ANOTHER POSSIBILITY

Author(s): CATHERINE MALABOU and Simone Kearney

Source: Research in Phenomenology , 2006, Vol. 36 (2006), pp. 115-129
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24660635

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY

by

CATHERINE MALABOU
Unwerdté de Paris X-Nanterre

Abstract

We try to explore here the Derridean concept of "possibility." Such a concept has no
contraries. It does not oppose effectivity or necessity, or even impossibility, but stays
what it is in any case: possible. Trying to negate it or to contradict it only leads to
denial. To Derrida, this strange status of possibility is addressed as the question of faith
as such, as it appears in "Faith and Knowledge." Every belief is always, at its founda
tion, belief in the possibility of a completely different history altogether, in what Derrida
calls the "utterly other chance." Is deconstruction the legible form of this otherness?

There is another possibility. It is in this way, very simply, that I would

resume the ultimate teaching of Jacques Derrida. This phrase, "there
is another possibility," can be conjugated in all tenses. In a sense, it
is time itself, a sort of transcendental schematism that secredy governs
the categories of deconstruction.
There is another possibility. In the present tense, this signifies: there
is always something else than what is. There is always something to
prefer. Let us not forget it: Derrida's last words were an injunction of
preference: "always prefer life and constandy affirm survival."1 Survival
is the other possibility of presence.
There is another possibility. In the future, it signifies: another order
of things may come, even if one can't "see it coming." The other
possibility is the absolute arrival. Derrida also gives the name "promise"
to this "arrival."

There is another possibility. In the past it signifies: that which has

been, all of our history, could have happened otherwise. A wholly
other possibility could have guided time. Other events could have
occurred that would have constituted another tradirion. This concept
of possibility is not that of the possible, which is connected to necessity
or actuality in the history of philosophy. The wholly other possibility

Research in Phenomenology, 36
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands 2006

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1 16 CATHERINE MALABOU

would be that which no other category could

the necessary nor the actual nor even the imp
Derrida tells us we can only believe in the ot
are the modalities of such a belief? Here w
address this question.

To begin, we would like to examine the motif

belief, of faith and the promise, present in Derri
it is evidently illegitimate to distinguish between
nevertheless one must recognize differences in
that the vast problematic of the "messianic" th
those of possibility and belief returns in the l
way, highlighting in a new fashion the problemat
like Circortfession,2 Spectres de Marx,3 Khôrap and
taine possibilité impossible de dire l'événement,
only these, are the most eloquent witnesses of
to the "vocabulary of the believed."8
One of the most remarkable traits of these te
that Derrida establishes between the other possibilit
Let us begin by clarifying the link that imme
dénégation closer together. Believing in someth
to holding that something as undeniable. O
affirmation of the undeniable always preclud
undeniable and the believed have a connection t
is believing that it is possible. So what does
possibility is undeniable? In "Foi et savoir," De
can not deny it, which means that one can at
the same time always signihes that one can only d
of the undeniable, because in order to be said
negation—one can not deny it—is always itself
a possibility is undeniable is "another way of
avoid denying it: one can only deny it."10 Or
be dénégation for this undeniable."11 Can w
possibility? Can we avoid believing in it? In a c
questions come back to the same thing.
This unavoidable logic of dénégation is of
specihed belief, for such and such act of faith
in particular. But each case proceeds from a c
called transcendental: affirming the undeniable ch
whatever it may be, believing in it, necessa

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 1 1 7

that this possibility could occur, without nece

could at least mark an event {faire événement). Bel
in the future; such is the foundation of all messi
other can arrive, finally or once again, arrive
Wholly other, signifying other than what is, oth
happened, other than that which we could ex
The wholly other has to do not only with th
also with the possibility of a wholly other beginn
the transcendental horizon of faith—always c
source: that everything could have been other
have happened otherwise. Possibility of anothe
what Derrida, in "Demeure, Athènes," entitles
[chance]." In this text, the philosopher evoke
"the way in which this poor Socrates betwe
sighting of the sails past Cape Sounion, believed,
that he would save himself, and philosophy
whereas I continue to believe [said Derrida]
have had another opportunity."12
"I persist in believing philosophy could have
nity": such is the paradigmatic example of an
niable, such is the typical example of a wordin
Socrates could have escaped; we can believe it
that even if Socrates affirms the contrary, e
declares that there is no other possibility than to
of the best by remaining in prison. Despite h
always possible to believe that philosophy c
opportunity or another destiny. One can believ
it. One can (not/only) deny it [On ne peut (que
Dénégation is born in this strange place whe
birth flickers, in the faltering caused by the ver
cannot fail to haunt all of tradition, all of
sequence of facts. This question is the followin
had taken place, something wholly other, something incred
everything that has occurred? A question that at t
up to the future: and what if something else, the wholly
(chance), the other possibility was susceptible to occu
cannot say what could have been or what cou
tunity (chance) for philosophy, for example. B
questioning this opportunity, whether such a
starting point or as an aim. One must always p

