displaced by a contract for legal services.
It must be noted that the complainants were laborers who desired to contest their dismissal for
being illegal. With no clear means to pay for costly legal services, they hired Atty. Agustin whose
remuneration was subject to the success of the illegal dismissal suit. Before a judgment was
rendered in their favor, however, the company closed down and settlement of the suit for an
amount lesser than their monetary claims, instead of execution of the favorable judgment,
guaranteed the atonement for their illegal termination. To make the complainants liable for
theP335,844.18 attorney’s fees adjudged in the LA Decision of September 27, 1998 would be
allowing Atty. Agustin to get a lion’s share of the P385,000.00 received by the former from the
compromise agreement that terminated the suit; to allow that to happen will contravene the
raison d'être for contingent fee arrangements.
It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad faith. It remains
undisputed that Podden has ceased operations on December 1, 1994 or almost four years before
the LA Decision dated September 27, 1998 was rendered. In view thereof, the implementation of
the award became unfeasible and a compromise settlement was more beneficial to the
complainants as it assured them of reparation, albeit at a reduced amount
Under the circumstances, Herrera cannot be made solidarily liable for Atty. Agustin’s fees which,
as a rule, are the personal obligation of his clients, the complainants. However, pursuant to his
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undertaking in the joint compromise agreement, Herrera is solely bound to compensate Atty.
Agustin at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the total settlement agreement.
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA

A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014, C.J. Sereno
Atty. Paguia filed a complaint for dishonesty with the IBP against Atty. Molina for giving
erroneous legal advice. Atty. Molina alleged that the complaint does not specify the offense charged.
The Court, siding with Atty. Molina stated that bare allegations in the complaint do not suffice the
holding of administrative liability. The presumption of good faith still applies absent any evidentiary
proof otherwise.
Facts:
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr.
Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set
of internal rules for the neighbors. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a
party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking
arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s
clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a
party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He
maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order
in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds:
1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina
gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice
or bad faith. The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
No petition for review has been filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrative complaint is with merit
Ruling:
No. The administrative complaint is unsubstantiated with proof. Bare allegations do not
warrant the imposition of administrative liability.
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When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is
on the complainant.
In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. The allegation of
giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the
corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving
the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be
held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or
malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never
presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact
and is evidentiary. There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was
indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith,
therefore, stands in this case.
ALMIRA C. FORONDA vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.

A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014, J. Reyes
Atty. Alvarez’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of worthless
checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. "The relationship of an attorney to his client
is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.’ Necessity
and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client."
Facts:
Complainant Foronda is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. She returned to the

Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. Foronda engaged the services
of Atty. Alvarez for a fee of P195,000.00. Foronda averred that the Atty. Alvarez promised to file
the petition after he received the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In
September 2008, the complainant inquired about the status of her case and was allegedly told by
the respondent that her petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a
decision by the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in
May 2009, the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized for
the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out that it
was filed only on July 16, 2009.
Foronda further alleged that Atty. Alvarez invited her to be an investor in the lending
business allegedly ran by the latter’s sister-in-law The respondent encouraged her to
invest P200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per month. Thus, the
complainant gave P200,000.00 to the respondent upon the security of thirteen (13) United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks. Upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank
honored the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed
account. When she brought the matter to Atty. Alvarez, he actually paid her certain amounts as
interest through her representative. Nevertheless, Atty. Alvarez failed to pay the entire obligation
as promised. Thereafter, the respondent issued eight (8) Banco de Oro (BDO)checks as
Page 12 of 370
replacement for the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were likewise
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Foronda filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Alvarez.
In his Answer, Atty. Alvarez admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July
2009 but the delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed him to hold
the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were discussing a possible reconciliation. He
further argued that the contract he executed with the complainant was a mere contract of loan.
Being a contract of loan, he cannot be held guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 since
the checks he issued were to serve only as security for it.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alvarez violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes. "Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." "He is required by
the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion." "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession."
The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." "The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action."
It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and
the issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far
as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The relationship of an
attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and
truthful when dealing with his client."
All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons 15, 17, Rule
18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable under
Rule 1.01 thereof.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "disbarment,

jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person."
Page 13 of 370
In the instant case, the Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges
filed against the respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant. The Court also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP-CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as
evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant's counsel. Therein, it was
acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of P650,000.00 in payment for the:
(1) P200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the complainant; (2) P195,000.00
for the attorney's fees he received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and expenses that the
complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed against the respondent including the
instant complaint with the IBP. Unlike in Solidon where the respondent failed to file the required
petition and did not account for the money he received, the respondent was able to file, albeit
belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the money he received as
attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition
and in filing the same - not to mention the cost he incurred for the purpose.
In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the Court
finds that the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is commensurate, with a
stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any
similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.
JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS vs. ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO

A.C. No. 10378, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case
entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of law to support his
client’s interest.
Securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the respondent’s control
and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the
court.
It is beyond dispute that the Baens engaged the services of the respondent to handle his case.
The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and negligent
in handling the complainant’s case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P250,000.00 for the
total expenses to be incurred in the said case. The excuse proffered by Atty. Sempio that he did not
receive any orders or notices from the trial court are highly intolerable. Securing a copy of such
notices, orders and case records was within the respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer
undertakes.
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (Baens) seeking for the disbarment of
Page 14 of 370
Respondent Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio (Atty. Sempio) for violation of Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
Baens engaged the services Atty. Sempio to represent him and file a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. He alleged in his complaint that
Atty. Sempio: (1) despite receiving the sum of P250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said
case, failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s wife who successfully
instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8, 2008; (2)
even with Baens furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated December 15, 2008, belatedly filed
an Answer and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated
in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of improper venue
as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never
bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set
for the case; and (5) as a result, the said case was decided on October 27, 2009 without the
complainant being able to present his evidence.
Atty. Sempio denied the allegations of Baens in his Answer to the complaint and explained
that after a meeting with Baens, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
asked Baens to go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the RTC of
Malabon City and that the latter was aware that the said petition will be filed in Malabon City. He
also contended that because of Baen’s refusal to testify, the case became pending and was
withdrawn. He said that he was not able to attend the hearings for the case because he did not
receive any notice from the trial court.
In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant appeared;
thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further participate in the IBP
proceedings. The Investigating Commissioner (IC) submitted his Report and Recommendation
finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent be
suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the IC found that Atty. Sempio
failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities
considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated.
The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating
Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension
from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Sempio violated Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Sempio violated Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
Page 15 of 370
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.
It is beyond dispute that Baens engaged the services of the respondent to handle his case.
The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and
negligent in handling the complainant’s case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum
of P250,000.00 for the total expenses to be incurred in the said case. The excuse proffered by Atty.
Sempio that he did not receive any orders or notices from the trial court are highly intolerable.
Securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the respondent’s control and
is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter
of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It
was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the
advancement of his client’s cause of action. Records further disclose that the respondent omitted
to update himself of the progress of his client’s case with the trial court.
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and
loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case,
he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his
cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.
Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken.
While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds
the period of six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner commensurate to
the facts of the case.
ALBERTO VALDEZ vs. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga
A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014, Per Curiam
Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due
to carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable with suspension of one month
and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. The Rules
classify violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules a serious offense punishable with suspension
of one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Page 16 of 370
Facts:
In a letter-complaint sent to Judge Victor Dalanao (Judge Dalanao), presiding judge of the
MTCC of Tabuk, Kalinga, complainant Alberto Valdez (Valdez) alleged that Sheriff Macusi failed
to act on the writ of execution issued by the MTCC in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sheriff Macusi explained that in a Report dated 6 January 2004, his predecessor, Francisco
C. Mabazza, served on accused Jorge Macusi the writ of execution issued by the MTCC on 5
December 2003. However, the accused replied that he had no money to pay for the execution.
Thus, the notation in the writ of execution was "unsatisfactory (sic) served”. Thereafter, Sheriff
Macusi stated that he tried to serve the order again by entering the residence of defendant
looking for personal properties that could be confiscated on account of the writ but to no avail.
Sheriff Macusi then asked accused to voluntarily comply with his legal obligation but found out
that accused had suffered a stroke and could no longer fend for himself and his family and
resorted to accepting charity from his sister.
In a Partial Report, Sheriff Macusi filed a return of the writ of execution stating that it was
still unserved. Judge Dalanao issued an Order stating that the Partial Report of Sheriff Macusi was
an improper and inadequate report as required under the Rules.
Acting on the letter-complaint sent by Valdez, Judge Dalanao issued an Order endorsing it
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. The OCA recommended
that the administrative complaint be referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Bulanao,
Tabuk City, Kalinga, Branch 25, for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt of notice. This Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA and referred the
matter to Executive Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas).
Judge Wacas found no substantial evidence to hold Sheriff Macusi for the offense charged
and recommended the dismissal of the complaint. This Court referred the Investigation Report to
the OCA. The OCA disagreed with the recommendation of Judge Wacas and found Sheriff Macusi
liable for (1) simple neglect of duty for his failure to submit the proper returns, and (2) violation of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in "People v.
Jorge Macusi y Wayet" is his brother. The OCA recommended that Sheriff Macusi be suspended
from office for two months without pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Macusi should be held liable for (1) simple neglect of duty and (2)
violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
Ruling:
We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation on the penalty.
In the present case, the records show that Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of
writ of execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other report to the court. Sheriff
Macusi failed to implement the court order and failed to submit periodic reports of the actions he
Page 17 of 370
had taken on the writ "every 30 days until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires," as required by the Rules.
Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty
due to carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable with suspension of one
month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Further, aside from Sheriff Macusi’s long delay in the enforcement of the writ, it has also
been verified by the OCA that Sheriff Macusi is the brother of the accused Jorge Macusi in
Criminal Case No. 4050.
As an officer of the court, Sheriff Macusi should have informed the court and inhibited
himself from enforcing the writ knowing fully well that there is a conflict of interest since the
accused is his brother. It is incumbent upon him, as an agent of the law, to adhere to high ethical
standards in order to preserve the good name and standing of the court. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe, we emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court
personnel bear in view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith. They must be
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. We agree with the OCA that Sheriff Macusi
violated the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in
"People v. Jorge Macusi y Wayet" is his brother. The Rules classify this violation of existing Civil
Service Law and rules a serious offense punishable with suspension of one month and one day to
six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
In view of the circumstances, the penalty that should be imposed is dismissal from the
government service. However, considering that Sheriff Macusi was deemed resigned after filing
his certificate of candidacy making the penalty of dismissal no longer feasible, we impose on him
the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned
and controlled corporations, since he had been previously warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
HENRY SAMONTE vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA

A.C. No. 3454, June 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. A lawyer ought to remember that honesty and integrity are
of far greater value for him than any of the circumstances occurring in his transactions with his
clients.
Facts:
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought an administrative

complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. CEB-6970. In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts
of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana. On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s
letter dated May 8, 1990 embodying additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction
Page 18 of 370
of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. On May 30,
199013 and July 30, 1990, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation. IBP received a motion to quash from Atty. Abellana, seeking the
dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte.
Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the postponement of the
hearings. Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on
declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana. On May 1,
2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling certain
aspects of his client’s case. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment
of Atty. Abellana.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Abellana is guilty of acts complained of.
Ruling:
Yes, he was.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given
full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession. By the Lawyer’s Oath, every lawyer is enjoined not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or
from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer
is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar
worthy of emulation by others.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in
his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to
outright falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that
he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14,
1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause
of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not
rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought
to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law
Profession than his transactions with his client.
JOSE ALLAN TAN vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE

A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014, Per Curiam
Page 19 of 370
The petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the respondent. The respondent
denied the allegations. The Supreme Court ruled that deception and other fraudulent acts by a
lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable
practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature
of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice
of law.
Facts:
The complainant Jose Tan sought the services of the respondent Atty. Pedro Diamante in
order to commence an action for the partition of property of the heirs of the late Luis and
Natividad Valencia Tan. The case was then dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The
dismissal, however, was not disclosed by Diamante. It was only when Tan came to the office of
Diamante that he came to know of the dismissal of the case. Tan then asked Diamante to appeal
to the decision. The appeal suffered the same fate of the initial complaint. It was dismissed
because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Again, Diamante did not inform Tan of the
dismissal of the case. Instead, Diamante falsified a decision which states the appeal was given due
course.
Tan later found out that the decision presented to him by Diamante is falsified. Because of
this he commenced an administrative complaint for disbarment against Diamante. The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines found Diamante administratively liabe and recommended that he be
suspended for a period of one year.
Issue:
Whether or not Diamante should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of IBP that Diamante should be
administratively held liable. However, the Supreme Court imposed the penalty of disbarment
against Diamante instead of just one year suspension from the practice of law.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject
to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly
updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to
wit:
Page 20 of 370
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client
of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and
loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly
keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of
the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered
to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007
when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent
in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period
therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters
of professional employment.
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by

fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it
appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long
been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly,
respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in
his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A
lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence
as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such
neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship
with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This
Page 21 of 370
is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow,
but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients
of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In
Mejares v. Romana, the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely
and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v.
Alcid, Jr., the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client
of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them.
CHAMELYN A. AGOT vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA

A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the respondent for failing to deliver the
money entrusted by the petitioner to the respondent upon demand. The Supreme Court ruled that
verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer
a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in
this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics.
Facts:
The petitioner Chamelyn Agot entered into a Contract of Legal Services with respondent
Atty. Luis Rivera. The latter represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Under the contract,
Atty. Rivera undertook to render legal services with Agot and received the amount of Php 350,000
as a downpayment. In their agreement the downpayment is to be returned to Agot when the US
Visa is not issued upon her.
Eventually, the US Visa was not issued in favor of Agot. Because of this, Agot demanded
the return of the downpayment. However, Atty. Rivera failed to return the same. Hence, Agot
instituted an administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera. The IBP found Atty. Rivera
administratively liable and recommended a penalty of 6 months suspension from the practice of
law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rivera should be held administratively liable.
Page 22 of 370
Ruling:
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject
to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent. As officers of
the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR,
provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted
to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the
amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has
no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported
US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to
prove Pineda’s identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-
serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is
not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic
moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under
the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant.
This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a
lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Page 23 of 370
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x xx.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of
suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the
IBP, to two (2) years.
MELODY R. NERY vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA

A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014, Acting C.J. Carpio
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their
clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and
flimsy.
Facts:
This case involves disbarment complaint filed by Melody Nery (Nery) against Atty. Gliceri
Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and
for making Nery believe that the petition was already filed. On June 2008, Nery engaged the
services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter.
The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As
for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife
of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they
would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed
the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana informed Nery that they needed
to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5
March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 11). When Nery asked why she did not
receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
Page 24 of 370
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12
March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 about the status of the petition for
adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, in the afternoon
of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid
him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted
that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed.
Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for said reimbursement from Sampana, but the demands
were left unheeded.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through

Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed
to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both
parties were directed to submit their position papers.
Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However,
Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage
and adoption. Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case.
Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
practice of law.
Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe
that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving
his legal fees. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report
and recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Sampana should be disbarred for failing to file the petition for
adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already
filed.
Ruling:
No. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this
Court, Atty. Sampana instead, should be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the
court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
Page 25 of 370
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and
flimsy.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of
the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition
for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the
money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client
and of the public confidence in the legal profession.
In Rollon v. Naraval, the Court imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after
receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment
and the previous rulings of this Court, it is proper to increase the penalty for Sampana’s
malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
Wherefore, the Court suspends Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for
three (3) years with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA
A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014, J. Bersamin
A lawyer must be aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility thus wise: “Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.”
Page 26 of 370
In the present case, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges
against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from
decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was
thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them
Facts:
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No.
2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in
Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose
L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused,
Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter
does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on
February 14, 2007. Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for
the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.
In his comment-complaint, Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the
February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to
counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in
failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused;
and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed
from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
The Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report and
recommendation. Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled Yap v. Judge Madrid. In compliance with
the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation. by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants
(2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No.
05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual
evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants
against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L.
Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt
officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable consensus of the IBP
chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases
Page 27 of 370
aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a
favorable action from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala
of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion
Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.
OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D.
Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose
L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap
III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this
ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403
entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation
and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided
and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto Villamor (RTC 52).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court
against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the
Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case
against the judges and personnel of the court.
Issues:
1. Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and
court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
2. Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits.
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed
against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer,
he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and
court personnel.
The Court sees no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments. Although the Court always admires
members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary
the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of
cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot
find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and
Page 28 of 370
even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse
to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be
to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary
action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but
a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to
initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule
1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thus wise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and
caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard
himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to
investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty
to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other
things.
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed
against erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts
and the law of the case.
2. Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself"
upon his motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."
However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for
filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal
whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted. Lawyers are licensed

officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them
by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:
Page 29 of 370
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or haveno materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for
the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
In the motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca, he avers that Judge Madrid did not hear
cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and
could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or
their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him
because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even
include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document
to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of
a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating
in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL vs. ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY

A.C. No. 9115, September 17, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A lawyer who mortgages a property which he holds in trust without the consent of the
beneficial owner shall be liable for misconduct. Members of the Bar are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public.
Facts:
Rebecca Nakpil and Roberto Uy are cousins. Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted
daughter of Dra. Pacita Uy. Dra. Uy owned shares of stocks from different corporations including
Uy Realty Company Inc. where Roberto served as president. When Rebecca was declared as the
heir of Dra. Uy, she demanded from her cousin Roberto an accounting and delivery of dividends
and other proceeds coming from URCI. However, Roberto failed to heed to Rebecca’s wishes.
This prompted Rebecca to file a disciplinary action against Roberto. In her complaint, she
alleged that aside from Roberto’s continuous failure to turn over the accounting and dividends,
Roberto also mortgaged Dra. Uy’s property which he held in trust without securing consent from
Rebecca. Roberto, in his defense, raised that the action should be dismissed on the grounds of
forum shopping and res judicata. He contended that Rebecca had already instituted several cases
Page 30 of 370
involving the same subject matter and issues. Pending resolution of the case, Rebecca filed a
motion to withdraw the complaint asseverating misunderstanding and misapprehension of facts.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended Roberto be charged for serious
misconduct for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and be
suspended for six (6) months. He also noted that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may
proceed independently; therefore, the Rebecca’s desistance cannot serve as a bar to the
proceedings. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the
commissioner and filed an administrative case against Roberto for serious misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Roberto is guilty of serious misconduct
Ruling:
No, he is not.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty –

depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
As the Court sees it, Roberto’s failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca – which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as Roberto’s acts
of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion
of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action
eludes the Court’s determination, for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of
the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the
allegations she had previously made arose out of a “misapprehension of the real facts surrounding
their dispute” and even adds that respondent “had fully explained to [her] the real nature and
extent of her inheritance x x x to her entire satisfaction,” leading her to state that she is “now fully
convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law.” Accordingly, with the admitted
misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP,
hardly hold water so as to support the finding of “serious misconduct” which would warrant its
recommended penalty.
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent
dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, Roberto should have exhibited
Page 31 of 370
prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the
slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
By no insignificant measure, Roberto blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but
also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what
has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds Roberto guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of
the Code.
DARIA O. DAGING vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS

A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014, J. Del Castillo
A lawyer’s act of representing and defending the other party of the case who was impleaded
as one of the defendants in a case filed by his client during the subsistence of the Retainer
Agreement is a clear violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts
Facts:
Complainant Daria Daging was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music
Lounge. She leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio
City where she operated the bar. Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from
Davis & Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling
(Atty. Sabling). This eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and
Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis &
Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in
force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on
behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business

partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He also denied that he took advantage of the
Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.
Page 32 of 370
The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding

respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his
client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Davis is guilty of betrayal of his client’s trust when, during the
subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, he represented and defended Balageo, who was
impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case filed by complainant.
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005
with respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the
rollo of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented
and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said
Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
appearance for Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies
even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his
law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant as her case is actually
handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment.
Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have
immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of
his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be
representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed,
respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the
services of another lawyer.
Page 33 of 370
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years. We thus adopt the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
SPOUSES NICASIO AND DONELITA SAN PEDRO vs. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014, J. Leonen
A valid retaining lien has the following elements: An attorney’s retaining lien is fully
recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful
possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees.
In the case at bar, Atty. Mendoza did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for spouses San Pedro remains
unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly
retain their client’s funds or properties. Furthermore, assuming that Atty. Mendoza had proven all
the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without
the proper accounting and notice to the client.
Facts:
Spouses San Pedro engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza to facilitate the transfer of title
to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to the spouses. The spouses then gave
Atty. Mendoza a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes. They also gave Atty.
Mendoza a check for 13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee.
Atty. Mendoza failed to produce the title despite spouses’ repeated follow-ups. Several
letters were sent by Atty. Mendoza explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However, he still
failed to produce the title and refused to return the amount the spouses gave for the transfer
taxes. The spouses were then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Company to secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names. According to
Atty. Mendoza, it was the spouses who caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title because
they were not able to furnish him several important documents. He also claimed that retention of
the money is justified owing to his receivables from the spouses for the services he rendered in
various cases.
The Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, found that Atty. Mendoza
violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to Atty. Mendoza were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.
Ruling:
Yes. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Page 34 of 370
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client, thus . . .
when a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The lawyer’s failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by the client.
Atty. Mendoza admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
spouses’ name. He continuously assured them that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after
three (3) years and several demands from the spouses, Atty. Mendoza Spouses’ alleged failure to
provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Mendoza’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has
the following elements: An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the
following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s
retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client,
and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s
possession in the course of his employment.
Page 35 of 370
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for
complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees,
lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining
lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and
notice to the client. The rule is that when there is “a disagreement, or when the client disputes
the amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees. . . .”
FELIPE LAYOS vs. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA

A.C. No. 8085, December 01, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of
any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. In the
case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble,
respondent no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that the same
was already amicably settled and terminated. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care,
and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment.
Facts:
In the Sumbong, it was alleged that respondent Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva (Villanueva) is
complainant Felipe Layos’ (Layos) counsel of record in Criminal Case No. 7367-B pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC), wherein the former’s constant failure
to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC’s issuance of an Order waiving the defense’s
right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the issuance of such order, Villanueva
remained absent and thus, Layos was only able to move for reconsideration thru Villanueva, only
four (4) years later, or on April 21, 2007, which was denied. Aggrieved, Layos, also thru Villanueva,
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed the petition on the merits. The CA likewise chastised Villanueva for his
“lack of candidness and fervor on [his part] to champion the cause” of his client, considering
that, inter alia: (a) Villanueva never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings where he was
absent from; (b) it took Villanueva a long amount of time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s
June 26, 2003 Order; and (c) Villanueva never questioned the appearances of other lawyers as
Layos’ counsel during his absence. Citing as basis such disquisition by the CA, Layos filed the
instant administrative case against Villanueva.
Villanueva denied being remiss in his duty as Layos’ counsel. He averred that during the
hearing on April 4, 2002 where the criminal case was supposed to be amicably settled, his car
broke down and thus, he was unable to attend the hearing. After his car was fixed, he decided to
go back to his office and asked his secretary to call Layos to know what happened in the said
hearing. However, Villanueva was unable to contact Layos and that he never heard from the latter
Page 36 of 370
for a long time. Villanueva claimed that he no longer received any notices from the RTC, and
thus, he assumed that the amicable settlement pushed through and that the case was dismissed
already.
Further, Villanueva maintained that it was only sometime before November 15, 2005 when
he received a notice of hearing from the RTC. Pursuant to the same, he went to the RTC and
found out about the June 26, 2003 Order and that other lawyers were appearing for Layos. After
the hearing, Villanueva approached the RTC personnel in order to get a copy of the June 26, 2003
Order but was unable to do so due to lack of manpower in the RTC. Thus, he relied on the RTC
personnel’s word that they would mail him a copy of such Order, but they were unable to do so.
Hence, he was only able to move for reconsideration of the June 26, 2003 Order on April 21, 2007
upon securing a copy of the same on April 4, 2006.
Finally, Villanueva averred that he had a hard time locating Layos who was not at his
home address and was staying at his workplace in Carmona, Cavite. According to Villanueva, this
caused him to advance the filing fees and other expenses of Layos’ cases, not to mention that the
latter has failed to pay the agreed appearance fees and attorney’s fees due him.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner found Villanueva

administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months. Villanueva moved for reconsideration which was, however,
denied by the IBP Board. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal as well as a Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva should be held administratively liable for the acts complained
of.
Ruling:
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to
serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of
all the developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence.
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client
of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and
loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly
keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As
such, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and
Page 37 of 370
a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car
trouble, respondent no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that
the same was already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew
that the case was still on-going, he attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the
RTC’s issuance of the June 26, 2003 Order which is prejudicial to complainant’s cause. Despite
such alarming developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the
interests of his client. Instead, he passively relied on the representations of the court employees
that they would send him a copy of the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he finally secured a copy on
April 4, 2006, it still took him over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to move the RTC to
reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being
filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent
failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
While the Court agrees that respondent should be held administratively liable for the
foregoing acts and thus, must be suspended from the practice of law, it nevertheless deems that
the IBP’s recommended period of suspension of six (6) months is too harsh a penalty, given the
complainant’s seeming disinterest in the developments of his own case. This is evidenced by
complainant not communicating with respondent, getting other lawyers referred to him by his
friends despite having a counsel of record, and being indifferent despite being informed of a
standing warrant of arrest against him. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months would be commensurate
penalty to the acts complained of.
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO

A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014, J. Mendoza
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. Absent proof of

such relationship, a lawyer could not be held liable for violation of the CPR.
Facts:
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa
against Caroline, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda
Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and
beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park,
Makati City. Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva, executed a deed of assignment of their respective shares
in favor of Carolone, who was then Jimenez’s common-law partner. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the Caroline in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of
P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said
amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed
of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for P78,000,000.00 only.
Page 38 of 370
Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to
Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one share was transferred to Ma.
Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his
shares to Caroline by another deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares
amounting to P1,249,997.00. According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the
United States in 2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo, approached
the Caroline and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service was
about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her
nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this
was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004. Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty.
Francisco that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case,
put the Forbes property for sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was eventually sold
to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s
knowledge. Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s
money. Caroline was duty-bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and
beneficial owner. Caroline and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated and converted the
funds for their personal use and benefit. Caroline was shocked upon reading the allegations in the
complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the
affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate
counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated
neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the proscription against
representing conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of Caroline. He might have assisted
her in some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to
do so.
Issue:
Whether respondent Francisco violated CPR rule on conflict of interest.
Ruling:
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish
that she was a client of Atty. Francisco. In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of

the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the
ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in
Page 39 of 370
the first place.
SPOUSES NICASIO AND DONELITA SAN PEDRO vs. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 5440, December 10, 2014, J. Leonen
lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to
the client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount
claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees .... "
Facts:
In November 1996, Complainants San Pedro engaged the services of Respondent Mendoza
to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants. Spouses San Pedro then gave Mendoza two checks, in the amount of PhP68, 250.00
and PhP13,800.00, representing the payment for transfer tax and the professional fee of the latter,
respectively.
Subsequently, Spouses San Pedro followed-up many times the legal work entrusted to
Mendoza, however, to their dismay the latter cannot deliver the new certificate of title for their
property. This forced them to obtain a loan in order to finance the transfer and perform the
legwork themselves.
In response to the administrative complaint, Mendoza asserted that it was Spouses San
Pedro who caused the 3-year delay in the transfer of title as they failed to furnish him several
important documents. In addition, Mendoza complains about the measly sum given to him as
professional fee despite all the work he did, which consisted of for four or five meetings, going to
the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, the Office of the Register of Deeds for Calamba and facilitating the
preparation and notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Mendoza also claimed that retention
of the money is justified owing to his receivables from Spouses San Pedro in their five (5) other
cases.
The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD found that Mendoza violated Canon 16, Rule
16.01 and 16.03 of the CPRL when the latter encased the checks in spite his failure to perform the
legal work and on the basis of his admission stated in his letters to Spouses San Pedro. The IBP
Board of Governors affirmed this ruling; though, it amplified the penalty to three months
suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the CPRL for failing to hold in
trust the money of his clients.
Ruling:
YES, Mendoza violated his duty to hold in trust and account for all the money and
properties of his clients.
Page 40 of 370
It has been said that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms
and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the [CPRL] is clear:
“The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . .
[w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money
(if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the [CPRL].
“[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by the client.”
Mendoza admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
[Complainants San Pedro’s] name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still
fulfill his duty. However, after three (3) years and several demands from [Spouses San Pedro], [he]
failed to accomplish the task given to him and even refused to return the money. Spouses San
Pedro’s alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify
his violation of his duty under the [CPRL].
Mendoza’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the
following elements:
“An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if [the following elements concur]: (1) lawyer-
client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds
of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment.”
Mendoza did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for
Spouses San Pedro remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and
notice to the client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the
amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession
to the payment of his fees ....”
Page 41 of 370
ERLINDA FOSTER vs. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014, Per Curiam
A lawyer collecting expensive amounts from his client without intent to return them shall be
held liable for unethical conduct.
Facts:
Erlina Foster sought the legal services of Atty. Agtang for her case against Tierra Realty
which involved an absolute sale of land. Foster immediately paid P20,000 for acceptance fee and
P5,000 for incidental expenses. Atty. Agtang loaned from spouses Foster the amount of P100,000
for his car troubles and asked Erlinda to give P150,000 to be used as payment for filing fees.
Erlinda found out that the total filing fees only amounted to P22,410. Worse, she found
out that the matters she alleged to have happened never appeared in the complaint which
resulted to the dismissal of her case. She also learned from the Registrar of Deeds that Atty.
Agtang was the lawyer who notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale by Tierra Realty.
Erlinda filed a complaint before the IBP for the non-payment of the money advanced by
Atty. Agtang. In his defense, Atty. Agtang denied that he borrowed money from Erlinda and
contended that it was Erlinda who insisted for him to take the money and need not worry for the
payment.
The IBP recommended that Atty. Agtang was guilty of ethical impropriety but did not
rule on Atty. Agtang’s conflict of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Agtang violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not
confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in
his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing
that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred
by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to
depravity and dishonesty.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
Page 42 of 370
from his client.” Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose
should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court

finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that
complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party,
Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.” Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at
stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of
the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written
consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court
cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was
the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. The Court cannot brush aside the
dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against
Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the
assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the
intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in
action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution
of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a
collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent
was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no
record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
Page 43 of 370
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused
or violated the entire profession suffers.”
FERNANDO W. CHU vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.

A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015, Per Curiam
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the
large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the
law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as
his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal
interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical
commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as
an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a
servant of the law. Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession.
Facts:
Complainant Chu retained Respondent Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes
involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Guico’s legal services included
handling a complaint for illegal dismissal. According to Chu, during a Christmas party held at
Atty. Guico’s residence, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be
given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Months
later, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised PhP 300,000.00 for the purpose and
which he later delivered to the latter’s law office.
In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Guico then handed Chua a copy of an alleged draft
decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. Atty. Guico told Chu to raise another PhP 300,000.00 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision but Chu could only produce PhP
280,000.00, which he again brought to Atty. Guico’s office. Finally, the NLRC issued an adverse
decision against Chu’s company and there was no other recourse but to file an appeal to the CA.
In response to the administrative complaint, Atty. Guico described the administrative

complaint as replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for
harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Atty. Guico’s
assistant Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He further denied handing to Chu a draft
decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must
have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnes-ses
in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.
IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the CPRL and recommended his disbarment from the practice of law. The IBP Board of
Governors, however, adopted leniency and reduced the penalty to three (3) years suspension.
Page 44 of 370
Issue:
Did Respondent Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
CPRL for demanding and receiving a huge sum of money from his client to guarantee a favorable
decision from the NLRC?
Ruling:
YES, by the acts committed by Atty. Guico, he has transgressed the parameters of conduct
and ethics as embodied in the CPRL.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish

respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court
has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of either
disbarment or suspension as penalty.
Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses, and presented the draft decision that Atty.
Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the draft
decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office,
inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office.
Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s
participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico
impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated from his
office, claiming only that used paper was just “scattered around his office.”
The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, espe-
cially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision… sufficed to confirm
that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving PhP
580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of
the allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu.
[The Court] cannot but conclude that the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was
intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result
in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his
complaint against Atty. Guico…
The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render
any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that he was
bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and
thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and
comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her
privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.
Page 45 of 370
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise
the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated
the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said
illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his
own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant
breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or
malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the
faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In
doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law. Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and
disgraced the Legal Profession.
Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct
by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of
others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because
good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege.
Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred, for
he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal profession.
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN vs. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY

A.C. No. 10568, January 13, 2015, J. Reyes
Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon
demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action.
“A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.”
Facts:
Complainant Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy in May 2007
in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement, Soliman agreed
to pay Atty. Amboy PhP 50,000.00 as acceptance fee, the half of which Soliman forthwith paid.
Atty. Amboy then advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-
owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof. Atty. Amboy just facilitated the
issuance of the titles to the said property from the co-owners to the individual owners and the -
25,000.00 earlier paid to her was then treated as payment for her professional services.
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy the following amounts, to wit:
Page 46 of 370
1. PhP 16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax;

2. PhP 50,000.00 to expedite the issuance of the certificates of title; and,
3. PhP 8,900.00 as payment for the RPT for the year 2009.
Ultimately, much to the disappointment of Soliman, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the
titles and the Deputy RD of Manila denied having received any amount from her counsel to faci-
litate the transfer of the titles. Soliman then demanded from Atty. Amboy the pertinent docu-
ments he invested to the latter or the reimbursement of the PhP 50,000.00 but to no avail. In
response to the complaint, Atty. Amboy asserts that she was able to perform her obligations
under the retainer agreement and she did not ask for any amount from Soliman for the speedy
release of the titles.
The investigating commissioner recommended the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months while the IBP Board of Governors raised this to two (2) years suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Amboy violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
YES, respondent-lawyer fell short of performing important duties attendant with the office
of a lawyer.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A
lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence; to never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving PhP
25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents rela-tive
to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she
asked from Soliman the amount of 50,000.00 to be paid to her “contact” inside the office of the
RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the
payment of PhP 50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of
title. Instead of procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy
asked for an additional PhP 10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence... Atty. Amboy’s acts
undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath,
Atty. Amboy bound herself to respect the law and [its] processes.
Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly

Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
Page 47 of 370
upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
“A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punish-
ment.”
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. vs. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL

A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren, his client, had already passed away at the time he filed the
Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.
The Court would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial
system. Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should act
with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. The Court also observes that he has used underhanded means to attain his
purpose. Atty. Caracol’s blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In
view of his actions of contravening his lawyer’s oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the Court deems it proper to suspend him from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
Facts:
Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr. (Villahermosa) is respondent in two land

cases involving cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation
of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession
of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433. Counsel on record for
plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren
received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in
their respective names. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and
titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn
sold the parcels of land to Villahermosa’s spouse, Raymunda. A deed of absolute sale was
executed in favor of Raymunda. Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs
Page 48 of 370
derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This
decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol (Atty. Caracol), as “Add’l Counsel for the
Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying
for the full implementation of the decision. On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion
for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for
the Plaintiff Efren Babela”.
Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the
motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record.
Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. Villahermosa presented affidavits of
Efren’s widow and daughter both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the
parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they were
familiar with Efren’s signature. They state that the signature in the waiver was different from his
usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional
counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the
filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in
Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. The
IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that
he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath
as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but
modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Caracol moved for
reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Caracol may be disbarred for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presidingjudge may, on motion
of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears,
and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
Page 49 of 370
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person
without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of
court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority
neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or
affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed
authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transaction.
The Court must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an
attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings
before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority
during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the
Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent
and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.
The Court would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial
system. Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should
act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the
law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his
demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. The Court also observes that he has used underhanded means to attain his
purpose. Atty. Caracol’s blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In
view of his actions of contravening his lawyer’s oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the Court deems it proper to suspend him from
the practice of law for a period of one year.
Page 50 of 370
AUGUSTO M. AQUINO vs. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, as Presiding Judge Regional Trial
Court-Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 and MA. ALA F. DOMINGO and MARGARITA IRENE
F. DOMINGO, substituting Heirs of the deceased ANGEL T. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015, J. Peralta
Aquino claims that he and Atty. Domingo agreed to a contract for contingent fees equivalent
to thirty percent (30%) of the increase of the just compensation awarded, albeit verbally. However, a
contract for contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage
of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce
or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the
attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit. Here, considering that the contract was
made verbally and that there was no evidence presented to justify the 30% contingent fees being
claimed by Aquino, the only way to determine his right to appropriate attorney’s fees is to apply the
principle of quantum meruit.
Facts:
On June 27, 2002, Atty. Angel T. Domingo (now deceased) verbally contracted Aquino to
represent him in Agrarian Case on a contingency fee basis. The case was for the determination of
the just compensation for the expropriation and taking of Atty. Domingo's ricelands consisting of
60.5348 hectares, situated in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 27. The DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank) initially valued Atty. Domingo's property at P484,236.27 or P7,999.30 per hectare, which
the latter, through Aquino-counsel, opposed in courts.
Eventually, the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court (RTC/SAC) issued a Decision dated
April 12, 2004 fixing the just compensation for Atty. Domingo's property at P2,459,319.70 or
P40,626.54 per hectare, or an increase of P1,975,083.43 over the initial DAR and the Land Bank
valuation. Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but was denied, thus, it filed a petition for
review. However, in a Decision dated June 12, 2007, the appellate court affirmed in toto the SAC
Decision dated April 12, 2004. Land Bank moved for reconsideration anew, but was denied.
Meanwhile, on September 30, 2007, Atty. Domingo died. Aquino filed a Manifestation
dated December 11, 2007 of the fact of Atty. Domingo's death and the substitution of the latter by
his legal heirs, Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Margarita Irene F. Domingo (private respondents).
Land Bank assailed the appellate court's decision and resolution before the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari dated December 4, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 180108 entitled
“Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Angel T. Domingo”. However, in a Resolution dated September
17, 2008, the Court denied the same for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
appellate court's decision. On December 15, 2008, the Court denied with finality Land Bank's
motion for reconsideration.
On February 11, 2009, Aquino wrote private respondent Ma. Ala Domingo and informed
her of the finality of the RTC/SAC decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. He then requested her to inform the Land Bank of the segregation of Aquino's thirty
percent (30%) contingent attorney's fees out of the increase of the just compensation for the
Page 51 of 370
subject property, or thirty percent (30%) of the total increase amounting to P1,975,983.43. Aquino
claimed never to have received a reply from private respondent.
On March 30, 2009, Aquino received a copy of the entry of judgment from this Court
certifying that its Resolution dated September 17, 2008 has already become final and executory on
March 3, 2009.
On July 28, 2009, Aquino received a Notice of Appearance dated July 16, 2009 filed by Atty.
Antonio G. Conde, entering his appearance as counsel of herein private respondents and
replacing him as counsel in Agrarian Case No. 1217-G.
On August 14, 2009, private respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Conde, filed a
Motion for Execution dated August 6, 2009 of the RTC/SAC Decision dated April 12, 2004.
On August 12, 2009, Aquino filed a Motion for Approval of Charging Attorney's Lien and
for the Order of Payment. Aquino further executed an Affidavit dated August 10, 2009, attesting
to the circumstances surrounding the legal services he has rendered for the deceased Atty.
Domingo and the successful prosecution of the Agrarian case from the RTC/SAC through the
appellate court and the Supreme Court.
On August 18, 2009, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss/Expunge Aquino's

Motion.6 Public respondent Presiding Judge Casabar denied the same.7 Private respondents
moved for reconsideration.
On January 11, 2010, public respondent Judge Casabar issued the disputed Order denying
Aquino's motion for approval of attorney's lien.
On the same day, January 11, 2010, public respondent issued an Order directing the
issuance of a Writ of Execution of the RTC/SAC Decision dated April 12, 2004.
On January 12, 2010, the Clerk of Court of Branch 33, RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, issued a
Writ of Execution of the April 12, 2004. On January 15, 2010, the Sheriff of the RTC of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija issued a Notice of Garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court committed a reversible error in denying the motion to
approve attorney's lien and order of payment on the ground that it lost jurisdiction over the case
since judgment in the case has already become final and executory.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court committed an error.
In the case of Rosario, Jr. v. De Guzman, the Court clarified a similar issue and discussed
the two concepts of attorney’s fees – that is, ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its
Page 52 of 370
extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing
party as indemnity for damages.
With regards to how attorney’s fees for professional services can be recovered, and when
an action for attorney’s fees for professional services can be filed, the case of Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC is instructive:
x x x It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate
action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the
client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been
decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue
over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the
fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to
be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s
fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the
courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the
client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to
when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within
his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for
holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution.
To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the
judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated
options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
Here, apparently Aquino filed his claim as an incident of the main action, as in fact, his
motion was for the court's approval of charging attorney's lien and the prayer thereto was to
direct the entry into the case records the attorney's fees he is claiming. Needless to say, Aquino's
motion for approval of charging attorney's lien and order of payment was not intended to be filed
as a separate action. Nevertheless, it is within Aquino's right to wait for the finality of the
judgment, instead of filing it ahead of the court's resolution, since precisely the basis of the
determination of the attorney's fees is the final disposition of the case, that is, the just
compensation to be awarded to the private respondents.
Aquino claims that he and Atty. Domingo agreed to a contract for contingent fees
equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the increase of the just compensation awarded, albeit
verbally. However, a contract for contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees,
usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the
success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an
Page 53 of 370
express contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.
Here, considering that the contract was made verbally and that there was no evidence presented
to justify the 30% contingent fees being claimed by Aquino, the only way to determine his right to
appropriate attorney’s fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court would have left it to the trial court the determination of
attorney's fees based on quantum meruit, however, following the several pronouncements of the
Court that it will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorney's fees in order that the
resolution thereof would not be needlessly prolonged, this Court, which holds and exercises the
power to fix attorney's fees on quantum meruit basis in the absence of an express written
agreement between the attorney and the client, deems it fair to fix Aquino's attorney's fees at
fifteen percent (15%) of the increase in the just compensation awarded to private respondents.
HENRY ONG LAY HIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2nd Division), HON. GABRIEL T. INGLES,
as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 58, Cebu City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015, J. Leonen
Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to "monitor the status of their
cases, especially if their cases are taking an "unreasonably long time" to be resolved. In the present
case, petitioner took almost seven (7) years, or almost 84 months, from the Court of Appeals'
issuance of the Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a Petition before this
court.
Facts:
In the Decision dated February 8, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City,
convicted petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin (Ong) and Leo Obsioma, Jr. (Obsioma, Jr.) of estafa
punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court found that
Ong and Obsioma, Jr. failed to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company a total of P344,752.20,
in violation of their trust receipt agreement with the bank.
Ong filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision. The Court of Appeals
likewise denied Ong’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
in its Resolution for raising mere rehashed arguments.
The Court of Appeals then issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the case became
final and executory on May 15, 2003. The Court of Appeals based the date of finality on the date of
receipt indicated in the registry return card corresponding to the mail sent to Ong’s former
counsel, Zosa & Quijano Law Offices. Based on the registry return card, Zosa & Quijano Law
Offices received on April 29, 2003 a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying Ong’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court received the original records of the case, the Decision, and the Entry of
Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals. In view thereof, the trial court, then presided by Judge
Gabriel T. Ingles, ordered the arrest of Ong.
Page 54 of 370
Almost six (6) years after, or on February 12, 2010 at about 10:30 p.m., Ong was arrested at
Ralphs Wines Museum located at No. 2253 Aurora Boulevard, Tramo, Pasay City. He was initially
ordered committed to the Cebu City Jail but is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison.
On May 6, 2010, Ong filed before this court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus with application for issuance of preliminary and/or mandatory injunction.
The Supreme Court ordered respondents to comment on Ong’s Petition.
In the meantime, Ong filed the Urgent Motion for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or,
Alternatively, for Bail.
In his Petition for Certiorari, Ong alleges that his counsel never received a copy of the
Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals never became final and executory, and the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment. Judge Gabriel T. Ingles likewise
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a warrant for his arrest and ordering his commitment to
the Cebu City Jail.
Assuming that his former counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution,
Ong argues that his counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal the Court of Appeals’
Resolution. This gross negligence allegedly deprived him of due process and, therefore, should
not bind him.
Considering the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, Ong prays that this court issue a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction for him to be
“liberated from his illegal imprisonment.” In the alternative, he prays that this court allow him to
post bail for his provisional liberty while this court decides his Petition for Certiorari.
In its Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that the registry return card “carries
the presumption that ‘it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed and must be presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise.’” In this case, the
registry return card corresponding to the copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution sent to Ong’s
former counsel indicates that his counsel received the Resolution on April 29, 2003. This date,
therefore, must be presumed to be the date of receipt of the Resolution. Since Ong failed to
appeal within the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals’ Decision became final and executory
and the Court of Appeals correctly issued the Entry of Judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the entry of
judgment;
2. Whether petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin’s former counsel’s negligence bound him.
Page 55 of 370
Ruling:
1. No. There is no grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion is the “arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice
or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law.”
In the present case, petitioner failed to prove the Court of Appeals’ and trial court’s grave
abuse of discretion.
The registry return card is the “official . . . record evidencing service by mail.” It “carries
the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed and, therefore, it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise.”
Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.
2. Yes. The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel bound him
The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the
application of procedural rules.
The exception to the rule is “when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the
client of due process of law.” The agency created between a counsel and a client is a highly
fiduciary relationship. A counsel becomes the eyes and ears in the prosecution or defense of his or
her client’s case. This is inevitable because a competent counsel is expected to understand the law
that frames the strategies he or she employs in a chosen legal remedy. Counsel carefully lays down
the procedure that will effectively and efficiently achieve his or her client’s interests. Counsel
should also have a grasp of the facts, and among the plethora of details, he or she chooses which
are relevant for the legal cause of action or defense being pursued.
In the present case, petitioner took almost seven (7) years, or almost 84 months, from the
Court of Appeals' issuance of the Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a
Petition before this court. As this court ruled in Bejarasco, Jr. vs People, petitioner ought to have
been sooner alerted of the "unreasonably long time" the Court of Appeals was taking in resolving
his appeal. Worse, he was arrested in Pasay City, not in Cebu where he resides. His failure to
know or to find out the real status of his appeal "rendered petitioner undeserving of any sympathy
from the Court vis-à-vis the negligence of his former counsel."
The Supreme Court fails to see how Ong could not have known of the issuance of the
Resolution. It cannot accept a standard of negligence on the part of a client to fail to follow
through or address counsel to get updates on his case. Either this or the alternative that counsel's
alleged actions are merely subterfuge to avail a penalty well deserved.
Page 56 of 370
JOSELITO F. TEJANO vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA

A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015, J. Carpio
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a
case “impliedly stipulates that he will carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final
and executory.” Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to
run its coursel without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file
the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and renders him subject to disciplinary action.
Facts:
On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano’s
own counsel, Atty. Baterina.
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former
to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the
judge’s court.
The case stems from a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by Tejano, his
mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property involved in the suit is a strip of
land located at the northern portion of a lot in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by
Tejano’s family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road stretching from the
provincial highway in the east to the provincial government’s motor pool in the west without
instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty.

Baterina in the former’s bid to “take possession” of their property and was “collecting rentals from
squatters who had set up their businesses inside the whole of the said lot.” In support of his
accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title covering the said lot in the
name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada; receipts of rents paid to
Terencio Florendo, sheriff at Judge Arquelada’s sala at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of rents paid
to Aida Calibuso, who was expressly designated by Laderas as her attorney-in-fact in collecting
said rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge Arquelada’s brother.
Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he
received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to
comply was “not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.”
Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the
Tejano case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after
the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of
Page 57 of 370
law for two years. He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejano’s mother and sister.
However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer. On the
contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the
termination of the case.19 Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and
conflict of interest”20 of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s predicament.
The Court found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him “to
be more heedful of the Court’s directives in order to avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case.”
The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
IBP found Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina guilty of gross negligence, and he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross negligence.
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross negligence.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound
to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” A lawyer’s acceptance
to take up a case “impliedly stipulates that he will carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and
executory.”
Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the
very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he
would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not
“sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.” The client “should never be
left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case.”
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its
coursel without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the
required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and renders him subject to disciplinary action. The penalties for a
lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine,
suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.
Page 58 of 370
Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules,
court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the
trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary
proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the
Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his
duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court.” As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a resolution of
this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely.”
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA CONCEPTION

vs ATTY. ELMER DELA ROSA
A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and
confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias) the Court categorically declared that a
lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice. A lawyer’s act of
asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by
the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
Facts:
In their Verified Complaint, complainants spouses Conception (complainants) alleged

that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent Atty. Dela Rosa served as their retained lawyer and
counsel. In this capacity, Atty. Dela Rosa handled many of their cases and was consulted on
various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the
end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.
Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture,
Atty. Dela Rosa called Henry to borrow the amount of 2,500,000.00, which he pr omised to
return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consu lted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing
that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to
respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks in Atty. Romero’s name.
Page 59 of 370
Upon receiving the checks, Atty. Dela Rosa signed a piece of paper containing: (A)
photocopies of the checks; and ( b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the
checks and that he agreed to return the 2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%),
within five (5) days. In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally
encahed by Atty, Dela Rosa.
On the day Atty. Dela Rosa promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants.
Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent merely made
repeated promises to pay soon. Blesilda sent a demand letter to respondent, which the latter did
not heed.
Eventually, Spouses Conception filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Dela Rosa
charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Reply, the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, Atty.
Dela Rosa claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real
debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro C ity. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.
Issue:
Whether or not whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. Rrespondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality
of this Decision, with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants,
Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants
and incurring the same obligation. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would
be illogical for them to extend a P2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person
they do not even know. On the other hand, complainants were able to submit documents
showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to
return the P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was
entered into during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,
allowing the former to wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence
inherently imbued in such relationship
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this
“trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from
Page 60 of 370
his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his
client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias) the Court categorically
declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is
unethical, to wit: Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice. A
lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes
within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation.
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients
and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to
their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he
will return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same
and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day.
Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the
same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ vs ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MAGRAGLLO

A.C. No. 10537, February 3, 2015, J. Leonen
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client

relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but
also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of
these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the
relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with
the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the
mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client. Thus, the relationship between a lawyer
and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that
has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses
which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual
engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the
counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too
late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of
indifference or negligence.
Facts:
In the Complaint filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty.
Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title.
Page 61 of 370
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him as per a referral from a friend of
Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition
that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees. It was also
agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. Atty.
Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court
of Appeals. The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime
in 2008. On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s
Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared. On
January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty.
Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there
was still no word from the Court of Appeals. On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed
Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. She told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due
to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim. She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of
the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had
already lapsed.
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was
filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she
had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000 per hearing. She also
claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance
of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent
fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy. Atty. Margallo asserted that she
would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to do
so.She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8,
2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had
been busy. Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her
phone and accidentally erased all her contacts
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her
actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with
more severely. Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the Resolution, the
Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration and increased the
recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years. Atty. Margallo filed a
Petition for Review alleging that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She
also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against her.
Page 62 of 370
Issue:
Whether or not the Atty. Margallo is guilty of the offense charged and the penalty of
suspension for 2 years is appropriate.
Ruling:
Yes. The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to
Ramirez.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but
also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either
the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and
attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to
prod him or her to do so. Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client
is per se a violation.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her
client was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act
as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was
no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that she
abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo
failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary
to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client

relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but
also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of
these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the
relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with
the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide
the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client. Thus, the relationship between a
Page 63 of 370
lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it is the
lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the
client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is
only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the
discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that
should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence. Parenthetically, it is this court that has the
constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers
of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the
infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to
increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers. This court is not without jurisdiction to
increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in the legal profession. The
desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for its members’
conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor
is reprehensible.
Wherefore, the Petition for Review is denied. The recommendations and Resolution of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is accepted, adopted and
affirmed. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO,

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015, Per Curiam
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place
and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that
eventually led to the death of Amparado. Thus, circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
Page 64 of 370
Facts:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty.
Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio).
(A.C. No. 7973) Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that he married
Virginia Alcantara whom he had two children. Then, he and Virginia separated.
Garcia alleged that, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which
was eventually granted. Garcia alleged that while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia
Soliman but the case was dismissed.
Subsequently, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned
abou this return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he
learned that Sesbreño was convicted by RTC for Homicide and that homicide is a crime against
moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law. Court
referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
(A.C. No. 10457/ CBD Case No. 08-2273.) A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, Garcia
filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño
is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide, and despite the facts that he is only
on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño
alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law" was deleted
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The IBP-CBD ruled
that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
Ruling:
Yes, the conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. The Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
Page 65 of 370
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or
does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are
crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
The Court agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral
turpitude. The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his
companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s
house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his
rifle, and started firing at them.
According to Yapchangco, they were about five meters, more or less, from the gate of
Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they
saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was
hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the
window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing
his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process.
Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw
Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of
his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong
place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño
that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
MELANIO S. SALITA vs. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE

A.C. No. 8101, February 04, 2015, J. Perlas- Bernabe
Verily, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. To recount, records reveal that Rodriguez used,
among others, the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Atty. Salve to file an ejectment complaint
against Salita. However, it must be remembered that Salita was merely made to sign such document
as collateral for his loan and that he had already fully paid the same, as evidenced by the notarized
Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is
simply unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as
it will be detrimental to his own interests. Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-
formed Deed of Absolute Sale without Salita’s presence before him.
Facts:
Salita – the registered owner of a parcel of land applied for a loan from one Jocelyn
Rodriguez in the amount of P50,000.00 and, in such regard, signed blank documents, including
an “incomplete” Promissory Note. Subsequently, here structured the aforesaid loan and further
signed several documents prepared by the latter, including two (2) Real Estate Mortgage
Page 66 of 370
Agreements (REM instruments) and a pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject
property as collateral. On November 15, 2006, Salita was able to pay his loan in full as evidenced
by a Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez before Notary Public Melendres,
which was later duly entered in the Register of Deeds.
Notwithstanding such full payment, Rodriguez instituted an ejectment complaint against

Salita presenting in furtherance of his cause the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two (2)
REM instruments signed by the latter. Upon checking the said documents, Salita discovered that
the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been notarized by Atty. Salve and his Community Tax
Certificate Numbers were allegedly falsified. During a Barangay Conciliation proceeding,
Rodriguez presented the same documents to reinforce her claims. Salita, for his part, noticed that
one copy of the Deed of Sale was purportedly notarized on August 12, 2007, while another was
notarized a month later, or on September 12, 2007.Thus, Salita went on to conclude that because
of the foregoing events, it appeared as if he had sold the subject property to Rodriguez and
executed the same before Atty. Salve. Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of
public documents against Rodriguez and Atty. Salve. Salita likewise filed the instant
administrative case against Atty. Salve.
In a Report and Recommendation dated January 4, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner dismissed Salita’s complaint for lack of merit. He
found that Salita was not able to obtain the required quantum of proofto hold Atty. Salve
administratively liable, especially considering that Salita’s criminal complaint was dismissed for
lack of probable cause. In a Resolution dated December 29, 2012 (December 29, 2012 Resolution),
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation dismissing the case for lack of merit. On reconsideration, however, the IBP
Board of Governors issued a Resolution dated March 8, 2014 (March 8, 2014 Resolution) setting
aside its December 29, 2012 Resolution and accordingly, recommended the suspension of Atty.
Salve’s notarial commission for a period of three (3) months. It, however, failed to state the
reasons for imposing the suspension.
Issue:
1. Whether or not IBP erred failing to articulate the reasons behind its resolution.
2. Whether or not Atty. Salve should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator’s
Report. Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court further states that: (b) If the Board,
by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
Page 67 of 370
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
With its March 8, 2014 Resolution barren of any reason to support the proffered
recommendation, said body had clearly failed to comply with the foregoing provisions. Thus, it is
strongly prompted to be ever-mindful of the above-mentioned rules.
2. Yes.
To recount, records reveal that Rodriguez used, among others, the Deed of Absolute Sale
notarized by Atty. Salve to file an ejectment complaint against Salita. However, it must be
remembered that Salita was merely made to sign such document as collateral for his loan and that
he had already fully paid the same, as evidenced by the notarized Release of Real Estate Mortgage
executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is simply unfathomable for
Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental
to his own interests. Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-formed Deed of
Absolute Sale without Salita’s presence before him.
Verily, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated
because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally
sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the
ones who executed the same.
As a final point, the Court expresses its concurrence with the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s finding that Atty. Salve should nevertheless be absolved from the falsification
charges against him. Suffice it to state that Salita failed to prove the allegations against Atty.
Salve, especially considering the resolutions in the criminal case against the latter finding no
probable cause to indict him of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents. That being said,
only Atty. Salve’s administrative liability for gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public
stands.
ROBERTO BERNARDINO vs. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client

relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.
Atty. Santos with full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Facts:
These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In A.C. No. 10583, Roberto C. Bernardino filed a Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Page 68 of 370
Victor Rey Santos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be
investigated and subjected to disciplinary action. Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of
his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that
Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. Atty. Santos used the falsified death
certificate to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of
Rufina Turla. Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano
Turla, filed a Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
temporary restraining order against Bernardino. The Complaint alleged that Marilu Turla is an
heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty.
Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.
Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal. Similar
to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with
conflicting interests. He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would
necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla. Also, in representing Marilu Turla,
Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called Dead Man’s Statute because he would be
utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his deceased client. Atty.
Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.
other words, he engaged in forum shopping. In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but
Atty. Santos knew this to be false. Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As part
of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs. Moreover, Atty. Santos
allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. Lastly, Atty.
Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his
arguments.
In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate. He explained that
the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla
and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate. Atty. Santos
argued that he did not represent and was not representing conflicting interests since Mariano
Turla was already dead. Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he
did not commit forum shopping because the various cases filed had different issues. As to the
conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as
the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla. On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited
a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it
was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended
that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. The Commission on Bar Discipline agreed
with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings and recommendations
of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors.
Page 69 of 370
Issue:
Whether or not the correctly held that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests and its recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Santos is guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended for 1 year.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client

relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their
case. Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, Atty. Santos would
necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to
represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. However, Rule
15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, “by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” Atty. Santos had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that
there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009, while Atty. Santos represented Marilu Turla in
March 2009. It is understandable why Atty. Santos was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s
consent. Still, Atty. Santos did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla
that he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently
proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that Atty. Santos violated
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officers of the court, lawyers
have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to be honest in all their
dealings. Unfortunately, Atty. Santos was far from being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina
Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.
This court, however, notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions
dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong. The authority to
discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution. Only this court
can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not
be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court.
MICHAEL RUBY vs. ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY. RUDOLPH DILLA BAYOT
A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, J. Reyes
Ruby engaged the services of Atty. Espejo regarding a donation case. Allegedly, Atty. Espejo
failed to account the payment of the filing fees which Ruby extended. Atty. Espejo, then was assisted
by Atty. Bayot who drafted several documents regarding the case. Ruby demanded the excess of the
Page 70 of 370
payment of the filing fees he extended but Atty. Espejo did not return the money. Moreover, Atty.
Espejo allegedly failed to notify Ruby of the status of the case. Hence, Ruby filed a disciplinary action
complaint against both Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot. Both the IBP-CDB and the IBP Board of
Governors sanctioned both lawyers. However, Atty. Espejo died. Hence, the complaint proceeded
only against Atty. Bayot. Atty. Bayot alleged that there was no attorney-client relationship between
Ruby and him since he merely assisted Atty. Espejo. In resolving this issue, the Court ruled that
“Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of
an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.” Further, acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, as regards the case
before the RTC, Ruby had two counsels – Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot.
Facts:
Michael Ruby and his mother, Felicitas Ruby Bihla (Felicitas), engaged the services of the
Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot in connection with a case for cancellation and nullification of deeds
of donation. Pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, Ruby and Felicitas would pay Atty. Espejo the
amount of 100,000.00 as acceptance fee, 70,000.00 of which was actually paid upon the signing of
the agreement and the remaining 30,000.00 to be paid after the hearing on the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Ruby and Felicitas likewise agreed to pay the
amount of 5,000.00 as appearance fee.
On September 15, 2009, Ruby gave Atty. Espejo the amount of 50,000.00 as payment for
filing fee. However, the actual filing fee that was paid by her only amounted to 7,561.00; she failed
to account for the excess amount given her despite several demand letters therefor.
Atty. Espejo allegedly asked Ruby to give Atty. Bayot the amount of 30,000.00 – the
remaining balance of the acceptance fee agreed upon. Ruby gave Atty. Bayot the amount of -
8,000.00 supposedly as partial and an additional 4,000.00 as appearance fee for the September 22,
2009 hearing.
Atty. Espejo called Ruby informing him of the need to file a separate petition for the
issuance of a TRO. Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order denying Ruby’s prayer for the issuance of
a TRO. Ruby alleged that the counsels failed to apprise him of the denial of his prayer for the
issuance of a TRO.
Ruby deposited the amount of 4,000.00 to the bank account of Atty. Bayot as appearance
fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons through publications. However, Atty. Bayot
allegedly did not appear in court.
Thereafter, Ruby alleged, the counsels failed to update him as to the status of his
complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their counsel.
Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of Ruby and that he was
merely a collaborating counsel.
Michael Ruby then filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot. The IBP-CBD
directed the counsels to submit their answers. In his Answer, Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not
the counsel of Ruby; that he merely assisted him and Atty. Espejo. On the other hand, Atty.
Page 71 of 370
Espejo, in her Answer, denied asking for 50,000.00 from Ruby as filing fees. She insisted that it
was Ruby who voluntarily gave her the money to cover the filing fees.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

Recommendation, which recommended the penalty of censure against the counsels. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted the recommendation but increased the penalty to one year
suspension. On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which dismissed
the case insofar as Atty. Espejo in view of her demise. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed Atty.
Bayot’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, which would
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC. He was
likewise the one who prepared the motion to serve summons through publication. He likewise
appeared as counsel for Ruby in the hearings of the case before the RTC. He likewise advised
Ruby on the status of the case. More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received 8,000.00,
which is part of the acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement, from Ruby. It is true that
it was Atty. Espejo who asked Ruby to give Atty. Bayot the said amount. However, Atty. Bayot
admitted that he accepted from Ruby the said 8,000.00 without even explaining what the said
amount was for.
The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Atty. Bayot and Ruby. “Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of
an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that
the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.” Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship. Accordingly, as regards the case before the RTC, Ruby had two counsels – Atty.
Espejo and Atty. Bayot.
The Investigating Commissioner’s findings, which was adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, did not make a distinction as to which specific acts or omissions the counsels are each
personally responsible for. This is inequitable since either of the counsels may not be held
personally liable for the infractions committed by the other. Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for
the failure to account for and return the excess of the 50,000.00 which was paid by Ruby for the
filing fees. The evidence on record shows that it was Atty. Espejo alone who received the said
amount.
As regards Ruby’s charge of gross neglect against Atty. Bayot, the Court finds the same
unsubstantiated. Ruby merely alleged that, after the hearing on the motion to serve summons
through publication, the counsels had “made themselves scarce” and failed to update him on the
status of the case before the RTC. However, other than his bare allegations, Ruby failed to present
any evidence that would show that Atty. Bayot was indeed remiss in his duties to Ruby.
Page 72 of 370
In any case, the charge of neglect against Atty. Bayot was premature, if not unfair,
considering that, at that time, the case before the RTC was still in the early stages; the pre-trial
and trial have not even started yet. That they lost their bid for the issuance of a TRO is not
tantamount to neglect on the part of Atty. Bayot.
WILFREDO ANGLO vs. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY.
PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY- VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA," AND ATTY.
WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP's conclusions that respondents represented
conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents' law firm
was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However,
after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing
of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the
Court observes, the law firm's unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to
organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases
assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it
accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.
Facts:
In his complaint-affidavit, Wilfredo Anglo (Anglo) alleged that he availed the services of
the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office (law
firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and
Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent.
Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases
were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant
and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain
Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law
office which handled complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case
against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR.
Herein respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association
is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements." According to them,
each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and
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expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered
by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees
exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and
associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that this
has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They averred that complainant's labor
cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm.
Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by
Atty. Penalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant's labor cases, as he started
working for the firm after the termination thereof.
Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant's labor cases but
averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, and that complainant did not have any monthly
retainer contract. He explained that he did not see the need to discuss complainant's labor cases
with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple, and that the latter did not confide
any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that would have been used in the
criminal case with FEVE Farms.
The IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest
and recommended that they be reprimanded therefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had
died on January 17, 2010. The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor
cases by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela.
Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Penalosa,
having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the
qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of

the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the

pertinent provisions of the CPR.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY

IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS
Page 74 of 370
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS

OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest. There
is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose
those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste.
As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm's deficient
organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such,
all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by
the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the
termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.

