Descartes, Perspective, and the Angelic Eye

Author(s): Karsten Harries

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 49, Science, Language, and the Perspective Mind: Studies in
Literature and Thought from Campanella to Bayle (1973), pp. 28-42
Published by: Yale University Press
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KarstenHarries

and theAngelicEye
Descartes,Perspective,

Few philosophers are initiallyas accessibleand,in theend,as elusive

as Descartes.Consider theMeditations: withhismethodological doubt
Descartesmakesan effort to takenothing forgranted;thethought
of his predecessors is bracketed;the readeris asked to participate
in an effortto philosophize de novo.As commentators have shown,
thisattempt fails; Descartes' arguments are more dependenton the
tradition thanhis principleof doubtwouldallow themto be. Yet
evenif we keepin mindthemanywaysin whichDescartesfollows
his predecessors, his workdoes represent a new beginning which
helpedto shapeour understanding of man'splace in theworld.Just
thisposes a difficulty. We findourselvesalreadycaughtup in ways
of speakingand thinking whichrest,at leastin part,on Cartesian
foundations. Not onlythe courseof modernphilosophy was set by
his conception of propermethod;our scienceand technology, even
our commonsensewithits faithin reasonand reason'spowerto
graspand manipulate realityowe muchto Descartes.And yet,while
thisfaithstilltendsto be takenforgranted-inspiteof thefactthat
eversinceKantit has comeunderincreasing attack-Descartes him-
selfwas unwilling to do so. For himit was theresultof reflections
whichhad theiroriginin a doubtwhichputseventherealityof the
worldinto question.To a baroqueaudiencewhichwouldtendto
viewlifeas a dreamthisdoubtmayhave seemedfamiliar enough;
fromour post-Cartesian pointof viewits meaningis moredifficult
to understand: howcan Descartesdoubtthereality ofa worldwhich
is just beingtornapartby a veryreal war? Grantedthathe does
so onlyas a philosopher, can philosophy afford to flyin thefaceof
whatis generally acceptedand takenforgranted?But if we cannot
makesenseof Descartes'doubt,we cannotevenbeginto participate

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in his Meditations.
The basis of his and to some extentstillour
trustin reasonremainsobscure.

Descartesintroduces his doubtas a deviceguarding againsterror.

If whatclaimsto be knowledge is to deservethatname,it mustbe
placedon a securefoundation. In orderto establishsucha founda-
tion Descartesdemandsthatwe take as false all thatis not so
patentlytrueas to resistall our attempts to doubtit. Too oftenwe
acceptwhatis questionable and are contentwithappearanceand
conjecture.Not thatwe can dispensewiththisaltogether; we simply
don'thave timeto examinecarefully all we see and hear.But until
suchan examination has takenplace our thought cannotreallybe
secure,it willbe belief,notknowledge.
The demandforknowledge and a need forsecurity are closely
linked.Securityagain demandsstabilityand order.Descartesthus
refusesto acceptthingsas theyofferthemselvesin all theirfleeting
and confusing variety;theyare to be transformed in such a way
thattheycan be graspedandmastered.Thisis thegoalofhismethod.
Be it withour hands,be it withour mind,we can grasponly
whatendures.All thatis evanescent-melting snow,fogrisingfrom
a meadow,fireworks, a smile-eludesus. How can we hold on to
time?The baroque'sfascination withtimekeepingdevicescomes
to mind.Gongoratellsofourfutileattempts to buildfortimeprisons
of glasswhichwouldletus holdit in ourhands.Descartes'mathesis
universalisis a relatedeffort.
To wish for masteryof the worldis not only to wish for a
conquest of time,for a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis.It
is also to wishforan Archimedean point,a place whichwillpermit
us to seize realityas it is, not onlyits representations,
perspectival
appearanceswhichpresentthemselves to us onlybecauseour point
of viewhappensto be whatit is. Alongwiththedreadof time,this
dread of the distorting powerof perspective is at the centerof
Cartesiandoubtas it is at thecenterof muchbaroquethought.