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1 18 CATHERINE MALABOU

Dénégation is there, taken away and given at t

manner in which this question inevitably resou
solicitation of thought by itself, in the manner
resounds without being able to be asked. The qu
(tout) other origin is a question that insists, digs, g
event (événement effectif ), gives it a surplus of t
repeating it, by repeating to itself that it cann
as a question, impossible as a question, necessar
gation would name this yes and this no in questi
The other opportunity is undeniable. It is for
can, that we must, give it credit. Perhaps this
the impossibility to go beyond, further than dé
or to suture the origin by a pressure that, whil
would not concede to it; it could perhaps be this im
to the origin that would liberate, negatively, the tr
origin, in which we cannot but believe. The secr
tunity seals the indissoluble alliance between fa
The new orientation of Derrida's interrogatio
in his final texts to pursue his explanation wit
"negative theology." This motif of dénégation,
elaborate from a new form of "apophatic" discou
that deconstruction "seems to return to this rhe
mination in an insistent and regular fashion, en
cautionary apophatic warnings: this, which is c
the text, the writing, the trace, the différance, the
the pharmakon, the paragon, etc.), it 'is' neither
sensible nor intelligible, neither positive nor ne
nor without, neither superior nor inferior, neit
neither present nor absent, not even neutral."
Derrida explains this new proximity with negat
avoid being merely apparent, must nonetheless
as it is the mask of an irreducible gap.
The thinker recognizes well the necessity of
the apophatic, i.e., to a modality of the negative
and to speak plainly, if it is true that every act
sible starting from an advantage (un crédit), an
the speaker to the listener. But far from accus
of discourse in relation to what it designate
hyper-essentiality of God), this modality of the ne

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 119

nor that, etc.) constitutes, on the contrary, t

of the discursive in the perspective of which
announce itself.

We should then of course look at Freud to understand the logic

proper to dénégation and the new use which Derrida makes of it. In
the text from 1925, entided " Vemeinung" Freud gives a specific significance
to this term. Dénégation is the act by which a subject refuses to
recognize as his own desire, a feeling or an object that he has repressed.
The Vocabulaire de psychanalyse specifies that it has to do with a "process
in which the subject, while formulating one of his desires, thoughts,
feelings, until then repressed, continues to defend himself denying that
it belongs to him."14 The individual says "no" but this "no" means
"yes."
Thus so, in one sense to deny {dénier) means the impossibility of
denying {nier), as Freud's famous example shows us. After recounting
the dream, the patient said to the analyst: "You ask who could that
person be in the dream. My mother, [but] it is not her."15 Explanation
that the psychoanalyst inevitably interprets immediately as "it's my
mother," being certain that the more vehement are the patient's oppo
sitions to his interpretation, the more they actually betray an admission
or an affirmation.

The method, which rests on a logical quirk—to transform the nega

tion into an affirmation—"is very handy," says Freud. "We ask [the
patient]: what can you hold to be the most improbable of all, in this
situation? What, in your opinion, was furthest then from you? If the
patient falls into the trap and names that which he could least believe,
he has thus, almost always, admitted that which is true."16 The inter
pretation consists then in systematically affirming {soutenir) the opposite
of what the patient says.
Nevertheless, dénégation is not a simple contradicted affirmation
{affirmation contrariée). If it dealt simply with that, the analytic cure
would be something quick and easy. Certainly, dénégation is an
affirmation turned upside down, but it also says something else. Thus
it persists like a negation despite its obvious dimension of an admit
tance. The subject who denies is found out through analysis, yet he
continues to deny it, does not recognize what is evident. The proof
then ceases to be a piece of evidence, and we are faced here with a
wall of resistance that does not concede to any test of truth or of reality.
For even if the analyst makes the denied object return, the mother in