A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 provides that “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” This rule was violated by
Atty. Delfin when he failed to file an action in court despite receipt receipt of P48,000.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund said amount that complainant gave him despite repeated demands. Rule 16.01 provides that
“A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.” Rule
Page 75 of 370
16.03 states that “A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.”
Facts:
Complainant Eduardo Maglente, as President of “Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma.

Corazon III, Incorporated”(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the
members of Samahan. In connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of
P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a
written acknowledgment executed by respondent himself. Despite the payment, respondent failed
to file an action in court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him
was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, Maglente asked for the return of the
money, but Atty. Delfin claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more
money. Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid
sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was not his money in the first place. Hence,
Maglente filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to
respondent.
In his defense, Atty. Delfin denied spending Maglente’s money, explaining that he had
already prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered
through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was
quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who
undertook to raise the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case
was filed against him
In a Report and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent

guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Aggrieved, respondent
moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Delfin should be held administratively liable for the acts complained
of
Ruling:
Yes. It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence,
care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR, which
reads:

DILIGENCE.
Page 76 of 370
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent
for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of
P48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with
his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was
not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated
demands, viz.:

from the client.
demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer
is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in
this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment, and
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
ANTONINA S. SOSA vs. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 8776, March 23, 2015, J. Brion
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as
found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful
intent and not a mere error in judgment. The Court finds it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained
a loan in the amount of PhP 500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement
receipt showing he received PhP 500,000.00. Although he initially denied getting this amount and
claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He
later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount.
Page 77 of 370
Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but
Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the post-dated check upon Atty.
Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to
comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that
Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
Facts:
Complainant Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of PhP 500,000.00 to
Respondent Atty. Mendoza at an interest of PhP 25,000.00 to be paid not later than September 25,
2006. They agreed on a penalty charge of ten percent (10%) per month, which shall accrue in case
of default. To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and
issued a post-dated check for the same value.
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date and the check bounced for
the reason of “DAIF”. Complainant Sosa, thru her new counsel, wrote a demand letter to
Mendoza, which the latter refused to receive. In view of Mendoza’s repeated failure to pay,
Complainant Sosa filed a formal complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza
for violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPRL. In his comment, Atty. Mendoza admitted the existence of
the loan but alleged that he only received the amount of PhP 100,000.00.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively but
also civilly considering that he categorically admitted the loan, though, disputes the amount.
Later, the IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is guilty of gross misconduct.

2. Is it proper for the Court to order the payment of the loan?
Ruling:
1. YES, the Court affirms the findings against Respondent Atty. Mendoza and order his
suspension for one (1) year.
The Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his
private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because
good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law.
Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession
justifies disciplinary action.
Gross misconduct is defined as “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.”
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Page 78 of 370
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as
found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment. The Court finds it undisputed that Atty.
Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of PhP 500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and
acknowledgement receipt showing he received PhP 500,000.00. Although he initially denied
getting this amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any
evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as
to the amount.
Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity
but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the post-dated check upon
Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still
failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored,
a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the CPRL and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well.
To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and Mendoza’s act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid
and just debt.
2. Is it proper for the Court to order the payment of the loan?
While [the Court agrees] with the punishment meted out by the IBP, [the Court differs]
with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal
interest.
The Court takes exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is
solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for collection of a sum
of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone deters us from agreeing with
the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint before us only requires substantial evidence
to justify a finding of liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of
preponderance of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare.
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue

acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. The purpose of
disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.
Page 79 of 370
The Court is aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case to
collect an outstanding debt from a lawyer. However, in the recent case of Heenan vs. Atty. Espejo,
the Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP’s recommendation to order the erring lawyer
to return the money he borrowed from the complainant.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Rose Bunagan-Bansig Vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera

A.C. No. 5581. January 14, 2014
Per Curiam
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but rather
an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty
considering the serious consequence of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar.
Facts:
This is a disbarment case filed against respondent for gross immoral conduct for allegedly
contracting a second marriage with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba despite being married to
Gracemarie R. Bunagan. The respondent’s contention is that the disbarment case cannot continue
since he failed to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
Issue:
Whether or not an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite failure of

respondent to answer the charges against him
Ruling:
In this case, there is a preponderance of evidemce that respondent contracted a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage. Respondent’s acts of deliberately making excuses for
not receiving the complaint and merely disappearing constitures willful disobedience to the order
of the court.. Being sui generis in nature, it is immaterial whether the respondent was able to
answer the charges against him since a disbarment case is an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.
Heinz R. Heck vs. City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr.

A.C. No. 5329; March 18, 2014
J. Bersamin
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member
of the Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution only for
the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Page 80 of 370
Facts:
Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against City Prosecutor Casiano Gamotin. According
to Heck, he was a victim of the faulty, highly improper, suspicious, anomalous and unlawful
practice by the respondent who had allegedly obstructed justice by delaying cases and
disregarding proper court procedures and displaying favors towards another lawyer who is the
latter’s business partner and friend.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) observed that although
there was no clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence of misconduct to warrant the penalty of
disbarment, the respondent’s conduct should be sanctioned. The OBC recommended that the
respondent be severely reprimanded .
Issue:
Whether or not the City Prosecutor should be disbarred.
Ruling:
Complaint Dismissed.
The Court considers that the evidence adduced by the complaint insufficient to warrant the
disbarment of the respondent. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction
against a misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always
exercised with great caution only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
However, unlike the OBC, the Court does not find any justification to sanction the respondent. A
lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong
actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him
establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that the assailed
conduct or actuation constituted a breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics.
Otherwise, the lawyer merits exoneration.
Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag

A.C. No. 3405; March 18, 2014
Where a lawyer was disbarred by committing a grossly immoral act, his plea to be
readmitted to the Bar cannot be granted when the same are mere words that are hollow and bereft of
any substance, such as when he continued to live with the woman for whose sake he abandoned his
family. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is only enjoyed by those who continue to
display unassailable character.
Facts:
Julieta Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Dominador Narag,
her husband, for allegedly violating Rule 1.01 in relation to Canons 1 and 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. According to Julieta, when the respondent was then a college
instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cagayan, he maintained an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita, a 17-year old first year
Page 81 of 370
college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already abandoned her and their
children to live with Gina.
On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision directing the disbarment of the respondent. The
Court opined that the respondent committed an act of gross immorality and had breached the
high and exacting moral standards set for members of the legal profession.
On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed a petition for reinstatement to the Bar. Respondent
alleged that he has expressed his extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and children for his
misgivings. He presented an undated affidavit prepared by his son purportedly attesting to the
truth of the respondent’s claim. Furthermore, the respondent claimed that he enlisted in the
Philippine Air Force Reserve Command and as a member thereof, he enlisted in various rescue,
relief and recovery missions. He likewise submitted various recommendations, testimonials and
affidavits in support of his petition for readmission.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be readmitted to the Bar.
Ruling:
Petition for Reinstatement to the bar Denied.
The respondent’s pleas are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any substance. The Court, in
deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be
convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly
immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the
respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour—the woman for
whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet
learned from his prior misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would not likewise be sufficient
ground to grant respondent’s plea. It is noted that only his son signed the affidavit which was
supposed to evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta
and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the
respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven him does not
discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a
woman other than his wife.
In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown any remorse over his
transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the
legal profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege. It is only enjoyed by those who continue to display unassailable character.
Atty. Clodualdo C. De Jesus vs. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal

A.C. No. 7961; March 19, 2014
Carpio, J.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension
Page 82 of 370
proceedings always rests on the complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty
Facts:
RTC issued a decision approving a compromise agreement in a civil case. De Jesus filed an
omnibus motion to compel Torres to pay P4,000,000 as success fees and to sell some of the
latter’s properties, the certificates of title of which were still with De Jesus.
Subsequently, Torres filed an administrative complaint against De Jesus before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), alleging that the latter refused to return the certificates
of title of title despite having received the attorney’s fees. Risos-Vidal was then the Director of
IBP-CBD.
In the meantime, Risos-Vidal became the new counsel of Torres in the civil case. Subsequently,
De Jesus filed his answer to the complaint and alleged therein that the subject matter of the
complaint was sub judice because of the civil case, and that Risos-Vidal took advantage of her
position as Director of the IBP-CBD by actually preparing the complaint against him.
De Jesus filed an administrative complaint accusing Risos-Vidal of gross misconduct, dishonesty

and gross unethical behavior under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. In IBP’s Report and
Recommendation, the Commissioner recommended that the administrative complaint against
Risos-Vidal should be dismissed for lack of merit. When De Jesus filed for a motion for
reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governor denied the same. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and gross unethical behavior.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him
until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings
always rests on the complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that a clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. Thus, not only does the burden of proof that the respondent
committed the act complained of rests on complainant, but burden is not satisfied when
complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence.
In the present case, the Court finds that De Jesus failed to discharge the burden of proving Risos-
Vidal’s administrative liability by clear preponderance of evidence. Except for his allegations, De
Jesus did not present any proof to substantiate his claim that Risos-Vidal used her position as
Director of the IBP-CBD to enhance her law practice.
Under the Rules of the IBP-CBD, within two days from receipt of the verified complaint, the IBP-
CBD shall issue the required summons, stating that the respondent has fifteen days from receipt
Page 83 of 370
within which to file his answer. As Director of the IBP-CBD, Risos-Vidal merely complied with the
rules when after the IBP-CBD received the complaint against De Jesus, she ordered him to answer
the complaint. Risos-Vidal issued the order to De Jesus in a ministerial capacity, with no
discretion, and even before she became the new counsel of Torres in the civil case.
The Rules of the IBP-CBD further provide that after receiving the answer for the respondent, the
case shall be assigned by raffle to an Investigating Commissioner. The Investigating
Commissioner shall then set a mandatory conference, direct the submission of position papers
conduct clarification questioning, and submit his report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors. Every case heard by the Investigating Commissioner shall thereafter be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors. In the present case, the Investigating Commisioner assigned to the
complaint against De Jesus was not RIsos-Vidal.
Thus, Risos-Vidal could not have used her position as Director of IBP-CBD against De Jesus. The
Rules further provide that it is the IBP Board of Governors, by majority vote of its total
membership, which determines whether the respondent should be recommended for suspension
from the practice of law or for disbarment.
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A. RAMOS

A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014, C.J. Sereno
Atty. Ramos is the counsel of Quiachon in a labor case. Atty. Ramos failed to notify
Quiachon of the status of the case as well as to appeal the adverse ruling of the RTC. Quiachon filed
then a disbarment case but subsequently withdrew it. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective.
Facts:
Atty. Joseph Ramos represented Adelia Quiachon, who was then the plaintiff in a labor
case filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding
case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted Quiachon a favorable decision. Upon appeal, it was
reversed and set aside by the NLRC. The NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Atty. Ramos on Quiachon’s behalf. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA), but it affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA
Decision was received by Atty. Ramos on 23 November 2010.
Quiachon would always ask Atty. Ramos regarding the status of the case. Atty. Ramos said
that the case is still pending decision. Sometime in August 2011, while Quiachon was in Atty.
Ramos’ office, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case
printed thereon. She asked the secretary to open the envelope. Upon opening, she found out that
it contained the CA’s Entry of Final Judgment. She tried to contact Atty. Ramos to no avail. When
she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that "it was alright" as they still had six
months to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor
case were ever communicated to complainant.
Page 84 of 370
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again,
respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was
received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the instant disbarment Complaint against

respondent. The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. However, Quiachon filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint.
In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda)

held that Atty. Ramos was indeed negligent and remiss in his duties. However, the case is
dismissed due to the withdrawal of the complaint. The Board of Governors of the IBP resolving to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of investigation commissioner Almeyda.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Governors of the IBP was correct in affirming the decision of
the IBP Commissioner in dismissing the disbarment case
Ruling:
The IBP Board of Governors erred in adopting the recommendation of IBP Commissioner
Almeyda.
The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a
lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even after finding
that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared to have
"been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled
by him in behalf of complainant." Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case, because
"without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a
member of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable
reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly
withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.
Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure
could result in the dismissal of the appeal. The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to
Page 85 of 370
exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The
abandonment by the former of the latter's cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client
reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of
complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and
consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should
have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.
In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of
the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client's cause. It is
clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they
must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE

BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D. SIOTING vs.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO
A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects
the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.In the realm of legal
ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). Owing to the evident similarity of the issues
involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more
pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending
related cases in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
Facts:
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties)

in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International
Development Corp. (Rudex). In view of several inadequacies and construction defects in the
housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective
contracts to sell before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund
of the monthly amortizations they had paid. The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein
complainants Sioting on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo and Marquizo on June 10, 2002, while the
second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan on March 3, 2003, Solis and
Ederlinda M. Villanueva (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang on July 29, 2003.
In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of
rescission cases. Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review before the
HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said
petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated
that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that
Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on
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September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint
against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s
ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification
against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its Credit and Collection
department, Norilyn D. Unisan, Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any
action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. The
said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for rescission of contracts to sell and
ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on
behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against
forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any
knowledge of any similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was
its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have
been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when,
in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before
the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty.
Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document
number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately
attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment.
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative
charges against him.
In the interim, the HLURB, dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment on
the ground that its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were
false due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held

administratively liable. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a
suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly
suspended for a period of one (1) month.
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Ruling:
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on Atty. Nazareno’s
administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it proper to
modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects
the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held
administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003,
petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission
cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the
ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the complainants’
rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a
complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications
against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against
Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting.
Finally, on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints
against the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum
shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno
– as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even
bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be
imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law
was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false and
untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a
similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion,
had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year.
Page 88 of 370
AMADO T. DIZON vs. ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA

A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014, J. Reyes
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless
and non-existent. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on
the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.
Facts:
Amado Dizon (Dizon) alleged that he, along with his siblings, engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in a case. Dizon claimed that Atty. De
Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) from him to expedite the
proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee
as evidenced by a contract.
According to Dizon, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier, Atty. De Taza
had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from
his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to
expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Dizon went to the Court and learned that the Court had already denied the petition,
contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found.
Thereafter, Dizon instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza
issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda
executed an affidavit which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks in her favor amounting toP481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand
letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit was attached to
the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check for P50,000.00 as payment for her loan.
Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit, stating that Atty. De

Taza owes herP29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a
period of two years from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors modified the
Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation.
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Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing
checks, demanding and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having the
proceedings before the court expedited.
Ruling:
The Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law
for two years.
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards Dizon and his siblings were even worse as she had the
gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited
and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was
employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De
Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the name
of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza
demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been
made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach." "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with
accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke
the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is
reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.”
VICTOR C. LINGAN vs. ATTYS. CALUBAQUIB BALIGA, ROMEO and JIMMY P. BALIGA
A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014, J. Leonen
The court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all
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functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
Facts:
In the resolution, the court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty
of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's
Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of
Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice
of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying that respondents
be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. It was denied for lack of merit. Atty.
Baliga, also the Regional Director of the CHR Regional Office, filed the undated ex parte
clarificatory pleading. In his pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that Lingan requested the Commission
to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law. After this
court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the CHR En Banc issued the resolution,
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the CHR Regional Office. According
to the CHR En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law prevented him from
assuming his post as Regional Director for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to
practice law is suspended. 11 Atty. Baliga · argued ·that he cannot be suspended for acts not
connected with his functions as CHR Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension
from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for
clarification of this court's resolution to prevent further injury and prejudice to his rights. The
court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not
render advisory opinions.
The court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter, Lingan alleged that
Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as CHR Regional Director, in
violation of this court's order of suspension. Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of
the functions of a CHR Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect a non-lawyer was
disqualified to hold the position of Regional Director.
The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib
and Baliga had already lapsed. It also said that the Commission deliberately disregarded the
court's order of suspension. The CHR had no power to alter, modify, or set aside any of this
court's resolutions which have become final and executory. On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a
manifestation, arguing that his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension
from public office. Atty. Baliga said, to stretch the coverage of his suspension from the practice of
law to his public office would be tantamount to violating his constitutional rights sic to due
process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded. . Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga filed motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law. In his comment,
Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he performed, generally, managerial functions,
which did not require the practice of law. Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not
Page 91 of 370
require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed that he faithfully complied with this court's
resolution suspending him from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga should not have been allowed to
perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities as Regional Director which required acts
constituting practice of law. Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his
functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
Ruling:
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member
of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this
authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional
Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or
suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
The court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006,
effective immediately. From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July
5, 2006, he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his
position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI.
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on
Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended
after: investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office. Second,
the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as
Regional Director.
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
A.C. No. 8108, July 15, 2014
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
A.C. No. 10299, July 15, 2014, CJ. Sereno
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
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the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
Facts:
Brodett and Tecson were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution, the
charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during
the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up”
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing
that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ
letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano
contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said
order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano’s verified Complaint-Affidavit was filed with the Committee
on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
Officers of the IBP, Cebu City Chapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment
proceedings. On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a
similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to
the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of
the bar.
Ruling:
The Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar,
irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these
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proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a
member of the bar.
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-
Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds
to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that “a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.” We
believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,

respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order
from the DOJ Secretary.
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission
that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending
before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official
DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of “expediting the case.”
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment
and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior
sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively
avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing
case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To
that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Rule 1.02 states: “A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Further, according to Rule 15.06, “a lawyer shall
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not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.” The
succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer “to impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness.”
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the
law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is
to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these
exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would
not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.
RAUL M. FRANCIA vs. ATTY. REYNALDO V. ABDON

A.C. No. 10031, July 23, 2014, J. Reyes
Complainant Raul Francia filed a disbarment case against Labor Arbiter Abdon for allegedly
asking for P100,000,000 in order for the latter to facilitate the release of a favorable decision of a
case to which the Labor Union of Francia is a petitioner. In dismissing the case, the Supreme Court
ruled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the Court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof. The complainant miserably failed to substantiate his claims with
preponderant evidence. In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of
the lawyer subsists and the complaint against him must be dismissed.
Facts:
In a verified complaint dated December 4, 2007 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD), Raul M. Francia prayed for the disbarment
and imposition of other disciplinary sanctions on Labor Arbiter (LA) Reynaldo V. Abdon for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his position paper, the complainant alleged that in November 2006, he had a meeting
with Abdon to seek his assistance with respect to a pending case in the Court of Appeals (CA)
involving the labor union of Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative (NEECO III). Abdon, who is a LA
at the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando, Pampanga, told the complainant that
he can facilitate, expedite and ensure the release of a favorable decision, particularly the award of
assets and management of NEECO III to the union.
In December 2006, the complainant met the respondent to discuss their plan and
timetable in securing a favorable ruling from the CA. The respondent told him that in order to
facilitate the release of such favorable decision, the union must produce the amount of
P1,000,000.00, a considerable portion of which is intended for Justice Sundiam, the ponente of the
case and the two member justices of the division, while a fraction thereof is allotted to his costs.
Shortly thereafter, the complainant met the respondent again and handed him the amount of
P350,000.00, which was raised out of the individual contributions of the members of the union, as
partial payment for the agreed amount and undertook to pay the balance as soon as the union is
finally allowed to manage and operate the electric cooperative. In turn, the respondent assured
him that a favorable ruling will be rendered by the CA in no time.
Page 95 of 370
A week before Christmas of the same year, the complainant made several followups with
the respondent about the status of the decision. Abdon made several excuses in response to these
inquiries. On January 4, 2007, the union was advised by their counsel that the CA has already
rendered a decision on their case and the same was adverse to them. This infuriated the union
members who then turned to the complainant and demanded for the return of the P350,000.00
that they raised as respondent’s facilitation fee. Respondent Abdon returned the amount of
P100,000 but failed to return the remaining amount, thus, the Francia was constrained to give his
car to the union to settle the remaining balance which the respondent failed to return.
For his part, the respondent denied that he made any representation to the complainant;
that he had the capacity to facilitate the release of a favorable decision in the CA; and that he
received money in exchange therefor.
In the Report and Recommendation of the IBPCBD dated September 30, 2008, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended for the dismissal of the complaint, holding that there
is no proof that the respondent received money from the complainant. Upon review of the case,
the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII2008545, reversing the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. On February 23, 2009, the respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the IBP Board of Governors denied the same in its Resolution No. XX201355.
The case is now before this Court for confirmation.
Issue:
Whether the disbarment case against respondent Abdon has merit
Ruling:
The case has no merit. It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. The
complainant miserably failed to substantiate his claims with preponderant evidence. Surely, he
cannot prove the respondent’s culpability by merely presenting equivocal statements of some
individuals or relying on plain gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination. Considering
the lasting effect of the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment on a lawyer’s
professional standing, this Court cannot allow that the respondent be held liable for misconduct
on the basis of surmises and imagined possibilities. A mere suspicion cannot substitute for the
convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer.
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer

subsists and the complaint against him must be dismissed. After a careful review of the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the complainant fell
short of the required quantum of proof. Aside from bare allegations, no evidence was presented to
convincingly establish that the respondent engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct,
particularly in extortion and influence peddling.
Page 96 of 370
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED vs. NICOLAS TORRES

A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Hence, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Facts:
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged
in overseas maritime employment. It hired Torres, a medical doctor and a lawyer by profession, as
its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal counsel and to
oversee the administration and management of legal cases and medical-related claims instituted
by seafarers against complainant’s various principals. Among the cases Torres handled in his
capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi, Rodelio J.
Sampani, Joseph C. Delgado, and Edmundo M. Chua.
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per Torres’ request, CF Sharp Crew
Management issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00,
and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.
However, the former later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued
to Delgado, Torres never gave the checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at
International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.
With respect to Sampani, CF Sharp Crew Management also discovered that he only received the
amounts of P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
P652,013.20, through checks not issued by CF Sharp Crew Management.
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order requiring Torres to file
an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did he appear in the mandatory conference
scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he file his position paper.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes, he did.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected
or received for or from his client.
Page 97 of 370
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. In this case, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner correctly found that CF Sharp Crew Management had duly proven its
charges against Torres. Clearly, the latter’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse
of trust and confidence reposed in him by the CF Sharp Crew Management, and betrayal of his
client’s interests which he is duty-bound to protect.
ROLANDO VIRAY vs. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS

A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014, J. Del Castillo
[O]ther than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support
[Sanicas’] claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that Viray
agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly
incurred in connection with the case. [Sanicas] did not present any document, retainer's agreement,
or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even
assuming that [Sanicas] was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from
his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional
employment. “The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He
is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his
client.” “The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected
for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.” Moreover, a
lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone
that the client owes him attorney's fees.”
Facts:
Complainant Viray alleges that he engaged the services of Respondent Sanicas relative to a
labor case he filed against his former employers. Having won the labor case and intending to
collect the total monetary award of PhP189,491.60, Viray monitored the execution of the
judgment. He later discovered that Sanicas already collected the amount of PhP95,000.00 from
the adverse party, through representations that there is sufficient authority coming from herein
Complainant Viray to receive the monetary award.
Thereafter, Viray demanded that this amount of money be returned to him by Sanicas,
however, the latter remained obstinate in spite the former bringing the matter with the barangay.
In his Comment to Viray's administrative complaint, Sanicas contends that Viray promised to give
him 25% of the monetary judgment on top of the reimbursement of the legal expenses incurred
for the litigation of the claim. The investigating commissioner and as adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors recommended that Sanicas be suspended for two years from the practice of law and
that he restitute his client of the excess of his attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not Sanicas is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to properly account
the finances of his client.
Page 98 of 370
Ruling:
YES, Sanicas failed to perform his duties under the CPRL towards his client and uphold
the standards of the legal profession.
“The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.”
Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to “account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.” Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand.”
In this case, [Sanicas] on nine separate occasions… received payments for attorney's fees
and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of [Viray]... But despite the number of times
over close to three months he had been receiving payment, [Sanicas] neither informed [Viray] of
such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was
issued and being implemented when [Viray] discovered that [Sanicas received] the total amount
of P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, [Sanicas] withheld and refused to deliver to [Viray] said amount,
which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. [Viray] brought the matter
before the barangay, but [Sanicas] simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordi-nate refusal…
to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption that he
converted it to his own use. His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action against him.
[Sanicas] justifies his action by asserting that [Viray] authorized him to receive payment.
He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from [the adverse
party] to his additional 25% attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the
case, in the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of P95,000.00
the amounts of P20,000.00, Pl 7,000.00, and P2,000.00, what was left to [Sanicas], to his dismay
was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other
than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support [Sanicas']
claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that Viray agreed to
pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in
connection with the case. [Sanicas] did not present any document, retainer's agree-ment, or
itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even
assuming that [Sanicas] was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from
his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his
professional employment. “The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client.” “The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his
hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting.” Moreover, a lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees.”
Page 99 of 370
In sum, [Sanicas’] failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D.

A.C. No. 10240, November 25, 2014, Per Curiam
Sanchez extended a loan to Atty. Torres in the amount of 2,200,000.00. Atty. Torres failed to
pay said obligation. This prompted Sanchez to file a complaint for disciplinary action against Atty.
Torres. The IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Torres be suspended
for 2 years and be ordered to pay the loaned amount. In this regard, the Court ruled that in a
previous case, Atty. Torres was already disbarred, therefore he cannot be meted the penalty of
suspension. Moreover, the Court cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s recommendation ordering
respondent to return the amount of P2,200,000.00 to complainant. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative
liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose to file against each other.
Facts:
Estrella Sanchez is a friend and close acquaintance of Atty. Torres. That in 2007, Atty.
Torres asked Sanchez to lend him money in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,200,000.00), and convinced her that he will pay the said amount within a period of one
(1) month, plus interest. Sanchez was convinced and handed him the cash amounting to Two
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00. To bolster Sanchez's trust and confidence,
Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied Bank checks in the total amount of P2,200,000.002
However, after one (1) month, Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised. When
Sanchez called Atty. Torres, she was told that she could again deposit the check. When Sanchez
deposited the said checks to her account, but the same were returned due to "ACCOUNT
CLOSED."
Despite repeated demands for the last three (3) years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay his
obligation since then, and thus, complainant sought legal assistance. As a consequence, formal
demand letters were sent by the complainant's lawyer. Atty. Torres failed and refused to pay his
obligation. Nonetheless, Atty. Torres, in his letter, promised to pay anew the amount of
P2,200,000.00 in cash on or before May 15, 2009 as replacement for the two checks he previously
issued. But no payment whatsoever was made.
The IBP–Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required Atty. Torres to file an answer.
However, Atty. Torres moved for extension of time to file an answer. The IBP-CBD noted that
Atty. Torres had yet to file his Answer to the complaint even after the expiration of the extension
period earlier granted; thus, a final extension was given anew Despite sufficient time for
respondent Atty. Torres to file his answer, he failed to do so. Worse, he even failed to appear in
the scheduled mandatory conference despite due notice.
Page 100 of 370

The IBP-CBD found Atty. Torres guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for
failure to pay just debt and for issuing checks without sufficient funds. It recommended that Atty.
Torres be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for at least two (2) years. On March
20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the IBP-CBD.
On August 5, 2013, Atty. Torres, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration. However, despite the lapse of considerable
time after the receipt of notice to comply with the said Resolution, no motion for reconsideration
was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Torres should be sanctioned for the imputed actions against him
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Torres should be sanctioned. He indeed violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. Sanchez was able to
discharge her burden of proving that she loaned P2,200,000.00 to Atty. Torres as evidenced by the
subject bank checks. Furthermore, backed by Atty. Torres' admission in his letter dated May 9,
2009, his promise to pay the amount of P2,200,000.00 in cash, as replacement for the two checks
he previously issued, is more than sufficient to establish a valid obligation of Atty. Torres to
Sanchez. Atty. Torres’ admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leave
no room for interpretation. Likewise, other than his belated and empty claims of payment, Atty.
Torres failed to discharge his burden of proving that he had indeed paid his obligation to
Sanchez.
The Court also note Atty. Torres' conduct in the course of the proceedings where he
repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration, which
he failed to submit, and his failure to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP do not speak
well of his standing as a lawyer.
The Court deems it proper to adopt the penalty of two (2) years suspension in light of the
amount involved and the brazen disregard by Atty. Torres of the Orders of the IBP-CBD on the
filing of an answer and appearance in the hearing. The Court cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s
recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of P2,200,000.00 to complainant. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
actions which the parties may choose to file against each other.
However, the Court notes that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres,
the Court had already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Page 101 of 370

RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C. RASING vs . ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III AND
PABLO R. CRUZ
The case is about whether the respondent should be held administratively liable due to the
fact that there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts as
to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the respondents. The court
ruled that there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and
maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the
dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon the Court
that the only logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO
Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents must have induced
Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of extending the period to file, the
otherwise time-barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this leap of inference proffered by the
complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in any way supported by
clear substantial evidence required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a
member of the Bar.
Facts:
Two (2) administrative cases for disbarment filed by complainants Raul C. Lanuza
(Lanuza) and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing) against lawyers Frankie O. Magsalin III (Atty.
Magsalin) and Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and against Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter
Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go) for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct in violation
of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant Lanuza against
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI), which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of
respondents Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices
(PRC Law Office). CA rendered a decision favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate him with
full backwages. According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia),
received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law
office located in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the
Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by
Atty. Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment with a copy
of the CA decision on April 10, 2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the
postman would belatedly deliver the said Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law
Office, which was also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days after he received his own copies.
Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a
certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the CA decision by
the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007 Certification, issued by Llewelyn F. Fallarme
(Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the Registered Letter No. S-
1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman Pecante)
and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of
Postman Pecante. With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the
disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz
Page 102 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held administratively liable
Ruling:
No, they should not be held administratively liable.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As
a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against
him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to
have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus,
insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.
Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return
Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the
respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that the respondents
intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and
resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would like
to impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates
between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents
must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of
extending the period to file, the otherwise time-barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this
leap of inference proffered by the complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture
and not in any way supported by clear substantial evidence required to justify the imposition of
an administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. Even if the postmaster’s certifications were to
merit serious consideration, the Court cannot avoid the legal reality that the registry return card
is considered as the official CA record evidencing service by mail. This card carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have been regularly
performed. In this sense, it is presumed to be accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise.
The Court finds merit in the respondents’ argument that had Calucag stamped an
inaccurate date on the registry return receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and had full view
of the receiving and stamping of the said registry return receipts, would have called her attention
to correct the same or would have refused to receive them altogether for being erroneous. Here,
Postman Pecante having accepted two registry return receipts with the dates, April 10, 2007 and
July 23, 2007, respectively, can only mean that the said postman considered the dates indicated
therein to be correct and accurate. While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out
the proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, the
Court will not wield its axe against those the accusations against whom are not indubitably
proven. Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint for
disbarment should be dismissed.
Page 103 of 370

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

A.C. No. 10576, January 1, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Arcatomy S. Guari against Atty. Christine Antenor-
Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply
with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Facts:
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President
of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI) when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any
share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin, as corporate secretary, admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing
Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS
was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but
unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was
made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information
from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.
In its Report, the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months.
It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI
consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that
Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Limpin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
Page 104 of 370

respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has
performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP
that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits
that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she
made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that
Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. The
Court also notes that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin
was in fact a stockholder. The Court thus finds that in filing a GIS that contained false
information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer
in accord with Canon 1and Rule 1.01 ofthe CPR.
The Court also agrees with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the
corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of
such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 ofthe CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action in submitting a false

document the Court see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension
from the practice of law.
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING vs. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA

The petitioners filed an administrative complaint against the respondent. It is the contention
of the respondent that the Waiver and Quitclaim signed by the petitioners would bar his
administrative prosecution. The Supreme Court ruled that a case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Facts:
Umaguing run for the position of SK Chairman for the year 2007. He lost the elections by
one vote. This prompted him to file an election protest and avail of the services of the respondent
Atty. De Vera. Subsequently during the pendency of the election protest, the petitioner spouses
requested Atty. De Vera to withdraw as their counsel because of their lack of confidence and
trust. They then instituted an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Vera.
Page 105 of 370

They allege that the De Vera caused the falsification of the signature of one of the witnesses in the
case.
After due investigation, the IBP recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from
practice of law for 2 months. Hence, the current petition.
It is the contention of Atty. De Vera that when he withdrew as counsel for the spouses, the
said spouses signed a document designated as a “Waiver and Quitclaim” releasing him from any
action that may be brought against him by the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable for falsifying the
signature of one of the witnesses in the case.
Ruling:
Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable. The Supreme Court adopted the
findings of the IBP. However, it increased the suspension period from 2 months to 6 months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every
lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations,
though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of
this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is
by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this
light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.”
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case,
would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively.
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest

of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
Page 106 of 370

undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted
the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort
to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. Atty. Catindig’s
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
Facts:
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the
mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed.
It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita,
Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her
pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he
refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her
that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to
their marriage.
Page 107 of 370

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan
Jegar Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since
the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union
by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still
have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she
came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the said letter,
Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is
removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage.
On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son. Atty. Catindig, in
his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with
her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was
blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. Atty.
Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican
Republic court on June 12, 1984. Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing,
including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any
effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left
their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. He denied that Atty. Baydo
was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall
apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999;
and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him.
He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed
that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected
Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since
he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty.
Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.
Page 108 of 370

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. After due proceedings, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, which recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not
only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’” In
various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful
wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out
of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the
evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous
letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love
letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
PO1 JOSE B. CASPE vs. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA

A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in good moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor as to render him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. In disciplinary
Page 109 of 370

proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to
establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of
by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. The Court has required that a
complainant has the onus of proving the charges against respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar, there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the
cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. Thus, we agree that the confluence of
circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against
Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
Facts:
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo Gaduena, a
barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on
duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which
was turned over to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police
blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other
barangay tanods who allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and
harmony, the Chief of Police called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against
the barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint for serious slander by
deed against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit of two barangay tanods. It was
alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to
disregard the agreement with the Chief of Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting
that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for
damages and disbarment against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP CBD found Atty. Mejica guilty of violating
Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in
encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his threat to file case upon case against
the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this was Atty. Mejica’s second
infraction for a similar offense.
In its April 15, 2013 Resolution, the IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of
the IBP CBD. Atty. Mejica moved for reconsideration. In its May 3, 2014 Resolution, the IBP BOG
denied the motion for reconsideration and modified the penalty by increasing the period of
suspension to three years.
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a
Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not receive
a copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009
Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he
received the Notice in the afternoon of February 3, 2009. Furthermore, he was not given the
opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he
was not present during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening
words.
Page 110 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not the Report and Recommendation of the IBP CBD that Atty. Mejica is
guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR should be adopted by the IBP BOG.
Ruling:
Based on the Report and Recommendation, the Court is convinced that there is sufficient
evidence to sanction Atty. Mejica. The following observation by the IBP CBD is well taken:
First, when the cases were initiated and filed against PO1 Caspe through the help of Atty.
Mejica, he was already facing disbarment and civil cases which the former filed against
him. Second, these cases were filed after Atty. Mejica made the threat to file cases against PO1
Caspe by reason of the refusal to withdraw the disbarment and civil cases. Third, a gap of more
than five months elapsed between the incident of December 21, 2007 and the filing of the grave
slander by deed and that during this period, the chief of Police who was presumed to have
regularly performed his job did not prosecute the criminal cases against Gaduena and
companions. Fourth, during the said period, PO1 Caspe who was presumed to have taken
ordinary care of his cause did not file the criminal cases against Gaduena and companions. Fifth,
the existence of a settlement agreement between PO1 Caspe and Brgy. Captain Agda, Kagawad
Sobresida and the other tanods is therefore factual, but despite such settlement, the case for grave
slander by deed was still filed with Atty. Mejica as counsel. Sixth, PO1 Caspe filed this disbarment
case only after the grave slander by deed and the multiple attempted murders were filed against
him with the help of Atty. Mejica. Seventh, and most importantly, despite ethical proscription,
Atty. Mejica served as counsel for the criminal complainants against PO1 Caspe.
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the
cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. We agree that the confluence of
circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against
Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not
able to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended
the mandatory conference, we find this untenable. Atty. Mejica during the course of these
proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings supposedly since he was not furnished any
copy of the complaint. Records suggest however that a copy of the complaint was sent to him on
August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He submitted two manifestations in response to
notices he received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an action against him.
It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the IBP
indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. We thus hold that Atty. Mejica
further violated Canon 11 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to observe and give due respect to
courts and judicial officers. Given that this is Atty. Mejica’s second infraction, we thus rule it
appropriate under the circumstances to impose a two-year suspension from the practice of law.
Page 111 of 370

ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES vs. MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO

G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015, J. Peralta
Atty. Gonzales was charged with grave misconduct for forcefully kissing Serrano. The court
ruled that Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered
as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In other
words, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be evident
Facts:
Serrano alleged Atty. Gonzales forcefully kissed her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene,
Roman and other customers. Serrano tried to ward off Atty. Gonzales by pulling her head away
from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her will. She also alleged that prior to that
“kissing” incident, petitioner had already degraded her person on four (4) separate occasions.
Atty. Gonzales alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed to treat them for lunch, as it was
Serrano’s birthday, and she had no money for a “blowout”. While their group was talking in the
restaurant, he greeted Serrano and planted an innocent birthday greeting kiss on her left cheek,
near her lips. He also alleged that he first met respondent when she applied for Attorney III; that
on July 1, 2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by the Personnel and
Administrative Division as to her frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of reviewing her
official functions was in accordance with his duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of
PHILRACOM.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Gonzales is guilty of grave misconduct
Ruling:
Yes, He is guilty of grave misconduct
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence;
otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists
in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others. In other words, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident.
Page 112 of 370

In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, Atty. Felipe used his position and authority as Head of the Legal Division of
PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors and to indulge in sexually
malicious acts from his respondent, his female subordinate. As to Atty. Felipe's sole defense that
he merely gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in view
of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips and said:
“Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila.”
Atty. Gonzales acts of grabbing and attempting to kiss Serrano were, no doubt,
intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures
to [complainant] De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome.
Considering that the acts Atty Gonzales committed against Serrano were much more aggressive,
it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ vs. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA

A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, J. Leonen
When a lawyer knowingly issues a check against insufficient balance, he shall be liable for
serious misconduct.
Facts:
Teresita Enriquez was a businesswoman engaged in building cell site towers. She met
Atty. Trina De Vera by subcontracting a cell site acquisition. De Vera loaned from Enriquez the
amount of P500,000 and P100,000, respectively. As a result, De Vera issued several postdated
checks to cover the obligation incurred. However, when Enriquez tried to encash them, the
checks were dishonored by the bank citing insufficient funds. Enriquez decided to give it another
try but it was still dishonored due to closed account.
Enriquez demanded from De Vera her payment for the obligation but they fell on deaf
ears. This prompted to Enriquez administrative action for disbarment or suspension against De
Vera.
De Vera, in her defense, stated that it was Enriquez who had unpaid obligations and
vehemently denied that she contracted the second loan. She also argued that provided that there
was truth to the allegation that she issued a check against insufficient funds, De Vera did not
issue it for value but only as a guaranty.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found that De Vera committed serious
misconduct by issuing checks without sufficient funds or against a closed account and
recommended the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for 1 year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera is guilty of serious misconduct
Page 113 of 370

Ruling:
Yes. In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she
also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Misconduct involves “wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment” it is
serious or gross when it is flagrant. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the
consequences of her acts. Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws
whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would
not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal
Profession as a whole."
INOCENCIO I. BALISTOY vs. ATTY. FLORENCIO A. BRON

A.C. No. 8667, 3 February 2016, J. Brion
FACTS:
Complainant Inocencio I. Balistoy was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-105743 (the “Case”),
entitled Inocencio I. Balistoy v. Paul L. Wee and Peter L. Wee, for damages, pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Manila. Respondent Atty. Florencio A. Bron was the
counsel for the defendants, the Wee brothers.
On March 5, 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Issuance of Order
to Show Cause with Counterclaim in the Case. The Wee brothers executed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for the motion, exhibiting Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
No. 12249877, issued on January 9, 2003 in Quezon City, for Paul, and CTC No. 1385810, issued on
January 29, 2003, in Manila, for Peter. On January 20, 2004, respondent filed an Answer for the
defendants who exhibited CTC No. 12249877 for Paul and CTC No. 12249883 for Peter, both CTCs
issued on January 9, 2003, in Manila. The complainant, however, discovered that the CTCs
exhibited by Paul and Peter had already expired and that the CTC Paul used for the Answer had
the same number as the CTC he showed for the Motion to Dismiss, but the place of issue was
changed from Manila to Quezon City.
With regard to the Case, an order was issued declaring that defendants have waived their
right to present evidence, and that the case was considered submitted for decision. According to
the order, when the case was called for the reception of evidence on September 6, 2006,
respondent appeared in the morning of that day and manifested before the clerk of court that one
of the defendants' nephews suffered injuries in a vehicular accident, thus, the reason for their
failure to attend the hearing. The defendants moved for reconsideration of the order alleging
therein that they defendants failed to attend the hearing on account of the knee injury suffered by
Paul in a vehicular accident in the morning. In proof of this, respondent submitted an unsigned
medical certificate dated November 27, 2006, issued by Dr. Joy M. Villano.
On June 20, 2007, Atty. Bron moved for a resetting of the hearing on the ground that Paul,
who was scheduled to testify on that day and who had just arrived from Malaysia with a fever, was
placed under quarantine. In compliance with the court’s order, respondent submitted a medical
certificate dated June 18, 2007 to prove that Paul was quarantined in Malaysia. Complainant,
however, discovered that the NAIA arrival logbook showed that Paul was not registered as a
passenger coming from Malaysia on June 18, 2007.
Page 114 of 370

In light of the foregoing, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent for disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is violated the Notarial Law and acted with gross misconduct.
RULING:
No sufficient evidence to prove that Respondent's participated in the fraudulent or

deceitful acts
There is nothing in the records that clearly indicates that respondent had knowledge of
his clients' fraudulent and deceitful acts with respect to their CTCs, or having known of their
defects, he had done nothing to correct their invalidity. In any event, respondent’s notarization of
the motion to dismiss and the answer in the civil case did not give merit to the Wee brothers'
defense nor did it weaken complainant’s case. Neither did the submission of Paul's medical
certificates constitute a gross misconduct in the practice of law by respondent as the evidence do
not show that he was the one who "procured" the medical certificates or caused Paul's getting sick
in Malaysia. In sum, complainant failed to discharge the burden of proof in his bid to disbar
respondent.
In Ricardo Manubay v. Atty. Gina C. Garcia, the Court held: "A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in moral character, probity or good
demeanor. The lawyer's guilt, however, cannot be presumed. Allegation is never equivalent to
proof and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability." Again, Balistoy failed to provide clear
and convincing evidentiary support to his allegations against Atty. Bron.
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET. AL. vs. ATTY. DANIEL D.
MANGALLAY
A.C. No. 10483, 18 March 2016, J. Bersamin
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Daniel D. Mangallay, as plaintiff, won in an ejectment action against

complainant The Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (“CSP-PLC”),
whose church building and other structures were the objects of the action. During the appeal, the
parties agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal
and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration
of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the respondent's
financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the agreement; hence, at the
respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by
virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante
(“Pante”), to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his based on his
Page 115 of 370

allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the
demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful
order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge. Complainant alleges that
the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled materials
worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his
legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition order;
that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious mischief;
and that his act warranted his disbarment.
Respondent, however, denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was
backed up by a court order; that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 2013 stated that CSP-PLC
did not comply with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises;
that he consequently sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the
writ of demolition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.
RULING:
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance
The court held that the documents submitted by respondent to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to
establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of
the structures of complainants
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013.
In the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully
discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was
by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The
complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who
did not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution.
After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful
implementation of the writ of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking
away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the
defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and
undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent
paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by CSP-
PLC on the same day. But the latter reneged on their part of the agreement without returning the
P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the
judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his
option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within
thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by the
Page 116 of 370

defendants on the subject property." Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of
the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." Respondent’s act of taking the
materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating
them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most
likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET. AL. vs. ATTY. DANIEL D.
MANGALLAY
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Daniel D. Mangallay, as plaintiff, won in an ejectment action against

complainant The Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (“CSP-PLC”),
whose church building and other structures were the objects of the action. During the appeal, the
parties agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal
and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration
of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the respondent's
financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the agreement; hence, at the
respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by
virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante
(“Pante”), to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his based on his
allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the
demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful
order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge. Complainant alleges that
the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled materials
worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his
legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition order;
that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious mischief;
and that his act warranted his disbarment.
Respondent, however, denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was
backed up by a court order; that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 2013 stated that CSP-PLC
did not comply with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises;
that he consequently sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the
writ of demolition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.
Ruling:
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance
Page 117 of 370

The court held that the documents submitted by respondent to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to
establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of
the structures of complainants
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013.
In the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully
discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was
by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The
complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who
did not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution.
After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful
implementation of the writ of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking
away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the
defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and
undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent
paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by CSP-
PLC on the same day. But the latter reneged on their part of the agreement without returning the
P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the
judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his
option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within
thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by the
defendants on the subject property." Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of
the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." Respondent’s act of taking the
materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating
them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most
likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.
ATTY. ANTERO M. SISON, JR. vs. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO

A.C. No. 10910, 12 January 2016, Per Curiam
Facts:
On 4 March 2011, respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, as the counsel of Marsman-

Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (“MDAHI”) in an insurance claim action against Paramount
Life & General Insurance Corp. (“Paramount Insurance”), met with the corporate secretary of
MDAHI, Atty. Enrique Dimaano, and proposed to increase MDAHI’s claim from P14,863,777.00 to
P64,412,534 by taking into account the interests imposed. The respondent, however, clarified that
the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00.
MDAHI agreed and granted said amount to Atty. Dimaano. On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave
the money for docket fees to respondent who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but
never did. The Corporate Secretary of MDAHI, complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, later
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discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI
granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.
On August 11, 2011, respondent sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount Insurance in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal
with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its
conforme on said letter. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI, respondent
filed the Satisfaction of Judgment dated 15 August 2011 before the RTC, stating that the parties had
entered into a compromise agreement.
On August 18, 2011, complainant met with respondent to clarify the events that transpired.
He asked respondent whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and
the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (“PBP-CBD”) a verified Affidavit-Complaint against respondent for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”).
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
Ruling:
Respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client,
respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI
did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement. However, despite the lack of a
written special authority, respondent agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf of his client
and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the RTC. Although MDAHI subsequently received the
payment of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase respondent’s transgression in
reaching the compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.
Respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR for the following reasons: (1) when MDAHI
granted the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to respondent, it was understood that such amount was
necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees. Yet, when complainant confronted
respondent regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of
court as the payment period had lapsed. Evidently, respondent did not apply the amount given to
him by his client for its intended legal purpose; (2) respondent failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI
from the moment he received the said amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort, the Court held that ethical
and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts,
even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records; and (3) on 26 May
2011, the RTC already rendered its decision, adjudging MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in
the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00. Despite a decision having been rendered,
respondent did not reject the said amount or return it to his client upon receipt thereof on 27
May 2011.
Page 119 of 370

Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money
entrusted to him by the clients. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and
his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for
the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
READMISSION TO THE BAR
CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.

A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014
In a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law, the Court will take into consideration
his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s
for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as
shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, the passage of more than four (4) years is insufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions especially when it is
the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct. It is the
duty of the Court to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity.
Facts:
In a Decision dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the
practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of
multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and
deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court.
The respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Banc
resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy asking the
Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that the
complainant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly
immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame
on another individual to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to
his disbarment was not of his own doing. However, the Court denied the appeal.
Page 120 of 370

The respondent again wrote the Court reiterating his pleas for the Court's compassion and
mercy. He sought the Court's forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the same
time, questioning the Court's finding for lack of factual support.
The respondent subsequently sent a letter addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc
once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for
more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been
involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in different religious services.
The plea was also denied.
On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency reiterating
his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on
his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic
kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. The respondent also pleads
for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from
being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep
remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member

of the Philippine Bar considering his sincere repentance and taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanour as well as unfortunate physical condition.
Ruling:
No, he cannot be reinstated.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural,

absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred
lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that
only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted
to the Bar.
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character
of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
In the case at bar, although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently
lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, as we note that before his
admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active involvement and participation
Page 121 of 370

in community and church activities and had actively engaged and participated in various
community projects, still, the Court is not convinced that respondent had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.
The Court is not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty
of gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr., was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law - mostly the same
grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus
Builders, we granted the respondent's motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the
respondent.
Considering the respondent's earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of the
penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending
review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and
perversity of the respondent's misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider
the respondent's reinstatement.
Furthermore, while he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility
of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, the decision
to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
Carlito Ang vs. Atty. James Joseph Gupana

A.C. No. 4545; February 5, 2014
J. Villarama Jr.
A jurat in the Affidavit of Loss stating that the person executing it had subscribed to the
affidavit before the notary public when in fact such person was already dead prior to its execution, is
made in violation of the notarial law. A party acknowledging must appear before the notary public
or any other person authorized to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents. The failure
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of a notary public to require the personal presence of such party can hold him administratively liable
for violation of his notarial duties.
Facts:
Carlito Ang is one of the heirs of Candelaria Magpayo. He received a parcel of land as his share.
When he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he discovered that the old TCT had already been
cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs had been issued in the names of the other heirs and third
persons. Because of this, Ang filed a complaint against Atty. Gupana for the latter’s direct
participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications, being the one who prepared and
notarized an Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of a
new TCTs. Ang further alleged that Atty. Gupana made himself the attorney-in-fact of the other
heirs, and pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale selling
the subject parcel of land even though a civil case involving the same was still pending before the
RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late
Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she died three
years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.
Respondent Atty. Gupana denied the allegations of Ang and argued that the latter is merely using
the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case to
accede to his wishes.
The Investigating Commissioner submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent

administratively liable and recommended for his suspension from the practice of law for three
months. It was further held that Atty. Gupana committed an unethical act when he allowed
himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property despite his knowledge that the
same is the subject of a pending litigation. The investigating Commissioner additionally found
that the respondent delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before
being brought to him for his signature.
Subsequently, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended penalty. The Board recommended
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s
notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.
Atty. Gupana filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Board denied the same. Hence, the
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer committed any unethical act.
Ruling:
The resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is affirmed.
The Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when he sold the property in dispute as
the sellers’ attorney–in–fact because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the
particular lot sold. However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his
notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he
Page 123 of 370

notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994. Section 1 of
Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
Sec. 1. x x x(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an

officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public
or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In the
case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit
before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.
Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, the Court emphasized the significance of the act of
notarization, to wit:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers
and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. It devolves upon
respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned documents.
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining the integrity
of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his
infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
Page 124 of 370

Wilberto C. Talisic vs. Atty. Primo R. Rinen

A.C. No. 8761; February 12, 2014
J. Reyes
The lawyer’s failure to personally verify the identity of all the parties who purportedly signed
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and Sale indicates a failure on his part to exercise the due
diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-officio. Furthermore, the fact that the
lawyer was a trial court judge during the time he administered the oath for the subject deed did not
relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon other
commissioned notaries public. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of public instruments would be undermined.
Facts:
Wilberto Talisic instituted an administrative case against Atty. Rinen, charging the latter with
falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to spouses Durante
a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto’s mother, Aurora Corpuz.
According to Wilberto, it was only after his father died that he and his siblings came to know
about the transfer the parcel of land via the subject deed. Wilberto believed that although his
father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were
merely forged.
Atty. Rinen denied the charge against him and explained that he only came to know of the
transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his
office as the then Presiding Judge of MTC, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and
notarized. He claimed that his clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered
the parties to his office for the administration of oath. The deed contained his certification that at
the time of the document’s execution, "no notary public was available to expedite the transaction
of the parties."
Subsequently, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Report and Recommendation for the
cancellation of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a
period of one year. The report indicated that although there was no evidence of forgery on his
part, he was negligent in not requiring the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as
proof of identity.
Atty. Rinen filed a motion for reconsideration, but the IBP Board of Governors, nonetheless,
adopted the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer failed to satisfy his duties as a notary public.
Ruling:
The notarial commission which Atty. Rinen may presently have is Revoked.
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In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all
parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before
him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the
community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the subject deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part
of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-officio.
The lapses he committed in relation to such function then justified the recommendations
presented by the IBP.
The fact that Atty. Rinen was a trial court judge during the time that he administered the oath for
the subject deed did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations
imposed upon other commissioned notaries public. He also could not have simply relied on his
clerk of court to perform the responsibilities attached to his function, especially as it pertained to
ensuring that the parties to the document were then present, performing an act that was of their
own free will and deed. "Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public." It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, "notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties." Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of public instruments would be undermined.
Rex Tupal vs. Judge Remegio Rojo

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014
J. Leonen
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the
judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is
inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing
officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony.
Facts:
For allegedly solemnizing marriages without the required marriage license and issuing, instead, to
the contracting parties a notarized affidavit of cohabitation, a complaint was filed by Rex Tupal
against Judge Rojo, an MTC judge, for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross
ignorance of the law.
Tupal argues that the affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official functions
and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. It ruled
that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court judges’
official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary, a judge’s duty is to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of
cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes the
judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnized.
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Issue:
Whether the judge is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance
of the law by issuing notarized affidavits of cohabitation to the parties whose marriage he will
solemnize.
Ruling:
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the
duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the
affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements
before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in
the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the
marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function
and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the
affidavit of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been
complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he
himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to
administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who
performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from
notarizing private documents bearing no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges. Since a marriage license is a public document, its counterpart, the affidavit of
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he
notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a

private document into a public document, rendering the document admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose,"
remains a private document until notarized.
Page 127 of 370

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized private documents.
As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize
marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Licero Dizon vs. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.

A.C. No. 10185; March 12, 2004
J. Mendoza
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest the truth of its contents. This is to
enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed.
Facts:
A hearing was conducted regarding the due execution and veracity of the compromise agreement
in a civil case. The signatories therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court but
not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public. Because of the irregularity in the due
execution of the compromise agreement, there was undue delay in the resolution of the civil case
which caused damage and injury to Licero Dizon.
On May 14, 2004, Dizon filed a petition against Atty. Cabucana before the IBP praying for the
disbarment of the latter. According to Dizon, Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in
notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants and that he should be
sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be
suspended for as Notary Public for a period of two years and from the practice of law for six
months.
In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation with modification that he be suspended only for six months for violation of his
obligation as Notary Public.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer is guilty of violating the Notarial Law.
Ruling:
Atty. Cabucana is found Guilty.
Section 1, of RA 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly

authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument
or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it,
Page 128 of 370

acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
The requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2(b) of Rule
IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if a person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document—
(1) Is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it
is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest the truth of its
contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed.
MERCEDITA DE JESUS vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT

A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014, CJ. Sereno
Atty. Sanchez-Malit had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market
stall that falsely named the Jesus as its absolute and registered owner. Atty. Sanchez-Malit conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides "CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
Facts:
On 1 March 2002, Atty. Sanchez-Malit had drafted and notarized a Real Estate
Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the Jesus as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
In her Comment, Atty. Sanchez-Malit explained that the mortgage contract was prepared
in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature.
However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was
only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered
owner” was inadvertently left unedited.
Atty. Sanchez-Malit argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by

complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Page 129 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary
public
Ruling:
The Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a
notary public.
In this case, Atty. Sanchez-Malit fully knew that Jesus was not the owner of the mortgaged
market stall. Jesus comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not
make Atty. Sanchez-Malit any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, Atty. Sanchez-Malit conduct amounted to a breach of Canon
1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides "CANON 1 — A
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
EMERITA B. MAHILUM vs. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA

A.C. No. 10450, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Notarizing a Deed of Donation in the absence of one of the affiants is an act which
contravenes Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 1 of Public Act
No. 2103, or the Notarial Law which mandates that affiants must personally appear to the notary
public and corollary, under Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 stating
that a commissioned notary public is enjoined from performing a notarial act unless the affiant is:
(1) in his presence at the time of the notarization; and(2) personally known to him or otherwise
identified by him through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Facts:
The complainant Emerita B. Mahilum averred that the respondent Atty. Samuel SM.
Lezama notarized a Deed of Donation executed by her estranged husband, Rodolfo (Rodolfo)
Mahilum as donor, and their common daughter, Jennifer Mahilum-Sorenson (Jennifer) as donee,
pertaining to the donor's share of one-half portion over a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-71071 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City.
According to the complainant, she has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not have
personally appeared before the respondent on May 24, 2006 or even on February 7, 2006 because
during those dates, she was in the United States of America (USA) working at the State Fund
Office in California.
The complainant submitted a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration showing the
arrival and departure records of Jennifer in the Philippines. Based thereon, Jennifer did not enter
the Philippines in the year 2006. Her travel records closest to that year showed that she arrived in
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the Philippines on June 25, 2004 but departed a month later or on July 22, 2004. She again arrived
in the Philippines on June 24, 2007 and left on July 20, 2007. There were other various dates of her
arrival in the country but the records did not reflect that she came to the Philippines in 2006.
Despite opportunity to submit evidence rebutting the foregoing certification, the respondent
failed to file any. The only supporting evidence he proffered were the documents attached to his
Answer showing the present marital status of the complainant – that she is actually married to a
certain George W. Cooper, a British Canadian; that on July 14, 1986 she filed for the dissolution of
her marriage with Rodolfo before the Superior Court of California, County of Orange and the
same was granted on October 23, 1986. Likewise attached to his Answer is an Affidavit executed
by Rodolfo attesting that Jennifer was physically present when she signed the deed of donation.
In its Resolution transmitted to the IBP national office, the Grievance Committee of IBP
Negros Occidental Chapter, the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline and the IBP Board of Governors
ruled against the respondent.
The respondent subsequently moved for reconsideration pleading for the modification of
the penalty meted upon him on the ground that various factors does not render it commensurate
with the offense charged. He appealed for humanitarian consideration and cited that he has been
a notary public for 35 years and this is the first administrative case filed against him. He also
rendered free notarial services to the members of the local Philippine National Police in San
Carlos City as well as the personnel of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Courts of
Calatrava in Negros Occidental. In the same motion, the respondent expressed remorse over his
negligence and pledged to exercise diligence in discharging his duties as a notary public.
However, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s act of notarizing a Deed of Donation in the absence of
the affiant violates the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent violated the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that affiants must
personally appear to the notary public, viz:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.
Corollary, under Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, a
commissioned notary public is enjoined from performing a notarial act unless the affiant is: (1) in
Page 131 of 370

his presence at the time of the notarization; and(2) personally known to him or otherwise
identified by him through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The respondent is, without doubt, familiar with the above rules and duties, having been a
notary public for 35 years. But he, nonetheless, failed to observe them. Contrary to the IBP’s
findings that such failure was due to carelessness, the Court finds and so holds that the
respondent deliberately disregarded the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Notarial Law.
A holistic examination of the records illustrates that the respondent has actually met
Jennifer when she went home to visit the ailing Rodolfo. But this was before and definitely not
during the notarization of deed of donation because based on her travel records, she did not come
to the Philippines in 2006. The respondent accommodated the notarization of the deed sans
Jennifer’s physical appearance before him on May 24, 2006 since he was personally acquainted
with Rodolfo. Hence, he took the latter’s representation that Jennifer voluntarily executed the
deed as reliable and faithful. Even if we were to uphold such representation, however, the truth
remains that Jennifer was not personally present to attest to the truthfulness of her acceptance of
the donation as donee during notarization.
Carelessness implies that the affiant was actually personally present and the notary public
just forgot to verify her identity or that she was not personally known to her. Here, however, the
affiant was not physically present during the notarization but the notary public nevertheless
affixed his seal and signature attesting that the affiant "personally appeared" before him when in
truth and in fact, she did not.
To stress, "[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed
will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant."
An act which contravenes the foregoing guidelines is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, which the respondent culpably
committed when he notarized the ‘Deed of Donation’ in the absence of one of the affiants. It must
be emphasized that the public and the courts accord conclusiveness of due execution in notarized
documents. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent misled
the public that Jennifer personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of
the contents of the deed when in fact she did not. Such misconduct can also usher in precarious
legal consequences should the deed of donation later on spawn court intervention.
IMELDA CATO GADDIvs. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO

A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014, C.J. Carpio
Gaddi alleged that Velasco violated 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice since the latter
notarized the document without the consent of Gaddi. The court ruled that a notary public who
failed to discharge his duties was meted out the penalty of revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year. For notarizing a document without ascertaining
the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for affixing his signature in
an incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, Velasco failed to discharge his
Page 132 of 370

duties as notary public and breached Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Facts:
Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that she
personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. She alleged that
she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any competent
evidence of identity or sign the notarial register. Velasco alleged that he was commissioned notary
public for Makati City from 4 January 2010 to 31 December 2011. He alleged that Gaddi appeared
before him in his notarial office in Makati City on 22 April 2010 and requested for the notarization
of a four-page handwritten document. He ascertained Gaddi’s identity, through two identification
cards – her BLSS ID and Tax Identification Number (TIN) ID, and that the document was her
own. Thereafter, he notarized the document and recorded it in his notarial register as Doc. No.
130, Page No. 27, Book No. 192, Series of 2010. Velasco insisted that he duly complied with the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and it was Gaddi’s complaint, which was notarized by a fake
notary public.
Issue:
Whether or not Velasco violated 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
Ruling:
Yes, Velasco violated such rules
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time
of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through
competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a
thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the
document is the signatory’s free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free
will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is also
prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
In the present case, contrary to Velasco’s claim that Gaddi appeared before him and
presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in rubber
stamp, itself indicates:
“SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x xx AT MAKATI CITY.
AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO.__________ISSUED AT/ON___________.”
The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had been remiss in his duty of
ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply with the most
basic function that a notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise,
he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily and refused
Page 133 of 370

to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. Velasco did not even present his notarial register to rebut Gaddi’s allegations. It is
presumed that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
In Isenhardt v. Real, a notary public who failed to discharge his duties was meted out the
penalty of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. For
notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the
document, for affixing his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his
pleadings, Velasco failed to discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering these findings and our previous
rulings, Velasco should not only be disqualified for two years as a notary public, he must also be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR. vs. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE

A.C. No. 7184, September 17, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Atty. Felipe was administratively charged for violation of notarial Law. The court ruled that
while seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, Atty Felipe’s act of notarizing documents in a
place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of
malpractice of law and falsification.
Facts:
Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged Atty. Felipe for malpractice and gross
negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging that the
latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina, notarized the
acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva" dated "25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that he is
a "notary public for and in the City of Marikina." Further, Atty. Felipe, thru the comment,
incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and
harassment of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.
In response, Felipe B. Almazan, Sr filed a Reply asserting that he has the legitimate right to
file the administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful act of notarization, which is
not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He also draws attention to the fact that the subject
document was incompletely dated and yet notarized by Atty. Felipe.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Felipe should be held administratively liable
Ruling:
Yes, He is guilty of malpractice.
Atty Felipe himself admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City
of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-
Page 134 of 370

1999, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said
notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the RTC of Pasig.
The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11,
Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term– A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for
a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section 240, Article II states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila
shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial
act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in
the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent
further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath.
Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, Atty Felipe’s act of notarizing

documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission,
partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not on all fours because of the
slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much
apropos:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of
the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate false hood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations
fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary

act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the
issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than
casual.
Page 135 of 370

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,

BALANGA CITY, BATAAN vs. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY
Atty. Renato Bagay was found guilty of negligence due to the fact that it was he secretary
who notarize documents and not him. The court ruled that Atty. Renato C. Bagay must fully bear
the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary. Because of the negligence of Atty. Renato C.
Bagay, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected
by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the
function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer
Facts:
Atty. Renato C. Bagay was found guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty, immediately revoked. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public
for two (2) years.It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11,
2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18
documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while Atty. Renato C. Bagaywas outside the country
attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the
persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they
did not see Atty. Renato C. Bagaysign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who
signed them or the documents came out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the
Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country
on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008.
Issue:
Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out
of the country constituted negligence
Ruling:
Yes, such constituted as negligence
Atty. Renato C. Bagay admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18
documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the
country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that Atty. Renato C. Bagay is responsible
for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a
“Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A
Page 136 of 370

notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary
public.
Atty. Renato C. Bagay cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which
he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his
office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and
register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to
notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by
this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could
be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Atty. Renato C. Bagay must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
Because of the negligence of Atty. Renato C. Bagay, the Court also holds him liable for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary
public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined
the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be
held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by
reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.Atty. Renato C. Bagay violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his
secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice
law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge,
he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint. Atty. Renato C.
Bagay also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They
expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later
found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and
effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person,
their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015, J. Mendoza
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, a notary
could not perform notarial functions in the place where he was not commissioned to perform such
act. Furthermore, by performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, is a
violation, not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice, but also
Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
Page 137 of 370

Facts:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial
Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.
The first letter-complaint was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for
the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie
Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty.
Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a commission. The complaint
alleged that Atty Siapno performed notarial acts and practices outside his place of commission
and after expiration of the said commission. Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had
delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas
(Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf. On March 17,
2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L.
Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license and he executed an
affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for
authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was
not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty.
Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct
a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros
(Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the
Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to
submit a report and recommendation thereon.
As to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without
commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
As regards the complaint against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelen, Judge Ros informed the
Court that he could not have complied with the investigation orders of the Court because he was
no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Siapno, Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn violated the Notarial Practica
Act.
Ruling:
Page 138 of 370

A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno
indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the
complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several
instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty.
Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the
Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
The Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is
invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts
a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty.
Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but
also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in
Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite
commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be
barred from being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk
of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases. The incumbent
Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to
conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.
JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA

The petitioners accused the respondent of notarizing a document that is forged. The
Supreme Court ruled that whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the
document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be
acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.
Page 139 of 370

Facts:
On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over a land covered by
TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita
Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the
name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee.
On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale4 over a land covered by
TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita
Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the
name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee. In addition to the forgery of their
signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically impossible for their brothers and sister,
Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the
United States on the day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.
Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint with this court
on August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public.
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed
of Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law. In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires that “[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”
Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s

notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary public
for two (2) years. The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Cefra should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
The Court agrees and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility in notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants.
The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As

this court previously explained:
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine;
to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries
public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
Page 140 of 370

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document
voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be
able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,
we stated that “it is obvious that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public.”
Furthermore, this court pronounced that:
a document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very
same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be
present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to
verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document
presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among
others, to guard against illegal deeds.
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express
the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the
integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in
the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not
physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document.
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO vs. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO

A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015, J. Leonen
Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on when
they encounter written documents and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries public
are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties
with utmost care. A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. It has the
presumption of regularity and to contradict the veracity of the entry, evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant
Facts:
Crescenciano M. Pitogo purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. However, Emcor, Inc.
allegedly failed to cause the registration of the motorcycle under his name. Pitogo, thus, filed a
Civil Complaint before the RTC against EMCOR. The motorcycle was eventually registered in
Pitogo’s name based on 3 documents notarized by respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello. The
documents indicate that they are registered in Suello’s notarial register
Pitogo obtained a copy of the three documents from the LTO. He went to Suello’s office
to have them certified, however, Suello disowned the documents. Suello instead ordered his
secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register. In the letter, Pitogo reiterated to Suello that
the documents were important in his civil case pending before the RTC. He requested Suello to
certify the authenticity and veracity documents he obtained from LTO. He wanted to determine if
the documents were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated but he did not receive a
reply from Suello.
Page 141 of 370

Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the Cebu Chapter of the
IBP. Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the three documents notarized by
Suello and Suello’s entries in his notarial register. In his Answer, Suello denies having notarized
the three documents obtained from the LTO. He admits that he certified the documents as true
copies.
In his Position Paper, Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogo’s documents.
When Pitogo called Suello to ask for certification, he advised Pitogo that he can get it at his office
after verifying the documents, Pitogo informed him that his secretary already certified them as
true copies. Suello told Pitogo that his secretary was not given such authority.
The IBP recommended Suello’s suspension from the active practice of law for six (6)
months, as well as the revocation of his commission as a notary public. The IBP Board of
Governors issued the Resolution recommended to increase the penalty of disqualification as
notary public to four (4) years. On motion for reconsideration, Suello claimed that penalty was
excessive. The IBP then reduced the penalty only to two years.
Issue:
Whether or not Suello violated the Rules on Notarial Practice
Ruling:
Respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his
notarial register. Under Rule VI the Notarial Rules: The notary public shall give to each instrument
or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which
the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries
Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for revocation of
notarial commission. When respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3)
documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s
documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial register and the notarial
process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers to promote respect for law and legal processes. Respondent also appears to
have committed a falsehood in the pleadings he submitted. In his Answer, respondent claimed
that he certified complainant’s documents as true copies. Later, in his Position Paper, he passed
the blame to his secretary. This violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
lawyers from engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct. Respondent’s secretary cannot be
blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial commission is a license
held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone
who is personally responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register.
Page 142 of 370

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO vs. ATTY. ROBERTO E.