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In thesecondof his Rules,wheretheprinciple of doubtis first

announced, Descartesasksus to rejectall merely possibleknowledge.
Doubt is tiedto possibility. In orderto doubtwe mustbe able to
conceiveof thepossibility thatsomething maybe different fromthe
wayit presents itselfto us. Essentialto doubtis thecontrast between
whatis and whatappearsto be. It is thusquitepossibleto doubt
whether theworldwhichI naivelytaketo be moreor less as I see
it reallyis thatway. In thisconnection philosophers have always
appealedto thefactthatour sensescan trickus; we do not even
have to appeal to opticalillusionsand thelike; something like the
distinctionbetweenappearanceand realityis inseparable from sense
experience. For example,as I look at thetablebeforeme,I am also
awarethatthatsame tablewill look different to thosewhosepoint
ofviewis notmyown.The tablelooksto me thewayit doesbecause
I happento be at thismoment in thisparticularplace.But in think-
ing the limitsimposedby mypointof view,I am alreadybeyond
theselimits:thusI can imaginemyselfoccupying differentpoints
of view.Weresomeoneto ask me to drawthetableas it wouldlook
froma pointof viewat thecenterof theceiling,I couldattempt to
do so. That thisis possibleshowsthatmy locationhereand now
does not imprison mythoughts. As soon as I recognizethata per-
spectiveis justa perspective and thatthereare others, I am already
in some sensebeyondall theseperspectives. This transcendence of
the selfoverthe hereand now makesit possibleto demandan a-
perspectival descriptionof the thingin question.
Historicallytherisingawarenessof and interest in thephenom-
enonof perspective, as it expressesitselfforinstance in thedevelop-
mentofrenaissance and baroqueart,goesthushandin handwiththe
emergence of theobjectiveconception of spacewhichis presupposed
bythenewscience.Alreadyin thefifteenth century CardinalNicolaus
Cusanusraisesthequestionwhether theearthis nottakenby us to
be thecenterof thecosmossimplybecausethisis wherewe happen
to findourselves. Could nota man drifting on a boat in themiddle
of the ocean take his boat to be the unmoving centerof theearth
withequal right?And wouldnot a lunariantendto takethemoon,

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a MartianMars to be thecenterof thecosmos?Whenwe maintain

thecentralpositionof theearth,are we notascribing to realityitself
whatonlyappearsto us becauseof ourpointofview?Thisreflection
on thephenomenon of perspectivehas explosiveconsequences. Not
onlydoes it lead Cusanusto questionthegeocentric worldview.The
veryidea of a naturalcenterof thecosmosis putintoquestion.And
if thisidea has to be givenup,it also makesno longeranysenseto
speakof thelimitsofthecosmos.Insteadwe arriveat theconception
of an objective, homogeneous, infinitespace. The overthrow of the
limited and hierarchicalmedievalcosmoshas itsoriginnotin thenew
scienceof Copernicus, Kepler,and Galileo,but in rathersimple
speculations on the natureof perspective.1 That such speculations
gainedwidecurrency is shownbya woodcutfromNuremberg, dating
fromabout 1530,whichshowsa man breakingout of the shellof
themedievalcosmos.2 The sixteenth century was readyforthedis-
coveriesof TychoBraheand Galileo.
But whilesuchreflections on thephenomenon ofperspective lead
to doubtin thatpictureof theworldpresented to us by thesenses,
theyhardlylead to the radicaldoubtwithwhichDescarteswould
have us begin.Justtheoppositewouldseemto be thecase. Doubt
providesits own curein thatit leads to a moreadequategraspof
whatis-whereone shouldperhapsquestiontheidentification of the
more adequatewiththe moreobjectivewhichis beingtakenfor
grantedhere.
We can generalize fromthisexample.To the extentthatI can
thinktheperspectival natureof myworld-andthepointof viewin
questionneednot be thehereand now,but couldbe myhistory or