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 1 20 CATHERINE MALABOU

this case—"it's your mother"—he cannot mana

sent to the subject; he makes her come back den
as a pure possibility. "It's your mother," says th
the patient does not admit it, the mother does no
she remains probable. It is possible, the patient r
the one who said it. Neither present, nor absent
negatively possible. She saves herself indehnitely.
would be exactly that—that which, simply suggested
itself on the ontological reserve, without the sta
That which remains on the threshold of being Freud
Thus the denied object is not reduced to the st
but quite thrown out of being. It is excluded fro
beings. The repressed, the denied, is rejected from
endlessly possible.
Such a possible is not a negation of the effectiv
affirmation of the impossible. Without being red
the negative possible is not the expression of any
witness to a power or to an aptitude of the negative
itself nor subtracts itself (ni ne se manque). This stra
defined by Freud as the state of that which must not
possible corresponds to an interdiction of presenc
Derrida takes up this understanding of the poss
the problematic of dénégation, and clearly co
philosophical question to which it is irreducibly co
of the absolute other origin. Dénégation, whose meand
are multiple, would be governed by the fundamental
possibility.
Derrida's oeuvre in its entirety can be read as the most scrupulous,
the most audacious attempt to legitimize the question of the wholly
other opportunity: the right of this question resides in its undeniable
character. This theme is clearly present in the very first texts, to which
the commentary on the thought of Levinas, developed in " Violence et
métaphysique," attests in particular. Derrida recognizes as undeniable the
Levinasian "dream" of a dispossession, of a de-motivation of the philo
sophical tradition in the name of the other in Greek, of the other of
the Greek source and of its German reappropriation. " Violence et méta
physique" characterizes this other as the "ultra-logical affect of speech":
"Interpolation of Greek by the non-Greek from the depth of a silence,
of an ultra-logical affect of speech, of a question which can only be

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 12 1

said by forgetting itself in the language of th

getting itself, can only be said in the languages
dialogue between speech and silence."17 And f
has already begun, we know it and this strang
another absolute origin, another absolute decis
the question in mind, liberates an incommens
cipline of the question."18
The later texts emphasize the importance of
so, a text like "Foi et savoir" gives the proble
origin a fundamental importance. It turns
very origin of faith, as we can see in this
gap between the opening of possibility (as a u
the determined necessity of this or that religion
ducible; and sometimes within each religion, be
what keeps it closest to its own 'pure' possibilit
own necessities or authorities determined by hi
can always criticize, reject, or combat this or t
or belief, even of religious authority, in the
nary [originaire] possibility. This one can be unive
thiness, 'good faith' as a condition of testimon
even of the most radical kind of questioning) o
example the belief in some original event of re
injunction, like in the reference to the Comma
Christianity, to some fundamental speech or w
pure than the clerical or theological discourse
ble to deny possibility in the name of which, t
necessity (determined authority or belief) woul
tion, suspended, rejected or criticized, even de
[on ne peut pas\ deny it, which means we can
deny it. Thus the discourse that we would use
always cede to the hgure or the logic of déné
the place where, before and after the enlight
reason, criticism, science, tele-techno science,
general keeps the same resources as religion in
Let us recall the general context of the analy
nomenon of the "return of the religious," whic
a violent resurgence of the religious question—
orthodoxy, fundamentalism—so difficult to th
understand and criticize at the same time?

