THE EMOTIONS

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES

Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor:
KEITH LEHRER, University ofArizona

Managing Editor:
LOIS DAY, University ofArizona

Board of Consulting Editors:

JONATHAN BENNETT, Syracuse University
ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan
ROBERT STALNAKER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University

VOLUME 53
 O.H.GREEN
Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, U.s.A.

THE EMOTIONS
A Philosophica1 Theory

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Green. O. H.
The emotions / O.H. Green.
p. cm. -- (Philosophical studies series ; v. 53)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-94-010-5126-2 ISBN 978-94-011-2552-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-2552-9
1. Emotions (Phi lasophy) 2. Intentional ity (Phi lasaphy)
1. Title. II. Serles.
B105.E3G74 1992
152.4--dc20 91-42219

ISBN 978-94-010-5126-2

Printed an acid-free paper

AII Rights Reserved

© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1992
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1992
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
 To My Mother and
the Memory of My Father
 CONTENTS
Preface Xl

Acknowledgements XV

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I Understanding Emotions 1

1. Introduction 1
2. Conceptual Coherence 2
3. Explanatory Value 5
4. Physical Realization 9
5. Conclusion 11

THE INTENT/oNALfIY OF EMOTIONS

Chapter II Intentionality 15
1. Introduction 15
2. Representation 16
3. Rational Assessment 18
4. Rational Function 19
5. Representation and Rationality 23
6. Emotional Intentionality 26
7. Conclusion 28

Chapter III Emotions and Belief 31

1. Introduction 31
2. The Extension of Belief 32
3. "Objectless Emotions" 33
4. Cognitively Anomalous Emotions 34
5. Propositional Content 38
6. Conclusion 41

Chapter IV Component Theories of Emotions 43

1. Introduction 43
2. Constitutive Phenomena and Derived Intentionality 44
3. Causal Relations 46
4. Emotional Intentionality 49
5. Dispositional Emotions 53
6. Conclusion 59
V1l1 CONTENTS

Chapter V Evaluative Theories of Emotions 61

1. Introduction 61
2. Non-emotional Evaluations 62
3. Semantic Properties 63
4. Rationality 68
5. Desires and Desirability Judgments 69
6. Conclusion 76

Chapter VI The Belief-Desire Theory of Emotions 77

1. Introduction 77
2. Intentional Structures 78
3. Basic Emotions 81
4. Semantic Assessment 89
5. Rationality 93
6. Elements and Compounds 96
7. Objections Considered 98
8. Conclusion 104

THE ECONOMY OF MIND

Chapter VII Emotional Behavior 109

1. Introduction 109
2. Emotional Expression 111
3. Emotional Motivation 118
4. Conclusion 127

Chapter VIII Emotional Affectivity 129

1. Introduction 129
2. Emotions and Sensations 129
3. Emotions and Perception 133
4. Hedonic States 135
5. Emotional Intensity 136
6. Experiential Emotions 138
7. Objections Considered 144
8. Conclusion 147

DIMENSIONS OF EMOTIONS

Chapter IX Activity and Passivity 151

1. Introduction 151
 CONTENTS lX

2. Desire Dependence 153

3. Iterated Beliefs and Desires 158
4. Slavery to Desires 161
5. Deciding to Believe 163
6. Responsibility 167
7. Conclusion 168

Chapter X Positive and Negative Emotions 171

1. Introduction 171
2. Drawing the Distinction 172
3. Emotional Opposition 174
4. The Differentiation of Emotions 181
5. Conclusion 188

References 191

Glossary 197

Index 201
 PREFACE

Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories of

scientific psychology, represent attempts to capture the essence of
emotions basically as they are conceived in common sense psychology.
Although there are problems, the success of explanations of our behavior
in terms of believes, desires and emotions creates a presumption that, at
some level of abstraction, they reflect important elements in our
psychological nature.
It is incumbent on a theory of emotions to provide an account of two
salient facts about emotions as conceived in common sense psychology.
As intentional states, emotions have representational and rational
properties: emotions represent states of affairs; and they are rationally
related to other mental representations, figure in rational explanations of
behavior, and are open to rational assessment. Emotions also have a
close relationship to a range of non-intentional phenomena: in typical
cases, emotions involve physiological changes, usually associated with the
activation of the autonomic nervous system, which are proprioceptively
experienced; and they often involve behavioral tendencies, as well.
I take the explanation of emotional intentionality to be the central
problem for a theory of emotions. It is often claimed that beliefs and
desires are in some sense the basic intentional states. If beliefs and
desires are understood in terms of their informational and motivational
functions, I think that this claim is correct. This means that the structure
of any intentional state is to be understood in terms of its relation to
beliefs, desires, or both. This is what gives rise to the problem of
emotional intentionality. Understanding the intentionality of emotions
constitutes a problem because in important respects emotions are like, but
also unlike, beliefs and desires. Emotions are like beliefs and desires in
having representational and rational properties, but they are unlike them
in lacking cognitive or conative function and conditions of success.
While important, explaining the relation of emotions to non-intentional
phenomena is a problem of less magnitude than that of emotion
intentionality. It is the status of emotions as rational representations, not
their connection with non-intentional phenomena, which determines their
role in the economy of mind.

XI
xii PREFACE

The main theories of emotions can be distinguished on the basis of the

account which they provide of emotional intentionality and the relation
of emotions to non-intentional phenomena. Component Theories, which
are held by most philosophers and many psychologists, take the
intentionality of emotions to be derived from beliefs to which they are
related and take non-intentional phenomena to be constitutive of
emotions. For Evaluative Theorists, whose view is also prominent,
emotions are evaluative beliefs or judgments and so are intrinsically
intentional; non-intentional phenomena may be caused by emotions but
are not constitutive of them. According to the Belief-Desire Theory,
which I introduce and develop, emotions are intrinsically intentional states
because they consist in structures of beliefs and desires; and, as
Evaluative Theorists also maintain, emotions may cause but are not
constituted by non-intentional phenomena. This profile of the main
theories of emotions is represented in the accompanying table.

Theories of Emotions

Component Evaluative Belief-Desire

Theory Theory Theory

Intentional Belief Belief Belief and Desire

Element

Non-intentional Constitutive Non-constitutive Non-constitutive

Phenomena

The value of a theory is a function of its power in resolving problems

and explaining phenomena. My thesis is that the Belief-Desire Theory
provides a plausible account of central features of emotions, while that
afforded by Component and Evaluative Theories is problematic or
mistaken.
The contentions that non-intentional phenomena are constitutive of
emotions and that emotional intentionality is derived from that of related
 PREFACE xiii

beliefs, which are definitive of Component Theories, are open to telling

objections. Dispositional emotions, including calm and unconscious
emotions, are emotions in which non-intentional phenomena are absent
and are effectively excluded by theories of this kind. Also, if non-
intentional phenomena were constitutive of emotions, it is unclear why
emotions should, or even could, assume the intentionality of related
beliefs.
Both Component and Evaluative Theories are cognitive, explaining the
representational and rational properties of emotions in terms of their
relation to beliefs; emotions are, or are associated with, beliefs of certain
kinds. Were this the case, we should expect emotions to be assessable as
false or true and to have a truth-functional role in reasoning. This,
however is not the case; arguable it could not very well be the case.
According to the Belief-Desire Theory, emotions are semantically
interrelated structures of beliefs and desires. This enables us to see how
emotions represent states of affairs and have rational properties without
having truth values or a truth-functional role in reasoning, given the
directional opposition of cognitive and conative functions. It also permits
an understanding of how non-intentional phenomena, which are various
in kind and etiology, are emotional only when caused by an emotion, not
by a mental state of some other kind, such as an evaluative belief, and
how emotions can exist in causal latency in the absence of non-intentional
phenomena.
Additionally, I believe that the development of the Belief-Desire Theory
provides a framework within which to further explain the role of
emotions in the economy of mind and the dimensions of emotions.
Behavior which is expressive of emotions is caused by emotions, is about
what emotions are about, and has an evidential function; and because of
their hedonic status as states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, given the
interrelationship of constituent beliefs and desires, emotions have an
indispensable role in behavioral motivation. The hedonic character of
emotions is also what accounts for emotional affectivity, for the fact that
emotions are felt and are feelings. The passivity of emotions is explained
by the fact that, as belief-desire structures, they are not directly dependent
causally and rationally on desires that we have them, as actions are on
desires that we perform them. Finally, as hedonic states of pleasure and
XIV PREFACE

displeasure, the belief-desire structure of emotions explains the distinction

between positive and negative emotions, how they may be opposed in
ways which admit of rational assessment, and the relatively richer
differentiation of negative emotions.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to Philippa Foot, Anthony Kenny, and Bernard Williams

for their guidance in my early work on emotions, though in the course of
time my approach to understanding emotions has changed a great deal.
In developing the ideas set out here, the comments and criticisms of a
number of philosophers have been especially helpful to me. Among
those who have read virtually the entire manuscript, Radu Bodgan,
Wayne Davis, John Deigh, William Lyons, and Joel Marks have given
extensive assistance. I am enormously grateful to them. Stephen
Leighton, Eric Lormand, John Morreall, Norton Nelkin, Michael Stocker,
and Irving Thalberg read parts of the manuscript, and I am also most
appreciative for their responses.
Some of the work on the manuscript was done while I was a fellow at
the National Endowment for the Humanities Institute on Human Action
in the summer of 1984 and while I was on sabbatical leave from Tulane
University during the spring of 1990. The support of these institutions
is acknowledged with thanks.
The approach taken in The Emotions is systematic, and, with the
exception of Chapter IX which appears as "Actions, Emotions, and
Desires" in Joel Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire (1986), none of the
material has been published previously.

xv
INTRODUCfION
 CHAPTER I

UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS

1. INTRODUCfION

Commonsense psychology comprises a prescientific assemblage of

concepts and generalizations which readily, and often intuitively, shapes
our expectations and interpretations of our behavior in various
circumstances. Among the concepts of commonsense psychology are
those of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, intentions, and dreams. These
concepts figure in numerous familiar, sometimes definition-like, rules of
thumb. For example, a man will believe what obviously follows from
what he believes, unless he is confused, distracted, drunk, forgetful, or
just not very bright. When you don't get what you hoped to get, you
will be disappointed, except when you have given up hope or don't know
what's going on. If it was only a dream, it didn't really happen. And so
on.
Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories
of scientific psychology as well, represent attempts to capture the essence
of emotions, both in general and in the case of particular emotions,
basically as they are conceived in commonsense psychology. Providing
a more or less systematic account of the understanding of emotions
implicit in ordinary thought and language could be viewed as a kind of
conceptual anthropology. Traditionally, however, the aim of the
theoretical enterprise has been to tell us more than what emotions are
commonly taken to be like; the aim has been to say something about
what emotions are like.
It can no longer be taken for granted that a theory of emotions based
on the concepts and generalizations of commonsense psychology will
yield an understanding of the nature of emotions. Doubts have been
raised about the coherence of the concepts of commonsense psychology,
and it has been argued that the explanations which it provides are
seriously defective in various ways. It is widely held, moreover, that our
ordinary understanding of emotions is in almost singular disarray, so that

1
2 CHAPTER I

even if we could frame a coherent explanatory account of basic cognitive

concepts, for example, no such account of emotions could be provided.
If these worries are well-founded, it is most unlikely that emotions as
they are ordinarily understood have anything to do with the internal
processes which are responsible for our behavior or that a theory of
emotions which is rooted in the commonsense view can have any
psychological value.
Here we confront large scale issues in philosophy of mind which I
shall make no sustained effort to resolve. Rather, I shall briefly attempt
to assuage some worries and to suggest some possibilities and in this way
to somewhat enhance the plausibility of a realistic understanding of
emotions along the lines of commonsense psychology.

2. CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE

Doubts about the coherence of the concepts of commonsense psychology

and emotional concepts in particular have two primary sources. The first
concerns the indeterminacy of the extension of the concepts. A variety
of conditions are commonly classified as emotions and even as emotions
of a given kind. It is this consideration which leads Amelie O. Rorty,
among others, to question the integrity of the commonsense concept of
emotions and the validity of related theories of emotions. l She writes as
follows:

Emotions do not fonn a natural class.... Fear, religious awe, exuberant delight, pity,
loving devotion, panic, regret, anxiety, nostalgia, rage, disdain, admiration, gratitude,
pride, remorse, indignation, contempt, disgust, resignation, compassion (just to make a
random selection) cannot be shepherded together under one set of classifications as active
or passive; thought-generated and thought-defined or physiologically detennined;
voluntary or nonvoluntary; functional or malfunctional; corrigible or not corrigible by a
change of beliefs.... There are, moreover, enormous differences within each emotion
type: some angers are etiologically and functionally closer to indignation than to rage.
(Rorty, 1980, pp. 1-2)

The questionable coherence of commonsense emotional concepts

easily leads to scepticism about theories of emotions. If various and
 UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 3

sundry states fall under our emotional concepts, no account of what is

essential to them is forthcoming. The variety of states commonly
considered emotions need not lead to scepticism, however; it does not
mean that a theory of emotions based on commonsense concepts is not
possible. Conceptual regimentation goes hand-in-hand with theory
construction. Starting with intuitively clear cases, a theory is framed
which accounts for the essential features of as many of the cases as
possible; cases not possessing the relevant features are excluded from the
domain of the theory, and other similar cases not initially considered are
included within the theoretical domain. This is standard procedure in the
construction of theories.
If theory construction is accomplished through conceptual revision,
it may well be asked whether the result is a theory of emotions. Doesn't
the procedure simply amount changing the subject? (See Rorty, 1980,
pp. 3-4.) The answer is that it does not, provided that two conditions are
met. First, sufficiently many intuitively clear cases must be covered by
the theory; and, second, the theory must provide a plausible rationale for
including or excluding other cases. Thus it is reasonable to expect that
a theory of emotions will cover such cases as amusement, anger, delight,
despair, embarrassment, envy, fear, fright, gladness, grief, pity, pride,
rage, relief, sadness, and shame. It is also reasonable to expect that a
theory of emotions will exclude depression, for example, or surprise, if
they fail to have essential features common to the other cases (see Ch. II,
Sect. 3 and Ch. VI, Sect. 7), and that it will include, for instance,
enjoyment or pain, if they tum out to have a structure similar to that of
commonly recognized emotions (see Ch. VIII, Sect. 5).
The second primary source of doubts about the coherence of
emotional and other commonsense psychological concepts is that, even
in a revised and regimented form, they exhibit certain internal
inconsistencies. Daniel C. Dennett is one of the philosophers questioning
the integrity of ordinary mentalistic notions on this ground. According
to Dennett, "most if not all of our familiar mentalistic idioms fail to
perform [the] task of perspicuous reference, because they embody
conceptual infelicities and incoherencies of various sorts" (Dennett, 1978,
p. xix).2 To the extent that emotional concepts lack integrity in this way,
4 CHAPTER I

they will fail to have a clear referential and hence explanatory

application; there will be cases in which we simply won't know what to
say. The result is that a theory of emotions will fall short of providing
an account of factors which account for our behavior.
Dennett does not consider this problem of conceptual integrity with
respect to emotions. It is not difficult, however, to see where
incongruities might arise within the set of beliefs about what emotions
are like which constitutes the commonsense concept of an emotion. Here
are two prime examples. Emotions are taken to be states which may be
dispositional; so, for instance, someone may have a fear of snakes even
when asleep or thinking about something else. On the other hand,
emotions like fear are also supposed to involve bodily agitation; in fear
we may blanch and tremble. With regard to these beliefs about what
emotions are like, it is not clear how we can have it both ways. Again,
emotions are supposed to be reason-based. A woman may be sorry about
breaking a figurine, for example, because she believes it to be
irreplaceable. Emotions like sorrow are also thought to be feelings. How
emotions can be based on reasons and at the same time be feelings,
however, it is not easy to understand.
There are two complementary strategies for coping with conceptual
incoherencies like these: beliefs may be interpreted so that they cohere
with each other; or, if interpreted in a way which makes them
inconsistent, beliefs may be discounted. If either of these moves can be
made plausibly, conceptual incoherencies can be resolved. If, for
example, the belief that emotions like fear involve somatic agitation is
taken to mean, not that such agitation is necessary for one to have the
emotion, but that emotions are frequently causes of bodily perturbation,
it is not inconsistent with the belief that emotions may be dispositional
states (see Ch. IV, Sect. 5). Alternatively, if the belief that emotions are
feelings is taken to mean that emotions are sensation-like and incapable
of rational backing, the belief may be discounted, since emotions are
evidently based on reasons (see Ch. VIII).
It seems fair to conclude that the variety of states commonly
considered emotions and incoherencies within our ordinary emotional
concepts give rise, not to objections to the theoretical enterprise, but to
problems to be dealt with in the construction of a theory of emotions
 UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 5

based on commonsense psychology. Strategies exist for the effective

resolution of these problems.

3. EXPLANATORY VALUE

Even if emotional and other commonsense psychological concepts are not

hopelessly incoherent on account of internal inconsistencies or the variety
of their extensions, the value of the behavioral explanations into which
they enter is open to challenge. It is often held that if an effective
explanation of behavior is to be given, it must be in physical tenns and
make no reference to intentional states. The rationale underlying the
commitment to physical explanation is not hard to discern. It seems clear
that the basic idea is that the behavior of a physical organism must be
must be physically explainable. Thus simply stated, the foundational
physicalist assumption has undeniable appeal. If it is granted, there
appear to be only two things that can be said about behavioral
explanations in commonsense psychological tenns: either they reduce in
meaning or extension to physical explanations, or they are to be
eliminated in favor of physical explanations.
Logical behaviorism and the type-type identity theory are two fonns
taken by the attempt to reduce explanations in tenns of commonsense
psychological concepts to physical explanations. Logical behaviorism
takes ascriptions of beliefs, desires, emotions, and the rest to be
equivalent in meaning to ascriptions of dispositional or occurrent patterns
of environmental stimulation and behavioral response. According to the
type-type identity theory, each type of mental state is the very same thing
as a certain type of brain state. If either fonn of reduction is successful,
evidently any explanation in tenns of beliefs, desires, and emotions is
equivalent to an explanation in physical tenns.
Both logical behaviorism and the type-type identity theory are now
generally rejected. The basic reason is the same in each case: the
physical regularities required for the reduction are lacking. Mental
notions can be defined with reference to patterns of environmental
stimulation and behavioral response only if there are appropriate
detenninate regularities in the occurrence of stimulus and response.
Without the illicit importation of mentalistic assumptions, however, even
6 CHAPTER I

approximate regularities are typically not specifiable. The association of

umbrella use with the onset of rain, for example, is obviously far too
loose to afford a definition of believing that it is raining. Again, if each
type of mental state is to be identifiable with some type of internal
physical state, there must be unifonnity in the internal makeup of beings
having mental states of the kind in question. Patently that is not the case.
We have only to consider the differences between human and non-human
species, not to mention imaginable machines or Martians. The physical
regularities in the internal construction of beings having mental states
required for type-type identity simply are not there.
If, owing to the absence of required physical regularities,
psychological explanations in tenns of beliefs, desires, and emotions do
not reduce to explanations in tenns of stimulus-response patterns or
neural state types, the commitment to physical explanation may lead one
to hold that commonsense psychological explanations should be
eliminated in favor of behavioral explanations in tenns of whatever
physical regularities are to be found. This eliminativist position has been
defended notably by Paul M. Churchland (see Churchland, 1981).
There are instances in which behavior can be successfully explained
and predicted in tenns of makeup-detennined physical regularities. The
most obvious cases involve the automatic stimulus-bound behavior of
certain species. Presented with a moving black speck or a warm body
nearby, the frog zaps and the rattlesnake strikes; when a shadow appears
over the nest or moves across the ground, baby birds open their mouths
and rodents scurry for cover. The neural mechanisms subserving such
behavior are well understood. In the case of most of the behavior of
human and other higher animals, however, automatic stimulus-bound
responses are conspicuously absent, and such underlying internal
mechanisms as there may be do not generally yield an understanding of
their behavior. To take a simple example, there is no behavioral response
which invariably occurs when a student is in a classroom and the bell
rings. If the student leaves the classroom, this is not something which
can be explained or predicted on the basis of knowledge of the
organization of the human brain (which is not to deny that at some level
of description his bodily movements are ultimately detennined by what
goes on in his brain).
The eliminativist's project of replacing commonsense psychological
 UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 7

explanations with physical neuroscientific explanations meets with the

same basic problem as attempts at behavioristic or identity-theoretical
reductions: the required physical regularities are lacking. Typically,
rigid correlations between stimulus and response are not to be found, and
where they are not it is correspondingly unlikely that our behavior can be
understood as mediated by internal states or mechanisms of certain kinds.
The explanations of commonsense psychology apply in the absence
of the narrow physical regularities required by eliminativist and
reductionist versions of physicalism. Gaps in the regularity of
connections between stimulus and response and internal makeup are
bridged by reference to a rational network of intentional states
instantiated in the individual. Thus when the bell in the classroom rings,
we predict that the student will leave the room if he believes that class
is over and desires to go to lunch or to the library after class. On the
other hand, if the student believes that the bell is out of order or desires
to stay and talk with the instructor, our prediction will be that the student
will not leave the classroom. Though rough and ready, the reliability of
such predictions is undeniable. Commonsense psychology appears to
give us a way of understanding our behavior not available by relying on
physicalist models of behavioristic or neuroscientific explanation (see
Pylyshyn, 1983 and Bogdan, 1988).
While the feasibility of reducing commonsense psychological
explanations to, or replacing them with, physical explanations is doubtful,
the prospects of a functionalist reduction or replacement are widely
thought to be more promising. The functional states of an information
processing machine or organism are specified in terms of their causal
relations to informational inputs, behavioral outputs, and to each other.
Psychological functionalism does not require the narrow physical
regularities on which reductive and eliminative physicalism depend.
Functional states are understood not just in terms of stimulus-response
connections but in terms of their relations to other functional states as
well, and functional states may be realized in internal physical states of
various types. Further, if behavioral output is mediated by complex
interactions among functional states, behavioral explanations along
functionalist lines need not be confined to input-determined responses.
As with physicalism, if the functionalist program can be carried out
in either of its basic forms, our behavior can be understood without
8 CHAPTER I

reference to the intentional states of commonsense psychology.

Functionalism provides the following elementary explanatory format: if
an organism or machine is in a relevant functional state or states, it will
emit a certain output when it receives a certain input. The explanation
is given entirely in terms of the causal mediation of input and output;
nothing is said about beliefs, desires, and the rest.
There appears to be a close fit between functional and commonsense
psychology, and this gives reductive functionalism its initial plausibility.
In commonsense psychology beliefs and desires are conceived as having
functional relations to perception, action, and to each other in processes
of thought. Moreover, elementary belief-desire action explanations are
isomorphic with explanations in the functionalist format. For example,
suppose it thunders and I go inside. Commonsense psychology links the
thunder with my belief that it's going to storm, my going inside with my
desire to do so, and gives my standing desire to go inside when it's going
to storm as the mediating link. This account seems to be basically in line
with functionalist psychology.
Notwithstanding the functional aspects of commonsense psychology,
if reductive functionalism is to succeed, it must be possible to individuate
intentional states solely in terms of their functional relations.
Consideration of the case of belief is sufficient to show that it is at this
point that the reductive program breaks down. Beliefs are supposed to
be individuated by reference to their causal relations to perception, action,
and to other beliefs and desires, but in general this network of causal
relations underdetermines the individuation of beliefs. Sensory exposure
to thunder need not result in the belief that it's thundering, leave alone
the belief that it's going to storm; and either belief may have any number
of perceptual causes. Other causal relations are even more obviously
unhelpful in the individuation of beliefs. The belief that it's thundering
or that it's going to storm may be linked to virtually any other belief or
desire or to the performance of virtually any action, depending on what
else is believed and desired; and the possibilities are endless.
The beliefs and desires of commonsense psychology are understood
not just by reference to their functional relations but in terms of their
content or what is believed or desired. The functional relations of beliefs
and desires are not sufficient to determine what is desired or believed.
This is the reason that reductive functionalism fails.
 UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 9

If belief-desire explanation is not subject to functionalist reduction,

it may be held that it should simply be replaced by explanation in the
functionalist format. This version of eliminativism is defended by
Stephen P. Stich (Stich, 1983).
That an understanding of our behavior is possible in purely
functionalist terms is an illusion. Given an intentional account of our
behavior in terms of beliefs and desires, it is possible to abstract a
parallel account in line with the functionalist format. Still, that does not
mean that the functionalist account will have the explanatory and
predictive force of the belief-desire explanation. In fact, it is easy to see
that it does not. Consider what happens when it thunders and I go inside.
Making no reference to beliefs and desires, basically what a purely
functionalist explanation tells us is that there was an underlying causal
process which was such as to yield that output given that input. This
explanation, of course, is quite vacuous. The situation is no better when
it comes to prediction. Given the input and a causal process which links
it to a response, we still have no idea what response to expect. The
functionalist format is completely lacking in predictive power. Evidently
abstract functional relations provide no substitute for an understanding of
behavior in terms of what is believed and what is desired.
Physicalist programs for the reduction or replacement of
commonsense psychological explanation fail because the required
physical regularities--behavioral or neuroscientific--aren't there.
Functionalist programs for reduction or replacement fail for a similar
reason. The required functional regularities among inputs, outputs, and
functional states themselves aren't there. Functionalist explanations of
our behavior, like physicalist explanations, are simply impoverished
relative to the behavioral explanations of commonsense psychology.