EXAMEN
A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations
since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. [The Court notes] that the error could have
been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the
correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness
to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document.
He was behooved under Sec. 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper
cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct
details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with
substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath
as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of OCT No. P-23261 representing a
lot located in Sultan Kudarat. The spouses later on died and deeds of absolute sale then surfaced
tending to show that Ramon Examen, a relative of herein Respondent Atty. Examen, acquired this
property from them sometime in 1984. On January 12, 2002, the Heirs of Alilano filed a suit for
recovery of possession involving the subject property against Atty. Examen and his wife, Edna.
During the litigation of this case, the said deeds of absolute sale were adduced. On
November 15, 2003, the Heirs of Alilano filed an administrative complaint alleging that Atty.
Examen violated the notarial law when he notarized the disputed documents when he is
prohibited from doing the same as Ramon Examen is related to him by consanguinity within the
the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. In addition, the acknowledge-
ment executed on the document is dubious because the competent evidence of identity presented
by Ramon Examen does not belong to him but to Florentina Alilano. For his defense, Atty.
Examen mainly assailed the complaint on the ground that there is no longer a prohibition upon
notaries public from notarizing documents executed by persons related to him by consanguinity
or affinity.
The CBD issued its Report and Recommendation wherein it found Atty. Examen liable for
breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Deeds of Absolute Sale before a court. He
recommended to be punished with the supreme penalty of disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP
Board of Governors came up with its own resolution adopting the CBD's report but modifying the
penalty to two years and the cancellation of Atty. Examen's notarial commission.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Atty. Examen is administratively liable for violating the
Notarial Law.
Page 143 of 370

Ruling:
YES, he failed to perform the duties and responsibilities reposed upon a notary public.
The OMB contends that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial
Law of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the
January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules
on Notarial Practice was passed by the Supreme Court.
In Kapunan, et al. vs. Casilan and [CA], the Court had the opportunity to state that
enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:
“It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the
parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22
and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the
deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter… The
appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the Spanish Notarial
Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496. The Court finds this ruling to
be correct. xxx.”
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the
absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with
the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the
Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the
time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty.
Examen was not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was
a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:
“At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-
259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a
notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related
to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of
affinity.”
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 3(c), a notary
public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or
consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:
“Sec. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial

act if he:
xxxx xxxx
“c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.”
xxxx xxxx
Page 144 of 370

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does
not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the
provisions of the Notarial Law.
In Nunga vs. Atty. Viray, the Court stated:
“…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substan-

tive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act
must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in
general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence... For this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the perfor-mance of their
duties.”
Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary
public to comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law. This includes the duty under Chapter
11, Sec. 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:
“Sec. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every

contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula [resi-dence]
certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be entered by
the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of
each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.”
Under Chapter 11, Sec. 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the
grounds for disqualification:
Sec. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on
the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxxx xxxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.
xxxx xxxx
In Soriano vs. Atty. Basco, the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow
formalities as these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law
requires them to certify that a party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in
the revocation of a notary’s commission. The Court said:
“As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge

with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect
Page 145 of 370

for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot

simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law.”
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certifi-
cate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of
Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate
number. Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have
his secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the
correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations
since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. [The Court notes] that the error could
have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the
correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and
unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges
the document. He was behooved under Sec. 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to
check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by
him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a
routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his
duties.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his
oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily
notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of
the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his
acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
The Court cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, Atty. Examen is expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. A
lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or
transcribed by their secretaries.
GEORGE FABAY vs. ATTY. REX A. RESUENA

In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent violated not only the notarial law but also his
oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal appearance.
FACTS:
On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia
Perez and Valentino Perez (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against
complainant Gregory Fabay before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with
respondent Atty. Resuena as their counsel.
Page 146 of 370

On the same date, respondent notarized a special power of attorney (“SPA”) with plaintiffs
as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only the spouse of
Amador Perez, Remedios Perez, who actually signed the SPA in behalf of Amador Perez,
Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was recorded in respondent's notarial
book.
The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, however, on appeal, the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be remanded to the
court a quo to try the case on the merits. In its Decision dated August 4, 2005, the trial court
noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on September 7, 1988 and
April 26, 1976, respectively.
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed the instant case for disbarment against
respondent. Complainant alleged that respondent violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing the SPA notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals therein, Amado Perez and
Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of the SPA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the notarial law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (“CPR”)
RULING:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal
appearance. The purpose of the SPA was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to represent the principals
"to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may
arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that respondent permitted Remedios Perez to
sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were already
dead at that time. Equally deplorable is the fact that Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on
behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were said to be residing abroad. Worse, he
deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an ejectment case that was filed in court. In
effect, respondent, in notarizing the SPA, contented himself with Remedios' representation of
four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with the actual physical appearance of all the
parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena ignored the basics of notarial procedure and
actually displayed his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only
did he violate the notarial law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might
result from its non-observance.
Through his acts, respondent also committed a serious breach of the fundamental
obligation imposed upon him by the CPR, particularly Rule 1. 01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer
of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only
injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.
Page 147 of 370

MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA vs. ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO

A lawyer who acts as a notary public without the necessary notarial commission is remiss in his
professional duties and responsibilities. Hence, by performing notarial acts without the necessary
commission from the court, respondent violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the
Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
FACTS:
On June 22, 2006, respondent notarized the Real Estate Mortgage between RC Lending
Investors, Inc. (“RC Lending”), as mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana (“Theresa”) and Ma.
Nette Japitana (“Nette”), as mortgagors. It was supposedly witnessed by Maria Sallie Japitana
(“Sallie”), Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (“Lourdes”) and her husband Dante Sibi (“Dante”),
complainants’ sisters and brother-in-law, respectively. The mortgage covered a parcel of land on
which the family home of the Japitanas was constituted. On the same date, respondent notarized
the Affidavit allegedly executed by Theressa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show their
conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their family home was situated.
On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco (“Cuenco”), filed its
Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. Consequently, the Transfer
Certificate of Title (“TCT”) was issued under the name of RC Lending. On February 3, 2009, RC
Lending filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a break-open order, in order to effectively
take the possession of the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite of
the sheriffs repeated knocking.
The complainant, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage as well
as in the Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006, were forgeries. She asserted that respondent
did not require the persons who appeared before him to present any valid identification.
Complainant alleged that respondent manually forged the signatures of Sallie, Lourdes and
Dante, as witnesses to the Real Estate Mortgage. She added that her sister, Theresa, was a
schizophrenic since 1975. More importantly, the complainant averred that respondent had no
notarial authority, as certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (RTC).
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed a verified complaint-affidavit with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines accusing respondent of performing notarial acts without
authority to do so, knowingly notarizing forged documents, and notarizing documents without
requiring sufficient identification from the signatories.
ISSUE:
Responsibility (CPR).
Page 148 of 370

RULING:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Canons 1 and 7 of the CPR
A close perusal of the records reveals that respondent had no existing notarial commission
when he notarized the documents in question in 2006. This is supported by the certification
issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on the Notarial Records, respondent
had not been issued a notarial commission for the year 2006.
A lawyer who acts as a notary public without the necessary notarial commission is remiss
in his professional duties and responsibilities. Hence, by performing notarial acts without the
necessary commission from the court, respondent violated not only his oath to obey the laws
particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at
all times.
ERLINDA SISTUAL, ET AL. vs. ATTY. ELIORDO OGENA

A.C. No. 9807, 2 February 2016, Per Curiam
Respondent was negligent in the performance of this duty as a notary public. He failed to require the
personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the aforementioned
documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, respondent failed to comply with the
most basic function that a notary public must do – to require the parties to present their residence
certificates or any other document to prove their identities.
FACTS:
The complainants Erlina C. Sistual, Flordelisa S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and Arlan C.
Sistual (the “Complainants”) filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”) a complaint
against respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena for willful, unlawful and felonious conduct. Complainants
alleged that: (1) respondent, who was the legal counsel of their late father, Manuel A. Sistual
(“Manuel”), falsified several documents which included, among others, a special power of attorney
(“SPA”), Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of Donation,
and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the children of Manuel and their mother,
Erlinda Sistual (“Erlinda”), executed the documents; (2) as a result of the falsification of said
documents, Transfer Certificate of Title No.60467 (the “Title”), registered in the name of “Heirs of
Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel Sistual,” was cancelled and was subdivided into several
lots; and 3) said lots were sold to interested buyers.
In its Report and Recommendations, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission
on Bar Discipline (“IBP-CBD”) stated that it is bereft of any jurisdiction to determine whether
respondent committed forgery in the aforementioned documents. It, however, found several
irregularities in the documents notarized by respondents. First in the SPA, the signatures of
Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (“CTC”) of
the signatories, namely: Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Espanol, and Elinda Sistual, were
not indicated. Second, in the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Manuel, although all the heirs
signed, only the CTC of Solfia S. Maribago was absent. Third, in the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Page 149 of 370

the Estate of Dolores Sistual with Waiver of Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay
was indicated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law.
RULING:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law
Respondent was negligent in the performance of this duty as a notary public. He failed to
require the personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the
aforementioned documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, respondent failed
to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do – to require the parties to
present their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities.
By notarizing the aforementioned documents, respondent engaged in unlawful dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct. His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to
notarized documents. His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in
damaging complainants’ rights but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. Thus, respondent should be liable for such negligence, not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
SPOUSES EDUARDO G. GACUYA and CARIDAD ROSARIO GACUYA vs. ATTY. REYMAN A.
SOLBITA
A.C. No. 8840, 8 March 2016, Per Curiam
FACTS:
This case pertains to the Complaint for Disbarment filed by the complainants, Spouses
Eduardo and Caridad Gacuya, against respondent Atty. Reyman A. Solbita for notarizing a deed of
sale without a valid notarial commission.
On February 21, 2006, the complainants went to the residence of respondent to request
legal assistance for the purpose of drafting and notarizing a deed of sale of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5925. The deed of sale was then executed and signed
by the complainants, as sellers, and the Spouses Fernando S. Gonzales, Jr. and Marivic P. Gonzales
(“Spouses Gonzales”), as buyers. Standing as witnesses to the deed were Angelo Sanchez and
Melanie Balbino who likewise affixed their signatures thereon. Consequently, Atty. Solbita
notarized the Deed of Sale on February 21, 2006, the date it was executed by the contracting
parties and entered it as Doc. No. 440, Page No. 88, Page No. X (sic), Series of 2006 despite an
expired notarial commission.
Page 150 of 370

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(“CPR”).
RULING:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and the Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the CPR
Respondent’s act of violating the notarial law is undisputed as he notarized the deed of
sale despite an expired notarial commission. "The act of notarizing without the necessary
commission is not merely a simple enterprise to be trivialized. So much so that one who stamps a
notarial seal and signs a document as a notary public without being so authorized may be haled to
court not only for malpractice but also for falsification."
It must be emphasized a new that "where the notarization of a document is done by a

member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do
so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
FLORA C. MARIANO vs. ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ

A.C. No. 10373, 31 May 2016, J. Peralta
Respondent, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for and
in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further
committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This
transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
FACTS:
Complainant Flora C. Mariano Complaint filed an Affidavit for Disbarment dated August
25, 2008 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez, for
violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial acts on documents without a notarial
commission.
In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several documents to show proof that Atty.
Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission, to wit: (1) Complaint
dated June 18, 2007; (2) Joint-Affidavit of Gina Pimentel and Marilyn Cayaban dated May 8, 2008;
(3) Affidavit of Ginalyn Ancheta dated May 8, 2008; and (4) Joint-Affidavit dated May 8, 2008. She
Page 151 of 370

also submitted a Certificate of Lack of Authority for a Notarial Act issued by Executive Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad showing that respondent has not been commissioned as a notary public for
and within the jurisdiction of the RTC, Santiago City at the time of the unauthorized notarization
on May 8, 2008. Mariano submitted a Certification issued by Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian,
RTC, Santiago City enumerating those lawyers who have been commissioned as notary public
within and for the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the term of 2007-2008,
which does not include respondent’s name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is violated the Notarial Law.
RULING:
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In the instant case, it is undisputable that respondent performed notarial acts on several
documents without a valid notarial commission. The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the
time of the unauthorized notarizations was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications
issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where respondent performed the unauthorized
notarial acts.
Respondent, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for
and in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he
further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This
MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA vs. ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO

Facts:
On June 22, 2006, respondent notarized the Real Estate Mortgage between RC Lending
Investors, Inc. (“RC Lending”), as mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana (“Theresa”) and Ma.
Nette Japitana (“Nette”), as mortgagors. It was supposedly witnessed by Maria Sallie Japitana
(“Sallie”), Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (“Lourdes”) and her husband Dante Sibi (“Dante”),
complainants’ sisters and brother-in-law, respectively. The mortgage covered a parcel of land on
Page 152 of 370

which the family home of the Japitanas was constituted. On the same date, respondent notarized
the Affidavit allegedly executed by Theressa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show their
conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their family home was situated.
On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco (“Cuenco”), filed its
Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. Consequently, the Transfer
Certificate of Title (“TCT”) was issued under the name of RC Lending. On February 3, 2009, RC
Lending filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a break-open order, in order to effectively
take the possession of the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite of
the sheriffs repeated knocking.
The complainant, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage as well
as in the Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006, were forgeries. She asserted that respondent
did not require the persons who appeared before him to present any valid identification.
Complainant alleged that respondent manually forged the signatures of Sallie, Lourdes and
Dante, as witnesses to the Real Estate Mortgage. She added that her sister, Theresa, was a
schizophrenic since 1975. More importantly, the complainant averred that respondent had no
notarial authority, as certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (RTC).
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed a verified complaint-affidavit with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines accusing respondent of performing notarial acts without
authority to do so, knowingly notarizing forged documents, and notarizing documents without
requiring sufficient identification from the signatories.
Issue:
Responsibility (CPR).
Ruling:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Canons 1 and 7 of the CPR
A close perusal of the records reveals that respondent had no existing notarial commission
when he notarized the documents in question in 2006. This is supported by the certification
issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on the Notarial Records, respondent
had not been issued a notarial commission for the year 2006.
A lawyer who acts as a notary public without the necessary notarial commission is remiss
in his professional duties and responsibilities. Hence, by performing notarial acts without the
necessary commission from the court, respondent violated not only his oath to obey the laws
particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at
all times.
Page 153 of 370

GEORGE FABAY vs. ATTY. REX A. RESUENA

Facts:
On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia
Perez and Valentino Perez (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against
complainant Gregory Fabay before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with
respondent Atty. Resuena as their counsel.
On the same date, respondent notarized a special power of attorney (“SPA”) with plaintiffs
as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only the spouse of
Amador Perez, Remedios Perez, who actually signed the SPA in behalf of Amador Perez,
Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was recorded in respondent's notarial
book.
The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, however, on appeal, the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be remanded to the
court a quo to try the case on the merits. In its Decision dated August 4, 2005, the trial court
noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on September 7, 1988 and
April 26, 1976, respectively.
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed the instant case for disbarment against
respondent. Complainant alleged that respondent violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing the SPA notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals therein, Amado Perez and
Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of the SPA.
Issue:
Responsibility (“CPR”)
Ruling:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal
appearance. The purpose of the SPA was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to represent the principals
"to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may
arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that respondent permitted Remedios Perez to
sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were already
dead at that time. Equally deplorable is the fact that Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on
behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were said to be residing abroad. Worse, he
deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an ejectment case that was filed in court. In
effect, respondent, in notarizing the SPA, contented himself with Remedios' representation of
four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with the actual physical appearance of all the
Page 154 of 370

parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena ignored the basics of notarial procedure and
actually displayed his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only
did he violate the notarial law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might
result from its non-observance.
Through his acts, respondent also committed a serious breach of the fundamental
obligation imposed upon him by the CPR, particularly Rule 1. 01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer
of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only
injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.
ERLINDA SISTUAL, ET AL. vs. ATTY. ELIORDO OGENA

Facts:
The complainants Erlina C. Sistual, Flordelisa S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and Arlan C.
Sistual (the “Complainants”) filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”) a complaint
against respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena for willful, unlawful and felonious conduct. Complainants
alleged that: (1) respondent, who was the legal counsel of their late father, Manuel A. Sistual
(“Manuel”), falsified several documents which included, among others, a special power of attorney
(“SPA”), Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of Donation,
and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the children of Manuel and their mother,
Erlinda Sistual (“Erlinda”), executed the documents; (2) as a result of the falsification of said
documents, Transfer Certificate of Title No.60467 (the “Title”), registered in the name of “Heirs of
Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel Sistual,” was cancelled and was subdivided into several
lots; and 3) said lots were sold to interested buyers.
In its Report and Recommendations, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission
on Bar Discipline (“IBP-CBD”) stated that it is bereft of any jurisdiction to determine whether
respondent committed forgery in the aforementioned documents. It, however, found several
irregularities in the documents notarized by respondents. First in the SPA, the signatures of
Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (“CTC”) of
the signatories, namely: Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Espanol, and Elinda Sistual, were
not indicated. Second, in the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Manuel, although all the heirs
signed, only the CTC of Solfia S. Maribago was absent. Third, in the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Dolores Sistual with Waiver of Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay
was indicated.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law.
Ruling:
Page 155 of 370

Respondent was negligent in the performance of this duty as a notary public. He failed to
require the personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the
aforementioned documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, respondent failed
to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do – to require the parties to
present their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities.
By notarizing the aforementioned documents, respondent engaged in unlawful dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct. His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to
notarized documents. His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in
damaging complainants’ rights but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. Thus, respondent should be liable for such negligence, not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
INOCENCIO I. BALISTOY vs. ATTY. FLORENCIO A. BRON

A.C. No. 8667, 3 February 2016, J. Brion
Facts:
Complainant Inocencio I. Balistoy was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-105743 (the “Case”),
entitled Inocencio I. Balistoy v. Paul L. Wee and Peter L. Wee, for damages, pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Manila. Respondent Atty. Florencio A. Bron was the
counsel for the defendants, the Wee brothers.
On March 5, 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Issuance of Order
to Show Cause with Counterclaim in the Case. The Wee brothers executed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for the motion, exhibiting Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
No. 12249877, issued on January 9, 2003 in Quezon City, for Paul, and CTC No. 1385810, issued on
January 29, 2003, in Manila, for Peter. On January 20, 2004, respondent filed an Answer for the
defendants who exhibited CTC No. 122498778 for Paul and CTC No. 12249883 for Peter, both CTCs
issued on January 9, 2003, in Manila. The complainant, however, discovered that the CTCs
exhibited by Paul and Peter had already expired and that the CTC Paul used for the Answer had
the same number as the CTC he showed for the Motion to Dismiss, but the place of issue was
changed from Manila to Quezon City.
With regard to the Case, an order was issued declaring that defendants have waived their
right to present evidence, and that the case was considered submitted for decision. According to
the order, when the case was called for the reception of evidence on September 6, 2006,
respondent appeared in the morning of that day and manifested before the clerk of court that one
of the defendants' nephews suffered injuries in a vehicular accident, thus, the reason for their
failure to attend the hearing. The defendants moved for reconsideration of the order alleging
therein that they defendants failed to attend the hearing on account of the knee injury suffered by
Paul in a vehicular accident in the morning. In proof of this, respondent submitted an unsigned
medical certificate dated November 27, 2006, issued by Dr. Joy M. Villano.
On June 20, 2007, Atty. Bron moved for a resetting of the hearing17 on the ground that
Paul, who was scheduled to testify on that day and who had just arrived from Malaysia with a
Page 156 of 370

fever, was placed under quarantine. In compliance with the court’s order, respondent submitted a
medical certificate dated June 18, 2007 to prove that Paul was quarantined in Malaysia.
Complainant, however, discovered that the NAIA arrival logbook showed that Paul was not
registered as a passenger coming from Malaysia on June 18, 2007.
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent for disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is violated the Notarial Law and acted with gross misconduct.
Ruling:
No sufficient evidence to prove that Respondent's participated in the fraudulent or

deceitful acts
There is nothing in the records that clearly indicates that respondent had knowledge of
his clients' fraudulent and deceitful acts with respect to their CTCs, or having known of their
defects, he had done nothing to correct their invalidity. In any event, respondent’s notarization of
the motion to dismiss and the answer in the civil case did not give merit to the Wee brothers'
defense nor did it weaken complainant’s case. Neither did the submission of Paul's medical
certificates constitute a gross misconduct in the practice of law by respondent as the evidence do
not show that he was the one who "procured" the medical certificates or caused Paul's getting sick
in Malaysia. In sum, complainant failed to discharge the burden of proof in his bid to disbar
respondent.
In Ricardo Manubay v. Atty. Gina C. Garcia, the Court held: "A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in moral character, probity or good
demeanor. The lawyer's guilt, however, cannot be presumed. Allegation is never equivalent to
proof and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability." Again, Balistoy failed to provide clear
and convincing evidentiary support to his allegations against Atty. Bron.
SPOUSES EDUARDO G. GACUYA and CARIDAD ROSARIO GACUYA vs. ATTY.

REYMAN A. SOLBITA
A.C. No. 8840, 8 March 2016, Per Curiam
Facts:
This case pertains to the Complaint for Disbarment filed by the complainants, Spouses
Eduardo and Caridad Gacuya, against respondent Atty. Reyman A. Solbita for notarizing a deed of
sale without a valid notarial commission.
On February 21, 2006, the complainants went to the residence of respondent to request
legal assistance for the purpose of drafting and notarizing a deed of sale of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5925. The deed of sale was then executed and signed
Page 157 of 370

by the complainants, as sellers, and the Spouses Fernando S. Gonzales, Jr. and Marivic P. Gonzales
(“Spouses Gonzales”), as buyers. Standing as witnesses to the deed were Angelo Sanchez and
Melanie Balbino who likewise affixed their signatures thereon. Consequently, Atty. Solbita
notarized the Deed of Sale on February 21, 2006, the date it was executed by the contracting
parties and entered it as Doc. No. 440, Page No. 88, Page No. X (sic), Series of 2006 despite an
expired notarial commission.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(“CPR”).
Ruling:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and the Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the CPR
Respondent’s act of violating the notarial law is undisputed as he notarized the deed of
sale despite an expired notarial commission. "The act of notarizing without the necessary
commission is not merely a simple enterprise to be trivialized. So much so that one who stamps a
notarial seal and signs a document as a notary public without being so authorized may be haled to
court not only for malpractice but also for falsification."
It must be emphasized a new that "where the notarization of a document is done by a

member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do
so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
FLORA C. MARIANO vs. ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ

A.C. No. 10373, 31 May 2016, J. Peralta
Facts:
Complainant Flora C. Mariano Complaint filed an Affidavit for Disbarment dated August
25, 2008 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez, for
violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial acts on documents without a notarial
commission.
In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several documents to show proof that Atty.
Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission, to wit: (1) Complaint
dated June 18, 2007; (2) Joint-Affidavit of Gina Pimentel and Marilyn Cayaban dated May 8, 2008;
Page 158 of 370

(3) Affidavit of Ginalyn Ancheta dated May 8, 2008; and (4) Joint-Affidavit dated May 8, 2008. She
also submitted a Certificate of Lack of Authority for a Notarial Act issued by Executive Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad showing that respondent has not been commissioned as a notary public for
and within the jurisdiction of the RTC, Santiago City at the time of the unauthorized notarization
on May 8, 2008. Mariano submitted a Certification issued by Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian,
RTC, Santiago City enumerating those lawyers who have been commissioned as notary public
within and for the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the term of 2007-2008,
which does not include respondent’s name.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is violated the Notarial Law.
Ruling:
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In the instant case, it is undisputable that respondent performed notarial acts on several
documents without a valid notarial commission. The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the
time of the unauthorized notarizations was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications
issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where respondent performed the unauthorized
notarial acts.
Respondent, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for
and in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he
further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero V. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.

A.C. No. 9872. January 28, 2014
Per Curiam
In this case, the respondent is found guilty of the following acts: (1) signing drawn checks
against the account of his son as if they were from his own account; (2) misrepresenting to Navarro
the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the
263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her; (4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from
Page 159 of 370

complainants; (5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it
was exorbitant; and (6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed. In view of the foregoing acts, respondent therefore violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Facts:
Respondent is accused of committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Based on the records presented to the court, the respondent, in committing the aforesaid acts,
violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility namely:
a. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
b. CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
c. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
d. Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Benjamin Ong vs. Atty. William Delos Santos

A.C. No. 10179. March 4, 2014
J. Bersamin
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws.
To accord with the canon of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, he
thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct.
Page 160 of 370

Facts:
Atty. Delos Santos asked Benjamin Ong to encash his postdated check as he was in dire need of
cash. To assure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged
about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial
stability, Ong handed him the amount of P100,000 in exchange for the Metrobank Check No.
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored for
the reason that the account was closed. Ong demanded for immediate payment, but Atty. Delos
Santos just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal
complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.
Furthermore, Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty.Delos Santos be held liable for violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Subsequently, the IBP
Board of Governeors issued a resolution adopting the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when issued the worthless check.
Ruling:
Atty. Delos Santos is Guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good
moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to
his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain
his membership in the Philippine Bar. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a
competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any
gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law.
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was
penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express
commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,

OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Page 161 of 370

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan, required of him as a lawyer an enduring
high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness
expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and
his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers
of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private
capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.
That this act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested
him—whether he was acting as such or in a non-professional capacity—with the obligation to
exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is no question that a
lawyer could be disciplined not only for the malpractice of his profession, but also for the grave
misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity. His being a lawyer demanded that he
conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.
Stephan Brunet and Virginia Brunet vs. Atty. Ronald Gauren

A.C. No 10164. March 10, 2014
J. Mendoza
A lawyer who, despite having accepted his acceptance fee, fails to perform his obligation to
file the case for the titling of his client’s lot despite the lapse of five years breached his duty to serve
his client with competence and diligence and is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Facts:
A Complaint was filed by Spouses Brunet against Atty. Ronald Gauren before the Commission on
Bar Discipline. The spouses alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Gauren for the titling
of a residential lot they acquired and Atty. Guaren asked for a fee including expenses relative to
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its proceedings. From 1997 to 2001, the Spouses constantly reminded Atty. Guaren about the case
and each time he would say that the titling was in progress. Bothered by the slow progress of the
case, the spouses demanded the return of the money they paid. The spouses also alleged that
despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Gauren made a
special appearance against them in a pending case.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of a
certain amount, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed five long years to elapse without
any progress. The Investigating Commissioner further recommended that Atty. Gauren should be
discipline for appearing in a case against the complainants without a written consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for
the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him.
Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez vs. Atty. Arnulfo Agleron, Sr.

A.C. No. 5359. March 10, 2014
J. Mendoza
A lawyer who fails to file a complaint despite the lapse of four years is guilty of violating Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
Page 163 of 370

Facts:
When Ermelinda’s husband died in a vehicular accident involving a dump truck owned by the
Municipality of Caraga, she decided to filed charges against the Municipality and engaged the
services of Atty. Agleron. On three occasions Atty. Agleron requested and received from
Ermelinda money for the alleged payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees. After the lapse of four
years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. This
prompted Ermelinda to file a complaint against Atty. Agleron. In the Report and
Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a matter entrusted to him. The Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Resolution Affirmed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed.
He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the
full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is
not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted
to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that
complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to
speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and
showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.
Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. vs. Atty. Diosdado Jimenez
A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
J. Villarama, Jr.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In filing the first motion for extension of time to file
appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file the same and thereby
causing the dismissal of his client’s appeal, the lawyer had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as
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set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every
member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Facts:
Spouses Frederico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Congressional
Village Homeowner’s Association and Ely Mabanag before the RTC for building a concrete wall
which abutted their property and denied them their right of way. The Law Firm of Gonzales
Sinense Jeminez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent Atty.
Jimenez as the counsel of the record and handling lawyer. On October 4, 1996, the RTC rendered
a decision in favor of Spouses Santander.
The Association appealed to the CA, but was dismissed on the ground that the original period to
file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to
filed the brief was filed.
Eight years later, Nestor Figueras and Beinvenido Victoria, Jr., members of the Association, filed a
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12;
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and wilful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.
The investigating Commissioner found Atty. Jimenez liable for the violation of the code and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months.
The Board of Governors of IBP adopted and approved the recommendation.
Issue:
Whether the lawyer was remiss in the performance of his duties as a counsel.
Ruling:
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client
as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to
file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.
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(People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious
lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22,
Canons of Professional Ethics;People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515).
Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja vs. Atty. Benjamin Reonal

A.C. No. 9896. March 19, 2014
J. Mendoza
A lawyers act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the client’s
case and, subsequently, failing to render the services, constitutes as an inexcusable negligence and is
a clear violation of Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.”
Facts:
Complainant, Elena Nebreja, engaged the services of respondent Atty. Reonal to file her petition
for annulment. Atty. Reonal asked the complainant for sums of money on separate occasions for
the payment of various fees. Despite payment and repeated inquiries regarding the status of her
petition for annulment, the complainant did not receive any word from Atty. Reonal.
When complainant tried again to obtain copies of her annulment case from Atty. Reonal, he did
not give any and told her that her annulment case would just be re-filed. When she asked him to
write a letter to explain to the University of Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy between the
surnames appearing in her children’s NSO-issued birth certificates and the school records,
respondent did not mention any pending annulment case in the letter, which he filed in
complainant’s behalf. These circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any
petition for annulment at all and prompted her to file a Complaint before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP against Atty. Reonal. Subsequently, the CBD found that the Atty.
Reonal was liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file the complainant’s petition for
annulment.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer violated the Code of Professional Reponsibility when he did not file
the contracted petition.
Ruling:
Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted petition. His
conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was
found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on
negligence and states:
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Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to
perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. Thus, a lawyer was held
to be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's interest after receiving his
acceptance fee. In another case, this Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client
of the status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the
appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums
he received from his client.
In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then completely
neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the
petition. His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the
complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
sup
P/SR. Insp. Teddy M. Rosqueta vs. Judge Jonathan A. Asuncion,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Laoag City
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823
J. Bersamin
A Judge who allowed his bodyguard to take possession of a firearm that is the subject of a
criminal case pending before the court where he is presiding is administratively liable for gross
misconduct for violating Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is guilty of misusing evidence entrusted to the court. After having accepted
their exalted positions in the Judiciary, the Judges owe to the public to uphold the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of them. The conduct required of court personnel, from the
Presiding Judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that could taint the
judiciary.
FACTS:
Two men were arrested for illegally possessing firearms. One of the arrestees was identified as
Fidel Refuerzo. In an investigation conducted, it was found that Refuerzo worked as a body guard
of Judge Asuncion and upon verification at the Office of the Firearms and Explosives, Security
Agencies and Guards Supervision (FESAGS), he was found to be not listed as a registered or
licensed holder of any kind and calibre of firearm. The investigation further revealed that the
firearm in question had been previously seized from the possession of one Joseph Canlas who,
after a buy-bust operation, was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The case for illegal possession of firearms filed against
Canlas was assigned to Branch 2 where Judge Asuncion presided
Subsequently, Police Sr. Insp. Rosqueta filed an affidavit-complaint charging respondent Judge
Asuncion with grave misconduct and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Rosqueta
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contended that the judge committed serious misconduct because he had shown malicious
interest in the firearm by allowing his bodyguard to take possession of them.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge committed grave misconduct for violating the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Ruling:
Judge Asuncion is Administratively Liable for Gross Misconduct.
The accountability for the Judge’s actuations is inescapable for him. He is guilty of misusing
evidence entrusted to the court. He thereby did not live up to the exacting standards prescribed
by the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically its Canon2 and Canon 4, viz:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. the behavior and conduct of judges must affirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all
the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.
The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety is more sternly applied to lower court judges. Indeed, judges are reminded that after
having accepted their exalted position in the Judiciary, they owe to the public to uphold the
exacting standards of conduct demanded of them. The circumstances obtaining here seriously
tainted the good image and reputation of the Judiciary, even as it reflected badly on Judge
Asuncion’s personal and official reputation. As this Court held in Re: Josefina V. Palon, the
conduct required of court personnel, from the Presiding Judge to the lowliest clerk, must always
be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be
free from any suspicion that could taint the judiciary.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct under
the category of gross misconduct. The Court had defined gross misconduct as a “transgression of
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some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. Gross misconduct involves corruption, or an act that is inspired
by the intention to violate the law, or that is a persistent disregard of well-known rules. Needless
to state, any gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the
Judiciary.
MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL vs. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014, J. Villarama Jr.
Cristobal engaged in the services of Atty. Renta. However, the latter has failed to file petition
to the court because such was misplaced. The court ruled that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case,
it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Here, it is beyond doubt
that Atty. Renta breached his duty to serve complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him. He himself admits that the petition for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness
from the Court and promises not to repeat his mistake
Facts:
Cristobal engaged the services of RentaPe& Associates Law Office for the filing of a
“petition for recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell Green” before
the Bureau of Immigration. Atty. Rentaas the managing partner signed the “Special Contract of
Legal Services”in behalf of said law office. Atty. Renta also received from complainant the “full
and package price” of P160,000 for the filing of the petition for recognition. No such petition,
however, was filed.Thus, the instant complaint was filed against Atty. Rentafor the latter’s failure
to file the petition for recognition and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand. Atty. Renta
explained that the petition for recognition was not filed because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to
file the petition, misplaced it and did not inform him of such fact. He also claimed that he begged
complainant to forgive him and assured him that he will return the money. However, respondent
failed to refund the money on time for he was “hard up in funds.” Eventually, he was able to save
enough and refunded the money to complainant. Atty. Renta likewise begs forgiveness from the
Court and promises not to repeat his mistake.
Issue:
Whether or not AttyRenta violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Renta violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Page 169 of 370

The court held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence. Here, it is beyond doubt that Atty. Renta breached his
duty to serve complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. He
himself admits that the petition for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court
and promises not to repeat his mistake. Complainant also submitted official letters from the
Bureau of Immigration that indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan supposedly lost
the petition for recognition and failed to inform Atty. Renta cannot absolve him of liability for it
was his duty not to neglect complainant’s case and handle it with diligence.
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTROGA

A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Though the agreement entered into by respondent and complainant was denominated as a
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, respondent alleges that it is one of equitable mortgage and
not one of pacto de retro sale, thus, giving him the legal right to mortgage the subject property to
other persons, such being the case, respondent contends that he should not be held administratively
liable. The SC however ruled that regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and
complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s
actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases,
clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable.
Facts:
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” on December 2, 1981 where respondent Astroga sold to
complainant Saladaga a parcel of coconut land covered by TCT No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under
the said deed, Astroga represented that he has “the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee
simple” the subject property and that the said property is “free from all liens and encumbrances.”
The deed also provided that Astroga, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase
the property, and if not repurchased within the said period, “the parties shall renew the
instrument/agreement.”
Astroga failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed.
No renewal of the contract was likewise made even after Saladaga sent Astroga a final demand for
the latter to repurchase the property, hence, Salagada remained in peaceful possession of the
property. However, in December 1989 Saladaga received letters from Rural Bank of Albuera
(Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by Astroga to RBAI and that
the bank had already foreclosed the property, thus, he should vacate the property. As a
consequence thereof, Saladaga made an investigation and found out that TCT No. T-662 was
already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name PNB as early as November 17, 1972 after
foreclosure proceedings, that TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of
respondent Astroga and his wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale between PNB and
Astroga and finally, that Astroga mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984 and
subsequently RBAI obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.
Page 170 of 370

Having been dispossessed of the property by RBAI, Saladaga instituted a criminal

complaint for estafa against Astroga. Saladaga likewise instituted the instant administrative cases
against Astroga seeking the disbarment of the latter.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Consolidated Answer, Astroga denied that his agreement with Saladaga was a pacto
de retro sale. He alleged that the agreement was one of equitable mortgage, thus, he still had the
legal right to mortgage the subject property to other persons.
In recommending that Astroga be suspended from the practice of law for one year, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline held that Astroga acted in
bad faith in executing the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase but later on claimed that the
same was one of equitable mortgage. The Investigating Commissioner likewise recommended
that Astroga be ordered to return the sum of P 15, 000 representing the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retro sale. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that
Astroga be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Astroga should be suspended from the practice of law.
2. Whether or not Astroga should be ordered to return the sum of P15, 000.
Ruling:
1. Yes, he should.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend
Astroga from the practice of law for two years.
Regardless of whether the written contract between Astroga and Saladaga is actually one
of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, Astroga’s actuations in his transaction with
Saladaga, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers,
for which Astroga should be held administratively liable.
When Astroga was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook
to “obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion.” He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly
agreed, that Astroga caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” as he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Astroga could have
simply denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and Saladaga
as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee,” respectively, rather than as “vendor a retro” and “vendee a retro.”
Page 171 of 370

If only Astroga had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the
deed, then the controversy between him and Saladaga could have been avoided or, at the very
least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed
lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to “conduct [him]self as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.”
Respondent Astroga, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to

complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is
embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer
who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention
of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting
parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed,
the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” was a significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal competence
of respondent.
Furthermore Astroga dealt with Saladaga with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he
entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981 with the latter.
He made it appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving
Saladaga the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had
already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not
even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new
copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of the said deed.
All told, Astroga clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against Saladaga.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal
processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand,
Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers. Any act or omission that is
contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is
“unlawful.” “Unlawful” conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
the concept is broad enough to include such element.
To be “dishonest” means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be

untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that is “deceitful” means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device
that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the
party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity
or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal
Page 172 of 370

terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed
acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.
Astroga’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court’s
referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused
delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required Astroga to comment on Saladaga’s Affidavit-Complaint in

A.C. No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively. While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit his
comment, no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution
dated February 4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment. Astroga neither showed
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor
submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner, Astroga was again required several times to submit his consolidated
answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this Court originally
required him to do so. The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Despite having been given several opportunities to submit the same,
Astroga did not file any position paper.
Astroga’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner,
which caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. x x x x
CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. x x x x
Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
Astroga’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a
disciplinary sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga, Astroga was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of Astroga from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
Page 173 of 370

2. No, he should not.
In Roa v. Moreno, the Court pronounced that “[i]n disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative
liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other.” While the respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give
rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in
the appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law
applicable and the quantum of proof required in each. Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the ones at bar, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its President,

ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ
A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014, J. Mendoza
Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: "A lawyer
should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a
right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Respondent in the case at bar is a
servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with the administration of
law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and
should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Her delay in the liquidation
of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission that she ran for
said election; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of
PACE officers, though she was no longer working in the Judiciary constitutes a violation of Chapter
1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Facts:
Complainant PACE is the umbrella association of the 1st and 2nd level court employees in
the Judiciary. It held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8,
2005. Respondent Atty. Diaz was then the National Treasurer of PACE who was entrusted with all
its money matters.
PACE alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by
Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City. PACE
further contended that during the 12th convention Atty. Diaz again ran for the position of
National Treasurer, but she was not elected. Also on the last day of the convention, the outgoing
Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007
appropriating the amount of 30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified
thereto. Finally, PACE contended that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th
Page 174 of 370

convention and that she failed to turn over the monies belonging to the association despite a
letter of demand sent to her. Consequently, the new set of PACE officers issued a Board
Resolution directing Atty. Diaz to explain why she failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the
Davao and Iloilo conventions.
Atty. Diaz on the other hand countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for
the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention. She likewise
alleged that she filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22,
2007 and that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by
the then President of PACE. Atty. Diaz denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer
during the Iloilo convention. Finally she contended that the approval of the P30,000.00 term-end
bonus did not rest with her solely, for it was approved by the previous board of directors and that
she never sponsored the bonus.
In the Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Fernandez he recommended

the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. He explained that Atty. Diaz offered
documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation reports for the two
aforementioned conventions of PACE. Moreover he did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as
national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer. Finally,
Commissioner Fernandez found the issue with respect to the passing of Resolution No. 1-2007 to
have no connection with her being a lawyer. Thus, according to him, Atty. Diaz should be
sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case.
Initially, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.
However, upon PACE’s motion for reconsideration the IBP-BOG issued an Extended Resolution,
dated June 21, 2013, reversing and setting aside its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Ruling:
Yes, she did.
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.
Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a
right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their
dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct
Page 175 of 370

themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts
and their clients. Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to
those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession
which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he
or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of this noble profession.
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of
candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or
passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she
was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There
was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP
AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015, J. Reyes
Respondents were charge of malpractice but thereafter the complainants condoned them.
The court ruled that the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the
respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle matters
amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants’
forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct
committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to
withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their
claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis
thereof. It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral
character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.
Facts:
The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection cases
which were filed against them by the respondents. respondents sued the complainants to compel
them to pay their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory note. After
they filed their answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out the
same and to declare them in default on the ground that the said pleading was prepared by a
Page 176 of 370

lawyer suspended from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was
however denied. On the other case, the respondents sued the complainants to collect the amount
of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record for the reason
that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its filing
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-
court settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents’ law office. She appealed for the
respondents’ consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of
installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her
first payment of P20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a written
document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should
still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in the civil cases
filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will be moving for
the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents’ assurance, the complainants did not attend
the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the
trial court in the two civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-
appearance in the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their
indebtedness and damages. The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement
between the parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment payments to
the respondents upon the latter’s assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial court
since they already had an out-of-court settlement before the rendition of said judgment. They
were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ.4 This prompted them to
seek legal advice to address their predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V. Carriaga who, after
learning of the factual milieu of their case, told them that they have a good ground to file a
disbarment case against the respondents. He, however, declined to handle the case himself as he
disclosed that his wife is a relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the complainants to
Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his suspensions. As advised, the
complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their counsel. Initially, Atty. Paras
refused to handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity between him and the
respondents may invite unwelcome repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted to retain
his services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the
respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. As foretold by Atty. Paras, the
complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were allegedly instigated by the
respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They received threats of physical
harm and Aida’s continued employment as a public school teacher was put in jeopardy. Also,
suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house. When they refused to yield
to the respondents’ intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of charges against them, to wit:
(1) an administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same debts subject of this case; and
(2) a criminal case for perjury against the complainants. To alleviate their situation, they filed a
Joint-Affidavit seeking the assistance of this Court to warn the respondents and to stop them from
employing deplorable acts upon them.
Respondents asserted that Atty. Paras clearly defied the authority of this Court when he
represented the complainants and filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his
suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that he appeared in several cases and filed
numerous pleadings despite his suspension. However, complaints thereafter forgive the
respondents.
Page 177 of 370

Issue:
Whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness of

the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily
results to Francisco’s absolution.
Ruling:
No, it will not lead to his absolution
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral
character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar
by informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional and
private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to
breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the unworthy.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants’ change
of heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint
for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of
the lawyer not only hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the
legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be
disciplined notwithstanding the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as
there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may
proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so
warrant.”23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of
an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep
sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. “The power to discipline
lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and withdrawal of the
charges. This is as it should be, especially when we consider that the law profession and its
exercise is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the
bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only but also to maintain the
dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.”
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability
against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle
matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The
complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the
misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and
Page 178 of 370

supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a
resolution on the basis thereof.
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA vs. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON

A.C. No. 8826, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas- Bernabe
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the client.16 As
such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of
the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case. Clearly, respondent
failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment and, hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Facts:
Camba alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of Atty. Bongon for the
purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe
Olayta, situated in the Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan, both in the province of Albay.
In connection therewith, she claimed to have given the aggregate amount of P112,499.55 to Atty.
Bongon. Despite the foregoing, Atty. BOngon failed to update complainant regarding the status of
the matters referred to him. Thus, Camba terminated her engagement with Atty. Bongon and
demanded for the return of P112,499.55, but to no avail. Hence, she filed the instant complaint
before the Court.
In his defense, Atty. Bongon asserts, inter alia, that he only received P55,000.00 and that
the rest of the money was received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an
employee of his law firm. Further, he averred that he had already offered to return the amount of
P30,000.00 to Camba, claiming that he already earned the fees for legal services in the amount of
P20,000.00 for having studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and
Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, accordingly,
recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
Issue:
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Bongon should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.
Ruling:
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
Page 179 of 370

It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to
serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of
a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must
be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR, which reads:

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, complainant engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate
properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as preparing the Deed, and in connection therewith,
allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which the latter admitted the receipt of only
P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered
the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the preparation of the Deed were delayed due
to the Deed’s several revisions; and that Bernabe Olayta’s surviving heirs were living in different
places, making it difficult to secure their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said
Deed.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00 that he personally received from complainant despite
repeated demands, viz.:

from the client.
demand. x xx.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer
is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the
client.16 As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is
a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment and,
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Page 180 of 370

ENGEL PAUL ACA vs. ATTY. RONALD P. SALVADO

Respondent’s act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the legal
profession. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the
public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused
to satisfy personal whims and desires.
FACTS:
On May 30, 2012, complainant Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met respondent through
Atty. Samuel Divina (“Atty. Divina”), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself
as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses including, but not limited to, a
lending business; that on the same occasion, respondent enticed the complainant to invest in his
business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various
clients and investors. Because of these representations, complainant made several investments in
respondent’s business.
As consideration for these investments, respondent issued several post-dated checks in

the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon
presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were
dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account. Thereafter,
complainant made several verbal and written demands upon respondent, but to no avail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
RULING:
Respondent violated the Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR
profession. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created
the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross
misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not
related to his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is respondent’s
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business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful
fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
2. To the courts
NEMESIA FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN vs. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA
As a member of the legal profession, respondent has the duty to obey the orders and processes of
this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shal not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.”
FACTS:
In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza
administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
Respondent’s liability stemmed from a Complaint dated 8 September 2000 filed by the
complainant spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran. From the records, the Court found that
respondent deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale
transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through,
respondent received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled
complainants into thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining
portion of their land. These actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed
respondent’s behavior as unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, respondent
has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his
profession both stating that he has desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29
May 2012; (2) pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return the
two sets of documents that respondent misled complainants and a certain Sartiga Epal to sign.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with gross misconduct when he failed to comply with the
court’s directive.
RULING:
Respondent acted with gross misconduct.
As a member of the legal profession, respondent has the duty to obey the orders and
processes of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shal not unduly delay a case, impede the
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execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.”
In the present case, respondent had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite
the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to
stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in
following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision over him. In Tugot v.
Judge Coliflores, it was held that the Court’s resolutions should not be construed as mere requests
from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of
respondent to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect
for the Court's lawful orders and directives.
ARTHUR TULIO vs. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHNAGIN

A.C. No. 7110, 20 April 2016, J. Peralta
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
FACTS:
On 29 June 2000, by virtue of complainant Arthur S. Tulio’s agreement with his siblings,
respondent prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights, dated on even date, which was
signed by all of his siblings in his favor. Thereafter, Complainant engaged the services of
respondent to represent him in filing a case for specific performance and damages which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4866-R entitled "Heirs of Angeline S. Tulia, represented by Arthur S.
Tulia vs. fleirs of Artemio E. Patacsil" before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 (the
“Civil Case No.4866-R”). Through his efforts, complainant claims that he and the defendants in
the Civil Case agreed to a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.
On 10 December 2005, to complainant’s surprise, respondent represented his siblings and

filed a complaint against him over legal matters which he had entrusted to him. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 6185-R pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 7 and entitled "Deogracias S. Tulia, et.al. vs. Arthur S. Tulia" for rescission of the deed of
waiver of rights which he himself prepared and notarized (“Civil Case No. 6185-R”). Thus, on 2
January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Disqualify respondent for his unethical conduct in
gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006,
Atty. Buhangin filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. It was stated in the said motion that
respondent: "due to conflict of interest, undersigned respectfully requests that he be allowed by this
Honorable Court to withdraw his appearance in this case as counsel for the plaintiff."
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed Complaint for Disbarment against respondent
for Gross Dishonesty in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Page 183 of 370

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interest.
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.
In this case, it must be noted that the subject property under dispute in Civil Case No.
4866-R and Civil Case No. 6185-R is one and the same. This is also the same subject property of
the Deed of Waiver of Rights which the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6185-R have executed and
signed in favor of complainant, which respondent later on used against complainant. Clearly, the
series of respondent’s actions in protecting the rights and interest of complainant over the subject
property before and after the filing of Civil Case No. 4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of
Waiver of Rights in favor of complainant runs counter and in conflict to his subsequent filing of
Civil Case No. 6185-R.
Evidently, there is no question that respondent took an inconsistent position when he

filed Civil Case No. 6185-R against complainant whom he has defended and protected as client in
the past. Even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if he has acted in good
faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests, it is still in violation of the rule of
conflict of interest.
ATTY. ANTERO M. SISON, JR. vs. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, respondent
violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money
entrusted to him by the clients. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for
or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose
should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Page 184 of 370

FACTS:
On 4 March 2011, respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, as the counsel of Marsman-

Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (“MDAHI”) in an insurance claim action against Paramount
Life & General Insurance Corp. (“Paramount Insurance”), met with the corporate secretary of
MDAHI, Atty. Enrique Dimaano, and proposed to increase MDAHI’s claim from P14,863,777.00 to
P64,412,534 by taking into account the interests imposed. The respondent, however, clarified that
the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00.
MDAHI agreed and granted said amount to Atty. Dimaano. On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave
the money for docket fees to respondent who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but
never did. The Corporate Secretary of MDAHI, complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, later
discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI
granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.
On August 11, 2011, respondent sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount Insurance in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal
with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its
conforme on said letter. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI, respondent
filed the Satisfaction of Judgment dated 15 August 2011 before the RTC, stating that the parties had
entered into a compromise agreement.
On August 18, 2011, complainant met with respondent to clarify the events that transpired.
He asked respondent whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and
the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (“PBP-CBD”) a verified Affidavit-Complaint against respondent for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
RULING:
Respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client,
respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI
did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement. However, despite the lack of a
written special authority, respondent agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf of his client
and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the RTC. Although MDAHI subsequently received the
payment of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase respondent’s transgression in
reaching the compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.
Respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR for the following reasons: (1) when MDAHI
granted the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to respondent, it was understood that such amount was
Page 185 of 370

necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees. Yet, when complainant confronted
respondent regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of
court as the payment period had lapsed. Evidently, respondent did not apply the amount given to
him by his client for its intended legal purpose; (2) respondent failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI
from the moment he received the said amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort, the Court held that ethical
and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts,
even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records; and (3) on 26 May
2011, the RTC already rendered its decision, adjudging MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in
the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00. Despite a decision having been rendered,
respondent did not reject the said amount or return it to his client upon receipt thereof on 27
May 2011.
Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the
money entrusted to him by the clients. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but
not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon
demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
PAULA T. YU vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

Respondent used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the
proceeds from the pledge. Respondent was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless
the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
FACTS:
Based on the records, respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz agreed to represent
complainant Paulina T. Yu in three (3) cases after receiving an aggregate amount of P43,000.00 as
acceptance fees.
On 29 November 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and

respondent was subsisting, respondent borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged
the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. (“Citystate”) for the amount of P29,945.50.
Respondent appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the
redemption of the said jewelry, respondent issued to complainant Citystate Check No. 0088551
dated 31 August 2011 in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed." Complainant
immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In two letters dated 23 March 2012 and 18 April 2012, complainant demanded for the
refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and
the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail. Hence, complainant filed a verified
Page 186 of 370

complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”) for the disbarment of
respondent on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of
acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR
Based on the evidence on record, respondent was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a
client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice.
Here, respondent used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for
himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the
value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his
exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter's property.
"trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from
his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property
from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

A.C. No. 10945, 23 February 2016, J. Bersamin
As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full
updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his
obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states “a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.”
FACTS:
Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame engaged the legal
services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to defend them in a case seeking the declaration of the
nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela. Upon receiving the
P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the
Page 187 of 370

Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) decided it in their favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals (“CA”), and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the
appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an additional amount of
P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged
and paid him the amount requested.
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
complainants of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially
in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in
filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable
worth of P3,391,600.00.
Consequently, the complainants brought this administrative complaint against the

respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitutes a serious breach of his Lawyer’s Oath and the
cannons of professional ethics.
RULING:
Respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his legal duties to
complainants
It is beyond debate, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued
with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with
the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with
utmost diligence, care and devotion. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the
client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case.
The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in
their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
Page 188 of 370

them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in that
respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.
NENITA D. SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS

A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified
to render.
FACTS:
In March 2005, Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez sought the legal service of respondent
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez. The respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at
P150,000.00 plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. The complainant initially paid the
amount P70,000.00 to respondent.
Sometime in May 2005, complainant went to respondent’s residence to inquire about the
developments in her case, but was told by respondent he would only start working on the case
upon her full payment of the acceptance fee. Complainant also learned that respondent intended
to file a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of complainant’s marriage, and
that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage. In light of
these developments, complainant withdrew the case from respondent, and requested the refund
of the amounts already paid. Respondent refused to do so on the ground that he already started
on the case.
Following respondent’s refusal, complainant sent a letter to respondent, through Atty.

Isidro S.C. Martinez, demanding the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded
to the legal services he had already performed, but to no avail. Thus, complainant filed an
administrative complaint against respondent with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”)
charging respondent with misconduct.
During the IBP’s investigation, Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr., declared that: (1) the
respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the
psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; and (2) because he rendered
some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the
P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct
RULING:
Respondent should be held liable for misconduct
Page 189 of 370

The Court held that respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to
the complainant. The records show that he did not know the distinction between the grounds for
legal separation and for annulment of marriage. His explanation that the client initially intended
to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action
for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her
British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still
render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she
desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to
serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney.
He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
RUDENIA L. TIBURDO vs. ATTY. BENIGNO M. PUNO

A.C. No. 10677, 18 April 2016, J. Carpio
FACTS:
The complaint stems from Civil Case No. 2633-G for Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages (the “Civil Case”) filed in the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Gumaca, Quezon by Gerd
Robert Marquard (“Marquard”) against Spouses Antonino and Imelda Macaraeg, Fr. Rodrigo F.
San Pedro and Araceli Emor (the “Defendants”). Respondent Atty. Benigno M. Puno was the
counsel for Marquard.
Due to the absence of summons to one of the Defendants in the Civil Case, the hearing
was reset to enable the service of summons by publication. At the subsequent hearing,
respondent manifested that this has been duly complied with. However, as respondent did not
have the Affidavit of Publication to prove such manifestation, the RTC required him to present
the affidavit at the next hearing. Despite repeated orders from the RTC, and more than sufficient
time to comply with such orders, respondent failed to present the required Affidavit of
Publication. Thus, the counsel for defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
case has been postponed several times due to the fault of the plaintiff, which shows lack of
interest. The RTC denied this motion and gave Atty. Puno a final chance to comply with its orders
Page 190 of 370

requiring the submission of the Affidavit of Publication. Unfortunately, Atty. Puno still failed to
comply. Thus, on 3 June 2009, the RTC eventually dismissed the case.
On 4 June 2010, complainant Rudenia L. Tiburdo filed her Complaint-Affidavit for the
disbarment of respondent alleging that: (1) Atty. Puno intentionally and deliberately failed to
submit the Affidavit of Publication to cause great damage and prejudice to Marquard; (2) Atty.
Puno failed to inform her (as the duly authorized attorney-in-fact of Marquard) or Marquard of
the dismissal of the Civil Case despite receipt of the order containing such dismissal; and (3) the
actuations and demeanor of respondent constituted gross misconduct and gross immoral conduct
which is a ground for his disbarment in accordance with Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Respondent is liable on account of his failure to (1) obey the RTC’s order, and (2) inform
complainant of the dismissal of the Civil Case
One. The Court held that a lawyer's failure to file the required pleadings on behalf of his
client constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
subjects him to disciplinary action. Analogously, respondent’s repeated failure to produce the
necessary Affidavit of Publication, in accordance with the orders of the court, should render him
liable for the proper penalty.
Two. Respondent also failed to perform his duty to inform his client of the dismissal of the
Civil Case. Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information." The records show that the office of respondent duly received the
Order of the RTC dismissing the Civil Case. However, he never informed Marquard or the
complainant of the Order, causing such dismissal to attain finality.
HELEN CHANG vs. ATTY. JOSE R. HIDALGO

A.C. No. 6934, 6 April 2016, J. Leonen
A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying
with the requirements in Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be
held liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS:
On 7 November 2005, complainant Helen Chang filed an administrative Complaint before the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Chang alleged that respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo was
being remiss in his duties as her counsel and as an officer of the court.
In her Complaint, respondent alleged that she engaged the services of respondent as legal counsel
Page 191 of 370

to represent her in several collection cases pending in various courts. Pursuant to the contract
they executed, complainant issued five (5) checks in favor of respondent totaling P52,000.00. Atty.
Hidalgo also collected P9,500.00 as "hearing fee." Respondent claimed that despite receiving a
total of P61,500.00, respondent did not attend any of the hearings in the collection cases and,
instead, sent another lawyer without her consent. The other lawyer failed to attend all hearings,
which resulted in the dismissal of the cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for failing to render legal services
despite receipt of payment of legal fees.
RULING:
Respondent acts constitute gross misconduct
In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to
show by preponderance of evidence that the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties
and has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”).
In this case, respondent failed to refute complainant’s allegations. He failed to present

proof that he performed any act in relation to complainant’s collection cases or attended the
hearings for the collection cases. Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly
due to complainant’s uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant
agreed to the withdrawal, or that respondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the
cases were pending. This necessarily resulted in the summary dismissal of the collection cases as
alleged by complainant. All these point to respondent’s complete disregard of his obligations
towards his client.
In light of the foregoing, the Court held that respondent is guilty of violating Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03 of the CPR, to wit:
Rules 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

A.C. No. 10945, 23 February 2016, J. Bersamin
Facts:
Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame engaged the legal services of
respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to defend them in a case seeking the declaration of the nullity
of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela. Upon receiving the P10,000.00
Page 192 of 370

acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the Regional
Trial Court (“RTC”) decided it in their favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court
of Appeals (“CA”), and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the
appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an additional amount of
P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in the CA. They
obliged and paid him the amount requested.
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
complainants of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were
initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them
as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such
motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their
dismay, they later discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the
decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479
hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00.
Consequently, the complainants brought this administrative complaint against the

respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitutes a serious breach of his Lawyer’s Oath and the
cannons of professional ethics.
Ruling:
Respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his legal duties to
complainants
It is beyond debate, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with
trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with
the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause
with utmost diligence, care and devotion. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary
relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the
developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states “a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.”
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best
of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking
up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest
therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the
litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for
reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested
for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case,
Page 193 of 370

particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that
were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their
substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their
case. As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were
then available. His various omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards
them.
ENGEL PAUL ACA vs. ATTY. RONALD P. SALVADO

Facts:
On May 30, 2012, complainant Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met respondent through
Atty. Samuel Divina (“Atty. Divina”), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself
as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses including, but not limited to, a
lending business; that on the same occasion, respondent enticed the complainant to invest in his
business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various
clients and investors. Because of these representations, complainant made several investments in
respondent’s business.
As consideration for these investments, respondent issued several post-dated checks in

the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon
presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were
dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account. Thereafter,
complainant made several verbal and written demands upon respondent, but to no avail.
Issue:
Ruling:
Respondent violated the Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR
profession. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created
the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross
misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not
Page 194 of 370

related to his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is respondent’s
business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful
fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
NEMESIA FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN vs. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA
Facts:
In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza
administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
Respondent’s liability stemmed from a Complaint dated 8 September 2000 filed by the
complainant spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran. From the records, the Court found that
respondent deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale
transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through,
respondent received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled
complainants into thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining
portion of their land. These actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed
respondent’s behavior as unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, respondent
has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his
profession both stating that he has desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29
May 2012; (2) pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return the
two sets of documents that respondent misled complainants and a certain Sartiga Epal to sign.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent acted with gross misconduct when he failed to comply with the
court’s directive.
Ruling:
Respondent acted with gross misconduct.
As a member of the legal profession, respondent has the duty to obey the orders and
processes of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shal not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.”
In the present case, respondent had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite
Page 195 of 370

the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to
stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in
following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision over him. In Tugot v.
Judge Coliflores, it was held that the Court’s resolutions should not be construed as mere requests
from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of
respondent to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect
for the Court's lawful orders and directives.
PAULA T. YU vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

Facts:
Based on the records, respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz agreed to represent
complainant Paulina T. Yu in three (3) cases after receiving an aggregate amount of P43,000.00 as
acceptance fees.
On 29 November 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and

respondent was subsisting, respondent borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged
the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. (“Citystate”) for the amount of P29,945.50.
Respondent appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the
redemption of the said jewelry, respondent issued to complainant Citystate Check No. 0088551
dated 31 August 2011 in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed." Complainant
immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In two letters dated 23 March 2012 and 18 April 2012, complainant demanded for the
refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and
the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail. Hence, complainant filed a verified
complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”) for the disbarment of
respondent on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of
acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath.
Issue:
Ruling:
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR
Based on the evidence on record, respondent was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a
client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice.
Page 196 of 370

Here, respondent used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for
himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the
value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his
exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter's property.
"trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from
his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property
from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
NENITA D. SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS

Facts:
In March 2005, Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez sought the legal service of respondent
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez. The respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at
P150,000.00 plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. The complainant initially paid the
amount P70,000.00 to respondent.
Sometime in May 2005, complainant went to respondent’s residence to inquire about the
developments in her case, but was told by respondent he would only start working on the case
upon her full payment of the acceptance fee. Complainant also learned that respondent intended
to file a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of complainant’s marriage, and
that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage. In light of
these developments, complainant withdrew the case from respondent, and requested the refund
of the amounts already paid. Respondent refused to do so on the ground that he already started
on the case.
Following respondent’s refusal, complainant sent a letter to respondent, through Atty.