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122 CATHERINE MALABOU

It is because the question of the return, Derrida

There is always more than one return in the
also doubles (se dédoublé) or repeats itself. In th
return of the religious is to recognize that re
twice. First, in the form of outbidding (surenchè
of the critique of the outbidding. This one
another religion to return: not this or that r
that determined religion, but a certain faith, prec
other opportunity (chance) (the belief in the fact
cism can happen), faith only from which fana
account and denounced. It is thus always in th
we think religion. It would be naive to think
gion can be criticized in the name of reason o
be independent from belief, or as if knowled
absolutely independent of faith. The final part
it: thought and religion both find their sustenanc
And it is towards this place—what it is, how t
Derrida's analysis directs itself.
"Always more than one source," he says, rei
title of Bergson's,20 recalling as well the two
of the word religion distinguished by Benveniste
then by exploring the gap set by Kant bet
religion" and "reflective faith" in Religion vuithin t
This reflective faith, says Derrida, "is not essen
historical revelation and so accords itself to t
practical reason."21 Eventually radicalizing thi
religion, and rational faith, Derrida, in the en
in which Heidegger extracts the thought o
(iSchuldigsein) from the Christian root as wel
occupations, aiming in this way towards a pri
originary than Kantian faith. The word "religi
resources of its source, would designate at once
ducible to a determined revelation, as well as p
from historical revelations.

Derrida asks: "How can we think then—withi

reason—a religion that, without reverting to '
be actually universal today? And that would
Christian paradigm or even the Abrahamic
words, no longer stops at that which has had
in the name of religion, it being understood t
Koranic revelations are inseparable from a historid

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 123

This universal religion is the other name for

democracy. It characterizes itself by an openness
the other. This openness to the other characteri
messianicity (messianicité) without messianism (m
be the openness to the future or to the arrival
coming of justice, but without a horizon of exp
prophetic préfiguration. The coming of the oth
singular event except where no anticipation can
other and death—and true evil—can surprise at
The "messianic" points to a faith without d
"every act of language and every act of addressi
is postulated every time I open myself to the o
trust (confiance) that I have or would like to have in
that I have or would like to have in the event of the encounter or

the future of the community. Yet—and here we begin to approach

the motif of dénégation—this faith is, in its possibility, more originary
than any act of confessional faith, more than any adhesion to a his
torically-determined religion. This faith or this act of trust (crédit) is in
some way prior to history, utterly originary (arche-onginary), for it makes
a sign, beyond the historical event of revelation, towards revealability
itself. Here Derrida interrogates, in the name of this strange faith, a
surplus or supplement of origin that exceeds the logic of history that
it has nevertheless opened and to which it does not belong. This
surplus, which no determined religion can understand, would coincide
precisely with the possibility of the wholly other opportunity (la tout
autre chance).
This surplus, then, is a place, the place, that at the same time is
atopical (atopique), that is to say, without place, without possible
localization. It is the pure possibility of the place that gives rise with
out itself occupying a space, without taking care of its own space. A
location we can only reach by the detour of a certain via negativa. This
place without location effects thought "ultra-logically" by shying away,
since the wholly other origin or the wholly other opportunity did not
take place (donnent lieu) and might never take place. They give rise (lieu),
they can give rise, but they themselves do not present themselves and
will not present themselves. Thus we can only speak of them apophat
ically, by summoning figures of aporia. In "Foi et savoir,'" Derrida names
four of these figures: the island, the promised land, the desert, and khora.
The text called "Comment ne pas parler" already insists on the "desertic
character, radically ahuman and atheological, of this 'place'."25 The
place of the wholly other possibility uproots the tradition of the place,

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1 24 CATHERINE MALABOU

whether this word is understood in the te

tion of the "taking place" [avoir lieu] as an even
(the tradition of the topic, of the place of discour
that which takes place is there). Thus the deser
abstraction of the place, the place where the
trace, according to the paradox that has it that
law—the law of the law, the institution of the
of the constitution—[be] a 'performative' even
the whole that it founds, inaugurates or justi
unjustifiable in the logic of what it will have o
of the other in the undecidable."26 The desert, or
is thus the paradoxical site of rooting—the fou
where the root is at the same time torn from
the source of all radicality. Between the root
tance of absolute alterity opens itself.
This place is a place of infinite resistance
khôra of the Timaeus, it is an-archical and un-arc
"without age and without history." Khôra is no
this nothing does not even announce itself as "
de l'être)·, it is not reappropriable (réappropr
theology, for it does not make a sign towards
arrives by it [khôra] and nothing happens to
"remains absolutely unmoved [impassible] and
processes of historical revelation or of anthrop
which nonetheless supposes its abstraction."28 B
abstraction that resists as promise, as excess of
sources of faith, faith in the wholly other opport
of this desert in the desert... is that by uproo
carries it, by atheologizing it, this abstraction lib
faith, a universal rationality and political democra
from it."29