4. PHYSICAL REALIZATION

Although behavioral explanations in terms of intentional states guide our

understanding and expectations more effectively than alternative modes
of explanation, some maintain that if they do not reduce to explanations
at the physical or functional level, intentional explanations are only
instrumental. Their value is merely heuristic; strictly speaking, there are
10 CHAP1ER I

no such things as beliefs and desires. This instrumentalist position is

prominently, but not consistently, maintained by Dennett (see Dennett,
1978 and 1981).
There is an obvious and plausible line of reply to instrumentalism.
The question we must answer is: why does commonsense psychology
work the way it does? Why is it successful in its explanatory task? It
can't be mere accident or luck. So there must be something about us
which commonsense explanations capture. The explanatory success of
commonsense psychology supports a realist, as opposed to an
instrumentalist, position regarding beliefs, desires, and emotions. If
commonsense psychology comes up with regularities in our behavior not
otherwise ascertainable, surely in view of our physical nature this is
strong evidence that these regularities have a physically instantiated
causal basis.
The idea which motivates instrumentalism is that if intentional states
had a physically instantiated functional basis, intentional explanations
would have to reduce to physical or functional explanations. This is
where the trouble lies. To argue that if explanatory reduction is not
possible, there are no beliefs, desires, and emotions, only physical and
functional states is to commit what physiological psychologist D.O. Hebb
calls "the nothing-but fallacy." Hebb explains:

If anxiety and thought and memory are identified with neural activities, it may be said
that there is nothing but those neural activities.... But this is fallacy.... Anxiety must be
a pattern of fuing of neurons in the limbic system, but the pattern is as real as the
individual neurons. (Hebb, 1980, p. 40)

The compatibility of a realist view of intentional states with the

irreducibility and ineliminability of intentional explanation is also made
quite clear by Hebb. He writes:

At a certain level of theoretical analysis there is no reality but the firing of single
neurons: emotions, intentions, and consciousness are convenient fictions. But human
thought does not restrict itself to anyone level of analysis when seeking explanations, and
those conceptions (of emotions, intentions and consciousness) are ... fictions only at the
microscopic level; when one is dealing with the phenomena of everyday experience and
of the clinic, fear and anger and grief are only too real. For scientific purposes also these
conceptions or others like them will always be necessary. Even if we could identify the
 UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 11

part played by every one of the 9 or 10 or more billion neurons in the brain, the human
mind of the scientist is obviously incapable of thinking of the whole activity in such
terms. It is not possible to follow the varying patterns of the firing of these cells as
individual units. What one must identify is the larger patterns of the activity, and it is
just such large patterns that we know as anger or fear--love, or mirth or pride. (Hebb,
1980, pp. 44-45)

5. CONCLUSION

If our behavior in various circumstances can be explained effectively by

reference to beliefs, desires, and emotions in a way not otherwise
possible, we have reason to think that these intentional concepts carve
nature at important joints, reflecting features of our psychological nature
which are responsible for our behavior. If, however, these concepts lack
integrity, there can be no hope of their explanatory and predictive value.
In this way the prospect for a realistic understanding of emotions hinges
on the coherence of the relevant concepts. There can be no doubt that
the commonsense-psychological concept of an emotion is something of
a mess. The question is whether a regimented concept can be refmed
from the materials of commonsense psychology, one which satisfies
constraints of coherence and explanatory power. My aim in what follows
is to provide the basis for an affinnative answer. Given the presumption
of realistic import which the success of intentional explanation creates,
the elaboration of a philosophical theory of emotions based on
commonsense psychology thus may be expected to provide a realistic
understanding of emotions.

NOTES

Wittgenstein's well-known scepticism about theories of emotions is also motivated

by consideration of the varied extension of emotional concepts. In his hands, however,
the argument takes a behavioristic twist. Emotional concepts are defined by reference to
behavioral criteria, according to Wittgenstein, and the diversity of emotional behavior
precludes strict definition. See Green (1979) for discussion of Wittgenstein's position.

While Dennett questions the integrity of the intentional concepts of commonsense

psychology, he does hold that suitably formulated intentional concepts may have
12 CHAPTER I

referential and explanatory usefulness. It is doubtful, however, that these intentional

concepts would sufficiently resemble those of commonsense psychology to be considered
reformulations of them.
THE INTENTIONALITY
OF EMOTIONS
 CHAPTER II

INTENTIONALITY

1. INTRODUCTION

In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano contends that

intentionality is an essential feature of emotions and other mental
phenomena. His position is set out as follows:

Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do
not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in jUdgment
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on.
(Brentano, 1874/1973, p. 88)

Brentano's thesis has had a substantial influence in philosophical

psychology, but quite different approaches to understanding the
intentionality of mental phenomena have developed, each with its own
conceptual apparatus. My concern here is not with the details of
Brentano's position nor, except incidentially, with the variety of current
conceptions of intentionality. What I want to do is to provide an account
of two central features of intentional mental states, representation and
rationality. In doing this, I will focus on beliefs and desires. My aim is
to establish a framework within which a problem about emotional
intentionality can be appreciated.
It is often claimed that beliefs and desires are in some sense the
basic intentional states. Properly understood, I think that this claim is
correct. Conceptions of beliefs and desires, which capture the
representational and rational properties of a class of mental states, are
required. It then turns out that cognitive and conative states are the
fundamental modes of mental representation and units in functional
rationality. If this is the right account of the place of beliefs and desires
in representation and rationality, the structure of any intentional state is
to be understood in terms of its relation to beliefs, desires, or both. This
is what gives rise to the problem of emotional intentionality.

15
16 CHAPTERTI

2. REPRESENTATION

Mental states like beliefs and desires represent objects or states of affairs.
The representational character of these mental states is defInitive of their
intentionality, as I understand it. Though requiring further development
in certain respects, a useful account of mental representation is presented,
using an analogy with speech acts, by John Searle in his book
Intentionality. "Intentional states," Searle explains, "represent objects and
states of affairs in the same sense of 'represent' that speech acts represent
objects and states of affairs" (Searle, 1983, p. 4).1
The analogy between linguistic and mental representation helps to
make clear several related properties of beliefs and desires as intentional
states and enables us to appreciate important differences between them
(Searle, 1983, pp. 5-13). First, like such speech acts as assertions and
imperatives, beliefs and desires have representational content. The
request that the patrons of the pub drink up at 10 o'clock and the
prediction that the patrons of the pub will drink up at 10 o'clock have a
representational content, that the patrons of the pub drink up at 10
o'clock, and represent the state of affairs which consists in the patrons of
the pub drinking up at 10 o'clock. The same is true of the desire that the
patrons of the pub drink up at 10 o'clock and the belief that the patrons
of the pub will drink up at 10 o'clock.
Second, like speech acts of the assertive and imperative classes,
beliefs and desires have directions offit. The report that the cat is on the
mat represents the state of affairs which consists in the cat's being on the
mat as one which obtains, as does the belief that the cat is on the mat.
Thus the direction of fit for the report is words-to-world, that of the belief
mind-to-world. The request that you bring me a cup of coffee represents
the state of affairs which consists in your bringing me a cup of coffee as
one which is to obtain, as does the desire that you bring me a cup of
coffee. So the direction of fit for the request is world-to-words, that of
the desire is world-to-mind.
It is important to stress the functional character of representational
direction. A description of an existing building and a blueprint of a
building which is proposed may represent the same building, but their
functions are basically different. This is why the representations are
 INTENTIONALIlY 17

distinguished as having different directions of fit. The functional nature

of the distinction between descriptions and instructions, and the
corresponding modes of representation generally, is perhaps more evident
in G.E.M. Anscombe's classical introduction of the distinction than in
Searle's development of it. Anscombe's illustration concerns a shopper
and a detective. Each has a list which is supposed to represent the
contents of a shopping basket, but the shopper's list is to guide his
selection of items while the detective's list is to be guided by the
selection of items by the shopper (Anscombe, 1957/1963, p. 56).
Third, as is the case with speech acts like assertions and imperatives,
beliefs and desires have conditions of success and admit of semantic
assessment. The statement that platinum is heavier than gold represents
the state of affairs which consists in platinum's being heavier than gold
as obtaining and is successful only if that state of affairs does obtain.
Truth and falsity are the success-conditional semantic values for
statements. The belief that platinum is heavier than gold has the same
success condition and semantic value as the statement. The order that
new recruits report to the commanding officer represents the state of
affairs which consists in new recruits reporting to the commanding officer
as one which is to obtain and is successful only if that state of affairs
obtains. The order is subject to success-conditional assessment in terms
of compliance. The desire that new recruits report to the commanding
officer has the same success condition as the order and is similarly
subject to semantic assessment in terms of satisfaction.
The functional character of success-conditional semantic values for
beliefs and desires, and for corresponding kinds of representation in
general, must also be emphasized. Suppose we have a mental
representation with the content that p and that is the case that p. We
cannot determine so far whether the representation is true or satisfied, or,
indeed, whether it has any semantic property. To determine the sematic
property which a representation has, if any, we must know its function or
the functions of its constituents. To be true, a representation must have
a cognitive function. To be satisfied, a representation must have a
conative function. The semantic or success-related values of
representations are functionally defined.
Representational content is a feature common to statement-like and
18 CHAPTERll

command-like speech acts and to belief-like and desire-like mental states.

There are, however, important differences between the two kinds of
speech acts and mental states with respect to success conditions and
directional function. Statements and beliefs aim at truth and have an
information carrying function. Commands and desires aim at satisfaction
and have a motivational function. Much more will be said about the
semantic and functional differences between cognitive and conative
mental states in due course. Already it seems clear, however, that as
regards functional relations between representations and states of affairs,
cognitive and conative states are the basic forms of mental representation,
as speech acts like assertions and imperatives are the basic forms of
linguistic representation.

3. RATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Beliefs and desires are the basic units in rational functioning, beliefs in
carrying information, desires in motivation; and, as such, they are open
to rational assessment.
The rationality of a belief is a measure of the likelihood that the
condition of its success is fulfilled, a measure, that is, of likelihood of its
trnth.2 This likelihood is primarily determined in a representational
system by perceptions and by other beliefs which provide evidence for
the truth of the belief in question.
The rationality of a desire is more complicated. It too is a function
of the likelihood that the condition of its success, which is satisfaction,
will be met. In a representational system this likelihood is determined by
beliefs concerning the feasibility of satisfying the desire. More precisely,
these beliefs concern the possibility and cost of satisfying the desire. The
possibility of satisfying the desire is usually understood in terms of ability
and opportunity. Cost is to be understood in terms of the non-satisfaction
of competing desires whose conditions of satisfaction are incompatible
with that of the desire in question.
The rationality of a desire is also a function of the goodness or
desirability of the desired state of affairs obtaining. In a representational
system this is determined by beliefs concerning the desirability of what
is desired.
The feasibility of satisfying a desire is a semantic condition of
 INTENTIONALI1Y 19

rationality but not a justificatory condition. The desirability of satisfying

a desire is a justificatory condition of rationality but not a semantic
condition. That it is feasible to satisfy a desire is no reason to have the
desire; it does not provide a justification for having the desire. Still, if
the satisfaction of a desire is not feasible, it is a desire which it is, so far
forth, not rational to have, there being no likelihood of its satisfaction.
(Of course, a corresponding wish may be perfectly rational. On the
distinction between desires and wishes, more will be said shortly). On
the other hand, that the satisfaction of a desire is desirable is a reason to
have the desire; all else being equal, it justifies one in having the desire.
Needless to say, the desirability of satisfying a desire has no direct
bearing on the likelihood of its satisfaction.
While the semantic and justificatory conditions of rationality are
separate for desires, for beliefs they are the same. Evidence detennines
the likelihood of the truth of a belief. It also provides the justification for
having a belief.
The functionally detennined asymmetry in the conditions of rational
assessment for beliefs and desires shows that the venerable adage that
what truth is for beliefs, goodness is for desires is correct only in part.
The goodness of what is desired is a condition of rational justification for
desires, as (the likelihood of) the truth of what is believed is for beliefs;
but, while truth is the success value for beliefs, goodness (or desirability)
is not a success value for desires.