1 "Origin"is used here to suggesta historicaland a logical priority.In

anotherpaper I hope to show thatCusanus' speculationsabout the infinity of
the cosmoshave theirrootsin Rhenishmysticism and in the hermetic tradition.
Thus when Cusanus describesthe cosmos as an infinite sphere,whichhas its
centereverywhereand its circumference nowhere,he uses a phrase which
firstappearsin the pseudo-hermeticLiber XXIV philosophorum as a metaphor
for the being of God, whose creativevisionis withoutlimitand beyondall
perspective.MeisterEckhartused the same metaphorto describeman's soul,
whosereachsurpassestheperspectival limitations
of all sense-boundknowledge.
Withthisreflection we are on the thresholdof a new objectivity.
2 Reproducedin Nikolaus von Cues, Die Kunst der Vermutung, Hans
Blumenberg, ed. (Bremen,1957),facingp. 186.

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my language-I mustalreadybe in some sensebeyondit, capable

of conceivingotherpointsof view.Considerthe following case:
someoneasks us to thinkof the Eskimosand of theirway of life
whichforcesthemtobe attentive toaspectsoftheirenvironment which
we would not even notice.We shouldexpectthisto be reflected
in theirlanguage.They are caughtin a linguistic framework dif-
ferentfromours-we live in different worlds.But to make sense
of thisthesiswe have to have someunderstanding of bothperspec-
tives.To understand howor eventhattheirworlddiffers fromours
we mustpossess the resourcesto do justiceto this If our
difference.
perspectives are indeeddifferent, we have to add thattheseper-
spectivesare not prisons,but can be transcended in thought.
This transcendence of thought makesit possibleto opposeto the
embodied,concrete"I" and its visionof the worldan angelically
pure or transcendental "I" whose"vision"of the worldwouldbe
objectiveand a-perspectival. The idea of such an angelic"I," and
perhapsit is no morethanthat,is implicit in ourexperience. It can
be uncovered and made the measureof whatpresentsitselfto us.
Usingthismeasurewe can tryto redescribe realityin such a way
thatall thoseaspectswhichpresupposea particular pointof view,
including all secondary qualities,dropout. The moveto objectivity
appearsto defeatdoubt.The ascentto thepureego promisessome-
thinglike the soughtArchimedean point,a transcendental absolute,
a place whereit is possibleto standwithout fearthatthisplace,too,
willbe recognized as relative.
To thinkan a-perspectival visionof realityis notyetto possess
it.We haveto keepin mindthattheobjective worldpictures provided
by scienceare notbased on somea-perspectival modeof vision,but
are conjectures which,if theyare to be morethanidle invention,
mustretaintheirfoundation in thedata providedby thesensesand,
in spiteof all thestriking successesof thenew science,it is by no
meansobviousthatthesilentand colourlessworldnow revealedto
us does greater justiceto realitythanthericherworldof our senses
of whichit is onlya redescription. Givenhis insistence thatwe take
as falseall thatis not so patently trueas to resistall our attempts

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to doubt it, Descartes would have us dismisssuch conjecturalknow-

ledge. If we are to escape fromdoubt theremust be in us a faculty
whichlets us grasp what is as it is, freeof the limitsof perspective.
Only if we can learn to see like the angels can Cartesian doubt be
defeated,can there be science in the Cartesian sense of clear and
evidentcognition.I