It is now possible to take into account the log

upholds such a discourse. The place of the wh
of the wholly other opportunity, is nothing,
resists without being, without having the time or
before time, from before history, without b
lead, whether chronologically, logically, or on
neither a principle nor an origin nor an event
with an instance but rather reveals itself in t
(here we can speak neither of being nor of man

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 1 25

would consist of this: being impossible to be

the undeniable, the undeniable insistence. The ga
of possibility and necessity for one religion or ano
cannot deny this possibility. That is to say o
possibility is not the possibility of something
demonstrates, dénégation has no bearing on the
but defines possibility itself. To be possible is
can be said in another way: the possible appears
the pure and simple impossibility of being den
possibility is dénégation. It is nothing outside of th
it does not affirm itself nor propose itself only to
consequendy negation, to the limit: at most one
as one denies it, which one cannot avoid doi
believe in it, one believes in it for that very rea
Dénégation, or the play of the undeniable, are
than the determined forms of dénégation that
determined forms that Derrida enumerates: that w
or in question, suspension, rejection, critique, deconst
course, all discourses of refusal, struggle, fight,
against this or that form of religious fanaticism, p
niable, that is to say from the very possibility o
attain, through struggle, only that which is determ
the absolutely originary {originaire) place or the re
of combat.

The discourse that we would oppose to that, Derrida says, would

always concede to the figure or to the logic of dénégation. A first
opposition to this discourse could consist in the following affirmation:
there is and there will always be only that which is; nothing other
than "determined necessity." Faith in the wholly other origin betrays
a naive trust in a sort of must-be {devoir-être) or bad infinity {mauvais
infini)·, it is a discourse of the "beautiful soul" {belle âme), the fraudu
lent intrusion of an illusory transcendence in the course of historical
immanence. To this discourse, one could respond that as soon as one
says: there is only that which is, this statement participates in the faith
in the "there is" and would not be possible without the trust {crédit),
open to speech, accorded to the donation itself (there is, es gibt). But
this donation is undeniable.

A second objection could show that it is impossible to exceed the

horizon of determined religion. To talk the Derridean way is to talk
once more from Christianity and Judaism. To this, one could respond

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1 26 CATHERINE MALABOU

that in fact Derrida is always speaking from the

tion, which he never pretended to do otherwi
attempts to analyze, between possibility and deter
not situate itself beyond religion but opens itsel
historically-determined religion. Not surprising then
its path, already, in this or that tradition. "There
one source."30

A third objection could raise the question of knowing if what Derrida

names faith, tolerance, trust {credit], messianic, etc., truly has a connection
with faith or with religion—if it has to do with a misuse of language
or not: faith is faith and not a subtle disguise of a form of atheism or
a ruse on the part of reason, of a counterfeit of faith. To answer this
objection would be to show that one cannot delimit a domain of
authentic faith without having faith in this authenticity itself, otherwise
said: unless one has faith in faith. This fiduciary reflexivity, this reflexivity
of faith, is made possible by an originary act of belief in faith itself
that does not confuse itself completely with the object of faith. It is
this gap that is given the name of possibility, or decision of the other.

It would probably be possible to multiply the effects of dénégation on

dénégation, that is to say, of the undeniable. They would come up
against the implacable logic of Derrida's argumentation. The undeniable
can only be denied. It is in the name of undeniable possibility that
determined or derived necessity can be deconstructed. Thus, as it has
been shown as early as Of Grammatolog)), in considering writing as that
which has been derived from the gaze of speech {la parole), metaphysics
had at the same time repressed the supplement, in other words, first
and foremost the possibility of the supplement of origin and of the
wholly other possibility.
The tie that unites possibility and dénégation is structural. The
possible—that which must not come into presence—is the very inden
tation (echancrure) of the future. Denying always demands an act of faith,
which I would define as faith in another possible beginning, in another
source. As soon as I deny, that is to say, as soon as I deny the evidence,
I postulate, without being able to affirm it, that everything could have
been otherwise, that everything could have happened differently.
Dénégation liberates the negative possibility of another history/story
{histoire). The negative possible, the state of that which must not be
made present, is the question that cannot be asked and that, at the
same time, can only be asked. It is this too that we cannot not hold