Isidro S.C. Martinez, demanding the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded
to the legal services he had already performed, but to no avail. Thus, complainant filed an
administrative complaint against respondent with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”)
charging respondent with misconduct.
During the IBP’s investigation, Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr., declared that: (1) the
respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the
psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; and (2) because he rendered
some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the
P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee.
Page 197 of 370

Issue:
Ruling:
Respondent should be held liable for misconduct
The Court held that respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to
the complainant. The records show that he did not know the distinction between the grounds for
legal separation and for annulment of marriage. His explanation that the client initially intended
to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action
for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her
British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still
render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she
desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to
serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney.
He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
RUDENIA L. TIBURDO vs. ATTY. BENIGNO M. PUNO

A.C. No. 10677, 18 April 2016, J. Carpio
Facts:
The complaint stems from Civil Case No. 2633-G for Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages (the “Civil Case”) filed in the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Gumaca, Quezon by Gerd
Robert Marquard (“Marquard”) against Spouses Antonino and Imelda Macaraeg, Fr. Rodrigo F.
San Pedro and Araceli Emor (the “Defendants”). Respondent Atty. Benigno M. Puno was the
counsel for Marquard.
Page 198 of 370

Due to the absence of summons to one of the Defendants in the Civil Case, the hearing
was reset to enable the service of summons by publication. At the subsequent hearing,
respondent manifested that this has been duly complied with. However, as respondent did not
have the Affidavit of Publication to prove such manifestation, the RTC required him to present
the affidavit at the next hearing. Despite repeated orders from the RTC, and more than sufficient
time to comply with such orders, respondent failed to present the required Affidavit of
Publication. Thus, the counsel for defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
case has been postponed several times due to the fault of the plaintiff, which shows lack of
interest. The RTC denied this motion and gave Atty. Puno a final chance to comply with its orders
requiring the submission of the Affidavit of Publication. Unfortunately, Atty. Puno still failed to
comply. Thus, on 3 June 2009, the RTC eventually dismissed the case.
On 4 June 2010, complainant Rudenia L. Tiburdo filed her Complaint-Affidavit for the
disbarment of respondent alleging that: (1) Atty. Puno intentionally and deliberately failed to
submit the Affidavit of Publication to cause great damage and prejudice to Marquard; (2) Atty.
Puno failed to inform her (as the duly authorized attorney-in-fact of Marquard) or Marquard of
the dismissal of the Civil Case despite receipt of the order containing such dismissal; and (3) the
actuations and demeanor of respondent constituted gross misconduct and gross immoral conduct
which is a ground for his disbarment in accordance with Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Ruling:
Respondent is liable on account of his failure to (1) obey the RTC’s order, and (2) inform
complainant of the dismissal of the Civil Case
One. The Court held that a lawyer's failure to file the required pleadings on behalf of his
client constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
subjects him to disciplinary action. Analogously, respondent’s repeated failure to produce the
necessary Affidavit of Publication, in accordance with the orders of the court, should render him
liable for the proper penalty.
Two. Respondent also failed to perform his duty to inform his client of the dismissal of the
Civil Case. Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information." The records show that the office of respondent duly received the
Order of the RTC dismissing the Civil Case. However, he never informed Marquard or the
complainant of the Order, causing such dismissal to attain finality.
HELEN CHANG vs. ATTY. JOSE R. HIDALGO

A.C. No. 6934, 6 April 2016, J. Leonen
Page 199 of 370

Facts:
A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying with the
requirements in Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be held
liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 7 November 2005, complainant Helen Chang filed an administrative Complaint before the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Chang alleged that respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo was
being remiss in his duties as her counsel and as an officer of the court.
In her Complaint, respondent alleged that she engaged the services of respondent as legal counsel
to represent her in several collection cases pending in various courts. Pursuant to the contract
they executed, complainant issued five (5) checks in favor of respondent totaling P52,000.00. Atty.
Hidalgo also collected P9,500.00 as "hearing fee." Respondent claimed that despite receiving a
total of P61,500.00, respondent did not attend any of the hearings in the collection cases and,
instead, sent another lawyer without her consent. The other lawyer failed to attend all hearings,
which resulted in the dismissal of the cases.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for failing to render legal services
despite receipt of payment of legal fees.
Ruling:
Respondent acts constitute gross misconduct
In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to
show by preponderance of evidence that the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties
and has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”).
In this case, respondent failed to refute complainant’s allegations. He failed to present

proof that he performed any act in relation to complainant’s collection cases or attended the
hearings for the collection cases. Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly
due to complainant’s uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant
agreed to the withdrawal, or that respondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the
cases were pending. This necessarily resulted in the summary dismissal of the collection cases as
alleged by complainant. All these point to respondent’s complete disregard of his obligations
towards his client.
In light of the foregoing, the Court held that respondent is guilty of violating Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03 of the CPR, to wit:
Rules 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Page 200 of 370

ARTHUR TULIO vs. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHNAGIN

A.C. No. 7110, 20 April 2016, J. Peralta
Facts:
On 29 June 2000, by virtue of complainant Arthur S. Tulio’s agreement with his siblings,
respondent prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights, dated on even date, which was
signed by all of his siblings in his favor. Thereafter, Complainant engaged the services of
respondent to represent him in filing a case for specific performance and damages which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4866-R entitled "Heirs of Angeline S. Tulia, represented by Arthur S.
Tulia vs. fleirs of Artemio E. Patacsil" before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 (the
“Civil Case No.4866-R”). Through his efforts, complainant claims that he and the defendants in
the Civil Case agreed to a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.
On 10 December 2005, to complainant’s surprise, respondent represented his siblings and

filed a complaint against him over legal matters which he had entrusted to him. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 6185-R pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 7 and entitled "Deogracias S. Tulia, et.al. vs. Arthur S. Tulia" for rescission of the deed of
waiver of rights which he himself prepared and notarized (“Civil Case No. 6185-R”). Thus, on 2
January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Disqualify respondent for his unethical conduct in
gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006,
Atty. Buhangin filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. It was stated in the said motion that
respondent: "due to conflict of interest, undersigned respectfully requests that he be allowed by this
Honorable Court to withdraw his appearance in this case as counsel for the plaintiff."
In light of the foregoing, complainant filed Complaint for Disbarment against respondent
for Gross Dishonesty in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interest.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.
In this case, it must be noted that the subject property under dispute in Civil Case No.
4866-R and Civil Case No. 6185-R is one and the same. This is also the same subject property of
the Deed of Waiver of Rights which the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6185-R have executed and
signed in favor of complainant, which respondent later on used against complainant. Clearly, the
series of respondent’s actions in protecting the rights and interest of complainant over the subject
Page 201 of 370

property before and after the filing of Civil Case No. 4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of
Waiver of Rights in favor of complainant runs counter and in conflict to his subsequent filing of
Civil Case No. 6185-R.
Evidently, there is no question that respondent took an inconsistent position when he

filed Civil Case No. 6185-R against complainant whom he has defended and protected as client in
the past. Even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if he has acted in good
faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests, it is still in violation of the rule of
conflict of interest.
IBP ELECTIONS
ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA vs. ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION

B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014, J. Brion
The "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the
sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot. The order of rotation is not a rigid
and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.
Facts:
On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas Region gathered at the
Session Hall of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Capitol Site,
Maasin, Leyte, to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term. Also present during
the meeting were the Court’s designated observer, Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Executive Judge of the
RTC, Branch 24, Maasin, Leyte), other lawyers of the Southern Leyte Chapter and outgoing
Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. Governor Enage presided over the election. He then called the
election to order and opened the nominations for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas
for the 2013-2015 term.
Upon a motion duly seconded, Atty. Maglana - the incumbent President of IBP Samar
Chapter - was nominated for the position of Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved that Governor
Enage declare that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the position of
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of all the other eight (8) chapters. Atty.
Maglana cited the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start
of the implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor
for IBP Eastern Visayas.
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, thereafter, took the floor
and manifested that before he decided to run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he
was still qualified to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the immediately
preceding term. Atty. Opinion stated that he received an opinion dated April 2, 2013 from
Governor Vicente M. Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee, that pertinently stated:
This has reference to your Letter dated March 15, 2013 addressed to former IBP
President Roan I. Libarios seeking clarification on your Chapter’s qualification to
field a candidate for Governor on May 25, 2013.
Page 202 of 370

Please be informed that your having lost the Governorship elections for Eastern
Visayas in 2011 does not disqualify your Chapter from seeking an election for
Governorship of Eastern Visayas Region. Thus, under the present set up, the IBP
Chapters of Eastern Samar, Samar, and Biliran are qualified to field their respective
candidate for the scheduled Regional Elections on May 25, 2013.
Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional Elections for IBP Eastern Visayas,
the representative of IBP Samar Chapter, Judge Amanzar, waived "the votes as he cannot pursue
an election at that time." Instead, Atty. Opinion was "asked to run." The Chapter President of
Samar in 2011, however, categorically denied the waiver and said, "I did not pursue my intentions,
although I had one at that time to run for governor, because I was financially handicapped... but I
did not categorically waive our right to the governorship, because I believe that waiver should be,
- should not be implied. I categorically say that I did not waive my right, or the right of the
chapter to run for governor."
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon, the delegate from Biliran, meanwhile pointed out that
Governor Joyas as Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee had no authority to make the above-
cited pronouncement; it is only the Supreme Court that has the authority to determine the
qualified chapters in the region.
After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the rotation rule to the present case,
Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the
position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. Thereafter, some delegates protested the decision of
Governor Enage which prompted him to call a recess. When the session resumed, Atty. Malig-on,
Vice President of IBP Cebu Chapter, moved that the election be suspended and the issue of Atty.
Opinion’s objection to Governor Enage’s ruling be resolved by the IBP BOG. Governor Enage,
however, denied this motion and, thereafter, ordered the distribution of the ballots.
The counting of the ballots revealed that only ten (10) out of the eleven (11) ballots cast
were filled up. Governor Enage counted the votes, with six (6) votes in favor of Atty. Opinion
considered as stray votes and four (4) votes in favor of Atty. Maglana. He then proceeded to
proclaim Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the
disqualification of the other nominee, Atty. Opinion.
Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the IBP BOG. The IBP BOG granted the
election protest of Atty. Opinion and declared him the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas for the 2013-2015 term. Atty. Maglana filed the present Appeal (With Urgent Motion to
Prohibit Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the Election for Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Set on June 15, 2013)
Issues:
1. Whether the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas, since the implementation of Bar
Matter No. 491, has been completed;
2. Whether IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order so that it can no
longer claim its right to the governorship position for the 2013-2015 term;
Page 203 of 370

3. Whether IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for
governor in IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; and
4. Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern
Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Ruling:
The logical starting point in resolving the present matter before us is Section 39, Article VI
of the IBP By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter No. 491. This provision established the rotation
rule in the IBP. The provision states:
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
As has been interpreted and applied by the Court in the past, the rotation rule under
Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws actually consists of two underlying
directives.
First is the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule. The
rule mandates that the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many terms as there may
be chapters in the region. This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to represent
the region in the IBP BOG.
Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation
rule. This exception would allow a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its
right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. Thus, as the Court
held in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, "[t]he rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the
order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose.
1. The First rotation cycle has been completed in 2007.
Counting from the governorship of Atty. Benedicto H. Alo of IBP Cebu Province Chapter,
the first rotation cycle of governors, consisting of nine (9) governorship terms from 1989 to 2007,
leaving three chapters – Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte – with no governor elected to represent
the chapter’s slot in the rotation. Pursuant to the rotational rule, the governorship of a region
shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region, to give every chapter a
chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG. However, not every chapter was represented in
the first rotational cycle. As the IBP BOG noted, there were instances when the Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas came from the same chapter, such as Northern Samar (1997-1999 and 2001-2003),
Cebu Province (1990-1991 and 2003-2005) and Cebu City (1991-1993 and 2005-2007).
These "aberrant" developments, strictly speaking, sidetracked the smooth and proper
implementation of the rotation rule in the first rotational cycle that started with the 1990-1991
Page 204 of 370

term of IBP Cebu Province and which should have ended in the 2005-2007 term with all the
chapters, including Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, given the chance to be governor. Stated
otherwise, had the chapters strictly and mandatorily followed the rotation rule, the first rotational
cycle should have been completed in 2007.
2. IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
As mentioned, the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
Laws is not absolute as it is subject to a waiver, as when a chapter in the order of rotation opts not
to field or nominate its candidate for governor during the election regularly called for the
purpose. The dissent, however, posits that IBP Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the
rotation cycle because there was no clear or unequivocal waiver on its part.
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order
of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election
regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of
votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained
through fraud as established by evidence. Such is not the case here.
Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony with, and not in
derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty.
Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of
rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling
circumstances.
3. IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for
governor for the 2013-2015 term.
With the end of the first rotation cycle in 2007 during the term of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi
of IBP Cebu City Chapter, the election of Atty. Evergisto S. Escalon of IBP Leyte Chapter in that
same year effectively ushered in a fresh second rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas region.
With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the second rotation cycle and with
governors from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters having served the region as starting
points, Atty. Maglana’s position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter qualified to
field a candidate for governor in the 2013 -2015 term clearly fails. The rotation by exclusion rule
provides that "once a member of [a] chapter is elected as Governor, his [or her] chapter would be
excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation
cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to
vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion."
Under this rule, considering that Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters already served
in the second rotation cycle, the six remaining chapters are qualified to field their candidates for
governor in the 2013-2015 term. Applied in the present case, it is clear that both IBP Eastern Samar
and IBP Samar, along with Cebu Province, Cebu City, Biliran and Northern Samar Chapters, are
qualified to field their candidates in the May 25, 2013 regional elections in the IBP Eastern Visayas
region.
Page 205 of 370

4. Atty. Opinion is the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015
term.
We agree with the IBP BOG that Governor Enage seriously erred in disqualifying Atty.
Opinion as a candidate and in declaring the six (6) votes he garnered as stray.
The election of Atty. Opinion is well-settled. He did not only come from the chapter
which is entitled to be elected for the position but also got the majority of six (6) votes, as
opposed to the four (4) votes garnered by Atty. Maglana in the May 25, 2013 elections.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
QUALITIES
QUALITIES
INTEGRITY
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA (SAMABAHU) vs. JUDGE CESAR O.

UNTALAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363, February 25, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by the Court with
utmost care, for proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents
concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well. Thus, when two court employees accused
a Judge of sexual harassment, yet they failed to properly report the incident-with one waiting for 2
years before filing a complaint-and their complaint was unsubstantiated while the Judge presented
documentary and testimonial evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that he could not have
committed the sexual advances, then the complaint must be dismissed.
Facts:
An anonymous letter purportedly purportedly written by a group of female court

employees styled as "Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura" (SAMABAHU) accusing respondent
Judge Untalan with sexual harassment by inappropriately touching the bodies of the female staff
of the Judge’s court, including Mrs. Rowena “Weng” P. Ripdos (Ripdos), Clerk III and Ms. Marissa
Fe B. Herradura (Herradura).
Ripdos and Herrardura executed their respective complaint-affidavits. Ripdos alleged that
on April 22, 2011, Judge Untalan embraced and kissed her on the neck and chest, and rubbed his
body against hers. After the incident, Judge Untalan threatened her with a low performance rating
and transfer to the Office of the Clerk of Court. Herradura corroborated Ripdos’s statement and
narrated her own experience. Judge Untalan pinched her breasts twice while she was working in
front of the computer.
The Office of Court Administrator referred the case to the CA. Judge Untalan denied all
the allegations of improper conduct imputed to him and submitted the supporting affidavits of
his three female employees. He argued that the standard of substantial evidence is not met in this
case considering that the alleged date mentioned by Ripdos in her affidavit, April 22, 2011, was in
Page 206 of 370

fact an official holiday as it was Good Friday. The manner in which the “discreet investigation”
was conducted was likewise assailed by respondent, pointing out that the OCA team’s findings
were apparently based on hearsay from unnamed sources. Accordingly, he prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Justice Bueser of the CA found Judge Untalan guilty of sexual harassment, finding the
testimonies of Ripdos and Herradura credible and that their silence for 2 years before filing the
complaint can be explained by their fear of losing their jobs. Dismissal from the service was the
recommended penalty.
Issue:
Was the guilt of Judge Untalan sufficiently proven?
Ruling:
After thorough evaluation of the records, the Court is unable to concur with the findings
and conclusions of the Investigating Justice.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
in his complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Further, it is settled that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the Investigating
Justice. However, there are some exceptions to the rule according finality to the trial judge’s
assessment of a witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would affect the result of the case.
In this case, the OCA and the Investigating Justice found credible the allegation of Ripdos
that respondent made sexual advances on her despite respondent’s assertion that such incident
could not have happened considering that the date stated in her Affidavit (dated June 17, 2013) –
April 22, 2011- was Good Friday, a regular holiday and hence all government offices including
courts are closed. Notably, it was only during the investigation proper at the CA that Ripdos
corrected herself in her Judicial Affidavit after had raised the issue in his Comment.
It may be recalled that as early as June 13, 2013, the OCA team gave Ripdos a copy of her
Affidavit so she can read and review the same. When the team returned on June 17, 2013, Ripdos
when queried on the contents of her affidavit said that she was satisfied with it and did not make
any correction on the date of the alleged incident stated therein. Her claim that it was pure
oversight on her part is thus difficult to believe, and so with her silence for two years when, except
for Herradura, she had not complained to the proper authorities about respondent’s improper act.
Judge Untalan vehemently denied the charge of sexual harassment. On Ripdos’ claim, he
presented documentary evidence to prove that on all Fridays of April 2011, except April 22, he
conducted hearings on his own court (Branch 149).
The OCA contends that these pieces of evidence are irrelevant because as narrated by
Ripdos, the incident took place during lunch break and it lasted for only a few minutes. It points
Page 207 of 370

out that while Atty. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk at Branch 145, testified that she normally sees
respondent taking his lunch at the canteen, she admitted that she does not know his whereabouts
after that.
However, the OCA failed to consider the fact that since Judge Untalan had no scheduled
hearing at Branch 145, where he was merely a Pairing Judge, and with his hands full of hearings
morning and afternoon at Branch 149, it was unlikely that on one Friday of April, Judge Untalan
would momentarily escape to Branch 145 at lunch break to commit the act of sexual harassment
imputed to him by Ripdos. Meanwhile, Atty. Tang-Togado clarified that while she leaves the
canteen after buying her lunch, with respondent there still eating, the latter usually returns to
their office (Branch 149) after eating his lunch, then takes a nap, comes out at 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. to
ask about his scheduled hearings for the day, and conducts hearing again at 2:00 p.m.
Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher at Branch 149 vehemently denied that
respondent committed any sexual misconduct on her person and neither has she experienced
anything offensive in the workplace, and likewise not heard of the existence of SAMABAHU nor
have knowledge of the alleged sexual complaints against the respondent.
Rosanna San Pedro, former Process Server of Branch 145 testified that the alleged lewd act
of respondent against her never happened. As to SAMABAHU, it was only at the hearing of the
case that she heard about such group. She denied the claim of Herradura that she was also
present when Herradura was being molested by respondent.
The testimonies of witnesses who have worked more closely with Judge Untalan on a
daily basis, testifying as they did in a candid, spontaneous and straightforward manner, and there
being no reason to believe they had any other motive in testifying except to tell the truth, put
serious doubts on the veracity of the allegations of Ripdos and Herradura.
In sum, the Court finds that Ripdos and Herradura failed to substantiate their charges
against respondent by the required quantum of proof. While it is true that their affidavits were
replete with details describing the alleged sexual advances, such detailed narration by itself will
not suffice and will not automatically result in a guilty verdict. Ripdos never reported the alleged
lascivious acts by respondent to the proper authorities until two years later when the OCA team
went to their branch. This seeming lack of urgency on her part in taking concrete administrative
action against a wayward judge bears heavily on her case.
The same thing can be said of Herradura, who appeared to have told everybody at Branch
149 and Branch 145 her story about respondent pinching the side of her breast, and yet failing to
complain before the proper authorities considering that the alleged infraction took place within
the court premises. Rosanna San Pedro even denied Herradura's claim that she was also present
when the aforesaid incident allegedly took place. In contrast, respondent presented credible
testimonial and documentary evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that he could not have
committed the alleged sexual advances.
Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty
that Judge Cesar O. Untalan committed the acts complained of.
Page 208 of 370

IMPARTIALITY
GASPAR BANDOY vs. JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, November 19, 2014, J. Mendoza
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned
De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve
into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed against him,
which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench that was
being challenged. His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure,
the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance. Here, the Court cannot
fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate
action coming from the court. The Code of Judicial Conduct emphasize that judges, as officers of the
court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly, and they but they
must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice.
Facts:
Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint, that he was one of the accused in
Criminal, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr., which was raffled to Branch
44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding
Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being
instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for of the Omnibus
Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan
during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public
elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; that they were
both assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored
to be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa, son of
House representative Amelita C. Villarosa and Mayor Jose Tapales Villaros of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching,
which was captured on video by a member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a
search warrant from the COMELEC, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots inside
his backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the
offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against
De Jesus, Jr.
According to Bandoy, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial Prosecutor

Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter Alfaro,
Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo. Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did
this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-
large until he was able to post bail. Because Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention,
the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for more than two
Page 209 of 370

years. Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by
displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, but was reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr.
entered a plea of not guilty. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s supposed unreasonable bias
towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite
De Jesus, Jr.’s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences when his appearance was
necessary.
Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused.
Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, denied the motion to withdraw information. Thereafter, Judge
Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor became the assisting
presiding judge of Branch 44. Upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and
continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr.
was dismissed, while their bail for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled.
Bandoy claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him
and his coaccused even though there was no warrant of arrest against them. He begged the Court
not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear that they would
have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from him. In his Comment, Judge
Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan. He also denied having a hand in the order to
arrest Bandoy and his co-accused. Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of arrest when
he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore.
In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator did not give credence to Bandoy’s
allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a warrant and to the
insinuation that the Court’s audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the
Villarosas for failure to present proof. The OCA observed, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the
allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the
arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence to admission.
However, Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found guilty of Bias and Partiality and Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be fined.
Issue:
Whether or not the OCA correctly ruled that Judge Jacinto is guilty of Bias and Partiality
and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted
position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence
at all times. In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he
arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose
not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed
Page 210 of 370

against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the
bench that was being challenged. His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public, which
is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and
procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance. The
procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take
nonchalantly. Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge
was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge ignores,
contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good
faith.
Canon 2,47 Rule 2.0148 and Canon 349 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize
that judges, as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly
and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest
and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are
circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such
acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general. Here, the Court
cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without
appropriate action coming from the court. Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge.
PROPRIETY
Ma. Liza Jorda vs. Judge Crisologo Bitas

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376. March 5, 2014
J. Peralta
The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a
judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. It is a patent
disregard of the well-known rules when a Judge grants bail to the accused without hearing nor a
motion for application for bail.
Moreover a judge’s use of abusive and insulting words to project the prosecutor’s ignorance
of the laws and procedure is insensitive, distasteful, inexcusable and is proscribed by Section 1,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that: "Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge."
Facts:
Two Complaints were filed against Judge Crisologo Bitas.
In A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376, the complainant alleged that Miralles, the accused in three criminal case
pending before the RTC where Judge Bitas presides, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest. The
prosecution filed its comment/opposition and moved for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Page 211 of 370

However, no warrant of arrest was issued against Miralles for Qualified Trafficking. Subsequently,
he respondent Judge issued an order finding that there is probable cause to hold the accused for
trial for the violation of R.A. 9208 and ordering Miralles to put up a bail bond of P40,000 for each
of the three cases. No warrant of arrest was issued against Miralles.
According to the complainant, the respondent Judge disregarded his duties and violated
mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the
accused Miralles, who was charged with two non-bailable criminal offenses, and when he
summarily granted a reduce bail in the absence of a motion to fix bail and the prosecution not
being given the opportunity to interpose its objections.
In A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377, Prosecutor Liza Jorda alleged that during the hearing on the Petition for
Involuntary Commitment of the minor victim to the DSWD, respondent Judge propounded series
of question which appeared to mitigate Miralles’ role in the crime charged. The complainant
pointed out that the respondent Judge’s line of questions went beyond judicial authority and
discretion. Furthermore, upon investigation, she discovered that the family members of the Judge
are close associates of Miralles. By reason of such events, Prosecutor Jorda filed a motion for
Inhibition against the respondent Judge. However, during the hearing, she was publicly
humiliated by the Judge.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Justice found the respondent judge guilty of
grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment, absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean,
however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of
his official functions.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of
R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000.00 but not
more than P5,000,000.00. Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a
matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak
or strong.
Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate from the requirement of a
hearing where there is an application for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without
neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Respondent judge's
justification that he granted bail, because he found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot
be sustained because the records show that no such hearing for that purpose transpired. What the
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records show is a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a
petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the determination of the existence of
probable cause. The latter takes place prior to all proceedings, so that if the court is not satisfied
with the existence of a probable cause, it may either dismiss the case or deny the issuance of the
warrant of arrest or conduct a hearing to satisfy itself of the existence of probable cause. If the
court finds the existence of probable cause, the court is mandated to issue a warrant of arrest or
commitment order if the accused is already under custody, as when he was validly arrested
without a warrant.
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the
same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law.
Likewise, we are convinced that respondent judge’s actuations in the court premises during the
hearing of the petition for commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest
partiality to the accused. Indeed, respondent judge’s utterance of: "I don’t want to see your
face!";"You better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by politicians" was
improper and does not speak well his stature as an officer of the Court. Respondent Bitas' use of
abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and
procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously
and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable.
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also
act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges’
competence, integrity and independence. Even on the face of boorish behavior from those he
deals with, he ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of
the court.
The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all the activities of a judge." It bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice,
respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting
language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014, J. Brion
An administrative case was filed against Judge Austria for allegedly committing acts of
impropriety by disclosing in her Friendster account her status as an RTC Judge and by posting
pictures of her wearing an off-shoulder attire which can be viewed by the public. The Supreme Court,
in ruling that Judge Austria is guilty of Impropriety, held that as the visible personification of law
and justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport
themselves. This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
Page 213 of 370

matters. The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality,
decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they
should be beyond reproach.
Facts:
In a supplemental complaint filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana against Judge Ma. Cecilia I.

Austria, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City, Lorenzana alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly
for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely
covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a
brassiere.
In her comment on the supplemental complaint, Judge Austria submitted that the photos
she posted in the social networking website “Friendster” could hardly be considered vulgar or
lewd. She added that an “off shouldered” attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. On July 4, 2008,
the complainant filed a reply, insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting “seductive” pictures
and maintaining a “Friendster” account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,
2.02 and 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, Justice Gonzales Sison, the
investigating justice, ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. she believes that her act
of maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing
personal details as a magistrate in the account) — even during these changing times when social
networking websites seem to be the trend — constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be
legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. On allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of
circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales Sison’s observations that the
respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard
of propriety set forth by the Code.
Issue:
Whether the act of the judge in maintaining a Friendster account, in posing her picture
where she wears an off-shouldered dress, and in disclosing that she is a RTC judge, are conducts
unbecoming a judge
Ruling:
Yes. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in
social networking activities, the Court remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status
as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that
every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that the court
judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner
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viewable by the public. Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does
not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right “includes the freedom to hold
opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers.” Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The
respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always
conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. This rule reflects the general principle of propriety
expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in
their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, the Court hold that Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an
“offshouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
The Court further state that they are not also unaware that the Judge Austria’s act of
posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held
to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves. This exacting
standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very nature of
their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety;
both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond
reproach. Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as
magistrates.
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN vs. JUDGE SIBANAH E. USMAN

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390, August 13, 2014, J. Peralta
In the absence of showing direct and convincing evidence to prove the alleged bribery, Judge
Usman cannot be held guilty of said charge. In the instant case, no evidence was presented showing
that Judge Usman in fact accepted or received money or anything from Cui in relation to the subject
Page 215 of 370

cases. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent
committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. . Bare allegation would not suffice to
hold respondent liable.
Facts:
Before the Supreme Court is an administrative complaint filed by Josephine Jazmines Tan
against Judge Sibanah E. Usman, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan City,
Branch 28, Samar for bribery and corruption, relative to Civil Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No.
6536. Tan is one of the plaintiffs and accused in Civil Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No. 6536,
then pending before Branch 28, presided by Judge Usman. She claims that Judge Usman was paid
P250,000.00 by their opponent, a certain Allan Tan, through Jaime Cui, Jr., as evidenced by a
receipt and signed by Nilda C. Cinco, OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of the same court.
Tan further accused Judge Usman of knowingly issuing an unjust interlocutory order
when he cited her in contempt. She pointed out that in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266, the Court found
Judge Usman guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Tan now prays that Judge Usman be meted the
penalty of dismissal from service for bribery and corruption. On August 14, 2012, the Office of the
Court Administrator directed Judge Usman to comment on the charges of Gross Misconduct,
Knowingly rendering an Unjust Order, Abuse of Power and Dishonesty against him.
In his Comment Judge Usman argued that since Tan's allegations and issues had already
been raised and threshed out in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266, following the principle of res judicata, the
instant complaint should not be given due course. Judge Usman countered that the allegations of
bribery and corruption are baseless and unfounded. He claimed that Tan merely concocted and
falsified the acknowledgment receipt wherein she made it appear that Nilda C. Cinco received the
money and issued the receipt in behalf of respondent.
Nilda C. Cinco, in her Affidavit, denied that she received any amount of money from Jaime
Cui, Jr., nor did she issue any acknowledgment receipt thereto. Jaime Cui, Jr., likewise,
vehemently denied even in open court that he disbursed a substantial amount of money to
respondent or to Nilda Cinco, in any occasion or for any purpose. Judge Usman argued that Allan
Tan was killed on October 28, 2008, hence, it is impossible that he gave orders to Jaime Cui, Jr. on
the alleged dates where bribery took place. The OCA recommended that the instant
administrative complaint be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City,
for raffle who shall conduct the investigation. The complaint was later on raffled to Court of
Appeals Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap. Investigating Justice recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence. The Investigating Justice opined that the complaint-
affidavit and the "receipt" given by Tan do not constitute as substantial evidence to prove that
respondent judge committed bribery or corruption.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Usman committed bribery and corruption.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court affirms the Investigating Justice.
Page 216 of 370

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent

committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the
facts upon which she bases her claim, respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense. As settled, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. The
complainant must present panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Bare allegation
would not suffice to hold respondent liable. In the absence of showing direct and convincing
evidence to prove the alleged bribery, Judge Usman cannot be held guilty of said charge. In the
instant case, no evidence was presented showing that respondent in fact accepted or received
money or anything from Cui in relation to the subject cases. Neither was there any evidence to
show that Judge Usman unlawfully or wrongfully used his official function for his own benefit or
personal gain.
By merely presenting a "receipt" with a tenor that money in the amount of P250,000.00
was received by Nilda Cinco in behalf of respondent to support an accusation of bribery will not
stand alone. As correctly observed by the OCA, while it may be considered as proof that indeed
there was money received, it does not prove however that respondent received the same.
Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a misconduct so grave that,
if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be
more than substantial.
The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or
any graver offense, as in this case, the evidence against him should be competent and derived
from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which Judge Usman belongs demands no less. Before any
of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is
penal in character. Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. As in the Supreme Court's previous rulings, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, Judge Usman enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties as well as the presumption of innocence.
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY

vs. JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee,

guardian or other fiduciary. The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and
interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow
him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official functions. When a member
of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of
losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with
those of the litigant who comes before his court.
The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust belongs to,
or the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.
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The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives within the second
degree of consanguinity.
Facts:
Conrado Lopez alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his adoptive
father Restituto Lopez 1/2 of Lot No. 1718 with an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban,
Cebu, evidenced by a testament. He claimed that while the document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he
ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696 with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that
became the object of an extrajudicial settlement involving him, his adoptive mother Honorata
Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent. Lopez alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and
the respondent met. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into signing a SPA to
process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to
the complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights"
that the respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No.
1696. After signing the document (notarized by a certain Atty. Mata without the complainant’s
presence), the respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no longer had any right over the
property. Lopez also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a
document entitled "Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and
Victoria Lopez". He alleged that in the extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his
adoptive mother were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the late Restituto who, in turn,
had inherited the property from his late mother Victoria Lopez, their exclusion from the
extrajudicial settlement was an act of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held
Judge Lucmayon (respondent) vehemently denied that he convinced the complainant to

sell his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant who was interested in
selling his shares after he got tired of cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the
complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He contended that the filing of the administrative
case against him was intended to embarrass and harass him. The respondent further stated that
the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done after he discovered that the complainant was not
legally adopted. He added that since there had been no legal adoption, the complainant could not
be considered as a legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He stated, too, that
his participation in the sale transaction was limited to informing his parents and relatives that the
complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.
The OCA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On motion for reconsideration, the
OCA held that while the respondent’s act of asking the complainant to sign the SPAs may not
constitute dishonesty, corruption or misconduct, his other actions (specifically requiring the
complainant to sign the SPAs and allowing Atty. Matato notarize the Waiver of Rights without
each other’s presence) as well as his appointment as the complainant’s attorney-in-fact, violate
Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and amount to impropriety.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Lucmayon is guilty of impropriety.
Page 218 of 370

Ruling:
Yes, Since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent’s "immediate family" as
herein defined, the latter’s appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact is not a valid exception to
the rule.
Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not only allowed himself to be

distracted from the performance of his judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts
necessary to protect the complainant’s interest. In effect, the respondent acted as the
complainant’s fiduciary, in direct and patent violation of the prohibition against judges.
As a judge who is expected to observe the ethical rules that govern judicial conduct both
in public and private affairs, the respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting the
appointment as an attorney-in-fact of the complainant. He should be reminded that the Code of
Judicial Conduct – which, among others, prohibits members of the bench from engaging in extra-
judicial activities that tends to create a conflict with their judicial duties– must be strictly
complied with.
On the charge of impropriety, the Court repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to
keep their conduct beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the discharge of their official duties and in their
everyday lives. The Court agreed with the OCA that the respondent’s acts of: (1) making the
complainant sign at least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights – without
the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents outside the
presence of the executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the
respondent had deceived the complainant into signing these documents, the Court cannot ignore
the fact that the documents the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant.
The Court also noted that the Waiver of Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a
judge who is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent, at the very least
should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g. advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer
who could lend him unbiased legal advice regarding the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings. This step, the respondent failed to
take.
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO vs. JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17,
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360, November 19, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for
functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose. It prohibits the use of
halls of justice for residential and commercial purposes. Since such use of the court’s premises
degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss
or damage. Complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that Mantua used his chambers in
the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place.
Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, or is willful, or shameless conduct
Page 219 of 370

showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an

inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.’" It was proven that Mantua engaged in
an extramarital affair with his mistress. There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is
not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary
but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors and is,
thus, punishable.
Facts:
Dorothy Fe Mah-arevalo(complainant), court stenographer, filed an Administrative

Complaint in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua
(respondent). Complainant accused Mantua of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act No. 3019,2 Gross Violation of the
Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
In the said complaint, it was alleged that Mantua: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly
his chamber, as his residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his
staff, (c) used the court process server as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load to his
legal researcher because he could not attend to the same due to his vices; (e) committed gross
ignorance of the law and extorted money from the accused; (f) asked for gasoline, personal
allowance from the local government; and (g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day
period because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary consideration.
Respondent submitted a comment denying all accusations against him. He maintained

that he: (a) could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was renting a house near the same;
(b) had no mistress; (c) merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City
and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the latter synchronized his process serving to
litigants and lawyers of Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as Atty.
Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e) that he never extorted money from the accused;
and (f) never asked for gasoline allowance, but, like all other local officials, received allowances
from the local government. Respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been
separated from service due to compulsory retirement.
The administrative case was referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, and recommended that he be fined in the amount of 25,000.00. The
Investigating Justice concluded that Mantua indeed made his chamber as his residence, a
prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. However,
Mantua is exonerated from the other charges for failure of the complainant to substantiate the
same. Also, Mantua’s acts would have warranted the latter’s suspension and even dismissal from
service, if not for his compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009. In lieu thereof, he was instead
meted a fine.
The OCA issued a Memorandum finding Mantua guilty of Immorality and violation of SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-92,and increased the recommended fine to 40,000.00, which
amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him. Similar to the Investigating
Page 220 of 370

Justice, the OCA found respondent to have violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M.
No. 01-9-09-SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Mantua should be held administratively liable for Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
Ruling:
The Court concurs with the findings of the Investigating Justice and the OCA.
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for
functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose. It prohibits the use of
halls of justice for residential and commercial purposes. Since such use of the court’s premises
inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to
danger of loss or damage.
xxxx
Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar
restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice, to wit:
PART I
Sec. 3. USE OF Halls of Justice (HOJ).
Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys,
Probation and ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including
their support personnel.
Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for
residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.
Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be
allowed in the HOJ.
In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that Mantua used his
chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. His defense that he rented a
house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is
possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in
another.
The Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found him guilty of Immorality.
Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, or is willful, or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.’"
It is a serious charge which may be punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except accrued leave
credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
Page 221 of 370

government-owned or controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, it was proven that Mantua engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress.
The testimonies of complainant clearly demonstrated how he paraded his mistress in full view of
his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other
public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise. Worse, he even had the
audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, Mantua
failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the
judiciary is expected to observe. There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is not
only a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary
but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors and
is, thus, punishable.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA
that since respondent can no longer be dismissed from office on account of his compulsory
retirement on January 9, 2009, he should be fined instead. The Court deems that given the
circumstances discussed, it is proper to impose upon Mantua the penalty of fine in the amount of
P40,000.00.
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D.

TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L.
NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, AND MARIVEL B. ISON vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S.
JACINTO, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015, CJ Sereno
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must
not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.
Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be
free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their
personal behavior and everyday life.
Facts:
Complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public
market of Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
the Municipality, Jose T. Villarosa allegedly wanted to demolish the public market, so that the
Municipality can use the space to erect the new “San Jose Commercial Complex.” Thus,
complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was
raffled to Judge Jacinto’s sala.
Judge Jacinto issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity. Hearings for the determination
of the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were scheduled
on 2 and 3 July 2012. While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to
Page 222 of 370

the case, were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing, only 12 out of the
more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to enter. Worse,
upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom. After the
hearing, respondent issued an open-court Order stating that “the Court is not inclined to extend
for 17 days the said TRO.” At the next hearing held, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom
to take a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court.
According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before
leaving the courtroom.
Judge Jacinto eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO. Petitioners claimed that during
the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, Judge Jacinto “argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused
and admonished petitioners without basis or justification.” They further claimed that respondent
judge asked complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit
answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.” Thus,
complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the
canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he issued
an order/ruling against Mayor Villarosa and the latter’s supposed supporters.
The Court issued a Resolution which referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the
CA for raffle among the Justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation. The case
was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Jacinto is guilty of the offense charged.

Ruling:
The Court adopted the recommendation of the investigating justice.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and
partiality. Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality. The
circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited “manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence” in the discharge of his judicial
functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO. The
Supreme Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned
from the mere fact that he did not allow the “more than 500 members” who accompanied
petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the
standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge group could have been
accommodated inside.
As to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished
their witnesses without basis or justification. The investigating justice found that apart from
raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making “abrasive and unnecessary statements to
her,” respondent also made the following statements in open court: “Mga taga-palengke na
nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang kanilang ginagawa”; “Basta na lang kayo pirma
pirma na gawa naman ng abogado niyo.”
Page 223 of 370

Respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness. Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
Also, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to
leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did
so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter
had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment. It was
the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left
the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him
as a judge. He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot
be blamed for thinking that respondent must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa.
Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could no longer return to
attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that. Thus,
respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3 which provides that “Judges shall ensure
that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.”
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Jesus Crisologo and Nanette Crisologo vs. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation

G.R. No. 196894; March 3, 2014
J. Mendoza
Failure to join an indispensable party in a case is a manifest disregard of the basic rules and
procedures and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. The judges are expected to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statues and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply
them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.
Facts:
Various cases of collection of sum of money were filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various
properties including the two parcels of land covered by TCTs Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject
properties). Petitioners spouses Crisologo were plaintiffs in two collection cases against So Keng
Kok, et al.
In another collection case, the trial court rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement
between the parties wherein the defendants were directed to transfer the subject properties in
favor of Sy Sen Ben. Thereafter, the latter sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in
turn sold the same to JEWM. TCTs Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of
Page 224 of 370

JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in
connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok.
A year after, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case. When the decision
attained finality, they moved for execution and a writ was eventually issued. Acting on the same,
the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale which included, among others, the subject properties
covered by TCTs Nos. 325675 and 325676. In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its
Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam praying for the exclusion of
the subject properties from the notice of sale. In an order, however, the motion was denied. To
protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction before the RTC to prevent the public sale of the subject
properties. At the scheduled hearing, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Manifestation
questioning the authority of the court to restraint the execution proceedings in the RTC. JEWM
opposed it on the ground that the Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.
The RTC granted JEWM’s application for writ of preliminary injunction. Subsequently, the
Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the orders
issued by the RTC. However, the CA denied the same holding that the action for Cancellation of
Annotations may proceed even without notice to and impleading the parties who caused the
annotations. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by Spouses Crisologo.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Petition Granted.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of
an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is
required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of
titile.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s lien were indeed annotated that back of
TCTs Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their leins annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs.
In other words, they are indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the present
case, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This manifest disregard of the basic rules
and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutiors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable
abuse of authority the trial judge’s “obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or
procedure.” Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgement. It amounts to evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
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Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as
judicial competence requires no less.
Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo vs. Judge Ramsey Domingo Pichay
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838; March 12, 2014
J. Perlas-Bernabe
While it has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the
proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy against unwarranted delays. Ejectment
cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right of possession of property, and that it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of
the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory. Thus a
judge who fails to resolve the motions filed within the three month period, notwithstanding that the
ejectment case had already been submitted for resolution, is administratively liable for undue delay.
Facts:
A case for unlawful detainer was filed by Spouses Marcelo against Spouses Magopoy before the
MeTC of Parañaque. Spouses Marcelo obtained a favorable judgement and, by virtue of a Joint
Decision dated September 5, 2005, Spouses Magopoy were ordered to vacate and surrender the
possession of the disputed property. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued.
For the continued refusal of the Spouses Magopoy surrender the property, Spouses Marcelo filed
an Ex-Parte Constancia. This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order dated August 7, 2009,
giving the sheriff three days within which to effect Spouses Magopoy’s eviction from the subject
property.
Consequently, Spouses Magopoy filed a motion for reconsideration. The hearing on the motion
was conducted on September 11, 2009, wherein Spouses Magopoy were directed to file their reply.
Days after, Spouses Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents for resolution.
Instead of resolving the pending insidents, Judge Pichay, in an Order dated October 1, 2009,
directed Spouses Marcelo to file their comment and/or opposition within five days from the
receipt of the order, with a warning that upon the expiration of said period, the court will resolve
the pending incidents.
Despite the directive of the court, Spouses Marcelo failed to file their comment and/or
opposition. Nonetheless, Judge Pichay set Spouses Magopoy’s previous motion for reconsideration
for hearing on February 12, 2010, March 16, 2010 and June 15, 2010
Because of Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Spouses Marcelo filed an administrative complaint
before the Office of the Court Administrator charging him with inordinate delay in the
disposition of the pending incidents in the civil case relating to the implementation of the writ of
execution of the 2005 decision.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA recommended that Judge Pichay be held
administratively liable. The OCA found that the Judge entertained dilatory machinations that
resulted in the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution.
Page 226 of 370

Issue:
Whether the judge is administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the pending
incidents.
Ruling:
The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases
and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months
from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
In consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct For the
Philippine Judiciary states that:
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently fairly and with reasonable promptness.
In furtherance of the foregoing mandate, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-87
[dated July 1, 1987], which states: The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the tremendous
responsibility of assisting parties litigants in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of their cases and proceedings as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Delay is a
recurring complaint of every litigant. The main objective of every judge, particularly trial judges,
should be to avoid delays, or if it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to
repudiate manifestly dilatory tactics.
As correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions,
namely the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion, within the three (3) month-
period prescribed therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo’s period to file their
comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/ or rejoinder to the reply lapsed on
October 18, 2009,at which time, the pending incidents were, as stated in the Order dated October
1, 2009, already deemed submitted for resolution. This is concordant with Section 15(2), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that "[a] case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself."
Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay
continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably
delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held that a presiding
judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to
adopt a policy against unwarranted delays. In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain
the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to why he still
had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu proprio
or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of
the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he should have been fully
Page 227 of 370

aware of. As case law instructs, “ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property," and that "it
becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment which has become executory."
Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental

A.M. No. 0-9-454-RTC
A judge who unjustifiably failed to decide a case within the reglementary period is guilty
gross inefficiency. The speedy disposition of cases the courts is a primary aim of the Judiciary, so
that the ends of justice may not be compromised and the Judiciary will be true to its commitment to
provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of their cases. The
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge administers justice impartially and without delay.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, a judge is obliged to perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.
Furthermore, a judge who submitted false certificates of service certifying he did not have
any unresolved cases and matters pending in his court docket is likewise guilty of grave misconduct
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
An Audit Team dispatched by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial
audit of Branch 20 of the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City, presided by Judge Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr.
Based on the audit report, the Judge failed to decided and resolve hundreds of criminal and civil
cases. Despite prior directives from the OCA, Judge Pantanosas did not take proper action on the
cases. The Second Audit Team further found that there were more motions or pending incidents
that had remained unresolved despite the lapse of the reglementary period; and that there were
more cases that had remained unacted upon despite the lapse of a considerable period of time.
Subsequently, the OCA found that the Judge’s failure to decide the cases within the reglementary
period constituted gross inefficiency that should be sanctioned. The OCA also found Judge
Pantanosa guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct from continuing to collect his
salary and other benefits based on false certificates of service that did not reflect the actual
number of his undecided cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge is guilty of gross inefficiency and grave misconduct.
Ruling:
The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a primary aim of the Judiciary, so that the ends of
justice may not be compromised and the Judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide
litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of their cases. The Code
of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge administers justice impartially and without delay.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, a judge is obliged to perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
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reasonable promptness. To comply with his obligation, he must first display such interest in his
office which stops not at the minimum of the day’s labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at
the expiration of official seasons, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light
and even into vacation periods. Only thereby can he do his part in the great work of speeding up
the administration of justice and rehabilitating the Judiciary in the estimation of the people. Any
unjustified failure to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency
that deserves the imposition of the proper administrative sanctions. Hence, decision-making is
his primordial and most important duty as a member of the Bench.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, undue delay in rendering a decision is classified
as less serious charge that carries with it the penalty of suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than nor more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000. However, the offense of Judge Pantanosas did not involve only a single but
several unrendered decisions. Hence, his offense was a compounded one worth of the highest
sanction.
The Court is dismayed to uncover that in addition to his gross inefficiency, Judge Pantanosas was
guilty of grave misconduct pursuant to Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by
submitting false certificates of service in which he certified that he did not have any unresolved
cases and matters pending in his court docket. Thereby, he defrauded the Government. The
certificates of services were not only the means to ensure his paycheck but were also the
instruments by which the Court could fulfil the constitutional mandate of the people’s right to
speedy disposition of cases. His dishonesty—because it badly reflected on his integrity as a
member of the Judiciary and seriously undermined his service to our country and people—
merited him the very high penalty of suspension without pay for the period of six months, similar
to what the Court prescribed for a judge who did not timely decide an election protest for eight
months and submitted false certificates of service, in addition to being found guilty of habitual
absenteeism.suspe
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE BORROMEO BUSTAMANTE

A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Supreme Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the
constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify
the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-
day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and
demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of
cases. The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90day reglementary period for
deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is
generally granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. In Office of
the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day reglementary period is
mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for
administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
Page 229 of 370

Facts:
Considering the impending retirement of Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante (Bustamante), a

judicial audit of the MTCC was conducted by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). OCA found that there were 35 undecided cases before the court of Judge Bustamante.
OCA issued letter to Judge Bustamante demanding explanation and ordered compliance. Judge
Bustamante complied and consequently resolved 33 out of 35 cases pending before his court.
However OCA later issued a memorandum of its findings and found that Judge
Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33 cases decided by
Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the
reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary
period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and
8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after
their respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).
Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his
court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5
days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending
incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing;
(b) there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts; and (c)
oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the
pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related
cases before other courts have already been decided.
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases

and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that retired Judge Borromeo R.
Bustamantebe fined in the amount of P20,000 for gross inefficiency.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and
resolutions pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and resolutions
pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the
judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its
commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of their cases.
Page 230 of 370

The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that
a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report
on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, A judge is mandated
to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for decision. Judges
are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the
Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure
to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge,
absent sufficient justification for his noncompliance therewith.
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer
justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. A judge cannot choose his deadline for
deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Supreme Court, the
failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction.
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by the Supreme Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the
required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and decide
cases within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower
court judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90 days from submission.
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the
integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice
more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to
negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. GarciaBlanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
The Supreme Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the
constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter
how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it
magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. A member of the bench cannot pay
mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its
implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the
mandatory period for disposition of cases. The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time
to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with
the 90day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for
an extension and such request is generally granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an
extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without
Page 231 of 370

any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that
merits administrative sanction.
GERSHON N. DULANG vs. JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN G. REGENCIA

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 02, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to
the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B
was already submitted for resolution on October 17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by
the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission
of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this,
Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on
February 18, 2011.
Facts:
This is an administrative case for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty against Judge Regencia of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asturias-Balamban, Cebu (MCTC), commenced thru a Verified
Complaint dated May 28, 2011 filed by complainant Dulang before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).
In the Verified Complaint, Dulang alleged that on May 4, 2009, he moved for the
resolution of an ejectment case, given that the same had been filed as early as year 2000 and had
already been submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment
proceedings, Judge Regencia rendered a Judgment dismissing the ejectment case only on February
18, 2011 (February 18, 2011 Judgment), or more than 11 years since its filing. Consequently, the
Notice of Judgment was issued only on March 7, 2011 and mailed on March 15, 2011.
The OCA recommended that Judge Regencia be held administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in the amount of P20,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It agreed
with the findings of Judge Montero that there is no justifiable excuse for Judge Regencia not to
render judgment in the ejectment case within the 30-day reglementary period mandated by the
Rules on Summary Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision
Ruling:
Yes, the SC held Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Page 232 of 370

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable
to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty
and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is
embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that “a judge shall
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods” and
echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which provides that “judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”
Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for resolution on
October 17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure
which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position
paper within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered
judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011.
While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable
to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be
regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has
been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge
Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case,
thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
Further, as adverted to earlier, Judge Regencia tried to justify the delay in resolving Civil
Case No. 212-B by claiming, inter alia, that there exists a prejudicial question brought about by the
existence of a pending case in the Toledo RTC and that the parties agreed on the suspension of
the proceedings. However, Judge Montero found that there was neither a prejudicial question nor
an agreement between the litigants that would warrant substantial delays in the proceedings – a
finding which is subscribed to by the OCA. Verily, Judge Regencia’s clear and blatant attempt to
mislead the Court is deplorable and should never be countenanced.
Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either
by: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.31 In
imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside from her
aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively liable for gross
inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover, as correctly observed by
Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of this case, her length of service of more than 17
years should be taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she should
have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an ejectment case, is a summary proceeding
and, thus, ought to be expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of suspension,
should be the appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia’s misconduct.
Page 233 of 370

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURT, BALIUAG, BULACAN
A.M. No. P-15-3298, February 04, 2015, CJ. SERENO
Being designated as acting Clerk of Court or OIC, Ms. Miranda had the duties and
responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court. As such, it was her duty to collect and receive, by herself
or through a duly appointed cashier, all monies in payment of all legal fees; as well as to receive
deposits, fines, and dues. A Clerk of Court, or an acting Clerk of Court, has the duty to ensure full
compliance with the circulars of this Court and the Court Administrator on deposits or collections
of court funds. Clerks of Court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court’s
funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurer,
accountant, guard, and physical plant manager thereof. It is the duty of the Clerks of Court to
faithfully perform their duties and responsibilities. They are the chief administrative officers of their
respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the proper procedures are followed in the
collection of cash bonds. Clerks of Court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the
prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, an unwarranted failure to fulfil these
responsibilities deserves administrative sanctions and not even the full payment of the collection
shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.
Facts:
This is an administrative matter stemming from a financial audit conducted at the

Municipal Trial Court in Baliuag, Bulacan, on the books of accounts of Ms. Anita S. Cruz (Cruz),
former Clerk of Court; Ms. Adelina A. Ramirez and Ms. Emilia A. Miranda, Officers-in-Charge
(OICs)/Clerks of Court of said court, covering a certain period.
Subsequently, the Audit Team issued a Financial Audit Report. It directed, among others,
Ms. Cruz to explain in writing why she should not be held administratively liable for the late
remittances of collections for the Fiduciary Fund account, which had accumulated to P1, 230,780;
and Ms. Miranda to restitute the shortage in the amount of P980, 234 and to explain in writing
why she should not be administratively dealt with for the shortages incurred for the different fund
accounts. Later, two separate Memoranda was mailed to the abovementioned court personnel.
In her letter Ms. Cruz explained that the delay in the remittances of Fiduciary Fund
collections amounting to P1,230,780,, admittedly occurred when she lost track of her duties as
accountable officer because of family problems and health conditions. She recounted that her
mother died of cancer in December 2000. In June 2001, her uncle, who acted as her father, also
died of lung cancer. The following year, in April, her brother died of acute leukemia. In May of
same year, her father-in-law also succumbed to cancer of the pancreas. In April 2003, her husband
died due to heart attack. In 2004, Ms. Cruz herself was diagnosed with colon cancer. Attached to
her letter were the Death Certificates of her family members. On 10 February 2008, Ms. Cruz
retired from the service.
With respect to Ms. Miranda, she failed to comply with the directives addressed to her
through Memorandum which was reiterated in another Memorandum. Subsequently, Ms.
Miranda filed her resignation as Court Interpreter, effective immediately due to health reasons.
Page 234 of 370

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) thus issued a Memorandum recommending

Mirandas’s dismissal from the service for gross dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave
misconduct with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and–controlled corporation[s] or in case of failure to restitute the shortages, the money value of
her accrued leave credits shall be applied to her accountabilities dispensing with the usual
documentary requirements, It likewise directed Cruz to pay a fine of P10,000 (10) days from
receipt of notice for the delayed remittances of her collections which should have earned interest
if the same were remitted on time;
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Court Administrator is correct in its recommendation.
Ruling:
Yes. We affirm the recommendations of the OCA, with modification.
Being designated as acting Clerk of Court or OIC, Ms. Miranda had the duties and
responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court. As such, it was her duty to collect and receive, by
herself or through a duly appointed cashier, all monies in payment of all legal fees; as well as to
receive deposits, fines, and dues. A Clerk of Court, or an acting Clerk of Court, has the duty to
ensure full compliance with the circulars of this Court and the Court Administrator on deposits or
collections of court funds. Clerks of Court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of
the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises. As such, they are generally
regarded as treasurer, accountant, guard, and physical plant manager thereof. It is the duty of the
Clerks of Court to faithfully perform their duties and responsibilities. They are the chief
administrative officers of their respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the proper
procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Clerks of Court are officers of the law
who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, an
unwarranted failure to fulfil these responsibilities deserves administrative sanctions and not even
the full payment of the collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.
While this Court can no longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service on Ms.
Miranda because she has already resigned, such resignation does not render the Complaint
against her moot. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. With respect to
Ms. Cruz, while she has admitted the delay in the deposit of her collections, she has also
explained that the reason for her shortcomings was the series of unfortunate events that befell her
and her family for several years. She has further substantiated her claims of the demise of her
family members. While her explanation and supporting documents do not absolve her of liability,
this Court deems her deserving of compassion and humanitarian consideration. Furthermore, she
had already retired in 2008.
Page 235 of 370

FLORANTE A. MIANO vs. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, 23 February 2016, J. Bersamin
To constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative liability to attach, it is not enough
that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
With regard to the delay in the resolution of pending motions for inhibition within the prescribed
period, the court found respondent guilty of gross inefficiency. The records are bereft of evidence to
show that respondent filed any request for an extension of time within which to resolve them.
FACTS:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint filed by complainant
Florante A. Miano before the Office of the Court Adminitrator (“OCA”) charging respondent Ma.
Ellen M. Aguilar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch
70 (RTC-Burgos), with ignorance of the rules on inhibition and gross inefficiency relative to
several pending cases in her sala.
Complainant alleged that he filed motions for inhibition in several cases raffled to the sala
of respondent, specifically Civil Case No. 173-B (“Migano case”), and Criminal Case No. B-685
(“Madarang case”), which respondent granted. Subsequently, however, respondent issued an
Order dated October 11, 2007 (the “Order”) in the Migano case directing that the proceedings
therein be held in abeyance "until such time that a new Presiding Judge will be appointed by the
Court Administrator to hear and decide this case." Complainant asserted that this constitutes
ignorance of the rules on inhibition on the part of respondent because according to
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-8-02-SC, where the judge in a single-branch RTC, such as
RTC-Burgos where respondent presides, is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits from hearing a case,
the Order of Inhibition shall be transmitted to the pairing judge who shall then hear and decide
the case. Likewise, complainant contended that due to the issuance of the Order, the proceedings
in the Migano case did not move from the time respondent inhibited therefrom in 2007 up to the
filing of the present administrative complaint.
Further, complainant accused respondent of gross inefficiency, citing various instances

where the latter failed to resolve motions for inhibition within the 90-day period prescribed by
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency.
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of gross inefficiency
One. To constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative liability to attach, it
Page 236 of 370

is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it
amounted to bad faith.
In this case, respondent maintains that she is aware of the foregoing rules on inhibition.
Nonetheless, she still issued the October 11, 2007 Order and directed that the proceedings in the
Migano case be held in abeyance, and failed to directly and immediately transmit the records of
the case to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City for further proceedings. Without a doubt,
respondent was remiss in her duty of familiarizing herself with the rules on inhibition set forth in
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. However, the Court finds that such error cannot be categorized as gross
ignorance of the law as records are devoid of evidence to show that respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or egregious error in issuing the Order.
Two. With regard to the delay in the resolution of pending motions for inhibition within
the prescribed period, the court found respondent guilty of gross inefficiency. The records are
bereft of evidence to show that respondent filed any request for an extension of time within which
to resolve them. The Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy
disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court allows extensions of time within which
pending cases may be disposed of, upon a seasonable filing of a request therefor and sufficient
justification. For failing to so, respondent acted with gross inefficiency in failing to resolve the
motions for inhibitions within the reglamentary period.
SPOUSES CESAR and THELMA SUSTENTO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, 8 March 2016, J. Bersamin
Accordingly, any judge who delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the
prescribed period without the Court's express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be
administratively sanctioned.
FACTS:
On 26 January 2009, complainants spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (the “Certiorari”) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City,
Leyte (“RTC 34”), praying for the annulment of the Orders issued by Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-
Lamoste of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in Tacloban City in Civil Case
No. 2008-05-CV-08. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed their Comment/Answer to the
Certiorari. Complainants followed suit, filing a rejoinder to Private Respondent's
Comments/Answer.
On 15 September 2009, respondent issued an Order of even date dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. Notably, said Order was only issued after almost six (6) months had already elapsed
and only after complainants filed a motion for Early Resolution dated 08 September 2009.
Thereafter, complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Private respondent’s

Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and complainants’ Reply were filed on 1
December 2009 and 8 December 2009, respectively. On 10 December 2009, respondent issued an
Page 237 of 370

Order deeming the Motion for Reconsideration submitted for resolution. However, up to the date
of the instant administrative matter was filed, respondent Judge Lilagan has still yet to resolve the
On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have charged the respondent with undue
delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari, and undue delay in the resolution of their
motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-day period in violation of the
Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with undue delay in resolving the Certiorari and the Motion for
Reconsideration.
RULING:
Respondent acted with undue delay
The respondent judge took too much time in disposing of the petition for certiorari and
the ensuing motion for reconsideration. The delays were plainly violative of the injunction to him
to act expeditiously on the matters 90 days from their submission.
We remind that decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy
disposition of cases thus becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends
of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all
persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through
the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases and
matters. In respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are submitted
for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court's business
and to decide cases within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day
period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the
judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Accordingly,
any judge who delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without
the Court's express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be administratively
sanctioned.
ARMANDO M. BALANAY vs. JUDGE JULIANA ADALIM WHITE

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443, 11 January 2016, J. Del Castillo
Facts:
On 20 September 2010, complainant Armando M. Balanay filed before the Office of the
Court Administrator (“OCA”) a verified Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent Judge Juliana
White with gross ignorance of the law for allowing Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (“Adamas”) six
furloughs despite being charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 10-07, a non-bailable offense.
Page 238 of 370

Worse, respondent granted Adamas’ motions without requiring the prosecution to comment or
giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.
Complainant likewise charged respondent with serious misconduct in precipitately

dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-07 by declaring that the prosecution had no witnesses to present
when the records showed otherwise. Complainant further claimed that respondent falsified the 22
July 2010 transcript of stenographic notes (“TSN”) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. He averred that
during the hearing held on said date, the prosecution made a reservation to present additional
witnesses. Respondent, however, instructed her court stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende
(“Mosende”), to delete from said TSN such reservation and insert therein other statements which
were not made during the said hearing. In support of his allegations, complainant submitted a
piece of paper containing respondent’s handwritten notes that were incorporated in the 22 July
2010 TSN.
The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious
misconduct.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct
Respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex parte
motions to allow Adamas’ temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is
indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the temporary
liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on
recognizance. It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that
litigious motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper
which the court should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent is also liable for gross misconduct. A TSN is supposed to be a faithful and
exact recording of all matters that transpired during a court proceeding. Respondent’s act of
directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein statements pertaining to
substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct
which warrants administrative sanction.
FLORANTE A. MIANO vs. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, 23 February 2016, J. Bersamin
Facts:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint filed by complainant
Florante A. Miano before the Office of the Court Adminitrator (“OCA”) charging respondent Ma.
Page 239 of 370

Ellen M. Aguilar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch
70 (RTC-Burgos), with ignorance of the rules on inhibition and gross inefficiency relative to
several pending cases in her sala.
Complainant alleged that he filed motions for inhibition in several cases raffled to the sala
of respondent, specifically Civil Case No. 173-B (“Migano case”), and Criminal Case No. B-685
(“Madarang case”), which respondent granted. Subsequently, however, respondent issued an
Order dated October 11, 2007 (the “Order”) in the Migano case directing that the proceedings
therein be held in abeyance "until such time that a new Presiding Judge will be appointed by the
Court Administrator to hear and decide this case." Complainant asserted that this constitutes
ignorance of the rules on inhibition on the part of respondent because according to
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-8-02-SC, where the judge in a single-branch RTC, such as
RTC-Burgos where respondent presides, is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits from hearing a case,
the Order of Inhibition shall be transmitted to the pairing judge who shall then hear and decide
the case. Likewise, complainant contended that due to the issuance of the Order, the proceedings
in the Migano case did not move from the time respondent inhibited therefrom in 2007 up to the
filing of the present administrative complaint.
Further, complainant accused respondent of gross inefficiency, citing various instances

where the latter failed to resolve motions for inhibition within the 90-day period prescribed by
law.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross inefficiency
One. To constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative liability to attach, it
is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it
amounted to bad faith.
In this case, respondent maintains that she is aware of the foregoing rules on inhibition.
Nonetheless, she still issued the October 11, 2007 Order and directed that the proceedings in the
Migano case be held in abeyance, and failed to directly and immediately transmit the records of
the case to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City for further proceedings. Without a doubt,
respondent was remiss in her duty of familiarizing herself with the rules on inhibition set forth in
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. However, the Court finds that such error cannot be categorized as gross
ignorance of the law as records are devoid of evidence to show that respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or egregious error in issuing the Order.
Two. With regard to the delay in the resolution of pending motions for inhibition within
the prescribed period, the court found respondent guilty of gross inefficiency. The records are
bereft of evidence to show that respondent filed any request for an extension of time within which
Page 240 of 370

to resolve them. The Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy
disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court allows extensions of time within which
pending cases may be disposed of, upon a seasonable filing of a request therefor and sufficient
justification. For failing to so, respondent acted with gross inefficiency in failing to resolve the
motions for inhibitions within the reglementary period.
SPOUSES CESAR and THELMA SUSTENTO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, 8 March 2016, J. Bersamin
Facts:
On 26 January 2009, complainants spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (the “Certiorari”) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City,
Leyte (“RTC 34”), praying for the annulment of the Orders issued by Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-
Lamoste of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in Tacloban City in Civil Case
No. 2008-05-CV-08. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed their Comment/Answer to the
Certiorari. Complainants followed suit, filing a rejoinder to Private Respondent's
Comments/Answer.
On 15 September 2009, respondent issued an Order of even date dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. Notably, said Order was only issued after almost six (6) months had already elapsed
and only after complainants filed a motion for Early Resolution dated 08 September 2009.
Thereafter, complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Private respondent’s

Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and complainants’ Reply were filed on 1
December 2009 and 8 December 2009, respectively. On 10 December 2009, respondent issued an
Order deeming the Motion for Reconsideration submitted for resolution. However, up to the date
of the instant administrative matter was filed, respondent Judge Lilagan has still yet to resolve the
On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have charged the respondent with undue
delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari, and undue delay in the resolution of their
motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-day period in violation of the
Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent acted with undue delay in resolving the Certiorari and the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ruling:
Respondent acted with undue delay
The respondent judge took too much time in disposing of the petition for certiorari and
the ensuing motion for reconsideration. The delays were plainly violative of the injunction to him
to act expeditiously on the matters 90 days from their submission.
Page 241 of 370

We remind that decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The
speedy disposition of cases thus becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may
the ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of
ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial. To pursue this aim, the
Court, through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting
on cases and matters. In respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are
submitted for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court's
business and to decide cases within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within
the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and
integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.
Accordingly, any judge who delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed
period without the Court's express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be
administratively sanctioned.
TRINIDAD GAMBOA-ROCES v. JUDGE RANHELA A. PEREZ

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887, January 9, 2017, J. Mendoza
Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Trinidad Gamboa-Roces (complainant)

charging Judge Ranhel A. Perez (Judge Perez), Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, E.B.
Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental (MCTC), with gross ignorance of the law for his failure to
render judgment on the consolidated ejectment cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-
M, within the reglementary period as prescribed by law.
In her complaint, denominated as Petition, dated November 17, 2015, complainant claimed that
she was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M for unlawful detainer and
damages. After the mediation proceedings and the Judicial Dispute Resolution proceedings failed
in Civil Case No. 451-M, it was referred back to the MCTC for trial and was set for preliminary
conference. As a new judge was soon to be assigned in the MCTC, the preliminary conference was
reset to January 10, 2014, by Judge Evelyn D. Arsenio, the then acting Presiding Judge.
Complainant further stated that when Judge Perez was appointed and assumed office, her counsel
filed two (2) separate motions for his inhibition in the two cases on the ground that she was
previously involved in a legal confrontation with Judge Perez himself when he was representing
his parents. Her motions, however, were denied in separate orders, dated March 7, 2014 and
March 24, 2014, respectively. Thereafter, Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M were consolidated in
the Order, dated March 11, 2014. After the preliminary conference for the two cases was held, the
parties were then required to file their respective position papers. Thereafter, Judge Perez issued
the Order, dated November 21, 2014, submitting the cases for resolution.
Complainant prayed that Judge Perez be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for his failure
to timely render judgment in the said cases. She claimed that despite the lapse of more than ten
(10) months, Judge Perez failed to decide the cases in violation of the 30-day reglementary period
within which to decide an ejectment case.
Page 242 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for failing to resolve the case
within the reglementary period.
Held:
Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the lower courts to decide or resolve cases
or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. In
complaints for forcible entry and unlawful detainer as in this case, Section 10 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure specifically requires that the complaint be resolved within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. Without any order of extension granted by
this Court, failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency.
In the same vein, Sections 2 and 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct enjoin the
judges to devote their professional activity to judicial duties and to perform them, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. This obligation
to render decision promptly is further emphasized in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which
reminds all judges to meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases because failure to comply with the prescribed period transgresses the parties'
constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases.
The Court has always reminded the judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and to
decide cases within the required periods for the honor and integrity of the Judiciary is measured
not only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with
which disputes are resolved. Any delay in the disposition of cases erodes the public's faith and
confidence in the Judiciary. Thus, judges should give full dedication to their primary and
fundamental task of administering justice efficiently, in order to restore and maintain the people's
confidence in the courts.
In this case, the explanation given by Judge Perez was too flimsy. His being inexperienced as a
newly appointed judge and his explanation that the delay was not intended to prejudice the
plaintiffs are not persuasive because it is his duty to resolve the cases within the reglementary
period as mandated by law and the rules. These excuses only show his lack of diligence in
discharging administrative responsibilities and professional competence in court management. A
judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and to note therein the status of each case so
that they may be acted upon accordingly and without delay. He must adopt a system of record
management and organize his docket in order to monitor the flow of cases for a prompt and
effective dispatch of business.
For his undue delay in rendering a decision, respondent was held guilty by the court and ordered
to pay a fine in the amount of Php10,000.00 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Page 243 of 370

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF JUDICIARY
LOWER COURT JUDGES AND JUSTICES
Sr. Remy Angela Junio, SPC and Josephine D. Lorica Vs. Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran,
Br. 3, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao City. Cagayan
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367. January 13, 2014
J. Brion
Since there is no showing of bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the denial,
respondent judge cannot be admonished for refusing to order withdrawal of the joint Informations
against Junio and Lorica.
Facts:
Junio and Lorica filed affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules
1.02, 3.01, 3.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They alleged that respondent judge only
resolved the the joint motion to withdraw informations after almost four months from the time it
was submitted for resolution. They claimed that four months was beyond the priod prescribed by
existing rules for the resolution of simple motions.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and judge when
she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of secretray of Justice in ordering the wihdrawal of Information against petitioners
Ruling:
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the secretary of Justice since it is mandated
to independently evaluate or assess the merit of the case and the facts of th case show that the
respondent judge did not act arbitrarily in denying the joint motion to withdraw informations.
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M No. SB-14-21-J, September 23, 2014
Dishonesty is “the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or

connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray,
cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith.” Dishonesty is also the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Dishonesty need not be
an outright lie. It can consist of the concealment of the truth. Justice Ong’s representations
constitute dishonesty that renders him administratively liable.
Page 244 of 370

Facts:
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an exposé involving billions of government
funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the “pork barrel scam,” as the money was
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country.
One of the personalities who allegedly visited the office of Janet Lim Napoles was Justice Gregory
Ong .
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
Justice Ong meticulously explained the controversial photograph with Napoles which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered
by the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the
accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles. Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to
conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court’s power of administrative supervision
over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession.
Issue:
Whether or not Justice Ong is guilty dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
Dishonesty is “the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or

connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to
betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith.” Dishonesty is also the “disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”
Dishonesty need not be an outright lie. It can consist of the concealment of the truth. The truth
can be concealed not only by negating the truth. Under certain circumstances, facts can be
concealed by one who does not say anything. The truth can be denied by uttering statements that
make a contrary reality seem like the truth.
Truth can also be denied by slanting the facts, i.e., refocusing events on a detail that is
irrelevant or stating only a partial truth. Dishonesty may be the conclusion from an examination
of a series of actions. Sometimes, individuals can utter independently true statements, but when
taken together, would create a context that is contrary to the truth.
Justice Ong committed dishonest acts in concealing his association with Napoles. Justice
Ong’s representations constitute dishonesty that renders him administratively liable.
Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Rule 140,
Section 11(A) provides for a range of penalties, to wit:
1. Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
Page 245 of 370

government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of

benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires propriety from its members. This qualification of a
justice should be constant and should be met by a justice at all times. When Justice Ong
committed dishonest acts to conceal his impropriety, his dishonesty related to his qualifications
as a Sandiganbayan justice.
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, DAET, CAMARINES NORTE
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, October 07, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Judge Amor failed to comment on the administrative complaint despite being given an
opportunity to do so. As aptly pointed out, Judge Amor's failure to file a comment despite all the
opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself.
Facts:
Judge Contreras reported on the alleged acts of Judge Amor: (a) he abused his authority in
impounding the tricycle and exerted undue influence on the security guards of the Hall of Justice
in his attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b) was discourteous in dealing
with a fellow judge when the latter was merely asking for reconsideration of her detail to another
station; (c) used his office and position to intervene in behalf of Atty. Venida and tolerated the
latter’s abusive practice as a lawyer in exchange for gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e) gave
orders to Atty. Loria to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him which resulted in
delays in the proceedings and asked the latter to demand “grease money” from newspaper
publishers in order not to be blacklisted.
Judge Amor failed to comment on the administrative complaint despite being given an
opportunity to do so. In a Memorandum dated July 25, 2008, the OCA found him administratively
liable as charged also found respondent guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for
unduly refusing to obey the Court’s repeated orders for him to file his comment on the instant
administrative case against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Amor should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of
Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service.
Ruling:
Yes. Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer,

who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment,
or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
Page 246 of 370

Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous,
and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate grave misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In the instant case, the OCA correctly found Judge Amor guilty of the charges against him.
As aptly pointed out, Judge Amor's failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded
him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a man
would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human
nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, his silence may
thus be construed as an implied admission and acknowledgement of the veracity of the
allegations against him.
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST REYNALDO C. ALCANTARA, UTILITY

WORKER I, BR. 70, AND JOSEPH C. JACINTO, ELECTRICIAN, HALL OF JUSTICE, BOTH OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BURGOS, PANGASINAN
A.M. No. P-15-3296, February 17, 2015, Per Curiam
Grave misconduct is committed when there has been '"a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by
substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct." In this
case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing checks of their co-workers without
permission. There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly stealing the checks and forging the
signatures of their co-workers constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Facts:
This case stemmed from an undated Letter-Complaint, addressed to Executive Judge

Abella, Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, charging Reynaldo C. Alcantara
(Alcantara) and Joseph C. Jacinto (Jacinto) with the commission of several illegal activities in
violation of Civil Service Rules. Alcantara worked as Utility Worker I, Branch 70, Regional Trial
Court, Burgos, Pangasinan, whereas Jacinto was an electrician at the Hall of Justice in the same
city.
The Letter-Complaint was indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Office of
the Court Administrator then directed Executive Judge Abella to conduct a discreet investigation
and submit a report. Executive Judge Abella recommended that Alcantara and Jacinto be
immediately dismissed from service. He found that as early as 2009, Alcantara and Jacinto
received and encashed checks of their co-workers without consent. Executive Judge Abella found
that Alcantara's and Jacinto's actions constituted grave misconduct and recommended their
dismissal from service.
Page 247 of 370

According to the Office of the Court Administrator, the acts of respondents Alcantara and
Jacinto clearly amounted to dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent Alcantara admitted to
stealing and encashing the checks of Tugade and Espanol and put up the lame excuse that he was
forced to do it because of his dire financial situation at the time. The explanation of respondent
Jacinto is even more absurd. He slaimed that he had no idea that the checks were stolen but he
admitted receiving proceeds from the scheme and allotting them to his personal needs. Under
Rule 9, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service, Serious
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from service even
on the first offense. As correctly pointed by Executive Judge Abella, Alcantara and Jacinto
committed grave offenses and "do not deserve to stay with the judiciary even for a minute longer."
Issue:
Whether or not Reynaldo C. Alcantara and Joseph C. Jacinto should be held guilty of
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes, the SC adopted the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of, integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Grave misconduct is committed when there has been '"a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by
substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct."
In this case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing checks of their co-
workers without permission. There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly stealing the checks
and forging the signatures of their co-workers constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. Their
alleged remorse for what they have done does not erase the transgression they committed. "The
Supreme Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward
an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the
public."
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46,
serious dishonesty and grave misconduct are punishable by dismissal from service even if for the
first offense.
Page 248 of 370

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY
AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 179914, June 16, 2014, J. Del Castillo
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000, June 16, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of
service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the
motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion,
depriving the other parties of their right to due process. A judge owes the public and the court the
duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.
Facts:
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon were owners of a property in Bukidnon. They
mortgaged it to PNB as security for their loan. It was foreclosed and sold at a public auction where
PNB emerged as the winning bidder. The Certificate of Sale in favor of PNB was duly registered in
1999. The spouses failed to redeem the property and the one-year redemption period lapsed.
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Garay, who was once appointed by
the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the
owner of a lot adjacent to the property. The spouses wanted to reacquire the property but had no
money. They hoped Atty. Garay would advance the money and in exchange, they promised to sell
to him a portion of the property.
They all went to PNB to inquire about the property. They were informed that the property
could be purchased at the fair market value of P2,938,000.00. Atty. Garay then went to the bank
alone the next day and offered to buy it by making a down payment of 20% the price. Upon
learning that Atty. Garay wanted the entire property for himself, the spouses made their own offer
to PNB. The bank told them to make a 10% down payment to formalize the offer.
Thereafter, a Transfer Certificate Title was issued to PNB and the bank decided to approve
the offer of Atty. Garay since the spouses failed to make the down payment.PNB filed an Ex-Parte
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC and it was and raffled to Branch 8,
presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr. The petition was granted. After PNB informed the spouses of
their decision to approve Atty. Garay’s offer, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the
issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly,
was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Judge Venadas, Sr. then issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession, stating that the implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession
would work great injustice to the registered owner because PNB or in this case Atty. Garay
counsel for the Sombilons is not entitled thereto. Atty. Garay and PNB filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals with prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or
Injunction. The CA issued a TRO and subsequently, found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.
Page 249 of 370

Thereafter, Atty. Garay filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of
Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s
motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite
lack of notice to PNB and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession.
The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure. It found Judge Venadas, Sr.
guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted
on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. It also pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay
were deprived of their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to them. The OCA
recommended that Judge Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.
The Court consolidated both cases.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Yes, he should be administratively sanctioned. The Court upheld the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and
the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took
cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right
to due process.
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the
basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands
Thus, the judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of
procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Blatant
disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of
the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
EFREN T. UY, NELIA B. LEE, RODOLFO L. MENES and QUINCIANO H. LUI vs. JUDGE
ALAN L. FLORES
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014, J. Villarama
Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti’s order when he
should have dismissed the petition for Gandarosa’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An
employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission
per Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. And even if we
Page 250 of 370

assume that the trial court has jurisdiction over Gandarosa’s petition, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court requires that the petition must be filed in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area. But the trial court presided by Judge Flores is within the 12th Judicial Region
while the Head Office and Regional Office, Revenue Region No. 16, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
are respectively located in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, and Cagayan de Oro
City.
Facts:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian B. Hefti relieved Mustapha M. Gandarosa as

Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Cagayan de Oro City.
Hefti reassigned Gandarosa as Chief of Staff of the Special Concerns Group at the Bureau's Head
Office in Quezon City. Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves approved Hefti's order.
Gandarosa filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, presided by
Judge Flores. Gandarosa prayed that Hefti’s order be declared void and that a writ of injunction be
issued prohibiting the Secretary of Finance and the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
enforcing Hefti’s order and from replacing or reassigning him. Judge Flores granted a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Gandarosa. Meanwhile, the new
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Sixto S. Esquivias IV, issued a new Revenue Travel
Assignment Order reiterating Hefti’s order. Gandarosa thus filed a petition for indirect contempt
against Secretary Teves and Commissioner Esquivias.
Judge Flores issued an order granting a 72-hour temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge Flores treated the comment to the Rule 65 petition, filed through
LBC, as a mere scrap of paper. The Court of Appeals annulled such orders and ordered Judge
Flores to dismiss Gandarosa’s Rule 65 and contempt petitions. The CA ruled that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition. Said CA Decision attained finality and entry of
judgment was made.
Complainants Efren T. Uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes and Quinciano H. Lui now
allege that Judge Flores exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he assumed jurisdiction over
the Rule 65 petition as it is the Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction over the issue of
Gandarosa’s reassignment. They add that the Regional Trial Court, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, which
is within the 12th Judicial Region, also lacks jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction effective in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, where
the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue hold office, and in Cagayan
de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region, where the Regional Office of Revenue Region No. 16 is based.
Moreover, Judge Flores treated the comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper
contrary to the basic rule that if a private carrier, LBC in this case, is used by a party, the date of
actual receipt by the court of such pleading is deemed to be the date of filing of that pleading.
The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Flores guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
Page 251 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Flores is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
Ruling:
Yes. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error
committed by the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be committed
when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Here, Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti’s order
when he should have dismissed the petition for Gandarosa’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. An employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil
Service Commission per Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987.
And even if we assume that the trial court has jurisdiction over Gandarosa’s Rule 65
petition, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition must be filed in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. But the trial court presided by Judge Flores is within the 12th Judicial Region while the
Head Office and Regional Office, Revenue Region No. 16, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are
respectively located in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, and Cagayan de Oro City,
10th Judicial Region. Judge Flores issued a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction against the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue who both hold
office in Metro Manila, outside the territorial area where his court can exercise its jurisdiction.
Another gross and patent error of Judge Flores is treating the comment of the Secretary of
Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a mere scrap of paper because the comment
was filed through LBC, not by personal filing or registered mail. But the established rule is that
the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as
the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court,
and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that
pleading. Thus, even if the comment was filed through LBC, it cannot be considered as a mere
scrap of paper. The comment was duly filed on the date it was received by the trial court.
GEORGE T. CHUA vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3847-RT J), September 1, 2014, J. Bersamin
Petitioner filed the present complaint against respondent charging him with manifest
partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law for declaring him in default despite the
pendency of his motion for reconsideration. In dismissing petitioner’s complaint the SC reasoned
out that not every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge
renders him administratively liable. Indeed, no judge can be held administratively liable for gross
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misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts
constituted fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Facts:
Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) and one Jimmy Gow entered into a lease
agreement wherein the former would lease to the latter about 10 hectares of reclaimed land along
Roxas Boulevard in Parañaque City for a period of 20 years. A year later, Gow, who was the
president of Uni wide Holdings, Inc. (Uniwide), assigned the lease to Uniwide. Thereafter, MBDC
and Uniwide then entered into a supplemental agreement over the lease.
On February 17, 2011, Uniwide filed an action for reformation of contract against MBDC
before the RTC in Parañaque City. The case was raffled to Branch 274 wherein respondent Judge
Madrona was the presiding judge.
Thereafter, MBDC, on the last day for the filing of its responsive pleading, instead of filing
its answer, moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss
through its order dated August 1, 2011. MBDC received a copy of the order on September 26, 2011,
and filed its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter. Judge Madrona then directed Uniwide
and MBDC to file their comment and reply, respectively. Meanwhile, before MBDC could file its
reply, Uniwide filed a motion to declare MBDC in default.
On December 23, 2011, Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the two pending
motions, declaring MBDC in default, and declaring its motion for reconsideration moot.
Aggrieved, complainant George T. Chua, as the president of MBDC, filed a complaint charging
Judge Madrona with manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. The
Court referred the administrative case to the Court of Appeals for investigation and
recommendation. The CA raffled the administrative case to Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.
In his Report and Recommendation, Justice Tijam held that Judge Madrona erred in
declaring MBDC’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss as moot
and in declaring MBDC in default. At the outset, MBDC cannot be legally declared in default as it
still has a pending motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss. Judge
Madrona erred in resolving simultaneously the MBDC’s motion for reconsideration and Uniwide’s
motion to declare defendant in default. With the filing of MBDC’s motion for reconsideration, the
running of the prescriptive period to file an Answer was interrupted, thus, the counting of the
period shall only begin to run upon MBDC’s receipt of the Order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the RTC’s Order dated August 1, 2011. Such being the case there was no basis to
declare MBDC in default as Judge Madrona needs to resolve first MBDC’s motion for
reconsideration before the latter is legally required by law to file its Answer within the period of
time allowed by law.
Be that as it may, Justice Tijam held that such error committed by Judge Madrona cannot
be corrected in an administrative proceeding but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former.
Page 253 of 370

Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto,
where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved
with finality. He explained that resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies and a final ruling on
the matter, are prerequisites for the taking of appropriate measures against the judges concerned,
whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature because if the assailed act is subsequently
found and declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
Records show that during the preliminary conference of the case MBDC admitted that
there are two separate petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals involving the
interlocutory orders issued by Judge Madrona which are allegedly questionable. Since these two
petitions for certiorari are still pending and as there is no evidence on record that the same have
already been resolved by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court with finality, the instant
administrative complaint is deemed pre-mature.
As to the allegation that Judge Madrona had tampered with the Minutes of the hearing
dated November 18, 2011, Judge Madrona pointed out that it was the usual practice in his
courtroom to allow the court interpreter to prepare the minutes before hearings started. He
explained that during the hearing on November 18, 2011, the parties agreed to file their comment
and reply within 15 days respectively; however, Judge Madrona said that with regard to the
comment and reply, he usually granted the parties only 10 days to file them. He elucidated that
when he dictated his order of changing the period to file the comment and reply from 15 days to
10 days, the counsels for the parties had already left the courtroom.
Agreeing with the contentions of Judge Madrona, Justice Tijam held that changing the
period for the parties to file their respective Comment and Reply was done in order to correct the
errors made on the Minutes as well as for the Minutes to conform with the usual court practice of
allowing only 10 days to file a comment. Such alteration or change, according to Justice Tijam, was
authorized and was made pursuant to the inherent powers of the court to correct error in his
order. Moreover, Justice Tijam held that Judge Madrona acted in good faith in changing the
period of time to file the comment and reply and that the same was made in accordance with the
court’s inherent power to amend and control his orders in the interest of justice and speedy
disposition of the case.
On a final not, Justice Tijam held that if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his
remedy lies with the proper court for proper judicial action and not with the office of the Court
Administrator by means of an administrative complaint, as in this case. Since the assailed
interlocutory orders of Judge Madrona were appealed through petitions for certiorari and are still
pending with the Court of Appeals, this Administrative case filed against Judge Madrona
constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Judge Madrona, however, must be
reminded to cease his practice of having his court interpreter, prepare in advance the minutes of
the hearing and requiring the parties to sign the same prior to hearing. The minutes must only be
accomplished after the case is adjourned in order to avoid conflict and to reflect an accurate
account of the proceedings.
Hence, this petition.
Page 254 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Madrano should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
No, he should not.
The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendations of Justice Tijam.
The records show that MBDC already availed of its rightful judicial remedies. On January
24, 2012, MBDC moved to have the order of default set aside and to have its answer admitted. On
February 10, 2012, it filed a motion for the inhibition of Judge Madrona and for the suspension of
the proceedings. After Judge Madrona adversely resolved each of the motions, it assailed the
adverse resolutions in the Court of Appeals through certiorari (i.e., CA-G.R. SP No. 126858 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 126938), the proceedings thereon being still pending.
This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be

summarily dismissed. To start with, no administrative recourse could supplant or pre-empt the
proper exercise by the CA of its certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, not every error or mistake by
a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him administratively liable.
Indeed, no judge can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or
corruption; or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice. These exceptions did not obtain here, for, as Justice Tijam rightly observed, MBDC did
not adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madrona’s acts were so gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious; or imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted with bias or partiality.
Justice Tijam found the allegation on the tampering of the minutes of the November 18, 2011
hearing unlikely.
The Court concurs with Justice Tijam. The correction of the minutes was done by Judge
Madrona under the inherent powers of his court to control its own orders and processes before
they became immutable. In changing in the minutes the period stated for filing the comment and
the reply from 15 days to 10 days, Judge Madronawas merely correcting the period conformably
with the existing practice in his branch of granting only the shorter period of 10 days to make
such filings. In that context, no bad faith should be inferred, considering that both parties were
subject to the same 10-day period. Moreover, MBDC did not suffer actual prejudice from the
change inasmuch as Judge Madrona had actually noted MBDC’s comment, and had considered
such comment in issuing his December 23, 2011 ruling.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. MAY F. HERNANDEZ, Clerk III, RTC,
Branch 199, Las Pinas City
A.M. No. P-13-3130, September 22, 2014, J. Peralta
Dishonesty has been defined as “the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. As such, falsification of time
Page 255 of 370

records constitutes dishonesty.
Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator received an anonymous letter reporting the
conduct of respondent May F. Hernandez, Clerk III, Branch 199, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City. The letter sender alleged that Hernandez would arrive late for work, but make it appear that
she arrived on time, she would insert her name right above or almost on the same line as the
series of “X” marks in the court's attendance logbook, which is the dividing line between the list of
names of people who arrived on time and those who were already tardy. Hernandez had allegedly
been doing this for more than a year and her actuations had started to affect the morale of other
employees.
The OCA then referred the matter to Executive Judge Elizabeth Yu-Guray of the RTC of
Las Piñas City for discreet investigation and report. In a Report dated January 24, 2011, Executive
Judge Guray stated that she issued a Resolution reprimanding Henandez. The OCA, finding the
Executive Judge's action to be insufficient, directed Executive Judge Guray to conduct a more
thorough investigation. Thus, in a Report dated March 22, 2011, Executive Judge Guray held that
evidence on record shows that respondent Hernandez may be held liable for dishonesty. The
latter then submitted a letter-explanation dated November 17, 2010 to Judge Vibandor, wherein
she begged for the indulgence of the court, explaining that she was then heavily stressed due to
her marriage annulment and burdened with serious health issues at that time.
Based on the foregoing, the OCA recommended that Hernandez be found guilty of
dishonesty and meted the penalty of suspension for a period of six months without pay, effective
immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely by the Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent Hernandez is guilty of dishonesty
Ruling:
The Court agreed with the evaluation of the OCA that Hernandez is guilty of dishonesty.
She readily admitted that she tampered with the court's attendance logbook by inserting her
name above the series of “X” marks to make it appear that she was not tardy. In Rufon v. Genita,
the Court categorically pronounced that falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty.
Dishonesty has been defined as “the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Such conduct of making it appear that she always reported for work on time although, in
fact, she was often tardy, is deplorable and falls way below the standard set for employees of the
Judiciary. Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
promulgated on November 18, 2011, states that falsification of official document, such as an
employee's Daily Time Record, is a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal from the service.
Under the circumstances, however, the Court does not believe that such extreme penalty should
Page 256 of 370

be imposed on Hernandez. Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides that the disciplining authority may consider mitigating circumstances
in imposing the proper penalty.
MARILOU T. RIVERA vs. JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2954-RTJ], November 18, 2014
A judge’s unexplained refusal which clearly called for by the urgency of the matter before
him, the plea for provisional liberty who enjoy the right to bail despite the serious offenses they were
charged with, can only support that his inaction was a clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice.
For maintaining a relationship with a person not his wife, a Judge crossed the line of a proper
and acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person.
Facts:
Marilou T. Rivera with the Office of the Court Administrator, charged Judge Jaime C.
Blancaflor with Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, R.A. 3019. Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain
judicial bonds since year 2000. Sometime in February 2008, she asked her daughter Shiela T. De
Mata, also a bondsman, to help her secure a bail bond for accused Ricardo Catuday. Who was
charged of violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor who then advised said accused for bail which needed
approval. Upon requirement of approval of then Executive Judge Blancaflor, De Mata acted as
advised, but Judge Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it was not her job to ask for the motion’s
approval and that she should return it to the Office of the Clerk of Court.
It was only with Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko, the Vice-Executive Judge of RTC who issued
an order granting Catuday’s motion to reduce bond. Rivera immediately secured a bail bond for
Catuday and presented it for Catuday’s provisional release. Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a
release order, as he never approved Catuday’s reduced bail bond. Rivera then learned from one
Teresa Mirasol that the reason he refused to approve Catuday’s motion because it was Rivera who
was working for it. According to Mirasol, the information was given to her over the phone by
Noralyn Villamar, allegedly Judge Blancaflor’s live-in partner.
Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge Blancaflor when
she worked for the approval of the bail of one Namplata who was charged with violation of Section
15 of R.A. No. 9165, also by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Explaining her difficulties with
Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a bondsman, Rivera claimed that the judge harbored
ill will against him being a ttorney-in-fact in a case handled by said judge.
In his Comment, Judge Blancaflor denied Rivera’s accusations and dismissed them as “mere
concoctions” of her “fertile imagination.” He claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter
approached him regarding Catuday’s and Namplata’s bail bonds. Even assuming that they did, he
refused their requests because they were not authorized bondsmen or agents of any duly accredited
surety company. They were acting as fixers, he explained; thus, he was justified in denying their
Page 257 of 370

requests.
Justice Fernando, on his investigation, found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross
misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She recommended that the judge be
dismissed from the service. The OCA relied on such recommendation for their own.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Blancaflor is liable for alleged misconducts?
Ruling:
Yes, he is liable for bribery, misconduct and immorality.
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail,
it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and Namplata.
Through Judge Blancaflor’s inaccessibility, as he was usually not in the court in the afternoon and
refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and Namplata and the people
working for the approval of their motions suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing
the motions’ approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Rivera a run-
around in Catuday’s and Namplata’s cases for no plausible reason other than the judge’s strong
antipathy towards Rivera. This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
His excuses, which were marked by inconsistencies and typified by his initial denial that he
approved Namplata’s motion, only to admit the approval before Justice Fernando – cannot justify
his failure to act. Action by the judge was clearly called for by the urgency of the matter before him
– the plea for provisional liberty of Catuday and Namplata who enjoy the right to bail despite the
serious offenses they were charged with. His unexplained refusal in these cases can only support
Rivera’s claim that his inaction was due to Rivera’s intervention in the approval of the motions, a
clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice against her.
On the charge of immorality, or allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar

who is not his wife, the records show, statements made here and there by witnesses and
personalities drawn into the case confirm the special relationship between Judge Blancaflor and
Villamar such that Villamar had no hesitation in speaking for the judge on matters concerning him
and his work. For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a
proper and acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person.
JILL M. TORMIS vs. JUDGE MEINRADO PAREDES

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 04, 2015, J. Mendoza
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
Page 258 of 370

disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an

element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully
and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must
have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties. Considering
that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge
Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They are simply not
related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable
for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Facts:
In her Affidavit/Complaint, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a
student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011
at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class
that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but
several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion
Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted
addict. She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda
L. Litang(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in
school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis (Lachica v.
Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving
payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had
issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the
findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand.
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Subsequently, a Report and Recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice
Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to the SC finding that Judge Paredes is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense
under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by
any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge Paredes should be administratively sanctioned for his actuation.
Page 259 of 370

Ruling:
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the
penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. To constitute misconduct,
the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis,
were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v.
Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that
courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in
2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision
on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make
comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges
involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding
that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for
discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out
insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the
publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge
Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the
fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the
issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,” as Justice Diy put it. Judge
Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge
Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit
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the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his
words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct and in language.
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by
the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge
Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge. When Judge Paredes failed to restrain
himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed
by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly
indicated his intention to taint their reputations. The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his
class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking
his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes
should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided
unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect
in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak
with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class
discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge
not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as
well.
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court,
should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the
Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He
should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the
position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in
accordance with the rules.
Page 261 of 370

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes
committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to
the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the
procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive
judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary
receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be
held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition with warning. Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the
appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition.
CHUA KENG SIN vs. JUDGE JOB M. MANGENTE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 54, NAVOTAS CITY
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, J. Leonen
The fact that the judge explained his inadvertence was mainly because of the bulk of wok
that he had to attend to attend to as the case was brought to him barely a year since he was
appointed as judge is of no moment. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with competence
and integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more
importantly, to the public.
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Chua Keng Sin against Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Job M.
Mangente for gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency relative to a criminal case for slight
physical injuries, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Chua Keng Sin.
Keng Sin alleged that he and his brother, Victorio Chua (Victorio), separately filed their
complaints for slight physical injuries against each other before the Lupon. Keng Sin filed his
Complaint earlier than Victorio. When Victorio learned that his complaint would be considered as
a counterclaim, he decided not to attend the scheduled hearings set by the Lupon. Instead,
Victorio filed “a complaint for attempted murder against complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Navotas City.
Due to Victorio’s failure to appear, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action in favor of
Keng Sin allowing him to file his complaint for slight physical injuries before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Navotas City.
The respective complaints for slight physical injuries and attempted murder were jointly
heard by Navotas assistant city prosecutor. It was “recommended that both brothers be charged
with slight physical injuries.” Information for the Complaints were filed as People v. Victorio Chua
Page 262 of 370

and People v. Chua Keng Sin.
The criminal case of People v. Chua Keng Sin was presided by Judge Mangente. Keng Sin
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case against him on the ground that Victorio’s complaint was filed in
court without the required certification to file action.
Judge Mangente denied complainant’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading under the Rule of Summary Procedure.
Complainant sought the reconsideration of the Order. After almost two (2) years, denied
the Motion for Reconsideration in the Order dated October 16, 2012 on the ground that the Lupon
had issued a certificate to file action.
Complainant argued that Judge Mangente’s refusal to grant his Motion to Dismiss was
violative of Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits the filing or
institution of a complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon directly in court of any other government office for adjudication unless there has been
a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the Lupon. Contrary to Judge Mangente’s interpretation, the
certification to file action issued by the Lupon was in favor of complainant, not his brother
Victorio. The certification did not authorize Victorio to pursue his own action.
Complainant also averred that the delay in resolving the Motion was in violation of Rule 37,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was decided two (2) years after the prosecution filed its
Comment, instead of resolving it within 30 days from the time it was submitted for resolution.
Issue:
Whether Judge Mangente is administratively liable for gross ignorance of law and delay in
resolving the motion to dismiss file by Chua Ken Sing
Ruling:
Yes.
Judge Mangente was careless in disposing the Motions filed by complainant, in a criminal
case no less. The Office of the Court Administrator correctly underscores that his experience as a
public attorney and prosecutor should have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic
tenets of law. He cannot be relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he was
newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These circumstances are not unique to him. His
careless disposition of the motions is a reflection of his competency as a judge in discharging his
official duties.
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously
and in utter disregard of procedural rules. Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of
ignorance or convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with
competence and integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire judicial system,
but more importantly, to the public. Judge Mangente's failure must not be brushed aside.
Page 263 of 370

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES vs. ATTY.

SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015, J. DEL CASTILLO
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may
not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases.
Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders
would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. Thus, Atty.
Nambi should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the
appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or
quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility of being
administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits.
Facts:
Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi (Atty. Nambi) rendered a Decision in a consolidated labor case
against M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses Mercado).
Respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the
name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for
failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the
Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment
of an Alias Writ of Execution. They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award
from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work,
Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work,
Inc. and all its incorporators/stockholders as additional entity/personalities against which the
writ of execution shall be enforced.
Atty. Nambi granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on
February 17, 2006 an Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary
judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special appearance,
M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are the complainants in this
administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash the Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they are not
bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. However, Atty. Nambi denied
the Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint for
Disbarment, which we referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Nambi guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was
adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors.
Issue:
Whether or not Nambi is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Page 264 of 370

Ruling:
The Court has no basis to hold Atty. Nambi administratively liable for gross ignorance of
the law.
Nambi’s conclusion had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to
speak. Clearly, Atty. Nambi did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any
manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have
already stated above, we are not here to judge in this present administrative proceeding whether
Atty. Nambi’s ratiocination on the application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only
concern here is to decide whether Atty. Nambi’s error was so gross as to amount to fraud and
dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be said, by any stretch of
imagination, that Atty. Nambi’s error, if any, was so gross or that he was actuated by malice when
he issued the above orders. His conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents
presented and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not
capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the
positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that Atty. Nambi should not be held
accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation of the facts of the
case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that
matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned for
every honest mistake or error he commits.
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold Atty. Nambi administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law. However, we note that Atty. Nambi had consistently and obstinately
disregarded the Court’s and IBP’s orders. It is on record that Atty. Nambi totally ignored the
Court’s Resolution directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. Neither did he file his
Position Paper.
As a former Labor Arbiter, Atty. Nambi should know that orders of the court “are not
mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely.” “He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to
obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court.” Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Page 265 of 370

Considering that this appears to be Atty. Nambi’s first infraction, we find it proper to
impose on him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
ARMANDO M. BALANAY vs. JUDGE JULIANA ADALIM WHITE

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443, 11 January 2016, J. Del Castillo
It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious motions
that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper which the court
should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent’s act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein statements
pertaining to substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross
misconduct which warrants administrative sanction.
FACTS:
On 20 September 2010, complainant Armando M. Balanay filed before the Office of the
Court Administrator (“OCA”) a verified Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent Judge Juliana
White with gross ignorance of the law for allowing Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (“Adamas”) six
furloughs despite being charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 10-07, a non-bailable offense.
Worse, respondent granted Adamas’ motions without requiring the prosecution to comment or
giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.
Complainant likewise charged respondent with serious misconduct in precipitately

dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-07 by declaring that the prosecution had no witnesses to present
when the records showed otherwise. Complainant further claimed that respondent falsified the 22
July 2010 transcript of stenographic notes (“TSN”) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. He averred that
during the hearing held on said date, the prosecution made a reservation to present additional
witnesses. Respondent, however, instructed her court stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende
(“Mosende”), to delete from said TSN such reservation and insert therein other statements which
were not made during the said hearing. In support of his allegations, complainant submitted a
piece of paper containing respondent’s handwritten notes that were incorporated in the 22 July
2010 TSN.
The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious
misconduct.
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct
Page 266 of 370

Respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex parte
motions to allow Adamas’ temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is
indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the temporary
liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on
recognizance. It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that
litigious motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper
which the court should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent is also liable for gross misconduct. A TSN is supposed to be a faithful and
exact recording of all matters that transpired during a court proceeding. Respondent’s act of
directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein statements pertaining to
substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct
which warrants administrative sanction.
SANTIAGO D. ORTEGA. v. JUDGE REGOLEIO LL. DACARA

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, January 11, 2017, J. Carpio
Facts:
This is an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and gross inexcusable negligence filed
by Santiago D. Ortega, Jr. (complainant) against Judge Rogelio Ll. Dacara (respondent judge),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Iriga City, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleged that complainant is the president of the Siramag Fishing Corporation
(SFC). On 18 January 2013, SFC and complainant filed a case for Damages with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Regional Office V (BFAR RO-V) and the Chief of
Fisheries Resource Management Division, BFAR RO-V. The case was raffled to RTC-Branch 37,
Iriga City, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent judge.
After the hearing on the injunction issue, respondent judge issued an Order dated 22 April 2013,
denying the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The denial
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was based on the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs
have not shown a clear and inestimable right to be protected; (2) the trial court is prohibited from
issuing the preliminary injunction under Presidential Decree No. 605 (PD 605) and Section 10,
Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC; and (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the defendants, who
are within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Complainant alleged that the Order shows respondent judge's incompetence and ignorance of the
law by his failure to distinguish between a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Complainant asserted that the prohibition under Section 10, Rule 2 of A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC and PD 605 applies only to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but not
to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Furthermore, RTC-Branch 37 has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction which may be enforced within the Fifth Judicial Region, which includes
Pili, Camarines Sur, where the office of the defendants is located. Complainant maintained that
respondent judge, whose sala is not designated as an environmental court, should not have taken
Page 267 of 370

cognizance of the case which involved environmental issues. It was only upon complainant's
motion that the case was eventually transferred to RTC-Branch 35, a designated environmental
court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held liable for his acts.
Held:
No. Respondent should not be held liable for his acts.
Not every error or mistake committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
renders him liable, unless his act was tainted with bad faith or a deliberate intent to do an
injustice. To hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed
decision, order or act of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be
contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption on his part.
In this case, there was no evidence that respondent judge was motivated with bad faith, fraud, or
corruption when he denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. More importantly, notwithstanding respondent judge's error in stating that there was
no jurisdiction over the defendants, the Order denying the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was proper.
Considering the circumstances of this case and the lack of malice and bad faith on the part of
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Order, the Court finds respondent judge not liable for
gross ignorance of the law and gross inexcusable negligence.
MISCONDUCT OF OTHER COURT PERSONNELS
Atty. Marcos R. Sundiang Vs. Erlito DS, Bacho, Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 124, Caloocan City
A.M. No. P-12-3043. January 15, 2014
J. Peralta
Any amount received by sheriffs in escess of lawful fees is an unlaweful exaction; it

constitutes unauhoried fees. This renders them liable administratively.
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed by Atty. Marcos P. Sundiang charging respondent Bacho,
Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124 with extortion, neglect of duty
and violation of RA 3019. Complainant avers hat prior to the issuance of writ of demolition,
respondent sheriff demanded P150,000 for the implementation of the writ in favor of the
plaintiffs. The respondent allegedly never submitted an estimate for court approval but, on his
own, demanded the money.
Respondent interposed the defense of good faith in receiving the money.
Page 268 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not the defense of the respondent will lie
Ruling:
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the performance of
their dutes. Nor can a sheriff request or ask sums of money from a party-litigant without
observing the proer procedural steps. Even assuming that such payments were indeed given and
received in good faith, the fact alone would dispel the suspicion that such payments were made
for less than noble purposes. Neither will the complainant’s acquiescence or consent to such
expense absolve the sheriff for his failure to secure the prior approval of the court concerning
such expense.
Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al./Re:
Report on the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court etc.
A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014
Per curiam
The conduct of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
The Court will not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of those involved in the
administration of justice which violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith
of the people in the Judiciary. As clerk of Court, the respondent is still liable for failing to exercise
supervision over court funds enabling Mapue to misappropriate the funds.
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against respondents for misappropriating court funds. In this
case, one of the respondents, Mapue, admitted misappropriating court funds. Now, Atty.
Buencamino’s contention is that she must be exculpated from liability due to Mapue’s admission.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Buencamino, as clerk of court, is exculpated from liability upon Mapue’s
admission of liability
Ruling:
The Court finds that Atty. Buencamino remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court
since she failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her thus
enabling Mapue to misappropriate the funds. She is held liable for simple neglect of duty.
A clerk of court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the court. The
administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and revenues, the clerk of court is
primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received by
him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. The conduct of all
court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. The Court will not
Page 269 of 370

countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of those involved in the administration of
justice which violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in
the Judiciary. As clerk of Court, the respondent is still liable for failing to exercise supervision over
court funds enabling Mapue to misappropriate the funds.
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino Vs. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc.

A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014
Per Curiam
A certificate is a written assurance or final representation that some act has or has not been
done or some event occurred or some legal formality has been complied with so the unauthorized
acts committed by respondent in authenticating a non-existent record, compromised the reputation
and integrity of the Court and the entire Judiciary.
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against Mylene H. Dela Cruz as clerk of court in RTC of Santa
Cruz, Laguna that despite having knowledge that she was not authorized to authenticate, she
authenticated the questioned order and issued a certification of finality in SP Proc. Case No. SC-
2268 allegedly upon the request of Mun. Civil Registrar of San Juan.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts committed by respondent call for the most severe administrative penalty
Ruling:
Without records to verify the truthfulness and authenticity of a document, o certification should
be issued. Dela Cruz should know that when she certified the questioned order, she did so under
the seal of the court. Thus when the decision she certified turned out to be spurious and non-
existent, she undoubtedly compromised the Judiciary and jeopardized the integrity of the court.
The acts committed by respondent are so grave that they carry the extreme penalty of dismissal
from service with forfeiture retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual
disqualification from employment in the government service.
Raul K. San Buenaventura Vs. Timoteo A. Migriño, Clerk of Court III, MeTC, Branch 69,
Pasig City
A.M. No. P-08-2574. January 22, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondent is found by the Court to be remiss in the performance of his duties as clerk of
court when he failed to supervise his subordinates well and to efficiently conduct the proper
administration of justice thus causing delay in the hearing of various motions.
Facts:
Page 270 of 370

This is an administrative case filed against Migriño as Clerk of Court for allegedly setting hearings
of various motions in the case over long periods of time and for unduly interfering in Civil case
No. 6798.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable for violation of Section 1, Canon IV of Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel which requires court personnel to perform official duties properly and diligently
all the time
Ruling:
The investigation conducted shows that respondent is guilty of delay in scheduling the various
motions in the case. As the officer of the court next in line to the Presiding Judge, respondent
Migriño is tasked to regularly check not only the status of the cases but also the functions of the
other court personnel and employees under his supervision.
The Office of the Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Hon. Cader
P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge and Abdulrahman D. Piang, Process Server, both of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2287. January 22, 2014
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against respondents for anomalous daily time records
submitted to the OCA-OAS. The DTRs submitted contained entries for periods even when the
same had not yet transpired and become due. Respondents alleged mere inadvertence and
claimed that it was an honest mistake caused by lack of knowledge of the policies implemented
by the office.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are administratively liable
Ruling:
The Court held Piang administratively liable; that the punching of the remaining working days
for the month of February and for the entire month of March 2010, even for dates that were not
yet due, is an outright violation of OCA Circular 7-2003. Failure to submit true and accurate
DTRs/Bundy Cards amounts to falsification which is punishable by dismissal, and under Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, it is dishonesty.
On the part of Judge Indar, Judge Indar is guilty of negligence in his failure to examine Piang’s
DTRs for February and March 2010 before signing the same. Even a cursory reading of the said
DTRs would readily reveal that they were not yet due, since they covered dates that had not yet
transpired.
Page 271 of 370

Re: Habitual tardiness of Cesar E. Sales, Cash Clerk III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Office of
the Clerk of Court, Manila
A.M. No. P-13-3171. January 28, 2014
Per Curiam
In this case, Sales failed to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees should at all times strictly observe official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism
and tardiness are impermissible. He was repeatedly reprimanded but he failed to mend his ways.
Facts:
In a report submitted by the Leave Division, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated
October 19, 2011 shows that respondent Cesar E. Sales, Cash Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, had always been tardy in going to the office for the months of
January to September 2011, as follows:
January - 20 times
February - 14 times
March - 10 times
April - 13 times
May - 17 times
June - 13 times
July - 15 times
August - 11 times
September - 12 times
Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, s. 1991, an officer or employee shall be considered
habitually tardy if he is late for work, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month
for at least two (2) months in a semester, or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year.
In the case of Sales, he had continuously incurred tardiness during the months of January to
September 2011 for more than 10 times each month, except during the month of March when he
only came in late 10 times.
Issue:
Whether or not Sales violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04
Ruling:
"By reason of the nature and functions of their office, officials and employees of the Judiciary must
be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public
trust." Pursuant to this dictum, the Court issued Memorandum Circular No. 49-2003, dated
Page 272 of 370

December 1, 2003, reminding all government officials and employees to be accountable at all
times to the people and exercise utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. They must
give every minute of their prescribed official time in the service to the public and must work for
every centavo paid to them by the government. "This duty calls for the observance of prescribed
office hours and the efficient use of official time for public service, if only to recompense the
government, and ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the judiciary. Thus,
to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees should at all times
strictly observe official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism and tardiness are
impermissible."
This is the third time that Sales has been charged of habitual tardiness. The OCA Report shows
that he has previously been penalized for habitual tardiness. He was reprimanded in A.M. No. P-
08-2499, suspended for 30 days without pay in A.M. No. P-05-2049, and suspended for 3 months
without pay in A.M. No. P-11-3022. Despite previous warnings that a repetition of the same offense
would be dealt with more severely, Sales failed to mend his ways.
Veronica F. Galindez Vs. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera

A.M. No. P-13-3126. February 4, 2014
Per Curiam
In this case, a court stenographer who defrauded a litigant by soliciting money to supposedly
facilitate a legal proceeding in the court is guilty of the most serious administrative offense of grave
misconduct. Her dismissal from the service is fully warranted.
Facts:
In her complaint-affidavit, Galindez averred that sometime in July 2008, she had approached
Susbilla-De Vera, her school batchmate and a court employee, to inquire where any petition for
the adoption of her nephew and niece had already been filed, pending, or approved by the Family
Court, as she was interested in filing such a petition herself; that after several follow-ups, Susbilla-
De Vera had reported to her that she could not locate any adoption petition involving the
intended adoptees in the Family Court; that Susbilla-De Vera had then volunteered that she could
handle the adoption process for her by coordinating with a lawyer, and that she could help in the
fast-tracking of the petition; that Susbilla-De Vera had even boasted that it would take only three
months for the entire process, and that there would be no need to follow up or to hire a lawyer to
handle the petition; that Susbilla-De Vera had told her that the cost for the adoption process
would be P130,000.00, half of which should be paid as down payment; that Susbilla-De Vera had
followed up with her on the proposal; that because she could raise only P20,000.00 as down
payment, Susbilla-De Vera had told her that the P20,000.00 would be acceptable, and that she
would just talk to a certain Atty. Nini, the handling lawyer; that she had paid the P20,000.00 to
Susbilla-De Vera; that after a week, Susbilla-De Vera had called her to ask for the balance of the
down payment; that she had willingly given the balance on two separate occasions, the first the
amount of P30,000.00 and the second the amount of P15,000.00 a week later; that Susbilla-De
Vera had handed her a receipt for the full amount of P65,000.00, with the assurance that
everything would be handled well, and she had made follow-ups on the progress of the adoption
proceedings, and Susbilla-De Vera had informed her that publication had already been done but
that there would be other papers that needed to be located; that because of her refusal to divulge
the name of the lawyer she had visited Susbilla-De Vera's office to ask the latter to facilitate a
Page 273 of 370

meeting with the engaged counsel; that Susbilla-De Vera had instead brought her to the Family
Court (Branch 73) to look into the logbook to find out if the previous adoption had been in fact
completely processed; that by the actuations of Susbilla-De Vera had given her cause to doubt,
and she had then gone to the Farinas Law Office herself to inquire on the status of the adoption
petition; that the legal secretary of the law office had told her that the adoption had already been
completed with her brother as the petitioner; that because of that information, she had
demanded from Susbilla-De Vera to return the money but Susbilla-De Vera had replied that the
money had been delivered to the lawyer; that she had offered to personally see the lawyer about
the return of the down payment, but Susbilla-De Vera had insisted to do it herself; that after a few
days, Susbilla-De Vera had informed her that the lawyer would be returning the money in two
installments; and that she had not received any reimbursement by Susbilla-De Vera as of the
filing of the complaint-affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not Susbilla-De Vera violated Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Ruling:
Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that "court personnel shall not
solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official functions" while Section 1 thereof provides that
"court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or
exemptions for themselves or for others."
In the case at bar, respondent violated these provisions as she took advantage of her official
position in receiving the amount of P65,000.00 from Complainant for the alleged hiring of a
counsel in the filing of a petition for adoption which did not materialize as the minors to be
adopted were already the subject in a decided adoption case and, thus, committed grave
misconduct. Moreover, she manifested her defiance with the directives of the OCA.
Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano vs. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca
A.M No. P-13-3119; February 10,2014
J. Reyes
The money received from the litigants does not acquire the status of court funds where clerk
of court who received the same issued no official receipt. However, it does not mean that the offense
attributable to the clerk of court who misappropriated such money is any less grave. Although the
act involved technically private money, the deceit pulled of is one that disrupts the public’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary and its personnel.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against Liza Salamanca. The complaint was initiated by a
letter, filed before the Office of the Court Administrator, stating that Salamanca incurred
unauthorized/unexplained absences on several occasions without filing any application for leave.
The letter also relayed other infractions committed by Salamanca, such as her failure to turn over
the P12,000 as partial settlement in a certain case and her failure to account and turn over the
payment for legal fees she received in another case.
Page 274 of 370

Salamanca, in her comment, explained that her absences were due to her failing health caused by
personal and professional problems and pressures. She also denied misappropriating the P12,000
intended for one litigant as partial settlement and claimed that she lost the same in the course of
her routine transit to and from her workplace.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted investigation the results of which yielded
that Salamanca violated the Civil Service Rules and Administrative Circular Nos. 02-2007 and 14-
2002 for unauthorized absences on separate occasions. For Salamanca’s failure to account for the
money she received from litigants on two separate occasions, the OCA concluded that her failure
to remit court funds and to give satisfactory explanation for such failure constitutes grave
misconduct and honesty. Consequently, the extreme penalty of dismissal was recommended to be
imposed on her.
The Court affirmed the OCA’s findings
Issue:
Whether or not the clerk committed an unethical conduct.
Ruling:
Respondent is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
Public Service.
The actuations of Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of
the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that
is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to
acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish - or tend to
diminish - the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
However, it must be stressed that Salamanca’s dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit
court funds because the money she received from the litigants did not acquire the status of court
funds as no official receipt therefor was issued by her. The amounts misappropriated by
Salamanca did not prejudice the Court’s coffers since they never formed part of the Judiciary’s
public funds. The partial settlement paid by the defendant in Syjuco intended for the plaintiff, but
received and misappropriated by Salamanca, was technically private money. The payment for
legal fees in Quiroga received and pocketed by Salamanca never attained the status of being part
of court funds because no official receipt was issued therefor precisely because Salamanca is not
the authorized court employee to receive such payments in behalf of and for the Judiciary. It was
not her duty to receive payments and issue official receipts. It also does not appear that she was
authorized or designated to do so. Since the subject amounts never formed part of the court
funds, there was no duty on her part to remit/deposit the same with the Land Bank pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95.
Page 275 of 370

For this reason, the stringent attitude of the Court towards clerks of court who fail to remit their
fiduciary collections as mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95 is not applicable to
Salamanca who did not hold a similar accountable position nor designated to act as such.
This does not, however, mean that the offense attributable to Salamanca is any less grave. The
Court finds that the factors, taken together, are not commensurate with the extreme penalty of
dismissal recommended by the OCA. The Court is persuaded to temper its power to wield penalty
to an erring employee and instead adopt a compassionate and humane view at Salamanca’s
transgressions.
While Salamanca’s complained acts involved technically private money, the deceit she pulled off
disrupted the public’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary and its personnel. She failed to live up
to the high ethical standards required of court employees thereby prejudicing the best interest of
the administration of justice. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of her public
office10 and violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, Section 4(c) of which commands that public officials and
employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to public safety and public interest.
Anacleto O. Villahermosa Sr. and Juleto Villahermosa vs. Victor M. Sarcia

A.M. No. CA-14-28-P. February 11, 2014
The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to
being a court employee. Thus, employees of the court extorting money from the party-litigants and
promising them of a favorable decision of their case pending before the court are guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Court personnel, regardless of
position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the strict standards of
integrity and morality.
Facts:
Complainants were petitioners of a petition for review with prayer for TRO pending before the
Court of Appeals. On the other hand, respondent Saricia is the Executive Assistant IV assigned to
the Office of Justice De Guia-Salvador, while respondent Rivamonte is a utility worker in the
Court of Appeals, Manila.
While the complainants were eating at a restaurant, Rivamonte allegedly approached them and
introduced himself as an employee of the CA and offered to help them in their case pending
before the CA. Thereafter, Rivamonte introduced the complainants to a certain Atty. Vic who
could help them with their case. After they had talked, Anacleto and Juleto gave Rivamonte
P3,000. The complainants met the respondents on several occasions. Each time they meet a
certain amount was always given by the complainants to the respondents.
Later on, the complainants received a notice to vacate from the lower court. This prompted them
to inquire from Rivamonte regarding the issuance of the TRO prayed for in their petition filed
before the CA. Rivamonte advised them to give P2,000 to a sheriff in Makati City. Subsequently,
the complainants received a resolution from the CA denying their application for TRO. They then
asked Sarcia about the denial but were told that it was in their favor.
Page 276 of 370

The complainants inquired from the CA regarding their prayer for the issuance of TRO. An
employee of the CA informed them that it was denied. Sensing that something went wrong with
their transaction, the complainants filed a joint complaint-affidavit against Sarcia and Rivamonte.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommended their dismissal from
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Respondents are guilty.
Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance
with the strict standards of integrity and morality. Indeed, the "special nature of court personnel’s
duties and responsibilities" is recognized through the adoption of a separate Code of Conduct
especially for them. The acts of court personnel reflect on the judiciary. Thus, it is necessary that
they uphold the ideals of the judiciary.
Respondents Sarcia and Rivamonte knew that complainants Villahermosa had a pending case
before the Court of Appeals. As admitted by respondents Sarcia and Rivamonte, they received
money from complainants Villahermosa. The Office of the Court Administrator found that the
money was received through extortion from complainants Villahermosa on the promise of a
favorable decision from the Court of Appeals. Thus, it found respondents Sarcia and Rivamonte
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Grave misconduct was defined in Ramos v. Limeta as a serious transgression of some established
and definite rule of action (such as unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or
employee) that tends to threaten the very existence of the system of administration of justice an
official or employee serves. It may manifest itself in corruption, or in other similar acts, done with
the clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of established rules.
In several cases, this court has held that the court personnel’s act of soliciting or receiving money
from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving money from litigants,
whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel6 requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest
in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other
remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions
or proceedings with the judiciary. "The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary
should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the
integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved." Court personnel cannot take
advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.
Grave misconduct merits dismissal. In some cases, the court exercised its discretion to assess
mitigating circumstances such as length of service or the fact that a transgression might be the
Page 277 of 370

first offense of respondents. However, due to the gravity of the acts of respondents Sarcia and
Rivamonte, no mitigating circumstances can be appreciated.
Civil Service Commission vs. Nenita Longos

A.M. No. P-12-3070. March 11, 2014
Per Curiam
A court personnel who asked another person to take the Civil Service Professional
Examination in her stead is guilty of dishonesty and, by reason of such, failed to take heed of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which regards all court personnel as sentinels of justice
expected to refrain from any act of impropriety.
Facts:
Nenita Longos was employed as Clerk II of the MCTC Surigao del Norte. A letter from a
concerned citizen informed the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of Longos’ spurious eligibility.
The letter stated that Longos asked someone else to take her Civil Service Professional
Examination which fraudulently resulted in her attainment of an 86.10% rating. In response, the
CSC studied the Personal Data Sheet (PDS), appointment papers, and examination records of
Longos. Later on, CSC found a patent dissimilarity between the pictures pasted in her PDS and
her purported Picture Seat Plan
CSC formally charged Longos with an administrative offense of dishonesty and referred the same
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Subsequently, the OCA found Longos guilty of
dishonesty. Without her filing any answer to explain the anomaly, the OCA construed the
evidence against her as unrefuted. It then recommended her dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
Issue:
Whether the respondent is guilty of dishonesty for asking another person to take the Civil Service
Professional Examination in her stead.
Ruling:
Respondent is hereby found Guilty.
As shown by the documents on record, which were uncontested by respondent despite an

opportunity to do so, it is clear that the pictures in her PDS and PSP are starkly
different. Therefore, based on substantial evidence, this Court concludes that she asked another
person to take the 1992 Civil Service Professional Examination in her stead.
It is beyond question that the act of fraudulently securing one’s appointment constitutes
dishonesty. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo, we squarely ruled thus:
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact,

or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, appointment or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which
reflects a person’s character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his
Page 278 of 370

honor, virtue and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary,
as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary.
The case of Longos is not one of first impression. In numerous other cases, this Court has
dismissed erring personnel of the judiciary whose civil service eligibility was unscrupulously
obtained through the guise of another.
Twelve years ago, in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, the CSC and the Court already uncovered
this type of mischief by comparing the pictures of civil servants in their PSP and PDS. Civil Service
Commission v. Sta. Ana,In re: Alleged Illegal Acquisition of a Career Service Eligibility by Ma.
Aurora P Santos, and most recently, Civil Service Commission v. Hadji Ali, also utilized the same
modus operandi decried by the Court.
This fraudulent act by an aspiring civil servant will not be countenanced by the Court, much more
so when committed by one who seeks to be employed in our fold. After all, credibility undergirds
the substance and process of the rendering of justice.
All public service must be founded on and sustained by character. With the right character, the
attitude of judiciary employees is set in the right direction. It is then of utmost consequence that
every employee of the judiciary exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity to preserve the
good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
In her act of dishonesty, respondent failed to take heed of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which regards all court personnel as sentinels of justice expected to refrain from any
act of impropriety. Thus, applying the penalties under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, we sanction her perfidy by imposing upon her the
penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties.
The Office of the Court Administrator vs. Clarita Perez