4. RATIONAL FUNCTION

Beliefs have an infonnational role in perception and inference which is

subject to rationally dictated causal constraints to ensure successful mind-
to-world representation. Desires have a functional role in motivation
which is also subject to causal constraints dictated by rationality to ensure
world-to-mind representation which is successful.
Biologically speaking, perceptual beliefs about the surroundings and
intentions or desires to act on the surroundings are the elementary fonns
of mental representation for an organism. In its causal interaction with
the environment, the survival of the organism depends on the success of
these representations.
20 CHAPTERll

The success of perceptual beliefs depends on our being affected by

what we perceive. The success of our desires to act depends on our
effecting what we intend. Problems with causal theories of knowledge
in epistemology and difficulties about deviant causal chains in action
theory indicate that the relevant causal relations with the world may be
hard to describe. Even so, that appropriate connections with the
environment are rationally required for the success of perceptions and
intentions is hardly subject to doubt. In these elementary cases the input-
oriented function of beliefs and the output-oriented function of desires are
clearly evident.
The external causal constraints on the success of perceptual beliefs
do not apply to all beliefs. General, abstract, and mathematical beliefs,
for example, evidently need stand in no particular causal relation to the
state of affairs represented. The same holds true of intentions and desires
generally. A distinction may be made between peiformative desires that
one perform an action and optative desires that a state of affairs obtain
which does not consist in one's performing an action. Optative desires
may have an indirect causal role in motivation where their satisfaction is
believed to be facilitated by the satisfaction of performative desires.
Often, however, optative desires, unlike performative desires, are
indifferent to the causal path to their satisfaction. Nonetheless, beliefs
generally are analogous to perceptions in that their success depends on
the way the world is; they have the same input-oriented direction of fit.
Desires, too, generally are analogous to intentions in that their success
depends on how the world comes to be; they have the same output-
oriented direction of fit. In each case, there are rationally dictated
internal causal constraints on the function of the mental representation.
It might be held, as lA. Fodor points out, that "The causal role of
a propositional attitude mirrors the semantic role of the proposition which
is its object" (Fodor, 1985, p. 86). On this view, thought has the logical
form of argumentation. Fodor explains the importance of the point as
follows:

The causal roles of mental states typically closely parallel the implicational structures of
their propositional objects; and the predictive successes of propositional attitude
psychology routinely exploit the symmetries thus engendered. If we know that Psmith
 INTENTIONALI1Y 21

believes that P ~ Q and we know that he believes that P, we generally expect him to
infer that Q and to act according to his interference. (Fodor, 1985, p. 90)

On the view which Fodor describes, the semantic and functional

properties of propositional attitudes are cognitive. This cognitivist view
involves two closely related contentions. It is held, first, that the contents
of propositional attitudes have truth values. Second, it is held that
propositional attitudes figure in rational thought processes which are
isomorphic with patterns of truth-functional inference. I believe that this
cognitivist view is fundamentally mistaken on both counts.
Considered in abstraction from linguistic and mental representations,
propositional contents do not have semantic values, which are
functionally defined, since they have no representational function. Only
considered as asserted or believed do propositional contents bear the
properties of truth and falsity, for only then do they have the cognitive
function in terms of which the semantic properties are defined. Not all
propositional attitudes have a cognitive function, however, and
consequently their contents cannot be assessed as false or true. What is
desired, for example, can be true or false only considered as asserted or
believed, not as desired, in view of the basic functional difference
between conative and cognitive representation.
It is also because of this basic functional difference that it is a
mistake to hold that propositional attitudes, including desires as well as
beliefs, have a role in thought which mirrors the structures of truth-
functional inference. Even when the propositional contents of desires are
considered as believed or asserted, it is still false to suppose that rational
transactions involving desires have the form of truth-functional argument.
If A desires that q and believes that p ~ q, on the assumption of
rationality, we expect A to desire that p, all else being equal. Our rational
expectation can hardly be that A's pattern of thought will reflect the
logical relations of the propositional contents of his belief and desire
considered as asserted or believed, however; that pattern of thought would
be irrational since it has the form of fallaciously affirming the consequent.
The question is: how do A's desire that q and belief that p ~ q constitute
reasons for the desire that p? The rationality conditions for the desire
that p are that it is feasible and desirable to bring it about that p. Only
by the desirability of bringing it about that p, however, is a reason for
22 CHAPTER II

desiring that p. The question, then is: how do A's belief and desire
relate to the desirability of bringing it about that p? There must be an
assumed principle of inference: it is desirable to bring about a means to
bringing about a state of affairs which is desirable. Given this principle,
if it is rational for A to desire that q, and specifically, if it is desirable
that q, then A has a reason to desire that p, when A desires that q and
believes that p ~ q. The reasoning we expect of A can be reconstructed
as follows:

(1) It is desirable that q.

(2) P ~ q.
(3) If it is desirable that q and if p ~ q, it is desirable that p.
(4) Therefore, it is desirable that p.

The reasoning follows the inferential pattern of beliefs, not desires; but
the beliefs relate to the rationality conditions of desires. We suppose that
A's beliefs and desires are rational, or that A takes them to be so, and we
expect that A will make rational inferences from his beliefs and desire
what he has reason to desire.
The view that desires have a role, along with beliefs, in means-end
or practical reasoning is false and largely due, no doubt, to the
widespread tendency to conflate desires and desirability beliefs--about
which much more later (see Ch. V, Sect. 5). Rational transactions in the
economy of mind are governed by the logic of truth-functional inference.
What this means is that all such rational transactions are mediated by
beliefs. The rational role of desires is not in inference but motivation.
The success of cognitive representations depends on the way the
world is, that of conative representations on the way the world is made
to be. In the case of perceptions and intentions, success is subject to
external causal constraints; the representations must be caused by or cause
the state of affairs they represent. In these cases, direction of fit is a
matter of causal input or output. The success of other cognitive and
conative states is not directly conditioned by causal input or output, but
their functional role in reasoning and motivation is similarly directed at
truth or satisfaction and subject to internal rationally dictated causal
 INTENTIONALITY 23

constraints. In this way input- or output-oriented direction of fit is a

general characteristic of the basic forms of rational representation.

5. RATIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION

Rationality requires representation. In representation success conditions

are set, and rationality is success-functional. Beliefs and desires aim at
and are assessed in terms of truth and satisfaction in the representation of
states of affairs. This does not mean that only representations have
rational properties. Actions have rational aim and are rationally
assessable but ordinarily are not representations. Still, the rational
properties of actions depend on those of the intentions with which they
are performed. Thus, though not themselves representations, the
rationality of actions requires representation.
While representation is required for rationality, representation is also
possible without rational function and assessment. hnaginative
representations and wishes are forms of mental representation in which
rational properties are absent or truncated.
Intuitively it appears that imaginative representations--which include,
in addition to imaginings, dreams, seeings as, and suppositions--are
belief-like, while wishes are desire-like representations. One may imagine
or believe that p, and one may wish or desire that it be the case that p.
The similarity in each case seems to be one of shared functional direction.
Unlike cognitive and conative representations, however, imaginative
representations and wishes carry no commitment to success. There being
no evidence of truth or feasibility of satisfaction, no likelihood of success
is assigned to imaginative representations or wishes.
The rational properties of mental states are determined by
representational direction and commitment to success. Because they
differ as regards commitment to success, imaginative representations and
beliefs also differ with respect to rational properties. Beliefs purport to
be true. Thus we may have reasons for our beliefs, for taking them to
represent what is the case. Beliefs may rationally motivate our behavior,
since we act on the basis of what we take to be the case. And beliefs
may be assessed as rational to the extent that, given available reasons,
they are likely to be true. hnaginative representations, on the other hand,
24 CHAPTER II

do not purport to represent actual states of affairs. On this account they

are not backed by reasons, do not directly motivate behavior, and are not
assessable as cognitively rational.
Because they lack commitment to satisfaction, wishes fail to exhibit
the range of rational properties which standardly characterize desire.
Desires pursue satisfaction. Accordingly, they may be rationally backed
by considerations of the feasibility, as well as the desirability, of their
satisfaction. Directly or indirectly, desires may rationally motivate us to
bring about states of affairs which are desired. And desires are rationally
assessable in tenns of the likelihood and desirability of satisfying them.
Wishes, on the other hand, carry no commitment to satisfaction. Thus,
they do not rest on considerations of the feasibility of their satisfaction,
do not motivate us to bring about what we wish for, and are not
assessable in tenns of the likelihood of their being satisfied.
Lack of commitment to success does not mean that wishes, like
imaginative representations, have no rational properties. While the
rationality of cognitive representation is entirely success-functional, the
rationality of conative representation is not. It depends on the desirability
of satisfying desires as well as on the feasibility of their satisfaction.
Wishes are like desires in that they are rationally constrained by
considerations of the desirability of their being satisfied.
A corollary of the asymmetrical rationality of beliefs and desires is
this. Persuaded of the absence of feasibility of satisfaction, our desires
tend to be converted into wishes. Seeing that peace on earth is most
improbable, we may cease to desire world peace and only wish for it.
This is because we still have reason to wish for peace, given its
desirability, even though the prospects of its attainment may be dim.
There is no similar conversion phenomenon regarding beliefs. In the
absence of evidence that the moon is made of green cheese, we cease to
believe it. Evidence for the truth of a belief is all the reason there is to
have it. We might still imagine the moon being made of green cheese,
but this would not be due to the force of reason.
Without commitment to success, imaginative representations and
wishes lack the infonnational and motivational function which is
definitive of cognitive and conative mental states. Yet, there is surely a
difference between imaginative representation and wishing, and the
differences would seem to be analogous to that between beliefs and
 INTENTION ALI1Y 25

desires. The problem is this: how can mental representations without

success commitment bear a functional analogy to beliefs and desires
while lacking the functional role definitive of beliefs and desires? The
most plausible solution, I think, is to construe wishes as dispositions to
desire and imaginative representations as dispositions to believe, where
the desiring or believing is blocked by the lack of feasibility of
satisfaction or the absence of evidence of truth. Were there feasibility,
we would desire what we wish for; and were there evidence, we would
believe what we imaginatively represent. In this way imaginative
representations and wishes relate to the directions of fit and functional
roles which distinguish cognitive and conative representations.
One may have beliefs which provide evidence or support the
feasibility of its being the case that p without believing or desiring that
p if one has never considered whether is or is to be the case that p. In
that event one is disposed to believe or desire that p in that, having the
success-related beliefs, all else being equal, one would believe or desire
that p if one considered the matter. On the other hand, if one imagines
or wishes that p, the thought that it is or is to be the case that p occurs
to one, though in the absence of success commitment, one does not have
the belief or desire that p. Still, one is disposed to have the belief or
desire, since, given the thought that it is or is to be the case that p, all
else being equal, success-related beliefs would result in success
commitment and the belief or desire that p.
The consideration or thought which imaginative representations and
wishes involve and which beliefs and desires require is no mere
'entertaining' --a supposedly attitude-neutral form of representation--but
a belief-like or desire-like mode of representation. Evidential
considerations can rationally activate only an input-oriented
representation; considerations of feasibility can activate only an output-
oriented representation.
The belief-like or desire-like character of imaginative representations
and wishes is reflected in the fact that, while they carry no commitment
to success, they may still tum out to be successful. What I imagine may
be the case, and I may get what I wish for. Success in these cases is
fortuitous. I am not lead by evidence to imagine that p, nor does my
wish motivate me to bring it about that p. Thus, though not rationally
integrated into the economy of mind, imaginative representations and
26 CHAPTER II

wishes do admit of success assessments; and they are the assessments

appropriate to beliefs and desires.
In the case of imaginative representations and wishes, then, there are
intentional states which lack rational properties. Rational properties,
therefore, can't be essential to intentionality. Intentionality is
fundamentally a matter of representation. Nonetheless, the relation
between representation and rationality is one which is very close.
Rationality requires representation, and cognitive and conative
representations have rational properties or would have them but for the
lack of commitment to success.

6. EMOTIONAL INTENTIONALITY

Beliefs and desires are the basic intentional states and are understood in
terms of their representational and rational properties. Once this has been
established, it is possible to grasp the problem of emotional intentionality.
It is the problem of understanding how emotions fit into a system of
rational representation. Understanding the intentionality of emotions
constitutes a problem because in important respects emotions are like, but
also unlike, beliefs and desires.
Like beliefs and desires, emotions have representational content. 3 A
villager in Turkey may be afraid that there will be an earthquake, or
people may be angry that the administration has not stemmed the tide of
unemployment. Also, like beliefs and desires, emotions have rational
properties. They are rationally related to other mental representations,
figure in rational explanations of behavior, and are open to rational
assessment. People's beliefs about administration policies explain their
anger that the administration has not reduced the level of unemployment.
If the Turkish villager is afraid that there will be an earthquake, he may
be motivated to sleep outdoors. And the anger of the people or the
villager's fear is assessable as rational or irrational.
Emotions are also importantly unlike beliefs and desires. Emotions
are felt and are feelings. On the usual account, what explains the
affectivity of emotions is that somatic sensations are constitutive of them,
and somatic sensations are supposed to lack intentional structure. Beliefs
and desires, on the other hand, are not affective states and, in view of
their intentionality, are generally contrasted with somatic sensations. In
 INTENTIONALIlY 27

this way, there comes to be a problem about understanding emotional

intentionality, given the affectivity of emotions.
It is even more evident that emotional intentionality presents a
problem when it is noted that. unlike beliefs and desires, emotions lack
functional direction and conditions of success. Thus, anger and fear are
not assessable as true or false, satisfied or unsatisfied and can hardly be
supposed to have any functional role governed by success-functional
constraints. The problem which emotional intentionality presents is one
of understanding how emotions can have representational content without
representing states of affairs either as ones which obtain or as ones which
are to obtain and how emotions can have rational properties, which are
success-functional, without conditions of success.
Wishes and imaginative representations lack the success commitment
and rational function which characterizes beliefs and desires in standard
cases, and it might be thought that, like wishes and imaginative
representations, emotions simply constitute a special case with respect to
representation and rationality. This approach does not yield a solution to
the problem of emotional intentionality.
There are emotions which involve imaginative representations or
wishes, rather than full-fledged beliefs and desires. These I shall call
imaginative emotions and wishful emotions, respectively. For example,
one might wish that the home team had won and be sorry, or imagine
cobras in the closet and be afraid. Imaginative and wishful emotions do
not provide a model for understanding the intentionality of emotions.
Typically, emotions involve, not imaginative representations or wishes but
full-fledged beliefs and desires, and emotions generally have rational
properties, unlike wishes and imaginative representations. Also, unlike
representations without success commitment, emotions do not have even
a dispositional connection with success-functional rational roles.
There remain three possible responses to the question How do
emotions as intentional states fit into a system of rational representation?
First. it may be denied that emotions are intentional states with
representational and rational features. This is the position taken by Hume
in certain passages of the Treatise: 4
A passion ... contains not any representative quality .... 'Tis impossible, therefore, that
[a] passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason .... (Hume,
1739/1962, p. 415)
28 CHAPTER II

Given the similarity of emotions to beliefs and desires in representational

and rational respects, Hume's view of them as impressions standing in
relations of causal association alone is simply untenable.
Second, it may be suggested that emotions do fit into a system of
rational representation but in a way fundamentally unlike beliefs and
desires. Pascal's dictum "The heart has reasons of which reason itself
knows nothing" may be seen as an expression of this view. For Pascal,
however, the pronouncement remains mystical, nor is it clear how it could
be developed. The very notion of rational representation apart from
considerations of cognitive and conative success seems unintelligible.
Third, there is the possibility that the place of emotions in a system
of rational representation is to be explained in terms of their relation to
generic beliefs or desires. This is the view which, in one way or another,
has been taken most often. It is represented most prominently by theories
with a cognitivist orientation. The account of emotional intentionality
afforded by theories of this kind will be the subject of sustained
examination in what follows.