In the Rules Descartes makes a firstattemptto show thatwe do

indeed possess an intuitionwhich unlikeocular vision is not marred
by perspective.Mankind is said to have "no roads towardscertain
knowledgeopen to it, save those of self-evident intuitionand neces-
sary deduction."4 The former,more fundamental in thatit is presup-
posed by deduction,is tied to an apprehensionof simplenatures.By
theirvery essence such simple natures do not permitdoubt as to
what theyare. We eithergrasp themor we fail to grasp them.We
cannot grasp them partially,for they have no parts. They could
thusnot possiblybe otherthan theypresentthemselvesto us. Simple
naturesare necessarilyclear and distinct,while all clear and distinct
ideas are or can be analyzed into simple natures.
Descartes leaves the statusof these simples somewhatuncertain.
He certainlysuggeststhat they are recognized,not invented-they
are more than figmentsof the mind; theyare the buildingblocks,
not only of science, but of reality.Among his examples of simple
naturesDescartesincludesexistence,unity,duration,extension,things
that are the same as a thirdthingare the same as one another,the
triangleis bounded by three lines only, 2 + 2 = 4, I exist, and I
think-a rather mixed group which blurs the distinctionbetween
notions and propositionsand thus betweenintuitionand judgment.
But whateverhis simples may be, we know that if thereare such

3 AlexandreKoyr6 thus thinksit verylikelythat Aquinas' discussionof

angelicknowledgeservedas the sourceof Descartes'accountof humanknowl-
edge.See Essai sur l'Idee de Dieu et les preuvesde Son existencechez Descartes
(Paris, 1922), p. 93. Also, Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le role de la pensee
medievaledans la formation du systemecartesien,3e edition(Paris,1967),p. 12.
4 Rule XII; vol. I, p. 45. Page referencesare to The PhilosophicalWorks
of Descartes,Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, trans.,2 vols..(New
York, 1955).

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simples they cannot be sensed, for all objects of sense are given
perspectivally;they will presentthemselvesdifferently to different
pointsof view and consequentlymusthave more than one side; but
this is incompatiblewiththe demandedsimplicity. If thereis indeed
an intuitionof simples,there would also appear to be an escape
fromperspective.
Unfortunately Descartes himselfraises some doubts. There are
passages in the Rules whereDescartes separatesthe ordersof being
and knowingand does not insistthattheyrun exactlyparallel.What
seems simple to us may not be simple in reality."Here we shall
treatof thingsonly in relationto our understanding's awarenessof
them and call those only simple,the cognitionof whichis so clear
and distinctthat they cannot be analyzed by the mind into others
more distinctlyknown."' Are Descartes' simple naturessimpleonly
relativeto our understanding?In the Rules Descartesappears willing
to admit this.But withthis admissionwe findourselvesback in the
theatreof perspectives.The foundationof Cartesianscience in intui-
tion is renderedquestionable.

If Descartes is to show that the move to the clear and distinct

does indeed offeran escape fromperspective,he has to establish
clarityand distinctness as an adequate criterionfor the truthof our
representations.Only if this is possible can the gap betweenknow-
ledge and being which opened up in the Rules be closed. In the
Meditationsan attemptis made to provide the necessarybridgeby
an analysis of the cogito: I cannot doubt that I, a thinkingthing,
exist,and, if Descartes is right,what makes it impossiblefor me to
do so is nothingotherthan the clarityand distinctnessof the idea
involved.But is Descartes not presupposinghere what is still to be
established,thetrustworthiness of theclear and distinct?If theclarity
and distinctnessof our ideas is sufficient
to freeus fromdoubt,what
reason is thereto begin with the cogito ratherthan with any other
clear and distinctidea. Any of the simplesmentionedin the Rules

5 Rule XII; vol. I, p. 41.

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should do equally well. An explanationof whyat least some of these