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 127

as being possible. That which we reject, exclude

one way or another, the vertigo of the wholly o
most secret? Is it not always that which I am n
fantasmatically, the question of what I could h
question, negatively possible, that lodges itself
history, all translation, all genesis. Not that wh
which could have been. This question which
name of actuality (effectivité) and which neverthel
of (au titre de) dénégation. The question of the
a question that we too often and quickly rid
ponder on what could have been," "Look at w
remake history," etc. And yet, do we not cont
way or another, of the other possibility? To the
this other origin that we hold as negatively po
non-presence that doubles the present, this neg
which could have been encircles actuality (effectivit
of it since it always returns?
Negative Hypothesis. This return signifies the i
the negative, which Freud, as we know, design
of the compulsion of repetition. That which re
of the possible. In recalling the scene of the tr
its dénégation, that is to say, the possibility th
Any questions, whether formulated or not, exp
throw towards the wholly other: and what if i
and what if something else had happened? w
the compulsion of repetition. For this reason, ne
an automatic procedure, a machine to retell or
Positive Hypothesis. The question of the other pos
other version, would simply not be, or not eve
being attached to the past (passéiste), of having a
logical attitude, but the sign of the coming of a
A way of being excluded from the domain of tr
way of being that we could call that of an a post
we reject, what we exclude, what we deny, is a
pending.
With such a possible, it has to do then with the opening of the
banality (sans histoire) in the story, of what Freud calls, in Inhibition,
symptôme et angoisse, that which has "not happened [non advenu]."31 In
a way that which has not happened; this dismissal of a charge (non
lieu), this repressed or rejected, harbors in itself the worst possibility.

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 128 CATHERINE MALABOU

Every fundamentalist attempt probably takes roo

actualize a presumed fantastic origin, wanting t
droits) what could have been, transforming i
quite the worst that can happen. Attempting
what reality has excluded from the beginni
impulse to destroy, the death wish.
At the same time, the negative possible is th
which does not let itself be encroached by any
any presence. That which does not lend itself
test of facts. A naive absolute trust, a child's f
"no and no," this fragile but unconditional bel
quite simply, would not be possible. Let us, rat

Translated by Simone Kearn

Boston College

NOTES

1. Quoted by Michel Lisse, m Jacques Derrida, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris:
ADPF-Publications, 2005), 66.
2. Circonfession, in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Paris
Le Seuil, 1991).
3. Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993).
4. Khôra (Paris: Galilée, 1993).
5. "Foi et savoir. Les deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison,"
in Gianni Vattimo and Jacques Derrida, La religion (Paris: Le Seuil, 1996), 9-86.
6. "Une certaine possibilité impossible de dire l'événement," in Dire l'événement, est-c
possible?, with Gad Soussana and Alexis Nouss (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 79-112.
7. (Paris: Galilée and Presses Universitaires de France, 2002).
8. First words of Circonfession, 7.
9. "Foi et savoir," 77.
10. "Comment ne pas parler," 561, in Psyché: Inventions de l'autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987)
535-95.
11. Ibid., 549.
12. "Demeure, Athènes. Nous nous devons à la mort," in Jean-François and Jacques
Derrida, Athènes à l'ombre de l'acropole, photographies de Jean-François Bonhomme
(Athens: Editions Olkos, 1996), 61.
13. Ibid.
14. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967), 113.
15. Freud, "La négation" ("Die Verneinung"), 167, in vol. 7 of Œuvres complètes (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 165-71.
16. Ibid.
17. "Violence et métaphysique," in L'écriture et la différence (Paris: Le Seuil, 1967), 196.
18. Ibid., 118.
19. "Foi et savoir," 76-77.

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 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 129

20. This of course refers to Les deux sources de la morale et de

21. "Foi et savoir," 19.
22. Ibid., 23.
23. Ibid., 17.
24. Ibid., 27.
25. "Comment ne pas parler," 570.
26. "Foi et savoir," 28-29.
27. "Comment ne pas parler," 569.
28. "Foi et savoir," 31.
29. Ibid., 29.
30. Ibid., 85.
31. S. Freud, Inhibtion, symptôme et angoisse, trans. Fr. Jo
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 34.

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