7. CONCLUSION

I have suggested that representation and rationality are the central features
of intentional mental states and that the basic intentional states are beliefs
and desires. The intentional structure of a wide range of mental states
can be appreciated within this framework, but the intentionality of
emotions presents a special problem. This is primarily due to the fact
that, while emotions resemble beliefs and desires in rational and
representational respect, they differ from them in that they lack functional
direction and conditions of success. I take the explanation of emotional
intentionality to be the central problem for a theory of emotions.

NOTES

This does not mean that the intentionality of mental states derives from that of
speech acts; the value of the comparison for our purposes is heuristic. A reductive
account of intentionality is not required because questions concerning relationships
between beliefs, desires, and emotions remain, whatever reductive position may be taken.
 INTENTIONALITY 29

2 Some hold that a belief may be rational if it is in our interests to have it, regardless
of the likelihood of its truth. Evidently this is Pascal's view regarding belief that there
is a God. This brand of rationality is not what I am buying. My concern is with the
mode of rationality appropriate to beliefs as such, given their distinctive function of
representing the way things are. A similar qualification applies regarding the rationality
of desires.

Sometimes the content of emotions is not propositionally specified, and some

emotions resist propositional content specification. Problems about the propositionality
of emotional content are considered and resolved in Chapters III and VITI.

Elsewhere, however, in his discussion of particular emotions such as pride, Hume

describes emotions as having intentional properties.
 CHAPTER III

EMOTIONS AND BELIEF

1. INTRODUCfION

Intentional states, I have suggested, are to be understood in tenns of

belief and desire. Treatments of the intentionality of emotions, however,
have almost invariably explained it in tenns of beliefs, not desires. There
are two related reasons for this. First, the desires most prominently
related to emotions have been taken to have a resultant and secondary
role. One is angry over some offense and consequently desires to
retaliate. Also, evaluative beliefs or desirability judgments themselves
have been supposed to involve or incorporate desires, which, for this
reason, do not require independent attention. A man who takes another
to have insulted him is supposed to think such treatment undesirable and
so of course to desire not to be so used. I think that both of these
assumptions represent serious misunderstandings about emotions and
desires and in due course will argue that this is the case (see Chs. V and
VI). For now, however, I will set these doubts aside, since I also think
that beliefs are essential to emotional intentionality.
I shall call theories which take emotions to be intentional states in
virtue of their relation to beliefs Cognitive Theories, as is often done.
There are two main types of Cognitive Theories. There are theories
which take emotions to involve non-intentional constituents as well as
beliefs. These theories will be referred to as Component Theories. There
are also Evaluative Theories, as I shall call them, which hold that
emotions are evaluative beliefs or judgments which may cause, but are
not constituted by, non-intentional emotional phenomena.
Cognitive Theories in general have great appeal in several ways.
First, it is not clear how the intentionality of emotions could be explained
without bringing in beliefs. If the unsuccessful candidate believes that he
did not make the runoff, we can understand his disappointment that he
did not make the runoff. The object-directedness of his emotion is hardly
intelligible in tenns of his slumping posture or the sinking sensation in

31
32 CHAPTER III

his stomach. In the second place, various emotions can be distinguished

from each other in terms of their relation to beliefs in a way which is not
otherwise possible. The glandular secretions which occur and the bodily
feelings which are experienced seem unlikely to distinguish shame from
remorse, for example. The relation of these emotions to such beliefs as
that one's bulbous nose is ridiculous or that one has let down a friend is
clearly more to the point. Finally, the connection between emotions and
beliefs provides an account of the fact that emotions may be rationally
justified or unjustified in a cognitive dimension. It is not because of any
feeling of exhilaration or smile on his face that a father's pride that his
son has graduated with honors is justified but on account of the
reasonableness of his beliefs about his son's accomplishment.

2. THE EXTENSION OF BELIEF

Cognitive Theorists typically insist at the outset that the project of

understanding emotions as intentional states in temlS of their relation to
beliefs requires that belief be understood in a somewhat extended sense,
and for this reason sometimes substitute quasi-technical concepts of
appraisal, evaluation, or judgment. The extension of the notion of belief
is often stretched in more than one way. First, the epistemic range of
belief must be expanded with respect to both certainty and modality of
apprehension. The certainty of apprehension must range from the hunch
of one who hopes to win with a dark horse to the realization of one who
grieves over the death of a friend. Also, the modalities of apprehension
must include, for example, imagining threats, recalling past misdeeds, and
seeing an oncoming truck on the wrong side of the road. In the second
place, the relevant beliefs must be evaluative beliefs or appraisals. In
embarrassment one's situation is perceived as awkward, and one who is
pitied is taken to suffer undeserved misfortune. Additionally, beliefs
related to emotions may be conscious or unconscious, dispositional or
occurrent. A boy who resents his father may be aware that he thinks of
him as slighting, but again he may not. One who has a fear of flying
may sometimes reflect on the risk but need not always be doing so.
That emotions are often, perhaps typically, connected with beliefs
 EMOTIONS AND BELIEF 33

and that the intentionality of emotions is to be understood at least partly

in tenns of these beliefs is not likely to be disputed. Still, reasons have
been given both for denying that emotions are essentially intentional
states and for denying that the intentionality of emotions is necessarily a
function of their relation to beliefs. The arguments tum on the extension
of belief and the relation between emotions and non-intentional states.
Appreciating the plausibility of Cognitive Theories of emotions requires
attention to the arguments. 1

3. "OBJECTLESS EMOTIONS"

Probably the most familiar reason given for denying that emotions are
necessarily intentional in virtue of their relation to beliefs is that there are
"objectless emotions"--emotions which apparently lack representational
content. According to William P. Alston, "That an evaluation of an
object is not strictly necessary [for the occurrence of an emotional state]
is suggested by the phenomenon of 'objectless emotions', such as a
nameless dread, a vague apprehension of some impending disaster, or a
general irritation at nothing in particular" (Alston, 1967, p. 486). Others
have insisted that there can be "free-floating" anxiety and that one may
be simply depressed or elated.
There are two basic lines of reply to objections like these. The
cognitivist can argue that so-called objectless emotions do involve belief-
based representational content, or he can argue that they are not emotions.
Depending on the case in question, I think that each line of reply can
have considerable plausibility and that they complement each other in
providing an effective answer to "objectless emotion" objections.
In a number of cases of so-called objectless emotions, belief-based
representational content is discernible. Of course the content may not be
conscious, articulated, precise, or specific, but this does not count against
the cognitivist's claim. It is clear that there may be vague or repressed
beliefs, for example; they still have the cognitive commitment and
rational properties which distinguish beliefs as a basic fonn of mental
representation. Thus the cognitivist can handle many cases thought to be
counter-examples to his position. In one of Freud's classic cases, for
instance, Little Hans was afraid that his father would hurt him, though he
34 CHAPTER III

was not conscious of his idea that his father would hurt him. And in
more common cases, one may be anxious about something bad happening
without being able to say exactly, or at all, what bad thing one believes
might happen. It is not to the point to insist that in such cases we do not
have belief in some strict sense. The cognitivist's claim is that belief
broadly construed is the basis of emotional intentionality, and there is
good reason to think that the claim is borne out in these cases.
In other cases it is objected that not even a vague or repressed belief
is involved because the emotions have no object or representational
content at all. Cases in which somebody is just anxious, depressed, or
elated are the most common examples. Here the cognitivist can reply that
these "objectless emotions" are not emotions. In at least these cases,
anxiety, depression, and elation are non-intentional moods (see Lormand,
1985). Unlike intentional emotions which are rationally engaged, these
non-intentional moods lack not only representational content but rational
properties. The person who is simply anxious, depressed, or elated is not
anxious, depressed, or elated about anything; and his state is not backed
by reasons, does not rationally motivate his behavior, and is not
assessable as rational or irrational. While perhaps moods like these may
be correctly called emotions in ordinary language, there remains a
theoretically important distinction. It is this on which the cognitivist's
reply to the objection is based.
"Objectless emotion" objections to Cognitive Theories are supposed
to show that emotions need not have belief-based intentionality because
they sometimes lack representational content. For more than one reason,
these objections are not successful. Other objections, however, are meant
to show that, though emotions may be intentional, their intentionality is
not based on belief, in at least some cases.

4. COGNITIVELY ANOMALOUS EMOTIONS

Phobias and fears of fictions have excited theoretical interest ever since
Hippocrates' description of the case of Nicanor, who was terrified by the
sound of flutes at a banquet, and Aristotle's attempts to explain fearful
responses to tragedies. Cases of such cognitively anomalous emotions,
in which the usual connection with belief is apparently broken, have an
 EMOTIONS AND BELIEF 35

important bearing on Cognitive Theories, which take the intentionality of

emotions to depend on their connection with beliefs. Cognitively
anomalous emotions are often held to be counter-examples to the
Cognitive Theorist's claim.2 Cognitive Theorists, in tum, fmd themselves
in the position of having to deny that we have genuine emotions in these
cases. I think that neither move carries conviction.
A well-developed case involving a dog phobia is presented by
Patricia S. Greenspan as follows:

After an attack by a rabid dog, we suppose, I find myself with a persistent fear of all
dogs, even toothless old Fido, the lovable pet of a friend of mine, whose harmlessness I
am sure of. When Fido approaches, my heart beats wildly, I feel an urge to flee, and
perhaps I even find myself thinking: "Fido is going to bite me!" I would deny, though,
that I really believe this; and there seems to be reason for trusting my denial, in this case-
-for resisting various attempts to attribute to me an unconscious belief that would ground
my fear--on the assumption that I am otherwise quite rational. When Fido approaches
others I care about (in a group, perhaps, which includes myself as well), I feel no urge
to alert them to a potential danger. (Greenspan, 1980b, p. 162)

Consideration of this case leads Greenspan to reject standard Cognitive

Theories on the ground that emotions do not necessarily involve
evaluative judgments, strictly construed as beliefs (Greenspan, 1981, p.
158 and 1988, pp. 17-20).
Kendall L. Walton provides a useful description of a fearful response
to fiction in this passage:

Charles is watching a horror movie about a terrible green slime. He cringes in his seat
as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly over the earth destroying everything in its path.
Soon a greasy head emerges from the undulating mass, and two beady eyes roll around,
finally fixing on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new course straight
toward the viewers. Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperately at his chair.
Afterwards, still shaken, Charles confesses that he was "terrified" of the slime. (Walton,
1978, p. 5)