simpleswon't do is givenin the Principles: "And when I statedthat
this propositionI think,therefore I am is the firstand most certain
which puts itselfto those who philosophizein an orderlyfashion,I
did not for all that deny that we must firstof all know what is
knowledge,whatis existence,and what is certainty, and thatin order
to thinkwe must be, and the like; but because these are notions
of the simplestkind, which of themselvesgive us no knowledgeof
anythingthat exists,I did not thinkthem worthyof being put on
record."6 Descartes now draws a distinctionbetween"notionsof the
simplestkind,"whichdo not claim to giveus a knowledgeof existence
and are thereforeof comparativelylittleinterest,and "propositions"
which do make that claim and just because of this are subject to
doubt.
The doubt of the Meditationspresupposesthat our thoughtsre-
presentor at least claim to representreality.Following medieval
traditionDescartes distinguishes betweenrealitasobjectiveand reali.
tas formalis.The representation (idea) intendsanotherrealitywhich
it claims to represent.By its claim to representation the idea has a
meaning,i.e. is realitas objective. This suggeststhat the objective
realityof our ideas cannot be graspedas a simple nature,for what
is grasped here is not simplyan idea, but this idea taken as a re-
presentation. Our understanding of objectiverealityinvolvesnot only
intuition,but judgmentas well and just thismakes it dubitable.Even
if our representations claim to representreality,how can this claim
be justified?Is not all our knowledgeof realitymediatedby ideas?
And if thisis so, is not the attemptto reach beyondrepresentations
to realityitselffutile?
Cartesiandoubtrecallsthe baroque view of thislifeas a theatrical
performance, the world as a stage, and of God as the authorof a
play in which we are givenparts we do not fullyunderstand.Only
deathputs an end to our performance;onlythendoes real lifebegin,
only thenwill we see realityas it is. With his hypothesisof an evil
deceitful demon Descartes transformsthe already distant divine

6 PrinciplesI, no. X; vol. I, p. 222.

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authorof the baroque into a being quite indifferent to man's desire

to grasp what is as it is. Descartes' demon has his originin the Oc-
camiteconceptionof an omnipotentGod in whosewill all truthshave
their foundation.Our truths,and this includes even the truthsof
mathematics, mustcorrespondto the creativethoughtsof God if they
are to be true in an absolute sense. To this view Descartes adds
the suspicion that we may not be attunedto God's will. A tran-
scendentground of what we take to be true is posited only to be
declared inaccessible.But this thoughtexperiment,which threatens
to transform thebaroque theatreintoa labyrinth, is introducedonlyto
show us that despitethe demon's schemeswe can escape fromcon-
jecture and doubt. The truthof what we comprehendclearly and
distinctlycannot be doubted while we so comprehendit. Here there
is no need to appeal to God. To the traditionalview which would
seek truthin the correspondenceof human and divine knowledge
Descartes opposes anotherwhich would found truthin the way in
which thingsappear to the perceivingsubject. "What is it to us,
thoughperchancesomeone feignthat that of the truthof whichwe
are so firmlypersuaded,appears false to God or to an Angel, and
hence is absolutelyspeakingfalse? We have assumed a conviction
so strongthatnothingcan removeit, and thispersuasionis the same
as perfectcertitude." 7 With Descartes the subject begins to replace

God as the foundationof truthand thusof reality.That otherCoper-

nican revolutionwhich Kant claims for his Critiqueof Pure Reason
announcesitself.The baroque view of the worldas a theatre,resting
as it does on the subordinationof the human to the divinepoint of
view, is replaced by anotherwhich understandsrealityin termsof
man's abilityto grasp and manipulatewhat is.
But Descartesprovidesus withno morethana beginning. The very
fact that he thinksit necessaryto secure our trustin the clear and
distinct,firstby an analysis of the cogito, later by proofs of the
existenceof God, shows that the traditionalview which seeks truth
in theadequacy of our ideas to thingswhichin turnhave theirfounda-
tion in the creativewill of God continuesto be operative.Descartes

7 Reply to ObjectionsII; vol. II, p. 41.

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turnsto the cogitoratherthanto any otherclear and distinctproposi-

tion because in this one case I am the realitybeing represented. No
longer imprisonedin my ideas, but outside,I can hope to show that
the clear and distinctis indeed like transparentglass which lets me
see what is withoutdistortion.
But do I have a clear and distinctidea of myself?We have to
grantDescartes that the existenceof the self cannot be doubted as
it is presupposedby all doubt,but how much contentcan I give to
this knowledge of my own existence? Certainly,and this would
be grantedby Descartes,all thatis connectedwithmy havinga body
is as dubitableas any othermatterof fact.But what remains?More
thanthe mutecertaintythatI am? Descarteswould pointto the idea
I have of myselfas thinkingsubstance.But thisidea is hardlygained
by simple intuition.It depends on a particularand questionable
interpretation
of being,accordingto which"to be" means "firstof all
to be as substance."8 Descartes' descriptionof the self as thinking
substancereststhus on theoryand is in that sense hypotheticaland
dubitable.