A.M. No. P-12-3074; March 17, 2014
J. Reyes
A Clerk of Court is guilty of misconduct where she incurred delay in the remittance of the
fiduciary collections in her custody and used the same for her own personal use. As a custodian of
the court’s funds and revenues, the Clerk of Court is entrusted with the primary responsibility of
correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds. Delay in the
remittance of collection is a serious breach of duty. It deprives the Court of the interest that may be
earned if the amounts are promptly deposited in a bank. Furthermore, it constitutes dishonesty
which carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from service even if committed for the first time.
Facts:
Clarita Perez is a Clerk of Court II of the MCTC of Oriental Mindoro. Due to her non-remittance
of collections and non-submission of her monthly financial reports, a financial audit report on her
books of accounts was made. The report revealed that Perez incurred cash inventory shortages
amounting P34,13.80 due to undeposited collections during a certain period of time.
Page 279 of 370

In the course of the audit, Perez’s other infractions were discovered. Apparently, she failed to
collect and issue receipts for all the marriages solemnized by the presiding Judge of the MCTC
and all the documents notarized by the latter. Furthermore, she also failed to submit the Monthly
Reports of Collection, Deposits and Withdrawals.
Perez subsequently remitted and paid the shortages and undeposited collections and admitted
that she personally used a part thereof to attend to her brother’s medical expenses.
In a Resolution, the Office of the Court Administrator ordered that the report be docketed as a
regular administrative case. Subsequently, the OCA submitted its Memorandum finding Perez
guilty of misconduct for her failure to timely remit the judiciary funds in her custody and submit
the Monthly Reports of Collections, Deposits and Withdrawals.
Issue:
Whether the Clerk of Court is guilty of misconduct for her failure to make timely remittance of
judiciary funds in her custody.
Ruling:
The Court finds the respondent Guilty.
Clerks of Court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court’s funds,
revenues, records, properties and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurer,
accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof. They are the chief administrative officers
of their respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the proper procedures are followed in
the collection of cash bonds. Thus, their failure to faithfully perform their duties makes them
liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.
Under the Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92, clerks of courts are mandated to immediately
deposit their fiduciary collections upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government
depositary bank.
In the present case, not only did the respondent incur delay in the remittance of her fiduciary
collections but also used the money for her personal use.
While the Court empathizes with the respondent in her predicament concerning her brother’s
medical needs, her wrongdoing cannot be excused. As a custodian of the court’s funds and
revenues, she was entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively
implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds. She was an accountable officer entrusted
with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. She was,
therefore, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. She
was not supposed to keep those funds in her possession or worse appropriate them for her
personal use.
The respondent’s subsequent restitution of the amounts did not alter the fact that she was remiss
in the discharge of her duties. Shortages in amounts to be remitted and the years of delay in
actual remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be
Page 280 of 370

By failing to timely remit the cash collections constituting public funds, she violated the trust
reposed in her as disbursement officer of the Judiciary. Delay in the remittance of collection is a
serious breach of duty. It deprives the Court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are
promptly deposited in a bank. It constitutes dishonesty which carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from service even if committed for the first time.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. John Glenn D. Runes

A.M. No. P-12-3055. March 26, 2014
CJ. Sereno
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty
during office hours. The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty
more than once. Thus, where a Clerk III of the MeTC was found absent in his post twice without
authority, such number of absences can already be considered frequent thereby making him guilty of
loafing.
Facts:
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) organized an investigating team to determine the
veracity of an anonymous complaint on alleged case fixing in the MeTC of San Juan City. In the
course of the investigation, the investigating team, however, found that the respondent Glenn
Runes, Clerk III of MeTC of San Juan City, had the habit of loafing during hours. The respondent
was found loafing in two instances: First was on January 26, 2010 when he was nowhere to be
found on his station and the second was on April 26, 2010 wherein he left his post at 1:45 p.m. In
both instances, the respondent declared in his Daily Time Records (DTRs) complete working
hours of 8:00am to 4:30pm.
Subsequently, the OCA recommended that the respondent be found guilty of the offense of
loafing with penalty of suspension for three months without pay.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Loafing.
Ruling:
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty
during office hours. The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent themselves from
duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being without authority, can
already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which
adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation conducted by
the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two instances when he was out of his
assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute these findings.
It is imperative that as Clerk III, respondent should always be at his station during office hours;
hence, if his absence were indeed because of some errand, he has yet again failed to provide
sufficient proof that those errands were official in nature. He had not filed any application for
Page 281 of 370

leave, nor did he possess any written authority to travel to justify his absence. Absent such proof,
his absence remains indubitably unauthorized.
Office of the Court Aministrator vs. Atty. Leah Espera Miranda, Clerk of Court V; and Ms.
Jocelyn Divinagracia, Clerk III, both of the RTC, Br. 38, Iloilo City
A.M. No. P-09-2648; March 26, 2014
Brion, J.
Court employees who tamper case records done through the intercalation of the explanation
in a Notice of Appeal in a pending Special Civil Action are guilty of grave misconduct. A court
employee is not prohibited from helping individuals in the course of performing his official duties,
but his actions cannot be left unchecked when the help extended places the integrity of the Judiciary
in a bad light. Court employees are strictly instructed not to use their official duties to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others. The evident purpose of
the instruction is precisely to free the court form suspicion of misconduct.
Facts:
The complainant asked the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to conduct an investigation
on the alleged tampering of case records by personnel of RTC, Br. 38, Iloilo City. Atty. Rico
likewise filed a complaint arising from the same incident against Clerk of Court V Leah Espera
Miranda and Clerk III Jocelyn Divinagracia.
The OCA referred the complaint to Executive Judge Azarraga to investigate the alleged tampering
of records in Special Civil Action No. 02-27-326. In his report and recommendation, Judge
Azarraga confirmed that there had indeed been tampering of records and this was done through
the intercalation of the explanation in the Notice of appeal filed by the private respondents in the
case. He found that Divinagracia had actively participated by causing the explanation to be typed
by the secretary of the respondent’s counsel. The Judge further reported that Miranda was aware
that the lacking written explanation was supplied while at her office using the court’s facilities.
Subsequently, the OCA recommended that Divinagracia and Miranda be admonished to be more
circumspect in the discharge of their functions as court employees.
Issue:
Whether the court employees are guilty of misconduct in tampering case records.
Ruling:
Respondents are Guilty of Grave Misconduct.
The Court finds no merit in Merit in Miranda and Divinagracia’s explanation. Their involvement
was not confined to the routinary process of receiving the Notice of Appeal and checking if it
complied with the requirements. They knowingly allowed the tampering the Notice of Appeal to
make it appear that it complied with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, during the proceedings on Atty. Rico’s Motion to Expunge the Notice of Appeal,
neither Miranda nor Divinagracia informed Judge Patricio about the circumstances leading to the
insertion of the written explanation of the Notice of Appeal. Their silence on the matter casts
doubts on the veracity of their statements.
Page 282 of 370

The Code of Conduct for Code Personnel reminds court personnel, in performing their duties and
responsibilities, to serve as sentinels of justice. Any act of impropriety they commit immeasurable
affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in the Judiciary. They
are, therefore, expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity
of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people’s confidence in the Judiciary. A court employee is
not prohibited from helping individuals in the course of performing his official duties, but his
actions cannot be left unchecked when the help extended places the integrity of the Judiciary in a
bad light. Indeed, court employees are strictly instructed not to use their official duties to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others. The evident purpose
of the instruction is precisely to free the court form suspicion of misconduct.
As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rules of action, or more

particularly, an unlawful behavior on the part of a public officer or employee. Grave misconduct
implies wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either
to maladministration or wilful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifested. Corruption
as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or
wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for another,
contrary to the rights of others. Miranda and Divinagracia’s act of allowing the tampering the
records of Special Civil Action No. 02-27326 to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal filed by
private respondents complied with the requirements constitutes grave misconduct.
Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda,

Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court, Palapag, Northern Samar
A.M. No. P-12-3093; March 26, 2014
An MTC Court Interpreter who falsified her Daily Time Records so that she could attend her
law classes is guilty of dishonesty, notwithstanding the permission of the MTC Presiding Judge.
Time and again, the OCA and Courts have underscored the importance of court employees
truthfully and accurately recording in their DTRs the time of their arrival in and departure from
office.
Facts:
An anonymous complainant, claiming to be a student at the University of Eastern Philippines

(UEP), filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging
Otelia Maceda, Court Interpreter of MTC, Palapag, Northern Samar, of falsifying her attendance
in the court so she could attend her law classes at UEP.
The OCA submitted its Report finding Maceda guilty of dishonesty and recommended that she be
suspended for six months.
Issue:
Whether the Court Interpreter is guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her DTR.
Page 283 of 370

Ruling:
Maceda only offered a general denial of any wrongdoing and asserted that someone at the MTC
was just trying to destroy her reputation. She did not offer a clear explanation on how she could
have attended her 5:30pm classes in UEP on time even when she supposedly left the MTC at only
5:00 pm. Maceda’s repeated assertion that she continued her law classes for self-improvement and
with the permission of the MTC Presiding Judge does little to exculpate her administrative
liability. These are not acceptable excuses for not properly declaring the time she logged-off from
work in her DTRs. Time and again, the OCA and this Court have underscored the importance of
court employees truthfully and accurately recording in their DTRs the time of their arrival in and
departure from office.
Maceda’s falsification of her DTRs is dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as the “disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to fraud, deceive or
betray.
Resolution No. 06-0538 of the Civil Service Commission, also known as the Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty, further classifies the offense into Serious Dishonesty, Less
Serious Dishonesty, and Simply Dishonesty, depending on the attendant circumstances.
The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest
act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:
1. The dishonesty act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not
so serious as to qualify under the immediately preceeding classification.
2. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the
dishonest act.
3. Other analogous circumstances.
Less Serious Dishonesty is deemed a grave offense punishable by suspension of six months and
one day to one year for the first offense.
Considering that Maceda has not been previously charged with an administrative offense in her
eleven years in government service and that there is no proof of her being remiss in the
performance of her duties as court interpreter or causing specific damage or prejudice to the
court for her dishonest act, the Court finds Maceda to be guilty of Less Serous Dishonesty, for
which the penalty of suspension for six months and one day is proper.
RE: MELCHOR TIONGSON, HEAD WATCHER, DURING

THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATIONS.
B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014, J. Carpio
In administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a

finding of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. In this case, upon being called by the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC), Tiongson admitted that he indeed brought a digital camera inside the bar
examination room. Thus, the Surpreme Court finds that Tiongson’s transgression of the rules
issued by the OBC amounts to misconduct.
Page 284 of 370

Facts:
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) designated Melchor Tiongson, an employee of the
Court of Appeals (CA), to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar Examinations on 6, 13, 20 and 27
November 2011. Tiongson, together with the designated watchers, namely, Eleonor V. Padilla
(Padilla), Christian Jay S. Puruganan (Puruganan) and Aleli M. Padre (Padre), were assigned to
Room No. 314 of St. Martin De Porres Building in UST. On 13 November 2011 or during the second
Sunday of the bar examinations, Tiongson brought his digital camera inside Room No. 314.
Padilla, Puruganan and Padre alleged that after the morning examination in Civil Law, while they
were counting the pages of the questionnaire, Tiongson took pictures of the Civil Law
questionnaire using his digital camera. Tiongson allegedly repeated the same act and took
pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after the afternoon examination. On the same day,
Padilla reported Tiongson’s actions to Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina
B. Layusa, who immediately investigated the report. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre subsequently
executed separate affidavits confirming Tiongson’s actions. Upon demand by the OBC to explain,
Tiongson admitted that he brought his digital camera inside the bar examination room. He
explained that he did not surrender his new digital camera to the badge counter personnel
because the counter personnel might be negligent in handling his camera.
In a Memorandum dated 16 November 2011 addressed to the CA Clerk of Court Atty.

Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongson’s designation as head watcher
for the remaining Sundays of the bar examinations.
The OBC found Tiongson guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct for violating a
specific provision in the Instructions to Head Watchers prohibiting the bringing of cameras to the
bar examination rooms.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substantial evidence that Tiongson is guilty of dishonesty and
gross misconduct.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the OBC with modification as to the
penalty.
Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. If any of the elements to
qualify the misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not proven by substantial evidence, a
person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct. On the other
hand, dishonesty refers to a person’s disposition “to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”
Page 285 of 370

The Supreme Court holds Tiongson liable for simple misconduct only, because the
elements of grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted
his infraction before the OBC.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT

INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL, SARAN GANI PROVINCE,
BRANCH
A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.
Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of
its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality
and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a
judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
Facts:
In August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken
the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B.
Junio-Decir (Decir). After Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her,
the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties to
such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating.
Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was
filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; she posited that the CSC no longer had any
jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal from service on the ground
that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is
estopped from assailing the same.
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA,
which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release
her salaries and allowances. However, Judge Infante’s sent a letter to the OCA, the FMO issued a
Memorandum informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampong’s
salaries and allowances.
In her Comment, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any
jurisdiction over the case against her.
The OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty of Dishonesty for impersonating
and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir
Page 286 of 370

and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground that she no longer possesses the
appropriate eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits
except accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
It added that the fact that the offense was not connected with her office or was committed
prior to her appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate her from administrative
liability as an employee of the court. The OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court
Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to discipline employees from all
branches and agencies of the government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service. The
CSC could validly impose the administrative penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it
that of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided. The
OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her civil service eligibility
and, could no longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III.
Issue:
Can the Court validly ruled that Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as
Court Interpreter III of the RTC even if the act of dishonesty was committed prior to her
employment in the judiciary?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, the Court had already held Ampong administratively liable for
dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination
for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:
The CSC found Ampong guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure
the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other
anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination." Ampong
impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By
intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve
dishonesty.
Ampong’s dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee.
Indeed, We take note that Ampong should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had
the Supreme Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service
examinations. Be that as it may, Ampong’s present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance
to her getting the penalty she deserves.
The Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same
case, viz.:
Page 287 of 370

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined
under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
"control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the
CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman
cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It
violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory
powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.
The present case involves a violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee.
Petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of
commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the
DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took
the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a
party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case
out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative
jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the
offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,"
Ampong could no longer seek the Decision’s modification and reversal. The penalty of dismissal
from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course.
Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and

honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with
other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve
the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary.
Page 288 of 370

ARGEL D. HERNANDEZ vs. JUDGE VICTOR C. GELLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, CLARINCE B.

JINTALAN, LEGAL RESEARCHER, and ROWENA B. JINTALAN, SHERIFF IV, ALL FROM
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, SORSOGON CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356, June 9, 2014, J. Bersamin
The filing of administrative complaints or just the threats of the filing of such complaints do
subvert and undermine the independence of the Judiciary and its Judges. Thus, the Court does not
tolerate unwarranted administrative charges brought against sitting magistrates in respect of their
judicial actions.
An administrative complaint against a judge is not a substitute for a proper remedy taken in
due course to review and undo his acts or omissions done in the performance of his judicial duties
and functions. For any litigant to insist otherwise is censurable because the, complaint adversely
affects the administration of justice and harms the reputation of a judicial officer.
In this case, the complaint against Judge Gella, being rooted in the denial of Hernandez’s
motion for reconsideration (vis-à-vis the denial of Hernandez’s motion to quash the writ of
execution), unquestionably related to Judge Gella’s performance of his judicial office, and is for that
reason outrightly dismissible. On the other hand, there is no question that Legal Researcher
Jintalan’s participation in the implementation of the writ of execution was upon the prior
authorization of Judge Gella in order to assist Sheriff Jintalan in her proceedings to implement the
writ of execution. Lastly, Sheriff Jintalan is administratively liable for simple neglect of duty. With
the implementation of the writ of execution being her purely ministerial duty, Sheriff Jintalan must
perform her duty strictly to the letter. She thus knew that the levied personal properties of
Hernandez must be kept safely in and under her direct custody, not in and under the custody of any
of the parties.
Facts:
Complainant Argel D. Hernandez (Hernandez) charged Judge Victor C. Gella (Judge

Gella), as the Presiding Judge of Branch 52 of the RTC Sorsogon City, with gross ignorance of the
law; and Sheriff IV Rowena B. Jintalan (Sheriff Jintalan), also of Branch 52, and Legal Researcher
Clarince B. Jintalan (Legal Researcher Jintalan) with abuse of authority in connection with the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in Case No. 2005-7473, a proceeding for
consolidation of ownership entitled Maria Purisima Borlasa v. Spouses Jesus Hernandez and
Margarita De Vera.
The property involved in the said case was sold at a public auction in which Maria
Purisima Borlasa (Borlasa) was declared the winning bidder and a final bill of sale was issued to
the latter on May 30, 2007; that in 2009, Borlasa’s motion for the issuance of the writ of execution
was granted; that in 2010, Sheriff Jintalan started implementing the writ but was unsuccessful in
doing so because Hernandez consistently found ways to resist her implementation, including the
filing of a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 2011, Sheriff Jintalan
successfully implemented the writ of execution and entered the house of Hernandez.
Hernandez alleged that the implementation of the writ of execution was tainted with
abuse because Sherff Jintalan and Legal Researcher Jintalan together with policemen and goons
carrying bolos and mallets arrived at his house and the goons were ordered to destroy his house
Page 289 of 370

and then took his family’s belongings and valuables which even traumatized his children despite
being made aware of the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the CA. He added that such
acts of Sheriff Jintalan and Legal Researcher Jintalan were in excess of their authority and that
would not have happened had Judge Gella not authorized the execution of the writ of execution
notwithstanding the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the CA. The respondents denied the
charges.
Judge Gella insisted that the RTC had afforded due process to Hernandez; that prior to the
implementation of the writ of execution Sheriff Jintalan had already accommodated Hernandez
by granting him concessions; and that Hernandez was only a disgruntled litigant who refused to
accept and to bow to the lawful orders and processes of the RTC.
Legal Researcher Jintalan said that he had been tasked to assist in the implementation of
the writ by Sheriff Jintalan, who was his wife; that police assistance became necessary because
Hernandez and his uncle had been resisting the writ of execution, which was a lawful court order,
by threatening Sheriff Jintalan with administrative and criminal cases, and even physical harm
and that the destroying of the fence and main door of Hernadez’s house was done so only to gain
entry into and to exit from the property. Lastly, he alleged that no valuables are taken.
Sheriff Jintalan asserted that she had only performed her ministerial duty to implement
the writ of execution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the administrative complaint against Judge Victor Gella shall prosper as a
proper remedy to undo or rectify his order or judgment.
2. Is Legal Researcher Jintalan administratively liable for acting in excess of his authority?
3. Is Sheriff Jintalan administratively liable for simple neglect of duty?
Ruling:
1. No, it cannot prosper. The complaint against Judge Gella, being rooted in the denial of
Hernandez’s motion for reconsideration (vis-à-vis the denial of Hernandez’s motion to quash
the writ of execution), unquestionably related to Judge Gella’s performance of his judicial
office, and is for that reason outrightly dismissible.
The Court reiterates that an administrative remedy is neither alternative nor

cumulative to any proper judicial review. A litigant like Hernandez who is aggrieved by an
order or judgment of the judge must pursue his proper available judicial remedies because
only a higher court exercising appellate authority can review and correct any error of
judgment committed in the discharge of the judicial office. As to an order or judgment tainted
by grave abuse of discretion or a jurisdictional defect, only a higher court invested with
supervisory authority can revise the order or judgment. It is always worth stressing that an
administrative remedy cannot be a proper means to undo or rectify the order or judgment.
Page 290 of 370

The filing of administrative complaints or just the threats of the filing of such
complaints do subvert and undermine the independence of the Judiciary and its Judges.
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the
performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil

action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming
to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very
nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and
the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however
erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.
2. No. The complaint against Legal Researcher Jintalan was similarly bereft of factual and
legal merit.
There is no question that Legal Researcher Jintalan’s participation in the

implementation of the writ of execution was upon the prior authorization of Judge Gella in
order to assist Sheriff Jintalan in her proceedings to implement the writ of execution. To hold
Legal Researcher Jintalan administratively liable is to unreasonably disregard his having acted
in the execution proceedings upon official authority of the court itself, and would be a
travesty of justice.
3. Yes, Sheriff Jintalan is administratively liable for simple neglect of duty. With the
implementation of the writ of execution being her purely ministerial duty, Sheriff Jintalan
must perform her duty strictly to the letter.
She thus knew that the levied personal properties of Hernandez must be kept safely in
and under her direct custody, not in and under the custody of any of the parties. Her bringing
of such personal properties to the warehouse of Vicente Bonaobra despite being aware that
the latter was the plaintiff’s brother and her attorney-in- fact for purposes of the case signified
that she let herself serve as the "special deputy" of the winning litigant. Verily, she did not live
up to the standards prescribed by her office. Her conduct as a court personnel must be
beyond reproach and free from any suspicion that could taint the Judiciary. She should avoid
any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official duties.
Sheriff Jintalan was thereby guilty of simple neglect of duty – the failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference.
PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL HIZON ALANO, MARY ANNABELLE A. KATIPUNAN,

SUZEE WONG JAMOTILLO, ANALIE DEL RIO BALITUNG, EDWINO JAYSON OLIVEROS
AND ROBERTO BABAODONO vs. PADMA LATIP SAHI
A.M. No. P-11-302, June 25, 2014, J. De Castro
Page 291 of 370

While it is true that respondent Sahi is merely human and may commit mistakes, there is
simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling
her attention to correct them. Granting that respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in
the beginning, she should have taken steps to learn and hone her computer skills which were
essential to her work. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Facts:
Complainant Judge Alano alleges that from the day he resumed office, respondent Sahi
never prepared any court calendar or minutes. He further alleges that respondent Sahi does not
know how to speak the Yakan and Visayan dialects, which is necessary for her position. Also,
complainant Judge Hizon gathered that even prior to 2004, it was Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan
(one of the complainants) who prepared the minutes of proceedings, calendar of cases and kept
records of the same. Respondent Sahi also abused her position when she required one of the
complainants, Suzee Wong Jamotillo, Court Stenographer I, to fill up her Income Tax Return to
include names of children that are not her own. She also required complainant Analie Del Rio
Balitung to prepare a promissory note in favor of a party litigant in an election protest before
another court. Complainant Judge Alano claims that in all cases he heard since 2004, he was the
one who would usually interpret the testimonies of the witnesses into English, to avoid
inconvenience and delay in the proceedings. He asserts that when respondent Sahi was assigned
in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Basilan Province, her stay was no longer
extended and she was directed by the Court to return to her official position at the 2nd MCTC,
Sumisip-Maluso-Lantawan, Basilan. From the time that respondent Sahi reported back to office,
she was not in the office for more than a month and worse, her Daily Time Records from August
2009 to May 2010 bore no signature of those authorized to sign the same.
After respondent Sahi received her Notice of Unsatisfactory Rating, complainant Judge
Alano again called her attention due to her inexcusable errors in formatting and grammar.
Therafter, respondent Sahi calendared only one case. In the morning of the same day, a
representative from the Provincial Prosecutors’ Office approached complainant Katipunan
regarding the cases that are calendared on that day, since respondent Sahi failed to post a copy
outside the courtroom. Consequently, at around 1:00 o’clock of the same day, respondent Sahi
failed to call the case for hearing, as she was not around. However, the court’s logbook shows that
she was present at that time. Because of respondent Sahi’s inefficiency and stubborn refusal to
perform her duties, complainant Judge Alano decided to relieve her of her duties and designated
complainants Jamotillo and Balitung as acting court interpreters. The other complainants claim
that the Sahi even tried to implicate them when she was sued for extortion. They assert that
respondent Sahi would always manipulate her officemates to do her job and falsely implicate
those who would do otherwise.
In her Comment, respondent Sahi vehemently denied the charges against her and asserted
that the allegations in the Verified Complaint are maliciously concocted lies which are just part of
complainant Judge Alano’s scheme to get back at her for earlier filing a complaint for grave abuse
of authority against said Judge. The Office of Court Administrator recommended that Respondent
Sahi be held guilty for Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties.
Page 292 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not Sahi is administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent Sahi is
administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
The charge that respondent Sahi was remiss in her duties as court interpreter has been duly
proven. Not only do the complainants corroborate one another, but the documentary evidence
supports the charge. The foregoing incidents demonstrate respondent Sahi’s indifference to her
work and lack of effort to improve despite already receiving unsatisfactory performance ratings
for the first and second semesters of 2008.
Respondent Sahi’s general denial carries little weight. As the preceding paragraphs will
show, there are specific charges against her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had
the opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed over. Her allegations that
complainant Judge Alano was merely retaliating against her after she filed an administrative case
against him; that the other complainants are mere stooges, subservient to complainant Judge
Alano; that Judge Alano had been pressuring employees to leave the court; and that complainant
Judge Alano gave her unsatisfactory performance rating because he did not like her from the very
beginning, are all uncorroborated and self-serving.
In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent Sahi’s unsatisfactory

performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output she had consistently
produced and her indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that respondent Sahi is
merely human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes
repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling her attention to correct them. Granting that
respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the beginning, she should have taken steps
to learn and hone her computer skills which were essential to her work.
As the Court pronounced in Judge Domingo-Regala v. Sultan:
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Public officers must be accountable to the people at all times and
serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which falls short of
the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
Page 293 of 370

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. PAZ P. CAPISTRANO, COURT

STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 224
A.M. No. P-13-3147, July 2, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In this case, Capistrano readily admitted to the fact that she indeed falsified the entries in
her April and May 2009 bundy cards, and concomitantly, has expressed her remorse and promised
not to commit the same. Thus, considering too that said infraction would be Capistrano’s first
administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to adopt the OCA’s recommendation to impose
against her the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay, and not the
supreme penalty of dismissal in view of the mitigating factors attending herein.
Facts:
In June 2010, Complainant OCA initiated an investigation relating to the discrepancies

found on the April and May 2009 bundy or time cards of Respondent Capistrano, Lolita Canque
and Rustico Terrado, Jr., all employed as Court Stenographer III. The issue stemmed from the
overbars on their respective times of arrival in the morning, which indicates that the bundy cards
were punched in the evening. After obtaining statements and other evidence from certain
officials, Capistrano was ordered to submit a Comment and in compliance therewith Capistrano
expressly admitted falsifying her bundy cards. She further appealed for judicial clemency and
pleaded for another opportunity to serve the judiciary, considering her length of service and
dedication to work.
In the separate administrative case against Capistrano, OCA recommended that she be
held liable for dishonesty in view of the false entries on the subject time cards, and thereby be
suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay, and with stern warning for more severe
penalty in case of repetition. OCA declined to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal taking
into consideration that Capistrano admitted her fault and sans any past record of demeanor.
Issue:
Whether or not Capistrano is administratively liable for dishonesty.
Ruling:
Yes, Capistrano is liable for falsifying the entries on her bundy cards.
Under OCA Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9, 2013, it is incumbent upon every court
official and employee to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and depar-
ture from office in their respective Daily Time Records/Bundy Cards.
Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify their DTRs are guilty of
dishonesty. Further, under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official
documents, which includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses. Accordingly, the
commission of these acts carries the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service.
Page 294 of 370

These notwithstanding, Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Adminis-
trative Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These
factors range, among others, from the erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, length of
service, or high performance rating.
In this case, Capistrano readily admitted to the fact that she indeed falsified the entries in
her April and May 2009 bundy cards, and concomitantly, has expressed her remorse and
promised not to commit the same. Thus, considering too that said infraction would be
Capistrano’s first administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to adopt the OCA’s
recommendation to impose against her the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months,
without pay, and not the supreme penalty of dismissal in view of the mitigating factors attending
herein.
SELECTION AND PROMOTION BOARD, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.

RONALDO D. TACA, CASHIER I, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OF COURT, MANILA
A.M. No. P-14-3218, July 8, 2014, Per Curiam
Personal data sheets should be accomplished with candor and truthfulness as the
information these sheets contain will be the basis of any appointment to government service. Any
false entry in these documents will be considered dishonesty and shall be punishable by dismissal
from service.
Facts:
Ronaldo D. Taca (Taca) is a Cashier I at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. He has been employed there since April 8, 1997. Sometime in
2012, he applied for the position of Cashier II and III. However, the Selection and Promotion
Board for the Lower Courts of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA-SPB) wrote to him,
asking him to explain the discrepancies found on his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) on file. The
discrepancies were found in the portion on his college educational attainment and the date of his
civil service examination.
Taca sent a letter-reply alleging that the handwritten copy of his PDS was not the same as
the Office of Administrative Services’ typewritten copy of his PDS on file. Said letter was,
thereafter, endorsed by OCA-SBP to the legal office for appropriate action.
The Chief of the OCA Legal Office submitted a memorandum to Court Administrator after
finding that there was a prima facie case against Taca for dishonesty. They alleged that there were
several discrepancies found in the PDS submitted by the respondent from 1991 to 2010. Upon the
legal office’s recommendation, the memorandum was docketed as an administrative complaint
and Taca was required to comment on the charges against him.
In his comment dated April 3, 2013, respondent denied all the allegations, claiming that
the discrepancies in his PDS were “the result of hastiness and negligence.” He claimed that he
understood degrees and units in "Degrees/Units Earned" to mean the same thing. He also
reiterated that the data he provided was the truth since he graduated from college and he passed
Page 295 of 370

the civil service examinations. Subsequently, the OCA submitted its report recommending the
dismissal of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether Taca committed dishonesty when he falsified the entries in his PDS.
Ruling:
Dishonesty is defined as “a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness;

lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”
Respondent claimed that the PDS copy on file with OAS was not his, which accounted for
the discrepancies. An examination, however, of both the handwritten and typewritten PDS dated
January 6, 1997 shows that most of the details listed were the same. The signatures on both copies
were also similar. Even if we were to disregard the typewritten PDS dated January 6, 1997, his
other PDS dated May 6, 1991, January 6,1997, and October 15, 2001 show that he listed "B.S.
Psychology" as his college degree.
His argument that he interpreted degrees earned and units earned to mean the same has
no merit. It only takes a simple comprehension of the English language to understand that
"degree earned" means the degree which the applicant graduated with. "Units earned" would
mean the number of units finished in a specific degree course if the applicant has not yet earned
the degree.
Respondent’s intent to deceive is clear from the information he falsified. Civil Service
Resolution No. 97-0404 dated January 24, 1997 required a bachelor’s degree and Career Service
(Professional) Second Level Eligibility for the position of Cashier I.
The false statements in his PDS prejudiced other more qualified applicants, who would
have been hired for that position had it not been for his misrepresentations. He is, therefore,
liable not only for dishonesty but also for falsification of public documents.
In Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document: Benjamin
R. Katly:
The Court has repeatedly said that persons involved in the dispensation of justice,
from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of
integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. The Supreme
Court will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best from all its employees.
An employee, such as respondent, who falsifies an officialdocument to gain unwarranted
advantage over other more qualified applicants to the same position and secure the
sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured up to the standards required of a
public servant.
“Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in the
judiciary.” Under Rule 10, Section 46 (A) (1) (6) of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, these offenses are punishable by dismissal. The penalty of
Page 296 of 370

dismissal from service includes cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits, and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty
and Falsification of Official Document: Benjamin R. Katly, all of respondent’s leave credits accrued
after his appointment on April 8, 1997 are forfeited, as his ineligibility retroacts to the date of his
appointment.
Re: Report of Judge Rodolfo D. Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tangub City,
Misamis Occidental, on the Habitual Absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez, Jr., Process Server.
A.M. No. P-14-3232, August 12, 2014, Per Curiam
It is evident from the records that respondent Velez is guilty of habitual absenteeism for
incurring unauthorized absences for the period covering 1 January up to 1 December 2011. We also
note that Velez was earlier charged for his unauthorized absences and tardiness in 2009. This
instant administrative case is therefore the second incursion of respondent Velez. . Under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, frequent unauthorized absences in
reporting for duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense.
Facts:
This administrative matter stemmed from the letter dated 5 April 2011 of Judge Rodolfo D.
Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tangub City, Misamis Occidental, informing the Office of
the Court Administrator of the habitual absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez, Jr., the process server of
his court. He reported that for the first quarter of 2011, respondent Velez incurred twenty-three
(23) absences. In an indorsement, the OCA required respondent Velez to comment on the letter
of Judge Vapor.
In his letter Velez admitted having incurred the aforesaid absences. He explained that the
absences were reasonable because he was undergoing treatment for liver disease, urinary tract
infection and iron deficiency at that time. He attached as evidence the Medical Certificate issued
by Dr. Meimei R. Yu-Porlares advising him to seek further work-up and treatment for three (3) to
four (4) months in higher health facilities. Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief of Office, Office of
Administrative Services, OCA, directed Velez to submit his Daily Time Records beginning March
2011 and the corresponding approved leave applications from the executive judge/presiding judge
for the absences he had incurred. Velez submitted his DTRs and the corresponding leave
applications, though without the corresponding approval of his executive/presiding judge.
In his letter, Velez contended that he had been incurring absences because of an illness,
by reason of which he was already being treated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Mario B. Estella. He
admitted that he was an alcoholic and that he was undergoing detoxification and rehabilitation at
the It Works Rehabilitation Center. He maintained that he shall be ready to resume his duty as
soon as he had fully recovered. He requested that his absences be considered excusable. Judge
Vapor informed the OCA that Velez failed to report for work for the entire months of October
and November 2011. He recommended that Velez be dropped from the rolls. Judge Vapor reported
that while Velez returned to work for the month of January2012, he was no longer given any task
Page 297 of 370

and his duties were distributed to the court’s utility worker and sheriff. The OCA recommended
that Velez be found guilty of habitual absenteeism and, accordingly, be dismissed from the
service.
Issue:
Whether or not Velez’s dismissal from service is valid and in accord with the law.
Ruling:
Yes, the dismissal is valid.
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in the civil service shall
be considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5
days monthly leave credit under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at
least three (3) consecutive months during the year. It is evident from the records that respondent
Velez is guilty of habitual absenteeism for incurring unauthorized absences for the period
covering 1 January up to 1 December 2011. We note the Court disapproved the application for leave
filed by Velez for the period 1 March 2011 up to 1 December 2011. All the absences he incurred
during that period were thus considered unauthorized.
We also note that Velez was earlier charged for his unauthorized absences and tardiness
in 2009. This instant administrative case is therefore the second incursion of respondent Velez.
Under Section 46 (b) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, frequent
unauthorized absences in reporting for duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal
from the service for the second offense.
There is no question that Velez is again administratively liable. Although we understand

his situation and his resolve to reform, we cannot, however, ignore the fact that his habitual
absenteeism has caused inefficiency in the performance of his functions. The Court has
pronounced that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on
the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Public
office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE B. LAGADO et al vs. CLERK II BRYAN ANTONIO C. LEONIDO

A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary.
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. In this case, the OCA
correctly found Leonido guilty of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct for fraudulently intercepting the
subject checks through the use of a falsified authorization letter purportedly signed by Empuesto
and keeping such checks in his possession without the complainants’ knowledge and authority. The
Page 298 of 370

subsequent return of the subject checks to their lawful owners is of no moment as it did not change
the unlawful nature of Leonido’s acts which is tantamount to stealing. Thievery, no matter how
petty, has no place in the judiciary.
Facts:
Complainants Presiding Judge Jose B. Lagado (Judge Lagado) and Clerk of Court II Josefina
C. Empuesto (Empuesto ), both of the Municipal Trial Court of Mahaplag, Leyte (MTC) alleged
that on February 22, 2011, Leonido intercepted and withdrew checks representing their second
quincena salary as well as their share in the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance
for Judges Fund (subject checks) from the Mail Distribution Center, Postal Office of Tacloban,
Leyte without their authority and knowledge.
According to Judge Lagado, Leonido was able to claim the subject checks from the postal
office by submitting a forged authorization lette dated February 22, 2011 purportedly from
Empuesto and presenting a photocopy of his Supreme Court identification card. Thereafter,
Leonido allegedly kept the subject checks in his possession without informing Judge Lagado of
such fact. Learning about what had transpired, Judge Lagado repeatedly tried contacting Leonido,
but to no avail. Eventually, Judge Lagado were able to recover the subject checks through
Leonido’s wife who turned them over to a certain Edgar M. Miralles, a court aide of the MTC. As
Judge Lagado averred, this was not the first time that Leonido fraudulently intercepted checks of
other MTC employees.
In a 1st Indorsement, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Leonido to
comment on the charges against him within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. Upon his failure
to comply, the OCA sent him a Tracer Letter, reiterating its prior directive and warning him that
the matter would be submitted for the Court’s resolution with or without his comment. To date,
Leonido has yet to file his comment.
The OCA found that Leonido’s acts of collecting the subject checks, forging a letter
purportedly authorizing him to claim the same, and keeping such checks in his possession instead
of immediately coordinating with Judge Lagado, which remain undisputed by his failure to
comment on the charges against him, constitute Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he
should be held administratively liable.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonido should be held administratively liable for Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct
Ruling:
Yes, the SC concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary.
Page 299 of 370

Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In this case, the OCA correctly found Leonido guilty of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct
for fraudulently intercepting the subject checks through the use of a falsified authorization letter
purportedly signed by Empuesto and keeping such checks in his possession without the
complainants’ knowledge and authority. The subsequent return of the subject checks to their
lawful owners is of no moment as it did not change the unlawful nature of Leonido’s acts which is
tantamount to stealing. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Leonido, the Court notes that Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal for the first offense.18
Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal from service carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution.
In this instance, since Leonido had already been dropped from the rolls pursuant to the
Court's Resolution dated September 7, 2011 in A.M. No. 11-7-79-MTC, the penalty of dismissal from
service can no longer be imposed upon him. Nevertheless, such penalty should be enforced in its
full course by imposing the aforesaid administrative disabilities upon him.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MARIO N. MELCHOR, JR., FORMER
CLERK OF COURT VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, BILIRAN (now
PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CALUBIAN-SAN ISIDRO,
LEYTE)
A.M. No. P-06-2227, August 19, 2014, Per Curiam
[Formerly A.M. No. 06-6-364-RTC]
Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as clerk of court, should deposit
immediately with the authorized government depositories the funds they have collected. Being the
custodian of court funds, it was Melchor's primary responsibility to immediately deposit the funds
received by his office with the Land Bank and not to keep the same in his custody. By failing to
properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Melchor violated the trust reposed in
him as the disbursement officer of the Judiciary. Delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes
gross neglect of duty because this omission deprives the court of interest that could have been
earned if the amounts were deposited in the authorized depository bank.
Page 300 of 370

Facts:
In the course of the fiscal audit examination, members of the financial audit team
discovered evidence of irregularities in the financial transactions of the court as well as shortage
in its financial accountabilities. There were shortages of massive amounts from various funds
collected and handled by Melchor totaling 1,939,547.80.
It was also unearthed that Melchor failed to remit numerous cash bonds collected from
the cases to the Court's legitimate bank account maintained with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank). When folders of several cases were examined, the audit team found
evidence of unrecorded collections of cash bonds. Worse, official receipts were cancelled to
conceal the unreported collections. Melchor likewise failed to present and maintain an official
cashbook for the Fiduciary Fund from September 1, 1997 up to the time of the audit. Anent the
JDF and the SAJF, no entries were made in the cashbooks from October 25, 2005 up to the time of
audit.
As recommended by the audit team, Hon. Enrique C. Asis, Executive Judge of RTC, Naval,
Biliran immediately relieved Melchor from his duties as the accountable officer of the comi per
Memorandum No. 01-2006,17 dated March 17, 2006.
In his Comment, Melchor admitted the findings of the audit team and apologized for his
negligence. He explained that the collected bail bonds from various cases were used to defray the
cost of the hospitalization expenses of his child. He pleaded for compassionate justice and
humanitarian consideration. He likewise informed the (Office of the Court Administrator) OCA
that he already restituted the shortages totaling P796,841,00.
In its Memorandum, the OCA adopted the findings of the audit team and made its
recommendation. In the Court's Resolution, the Court approved the recommendation of the
OCA, and resolved to:
REDOCKET the report of the Financial Audit Team as a regular administrative complaint against
Atty. Mario N. Melchor, Jr.,
DIRECT Atty. Mario N. Melchor, Jr., to PAY and DEPOSIT the shortage of P2,505.00 and P20.00
for the General Fund Sheriffs General Fund, within fifteen (15) days from notice;
DIRECT the Legal office, OCA to file the appropriate criminal charges against Atty. Mario N.
Melchor Jr.
In its Memorandum, the OCA informed the Court that it has received a letter from
Melchor disclosing his compliance with the directive of the Court by depositing the shortage of
P2,505.00 and P20.00 for the General Fund and Sheriff's General Fund. He informed the OCA that
he had assumed office as Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC )Judge of Calubian San Isidro,
Leyte on December 29, 2006, but had yet to receive his initial salary for lack of clearance from the
Financial Management Office. He prayed that the administrative case against him be considered
closed and terminated.
Page 301 of 370

The Court took note of the said letter and modified the Resolution by deleting the
directive to file criminal charges against him.
In its Report, the OCA revealed that the amounts of P2,505.00 and P20.00 returned by
Melchor were not the only shortages that he failed to remit on time. He likewise incurred
shortages in the collection for the JDF in the amount of P40,873.00, which was restituted only on
March 14, 2006; SAJF for the amount of P99,326.80 and returned only on March 16, 2006; and FF
collections totaling P796,841,00 that was restituted on various dates, the latest being on March 24,
2006.
In the Resolution, the Court denied Melchor's request for the release of his initial salary
and other benefits as Presiding Judge of MCTC, Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte.
In its Report, the OCA held that although the shortages were eventually restituted as
reflected in the deposit slips presented to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, it should be not
disregarded that Melchor violated various court circulars. The OCA likewise opined that
Melchor's promotion as a judge should not be taken to mean that the infractions he committed
while in the service as Clerk of Court were forgotten.
The OCA recommended that Judge Mario N. Melchor, Jr., former Clerk of Court be found
GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, GROSS DISHONESTY and GROSS MISCONDUCT; and
he be DISMISSED from the service with FORFEITURE of all retirements benefits due him except
payment of his accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Mario N. Melchor, Jr. Is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
After careful examination of the records of this case, the Court finds the recommendation
of the OCA to be well-taken.
By his own admission, Melchor knowingly used the court funds in his custody to defray
the hospitalization expenses of his child. Regrettably though, personal problems or even medical
emergencies in the family cannot justify acts of using the judiciary funds held by an accountable
officer of the court. As Clerk of Court, Melchor was entrusted with delicate functions in the
collection of legal fees. He acted as cashier and disbursement officer of the court; and was tasked
to collect and receive all monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and dues, and controls the
disbursement of the same. He was designated as custodian of the court's funds and revenues,
records, properties and premises, and should be liable for any loss or shortage thereof.
Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as clerk of court and cash
clerks, should deposit immediately with the authorized government depositories the various
funds they have collected. Being the custodian of court funds and revenues, it was Melchor's
Page 302 of 370

primary responsibility to immediately deposit the funds received by his office with the Land Bank
and not to keep the same in his custody.
By failing to properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Melchor
violated the trust reposed in him as the disbursement officer of the Judiciary. Delayed remittance
of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this omission deprives the court of
interest that could have been earned if the amounts were deposited in the authorized depository
bank.
Thus, even when there is restitution of funds, unwarranted failure to fulfill these
responsibilities deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of the collection
shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability. The restitution was only initiated by
him after the discovery of the anomalous records of collection under his custody.
The fact that Melchor tampered with several official receipts of the cash bond collections,
even devising a way to further conceal his misdeed, demonstrated a serious depravity on his
integrity. It exemplified gross dishonesty, which undermines the public's faith in courts and in the
administration of justice as a whole.
Melchor's promotion as a judge during the pendency of this case cannot be considered by
the Court either as a mitigating or an exculpatory circumstance to excuse him from any
administrative liability. A judge is still bound by the same principle enshrined in Section 1, Article
XI of the Constitution, which states that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The
demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for the members and personnel of the
Judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. The conduct of court members and
personnel must not only be characterized with propriety and decorum but must also be above
suspicion, for any act of impropriety can seriously erode or diminish the people's confidence in
the Judiciary. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest
tandards of honesty and integrity in the public service. Thus, Melchor's current position in the
judiciary will not merit any leniency from the Court.
The Court does not agree with Melchor's contention that the withholding of his salary as a
judge was already penalty in itself. It was a mere precautionary measure and not in any way a
form of penalty as he would still be compensated for actual service rendered.
There is no doubt that Melchor is guilty of dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and gross
misconduct. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses
with the corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first offense.
JOSE S. VILLANUEVA vs. ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD, CLERK OF COURT VI, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC
A.M. No. P-13-3102, September 8, 2014, J. Peralta
Page 303 of 370

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (Republic Act No.
6713) sets out a policy towards promoting a high standard of ethical responsibility in the public
service. It enjoins those in the government service to extend prompt, courteous and adequate
service to the public, and, at all times, to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals and good customs, among other ideals.
In this case, regrettably, although Atty. Saguyod’s reaction was understandable given the
circumstances, he should have still conducted himself in a manner befitting an officer of the court.
Atty. Saguyod became rude when Atty. Saguyod turned down his request to get a photocopy of the
petition and other court documents. For this, Atty. Saguyod is admonished and warned to be more
courteous in his dealings with the public.
Facts:
On February 20, 2007, Jose Villanueva (Villanueva) received a text message from Atty.
Lavezares Leomo (Atty. Leomo), his employer, instructing him to get a certified photocopy of a
Petition relative to Land Case No. 051-06 entitled "Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of Arnel D. Morales. On or about 8:45 in the
morning of that same day, Ms. Rosalie Sarsagat, the assigned stenographer of RTC Branch 67 of
Paniqui, Tarlac, advised him to return after thirty minutes because the custodian of the records is
not yet around. Immediately following the lapse of that period, Villanueva was informed that the
records being requested were in the custody of Atty. Paulino Saguyod (Atty. Saguyod) but must
talk to his wife, Mrs. Judith Saguyod (Mrs. Saguyod), in order to secure the requested pleading.
Villanueva found out that Mrs. Saguyod likewise holds office in the room of Atty. Saguyod
although she is not an employee of the said court.
Villanueva alleges that when he respectfully asked for a photocopy of the pleading, Atty.
Saguyod inquired whether he has a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing him to get such
photocopy. Villanueva showed him the text message he received from Atty. Leomo. However,
Atty. Saguyod’s wife interrupted them and called a certain person at the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac whom she asked whether Villanueva is allowed to be given a copy of the Petition being
requested. At the end of their conversation, the wife said that he should not be given a copy of
Arnel Morales’ Petition.
In the course of their dialogue, Atty. Saguyod told Villanueva: "Pinalusot ko na nga yung
pinitisyon mong apat (4) na lost title, ganiyan ka pa makipag-usap sa amin." Villanueva answered
back and said, "Anong kinalaman, Sir, noong pinitisyon kong lost title, eh iniutos sa akin ng boss
ko na ikuha ko siya ng kopya ng certified photocopy, at wala naman po akong ilegal na
transaction na ginawa." Upon hearing this reply, Atty. Saguyod stood up in his chair and
challenged Villanueva to a fistfight while shouting these words: "Punyeta ka! Mayabang ka. Ano
lalaban ka." Villanueva calmly said, "Di ako lalaban, Attorney, kung ayaw mong magbigay ng
kopya. Yon na lang sasabihin ko kay Atty. Leomo." Atty. Saguyod angrily told Villanueva,
"Tarantado ka. Mayabang ka. Di mo ako kilala kung sino ako dito." Villanueva politely replied,
"Alam ko po na ikaw ang Clerk of Court dito."
Villanueva went out of the room to avoid Atty. Saguyod and proceeded to the parking
area. Atty. Saguyod blocked his way and shouted, "Taga Paniqui ka, taga Victoria ako. Suntukan
na lang tayo." Villanueva replied, "Hindi ako lalaban sa’yo, Attorney." Atty. Saguyod retorted,
Page 304 of 370

"Sino ang pinagmamalaki mo, si Atty. Leomo, shit sino ba siya dito?" Villanueva answered him,
"Wala akong ipinagmamalaki, Attorney. Siya lang ang nag-utos sa akin para kumuha ng kopya ng
petition ni Mr. Arnel Morales."
Villanueva realized that this boorish attitude of Atty. Saguyod was an act of vengeance
because he failed to give the balance of P1,500.00 which he promised to pay for the Certificate of
Finality he issued relative to Land Case Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06. Apparently, the four (4) lost
titles which Atty. Saguyod is referring when he said, "pinalusot lang niya ito" pertains to the land
case he initiated by virtue of the SPA given to him by Mrs. Charlotte Antaran.
In his comment, Atty. Saguyod denied the charges and claimed that he did not give a copy
of the Petition being requested because Villanueva did not present a SPA showing his purpose
and authority to get such photocopy. He could not rely on the text message received by
Villanueva because he doesn’t know the phone number of Atty. Leomo. Atty. Saguyod denies that
his wife holds office in the Office of the Clerk of Court. He points out that Villanueva has no
evidence to prove such charge and that his wife has nothing to do with his refusal to give
Villanueva a copy of the petition.
Atty. Saguyod admits that he instructed Rosalie Sarsagat to tell Villanueva that he has to
pay the proper fees for reception of evidence as required under Section 21(e), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court and the Department of Justice (DOJ). He did not personally ask Villanueva to pay those
fees because the latter might misconstrue it and use it against him.
The Court referred the instant administrative complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Paniqui, Tarlac for investigation, report and recommendation. The records of the case were
transmitted to Executive Judge Liberty O. Castañeda (Judge Castañeda). Judge Castañeda
recommended that the complaint against Atty. Saguyod be dismissed for lack of merit. However,
the Court nullified Judge Castañeda’s Reports and Findings, considering that she made the same
while she was under preventive suspension from office. Thus, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to Acting Presiding Judge Alipio C. Yumul, (Judge Yumul) Branch 67,
Paniqui, Tarlac. Judge Yumul recommended that the case be dismissed.
The Court then, referred said Report to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. OCA recommended that the the present administrative case against Atty.
Saguyod, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and that he be ADMONISHED for
Violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and of Section 4(e) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Ethics for Public Officials and Employees, and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with severely in the future and be
SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day for simple misconduct for
demanding from Villanueva the amount of P3,000.00 as commissioner’s fee and appearance fee in
Land Case Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Saguyod committed violations of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and Section 4 (e), Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Page 305 of 370

Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Saguyod violated the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and Section 4 (e),
Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
Section 4 (e), Republic Act (RA) No. 6713 provides:
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct
in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall

extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless
otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public
officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation
of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in
the depressed rural and urban areas.
To begin with, clerks of court are important officers in the judicial system. Their
administrative functions are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. They cannot
be allowed to overstep their powers and responsibilities. Their office is the hub of adjudicative
and administrative orders, processes and judicial concerns. They perform a very delicate function
as custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, property and premises. They are specifically
imbued with the mandate to safeguard the integrity of the court as well as the efficiency of its
proceedings, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. As such,
the Supreme Court cannot countenance any act or omission of any court personnel that would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Time and again, the Court have held that clerks of court are not authorized to demand
and/or receive commissioner’s fees for reception of evidence ex parte. To be entitled to reasonable
compensation, a commissioner must not be an employee of the court.
Atty. Saguyod, however, may be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee for
his attitude towards Villanueva. It appears from a reading of the transcript of stenographic notes
that Atty. Saguyod became rude when Atty. Saguyod turned down his request to get a photocopy
of the petition and other court documents. Ronaldo David and Ruben Giganti, court employees,
both testified that Villanueva shouted and pointed a finger at Atty. Saguyod when he requested
for the documents. To avoid confrontation, Atty. Saguyod called for them to escort Villanueva out
of the office. Villanueva continued shouting invectives, hence, Atty. Saguyod upon being
informed of Villanueva’s behavior, went out and confronted Villanueva.
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (Republic Act
No. 6713) sets out a policy towards promoting a high standard of ethical responsibility in the
Page 306 of 370

public service. It enjoins those in the government service to extend prompt, courteous and
adequate service to the public, and, at all times, to respect the rights of others and refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals and good customs, among other ideals. As a public
officer, Atty. Saguyod is bound, in the performance of his official duties, to observe courtesy,
civility and self-restraint in his dealings with the public. Regrettably, although Atty. Saguyod’s
reaction was understandable given the circumstances, he should have still conducted himself in a
manner befitting an officer of the court. For this, Atty. Saguyod is admonished and warned to be
more courteous in his dealings with the public.
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER vs. JUDGE CORAZON D. SOLUREN, PRESIDING JUDGE, and
RABINDRANATH A. TUZON, LEGAL RESEARCHER II, both of BRANCH 91, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BALER, AURORA
A.M. No. P-14-3217, October 8, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a legal researcher who has no authority to accept various amounts of settlement
money from party-litigants and kept them in his custody and without issuing any official receipts
therefor, he clearly went beyond his duties as a Legal Researcher of the RTC. Having kept the money
in his possession and exercised control over it, the legal researcher evidently overstepped his
authority and, thus, committed a form of misconduct. However, absent any proof that said actions
were tainted with corruption, or with a clear intent to violate the law, or would constitute a flagrant
disregard of an established rule – say for instance, by the actual misappropriation of any amount
which came to his possession – the legal researcher cannot be held liable for Grave Misconduct but
only for Simple Misconduct which is punishable by suspension for a period of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months at the most without pay.
Facts:
In the Anonymous Letter, it was alleged that Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge Soluren)
had been instructing the party-litigants to deposit with her court settlement money for various
cases in her sala. It was elaborated that Rabindranath A. Tuzon (Tuzon) would merely
acknowledge receipt of the settlement money for the different cases through handwritten notes
without issuing any official receipts therefor; afterwhich, Judge Soluren would order the dismissal
of the corresponding cases. However, when the parties requested for the release of the said
money, Tuzon would fail to timely comply with the same.
Subsequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the Anonymous
Letter to Executive Judge Evelyn A. Turla (Executive Judge Turla) of the same RTC, for her
discreet investigation and report. In compliance, Executive Judge Turla sent a letter to OCA with
Tuzon’s comment attached thereto, stating that she did not find any act of irregularity or any
unauthorized collection on the part of the RTC. Tuzon admitted his receipt of various amounts as
settlement money for the different cases pending before Judge Soluren’s sala. He, however,
explained that, on orders of Judge Soluren, he merely accepted the said amounts from the parties
who were willing to settle the civil aspect of their respective cases and kept them in the court’s
vault. He also admitted not having issued official receipts for the amounts he received, not being
an accountable officer in possession of such receipts.
Page 307 of 370

Meanwhile, Judge Soluren was no longer investigated due to her compulsory retirement
on January 29, 2012.
In a Report and Recommendation, OCA recommended that the complaint against Judge
Soluren be considered closed and terminated on the ground that her compulsory retirement on
January 29, 2012 had divested it of jurisdiction to hear the administrative complaint against her.
Moreover, the OCA found no substantial proof to hold her liable for the administrative charges
against her. On the other hand, it found Tuzon guilty of Grave Misconduct and recommended
that he be dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. It held that by
receiving money from the party-litigants under the guise of safekeeping the same, Tuzon had
overstepped his bounds as Legal Researcher. In this relation, the OCA opined that accepting
fiduciary money for the court’s safekeeping is not within the scope of Tuzon’s duties. Thus, in
doing so, he disregarded the rules of procedure and the law, especially considering that he kept
the money in his possession for a long period of time and did not issue official receipts therefor.
In sum, the OCA deemed Tuzon’s acts as a form of Grave Misconduct for which he should be held
administratively liable.15
Issue:
Whether or not Tuzon should be held administratively liable for the charge of Grave
Misconduct as recommended by the OCA.
Ruling:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and
must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate Grave Misconduct from Simple
Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In the instant case, Tuzon readily acknowledged that he accepted various amounts of
settlement money from party-litigants and kept them in his custody without authority to do so
and without issuing any official receipts therefor. In doing so, he clearly went beyond his duties as
a Legal Researcher of the RTC. In view of the foregoing, the OCA therefore correctly found that
Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not authorized to receive any settlement money from party-
litigants. Neither was it shown that Judge Soluren instructed him to receive the same. Having
kept the money in his possession and exercised control over it, Tuzon evidently overstepped his
authority and, thus, committed a form of misconduct.
The Court, however, disagrees with the OCA’s appreciation of the misconduct’s gravity.
Considering the absence of any proof that Tuzon’s actions were tainted with corruption, or with a
clear intent to violate the law, or would constitute a flagrant disregard of an established rule – say
Page 308 of 370

for instance, by the actual misappropriation of any amount which came to his possession – Tuzon
cannot be held liable for Grave Misconduct but only for Simple Misconduct which is punishable
by suspension for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months at the most without
pay. That being said, the Court deems it proper to impose the maximum of the foregoing penalty.
Court employees like Tuzon would do well to constantly keep in mind that those in the
Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably
affects its honor and dignity and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best
possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any
conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to
diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid
its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient
administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
IRENEO GARCIA, Record Officer I, MeTC, OCC, Caloocan City vs. Clerk of Court IV ATTY.
MONALISA A. BUENCAMINO, et al./EXECUTIVE JUDGE MARIAM G. BIEN, MeTC, Br. 53,
Caloocan City vs. IRENEO GARCIA, Record Officer I, et al./Clerk of Court IV ATTY.
MONALISA A. BUENCAMINO, et al. vs. IRENEO GARCIA and Utility Woker I HONEYLEE
VARGAS GATBUNTON-GUEVARRA
A.M. No. P-09-2691/A.M. No. P-09-2687/A.M. No. P-14-3247. October 13, 2014,
J. Mendoza
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit
at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties
and responsibilities, government employees must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render
inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Improper behavior, especially during office hours, exhibits not only
a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the court itself.
Facts:
AM No. P-09-2691
Garcia charged his co-workers, Clerk or Court IV Monalisa A. Buencamino (Atty.