After examining this case, Walton's conclusion is that Charles only make-
believedly fears the slime since he does not believe but only pretends that
the slime threatens him (Walton, 1978, p. 13).
What I want to do, rather than enter into a discussion of the
literature, is to suggest a plausible interpretation of the intentional
36 CHAPTER III

structure of cognitively anomalous emotions like those described in these

examples, which will enable us to see how far attacks on and defenses of
the cognitivist's position are, and are not, successful. To develop this
interpretation, I need to make use of the notion of imaginative
representation. Imaginative representations are like beliefs in that they
would play an informational role were not semantic commitment
evidentially blocked. Because of this difference, imaginative
representations lack the rational properties which characterize beliefs.
They are not backed by evidence, do not directly motivate behavior, and
are not assessable in terms of cognitive rationality (see Ch. II, Sect. 5).
My suggestion is that cognitively anomalous emotions like fear of
Fido or of the Slime involve, not beliefs, but imaginative representations.
They are, in the terminology introduced earlier, imaginative emotions. 3
This interpretation is based on the fact that the representations of Fido or
the slime as threatening lack the cognitive commitment and rational
properties of beliefs.4
Charles knows that the slime is not going to ooze out of the movie
screen and envelope him, and the cynophobe knows that toothless old
Fido won't bite. Each denies, or presumably would deny, believing that
there is danger. Thus it seems clear that their representations of danger
carry no cognitive commitment.
Neither Charles nor the cynophobe is prepared to offer reasons for
his representation of danger, nor is either of them open to the charge of
delusion. The cynophobe is not rationally motivated to call the dog
catcher nor Charles to seek the aid of slime stoppers. Evidently their
representations of danger also lack the rational properties of beliefs.
A couple of observations about this interpretation of the cognitively
anomalous emotions which concern us may be useful before applying it
to claims about the adequacy of the cognitivist's position. First, while
fears of fictions and phobias often may be imaginative emotions, not all
are. Children who are frightened when they view "The Slime" may
believe that the monster threatens them, and some cynophobes may
believe all dogs to be dangerous. These are delusive fears, fears which
involve patently irrational beliefs. Some types of fears are always
delusive. These range from superstitious fears to paranoia. Imaginative
fears are rationally truncated, as we have seen; delusive fears are not.
Thus, though the paranoid's conviction that people are out to get him is
 EMOTIONS AND BELIEF 37

irrational, he finds reasons for it in their "sinister" glances or their words

spoken "behind his back," and his fear directly motivates his mistrust of
people and withdrawal from their society. This contrast between
imaginative and delusive fears is significant. Because they differ from
imaginative fears in cognitive commitment and rational properties,
delusive fears do not even appear to be counter-examples to the
cognitivist's claim. Unlike imaginative fears, delusive fears clearly
involve beliefs about danger.
The second observation concerns the motivational force of
imaginative emotions. While imaginative emotions do not rationally
motivate our behavior directly, they do affect us. In ordinary fears,
beliefs about danger may trigger endocrine, autonomic, and behavioral
responses. Our sensitivity to danger is such that imaginative
representations of danger can have similar effects. On occasion the
effects of imagined dangers may be profoundly distressing. This is likely
to be the case where we find our ability to control the situation which
inspires our imaginative fears to be very limited. In general, phobic fears
impose themselves on us, while we expose ourselves to fears of fictions.
Thus, cynophobia may be a serious problem for one who fmds it difficult
to avoid contact with dogs. Charles, on the other hand, has only to leave
the theatre if his fear gets to be too much for him. He may actually
enjoy the excitement which his imaginative encounter with the monster
inspires (see Morreall, 1985). Because of the distress or enjoyment which
the experience of imaginative emotions may bring, imaginative fears may
indirectly motivate behavior. To avoid the distress of contact with dogs
a cynophobe may be motivated to take up residence in China or Iceland,
where there are no dogs, and Charles may be motivated to go to horror
movies regularly for the thrill of it. In such cases it is not the fearful
response to the imaginative representation which directly motivates
avoidance or pursuit but the distress or enjoyment which the emotional
response occasions.
We are now in a position to assess the implications of imaginative
emotions for the cognitive view of emotional intentionality. Imaginative
emotions do not involve representations with cognitive commitment and
rational properties. For this reason, their intentionality does not depend
on their relation to beliefs. About this the critic of the cognitivist's
position is correct. Still, it is a mistake to conclude that a Cognitive
38 CHAPTER III

Theory can have no application to imaginative emotions. Imaginative

emotions are emotions--rationally truncated emotions; and, though they
do not involve belief, they do involve something like belief--imaginative
representation. Although they lack the rational engagement which
ordinary fears have, imaginative fears do involve a representation of
danger which can affect us as ordinary fears do. It is the representation
of danger which is essential for the intentionality of fear, and the
representation, if not a belief, must be at least belief-like; this is what the
Cognitive Theorist should insist upon. Without the representation of Fido
as threatening, it would be impossible to distinguish a dog phobia from
a dog allergy. It would in fact be most natural to put down the agitation
as an unfortunate effect of Fido's presence, as a rash or a cough might
be, and the urge to flee as a simple aversive reaction to a noxious
stimulus.
By stressing the involvement of imaginative representation,
cognitively anomalous emotions which do not involve belief can be
accommodated by a Cognitive Theorist. Moreover, a proponent of a
Cognitive Theory can explain the initially puzzling character of
cognitively anomalous emotions as due to their secondary status.
Imaginative fears, for example, are secondary to ordinary fears involving
beliefs about dangers, not just in being less common, but in a more basic
sense. Our emotional sensitivity to imaginative representations of danger
is explained by our sensitivity to beliefs about danger, for it is in those
cases that our emotional representations have the adaptive value which
accounts for their evolutionary origin.

5. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT

Canonically, the representational content of beliefs is propositional in

form. What we believe is, for example, that grass is green. If the
intentionality of emotions is due to their relation to belief, as Cognitive
Theorists claim, one would naturally expect that their content would also
be propositional. Often, however, the content of emotions is non-
propositionally specified, and this may be thought an objection to
Cognitive Theories.
This objection is, I think, not a very serious one. That the content
of an attitude is not propositionally specified does not mean that it lacks
 EMOTIONS AND BELIEF 39

propositional content; content and content specification must be

distinguished. This can be seen clearly in the case of belief. While there
is no doubt about the propositionality of the content of the attitude,
pragmatic considerations may make non-propositional content
specification appropriate. For example, if Jack expresses his belief,
saying, "It would be fun to run down the hill," Jill may express hers
when she says, "I believe what Jack says" or "I believe him."
A number of emotions are like beliefs in that their content may be
appropriately specified propositionally or non-propositionally, depending
on pragmatic considerations. Fear is an example. We may be afraid that
it will rain, but Little Red Riding Hood was afraid of the Big Bad Wolf.
It is plausible to suppose that propositional specifications are simply more
explicit about content than non-propositional specifications. Fears-x
descriptions do not indicate the respect in which something is feared;
fears-that-p descriptions often do. Fears-x descriptions are typically used
when it is obvious, or else obscure, why one is afraid of something.
Thus, since it is well known that, in nursery stories at least, Big Bad
Wolves eat up little girls, it is generally sufficient to say that Little Red
Riding Hood was afraid of the Big Bad Wolf. On the other hand, Oaude
may be afraid of clouds where it is not clear, even to him, why this is so.
For emotions like fear, where a non-propositional content specification is
given, some propositional specification can be given as well; and the
propositionally specified content will be that of a belief which the subject
of the emotion must have. If Claude is afraid of clouds, he must at least
fear that clouds will bring some trouble. And, of course, where Red
Riding Hood is afraid of the Wolf, no doubt she is afraid that he will eat
her.
Emotions like pity, hate, resentment, and love may be taken to pose
a more serious problem for the Cognitive Theorist, since they appear not
to have propositional content at all. A description of someone as pitying,
hating, resenting, or loving that p would be syntactically deviant. In this
respect these emotions certainly seem different from beliefs. Even so,
this difference is compatible with their having belief-based propositional
content. In these cases, the object of the emotion is specified by a noun
phrase which may be followed by a propositional clause. Specification
of the content of emotions like pity and love is not limited to "Marsha
loves John" and the like. Often, at least, fuller descriptions like "John
40 CHAPTER III

pities the refugees because they have lost everything" can be given. Such
descriptions indicate the respect in which objects figure in the content of
an emotion, as propositional specifications often do, and their truth
requires that the subject of the emotion have a certain belief. Thus, if
John pities the refugees in that they have lost everything, he must believe
that they have suffered the loss. In this way the specification of the
content of an emotion like pity may derive from that of a belief related
to the emotion, as a Cognitive Theory requires.
That pity resists a propositional content specification of the sort that
fear admits is perhaps an accident of idiomatic syntax. In other cases the
intentional structure of the emotion affords an explanation. There seems,
for example, to be no standard belief which must be held with regard to
one who is loved. It is surely a romantic fantasy to suppose that one who
is loved must be regarded as "wonderful," as one who is pitied must be
regarded as suffering undeserved misfortune. Still, that there is no belief
which is standardly related to love does not mean that no belief need be
involved. Marsha could hardly love John if she had no beliefs about him,
and she may love him because she believes he is gentle and kind.
Various beliefs may provide the basis for love's intentionality, and all
they may have in common is reference to the one who is loved.
While it is plausible to think that many emotions have propositional
content, even when their content is not propositionally specified, there are
cases in which emotions do not have propositional content. The emotions
are experiential emotions. The intentional structure of these emotions
remains to be considered (see Ch. VIII, Sect. 6); the important point at
present is that perceptual experiences, rather than beliefs, are constitutive
of experiential emotions. Enjoyment is a case in point. One does not
enjoy that a Bach sonata is being performed; one enjoys the performance
of the sonata. More important, the belief that a Bach sonata is being
performed is not necessary for the emotion; what is required is the
experience of the sonata's performance. That is why enjoyment lacks
propositional content. Still, its content depends on the constitutive
perceptual experience, and the experience is a belief-like representation.
The experience is belief-like in that it disposes one to form related
beliefs, and thus has an informational function; but beliefs need not result,
nor is the experiential content propositional in fOffil. For this reason, if
the contention of the Cognitive Theory is extended to include belief-like
 EMOTIONS AND BELIEF 41

representations, as well as beliefs, as providing the basis of emotional

intentionality, even experiential emotions need not be a stumbling block.

6. CONCLUSION

Cognitive Theories generally have considerable initial appeal as accounts

of representational and rational features of emotions. They can also be
defended plausibly, and in ways which may contribute to our
understanding of emotions, against a range of usual objections. Still, it
is my critical purpose to demonstrate the inadequacy of Cognitive
Theories and so to pave the way for an account of a different kind, for
which greater problem-solving and explanatory power is claimed. To this
task I now tum, considering first Component Theories, then Evaluative
Theories of emotions.

NOTES

The objections to Cognitive Theories could also be brought against the Belief-Desire
Theory developed in Chapter VI, since the theories share the contention that intentionality
which is at least in part belief-based is essential to emotions. Hence, the replies made to
these objections constitute a defense of theories of emotional intentionality of either kind.
2 Cases in which self-deception or contradictory beliefs are involved are also
cognitively anomalous but do not have the same significance, since the link between
emotions and belief does not even appear to be broken.
3 It is possible that the interpretation I suggest for cognitively anomalous emotions,
like those of the cynophobe or the movie goer, would be acceptable to Greenspan or
Walton. Even so, it is not the account which they give. In place of belief, Greenspan
holds that fear of Fido involves a "con-attitude" toward Fido, and Walton claims that
Charles "makes-believe" that the slime is threatening. These notions, and their relation
to that of belief, remain unanalyzed for Greenspan and Walton; and the intentionality of
cognitively anomalous emotions consequently goes unexplained.
4 Mike Martin correctly argues that there are emotions which involve imagined rather
than believed danger, suffering, and so on; but he fails to appreciate their rational
truncation, assimilating their motivational influence to that of ordinary emotions (see
Martin, 1983).
 CHAPTER IV

COMWONENTTHEORmSOFEMOTIONS

1. INTRODUCfION

Most philosophers and many psychologists currently conceive of emotions

as involving an intentional appraisal or evaluation and non-intentional
components like physiological changes, somatic feelings, and overt
behavior. Theories of this kind I call Component Theories. In
psychology Component Theories are prominently advanced by Arnold
(1960), Izard (1977), Averill (1980), Lazarus (1980), Plutchik (1980), and
Ortony et al. (1988). Among philosophers conspicuously defending
Component Theories are Kenny (1963), Trigg (1970), Wilson (1972), Neu
(1977), Thalberg (1977), Lyons (1980), Taylor (1985), de Sousa (1987),
Gordon (1987), and Greenspan (1988).
In the history of thought about emotions there are also important
versions of the Component Theory. While there are difficulties of
interpretation in some cases, these may reasonably be taken to include the
theories of Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, James, Wundt, and Freud.
The intentionality, rationality, and differentiation of emotions can
hardly be explained without bringing in the relation of emotions to
beliefs, and Component Theories share the appeal of Cognitive Theories
generally in their emphasis on this relation. The particular plausibility of
Component Theories is due to their comprehensive character. A wide
range of emotional phenomena is taken into account. These theories
reflect the tenets of commonsense psychology that our emotions depend
on our interpretation of a situation, often are related to bodily upset or
change, are typically felt, and may lead to certain patterns of behavior.
Notwithstanding their initial appeal, I think that Component Theories are
seriously deficient and that they are deficient in ways which point us in
the direction of a more adequate theory. As a first step toward showing
that this is so, it is necessary to consider just what is being claimed by
Component Theorists.