Is there any descriptionof realitywhich is not inadequate in

comparableways.Descartes' own interpretation of beingas substance
can be turnedto suggestthat thereis not. Substance,Descartes tells
us, is known only as that in which attributesreside. Man has no
unmediatedcognitionof substance.This recognizesthatour knowledge
of realityis markedby a kindof double awareness: our knowledgeof
what somethingis mediates,but does not exhaust our knowledge
of it. But does not our knowledgeof what somethingis depend on
antecedentlygiven, usually linguisticframeworkswhich determine
how that realitycan presentitselfto us? How definitiveare these
frameworks?Do they offerus more than possible points of view?
Once again a labyrinthof perspectivesthreatens. To answerthisthreat
Descartes could point out that in the case of language,too, we can
move from our language and its perspectiveto a more perfect

8 Meditation V; vol. I, p. 182. Principles I, nos. LI, LII, and Liii; vol. I,
pp. 239-40.

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a-perspectivallanguage. To be sure, thereis no logical reason why

there are just these languages and no others.The multiplicityof
languages is part of facticityand like all facticitygroundless.But
giventhe alreadymentionedpossibilityof an ascentfromthe concrete
"I" and its visionto thepure "I," can we not similarlyarriveat a con-
ceptionof languagewhichis equally pure,an a prioriformwhichall
languagesmustsharein orderto be languagesat all? Such an a priori
formcould not be imaginedto be otherthan it is. Its mode of con-
structionwould guaranteethatit would presentitselfto us sub specie
aeternitatis,i.e. as ground. The idea of this formcan be used to
judge one supposed a priorimore certainthan another.The greater
the degreeto whichparticularperspectiveshave been transcended, the
more ideal, the more certain the a priori. In this sense the rules
governingour use of the word "good" transcendmy particularper-
spective; theyprovideus witha commonmeasureand in this sense
they furnishsomethinglike an a priori,but this a priorilacks the
certaintyof,let us say, the rulesgoverningcountingor of such logical
principlesas the law of noncontradiction. Does thismovementto the
progressively more certaincome to an end, e.g. when we arrive at
the conditionsof all possible experience?If so, it should be possible
to establishsolid ground.
Withhis "notionsof the simplestkind" Descartestook a firststep
in this direction.Unfortunatelyhis discussionis too sketchyto pro-
vide more than suggestions.Perhaps even the principlesof logic can
be consideredperspectivalphenomena,as e. g. Nicolaus Cusanus tried
to show withhis discussionof a coincidentiaoppositorum.If so, man
can transcendthem.With Cusanus the step beyond all perspectives
becomes a step beyond the finiteto which we can give no content.
But this must remain no more than a suggestionon which little
depends.What I would like to emphasizehere is thatthismove to a
purerlanguagewhichoffersan escape frompossibilityand perspective
is also a move to the increasingly
formaland therefore empty.Again
the search for securityleads away fromconcretereality.
A more serious threatto the Cartesian programis posed by a
second consideration.To know what somethingis is to have assigned