Buencamino) with Misconduct; Records Officer I Jovita P. Flores (Flores) with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Falsification of Public Document; and Process Server Salvador F. Toriaga
(Toriaga) with Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee. Garcia specifically alleged the
following:
1. Despite being on leave from September 1-5, 2008, Atty. Buencamino still
officially placed the remarks such as “out of office” and “sleeping during office hours” on
their bundy cards for the month of September 2008.
2. As Records Officer II, Flores was responsible for signing and issuing court
clearances. Flores, however, often left the office without permission. Thus, she made “pre-
signed” court clearances making it appear that the court continued to issue the said
clearances even when she was out of the office. More specifically, on September 19, 2007
between 1:00-2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Flores’ signature appeared in some of the court
Page 309 of 370

clearances despite the fact that she was at the Supreme Court, attending to her loan and
only came back to the office at around 2:50 o’clock in the same afternoon.
3. Toriaga exhibited acts which were unbecoming of a court employee in an
incident that happened on September 19, 2008.
In her Comment, Atty. Buencamino denied the allegations against her and averred that
the comments/annotations on the bundy card/daily time record of Garcia and his common-law
wife, Honeylee Gatbunton-Guevarra (Guevarra), as well as of all the court personnel was a
method to stop erring court employees from further wrongdoings such as sleeping, loafing or
missing, playing computer games, doing nothing, cooking during office hours and other acts in
violation of the civil service and Supreme Court rules and regulations or circulars. Atty.
Buencamino also claimed having instructed her staff and other persons to list all court employees
of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of their whereabouts, what they were doing and those
sleeping during office hours at the time/period she was on leave. If those instructed could not
write their reports on the logbook or journal, then she would be the one to write them upon her
return to work.
Atty. Buencamino further alleged that Garcia showed little concern for time lost from
work as he was a habitual absentee, late comer, lazy, and indifferent. Insofar as the complaints
against Toriaga and Flores were concerned, Atty. Buencamino claimed that Toriaga never
complained about his work for 19 years and that he was not a quarrelsome person. Flores, on the
other hand, had never issued pre-signed court clearances because she herself would not allow
such act.
Flores claimed that Garcia was one of their erring court employees who were always
caught sleeping, loafing or missing, and doing nothing during office hours. In like manner,
Toriaga, in his Comment, denied Garcia’s allegations against him and claimed that he did not
threaten Garcia or bring any gun to work, as likewise contained by the report of the building’s
security guard. He, however, admitted that he and Garcia shouted and hurled invectives at each
other. Because of the said incident, they were called by Executive Judge Bien to settle things
between them. As no settlement took place, they were asked to submit their respective written
explanations. Toriaga also mentioned having previously reported another misconduct of Garcia
relating to the latter’s misuse of their office comfort room to their other superiors
A.M. No. P-09-2687
This case arose from the formal letter sent by Judge Bien to ACA Villasor where she
reported the September 19, 2008 incident between Garcia and Toriaga. Allegedly, Toriaga got
irked by Garcia’s manner of using their office’s comfort room, and out of anger, he went home
and drank liquor. He then returned to the office and confronted Garcia. A shouting match
between the two ensued.
Judge Bien endeavored to talk to both parties immediately after the incident, but Toriaga
already left the office premises and took a month-long leave of absence. Upon the latter’s return
to work on October 20, 2008, efforts were exerted to have the parties settle the matter amicably,
but to no avail.
Page 310 of 370

A.M. No. P-14-3247
This case was an offshoot of the respective comments submitted by Atty. Buencamino,
Flores and Toriaga on Garcia’s complaint against them. It is an administrative complaint against
Garcia and his alleged common-law wife, Guevarra. Pieces of evidence were submitted to prove
the immoral relationship between the two and the infractions that both had committed, in
violation of the existing rules and regulations, circulars and laws of the Civil Service Commission
and of the Supreme Court. More specifically, Garcia was charged with habitual absenteeism and
violation of office rules, while Garcia and Guevarra were charged with immorality for their
common-law relationship, which relationship was of public knowledge.
Findings and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge
In A.M. No. P-09-2691, Judge Aguirre recommend the dismissal of the complaints against
Atty. Buencamino and Flores. Garcia testified that he did not see Atty. Buencamino place the
remarks being complained by him on the specified dates on his DTR. nsofar as Toriaga was
concerned, Judge Aguirre recommended the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month
suspension from office without pay for misbehavior, to serve as a deterrent to others. Garcia was
meted out the penalty of suspension from office for one (1) month without pay for the
inappropriate use of the office comfort room and for shouting invectives at Toriaga within the
office premises. These same findings and recommendation were made by Judge Aguirre in A.M.
No. P-09-2687, inasmuch as the facts of the case were identical.
In A.M. No. P-14-3247, Judge Aguirre recommend the dismissal of the complaint against
Garcia and Guevarra due to insufficient grounds for indictment.
The OCA agreed with the findings of Judge Aguirre in A.M. No. P-09-2691 and A.M. No. P-
09-2687 and concluded that the recommendations made by the investigating judge were in order.
The OCA, however, concluded otherwise with respect to A.M. No. P-14-3247. he OCA found
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that Garcia and Guevarra were remiss in their
duties, which Garcia did not adequately refute. Further, the amorous affair between Garcia and
Guevarra having been established, they could be held liable for immorality. The marriage
certificate of Guevarra and the birth certificate of at least one of her purported three (3) children
with Garcia were incontrovertible proof of such an illicit relationship. Nonetheless, the OCA
opined that any neglect of duty on the part of the respondents would merely be an aggravating
circumstance of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct, pursuant to the Civil
Service Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not the recommendations of OCA are proper?
Ruling:
The Court adopts with modification the recommendations of the OCA. Public service
requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, government employees must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render
Page 311 of 370

inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Improper behavior, especially during office hours,
exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the
court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and
employee.
Insofar as the September 19, 2008 shouting incident is concerned, neither Garcia nor
Toriaga denied it. In fact, Toriaga admitted hurling invectives against Garcia for the latter’s
improper use of their office comfort room. Garcia, on the other hand, did not refute the said
imputation, but complained against the misbehavior displayed by Toriaga.
In De Vera, Jr. v. Rimando, the Court held that the act of engaging in a shouting match,
one even cursing the other, within the court premises, is censurable, to say the least. Court
employees are supposed to be well-mannered, civil and considerate in their actuations, in their
relations with both co-workers and the transacting public. Boorishness, foul language and any
misbehavior in court premises diminishes its sanctity and dignity.
The OCA, thus, was correct in finding Garcia and Toriaga both guilty for simple
misconduct. Simple misconduct is defined as an unacceptable behavior which transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers, work-related or not.
While the OCA correctly observed that Garcia had been loafing and sleeping during office
hours, these acts, however, constitute two separate offenses as they are not embraced under the
offense of neglect of duty. Loafing, just like frequent unauthorized absences, is a grave offense
while sleeping during office hours, an act violative of office rules and regulations, is a light
offense. More appropriately, Garcia was guilty of loafing for which the rules impose a penalty of
suspension from work for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense,
dismissal for the second, as well as violation of reasonable office rules and regulations with
reprimand as the penalty for the first offense. It must be remembered that by reason of the nature
and functions of the judiciary, its employees must be role models in the faithful observance of the
constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. Inherent in this mandate is the
observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public
service, if only to recompense the government, and ultimately the people who shoulder the cost
of maintaining the Judiciary.
Aside from loafing and sleeping during office hours, Garcia also frequently absented
himself from work. Just like loafing, frequent unauthorized absences or habitual absenteeism is a
grave offense where the penalty of suspension from work for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second, are imposed.
As regards the charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct against Garcia and Guevarra,
the OCA’s findings and recommendation are correct. Garcia and Guevarra failed to refute the
alleged illicit relationship and simply labeled the charge against them as malicious, fabricated and
baseless.
On the other hand, incontrovertible proof such as the marriage contract of Guevarra with
her husband, the birth certificate of one of Guevarra’s children with Garcia, and the affidavit of
Page 312 of 370

acknowledgement/admission of paternity by Garcia were presented to support the allegation of

immoral conduct. Moreover, the genuineness and authenticity of these documents were never
questioned. Thus, there is no doubt that Garcia and Guevarra had, and appears to still have, an
illicit relationship while the latter is still legally married. Such a relationship is highly frowned
upon, especially when court employees are involved because they are expected to maintain moral
righteousness and uprightness in their professional and private conduct to preserve the integrity
and dignity of the courts of justice. For the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the
rules impose a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In sum, as modified, Garcia committed not only
simple misconduct and disgraceful and immoral conduct but also the offenses of habitual
absenteeism and loafing and violation of office rules and regulations. Guevarra, on the other
hand, committed the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL H. ALANO vs. PADMA L. SAHI, COURT INTERPRETER, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, MALUSO, BASILAN
A.M. No. P-14-3252, October 14, 2014, En Banc
The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from
judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. That is why, the Court
provides the rule against any form of solicitations of gift or other pecuniary or material benefits or
receipts of contributions for himself/herself from any person, whether or not a litigant or lawyer, to
avoid any suspicion that the major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in
performing official duties.
In the present case, the corrupt practice of respondent in soliciting and receiving bribe
money from party litigants on the pretext that they will obtain a favorable judgment undoubtedly
degraded the Judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of the people for the court and its
personnel.
Facts:
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Judge Juan Gabriel H. Alano (Judge
Alano) of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sumisip, Maluso and Lantawan,
Basilan Province against Padma L. Sahi (Sahi), Court Interpreter I of the same court, charging her
with violations of Sections 11 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, violation
of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Grave Misconduct.
In the complaint, Judge Alano alleged that Sahi brokered for party litigants and solicited
money and gifts in exchange for favorable decisions in the election protest cases pending before
his court, despite constant reminders to his staff that they should never demand, solicit, or
receive money, gifts or other benefits from any party litigants. For particulars:
Judge Estacio recommended that Sahi be dismissed from service, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporation, and forfeiture of all her benefits, except accrued leave credits.
The findings and the recommendation of the Investigating Judge are well-taken.
Page 313 of 370

As found by Judge Estacio, the evidence on record undeniably shows that during several
instances, Sahi solicited and received various sums of money from party litigants in the election
protest cases pending before the 2nd MCTC of Sumisip, Maluso and Lantawan, Basilan Province
despite constant reminders from Judge Alano not to demand, solicit or receive money or other
gifts or benefits from any party litigant. In fact, Judge Alano’s discreet investigation was
corroborated by affidavits executed by the parties who stated that Sahi exacted money from them
in exchange for favorable judgments in the sala of Judge Alano.
Issue:
Whether or not Sahi is administratively liable for improper solicitation and guilty of grave
misconduct?
Ruling:
The records of the case will show that the party litigants in the election protest cases
pending before Judge Alano’s court had the impression that Sahi was acting as an agent of Judge
Alano. This explained why several protestants and protestees inquired from several court
personnel if Judge Alano received the bribe money they gave through Sahi. Convincingly, the
Affidavits of Sawari and Jalil showed Sahi’s corrupt practice of soliciting money in exchange for
favorable judgments.
To escape liability, Sahi proffered her defense of bare denial and self-serving claim that
she never acted as broker to any party litigant. According to her, the affidavits executed by the
party litigants should not be taken as gospel truth because they are the kind of persons who can
easily be pressured to execute a document without being fully aware of its consequences and
contents. It bears to note, however, that during the hearing held on March 30, 2011 at about 2:00
p.m., Sawari and Jalil, together with the latter’s son, Hassan Jalil, appeared and re-affirmed their
respective affidavits.
Clearly, Sahi failed to overcome the positive, candid, and straightforward testimonies of
the complaining party litigants. By jurisprudence, "denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility."14 In the present
case, the investigating judge took note of the fact that Sahi failed to present even a single witness
to believe the accusations hurled against her.
Time and time again, the Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. "That is why, the Court provides the rule against any
form of solicitations of gift or other pecuniary or material benefits or receipts of contributions for
himself/herself from any person, whether or not a litigant or lawyer, to avoid any suspicion that
the major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties."
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, provides that "court
personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions," while Section
2(e), Canon III states that "court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity,
discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be
Page 314 of 370

inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing
official duties."
In the present case, the corrupt practice of Sahi in soliciting and receiving bribe money
from party litigants on the pretext that they will obtain a favorable judgment undoubtedly
degraded the Judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of the people for the court and its
personnel. Such practice constitutes grave misconduct in office which is appalling. It is a grave
offense that carries an equally grave penalty. Under Section 22(c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
gross misconduct is classified as a grave offense. The penalty for this offense is dismissal even for
the first offense.
The Supreme Court has been resolute in its drive to discipline and, if warranted, to
remove from the service errant magistrates, employees and even Justices of higher collegiate
appellate courts for any infraction that tends to give the Judiciary a bad name. The Court has been
unflinching in imposing discipline on errant personnel or in purging the ranks of those
undeserving to remain in the service, such as in this case. Thus, the Supreme Court finds the
respondent administratively liable for improper solicitation and imposes the penalty prescribed
by prevailing rules and jurisprudence, which is dismissal from service on the first offense.
JEAN PAUL V. GILLERA, SUZETTE P. GILLERA, ATTY. JILLINA M. GERODIAS, AND IBARRA
BARCEBAL vs. MARIA CONSUELO JOIE A. FAJARDO, SHERIFF REGIONAL TRIAL IV,
COURT, BRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA
A.M. No. P-14-3237, October 21, 2014, Per Curiam
An administrative complaint was filed against Fajardo, sheriff of RTC Laguna for dishonesty.
In upholding the dismissal of the Fajardo from service, the Court held that dishonesty involves “a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.” The rules consider dishonesty as a grave offense such that the first offense merits
dismissal from the service
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Court Complainants
Spouses Jean Paul and Suzette Gillera against Maria Consuelo Fajardo, sheriff of RTC Laguna. The
complaint alleged that Fajardo issued post-dated checks in favor of the Spouses Gillera as
payment for the rent of the house being rented by the respondent. The bank, Banco de Oro
(BDO), dishonored the first two checks for being drawn against a closed account. Fajardo ignored
demands to replace the checks and failed to pay the rentals.
Meanwhile, the Spouses Gillera designated Hercules Financing Corporation (HFC),

another Gerodias-owned company, to sell their house and lot occupied by Fajardo. The Spouses
Gillera signed a blank deed of absolute sale that HFC could complete upon consummation of the
sale. Fajardo offered to buy the house and lot.
In February 2009, Fajardo and HFC agreed on the sale of the house and lot. HFC gave
Fajardo a photocopy of the blank deed of absolute sale signed by the Spouses Gillera as proof of
Page 315 of 370

its authority to sell the house and lot. Fajardo failed to pay the balance when it fell due on March
27, 2009. After seeking extensions, she issued HFC three (3) post-dated checks, such checks later
on bounced. On September 1, 2009, HFC employee Victor Romero called Fajardo to collect
payment. It was then that Fajardo claimed having paid the entire balance in cash on August 29,
2009 to complainant Ibarra Barcebal, HFC’s general manager. Fajardo claimed that she was
issued Official Receipt No. 8010 and given the deed of absolute sale signed by the Spouses Gillera
as sellers and Fajardo's mother as buyer.
Fajardo continued to occupy the property without paying until the MTC ordered her
eviction upon the instance of the Spouses. The Spouses Gillera also filed charges against Fajardo
for two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and this administrative complaint praying
for Fajardo’s dismissal from the service.
Executive Judge Sonia T. Yu Casano she recommended that the respondent be dismissed
from service. The Office of the Court Administrator agreed with the findings and
recommendations of Executive Judge Sonia T. Yu-Casano, and recommended that respondent be
found guilty of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and be ordered
dismissed from the service. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Office of City Administrator erred in holding that Fajardo be dismissed from
service
Ruling:
No. Sheriffs, our front-line representatives, play a crucial role in our justice system, having
the important task of executing our courts’ final judgments. Sheriffs must conduct themselves
with integrity at all times as “once he[/she] loses the people’s trust, he[/she] diminishes the
people’s faith in the judiciary.” Respondent’s acts failed to meet the high standards of conduct
expected from the position held..
The respondent’s continuous refusal to pay a just debt amounts to “conduct unbecoming
of a public employee.” Worse, respondent testified during investigation that her mother had
bought the house and lot, and respondent produced anew documents already rejected by the
ejectment court. Both Executive Judge Sonia T. Yu-Casano and the Office of the Court
Administrator found that respondent presented a falsified Official Receipt No. 8010 and passed off
a deed of absolute sale copy, bearing her mother’s signature, to serve as a faithful reproduction of
a nonexistent original document.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that respondent “debased the judicial process
by introducing in evidence a falsified document, committing perjury and giving false testimony in
an effort to obtain unfairly a favorable judgment for herself.” The blatant disregard of the rules in
an effort to mislead and deceive the court in its investigation reflects respondent’s “incorrigible
and unrepentant conduct.” Respondent also issued bouncing checks, having been drawn against
closed accounts. She failed to substantiate her claim that complainants Spouses Gillera agreed to
offset her expenses for improvements with rental arrears.
Page 316 of 370

On the other hand, respondent’s bank account had been closed when complainants
Spouses Gillera deposited the checks on January 23, 2008, and yet on July 19, 2009, respondent
issued another check for complainants Spouses Gillera drawn from the same account. Such
fraudulent behavior compounds respondent’s acts of presenting forged documents and making
untruthful testimony, all in all depicting her as “lack[ing] [in] personal honesty and good moral
character [that] render her unworthy of public confidence.” Dishonesty refers to “intentionally
making a false statement on any material fact.” Dishonesty involves “a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” The
rules consider dishonesty as a grave offense such that the first offense merits dismissal from the
service and carries with it “cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided
in the decision.” Dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of official duty as to
warrant the penalty of dismissal The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[c]ourt employees
should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people’s respect and faith
in the judiciary.” Consequently, their conduct “must not only be, but must also be perceived to
be, free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to
their behavior outside the court.” The Supreme Court will not tolerate acts or omissions
“diminishing or tending to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts.”
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF NAVAL, BILIRAN vs. FLORANTE F. RALAR, Court

Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Caibiran, Biliran
The falsification of an official document like the personal data sheet required for
employment in the Judiciary is gross dishonesty, and constitutes a serious administrative offense
that warrants the dismissal of the employee.
Facts:
By an anonymous letter dated June 17, 2008, the writers, self-styling themselves as the
Concerned Citizens of Naval, Biliran, formally charged Florante F. Ralar, Court Stenographer III of
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court in Caibiran, Biliran with dishonesty through falsification of
public documents.
The letter alleged that Ralar, who had been appointed as Court Stenographer III in 1998,
did not state in his application for the position his having been previously employed in the Bureau
of Post, later known as the Philippine Postal Corporation; that in his Civil Service Form No. 212
(Personal Data Sheet), he had filled out and attached his application without stating therein that
he had then been employed in that office; that all papers relative to his employment had shown
his deliberate omission of his previous employment in the Bureau of Post; that a verification at
Regional Office No. 08 of the Philippine Postal Corporation in Tacloban City disclosed that he
had been actually employed as a Letter Carrier prior to his employment in the Judiciary, and that
at that time he had been indefinitely suspended for committing mail pilferage, and had eventually
been dismissed from the service for such offense; that his co-employees were wondering why he
had been employed in the Judiciary despite his disqualification to work in the Government; that
he had also been previously employed as a Revenue Collection Clerk in Naval, Biliran, in which
Page 317 of 370

position he had also committed misappropriation of his collections, but the matter had been
settled without him being formally charged; that he had frequently indulged in gambling and
drinking during office hours to the prejudice of the public service; that his notoriety had been of
common knowledge in the community; that despite knowing nothing about stenography, he had
obtained a falsified certification of his knowledge of stenography to secure an appointment to his
present position; and that he had even asked court litigants for money in consideration of
assistance extended to them in cases pending in court.
In his comment dated September 2, 2009, Ralar denied the accusation of dishonesty. He
insisted that the allegations made against him were general statements that did not state causes
of action and should be outrightly dismissed; that giving due course to the complaint against him
despite the absence of any named complainant would violate his fundamental right to face and to
confront the witnesses against him; that he admitted having been previously employed by the
Philippine Postal Corporation (formerly, the Bureau of Post), and later on by the local
government of Naval, Biliran; that in his pursuit and determination to earn more, particularly to
ensure the education of his children, he had applied in the Judiciary, where he presently holds the
position of court stenographer; that he had no knowledge of having violated any law, rules and
regulations that would disqualify or render him ineligible to hold any government position; that
all the allegations about his suspension and dismissal from the service for mail pilferage, use of
government funds collected as Revenue Collection Clerk in the local government for his personal
benefit, being recently seen in gambling and drinking places during office hours, and soliciting
money from litigants, being unsubstantiated, should not be given credence.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report and recommendation
and finds that there is sufficient basis to hold respondent Ralar guilty of the offense attributed to
him.
Issue:
Whether or not Ralar should be terminated from the Judiciary.
Ruling:
Yes. Ralar has no place in the Judiciary.
The Court finds the report of the OCA to be substantiated by the records, and adopts its
recommendation in its entirety.
Ralar appeared defiant because the charge had been made anonymously. Yet, his
invocation of the right to face and to confront his accusers was misplaced, for the charge was soon
easily substantiated by the results of the OCA’s legitimate queries put to the various offices of the
public service in which he had previously served. That he committed falsification of an official
document when he did not disclose in his written application for his present position his having
been formally charged administratively, and having been found guilty of such charge became
indisputable. His omission, being designed by him to misrepresent his qualifications for the
position he sought, constituted gross dishonesty that the Court cannot tolerate. It is the State’s
policy to promote a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service; and to
hold all public officials and employees accountable to the people at all times. This policy
Page 318 of 370

demands that they discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and
loyalty; act with patriotism and justice; lead modest lives; and uphold public interest over
personal interest. No more essential is that policy than in the Judiciary, for no other office in the
Government exacts the greatest demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from public
employees and officials than the Judiciary. As such, the Judiciary deserves the best from all its
employees and officials. Dishonesty and falsification – malevolent and abhorrent – have no place
in the Judiciary.
Ralar was guilty of dishonesty, which is defined as the absence of integrity; the disposition
to betray, cheat, deceive, or defraud; or the intentional violation of truth. Pursuant to Section 46,
Rule 10 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Case in the Civil Service, dishonesty,
classified as a grave offense, is penalized with dismissal for the first offense.
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR vs. PAUL M. RESURRECCION and MARICAR M. EUGENIO

An administrative case was filed against Paul Resurreccion, Court Interpreter of RTC
Muntinlupa City for usurpation of an official function and illegal exaction. In ruling for the
dismissal of the respondent from service, the court ruled that the respondent’s acts of dishonesty,
usurpation of official functions and illegal exaction demanded the Court to classify his acts as grave
misconduct. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consisted in his acts of unlawfully or wrongfully
using his position or character of his office to procure some benefit for himself or for another,
contrary to the rights of others. The collection of the fees had no legal basis whatsoever; hence, his
illegal exactions were outrightly and plainly corrupt. Dismissal from the service was called for
because of the grave nature of Resurreccion’s offense.
Facts:
In his complaint-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar denounced
Court Interpreter Paul M. Resurreccion of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, in Muntinlupa
City, for committing acts of extortion, illegal exaction, and blackmail by using his position to
extort money from him, a law practitioner, in exchange for non-existent goodwill, and for
violation of Administrative Circular No. 31-90. The complaint alleged that the respondent illegally
extracted money from Atty. Pulgar in exchange of a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 95-079
entitled Rey O. Chand vs. Armenia P. Chand for Annulment of marriage based on Art. 36 of the
Family Code. Resurreccion was also claimed to have usurped an official function when he acted as
a commissioner and received evidence ex parte.
OCA recommended that Resurrection be found guilty of grave misconduct and be

dismissed from service as a Court Interpreter. It also recommended that Eugenio be found guilty
of dishonesty and simple neglect of duty, imposing upon her the penalty of suspension of six
months without pay. Hence, this appeal.
Page 319 of 370

Issues:
Whether Resurreccion is guilty of grave misconduct
Ruling:
Yes. At the time material to this administrative case, Resurreccion was the Court
Interpreter of Branch 276 of the RTC in Muntinlupa City. In order to maintain the trust and
confidence of the people in the Judiciary, therefore, he should have acted within the limits of his
authority as such. Although his Presiding Judge designated him as commissioner to receive
evidence ex parte in some cases, he still could not discharge or perform that task because he was
not a member of the Philippine Bar, and thus had no authority whatsoever to act or serve as such
commissioner to receive the evidence ex parte of any of the parties. But, as the records indicated,
he served as such commissioner. His deliberate assumption of the duties of a commissioner for
that purpose blatantly transgressed the limits of his official functions as the Court Interpreter, and
constituted unmitigated usurpation of powers. Such irregularity was undeniable, because the
language of Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, of which he and his Presiding Judge were well
aware, was straightforward and unequivocal, viz:
Section 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. — The judge of the court
where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties.
However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the
court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The
clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of
exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the
transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing. (n)
Compounding the usurpation of powers was the more serious offense of illegally exacting
fees from litigants and their lawyers or representatives. It is worth mentioning that Circular No.
50-2001, which proscribed the unauthorized collection of fees or amounts of compensation by
clerks of court for their reception of evidence ex parte, was issued only on August 21, 2001. Even
then, Resurreccion could not feign ignorance of the prohibition because the Manual of Clerks of
Court, which had been issued long before the issuance of Circular No. 50-2001, already contained
a similar prohibition that explicitly stated: No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive
commissioner's fees for reception of evidence ex-parte.
In view of the foregoing, the recommendation of the OCA for the immediate dismissal of
Resurreccion from the service is warranted. His acts of dishonesty, usurpation of official functions
and illegal exaction demanded that we classify his acts as grave misconduct. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. They were so in his case.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consisted in his acts of unlawfully or wrongfully
using his position or character of his office to procure some benefit for himself or for another,
contrary to the rights of others. The collection of the fees had no legal basis whatsoever; hence,
his illegal exactions were outrightly and plainly corrupt. It then becomes unavoidable for the
court to judge his transgressions as motivated by the lust for money and power, rather than
having proceeded from his unfamiliarity with standing rules and guidelines. Dismissal from the
service was called for because of the grave nature of Resurreccion’s offense. He thereby revealed
Page 320 of 370

his absolute unworthiness to remain in the service of the Judiciary. Indeed, he should not be
allowed to serve a minute longer in the Judiciary lest the reputation and integrity of the service be
prejudiced. Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, serious dishonesty and grave misconduct, among others, are grave offenses punishable by
dismissal from the service.
ATTY. ALAN A. TAN vs. ELMER S. AZCUETA, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch
22, Imus, Cavite
A.M. No. P-14-3271, October 22, 2014, J. Brion
Atty. Tan filed an administrative case against Azcueta. During the investigation of the case,
the former failed to appear before the Investigating Judge despite notice. In ruling such failure of
Atty. Tan to attend does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the court held that the issue in
an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the erring court
employee, but whether the latter has breached the court's ethical and procedural norms and
standards.
Facts:
This administrative case was filed by complainant Atty. Tan, counsel for Jennelyn Yabut-
Gopole who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4263-10, with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, for
Damages with prayer that defendant Felomina F. Cayabyab (defendant) be made liable for grave
oral defamation. Atty. Tan alleged that summons was issued by the RTC against the defendant on
November 18, 2010. However, up to the date of the filing of the present administrative case, the
summons remained unserved on the defendant. The oral defamation case has not yet been heard
because the defendant has not filed his answer to the complaint for damages.
In his comment, the respondent denied the accusations against him. He alleged that he
tried to serve the summons on the defendant four times but on all occasions she was not around
at her given address on January 4, 2011, February 25, 2011, April 26, 2011 and May 27, 2011.
Executive Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr. (Investigating Judge) set the case for hearing
twice but on both occasions, Atty. Tan did not appear despite notice.
In his Administrative Investigation Report the Investigating Judge found that from the evidence
submitted by the respondent that the intervals between the dates the services were effected were
very long. The Investigating Judge recommended that the respondent be suspended from office
for one (1) month without pay, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
Issues:
1. Whether Azcueta is guilty of neglect of duty
2. Whether the failure of the Atty. Tan in attending the Investigation warrants the
dismissal of the case
Page 321 of 370

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court agrees with the Investigating Judge’s finding that the intervals between
the dates the summons were served were very lengthy. The first service was made on January 4,
2011, the second service was on February 25, 2011 after a period of 52 days. The third attempt was
on April 26, 2011 after a period of 60 days and the last service was on May 27, 2011 after a period of
31 days.
The duty of a process server is vital to the machinery of the justice system. His primary
duty is to serve court notices, which precisely requires utmost care on his part by seeing to it that
all notices assigned to him are duly served upon the parties. Having a heavy workload is not a
compelling reason to justify failure to perform one’s duties properly. Otherwise, every
government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty would always proffer a
similar excuse to escape punishment, to the prejudice of the government service.
2. It does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint, because the issue in an
administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the erring court
employee, but whether the latter has breached the court's ethical and procedural norms and
standards. The Court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of all employees of the judiciary.
The Court finds the respondent liable for simple neglect of duty for failure to serve court notices
promptly.
Simple neglect of duty is failure to give proper attention to a required task. It signifies
disregard of duty due to carelessness or indifference. Section 52(B)(l) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999)
classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable by one ( 1) month and one ( 1)
day to six ( 6) months suspension for the first offense. At the same time, Section 53 of the same
Rules provides that in the detennination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating
and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.
The respondent's heavy workload and the fact that he attended to the service of summons and
that the defendant was clearly evading service of summons should work to mitigate the
respondent's culpability.
LOLITA RAYALA VELASCO vs. GERALDO C OBISPO

A.M. No. P-13-3160, November 10, 2014, J. Reyes
To temper the harshness of the rules, however, the Court has refrained from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal in a number of cases in the presence of mitigating factors. The Court
also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by
the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the law’s
concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners. Applying the rationale in the
aforesaid judicial precedents and rules, the Court considers as mitigating circumstances the fact
that this is the first infraction of Obispo and more importantly, the lack of bad faith on his part in
committing the act complained of.
Page 322 of 370

Facts:
Lolita Rayala Velasco (Lolita) charged respondent Geraldo Obispo (Obispo), Utility
Worker of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), with Grave Misconduct and Violation of Republic Act
No. 3019.
In her letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Lolita alleged that sometime
in 2010, some court employees in San Pedro, Laguna introduced her to Obispo, who can allegedly
help her in the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (Petition) of her son,
Carlos R. Velasco II (Carlos) and daughter-in-law, Ria Samia Velasco (Ria). According to Lolita,
Obispo assured her that he can work out the annulment of marriage without the couple’s
appearance in court.
Immediately, Obispo demanded money from Lolita. As such, the latter issued a
Metrobank checkd amounting to P75,000.00 in favor of Obispo. Subsequently, the complainant
made the second payment in the amount of P10,000.00. Despite the assurance of Obispo,
however, Lolita averred that the annulment of marriage did not materialize. Consequently, she
demanded the return of the P85,000.00 she made in favor of Obispo. In reply, Obispo requested
that the refund be made in installment. Lolita, however, did not agree and demanded that full
payment be made.
Obispo filed his Comment. He denied that he gave assurance to the complainant that he
could work out the petition without the appearance of the parties in court. For his defense, he
claimed that he merely recommended to the complainant a lawyer who could handle the case and
a psychologist who could conduct the required psychological evaluation of the couple. When he
called up the lawyer on the cellphone, the latter informed him that he was out of town and that
he would attend to the case upon his return.
The OCA found Obispo guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Canon 1, Section 2 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; and, thus, recommended his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not the OCA correctly ruled finding Obispo guilty of grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Except for the penalty imposed, the evaluation of the OCA is well-taken.
Undoubtedly, Obispo’s act of soliciting money constitutes grave misconduct in office

which is appalling. It is a grave offense that carries an equally grave penalty. Under Section 22(c)
of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. No.
292) and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, gross misconduct is classified as a grave offense. The
penalty for this offense is dismissal even for the first offense
Page 323 of 370

Time and time again, the Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and
decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the
judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
In the present case, the records of the case reveal that the conduct of Obispo fell short of
this standard. By soliciting money from the complainant, even for the purpose of securing the
services of a counsel and the filing of the Petition for Annulment of Marriage, among others, he
committed an act of serious impropriety which tarnished the honor and dignity of the Judiciary
and deeply affected the people’s confidence in it. He committed the ultimate betrayal of the duty
to uphold the dignity and authority of the Judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, creating the
impression that decisions can be bought and sold.
Upon review of the records, however, the Court finds the defense of Obispo without
merit. A review of the check presented by the complainant clearly shows that the same was made
to the order of Mr. Geraldo C. Obispo which he personally encashed on September 22, 2010.
Clearly, the check received by Obispo reveals that the payment was made indeed in his favor. The
mere fact that he received money from the complainant inescapably creates a notion that he
could facilitate the favorable resolution of the case pending before the court. Such behavior puts
not only the court personnel involved, but the Judiciary as well, in a bad light.
To temper the harshness of the rules, however, the Court has refrained from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal in a number of cases in the presence of mitigating factors. The Court
also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed
by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the law’s
concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.Applying the rationale in the
aforesaid judicial precedents and rules, the Court considers as mitigating circumstances the fact
that this is the first infraction of Obispo and more importantly, the lack of bad faith on his part in
committing the act complained of.
Wherefore, respondent Geraldo C. Obispo, Utility Worker I of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 113, is found guilty of Grave Misconduct. He is suspended for one (1) year,
without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ISABEL A. SIWA, Stenographer,

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila,
A.M. No. P-13-3156, November 11, 2014 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3012-P), J. Velasco Jr.
The Court has ruled, in a number of cases, that the failure to submit the TSNs within the
period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross
neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense
pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Here, it had been sufficiently established that despite the clear provision of Administrative
Page 324 of 370

Circular No. 24-90, respondent failed to submit and account for the TSNs assigned to her which
makes her liable for gross neglect of duty.
Facts:
The instant administrative matter is an off-shoot an undated anonymous letter-complaint

against Atty. Miguel Morales (Morales), Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of the City of Manila. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P is also an anonymous letter-complaint
against Morales, this time together with four other court employees among them herein
respondent Isabel Siwa (Siwa), Court Stenographer of Branch 16, MeTC, City of Manila. OCA IPI
No. 05-2155-P and OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P were referred to the Executive Judge of the MeTC of
Manila for investigation and report.
The second letter-complaint alleged that Siwa has been engaged in lending activities and
in the discounting of checks, and her services were availed of by employees from "MeTC, RTC,
BIR, DPS, Manila City Hall, Schools, [h]ospital, etc."
In the meantime, Siwa applied for optional retirement, which the Supreme Court granted
in a Resolution dated October 12, 2005 in A.M. No. 12096-Ret. As to Siwa, in her Report and
Recommendation, the investigating judge recommended that she be directed to explain why she
still has pending transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs), despite having already availed of
optional retirement.
By Resolution, the Court found Siwa administratively liable for engaging in the business of
lending and discounting of checks. In its report, the OCA recommended that Siwa be adjudged
liable for gross neglect of duty, for her failure to submit the TSNs, despite Administrative Circular
No. 24-90, which provides that "all stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes
and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the
time the notes are taken."
Issue:
Whether or not Siwa is liable should be held administratively liable for gross neglect of
duty.
Ruling:
Yes, she is.
Her failure to account for the TSNs amounts to Gross Neglect of Duty. The Court has
ruled, in a number of cases, that the failure to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed
under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is
classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to
Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Here, it had been sufficiently established that despite the clear provision of Administrative
Circular No. 24-90, respondent failed to submit and account for the TSNs assigned to her.
Page 325 of 370

Respondent's infractions warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service, if
not for the fact that she is already out of the service as a result of retirement. The Civil Service
Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989, however, provides that "the penalty
of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and the disqualifications for re-employment in the government service."
Hence, in line with present jurisprudence, in lieu of dismissal from service, we deem it proper to
impose the penalty of forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits.
FELICIANO O. FRANCIA vs. ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Davao City
A.M. No. P-14-3272, November 11, 2014 [Formerly: OCA IPI No. 14-4264-P], PER CURIAM
A sheriff may be held liable for gross neglect of duty in implementing the Writ of Execution
after acknowledging a receipt of a certain amount from a party to the case even if it was allegedly for
legal expenses, and there was neither an accounting of the said amount he admittedly received nor a
showing that a liquidation was prepared and submitted to the court as required under the rules.
Even if the money was given voluntarily, such would not absolve respondent sheriff from liability
because of his failure to secure the court’s prior approval.
The rules on sheriff’s expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts. A
sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the
proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion.
Facts:
Feliciano is the plaintiff in the Unlawful Detainer case filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City. The MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of Feliciano and
ordered the defendants and their heirs, assigns and those acting for and in their behalf to, among
others, vacate the property subject matter of the case. The RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of
the MTCC.
By virtue of the said decision, a Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC commanding
respondent sheriff to implement the dispositive portion of the affirmed MTCC Decision and to
make a return within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof.
Feliciano alleged that respondent sheriff asked P3,000.00 from him for expenses which he
readily gave. He even offered respondent sheriff another P15,000.00 for the full satisfaction of the
writ. Despite the lapse of more than one (1) year, however, the writ remained unimplemented.
This prompted him to file the instant administrative case against respondent sheriff for neglect of
duty.
In his Explanation, respondent sheriff acknowledged receiving the P3,000.00 from

Feliciano and contended that the amount was for legal expenses. He contended that defendants
insisted on staying in the subject place. Thus, he requested for police assistance in the
implementation of the writ and in the service of the Notice to Vacate. He averred that by the time
the request for police assistance was approved, Feliciano could no longer be found. He further
averred that as of date of his letter-explanation, he is still waiting for Feliciano to appear so that
he could proceed with the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
Page 326 of 370

The OCA found respondent sheriff guilty of gross neglect of duty. It recommended that
respondent sheriff be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Sheriff Esguerra of gross neglect of duty in implementing the
Writ of Execution issued by the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent is liable for gross negligence and other offenses like dishonesty and gross
inefficiency in the performance of official duties.
The duties of sheriffs in the implementation of writs are explicitly laid down in Section 10,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The aforesaid rule enumerated the steps to be
followed in the payment and disbursement of fees for the execution of a writ, to wit: (1) the sheriff
must prepare and submit to the court anestimate of the expenses he would incur; (2) the
estimated expenses shall be subject to court approval; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall
be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court, who is also the ex-officio sheriff; (4)
the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; (5) the executing sheriff
shall thereafter liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ;
and (6) any amount unspent shall be returned to the person who made the deposit. It is clear
from the enumeration that sheriffs are not authorized to receive direct payments from a winning
party. Any amount to be paid for the execution ofthe writ should be deposited with the Clerk of
Court and it would be the latter who shall release the amount to the executing sheriff. The
amount deposited should be spent entirely for the execution only and any remainder of the
amount should be returned.
In the present case, respondent sheriff acknowledged his receipt of the P3,000.00 from
Feliciano and explained that it was for legal expenses. Other than his vague explanation, there
was no accounting of the P3,000.00 he admitted to have received. In fact, there was also no
showing that a liquidation was prepared and submitted to the court as required under the rules.
Even if Feliciano was amenable to the amount requested or that the money was given voluntarily,
such would not absolve respondent sheriff from liability because of his failure to secure the
court’s prior approval.
In Bernabe v. Eguia that acceptance of any other amount is improper, even if it were to be
applied for lawful purposes. Good faith on the part of the sheriff, or lack of it, in proceeding to
properly execute its mandate would be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge
that being the officer of the court tasked therefore, it behooves him to make due compliances.
The rules on sheriff’s expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts. A
sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the
proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount
received in violation of Section 10,Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees.
Page 327 of 370

In the implementation of writs, sheriffs are mandated to follow the procedure under
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules, which reads:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution shall be returnable to the
court issuing itimmediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. Ifthe judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in
full, or its effectively expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties. Respondent sheriff would want us to believe that his failure to implement the writ was
brought about by circumstances beyond his control. He maintained that the defendants were
adamant in staying in the subject property. Thus, he had to seek police assistance which he
obtained only after several months of waiting. Respondent sheriff further alleged that he
thereafter waited for Feliciano to appear before him so that he could proceed with the
implementation of the writ.
We have previously ruled that failure of the sheriff to carry out what is a purely ministerial
duty, to follow well-established rules in the implementation of court orders and writs, to
promptly undertake the execution ofjudgments, and to accomplish the required periodic reports,
constitute gross neglect and gross inefficiency in the performance of official duties. Records reveal
that this is not the first offense of respondent sheriff. In A.M. No. P-07-2370 dated 14 September
2007, he was suspended by the Court for one (1) month for dereliction of duty. Records further
reveal that another charge of neglect of duty (OCA IPI No. 12-3880-P) is pending before the Legal
Office, OCA. It is evident that he never learned from his previous infraction. Having tarnished the
good image of the judiciary, he should not be allowed to stay a minute longer in the service.
ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and

BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014, J. Mendoza
According to Judge Quinagoran, the June 9, 2011 order of arrest failed to state a bail bond
because Magleo jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June 8, 2011. The Court finds
this acceptable because when an accused fails to appear in person as required, the bond shall be
declared forfeited. Also, it is not required by the Rules of Court that the amount of new bail bond be
stated in the bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise Judge Quinagoran for an act not required by
the Rules. Absent any abuse of discretion, it is sufficient that the bail bond was fixed after Magleo
was arrested. Such would be the proper time for the judge to consider whether to increase, decrease
or retain the amount of bail based on the guidelines. Magleo also claims that Clerk of Court Atty.
Laura and some court personnel were disrespectful in conversing with her bondsman, her son, and
her lawyer. While the allegations of Magleo were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with
the respondents that disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and even
considered "justified remarks." The respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should be
reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the kind of conduct, official or otherwise,
which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the lowliest clerk.
Page 328 of 370

Facts:
Magleo is the accused in the criminal case of estafa. She averred that in an Order, dated
May 13, 2010, Judge Manalo granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her of the charge of
estafa. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit Judge Manalo from the case which was
later re-raffled to Branch 166, RTC, presided over by respondent Judge Quinagoran. Magleo avers
that, instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground of double jeopardy, respondent Judge
Quinagoran through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the order of acquittal and
set the case for reception of defense evidence on February 23, 2011. Magleo asserts that the
November 4, 2010 and February2, 2011 orders Judge Quinagoran were indicative of her gross
partiality and lack of knowledge of the existing laws and jurisprudence, violating Magleo’s right
against double jeopardy.
She further stated that she did not receive a notice of hearing for June 8, 2011. Despite such
omission, Judge Quinagoran still issued a warrant of arrest on June 9, 2011. She was surprised
when agents of NBI forcibly arrested her. She added that while on her way to the NBI office, a lady
agent called the personnel of Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, to inquire on the amount of Magleo’s
bail, but the personnel said that there was no bail indicated. The personnel was said to be
reluctant in giving any information and asked, "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya."
She claimed that on the same day, she instructed her bondsman to proceed to Branch 166 to
inquire about the proper amount of bail. Respondent Clerk of Court Atty. Laura and the staff,
however, treated the bondsman with hostility, annoyance and indifference.
The next day, Magleo’s son and her lawyer talked to Judge Quinagoran and the latter
agreed to fix the amount of bail at P40,000.00. Judge Quinagoran, however, initially refused to
sign the order and advised them to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest. Magleo averred that
when her son inquired why the same was not signed, the court secretary arrogantly said, "Huwag
mo na ako tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge makikipagtalo ka pa e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka
namang magagawa." Thereafter, upon filing of an ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, Judge
Quinagoran granted the same and Magleo was released from NBI. To aggravate her ordeal, police
officers proceeded to Magleo’s house on June 27, 2011 to enforce a new the warrant of arrest, but
her counsel sent an e-mail to the arresting officer, furnishing him a copy of the order lifting the
order of arrest. Magleo avers that these acts show how cruel, ignorant and unorganized Judge
Quinagoran is in running her office. It would also show that respondent clerk of court Atty. Laura
and the court staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton disregard of respect.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Quinagoran committed transgressions in the performance of her

duties warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties.
Ruling:
No.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for not serving the Notice of Hearing
Page 329 of 370

Magleo asserts that she did not receive the February 23, 2011 Constancia and, for said
reason, she was not able to attend the June 8, 2011 hearing. The respondents, however, were able
to submit numerous documentary proofs stating that Magleo indeed received the notice of
hearing, to wit: (1) Certified true copy of the subject Constancia, dated February 23, 2011; together
with the two return cards pasted on the back thereof; (3) the certified true copy of the court
calendar for June 8, 2011; and (4) the Post Office Certification that Magleoand her counsel were
notified about the said hearing date. Between the bare allegations of Magleo that she did not
receive the Constancia and the substantiated claim of the respondents that the notices were
served, the Court tends to believe the latter. Thus, Magleo has no acceptable excuse to be absent
on the June 8, 2011 hearing. Her failure to attend now seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore
such important trial date and the consequences of her absence are attributable to her alone.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing a Bench Warrant
As a consequence of failing to attend the trial when so required, a bench warrant was
issued against Magleo. A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly by a judge to a law-
enforcement officer, especially for the arrest of a person who has been held in contempt, has
disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appear for a hearing or trial. Jurisprudence dictates that the
primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent-party was duly
informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so. As stated above, Magleo was
undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but she failed to attend.
Magleo also averred that Judge Quinagoran committed erroneous conduct (1) when she
issued a bench warrant without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2) for not motu
proprio lifting the bail bond when Magleo’s son and lawyer showed their willingness to apply for
bail. According to Judge Quinagoran, the June 9, 2011 order of arrest failed to state a bail bond
because Magleo jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June 8, 2011. The Court
finds this acceptable because when an accused fails to appear in person as required, the bond
shall be declared forfeited. Also, it is not required by the Rules of Court that the amount of new
bail bond be stated in the bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise Judge Quinagoran for an act
not required by the Rules. Absent any abuse of discretion, it is sufficient that the bail bond was
fixed after Magleo was arrested. Such would be the proper time for the judge to consider whether
to increase, decrease or retain the amount of bail based on the guidelines.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the
bench warrant once the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision
to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court governs such that a motion must be filed
to seek affirmative relief. In the present case, Judge Quinagoran acted within the scope of her
authority when she required Magleo’s son and lawyer to file an ex parte motion to lift the order of
arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did not express any objection, Judge
Quinagoran deemed it fit to impose the same amount of bail at P40,000.00. Judge Quinagoran
immediately entertained Magleo’s son and lawyer when they came to her branch despite her
scheduled hearing and as a result, Magleo was released on that same day.
Claim of Performing Acts Unbecoming of a Judge and Court Personnel due to the court
personnel’s discourtesy
Page 330 of 370

Magleo claims that Clerk of Court Atty. Laura and some court personnel were
disrespectful in conversing with her bondsman, her son, and her lawyer. While the allegations of
Magleo were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with the respondents that disrespectful
remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and even considered "justified remarks."
The respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should be reminded that the image of
the Judiciary is mirrored in the kind of conduct, official or otherwise, which the personnel within
its employ display, from the judge to the lowliest clerk. Impolite language and improper tone
should be avoided. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right
conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are required to
preserve the Judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice. For such improper
remarks, the respondents and their court personnel are admonished.
NOVO A. LUCAS vs. ROLANDO A. DIZON, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija
A.M. No. P-12-3076 (Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 11-3612-P), November 18, 2014 
The failure of the sheriff to carry out what was a purely ministerial duty, to follow well-
established rules in the implementation of court orders and writs, to promptly undertake the
execution of judgments, and to accomplish the required periodic reports constituted gross neglect
and gross inefficiency in the performance of official duties.
Facts:
February 2011, Novo A. Lucas charged Sheriff IV Rolando A. Dizon with serious neglect of
duty and violation of R.A. 3019, for delaying the implementation of the Writ of Execution issued
by the MTC of Sto. Domingo in a case for collection of sum of money against Francisco Pascual.
Lucas then averred that he was being manipulated by Sheriff Dizon for money, or native chicken,
or vegetables, or a goat in numerous occasions for him to pursue the execution against said
Pascual, obviously, requesting favors for him to start with the execution.
In his Comment, Sheriff Dizon denied the accusations against him. Said sheriff insisted
that the delay in the implementation of the writ was attributable to Lucas as the latter never
returned after making arrangements with Pascual. A day or two after filing the partial return with
the MTC, complainant arrived, together with two other persons on board a tricycle, demanding to
immediately proceed to the house of Pascual to seize the latter’s truck since the commitment to
pay the judgment debt was not honored. Sheriff Dizon allegedly begged complainant to come
back the next day as he was ill and because the weather was bad. Sheriff Dizon also denied asking
for any amount of money, or native chicken, or vegetables, or goat from Lucas.
In his Reply, Lucas denied that said sheriff explained to him the procedure for the
implementation of the writ; that he knew for a fact that personal properties of Pascual could be
seized as he believed all along that he would be getting cash; that there was an arrangement he
made with Pascual; and that the real reason why they did not proceed to Pascual’s house was
Sheriff Dizon’s refusal to ride in a tricycle. Finally, Lucas cited Sheriff Dizon’s failure to file a
return with the court within the period prescribed by Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In its Resolution, the Court resolved to refer the administrative matter to Executive Judge Nelson
A. Tribiana for investigation, report and recommendation.
Page 331 of 370

In his report, Judge Tribiana find that there was neglect in the duty of Sheriff Dizon stated
that the full implementation and satisfaction of the writ was made only on December 2012 or
more than two years since it was assigned to respondent in September 2010; that Sheriff Dizon
deliberately neglected and refused to perform a mandated duty; and that the reasons offered by
Sheriff Dizon were not worthy of consideration. Regarding the allegation of corruption, Judge
Tribiana found no evidence to support it because Lucas declined to substantiate his claims. For
said reason, Judge Tribiana recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of dismissal
from service for gross neglect of duty.
In its July 2013 Resolution, the Court noted the investigation, report and recommendation
of Judge Tribiana. Thereafter, the Court referred the administrative matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its report, the OCA followed the report of Judge Tribiana, finding the Sheriff with gross
neglect of duty and the recommendation of dismissal from service as this serves as his second
offense. The OCA also agreed with Investigating Judge Tribiana that there was no sufficient
evidence to support the charge of violation of R.A. 3019 against Sheriff Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not there delay in the implementation of the Writ of Execution for two years
is constitutes gross neglect of duty.
Ruling:
Yes, such constitutes gross neglect of duty.
In Proserpina V. Anico vs. Emerson B. Pilipiña, it was held that the failure of the sheriff to
carry out what was a purely ministerial duty, to follow well-established rules in the
implementation of court orders and writs, to promptly undertake the execution of judgments, and
to accomplish the required periodic reports constituted gross neglect and gross inefficiency in the
performance of official duties.
In this case, Sheriff Dizon is charged for failing to perform his ministerial functions in the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in favor of complainant. In this regard, the Court
agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent’s omissions clearly qualify as gross
neglect of duty.
Respondent’s indifference became more apparent when he reasoned out during the
investigation that the "execution" of a judgment expires only after a period of five years.
Obviously, Sheriff Dizon had not only been negligent, but also ignorant of the very rules
pertaining to his office. He ought to know that the five-year limitation is the period allowed by
the Rules for a party to move for the issuance of a writ and not a period within which the sheriff
may complete his task of implementing a writ.
Lastly, respondent utterly failed to make periodic reports, thus, depriving the court of the
opportunity to know and ensure the speedy execution of its decision. Hence, for the infractions
committed, respondent should be meted out the penalty of dismissal from service with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
Page 332 of 370

government-owned or controlled corporations.
ANGELITO P. MIRANDA vs. MA. THERESA M. FERNANDEZ, CLERK III, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. P-14-3270, November 18, 2014, Per curiam
The blocking of the ATM card she surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new
ATM card from the LBP to avoid payment of her indebtedness constitute dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee. As an employee of the judiciary, Fernandez is held to the highest
ethical standards to preserve the integrity of the courts. These standards include the moral and legal
duty to settle contractual obligations when they become due. She has demonstrated her unfitness to
be in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal from the service.
Facts:
A complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which it dismissed and
referred to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action since it involves a court employee.
Angelito Miranda (Miranda) acts as an agent of money lenders Manuel Miranda and
Josephine Cabusao (creditors). Then, Ma. Theresa Fernandez (Fernandez) obtained a loan payable
in equal installments every 15th and 30th day of the month until fully paid from the creditors,
through Miranda which was evidenced by an Agreement between Fernandez and her creditors.
Thus, as security for the loan, Fernandez surrendered her ATM Card to her creditors to allow
them to withdraw the amount every payday from her salaries deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Then, Fernandez’s creditors went to the bank to collect the amount due from her bank
account and when the ATM card was inserted into the machine, it was retained by the ATM
machine with the advisory receipt stating "Invalid Card." This happened because Fernandez had
blocked her ATM card to prevent withdrawals by her creditors. It appeared Fernandez reported to
the LBP that she had lost her ATM card. The report enabled her to withdraw her salary over the
counter and led to the issuance of a new ATM card in her favor.
A day after discovery of the fraud, the complainant sent Fernandez a demand letter which
she ignored. She continuously failed to comply with her undertaking. The complainant, acting as
the representative of the creditors under a Special Power of Attorney filed the present
administrative complaint against Fernandez.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernandez is guilty of gross misconduct, insubordination and dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes, Fernandez is guilty.
Page 333 of 370

To guaranty the monthly payments due on Fernandez’s loan, the she surrendered her
ATM card to her creditors to allow the latter to withdraw her payments from her salary. However,
when the payments became due, Miranda could not withdraw from Fernandez’s account because
the ATM machine "swallowed" and retained the ATM card. The ATM machine released an
advisory receipt stating "Invalid Card."
Fernandez made false representations to the LBP declaring that she lost her ATM card so
she could directly withdraw her salary over the bank’s counter and cause the issuance of a new
ATM card in her favor. She did this in violation of her undertaking that she will not block her
ATM card to avoid withdrawal by her creditors of the amounts due on her loan. The blocking of
the ATM card she surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new ATM card from the
LBP to avoid payment of her indebtedness constitute dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
court employee.
Fernandez has failed to file her comment on the letter complaint despite receipt of the
two (2) directives sent to her and the show cause resolution. Fernandez’s failure to comply with
the Court’s directives constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, or an unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer; misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, as established
by substantial evidence.
It is clear that Fernandez is guilty of the offenses charged. As an employee of the judiciary,
Fernandez is held to the highest ethical standards to preserve the integrity of the courts. These
standards include the moral and legal duty to settle contractual obligations when they become
due. The Court finds Fernandez separately liable for three administrative offenses of willful failure
to pay just debts, gross misconduct and insubordination and dishonesty. She has demonstrated
her unfitness to be in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal from the service.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. MRS. AURORA T. ZUNIGA, CLERK OF

COURT II, MRS. MINDA H. CERVANTES, STENOGRAPHER 1, both of MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT (MTC) VIRAC, CATANDUANES, and MR. PEPITO F. LUCERO, INTERPRETER III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 43, VIRAC, CATANDUANES
A.M. No. P-10-2800, November 18, 2014
Delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this
omission deprives the court of interest that may be earned if the amounts were to be deposited in the
authorized depository bank. SC Circular No. 13-92 requires clerks of court to withdraw interest
earned on deposits and to remit the same to the account of the JDF within two weeks after the end of
each quarter. Delay in the remittance of court’s funds casts a serious doubt on the concerned court
employee’s trustworthiness and integrity.
Facts:
State Auditor Madeleine S. Rivera of the Commission on Audit (COA) for the period from
August 21, 2003 to June19, 2007 found fund shortages in the books of account of the MTC of Virac,
Catanduanes. Specifically, the financial audit team examined the books of account of the MTC
covering the period from March 1985 to March 2008, under the following accountable officers:
Mrs. Aurora T. Zuñiga (respondent), Mrs. Paz T. Tacorda (Tacorda), Mrs. Minda H. Cervantes
Page 334 of 370

(Cervantes), Mr. Pepito F. Lucero (Lucero), Mr. Garibaldi L. Sarmiento (Sarmiento), and Ms.
Sonia T. Bagadiong (Bagadiong).
Having determined their respective shortages, the audit team then ordered: 1) Tacorda
deposit his shortage; 2) Lucero to restitute his respective shortage and explain in writing why he
should not be administratively dealt with for failure to deposit his collections to their respective
fund bank accounts, which is contrary of the circulars issued by the Court in the proper handling
of Judiciary Funds; 3) to clear Bagadiong and Sarmiento from any liability during their terms for
their books of account are in order; 4) Cervantes to restitute her incurred shortage on the
Juniciary Fund, explain in writing why she failed to deposit her collections and explpain in writing
why she should not be administratively dealt with for failure to deposit big/substantial portion of
her collections on Fiduciary Fund to its fund bank account; and 5) Respondent Zuñiga to restitute
numerous funds from different allocations, transmit to the Court through the Fiscal Monitoring
Division, Court Management Office all the documents to support the validity and authenticity of
the withdrawals/refund of cash bonds as enumerated in the attached list of Fiduciary Collections
from June 1992 to August 1995, explain in writing why she should not be administratively dealt
with for failure to report and deposit the following collections in their corresponding fund bank
accounts, a clear violation of the circulars and other issuances of the Court on the proper
handling of Judiciary collections, and explain in writing why during the period of accountability of
Mr. Garibaldi L. Sarmiento as an accountable officer from November 2006 to July 2007, she was
collecting legal fees accruing to Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund without the knowledge of Mr. Sarmiento and the fees collected were not reported
and deposited.
Sometime in 2010, through two letters Zuñiga claimed that she had already complied with
the Court’s directive of January 2009. She averred that, on July 2007, she personally handed over
to the presiding judge Santiago-Ubalde, the funds to be restituted. In the meantime, Judge
Santiago-Ubalde, in a letter, dated September 2010, informed the Court that Zuñiga already
received the suspension order on August 2010, but she still had not made any restitution as
directed. In her letter, Zuñiga echoed her plea for the lifting of her suspension insisting that she
had already complied with the court’s directive to restitute her shortages.
In the resolution, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) it cleared all administrative
matters with the other accused and OCA requested additional time of 60 days to fully evaluate
the letters and documents that Zuñiga submitted. In its report, the OCA stated that most of the
documents that Zuñiga presented were already tagged as valid withdrawals; thus, her
unaccounted withdrawals had only been reduced. The OCA also clarified that the money she
returned was already credited in the audit report. The office then recommended that Zuñiga be
guilty of dishonesty and she be dismissed from service.
Issue:
Whether or not such recommendation by the OCA was correct.
Ruling:
Yes, such recommendation is correct.
SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93, as integrated in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court, provide the guidelines for the accounting of court funds. All fiduciary collections upon
Page 335 of 370

receipt shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned with an authorized
government depository bank.
Furthermore, Section B(4) of Circular No. 50-95 directs that all collections from bailbonds,
rental deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited with the LBP within 24 hours by
the Clerk of Court concerned as instructed in Circular No. 13-92.
Zuñiga, as Clerk of Court, was entrusted with the delicate functions of collecting legal fees.
She acted as cashier and disbursement officer of the court and was tasked to collect and receive
all monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and dues, and controls the disbursement of the same.
She was also designated as custodian of the court’s funds and revenues, records, properties and
premises, and should be liable for any loss or shortage thereof.
Zuñiga, however, failed to properly account for her Fiduciary Fund collections and to
judiciously deposit the same with the Land Bank within 24 hours upon receipt. She was also
unable to explain the shortage from her July 2007 to March 2008 transactions. Moreover, she
failed to provide proper documentation to completely support the cash bond withdrawals
spanning from June 1992 to December 1995 which she claimed to have been refunded to
bondsmen/litigants. Clearly, Zuñiga’s unorganized method of managing and documenting the
cash collections allocated for the JDF was a serious violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-93.
More importantly, delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty
because this omission deprives the court of interest that may be earned if the amounts were to be
deposited in the authorized depository bank. SC Circular No. 13-92 requires clerks of court to
withdraw interest earned on deposits and to remit the same to the account of the JDF within two
weeks after the end of each quarter. Delay in the remittance of court’s funds casts a serious doubt
on the concerned court employee’s trustworthiness and integrity.
It need not be over emphasized that court personnel tasked with collections of court
funds, such as the clerk of court and cash clerks, should deposit immediately with the authorized
government depositories the various funds they had collected. Being the custodian of court funds
and revenues, Zuñiga had the primary responsibility to immediately deposit the funds received by
her office with the authorized government depositories and not to keep the same in her custody.
The Court cannot accept Zuñiga’s argument that she already made the appropriate restitution
because it was not supported by evidence. Zuñiga posits that she personally gave the money to
her presiding judge to answer for her accountabilities on July 2007, but it was only in 2008 that
the financial audit team examined her books of account.
ANGELITO P. MIRANDA vs. MA. THERESA M. FERNANDEZ, CLERK III, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. P-14-3270, November 18, 2014, Per curiam
The blocking of the ATM card she surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new
ATM card from the LBP to avoid payment of her indebtedness constitute dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee. As an employee of the judiciary, Fernandez is held to the highest
ethical standards to preserve the integrity of the courts. These standards include the moral and legal
duty to settle contractual obligations when they become due. She has demonstrated her unfitness to
be in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal from the service.
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Facts:
A complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which it dismissed and
referred to this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate
action since it involves a court employee.
Angelito Miranda (Miranda) acts as an agent of money lenders Manuel Miranda and
Josephine Cabusao (creditors). Then, Ma. Theresa Fernandez (Fernandez) obtained a loan payable
in equal installments every 15th and 30th day of the month until fully paid from the creditors,
through Miranda which was evidenced by an Agreement between Fernandez and her creditors.
Thus, as security for the loan, Fernandez surrendered her ATM Card to her creditors to allow
them to withdraw the amount every payday from her salaries deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Then, Fernandez’s creditors went to the bank to collect the amount due from her bank
account and when the ATM card was inserted into the machine, it was retained by the ATM
machine with the advisory receipt stating "Invalid Card." This happened because Fernandez had
blocked her ATM card to prevent withdrawals by her creditors. It appeared Fernandez reported to
the LBP that she had lost her ATM card. The report enabled her to withdraw her salary over the
counter and led to the issuance of a new ATM card in her favor.
A day after discovery of the fraud, the complainant sent Fernandez a demand letter which
she ignored. She continuously failed to comply with her undertaking. The complainant, acting as
the representative of the creditors under a Special Power of Attorney filed the present
administrative complaint against Fernandez.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernandez is guilty of gross misconduct, insubordination and dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes, Fernandez is guilty.
To guaranty the monthly payments due on Fernandez’s loan, the she surrendered her
ATM card to her creditors to allow the latter to withdraw her payments from her salary. However,
when the payments became due, Miranda could not withdraw from Fernandez’s account because
the ATM machine "swallowed" and retained the ATM card. The ATM machine released an
advisory receipt stating "Invalid Card."
Fernandez made false representations to the LBP declaring that she lost her ATM card so
she could directly withdraw her salary over the bank’s counter and cause the issuance of a new
ATM card in her favor. She did this in violation of her undertaking that she will not block her
ATM card to avoid withdrawal by her creditors of the amounts due on her loan. The blocking of
the ATM card she surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new ATM card from the
LBP to avoid payment of her indebtedness constitute dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
court employee.
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Fernandez has failed to file her comment on the letter complaint despite receipt of the
two (2) directives sent to her and the show cause resolution. Fernandez’s failure to comply with
the Court’s directives constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, or an unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer; misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, as established
by substantial evidence.
It is clear that Fernandez is guilty of the offenses charged. As an employee of the judiciary,
Fernandez is held to the highest ethical standards to preserve the integrity of the courts. These
standards include the moral and legal duty to settle contractual obligations when they become
due. The Court finds Fernandez separately liable for three administrative offenses of willful failure
to pay just debts, gross misconduct and insubordination and dishonesty. She has demonstrated
her unfitness to be in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal from the service.
ELLA M. BARTOLOME vs. ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE
A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014, Per Curiam
As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is expected
of the respondent at all time, one should be the personification of the principle that public office is a
public trust. By soliciting money from the complainant, she committed a crime and an act of serious
impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the people’s
confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the impression that decision can
be bought and sold.
Facts:
On December 16, 2009 Ella Bartoleme filed against Rosalie Maranan an administrative
case for extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee. The Bartolome alleged that the Maranan asked money from her in the amount
of P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for
annulment of marriage. She further alleged that Maranan undertook to have the case decided in
her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. Thus, to put
an end to Maranan’s extortion activities, Bartoleme decided to report the matter to the police
authorities. During the entrapment operation, Maranan was apprehended inside the premises of
the RTC of Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from Bartolome.
The Court required Bartolome to comment on the complaint against her and she denied
the accusations against her. She alleged her belief that Bartolome is a fictitious person as the
affidavit-complaint does not indicate its exact address. She asserted that her detention at Imus
Police Station does not prove her culpability since no actual criminal charges were filed against
her.
After, the OCA, submitted its Report to the Court, finding enough evidence to prove
Maranan’s involvement in anomalous activities and recommending that the respondent be
immediately DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except her
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accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from employment in any government
agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned and controlled corporations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Maranan is guilty and should be dismissed from the service
Ruling:
Yes, Maranan is guilty.
Maranan’s bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting Bartolome’s accusation
that she demanded money on the promise that she would facilitate the annulment of the latter’s
marriage. The respondent’s actions from the time the petitioner started communicating with her
and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until the entrapment
operation, showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The respondent’s text messages sent
to the complainant corroborate that she promised to expedite – in exchange for a monetary
consideration and that she would provide the lawyer who would file the annulment case.
The Court totally agrees with the OCA’s finding that Maranan is guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Maranan’s assertion that
Bartolome is a fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her exact
address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal and text message contacts
between them. In the absence of supporting evidence, the claim that the complaint against her is
pure and simple harassment orchestrated by persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural
allegation.
As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is
expected of the respondent at all times. She should be the personification of the principle that
public office is a public trust. Maranan unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that
should have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the complainant, she
committed a crime and an act of serious impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the
judiciary and deeply affected the people’s confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of
the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants,
thereby creating the impression that decision can be bought and sold.
MARCIDITO A. MIRANDA vs. ERNESTO G. RAYMUNDO, JR., Sheriff III, Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 74, Taguig City
A.M. No. P-13-3163, December 1, 2014, J. Peralta
Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with
utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.
As agents of the law, high standards are expected of sheriffs. For failing to satisfactorily implement
the writ, Raymundo displayed conduct short of the stringent standards required of court employees.
He is guilty of simple neglect of duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give attention
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to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.
Facts:
Marcidito A. Miranda (Miranda) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against defendant
Joel Pido. After due proceedings, the MeTC, Branch 74, Taguig City, rendered a Decision in favor
of the Miranda.
Miranda, as plaintiff therein, then filed a motion for execution which was granted by the
trial court. Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued by the trial court on December 7, 2007.
Herein respondent (Raymundo) was the Sheriff assigned to implement the writ of execution. In
his Sheriff's Return dated February 8, 2008, Raymundo informed the trial court that despite the
service of the writ to the defendant, the latter and all persons claiming rights under him, are still
occupying the subject premises and refused to vacate the same. Miranda alleged that on October
21, 2008, Raymundo, after having received the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00)
from him, returned to the subject property to enforce the writ. However, the wife of defendant
Pido pleaded that they be allowed to stay in the subject premises until October 26, 2008. When
the occupants failed to vacate the subject property on the agreed date, Miranda approached
Raymundo to seek the writ's enforcement anew. However, Miranda was taken by surprise when
Raymundo asked for another Six Thousand Pesos (PhP6,000.00). Since Miranda could not
produce the amount requested by the Raymundo, the writ was not implemented anew.
On July 23, 2010, Miranda filed a Motion to Issue an Alias Writ of Execution, which the
trial court granted on January 27, 2011. Accordingly, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued on
February 4, 2011. Miranda averred that he was assured by Raymundo that the writ would be
implemented on March 4, 2011, but the date passed without any affirmative action from the latter.
In his Sheriff's Return dated March 25, 2011, Raymundo again informed the court that defendant
Pido refused to vacate the property and padlocked the front door of their residence to avoid the
implementation of the said writ.
Due to the foregoing, on February 10, 2012, Miranda filed an Ex Parte Motion to Break
Open with Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted by the trial court
on March 23, 2012. Miranda alleged that Raymundo again failed to enforce the directives of the
trial court, citing this time the absence of police officers and barangay officers. With the repeated
and inexcusable failure of Raymundo to implement the writ, Miranda decided to institute the
present administrative complaint.
On April 23, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed the Raymundo to
comment on the complaint. In his Comment, Raymundo denied the allegations that he received
money from the Miranda and that he refused to enforce the writ issued by the trial court. On
September 12, 2013, the OCA recommended that Raymundo be found guilty of simple neglect of
duty.
Issue:
Whether or not the conclusion of the OCA that Raymundo is guilty of simple neglect of
duty for his failure to enforce the writ of execution issued by the trial court is correct.
Page 340 of 370