43
44 CHAPTER IV

2. CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENA
AND DERIVED INTENTIONALITY

The general claim made by Component Theorists is that emotions involve

certain kinds of beliefs and non-intentional elements. "Involve," however,
is a rather wooly word. Thus, this characterization of Component
Theories is underdetermined. There is in fact a variety of claims made
by Component Theorists. Differences between them tum on the relation
taken to obtain between beliefs and emotions. There is first the
difference between theories which hold the intentional element to be
conceptually necessary for emotions and those which do not. Then there
are differences which obtain between theories which take the relation
between beliefs and emotions to be causal, constitutive, or both.
Influenced by the Wittgensteinian contention that psychological
concepts, such as those of hatred and joy, are applied only in view of
"family resemblances" among psychological phenomena, some
philosophers advocating Component Theories hold that an intentional
element of belief is not necessary for emotions. William P. Alston, for
example, argues that for an emotion "evaluation of an object is not
strictly necessary .... " Further, on his view, no other feature is necessary
for emotion, with the possible exception of bodily upset. Thus, Alston
suggests that we may take a "list of typical features as bringing out what
sort of thing an emotion is" (Alston, 1967, p. 486). Others holding this
position are Anthony Kenny (1963), George Pitcher (1965), and Abraham
I. Melden (1967).
For most Component Theorists a belief of a characteristic type is
essential for an emotion. On this view there can be no fear without an
apprehension of danger, no grief without a sense of loss. Component
Theories which incorporate this contention will be my primary concern.
I have already argued that relevant beliefs or belief-like representations
are necessary for the attribution of emotions: considered as such, non-
intentional phenomena like affective and somatic changes may be related
to various emotions or to no emotion at all (see Ch. III).
Regarding the nature of the relation taken to hold between emotions
and beliefs, Component Theories may be divided into three types:
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 45

Causal Theories take beliefs to be causes, but not constituents of, emotions. Emotions
themselves are constituted of non-intentional phenomena. Theories of this kind are held
by Arnold (1960), Wilson (1972), Lyons (1980), Plutchik (1980), Gordon (1987),
Greenspan (1988), and Ortony et al. (1988), among others.

Causal Constituent Theories hold that beliefs are both causes and constituents of
emotions. The other constituents of emotions include non-intentional phenomena. Neu
(1977) and Lazarus (1980) set out theories of this type.

Constituent Theories maintain that beliefs are constituents, but not causes of emotions.
Non-intentional phenomena, of which the beliefs are causes, are among the other
constituents of emotions. This kind of theory is advanced by Thalberg (1977), Averill
(1980), Lyons (1980), and de Sousa (1987).

Often the commitment of a Component Theorist to a particular form

of the theory is ambiguous, and statements of different forms of the
theory in a given work are common. Formulations of the Causal Theory,
for example, are taken to be interchangeable with those of the Causal
Constituent or the Constituent Theory. This imprecision, I am inclined
to think, is due chiefly to supposing that necessary conditions for the
attribution of an emotion, and particularly causal conditions, are
constituents of an emotion. Such assumptions, however, are not generally
true. It is a necessary condition of a painting's being a Rembrandt that
it have been painted by Rembrandt van Rijn, but that is in no sense a part
of it. There are important differences between the forms of the
Component Theory. Still, there are also important similarities.
The three forms of the Component Theory incorporate two basic
contentions which I take to be definitive of theories of this kind. 1 The
first is that non-intentional phenomena are taken to be partly or wholly
constitutive of emotions. When a man is angry he will typically undergo
and experience certain changes associated with the activation of the
autonomic nervous system; his heart will race, his muscles will tense, and
so on. Some such phenomena, it is held, must be present for a man to
be in a state of anger, and they are at least part of what it is for him to
be angry.
The second basic contention common to Component Theories is that
emotions have derived intentionality: they take their intentional content
from the evaluative beliefs which are causally or constitutively related to
46 CHAPTER IV

them. Thus, if King George was angry that the colonists had impudently
dumped the tea into Boston harbor, it was because he believed that the
colonists had impudently dumped the tea into Boston harbor. This
contention is closely related to the first. The reason why the
intentionality of emotions must be derived from that of related beliefs for
Component Theories is that, aside from the beliefs, emotions are taken to
be constituted by such non-intentional phenomena as affective and bodily
agitation; there is simply no other source for emotional intentionality on
this view.
The primary objections which I shall raise against Component
Theories tum on the basic common contentions that non-intentional
phenomena are constitutive of emotions and that emotions have derived
intentionality. Two of these objections have not been raised previously.
There is another objection, concerning causal relations between beliefs
and emotions, however, which has received considerable, but perhaps not
decisive, discussion in the literature.

3. CAUSAL RELATIONS

Causal and Causal Constituent Theories differ in that the latter take
beliefs to be constitutive of emotions while the former do not. However,
theories of both kinds take emotions to be caused by the beliefs on which
their intentionality depends. This common contention is clearly
represented in the work of William Lyons and of Richard S. Lazarus. A
form of the Causal Theory is set out by Lyons as follows: "X is to be
deemed an emotional state if and only if it is a physiologically abnormal
state caused by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her
situation" (Lyons, 1980, pp. 57-58)? Lazarus and his colleagues provide
this statement of the Causal Constituent theory:

Emotions are complex, organized states... consisting of cognitive appraisals, action

impulses, and patterned somatic reactions .... By including appraisals in the definition [of
emotion] we are saying that not only do emotions arise as the result of evaluation of the
transaction or encounter, but the ongoing appraisals are themselves an integral and
intrinsic component of the emotion. (Lazarus, et at., 1980, p. 198)
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 47

That emotions are caused by characteristic types of evaluative beliefs

or appraisals appears to be a natural view to take. If Jim is alarmed that
he might miss his plane, surely he must believe there to be some danger
of his missing it. And, whether or not he is in fact short of time, if he
thinks that he is, Jim is likely to be alarmed about missing the plane.
Regardless of its initial plausibility, however, the coherence of the causal
claim proves on reflection to be open to question.
It is argued, most notably by Irving Thalberg, that the contention that
the beliefs, from which the intentionality of emotions is derived, are also
their causes runs afoul of a widely accepted Humean principle concerning
causal relations. Thalberg explains the problem as follows:

Generally, for any occurrence or state of affairs which depends causally upon others, we
do not contradict ourselves if we suppose that it endures, or that it originates, without
those others. By contrast ... object-directed emotions cannot conceivably go on or begin
unaccompanied by thought. (Thalberg, 1979, p. 152)

Thalberg thinks that this difficulty "is bound to appear in any causal
analysis of the thought-emotion relationship" (Thalberg, 1978a, p. 144).
It turns out, however, that there is good reason to consider Causal and
Causal Constituent Theories separately.
For the Causal Theorist emotions are by definition constituted by
such phenomena as affective and somatic agitation, caused by beliefs of
certain kinds; so, on this view, emotions could not conceivably occur
apart from beliefs. Critics of Thalberg's position reply that this does not
mean that beliefs do not cause emotions. After all, sunlight is defined as
light produced by the sun, and certainly the sun produces sunlight. (See
Green, 1972; Gordon, 1974; and Davidson, 1978.) The problem is not
that Thalberg takes the separability requirement to rule out such causal
relations, however; he is prepared to admit causal relations where
descriptions of the relata are definitionally linked. What is required for
causal relations, on his view, is that the separation of the relata be
conceivable under some description. There is thus no problem about the
sun's being the cause of sunlight, since the light can be identified apart
from the sun from which it emanates. Even so, for Thalberg, the Causal
Theory meets a problem because object-directed emotions are not
identifiable apart from the beliefs from which their intentionality derives
48 CHAPTER IV

(Thalberg, 1978, p. 146). This, of course, is true, but it does not mean
that the separability requirement is not satisfied; for the felt and bodily
agitation which constitutes emotions, according to the Causal Theory, can
still be identified apart from the beliefs which are its cause.
In holding beliefs to be essential constituents of emotions, as well as
the source of their intentionality, Causal Constituent Theories encounter
a more trenchant separability problem. Simply put, the problem is this:
beliefs are supposed to cause emotions of which they are themselves a
part; thus no separability of the emotions from the beliefs is conceivable,
since, as Thalberg puts it, "no event is distinguishable from itself'
(Thalberg, 1978, p. 151).
It has been suggested by Jerome Neu that this kind of separability
problem for Causal Constituent Theories can be averted. His idea is the
following:

Even if a thought is a logically necessary or essential constituent of an emotion, it will

make sense to say it 'causes' the emotion if it causes the rest of the emotion, i.e. the other
constituents. If E consists of P, Q, R. .. and P causes Q, R, ... then one can say, quite
properly, that P causes E .... We secure the contingency required for a causal analysis by
omitting an element.... (Neu, 1977, p. 161)

The application of this proposed principle of part-whole causation might

be found problematic (see Thalberg, 1980, pp. 398-99). I think that a
more forceful reply is in order. If it is agreed that when a thought is said
to cause an emotion, the thought does not cause itself, this comes to no
more than saying that the thought causes the other components of the
emotion. What we have is thus not a questionable view of part-whole
causation. Rather it is a mere fw;on de parler parading as a causal
principle.
The fact is, the Causal Constituent Theory is incoherent. If beliefs
are essential constituents of emotions, they cannot be their causes. If
beliefs caused emotions, then besides causing other constituents of
emotions, they would cause themselves as well; but this is absurd. If
beliefs do not cause themselves, but only other constituents of emotions,
they do not cause emotions.
One more form of the Component Theory remains to be considered.
Unlike Causal and Causal Constituent Theories, Constituent Theories do
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 49

not involve emotion-thought causation and so avoid problems about

separability. The intentional component of an emotion is taken to cause
other components of the emotion but not the emotion itself. Such a
theory is advocated by Thalberg in Perception, Emotion and Action. He
explains it as follows:

With respect to the total episode of your emotion that H your thinking is not a cause but
an ingredient.. .. Other elements of the total occurrence, some of them logically necessary
and some of them accidental, may be influenced by your thinking or its neural equivalent;
for instance such elements as your blood pressure, adrenalin flow and breathing rate.
(Thalberg, 1977, p. 34)

While Constituent Theories do not encounter problems about causal

relations and separability, and Causal Theories escape them, there are
further difficulties which arise for any fonn of the Component Theory of
emotions. The first of these difficulties concerns the intentional structure
of emotions.

4. EMOTIONAL INTENTIONALITY

According to Component Theories, since, aside from the evaluative

beliefs which are constitutively or causally related to them, emotions are
constituted by non-intentional phenomena, such as affective and bodily
agitation, their intentionality must be derived from those beliefs. The
claim that emotions have derived intentionality is sometimes challenged
directly on the ground that only representations like beliefs can be
intentional, not such non-representational phenomena as emotional
perturbations.
With the rejection of derived intentionality comes a choice between
denying that emotions are intentional and denying that non-intentional
phenomena are constitutive of emotions. Hume takes the first alternative
when he says, "When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion,
and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object than
when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high." He is led to take
this position by his identification of passions or emotions with
impressions of reflection, accompanied or caused by ideas or judgments.
Thus, of them, Hume says "A passion ... contains not any representative
50 CHAPTER IV

qUality ... " (Hume, 1739/1960, p. 415).3 The second alternative is taken
by Robert C. Solomon. His claim is that, "As soon as one distinguishes
between the 'feeling' of emotion and its object..., for example, there is no
way to understand ... how emotions intend their objects ... " (Solomon, 1980,
pp.273-274). Thus Solomon comes to identify emotions with evaluative
judgments, denying that non-intentional phenomena like feelings are
constitutive of them. He explains:

Feelings do not have "directions." But I am angry "about" something .... Anger is not a
feeling; neither is it a feeling plus anything else (e.g. what it is "about"). (Solomon, 1980,
p.,253)

Hume's denial of emotional intentionality must be rejected in view of the

rational and representational properties which emotions manifestly have.
Solomon's assimilation of emotions to evaluative judgments remains to
be considered (see Ch. V). What is important at present, however, is that
neither Hume nor Solomon provides any reason for dismissing derived
intentionality. Nevertheless, there are grounds for taking a sceptical view.
In the first place, there seems to be no compelling reason to suppose
that a causal or constitutive relationship to a belief makes an emotion,
otherwise constituted of non-intentional phenomena, an intentional state.
Such relationships to a mental representation do not in general confer
intentionality on a complex state or event. Consider the case of ordinary
actions. Many theories of action take actions to have a structure parallel
to that ascribed by Component Theories to emotions. Just as Component
Theories relate beliefs to emotions as causes, constituents, or both,
prevalent action theories relate intentions to actions. In each case, aside
from the related intentional state, the constituents are taken to be non-
intentional phenomena--affective and somatic changes for emotions,
bodily movements and states for actions. Still, causal or constitutive
relationship to the intention with which they are perfonned does not mean
that actions have intentionality;4 actions typically do not have
representational content. When I shift gears and tum the wheel, I do not
thereby represent myself as driving the car. I do not represent anything
at all. What I do is drive the car. If actions do not have derived
intentionality, it is unclear why we should suppose that similarly
structured emotions do have derived intentionality.
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 51