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it a place in a logical or linguisticspace which has room not only

for this,but for countlessotherpossible worlds.This place is never
so fullydeterminedthatis could not also be occupied by some other,
very similarthing.To give just one example: outside my window
I see a lindentree,lightgreennow and wet withrain, almost ready
to bloom. But when I tryto describethis tree I also know that no
matterhow rich my descriptionsmightbecome, theywould still fail
to do justiceto thisparticulartree.The measureswhichwe bringto
reality,for instance when we call somethinga linden tree, cannot
capturethe individualin its individuality, but onlyin certainrespects
which make it comparableto otherobjects. We should not be too
quick to see in our inevitablefailureto close thegap betweenlanguage
and realitya defect.Wereit notpossibleto subjecttheinfinite richness
of realityto our measures,all attemptsto secure our place in the
worldwould be in vain. Realitywould drownus. But if,as Gryphius
writes,"throughlanguage we rule," that rule is very incomplete.I
The Cartesian demand for fullyadequate representations of reality
cannotbe fulfilled. Realityrevealsitselfto us as such preciselywhere
it revealsitselfto us as surpassingall our formsof representation.

Justas I cannotprovidea definitive description

of thethingswhich
surroundme, I cannot provide a definitivedescriptionof my own
self. Least of all does Descartes' thinkingsubstanceprovide such a
description.In it I grasp myselfnot concretely,but at best as the
abstract form of my and any other possible consciousness,an
abstractionwhich can appear so hard and simpleonly because it is
so formaland empty.As soon as I grasp myselfas this individual,

9 Andreas Gryphius,Grosse und Elend der Sprache [The Grandeurand

Misery of Speech]. The poem is in two parts.The firstpraises the giftof
speech: "Das Wunderder Natur,das UberweiseTier, / Hat nichts,das seiner
Zungensei zu gleichen./ Ein wildesVieh entdecktmitstummen Zeichen/ Des
innernHerzens Sinn; durchReden herrschenwir!" [The wonderof nature,
the more-than-wiseanimal,/ Has nothingto comparewithits tongue./ A wild
beast discoverswithmute signs / The meaningof the innerheart; we rule
throughspeech!"]. It concludeswith the line: "Des MenschenLeben selbst
beruhtauf seinerZungen" [Man's life itselfrestson his tongue].The second
part offersthe antithesis.It concludeswith the line: "Der MenschenTod
beruhtauf jedes Menschen Zungen!" [Men's death rests on every man's
tongue!].

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existinghere and now, the illusionof transparencydisappears.Again

the search fora securefoundationleads to an attemptto liftthe self
out of this world, to leave behind the prison of the body and to
become the pure "I." But far from leading to realitythis ascent
to angelic heights leaves only the emptinessof abstraction.The
attemptto make this form of self-knowledge the paradigm of our
knowledgeof realityhas to lead to a similarlyabstractpictureof the
world.

For very different reasons Descartes feltthat his analysis of the

cogito failed to provide an adequate foundationfor our faith in
the clear and distinct.Afterthatanalysishas been completed,doubts
return: How do I know whetherwhat presentsitselfto me clearly
and distinctly is reallytrue? Have I not been deceivedin thepast and
may I not be deceived again? Doubt reappears as a doubt in the
destructivepower of time.
This fear of time makes a firstappearance in the Rules. In his
discussionof deduction,on whichwe have to relyif we are to move
fromthe simplesprovidedby intuitionto morecomplicatedstructures,
he suggeststhat while intuitiontakes place "at the same time and
not successively,"deductiontakes time; its certitudeis "conferred
upon it in some way by memory."10But is memoryreliable? In the
Rules Descartes triesto minimizethis dangerby suggestingthat we
can learn to performour deductionsso quicklyas to all but cut out
this dependence on memory.The measure of knowledge is thus
providedby instantaneousintuition.Deduction is suspectbecause of
its tie to time.
These suspicionswere to increase. In his Replies to Mersenne
Descartes even goes so far as to maintainthat God's guaranteeis
necessaryonly to guaranteethe reliabilityof memory.This doubt
concerning memoryis no moreto be reducedto the empiricalproblem
of how reliable an individual's memoryis than Descartes' doubt
concerningthe realityof the world is to be reduced to the problem
of the reliabilityof our senses.In both cases the questionis whether