Ruling:
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the OCA that respondent is guilty of simple
neglect of duty for his failure to enforce the writ of execution issued by the trial court.
Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution
with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate.
Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not
unduly delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily
as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of sheriffs.
In the present case, the non-implementation of the writ of execution is undisputed. It is

clear that despite the trial court's numerous directives to the Raymundo to implement the writ,
the same remained unimplemented for more than four (4) years. In his Comment submitted
before the OCA, Raymundo failed to offer any credible explanation as to why he has not enforced
the writ all these years. There is no evidence presented to show that he exerted earnest efforts to
implement the writ.
For failing to satisfactorily implement the writ, Raymundo displayed conduct short of the
stringent standards required of court employees. He is guilty of simple neglect of duty which is
defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
MARIVIC C. VITOR vs. CAROLINE GRACE ZAFRA, COURT STENOGRAPHER II,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY
A.M. No. P-11-2917, December 2, 2014
Under the Uniform Rules, willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense with
the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one to 30 days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. With respondent Zafra’s indebtedness having
been adjudicated with finality by a court of law, her liability under the law is undisputed. Since she
committed the offense for the first time, the appropriate penalty is reprimand. However, the
conviction of Zafra of criminal offenses requires the imposition of higher penalties. It is clear,
therefore, that Zafra should be dismissed from the service for having been convicted by final
judgment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 violations. Verily, her criminal convictions evinced her absolute
unfitness and unworthiness to remain in the service of the Judiciary, a department of the
Government that demands from its officers and employees the highest degree of integrity and
reputation.
Facts:
The complaint-affidavit dated July 31, 2006 filed by Marivic C. Vitor (Vitor) charged
respondent Caroline Grace Zafra (Zafra) with conduct unbecoming of a court personnel for the
latter’s failure to pay the amount of P37,500.00 she had owed to the former. Vitor averred that
Zafra had issued to her six postdated checks as payment of her loan; that the checks had bounced
upon being deposited for the reason that the account had been closed; and that Zafra had then
Page 341 of 370

ignored her repeated demands to pay the amounts of the checks, thereby forcing her to bring her
criminal complaint against Zafra for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
In due course, the Court directed Zafra, a Court Stenographer II of Branch 71 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasig City (MeTC), to comment on the complaint-affidavit of
Vitor. But she did not file her comment. The Court instructed her to show cause why she should
not be held in contempt of court for failing to file the comment on the complaint-affidavit and to
submit the required comment, both within 10 days from notice. However, Presiding Judge Maria
Gracia A. Cadiz-Casaclang of the MeTC informed the Court that the resolution could not be
served because Zafra had stopped reporting for work, and the MeTC did not have any confirmed
information as to her current address.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. Thus, the Court reminded Zafra to
file her comment on the complaint-affidavit within 10 days from notice; otherwise, the complaint-
affidavit would be deemed submitted for resolution without her comment.
The Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA, but still directed Zafra to file her
comment on the complaint-affidavit within 10 days from notice, warning her yet again that should
she fail to file the comment the complaint-affidavit would be resolved without the comment.
Zafra communicated with the Court only 10 months later through an undated handwritten
letter requesting a copy of the complaint-affidavit of Vitor. It is shown on the lower left corner of
the letter that Zafra affixed her signature thereon to acknowledge receiving a copy of the
complaint-affidavit.
Despite her receipt of the copy of the complaint-affidavit, Zafra did not submit her
comment. Accordingly, the Court still directed Zafra to show cause why she should not be held in
contempt of court for such failure, and to comply with the resolution. The Court reiterated these
directives. Although it did not receive any communication from Zafra afterwards, the Court
deemed her to have been properly notified of the charge, and considered her to have waived her
right to comment by virtue of her silence. Hence, the Court deemed the charge submitted for
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Zafra was guilty of the administrative charge of willful failure to pay just
debts.
Ruling:
Zafra was guilty of the administrative charge of willful failure to pay just debts. The
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Services defines "just debts" as those (1) claims
adjudicated by a court of law, or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by
the debtor. Under the Uniform Rules, willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense
with the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one to 30 days
for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. With her indebtedness having been
adjudicated with finality by a court of law, her liability under the law is undisputed. Since she
committed the offense for the first time, the appropriate penalty is reprimand. However, the
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conviction of Zafra of criminal offenses requires the imposition of higher penalties. This is
particularly so here, considering that Court has already classified and characterized the violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a crime involving moral turpitude.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, a conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disciplinary action. In that regard, the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service states that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude isa grave
offense and upon the first offense, the penalty of dismissal must be meted out. It is clear,
therefore, that Zafra should be dismissed from the service for having been convicted by final
judgment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 violations. Verily, her criminal convictions evinced her
absolute unfitness and unworthiness to remain in the service of the Judiciary, a department of the
Government that demands from its officers and employees the highest degree of integrity and
reputation.
FELISICIMO* R. SABIJON and ZENAIDA A. SABIJON vs. BENEDICT** M. DE JUAN,

SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KABACAN, NORTH COT ABATO, BRANCH22
A.M. No. P-14-3281, January 8, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers
of the court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a
high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the
procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action, which
may be deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or even Grave Abuse of Authority. In this case,
respondent, as a Sheriff, failed to follow the Rules in executing the judgment in Civil Case No. 345
and in the disposition of the subject truck therefore warranting disciplinary measures.
Facts:
In their Joint Affidavit-Complaint, complainants alleged that on May 19, 2007, Felisicimo
and P02 Recto Aquino (P02 Aquino) figured in a vehicular accident whereby the former's Isuzu Elf
Truck with Plate No. GJY-476 (subject truck), which complainants used for their livelihood, hit
P02 Aquino's van from behind. Due to their failure to settle, P02 Aquino filed a civil case for
damages and attorney’s fees against Felisicimo and a certain Roger Saso, as driver/owners of the
subject truck” docketed as Civil Case No. 345, before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
MlangMatalam, Mlang, Cotabato (MCTC).
Thereafter, or on December 8, 2011, respondent and PO2 Aquino went to complainants’

residence and, on the strength of the Writ of Execution2 dated June 14, 2011 (subject writ),
allegedly forcibly took away the subject truck. In this regard, complainants surmised that
respondent committed irregularities in executing the judgment in Civil Case No. 345 and in the
disposition of the subject truck, claiming that: (a) they were not furnished a Notice of Sheriff’s
Sale anent the subject truck; (b) assuming an auction sale indeed took place, respondent never
gave them the excess of the proceeds, considering that the value of the subject truck was
significantly higher than their judgment debt which was less than 80,000.00; (c) respondent and
PO2 Aquino connived in not selling the subject truck at public auction and instead, appropriated
the same for their personal benefit, causing damage and prejudice to complainants; and (d)
Zenaida personally saw the subject truck being driven by a person other than PO2 Aquino.
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In his defense, Sheriff De Juan vehemently denied the accusations against him and
invoked good faith in the performance of his duties. He maintained that he was merely enforcing
the subject writ.
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 11, 2014, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found Sheriff De Juan administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority
and Simple Neglect of Duty, mitigated by the fact that it was his first offense in his more than 19
years of service, and accordingly, meted him the penalty of fine in the amount of 10,000.00
payable within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Court’s Resolution, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not De Juan should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of
Authority (otherwise referred to as Oppression) and Simple Neglect of Duty.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Sheriffs, like respondent being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must
discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing writs, as well as
processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper
dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as
agents of the law, high standards are expected of them. They should always hold inviolate and
invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In this light, sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their
functions as officers of the court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should
at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act
deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants
disciplinary action, which may be deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or even Grave Abuse of
Authority.
Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to
a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand,
Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or
other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
In this case, respondent, as a Sheriff, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9 Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay all or part of the
judgment debt, is given the option to choose which among his properties or a part thereof may be
levied upon.
Moreover, respondent should have known that under Section 14 of the same Rule, he is
required to make a return on the writ of execution and make periodic reports on the execution
Page 344 of 370

proceedings until either the full satisfaction of the judgment or the expiration of the writ’s
effectivity, as well as to furnish the parties copies of such return and periodic reports. Contrary to
the aforesaid provisions and as correctly pointed out by the OCA, there was no showing that
complainants manifested that: (a) they were unable to settle their judgment debt through cash,
certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment creditor, PO2
Aquino; and (b) they chose the subject truck to be levied upon for the payment of their judgment
debt. Instead, respondent immediately levied upon the subject truck without regard to
complainants’ pleas not to do so, since they were using the subject truck for their livelihood.
Indeed, respondents’ brazen act not only deprived complainants of the option given to them by
the Rules on Execution but also caused undue prejudice to them since they were using the subject
truck for livelihood purposes. Worse, respondent himself admitted that he failed to make a return
on the writ and to make periodic reports on the execution process, thus, putting into serious
doubt that an auction sale involving the subject truck was actually conducted. Irrefragably, the
OCA correctly concluded that respondent’s foregoing acts constitute Grave Abuse of Authority
and Simple Neglect of Duty.
CONCHITA S. BAHALA vs. CIRILO DUCA, SHERIFF III, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
A.M. No. P-08-2465, January 12, 2015, J. Bersamin
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires a sheriff implementing a writ of execution
(1) to make and submit a return to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the
judgment; and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court within 30
days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. In the case at bar,
without filing his return on the writ, Sheriff Duca served a notice of auction sale, stating an amount
as the rentals-in-arrears due and demandable. The amount was allegedly his erroneous computation
of the rentals-in-arrears due because it was not based on the decision of the RTC. Sheriff Duca is
guilty of simple misconduct.
Facts:
The MTCC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 98-July-817 that was adverse to
Bahala. Pending appeal, RTC rendered a judgment on the compromise agreement of the
parties, pursuant to which Bahala paid the balance of the money judgment, remained in the
premises during the agreed extension of two years, and paid her monthly rentals. By the end of
the two-year extension, she offered to sell the building standing on the property that she had
supposedly built in good faith. Not wanting to pay for the building, the plaintiff opted to execute
the judgment. Sheriff Duca served the writ of execution, but demanded P2,000.00 from her in
order to delay its implementation. She delivered the amount demanded on a Saturday at the Hall
of Justice in the company of her friend, Helen Peligro. Bahala averred, too, that Sheriff Duca had
served the writ on her more than 10 times, and that she had given him either P200.00 or P100.00
each time. In 2003, she started to evade Sheriff Duca whenever he served the writ.
Without filing his return on the writ, Sheriff Duca served a notice of auction sale, stating
the amount of P210,000.00 as the rentals-in-arrears due and demandable. The amount was
allegedly his erroneous computation of the rentals-in-arrears due because it was not based on the
decision of the RTC. Consequently, Bahala opposed the sale. The RTC ordered the sheriff to
enjoin from proceeding with the auction sale of defendant property and he is instead hereby
Page 345 of 370

directed to execute the parties’ agreement regarding ejectment and removal of defendant
buildings/structures from the leased property of the plaintiff.
Despite the clear order of the RTC, Sheriff Duca proceeded with the auction sale and
awarded the building to the plaintiff as the sole and highest bidder. He forcibly removed all the
personal belongings of the actual occupants of the building, and placed them outside the building
and along the street. He padlocked the building, and warned Bahala and her lessees not to re-
enter the premises.
In his answer, Sheriff Duca denied receiving any amount from Bahala. He admitted not
having filed any return because his implementation was not yet complete at that time, and that he
informed the plaintiff about the status of the implementation of the writ. He maintained that the
amount of P210,000.00 contained in the notice of auction sale was based on the computation of
the arrears submitted by the plaintiff. As regards the auction sale, he received a copy of the RTC’s
order long after the property had been auctioned off. He denied using force in ejecting the
occupants of the building, stating that they had voluntary removed their personal belongings
themselves.
In his report, then Executive Judge Edgardo T. Lloren found and concluded that Sheriff
Duca had committed simple misconduct for not filing his periodic report on the writ pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and for adopting the computation of arrears made by the
plaintiff. The OCA agreed with Judge Lloren’s finding.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Duca is guilty of simple misconduct for not filing his periodic
report on the writ and for adopting the computation of arrears made by the plaintiff
Ruling:
Yes. As an agent of the law, a sheriff must discharge his duties with due care and utmost
diligence. He cannot afford to err while serving the court’s writs and processes without affecting
the integrity of his office and the efficient administration of justice. He is not given any discretion
on the implementation of a writ of execution; hence, he must strictly abide by the prescribed
procedure to avoid liability.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires a sheriff implementing a writ of
execution (1) to make and submit a return to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in
full of the judgment; and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the
court within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made.
He shall continue making the report every 30 days in the proceedings undertaken by him until the
judgment is fully satisfied in order to apprise the court on the status of the execution and to take
necessary steps to ensure speedy execution of decisions.
Although Sheriff Duca thrice served the writ on Bahala, he filed his return only on
October 7, 2003 after her property had been levied and sold on public auction. His excuses for his
omission, that his “job was not yet finished,” and that he had informed the plaintiff on the status
of its implementation, did not exculpate him from administrative liability, because there is no
Page 346 of 370

question that the failure to file a return on the writ constituted “simple neglect of duty,” defined
as the failure of an employee to give his attention to the task expected of him, signifying a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Duca’s reliance on the computation of plaintiff for the rental-in-arrears amounting to

P210,000.00 contained in the Sheriff’s Notice of Auction Sale is likewise irregular. He should not
have put undue reliance on the computation made by a private individual not duly deputized by
the court. It must be borne in mind that respondent sheriff has, as an officer of the court, the duty
to compute the amount due from the judgment debtor.
It was Sheriff Duca’s duty as court sheriff to know the computation of the amount due in
accordance with the writ of execution. He should have ensured that only those ordained or
decreed in the judgment would be the subject of execution. To accomplish this, he must himself
compute the correct amount due from the judgment obligor or garnishee based strictly on the
terms of the executory judgment, and, if necessary, he must verify the amount from the court
itself; in other words, he could not rely on the computations submitted by private individuals not
duly authorized to do so by the issuing court. He could not delegate the official duty to compute
or reckon the amounts to be realize through execution to such individuals. In adopting the
computations submitted by the plaintiff without himself determining whether the computations
conformed to the terms of the judgment and the writ, he was guilty of simple misconduct, an act
that related to any unlawful conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause.
Sheriff Duca should discharge his duties as a court sheriff with utmost care and diligence,
particularly that which pertained to the implementation of orders and processes of the court. In
the discharge of his duties, he acted as an agent of the court, such that any lack of care and
diligence he displayed would inevitably cause the erosion of the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR. vs. GEORGE E. VIAJAR, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 4, BUTUAN CITY
A.M. No. P-11-2940, January 21, 2015, J. Carpio
The Court stresses once again that sheriffs play an important role in the administration of
justice. As agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence. In serving the court’s writs and processes and implementing its orders, they cannot afford
to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.
Facts:
On 26 March 2010, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul) issued a Writ of Execution
(writ) in Civil Case No. 3985 entitled “Felipe Gorme, Sr., Adela Gorme, Crisanta Gorme-Gado and
Felipe Saludo v. Fast Cargo Transport Corporation and Romy Estrella.” Judge Abul alleged that
George E. Viajar (Viajar) received the writ on the same day it was issued but Viajar withheld the
writ and filed the Sheriff’s Return of Service only on 21 June 2010. Furthermore, Judge Abul
asserted that Viajar arrogated judicial powers upon himself by receiving P68,000 from the
judgment creditor and failing to deposit it to the court. Moreover, Viajar submitted an
unreasonably high Sheriff’s fees, through padded and imaginary charges. Judge Abul alleged that
Page 347 of 370

Viajar refused to follow the Rules of Court when he failed to demand payment directly from the
judgment creditor. Viajar took it upon himself to make a determination that the judgment
creditor in Civil Case No. 3985, Fast Cargo Transport Corporation, is the same as Fast Cargo
Logistics Corporation. In addition, Viajar mailed a copy of the writ of execution to the judgment
debtor in Cebu City instead of serving the writ. He then proceeded to execute a levy garnishment
and conducted an illegal sale. By purposely not giving notice to the judgment debtor and its
counsel, respondent deprived some of the parties of their right to participate. Viajar allegedly
conducted a simulated bidding, awarded the property to the judgment creditor, received
P800,000 for the bid but did not deposit the money with the Clerk of Court. On 15 June 2010,
Viajar executed a Sheriff’s Certificate of Redemption with accompanying acknowledgment receipt
which showed that he charged the judgment debtor additional expenses of P40,000 as actual
expenses and P40,000 as Sheriff’s fees. Viajar then allowed the judgment debtor to withdraw the
amount of P460,647 from him and only informed the trial court through an addendum of Return
of Service submitted on 24 June 2010. The trial court ordered respondent to deposit the P800,000
paid by the highest bidder to the court but he refused and only gave a vague explanation.
Viajar denied all the claims of Judge Abul. Hence, the Court referred the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Th Executive Judge and Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that
Viajar did not follow the basic procedure for implementing a writ of execution. The OCA found
that respondent was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The OCA recommended that
respondent be imposed the penalty of suspension from office without pay for six months.
However, considering that respondent had already retired from the service, the OCA further
recommended that the amount corresponding to Viajar’s salary for six months should instead be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
Issue:
Whether Viajar is guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Ruling:
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA and increase the recommended penalty.
The Court stresses once again that sheriffs play an important role in the administration of
justice. As agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence. In serving the court’s writs and processes and implementing its orders, they
cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration
of justice.
In this case, respondent had been remiss in performing his responsibilities. First,
respondent violated a basic rule by failing to do his ministerial duty to make periodic reports on
the writ. The writ of execution was issued on 26 March 2010. Viajar received it on the same day.
Viajar made his Report on 21 June 2010 and ignored the directive of the Rules requiring him to
make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken on the writ until the judgment
is satisfied in full, or when the effectivity of the writ expires. The Court cannot accept Viajar’s
explanation that the main reason for his failure to make his report was that there were still
activities to be undertaken in the process of his implementation of the writ. The Rule is clear.
Page 348 of 370

Even when the judgment has not yet been fully satisfied, Viajar is mandated to submit his
periodic report to the court which he failed to do so.
Viajar likewise failed to show that he personally demanded from the judgment debtor the
immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution, and of all lawful fees. In
addition, respondent failed to show that he accorded the judgment debtor the option to choose
which among its real or personal properties would be levied upon. Section 9(b) of Rule 39 states
that “[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon
the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment.” In this case, respondent just levied upon the property of the judgment debtor without
demanding payment of the judgment debt, and without giving the judgment debtor the option to
choose which of its properties may be levied upon.
In addition, respondent’s duty to execute a judgment is ministerial and he need not look
outside the plain meaning of the writ of execution. When a sheriff is faced with an ambiguous
execution order, prudence and reasonableness dictate that he seek clarification from the
judge. When confronted with the question of whether Fast Cargo Transport Corporation is the
same as Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation, Viajar should have consulted with the judge. Viajar
relied on the words of Atty. Audie Bernabe, counsel of the judgment creditor, when his proper
course of action should have been to seek clarification from the judge.
As regards the Sheriff’s expenses, respondent himself admitted that some of the amount
he included did not have receipts and were, therefore, not justified.
The OCA found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty in the
performance of his duties, which, considering the circumstances, we deem to be serious
dishonesty. Both offenses are punishable with dismissal from the service.9 However,
in recommending the imposable penalty, the OCA considered the following as mitigating
circumstances in favor of respondent: (1) this is respondent’s first offense; (2) respondent had
been in the service for 15 years; and (3) humanitarian reasons. Thus, the OCA recommended that
the penalty of suspension from office without salary for six months should instead be meted on
respondent. In view of respondent’s retirement from the service, the OCA further recommended
that the amount corresponding to six months’ salary be instead deducted from respondent’s
retirement benefits. We modify the recommended penalty by increasing the suspension from six
months to one year. Considering that respondent already retired from the service, the amount
corresponding to one year’s salary should instead be deducted from respondent’s retirement
benefits.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. CONSTANTINO P. REDOÑA, former Clerk

of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Tanauan, Leyte
A.M. No. P-14-3194, January 27, 2015, Per Curiam
Time and time again, the Supreme Court has stressed that those charged with the
dispensation of justice - from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk - are circumscribed with a
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct at all times must not only be characterized by
Page 349 of 370

propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. The inculpatory acts committed by Redoña are so
grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both
being in the nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits
Facts:
This administrative matter stemmed from the financial audit on the Books of Accounts of
the Municipal Trial Court, Tanauan, Leyte, conducted by the Audit Team of the Court
Management Office (Team) due to the application for separation benefits under Section 11,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291 of Constantino P. Redoña. The audit covered the
accountability period of Constantino P. Redoña and Ranulfo R. Balano, former Clerk of Court II
and Officer-in-Charge, respectively, of the same court, from October 1, 2004 to July 31, 2012 and
August 1, 2012 to February 28, 2013.
As culled from the records, the audit report yielded the following results:
The audit of the court's Fiduciary Fund (FF) account showed an outstanding balance of
Four Hundred Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Four Pesos (P407,874.00) and upon
reconciliation of the said balance against the court's LBP Savings Account, it disclosed a shortage
of Seventy-One thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P71,900.00), which was restituted by Redoña on
March 21, 2013. In sum, the total accountabilities of Redoña, which was restituted on March 21,
2013, totalling to Seventy One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P71,900.00).
Considering the irregularities discovered by the audit team, the team recommended that
their audit report be docketed as a regular administrative matter against Redoña for gross
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and delay in the deposit of court collections, and
that Redoña's retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, be forfeited.
Issue:
Whether or not Redoña is guilty of gross misconduct in the deposit of court collections.
Ruling:
Yes. Redoña is guilty of gross misconduct
The guilt of Redoña is undisputed. The recqrds speak for themselves, to wit: (1) The
unreported and unremitted collections with a total amount of P71,900.00 resulting to a shortage
of P71,900.00;4 (2) To cover up for the missing collections, Redoña cancelled several original
receipts; (3) For the December 2009 monthly report, Redoña issued a certification of "no
collection" of fiduciary fund and again cancelled official receipts, amounting to P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively, to cover up for the missing collections; (4) For OR No. 3503958 dated
December 7, 2009 in the amount of P8,0000.00, Redoña allegedly posted cash bailbond for his
friend, the accused Raymundo Abarca, out of pity; and (5) in several instances, Redoña incurred
delay for a period of four years and nine months in the remittances of his collections on fiduciary
fund.
Page 350 of 370

For his failure to remit the collections on time, Redoña committed a gross violation of SC
Circular No. 13-92 which commands that all fiduciary collections "shall be deposited immediately
by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized depositary bank."
Settled is the role of clerks of courts as judicial officers entrusted with the delicate function with
regard to collection of legal fees, and are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations. Shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of delay in the actual
remittances constitute gross neglect of duty for which Redoña should be administratively liable.
Safekeeping of public and trust funds is essential to an orderly administration of justice.

No protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to
promote full accountability of government funds. Thus, Redoña's claim of good faith, his
forgetfulness and lack of secured storage area for the collections are lame excuses to evade
punishment for his neglect of duty.
Clerks of court are not supposed to keep funds for a period of time. They have the duty to
immediately deposit their collections with authorized government depositories because they are
not authorized to keep those funds in their custody and failure in this regard constitutes gross
neglect of duty. The unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative
sanction and not even the full payment of the collection shortages will exempt the accountable
officer from liability. Moreover, failure to comply with pertinent Court circulars designed to
promote full accountability for public funds constitutes grave misconduct.
Equally appalling is the tampering of the court records, such as the unwarranted
cancellation of official receipts which were committed with conscious and deliberate efforts to
conceal the missing collections thus evincing a malicious and immoral propensity.
Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court's funds,
revenues, records, properties and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurer,
accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof. It is the clerks of courts' duty to faithfully
perform their duties and responsibilities to the end that there was full compliance with function,
that of being the custodian of the court's funds and revenues, records, properties and premises.
They are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure
that the proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Clerks of court are
officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice.
Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. They
are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.
The inculpatory acts committed by Redoña are so grave as to call for the most severe
administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a grave
offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
MARY-ANN* S. TORDILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 27 vs. LORNA H. AMILANO, COURT
Page 351 of 370

STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR,

BRANCH 61
A.M. No. P-14-3241 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3672-P), February 04, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
While indeed the failure to pay just debts can, broadly speaking, be considered as a form of
misconduct since the legal attribution of that term (misconduct) would cover almost every possible
“intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,” the correct
classification of respondent’s dereliction should be willful refusal to pay just debts, as it is the latter
which specifically constitutes the offense she had committed. When the gravamen of the offense is
the unwillingness to pay a just obligation, the more accurate finding would be to hold the errant
employee liable for willful failure to pay just debts.
Facts:
Sometime in April 2005, eleven (11) stenographers of the RTC decided to attend the 4th
National Convention and Seminar of the Court Stenographic Reporters Association of the
Philippines (COSTRAPHIL) to be held in Iloilo City from April 13 to 15, 2005, as authorized by
OCA Circular No. 99-2004. To cover the expenses incidental thereto, the stenographers solicited
funds from the City Government of Naga (City Government). Unfortunately, only five (5) of the
stenographers, including respondent Lorna Amilano, was required to attend the seminar.
However, even if she was excluded from attending the seminar, the cash advance intended for her
was still received by Amilano.
Until Tordilla received a demand letter from the Office of the Auditor of Naga City,
Camarines Sur asking her to pay the amount of p5,914.00 as unliquidated cash advance. When she
procured a copy of the Disbursement Voucher, she noticed the signature of Amilano under her
signature inside Box E of the same. Tordilla then confronted respondent and the latter admitted
that she received the cash advance on her behalf. Amilano then executed an Affidavit promising
to refund the unliquidated cash advance she received on or before June 15, 2008. However, she
reneged on the same.
After the second demand, Tordilla was prompted to file the present complaint. In her
defense, Amilano vehemently denied the charges hurled against her. The OCA recommended that
respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct. The OCA observed that it took respondent six
(6) years from receipt of the cash advance, or on July 28, 2011, to liquidate the cash with the City
Government. It found that even though respondent cannot be held administratively liable for
willful refusal to pay just debts, as her alleged debt to complainant was not a claim adjudicated by
a court of law, her act can be construed as simple misconduct since the same tainted the image
and integrity of the Judiciary.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Amilano should be held administratively liable for simple
misconduct or for willful failure to pay just debts as charged.
Ruling:
Amilano is liable for willful failure to pay just debts.
Page 352 of 370

Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,”
provides that a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action.
Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section 52,21
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Rules), defines “just
debts”. Clearly, under the Rules, the term “just debts” may refer not only to claims adjudicated by
a court of law but also to claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor, as
respondent in this case.
To expound, while indeed the failure to pay just debts can, broadly speaking, be
considered as a form of misconduct since the legal attribution of that term (misconduct) would
cover almost every possible “intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior,” the correct classification of respondent’s dereliction should be willful
refusal to pay just debts, as it is the latter which specifically constitutes the offense she had
committed. When the gravamen of the offense is the unwillingness to pay a just obligation, the
more accurate finding would be to hold the errant employee liable for willful failure to pay just
debts.
In this relation, note that the penalty imposed by law is not directed at respondent’s
private life, but rather at her actuation unbecoming of a public official. Certainly, to preserve
decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act
fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, [respondent] is
expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct
but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to
avoid becoming her court’s albatross of infamy.
In fine, for deliberately failing to settle her debt to complainant for the protracted length
of time of six (6) years, respondent is found guilty of the light offense of willful failure to pay just
debts. Being her first offense, she is thus reprimanded for the same, with a stern warning that a
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
LEAVE DIVISION – O.A.S., OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. TYKE J.

SARCENO
Conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the norm of public accountability
and diminishes – or tends to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. By the habituality and
frequency of his unauthorized absences, Sarceno did not live up to the degree of accountability,
efficiency, and integrity that the Judiciary has required of its officials and employees. His position as
Clerk III was essential and indispensable to the Judiciary’s primary mandate of the proper
administration of justice. This mandate dictated that he as a court employee should devote his office
hours strictly to the public service, if only to repay and serve the people whose taxes were used to
maintain the Judiciary. His habitual absenteeism severely compromised the integrity and image that
the Judiciary sought to preserve, and thus violated this mandate.
Page 353 of 370

Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the bringing of an

administrative complaint for habitual absenteeism against respondent Tyke J. Sarceno, Clerk III of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, in Manila. The recommendation was based on a finding that
Sarceno had incurred 92 days of unauthorized absences in the months of June 2009 to September
2009, inclusive.
Sarceno continued to incur unexplained absences. His continuing absenteeism was

discovered by Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief, Administrative Services of the OCA, who had
meanwhile sent a telegram requesting Presiding Judge Germano Francisco D. Legaspi of Branch 31
of the Regional Trial Court in Manila to direct Sarceno to submit his bundy cards for July 2010 and
August 2010 lest the OCA would recommend that Sarceno’s salary be withheld; and the latter had
responded by letter dated September 8, 2010 addressed to then Assistant Court Administrator
Thelma C. Bahia stating that he could not immediately and directly instruct Sarceno to submit his
bundy cards due to Sarceno not having reported to work since July 28, 2010.
It appears that Judge Legaspi further informed the OCA that the records in his office
showed that Sarceno had incurred 75 absences in 2009; and 37 absences in 2010, excluding the
absences in relation to which Sarceno indicated in the logbook that he had been on sick or
vacation leave; that Sarceno did not apply for leave for the absences incurred in July 2010 and
August 2010; that the previous withholding of his salary had not moved Sarceno to change his
ways; and that Sarceno’s excessive absences indicated that he had already abandoned his duty to
the detriment of public service.
Accordingly, Judge Legaspi recommended that Sarceno be dropped from the rolls, or, in
the alternative, that appropriate administrative charges be brought against him for habitual
absenteeism.
Issue:
Whether or not Sarceno should be held guilty of habitual absenteeism
Ruling:
Yes, the SC declared that is Sarceno guilty of habitual absenteeism.
Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an employee in the Civil Service shall be
considered habitually absent if he or she incurs “unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable
2.5 days monthly leave credit under the law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least
three (3) consecutive months during the year.”
The OCA found that Sarceno had incurred absences totaling 92 days spread in the months
of June, July, August, and September, all in 2009. Such absenteeism already merited the
imposition of the penalty for habitual absenteeism. Still, Judge Legaspi reported that as of the
writing of his letter to Atty. Bahia on September 8, 2010, Sarceno had incurred a total of 37
absences in 2010, 34 of which were in the months of July, August and September, all in 2010. The
OCA observed that as of the writing of its AMFA on December 14, 2010, Sarceno had remained
Page 354 of 370

absent without official leave. The frequency and the number of Sarceno’s absences rendered him
guilty of habitual absenteeism, and indicated that he had thereby exceeded the allowable days of
monthly leave credits.
Conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the norm of public accountability
and diminishes – or tends to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. By the habituality and
frequency of his unauthorized absences, Sarceno did not live up to the degree of accountability,
efficiency, and integrity that the Judiciary has required of its officials and employees. His position
as Clerk III was essential and indispensable to the Judiciary’s primary mandate of the proper
administration of justice. This mandate dictated that he as a court employee should devote his
office hours strictly to the public service, if only to repay and serve the people whose taxes were
used to maintain the Judiciary. His habitual absenteeism severely compromised the integrity and
image that the Judiciary sought to preserve, and thus violated this mandate.
Section 52 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
punishes habitual absenteeism and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service with
suspension of six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal from the
service for the second infraction. Although this was Sarceno’s first offense, the OCA
recommended that he should suffer the ultimate penalty of dismissal. The recommendation is
appropriate and deserved.
As the OCA pointed out, Sarceno again went on AWOL in 2010 despite having expressed
his “repentance with a resolve to correct his shortcomings.” Indeed, according to him, the chance
to remain employed in the public service would prejudice the public service. We would thereby
be tolerating his lack of integrity and incompetence. The hand of mercy and compassion should
be denied to those like Sarceno who refuse to reform despite being given the opportunity to do
so. He thus deserves dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leaves.
As mentioned, Sarceno’s name had been dropped from the rolls on February 22, 2012, and
his position as Clerk III of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila had been
declared vacant. Such actions of the Court effectively amounted to his dismissal from the service.
Accordingly, the Court, in the interest of the public service, declares him to be ineligible for
public office hereafter.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AS REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR IV MARIA LETICIA G.

REYNA vs. JOVILYN B. DAWANG
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Upon examination of Dawang's photograph on the
picture-seat plan of the August 18, 1996 Career Service Professional Examination and her
photographs on her Personal Data Sheets, the individual whose picture appears on the picture-seat
plan is not Dawang. Allowing another person to take the examination on one's behalf is an act of
dishonesty.
Page 355 of 370

Facts:
Jovilyn B. Dawang (Dawang) is a Court Stenographer 1 in the Municipal Trial Court of

Talugtog, Nueva Ecija. Dawang had been working as a stenographer for various courts in a
temporary capacity since 1993, until she qualified as a permanent employee upon obtaining her
Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility.
In the Letter dated June 21, 2011, the Civil Service Commission informed the Office of the
Court Administrator that it was charging Dawang with serious dishonesty. According to the Civil
Service Commission, Dawang conspired with another individual during the Career Service
Professional Examination held on August 18, 1996.
Dawang, then Jovilyn S. Borillo, asked an impersonator to take the examination in her
stead. The impersonator placed her own 2x2 photograph on the picture-seat plan of the
examination under the name of Jovilyn S. Borillo. The complete personal circumstances and
alleged signature of Dawang were affixed on the documents for the exam. The impersonator
passed the examination and consequently, a Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility
was issued in the name of Dawang. Dawang filed a modified Personal Data Sheet on October 11,
1996. In its Item No. 18, she included the qualification "Career Service Professional" with a rating
of 84.86%.
On February 2, 2007, Dawang requested for authentication of her Certificate of Eligibility

at the Integrated Records Management Office of the Civil Service Commission. Upon verifying
Dawang's examination and employment records, the Integrated Records Management Office
noted marked differences in the facial features of the photographs and signatures on the picture-
seat plan and the identification cards Dawang presented.
The 2x2 photograph on Dawang's modified Personal Data Sheet had different facial
features from the photograph on the picture-seat plan for the examination. The different facial
features showed that the person in the Personal Data Sheet and the person on the picture-seat
plan were two different individuals. The Integrated Records Management Office "forwarded
Dawang's request to the Examination, Recruitment, and Placement Office of the Civil Service
Commission for further investigation
On May 29, 2007, the Examination, Recruitment, and Placement Office required Dawang
to show cause "why she should not be administratively charged for having employed fraud in
acquiring her Career Service Professional Eligibility.
Later, the Civil Service Commission transferred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator. In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator found Dawang guilty of
serious dishonesty.
Issue:
Whether or not Dawang's acts constituted serious dishonesty
Page 356 of 370

Ruling:
Yes, the SC agrees with the Office of the Court Administrator's Report, hence, Dawang's
acts constituted serious dishonesty.
Upon examination of Dawang's photograph on the picture-seat plan of the August 18, 1996
Career Service Professional Examination and her photographs on her Personal Data Sheets, the SC
share the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Court Administrator's conclusion that
the individual whose picture appears on the picture-seat plan is not Dawang. The differences are
apparent even to an ordinary person.
Allowing another person to take the examination on one's behalf is an act of dishonesty.
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Dawang's Personal Data Sheet filed on October 11, 1996 documented her dishonesty. She
wrote that her Civil Service Eligibility included "Career Service Professional." On the field for date,
she wrote "August 18, 1996." She also noted that her rating was "84.86%" and that the place of
examination was "Juan Sumulong High Sch. M.M." She had the courage to write all these details,
yet she admitted in her sworn statement that she did not take the examination on August 18,
1996. If she did not take the examination on the said date at the said venue, then it is impossible
for her to score in the examination. Yet, in her Personal Data Sheet, she declared under oath that
she did.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46,
serious dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service. For her dishonesty,
Dawang does not deserve to be a stenographer in the judiciary. She should be dismissed from
service.
BENITO B. NATE vs. JUDGE LELU P. CONTRERAS, BRANCH 43, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
VIRAC, CATANDUANES
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015, CJ. Sereno
Court agree with the OCA findings that Contreras’s act of affixing her signature to the jurat
portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work as
the then clerk of court of RTC–Iriga City. The power of ex officio notaries public has been limited to
notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties. This means that they
have no longer had the authority to notarize documents that do not bear any relation to the
performance of their official functions. Any one of them who does so would be committing an
unauthorized notarial act, which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and
abuse of authority. While we agree with her that ex officio notaries public are not authorized to
perform a notarial act in relation to private documents, the applicable test is not based merely on
the nature of the transaction as private, but also on the relationship between the document and the
official functions and duties of the ex officio notary public.
Page 357 of 370

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Benito B. Nate calls the attention of the Court to the supposed grave
misconduct of Contreras while she was still clerk of court and ex officio provincial sheriff of RTC–
Iriga City. According to him, there were three instances in which respondent abused her
authority.
First, Contreras allegedly notarized an administrative complaint that was prepared by her
own father and filed with the Court sometime in June 2003. Nate stresses that Contreras could not
have legally notarized a document. He points out that Section 3, Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries from performing a notarial act if they are related to the
principal within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Furthermore, he argues that
Contreras acted beyond her authority when she notarized in Iriga City a document that was
signed in the Municipality of Buhi, which was outside that city. We note that complainant was the
subject of the administrative complaint filed by respondent’s father.
Nate claims that Contreras certified a document as a true copy of the original, and that her
sister-in-law later on used the certified document in a labor case then pending with the National
Labor Relations Commission in Naga City. He points out that Contreras, as an ex officio notary
public, was empowered to authenticate only those documents that were in her custody. Since the
document – an amended labor complaint – was not a document pending before the RTC–Iriga
City, Contreras allegedly went beyond her authority when she authenticated it. And purportedly
without the Court’s prior written authority, Contreras appeared as her father’s counsel before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Nate alleges that Contreras herself admitted during the
proceedings before the IBP that she had not yet obtained a written authority.
Contreras admits to all of these allegations. However, she maintains that her actions were
allowed under the Manual for Clerks of Court. As regards the first act, she stresses that as ex
officio notary public, she was authorized to administer oaths and notarize documents so long as
no private document was involved. Furthermore, she explains that the municipality of Buhi was
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC–Iriga City. Contreras explains that the Manual for
Clerks of Court allowed her to authenticate copies of documents, especially since the RTC in Iriga
City did not have human resource management officers. Furthermore, she stresses that the power
of clerks of court to authenticate documents as true copies of the original is not limited to copies
of documents that are in their custody. Lastly, Contreras points out that the intended first hearing
before the IBP was suspended, precisely because she informed the hearing officer that she had not
yet received authority to appear as counsel for her father. She clarifies that the proceedings
pushed through only when she was able to present her written authority from the Supreme Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator agrees with Nate as regards the first and the second
acts. With regard to the third act, the OCA is of the view that Contreras did not commit any
irregularity, since she was authorized by the Supreme Court to represent her father in the
administrative case he had filed.
Issues:
Whether or not Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts: (1)Affixing her
signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father; (2)
Page 358 of 370

Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint; (3) Appearing as
counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father.
Ruling:
No, Contreras is only liable for reprimand and warning for the first act.
Clerks of court are authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under Sections 41 and
42 of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Section D(1), Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court. One of the main reasons why these public officers were allowed to
perform any notarial act was that there were still rural areas in the country that did not have
regular notaries public. While some areas had notaries, not all of them kept regular office
hours. As more lawyers and regular notaries public populated far-flung areas, the need for ex
officio notaries public diminished as did their power. Thus, the power of ex officio notaries public
has been limited to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and
duties. This means that since the promulgation of that ruling, they have no longer had the
authority to notarize documents that do not bear any relation to the performance of their official
functions. Any one of them who does so would be committing an unauthorized notarial
act, which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and abuse of authority.
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the
competency of regular notaries public is now more of an exception rather than a general rule.
They may perform notarial acts on such documents that bear no relation to their official functions
and duties only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of
any other lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged
will be for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer. The Court
agree with the OCA findings that Contreras’s act of affixing her signature to the jurat portion of
the administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work as the
then clerk of court of RTC–Iriga City. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the proceedings
involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys shall be conducted before the IBP. This
means that clerks of court are not among the touchpoints in the regular procedure pertaining to
complaints against an attorney. Neither may a pleading in a case involving lawyers be filed with
the RTC.
Contreras defends her actions by arguing that she was guided by the test of whether or not
the instrument she notarized was considered a private document. While the Supreme Court agree
with her that ex officio notaries public are not authorized to perform a notarial act in relation to
private documents, the applicable test is not based merely on the nature of the transaction as
private, but also on the relationship between the document and the official functions and duties
of the ex officio notary public. However, the documents notarized by Contreras do not involve a
private or commercial undertaking, and that this is the first time that she has been charged, the
Supreme Court agree with the recommendation of the OCA that the penalty of reprimand,
instead of a fine, is more appropriate under the circumstances.
The Supreme Court apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of Contreras; that is,
her certification of a copy of her sister-in-law’s labor complaint. Contreras herself admits that the
document was filed before the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTC–
Iriga City. Thus, in the regular course of her duties, she would not have come across, encountered,
Page 359 of 370

or been in custody of the document. While we agree with her that clerks of court are allowed to
perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be connected to the exercise of
their official functions and duties – meaning to say, it must be done in connection with public
documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody.
With regard to the third act, the Supreme Court reiterate that the primary employment of
court personnel must be their full-time position in the judiciary, which is the chief concern
requiring their dutiful attention. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees does allow for limited exceptions. The Supreme
Court has on a number of occasions, granting requests of court personnel to appear as counsel on
behalf of their immediate family members. This grant is premised on the strict condition that
their representation will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. Furthermore,
they must not use official time in preparing for the case and must file a leave of absence every
time they are required to attend to the case. Contreras has satisfactorily proved that she was
granted authority by the Supreme Court to represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089
provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of
the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the case. We thus agree with the
OCA recommendation that she did not commit any irregularity when she represented her father
before the IBP.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. CLERK OF COURT EMMANUELA A. REYES,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BANI, PANGASINAN
A.M. No. P-10-2872 [Formerly A.M. No. 10-10-118-MTC], February 24, 2015, Per Curiam
The Court cannot tolerate non-submission of financial reports, non-reporting and non-
deposit of collections, undue delay in the deposit of collections, unauthorized withdrawal, and non-
explanation of incurred shortages and undeposited collections. Said infractions certainly constitute
gross negligence, dishonesty, and grave misconduct which are serious offenses that deserve the
penalty of dismissal under Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases. Consequently, respondent, for violating the trust reposed upon her as a collecting officer of
the judiciary, the SC affirmed the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss respondent from service.
Facts:
On June 16, 2009, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a Memorandum
directing Reyes to explain in writing why she should not be held administratively liable for the
delayed remittances of collections of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), Fiduciary Fund (FF),
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Sheriff’s Trust Fund (STF), and Mediation Fund
(MF) for the years 2004 to 2009. Interests earned on Fiduciary deposits which were withdrawn
from the Fiduciary Fund Account were likewise not deposited promptly to the proper fund
account on the day they were withdrawn.
Reyes reasoned out that since no one called her attention, she presumed that there was
nothing wrong as long as the court’s collections were intact in her possession. She further
contended that the bank is fourteen (14) kilometers away such that she would only go to the bank
if she needed to withdraw from the court’s Fiduciary Fund Account. As to the interests on
Fiduciary deposits, Reyes did not present any explanation.
Page 360 of 370

After a thorough review and evaluation of the case, the OCA recommended that Reyes be
directed to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for the interest that should have been earned. Reyes was
likewise sternly warned that a repetition of her failure to promptly remit the court’s collections to
their respective fund accounts in the future would be dealt with more severely.
For failing to submit the court’s monthly financial reports to the Revenue Section,
Accounting Division, Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA, Reyes’s salaries were withheld
in February 2009. These were, however, subsequently released in November 2010 upon her
compliance with the directives of said office.
Thereafter, Reyes was directed to comment to another OCA Memorandum dated April 16,
2012 with regard to the audit team’s examination of her books of accounts for the years 2009 to
2012. Reyes was required to explain the shortages she incurred, partial unremitted collections, the
unauthorized withdrawal from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office (MTO) of Bani in May 2005, late
issuances of several Official Receipts in December 2011, and delayed remittances of collections of
the JDF, FF, SAJF, General Fund (GF), STF, and MF for the years 2009 to 2011.
After investigation and for failure of Reyes to explain the shortages she incurred, the OCA
recommended that Reyes be dismissed from the service for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and
grave misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes should be dismissed from service.
Ruling:
Yes, she should.
The Court affirms the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Reyes should thus be
held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.
After her salaries were released, Reyes was not only late in her deposits, she had also
ceased remitting her collections beginning July 2011 and resumed her non-submission of financial
reports to the FMO, OCA. If not for the emergency audit of her accounts at the Bani MTC on
January 9, 2012, her continuous abuse of authority as an accountable officer of the court would
have gone unnoticed. Reyes also failed to present any proof that the court ordered her to
withdraw the amount of P82,755.00 from the Bani MTO in May 2005.
The undeposited collections and delayed remittances resulted to loss of interests that
should have accrued had the collections been deposited promptly to their respective fund
accounts. Under Section 3-C of the JDF and SAJF procedural guidelines in Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004, as amended, dated August 20, 2004, the daily remittance of JDF and SAJF
collections is required. In relation to this, Section 4 of OCA Circular No. 50-95 provides that all
collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other Fiduciary collections shall be deposited by
the Clerk of Court concerned, within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof with the
Landbank of the Philippines. Indubitably, Reyes violated the trust reposed upon her as a
collecting officer of the judiciary. The Court cannot tolerate non-submission of financial reports,
non-reporting and non-deposit of collections, undue delay in the deposit of collections,
unauthorized withdrawal, and non-explanation of incurred shortages and undeposited
Page 361 of 370

collections. Reyes failed to fully settle her deficit in the court funds despite the ample time given
to her to do so. The request for an extension of time to be able to come up with the amount
needed is merely a delaying tactic to evade full responsibility for the violation committed.
Said infractions certainly constitute gross negligence, dishonesty, and grave misconduct
which are serious offenses that deserve the penalty of dismissal under Section 52, Rule IV of the
Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. Failure to completely settle her
accountability may likewise give rise to criminal liability.
ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. ARNOLD B.

LUGARES vs. ALEXANDER D. VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 60, MAKATI CITY
The role that Sheriffs play in the dispensation of justice is pivotal. They serve as the agents to
ensure that arduous and painstaking court proceedings will result in a final execution. It is
incumbent upon them to act in a manner fitting of the dignity of their office as employees of the
judiciary.
Respondent in the case at bar demanded that complainant give him money before he would
implement the Writ of Execution which under the law is his duty to perform. For doing so, the SC
found him guilty of guilty of gross misconduct. Consequently, respondent was dismissed from
service.
Facts:
Complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices, a professional law practice partnership,
represented FGU Insurance Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC Cargo
Services, Inc. In that case, a decision in favor of FGU Insurance was rendered by the RTC and was
later on affirmed by the CA making the same final and executory. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution
was issued by the Branch Clerk of Court and respondent Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to
execute the same.
Thereafter, when Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Lugares started coordinating with each
other for the execution of the Decision, they agreed to meet to discuss the service of the Notices
of Garnishment. During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva demanded P8,000.00 from Atty. Lugares
before he would execute the Decision. He allegedly stated: “[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung
wala naman tayong makokolekta” and “E wala pang 50% ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.” Atty.
Lugares informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part of his job, and he should not demand
money from him. Sheriff Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to P5,000.00.
On the day the Notice of Garnishment was agreed to be served Sheriff Villanueva again
texted Atty. Lugares asking him if he has with him the “colors” he asked for. When Atty. Lugares
asked what he meant by “colors” Sheriff Villanueva replied that he was referring to the “legal fees.”
For failure to give the P5000 demanded by Sheriff Villanueva, Atty. Lugares assumed that the
issuance of the Notices of Garnishment did not take place. Thus, Astorga and Repol Law offices,
represented by Atty. Lugares filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Villanueva charging
him with willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct in office due to graft and corruption or
Page 362 of 370

extortion with a prayer that a penalty of dismissal or other appropriate sanctions be meted against
him.
For his defense Sheriff Villanueva countered that the Complaint stemmed from a Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006 originally assigned to Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas. This Writ of
Execution was served on NEC Cargo Services, Inc., and personal properties or office equipment
found inside NEC Cargo Services, Inc.’s office were levied. However, prior to the scheduled
auction sale, Mr. Narciso E. Calaton filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. FGU Insurance
Corporation failed to post the indemnity bond in favor of the third-party claimant. Thus, the Writ
of Execution was returned unsatisfied.
Sheriff Villanueva denied any attempt to extort money from Atty. Lugares. He alleged that
what he was asking for was the legal fees which under the law was required to be paid by Atty.
Lugares before the Notice of Garnishment is to be served. Sheriff Villanueva further stated that it
was Atty. Lugares who offered him money as a “token of gratitude” if the garnishment of the
stocks of NEC Cargo would take place. He denied all imputations of bribery alleged by Atty.
Lugares and stated that Atty. Lugares was filing these charges against him to harass him.
In his Report and Recommendation, Executive Judge Pozon concluded that Sheriff
Villanueva did not commit gross neglect of duty. He stated that Atty. Lugares was not able to
provide evidence to substantiate his claim that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform his
duty. Executive Judge Pozon explained that the use of “colors” could not automatically be
construed to pertain to something illegal. Executive Judge Pozon stated that since Atty. Lugares’
outgoing text messages to Sheriff Villanueva were not presented as evidence, the text messages
from Sheriff Villanueva served as the sole evidentiary basis for Atty. Lugares’ allegations. Atty.
Lugares’ failure to show and verify the text messages he sent meant that the charges were bereft of
evidence. Hence, Executive Judge Pozon ordered that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect of duty
and corruption or extortion.
Ruling:
Yes he is.
After a review of the records and the evidence, the Supreme Court must reverse the
findings of Executive Judge Pozon. Respondent should be subject to disciplinary sanctions.
Contrary to Executive Judge Pozon’s position, however, Atty. Lugares was able to prove
that respondent committed actions that warrant administrative liability.
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial evidence.

In Menor v. Guillermo:
Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise

stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the
complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
Page 363 of 370

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is

justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.
There is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegation of neglect of duty.
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were
admitted as evidence and given probative value by the Supreme Court. In those cases, the court
considered the content of the text messages and the identification of the person sending them as
substantial evidence to prove the commission of administrative offenses.
Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He
attached photographs of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were
received. He submitted Sheriff Villanueva’s calling card that contained the same phone number
seen in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that respondent was the
source of the text messages. Sheriff Villanueva denied meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never
denied sending the text messages to him.
The content of the text messages from Sheriff Villanueva and the circumstances within
which they were made constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative
liability. The presentation of text messages that Atty. Lugares sent to Sheriff Villanueva is not
necessary.
Sheriff Villanueva’s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to
implement the Writ of Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his
manifest refusal to properly implement the Writ of Execution.
Among the text messages presented by Atty. Lugares, Exhibit “V” states that Sheriff
Villanueva sent Atty. Lugares the following text message: “Nka pag Shf. return na ako dyan sa kaso
na yan, bhala ka sa gusto mo mangyari.” Respondent Sheriff Villanueva sent this text message at
9:06 a.m. on November 26, 2008.
That text message is evidence that Sheriff Villanueva did not undertake his duty to
implement the Writ of Execution. In his Reply, Atty. Lugares correctly stated that a cursory
execution of the Sheriff’s Return did not excuse Sheriff Villanueva from faithfully implementing
the Writ of Execution. A writ of execution continues to be effective during the period within
which a judgment may be enforced by motion, which is within five (5) years from the entry of
judgment. After the lapse of the five (5) year period, the judgment may be revived and executed
before it is barred by the statue of limitations. The failure to execute the judgment could result in
years of protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must exert the necessary effort to ensure that the
judgment is duly executed.
Thus, Sheriff Villanueva’s failure to show that he did the necessary steps to implement the
Writ of Execution in good faith cannot be tolerated by the Supreme Court. Sheriff Villanueva
violated Canon IV, Sections 1 and 6 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours.
Page 364 of 370

SEC. 6. Court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of the
court within the limits of their authority.
“When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it
according to its mandate.” “The Court has said time and again that a sheriff’s duty in the
execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the
letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not.” “[T]he officers charged with
the delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of the same must, in the absence of a
restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of
justice[.]”
For violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for failing to perform his duties
as a Sheriff in an expeditious manner, Sheriff Villanueva must be held liable for willful neglect of
duty.
Having found substantial evidence to prove Atty. Lugares’ allegations, Sheriff Villanueva
must be held accountable by the Supreme Court. He has failed to uphold the high standard of
integrity required by a position in the judiciary. He has violated Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I FIDELITY TO DUTY
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others.
SEC. 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or
explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions.
Sheriff Villanueva has been found guilty of soliciting money from litigants in order to
execute his duties as a Sheriff. This deplorable behavior in some court personnel must be stopped.
In Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia:
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of
interest in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or
other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the judiciary. “The Court has always stressed that all members of the
judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the
integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved.” Court personnel cannot take
advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.
Sheriff Villanueva is guilty of gross misconduct. The Supreme Court defined misconduct
as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals,
the Supreme Court held that “[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and
‘gross’ has been held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . The Supreme Court once held that the word
misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.”
Page 365 of 370

Thus, Sheriff Villanueva must face the full consequences of his actions. The Supreme
Court will not abandon its responsibility in exacting the highest amount of integrity from those
within its ranks. Sheriff Villanueva must be dismissed from the service.
JOSEPHINE E. LAM vs. NILA M. GARCIAM JUNIOR PROCESS SERVER, MUNICIPAL

COURT, SIATON, NEGROS ORIENTAL
A.M. No. P-15-3300, 10 February 2016, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondent, upon discovering that the entries in her DTR were modified, complained loudly
against complainant, using insulting and offensive words. For this, respondent must be
administratively sanctioned for simple discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee.
FACTS:
Complainant Josephine E. Lam, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Siaton, Negros Oriental filed an Amended Letter-Complaint dated October 12, 2012 charging
respondent Nila M. Garcia (Garcia), Process Server of the same court, with insubordination and
conduct unbecoming a court employee. Complainant alleged in her Letter that on October 2, 2012,
at around 2:20 in the afternoon, respondent was scanning the Office Logbook so that she could
copy the entries to her Daily Time Record (DTR), when she said out aloud to Lam, "Pin! Buang Ka!
Yawa Ka! Nganong imo kong gibotangan ug absent? Gasunod sunod pa gud. Paghulat ug akoy
mabotang! Disabled!" ("Pin, you are stupid/foolish! You devil! Why did you mark me absent for
consecutive days? Wait until I would be the one to write! Disabled!"). Complainant replied,
"Ngano mang dili tikaw botangan ug absent diha nga wala man ka nitungha?" ("Why should I not
mark you absent when in fact you were not around?"). Respondent then continued to hurl
abusive words against complainant, loud enough for their co-employees to hear.
In her Comment and Answer, respondent denied complainant's charges against her and
insisted that what happened between them was a mere misunderstanding. According to
respondent, she merely called complaint's attention as the latter maliciously modified the
former's DTR without notice. Respondent alleged that complainant erased some entries in
respondent’s DTR and superimposed on said entries the word "ABSENT." Respondent explained
that she felt insulted and humiliated by what complainant had done, not only because the DTRs
were the employees' personal property, but also because it had always been a practice in their
office that only the employees themselves are allowed to fill out or make changes to their
respective DTRs. Garcia further alleged that she confronted and raised her voice at complainant,
but denied demeaning or insulting the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of insubordination.
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of simple discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee,

not insubordination.
Page 366 of 370

Respondent, upon discovering that the entries in her DTR were modified, complained
loudly against complainant, using insulting and offensive words. For this, respondent must be
Time and again, the Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of employees in the
judiciary, particularly those in the first and second level courts, are circumscribed by the rules on
proper and ethical standards. The nature and responsibilities of men and women in the judiciary,
as defined in different canons of conduct, are neither mere jargons nor idealistic sentiments, but
working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. No less than
self-restraint and civility are at all times expected from court employees. Their conduct,
particularly when they are within court premises, must always be characterized by propriety and
decorum. Stated a bit differently, they should avoid any act or behavior that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts.
An employee of the judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity. Government service is people oriented where high strung and belligerent
behavior cannot be allowed.
ANTONIO A. FERNANDEZ vs. MILA A. ALERTA

A.M. No. P-15-3344, 13 January 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Indeed, case law dictates that officials and employees of the judiciary must serve with the
highest degree of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined to conduct themselves with propriety
even in private life, as any reproach to them is bound to reflect adversely on their office. As such,
they are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even
outside office hours to ensure full-time service so that there may be no undue delay in the
administration of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by prevailing rules.
FACTS:
On 18 October 1993, complainant Antonio A. Fernandez engaged the services of

respondent Mila A. Alerta, a Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas,
Iloilo, Branch 68 (RTC), to cause the transfer to the former's name the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. T-11566, which covers the parcel of land he bought from Ma. Fema M. Arones
(“Arones”).
After over nineteen (19) years, however, respondent still had not caused the transfer of the
title to complainant's name. Thus, in letters dated 17 February 2014 and 3 March 2014,
complainant, through his counsel, demanded the return of the documents previously transmitted
to respondent, but to no avail. Hence, an administrative case was filed by complainant before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging respondent with grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act."
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Page 367 of 370

RULING:
Respondent is administratively liable.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Services, "moonlighting" is
denominated as the "[t]he pursuit of a private business or vocation without the permission
required under Civil Service rules and regulations." It is punishable by reprimand for the first
offense, suspension from office for a period of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense,
and dismissal from service for the third offense.
In this case, respondent's administrative liability for "moonlighting" remains undisputed

as she, in fact, readily admitted that she endeavored to process the transfer of OCT No. T-11566 in
complainant's name as agreed upon by them. Notably, such task is not part of her duties as a
court stenographer. Indeed, absent any showing that such conduct was permitted, she violated
the rule against "moonlighting" and hence, being her first infraction therefor, should be meted
with the penalty of reprimand, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
highest degree of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined to conduct themselves with
propriety even in private life, as any reproach to them is bound to reflect adversely on their office.
As such, they are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession even outside office hours to ensure full-time service so that there may be no undue
delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by prevailing
rules.
ANTONIO A. FERNANDEZ vs. MILA A. ALERTA

A.M. No. P-15-3344, 13 January 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
On 18 October 1993, complainant Antonio A. Fernandez engaged the services of

respondent Mila A. Alerta, a Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas,
Iloilo, Branch 68 (RTC), to cause the transfer to the former's name the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. T-11566, which covers the parcel of land he bought from Ma. Fema M. Arones
(“Arones”).
After over nineteen (19) years, however, respondent still had not caused the transfer of the
title to complainant's name. Thus, in letters dated 17 February 2014 and 3 March 2014,
complainant, through his counsel, demanded the return of the documents previously transmitted
to respondent, but to no avail. Hence, an administrative case was filed by complainant before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging respondent with grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act."
Page 368 of 370

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Respondent is administratively liable.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Services, "moonlighting" is
denominated as the "[t]he pursuit of a private business or vocation without the permission
required under Civil Service rules and regulations." It is punishable by reprimand for the first
offense, suspension from office for a period of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense,
and dismissal from service for the third offense.
In this case, respondent's administrative liability for "moonlighting" remains undisputed

as she, in fact, readily admitted that she endeavored to process the transfer of OCT No. T-11566 in
complainant's name as agreed upon by them. Notably, such task is not part of her duties as a
court stenographer. Indeed, absent any showing that such conduct was permitted, she violated
the rule against "moonlighting" and hence, being her first infraction therefor, should be meted
with the penalty of reprimand, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
highest degree of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined to conduct themselves with
propriety even in private life, as any reproach to them is bound to reflect adversely on their office.
As such, they are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession even outside office hours to ensure full-time service so that there may be no undue
delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by prevailing
rules.
JOSEPHINE E. LAM vs. NILA M. GARCIAM JUNIOR PROCESS SERVER, MUNICIPAL

COURT, SIATON, NEGROS ORIENTAL
A.M. No. P-15-3300, 10 February 2016, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
Complainant Josephine E. Lam, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Siaton, Negros Oriental filed an Amended Letter-Complaint dated October 12, 2012 charging
respondent Nila M. Garcia (Garcia), Process Server of the same court, with insubordination and
conduct unbecoming a court employee. Complainant alleged in her Letter that on October 2, 2012,
at around 2:20 in the afternoon, respondent was scanning the Office Logbook so that she could
copy the entries to her Daily Time Record (DTR), when she said out aloud to Lam, "Pin! Buang Ka!
Yawa Ka! Nganong imo kong gibotangan ug absent? Gasunod sunod pa gud. Paghulat ug akoy
mabotang! Disabled!" ("Pin, you are stupid/foolish! You devil! Why did you mark me absent for
consecutive days? Wait until I would be the one to write! Disabled!"). Complainant replied,
"Ngano mang dili tikaw botangan ug absent diha nga wala man ka nitungha?" ("Why should I not
Page 369 of 370

mark you absent when in fact you were not around?"). Respondent then continued to hurl
abusive words against complainant, loud enough for their co-employees to hear.
In her Comment and Answer, respondent denied complainant's charges against her and
insisted that what happened between them was a mere misunderstanding. According to
respondent, she merely called complaint's attention as the latter maliciously modified the
former's DTR without notice. Respondent alleged that complainant erased some entries in
respondent’s DTR and superimposed on said entries the word "ABSENT." Respondent explained
that she felt insulted and humiliated by what complainant had done, not only because the DTRs
were the employees' personal property, but also because it had always been a practice in their
office that only the employees themselves are allowed to fill out or make changes to their
respective DTRs. Garcia further alleged that she confronted and raised her voice at complainant,
but denied demeaning or insulting the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of insubordination.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of simple discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee,

not insubordination.
Respondent, upon discovering that the entries in her DTR were modified, complained
loudly against complainant, using insulting and offensive words. For this, respondent must be
Time and again, the Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of employees in the
judiciary, particularly those in the first and second level courts, are circumscribed by the rules on
proper and ethical standards. The nature and responsibilities of men and women in the judiciary,
as defined in different canons of conduct, are neither mere jargons nor idealistic sentiments, but
working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. No less than
self-restraint and civility are at all times expected from court employees. Their conduct,
particularly when they are within court premises, must always be characterized by propriety and
decorum. Stated a bit differently, they should avoid any act or behavior that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts.
An employee of the judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity. Government service is people oriented where high strung and belligerent
behavior cannot be allowed.
Page 370 of 370

ETHICS - Consolidated Case Digests 2014-June 2016

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ETHICS - Consolidated Case Digests 2014-June 2016

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LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS 2014 - June 2016

ALVIN S. FELICIANO vs. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA ESTAQUIO vs. ATTY. EDGAR R.

Respondent is liable for failing to comply with the Court’s resolution

MOAMAR PANGANDAG vs. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES

Respondent is liable for failing to comply with the Court’s resolution

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA ESTAQUIO vs. ATTY. EDGAR R.

Respondent is liable for failing to comply with the Court’s resolution

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER

Whether or not the stipulation in the contract is valid

This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.

Edgardo Areola Vs. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza

Atty. Emmanuel Agustin et al. vs. Alejandro Cruz-Herrera

As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be

Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Whether or not the administrative complaint is with merit

ALMIRA C. FORONDA vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.

Complainant Foronda is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. She returned to the

Whether or not Atty. Alvarez violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility

The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "disbarment,

JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS vs. ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO

HENRY SAMONTE vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA

On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought an administrative

Whether Atty. Abellana is guilty of acts complained of.

JOSE ALLAN TAN vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE

Whether or not Diamante should be held administratively liable.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by

CHAMELYN A. AGOT vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA

Whether or not Atty. Rivera should be held administratively liable.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

MELODY R. NERY vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted. Lawyers are licensed

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL vs. ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY

Whether or not Roberto is guilty of serious misconduct

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty –

DARIA O. DAGING vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS

In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business

The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding

Yes. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:

FELIPE LAYOS vs. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner found Villanueva

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO

The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. Absent proof of

Whether respondent Francisco violated CPR rule on conflict of interest.

The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of

the first place.

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the [CPRL] is clear:

ERLINDA FOSTER vs. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

Whether or not Atty. Agtang violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court

FERNANDO W. CHU vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.

In response to the administrative complaint, Atty. Guico described the administrative