10 Rule III; vol. I, p. 8. Rule XI; vol. I, p. 33.

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KarstenHarries

my reach extendsbeyond the theatreof representations which here

and now presentsitselfto me. This momentmay be mine,but is the
past mine? The future?Doubt appears here as a functionof the at-
temptto give trutha foundationin the intuitionof the moment.That
attemptthreatensto imprisonthe knowerin the instant,makinghim
like an infant"whose power of thinkingis asleep." 11Accordingto
Descartes the infantdoes think,he is even consciousof his thoughts,
but he cannot grasp himselfin his successivethoughts.The infant
has neitherpast nor future.Similarlyour attemptto make the
momentarygrasp of the clear and distinctthe foundationof truth
cuts us offfromour own past and future.And yet,just as reflection
shows my point of view in space to be just one of infinitely many
possible points of view, it also shows this momentto be just one
manypossible moments.But can we call truthwhat has
of infinitely
its foundation only in what I now happen to grasp clearlyand dis-
tinctly?Is the very essence of truthnot destroyedwhen it is thus
subordinatedto time? With his proof of the existenceof God who
guaranteesthe reproductionof the past in the present,both as con-
tinuedexistenceand as memory,Descartes retreatsfromhis attempt
to foundtruthin the subject.
But is this retreatnot premature?Can we not replace God with
the subject,not with the concretesubject,bound to the here and
now, but with the transcendentalor pure subject. It is indeed in
such a replacementthat our own objective view of realityhas its
foundation.Our truthshave theirmeasurein what such an ideal ob-
serverwould findtrue,where it is importantto note that the ideal
observerneed not existto providethismeasure.It has been suggested,
by Heideggerforexample,thatall this talk of a pure "I" restson a
confusionof theologyand philosophyand it is indeed easy to show
that there are historical and systematicconnectionsbetween the
ChristianGod and the transcendental subjectwhichcomes to replace
God as the foundationof truthand reality.12 But to point thisout is
not to discreditthe latterconception.As I have triedto show, the

11 Reply to ObjectionsIV; vol. II, p. 103.

12 Sein und Zest,7th edition(TUbingen, 1953),p. 229.

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 Yale French Studies

pure "I" has its foundationin the self-understanding of concretely

existingman who, as he becomes aware of himselfas occupyinga
particularpoint of view here and now, also learnsto transcendit.
There is, however,a crucialdifference betweenthe ways in which
God and thetranscendental subjectcan functionas foundationof real-
ity.While God functionsas the groundof all thatis, providingboth
formand matter,the transcendental subject providesonly its empty
form,a formwhichhas room not only forthis,but forendlessother
subjectis an
possible worlds.Part of the ascentto the transcendental
ontologywhich reduces realityto groundlessfacticity.
Here we come to what is perhaps the fundamentalreason for
Descartes' retreatfrom his own attemptto make the subject the
foundationof truthand to a final formulationof Cartesian doubt.
Again doubt presupposesthat we measurewhat presentsitselfto us
as realityby our idea of reality.Followingthe traditionDescartesties
being to perfectionand perfectionto self-sufficiency. What supports
itselfin its being is thus more perfectthan what depends for its
being on another.Substancesare more perfectthan attributes;God,
in whose will all thingshave theirfoundation,is the most perfect
being.Measured by thisidea of reality,the objectiveworldof science
has to appear unreal. The world of Descartes' dream is one which
is neithermaintainedby God in its being,nor, like the Cartesian
God, the foundationof its own being; it is a worldwithouta founda-
tion,a bubble floatingon the nothingness of timewhichhas replaced
God. Given a very different understanding of realitywhich stresses
objectivityand makes man's power to grasp and manipulate the
measure of what is, this doubt ceases to be intelligible.But that
understandingof being, which owes much to Descartes and his
method,is more an expressionof our will to rule than a conclusion
drawnfrombeingitself.Perhaps we findit so difficult to understand
Descartes' dream because this dream has become our reality.

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