While actions like driving a car do not have representational

properties, speech acts provide what is perhaps the one clear case of
derived intentionality. When I make a statement, certain sounds or
marks, which are not intrinsically intentional, represent a state of affairs
as obtaining because of my intention that they do so. The
representational properties of the statement, however, are not those of the
intention with which I make the marks or sounds but those of the belief
which it expresses. It is from the belief that the statement derives its
representational properties, and it derives them because of the intention
with which I speak or write (see Searle, 1983, Cbs. I and 6).
Although speech acts give us an instance of derived intentionality,
they make a poor model for understanding the intentionality of emotions.
The two cases are different in important respects, and this constitutes a
second ground for scepticism about the derived intentionality of emotions.
Speech acts and emotions differ with respect to representational
intentions and semantic properties, and both differences bear on the issue
of their intentionality. In making a statement, sounds of marks are made
with the intention that they have certain representational properties. Apart
from the intention, the utterance or writing represents nothing. The
bodily and affective changes which are supposed to be constitutive of
anger are not produced with any representational intention (or produced
at all, for that matter). For this reason emotions which are supposed to
have non-intentional phenomena as constituents can hardly have derived
intentionality as speech acts do.
Statements derive their intentionality from the beliefs which they
express. The statement and the belief that Boston is north of New York
represent the same state of affairs as obtaining and, depending on the
success of the representation, bear the same semantic assessment in terms
of truth or falsity. If emotions took on the cognitive intentionality of
beliefs, as statements do, they would take on the same success conditions
and semantic properties. Assessments of truth and falsity, however, are
not applicable to emotions. If I am afraid that it will freeze and burst the
pipes, I believe that it will freeze and burst the pipes; but unlike my
belief, my fear is not false or true. Also, if emotions took on the
cognitive intentionality of beliefs, as do statements, they would take on
the same rational properties. Statements, like beliefs, have a truth-
functional role in inferential reasoning and are rationally assessable in
52 CHAPTER N

terms of the likelihood of their truth. Unlike statements, however,

emotions lack truth values and so can hardly share the rational properties
of beliefs. Thus, again, emotions cannot be supposed to have derived
intentionality in the way that speech acts do.
I think that scepticism about the Component Theorist's account of
emotional intentionality is warranted in that it is unclear why or how
emotions should be taken to have derived intentionality. By and large,
however, problems about derived intentionality have gone unnoticed by
proponents of Component Theories. In only one instance has the
question of representational and semantic properties been raised.
Thalberg considers the problem of false pleasures discussed by Plato in
the Philebus and contends that, "although my pleasure has belief-
constituents which are false, we can deny that it is false--and even deny
that falsehood is meaningfully predicable of it" (Thalberg, 1977, p. 41).
For the Component Theorist, if emotions, unlike the beliefs from which
their intentionality is supposedly derived, do not have properties such as
truth and falsity, it is most natural to suggest that this is due to their
being constituted wholly or in part by non-representational components. 5
Thus, Thalberg maintains:

Falsity is a relational feature of one's belief. Relational features are not infectious. They
do not spread from part to whole. (Thalberg, 1977, p. 40)

This approach to the problem is unsuccessful. Intentionality is as much

a relational feature of belief as falsity; it is, after all, a matter of the
representational relation of the belief to a state of affairs. If emotions did
not take on the semantic features of related beliefs, because they are
relational, they would not take on the intentional features either. In any
case, relational properties often do spread from part to whole, and this is
true specifically for semantic properties. A statement takes on the truth
value of the belief which it expresses as it takes on the representational
properties of the belief. If one accepts something like a Constituent
Theory of action, as Thalberg does, this is an instance in which semantic
properties spread from part to whole. We are left with no explanation
why the semantic properties of beliefs should not spread to emotions to
which they are related, and the Component Theorist's account of
emotional intentionality remains problematic.
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 53

The Component Theorist's contention that emotions derive their

intentionality from related believes gives rise to difficulties about causal
relations and is itself problematic. The problematic character of this
contention also gives us a reason to deny the other main contention of
Component Theories, on which it depends. This is the contention that
non-emotional phenomena are constituents of emotions. Further reasons
to reject this contention emerge when dispositional emotions are
considered.

5. DISPOSITIONAL EMOTIONS

Component Theories hold non-intentional emotional phenomena, such as

somatic agitation and sensation, to be constitutive of emotions and so
focus on occurrent emotions in which such phenomena are present, rather
than on dispositional emotions in which they are not. Though Victoria
grieved over Albert for many years, the occasions on which her sorrow
welled up in her breast and tears filled her eyes are taken to provide a
basis for understanding her grief, not the stretches of time through which
she slept or was occupied with affairs of the Empire. Still, even when
not moved to tears, Victoria no more ceased to be grieved than she
ceased to believe that Albert was dead. It is an important question how
Component Theories, with their emphasis on constitutive phenomena, can
account for dispositional emotions.
The basic position of Component Theorists is clear. Since emotional
phenomena are necessary for having an emotion and constitutive of it,
there are no dispositional emotions. According to Lazarus, for example,
"When one component [such as a patterned somatic reaction or an action
impulse 1 is missing from the perception the experience is not a proper
emotion although it may contain some of the appropriate elements"
(Lazarus et ai., 1980, p. 198). In the absence of emotional phenomena,
there are only dispositions to have an emotion; they consist in some state
which is the underlying cause of emotional phenomena but not itself an
emotion. Lyons explains, "Emotions are only occurrences of a psycho-
somatic sort, but we can attribute them to (use emotion terms of) people ...
dispositionally (pointing out that some person is not or may not be in the
grip of some emotion but is prone to being so in certain circumstances)"
(Lyons, 1983, personal correspondence).
54 CHAPTER IV

In holding this view regarding dispositional emotions the Component

Theorist apparently takes them to conform to the model of such standard
dispositions as solubility or fragility. Lyons tells us that dispositional
anger, for example, is to be understood as analogous to seasickness
(Lyons, 1980, p. 56). There is a disposition to dissolve or to be seasick
which consists in some state which is the underlying cause of dissolution
in a solvent or of nausea at sea. There is, however, no such thing as
dispositional dissolution or seasickness which obtains apart from a
substance's going into solution or someone's nausea.
It is a mistake to suppose that the dispositional structure of beliefs,
desires, and other intentional states is like that of standard dispositions. 6
Certainly it is a mistake regarding dispositional emotions. Standard
dispositions are functionally defined relative to input and output
conditions; this is not the case for emotional dispositions. Phenomena
associated with emotions are not uniquely correlated with emotions. They
are various in kind and etiology. Dissolving, on the other hand, is
uniquely correlated with solubility. Emotional phenomena are identified
only by reference to their cause; they are not otherwise identifiable as
emotional phenomena. In contrast, dissolution is identifiable
independently of its dispositional cause; solubility is whatever disposes
something to dissolve.
A Component Theorist need not assimilate emotional dispositions to
standard dispositions. Emotional dispositions may be held to resemble
standard dispositions in that they are underlying causes of emotional
phenomena but not themselves emotions, though the phenomena are
identifiable as emotional only by reference to the evaluative belief which
is their cause. The underlying cause in which the disposition consists
may be held to be an evaluative belief. This is the position taken by
Lyons when he maintains that, "The evaluative aspect [is] the lynchpin
of the different parts which make up an emotional state, and the
differentiator of different emotions" (Lyons, 1980, p. 81). A case of
dispositional fear provides an illustration for Lyons. He writes:

That I am afraid of Alsatians is true although I am writing at my desk. If an Alsatian

suddenly appeared I might be plunged instantaneously, reflexly, into a state of fear. Some
time ago I formed the view that Alsatians are very dangerous. (Lyons, 1980, pp. 88-89)
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 55

Emotions are handled in a basically similar way by Lazarus and his

colleagues. "It is our view," they explain, "that emotions are experienced
in fleeting episodes, as distinguished from the more stable sentiments .... "
The sentiments are taken to be "dispositional judgments of social and
physical objects, judgments that often underlie an emotional episode when
triggered by a relevant cue" (Lazarus et al., 1980, pp. 196-7).
I think that it is also a mistake to deny that there are dispositional
emotions, taking the underlying cause of occurrent emotional phenomena
like bodily and affective changes to be evaluative judgments or beliefs.
What the Component Theorist does in effect is to assign to emotions a
structure with respect to dispositions like that of actions rather than that
of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states.
Consider first the case of actions. For the performance of an action
the presence of bodily movements, states, or other action-related
phenomena is necessary, and the phenomena are at least partly
constitutive of the action. When I write, for example, my hand must
guide the pen, and my writing consists at least in part in the movements
of my hand. There can be a disposition to perfonn certain actions when
relevant action-related phenomena are absent and the actions are not
being performed. This requires that there be a condition which is the
latent cause of the action-related phenomena. Thus even when I am not
writing, I am disposed to do so in that I have the intention to write a
book which is often the cause of my writing-related movements in the
production of pages, sections, and chapters. Various phenomena may be
constitutive of writing; they are identified as action-related only by
reference to the intention by which they are caused.
With respect to dispositions, there are two structural features of
actions which are of special importance for our purposes. For one thing,
there can be no dispositional actions since actions require the presence of
the phenomena which are constitutive of them. In the second place,
when, in the absence of actions there is a disposition to perform them,
there is a latent cause of action-related phenomena which is not itself an
action. In denying that there are dispositional emotions and asserting that
when there is a disposition to have an emotion there is an evaluative
belief which is the underlying cause of emotional phenomena, the
Component Theorist takes emotions to have a structure like that of
actions in both of these respects.
56 CHAPTER IV

The dispositional structure of beliefs, desires, and other intentional

states is quite different from that of actions. Take belief as an example.
Saying aloud or to oneself that p, employing p as a premise in reasoning,
and acting on the information that p may be viewed as occurrent
phenomena of believing that p. There is (or should be) no temptation to
take such phenomena to constitute believing that p. Obviously one can
have the belief that p in the absence of the phenomena. In such cases the
belief is dispositional. It is the latent cause of the relevant phenomena,
and when they occur the phenomena and identified as phenomena of
belief by reference to their cause. Thus, a man who is asleep may
dispositionally believe that p. When awake, he may tell us that p because
he believes that p, and his assertion is an expression of belief in virtue of
its cause. There are dispositional beliefs, and they, rather than states of
some other kind, are the underlying causes of the occurrent phenomena
of belief.
With respect to dispositions, it is not actions but beliefs and desires
that emotions structurally resemble. When one is disposed to have some
emotion, the underlying cause of occurrent emotional phenomena such as
affective and bodily change is the emotion, not an evaluative belief. In
occurrent pity, for example, one may be moved to tears. So in cases
where one is disposed to pity someone, there is a latent cause of such
emotional phenomena. As such, however, tears have nothing to do with
pity; tears may come with grief or even joy, not to mention mace. Tears
of pity must have pity as their underlying cause. The dispositional state
cannot be reduced to a state of some other kind, such as an evaluative
belief. If some Scrooge believes that the poor suffer undeserved
misfortune but does not care, he has an evaluative belief typical of pity
but he does not pity the poor. If this belief should somehow activate his
tear ducts, that would not make his tears tears of pity, since, again, this
Scrooge does not pity the poor.
Mental states like emotions, desires, and beliefs are causes of our
behavior. The Component Theorist's mistake is taking emotions to be
effects of mental states, at least in part, and not mental states at all.
Since emotions are causes of emotional phenomena and can exist in
latency apart from emotional phenomena, emotional phenomena are not
necessary for emotions; and where present, emotional phenomena could
hardly be constitutive of emotions.
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 57

It might be objected that to maintain that felt or physiological

changes are not constitutive of emotions is in effect denying that there are
occurrent emotions. This is not accurate. Such changes are emotional
only when caused by emotions and so could not be caused by and
constitutive of emotions. Occurrent emotions are not the same as felt and
physiological changes, or such changes caused by beliefs; they are
emotions which are causally active in the production of various emotional
phenomena including felt and physiological changes.
Dispositional emotions are latent causes of emotion-related
phenomena. Calm and dispositional emotions are dispositional emotions
with respect to certain phenomena. Calm emotions are dispositional with
respect to the production of agitation. Unconscious emotions are
dispositional with respect to the production of either awareness that one
has the emotion or somatic and sensational effects of which one is
proprioceptively aware. In their classic discussions of calm and
unconscious emotions, respectively, both Hume and Freud argue that
dispositional--calm or unconscious--emotions must be recognized to
account for our behavior and thoughts. That is, they maintain that an
emotion may be an active cause of behavior or thought but only a latent
cause of agitation or awareness.
According to Hume, "The reflective impressions may be divided into
two kinds, viz., the calm and the violent" (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 276).
The latter are productive of "sensible agitation"; the former are not.
Often, Hume says, "Tho' they be real passions, [they] produce little
emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the
immediate feeling or sensation" (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 417). Both calm
and violent passions must be recognized because of their influence on the
will. '''Tis evident," Hume observes, "passions influence not the will in
proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the
temper. .. " (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 418).
In his essay The Unconscious, Freud argues that in explaining
thought and action, it is necessary and legitimate to assume that there are
unconscious ideas, and he is inclined to say the same thing about
unconscious emotions. Freud presents the argument as follows:

[The assumption] is necessary because the data of consciousness are exceedingly

defective.... OUf most intimate daily experience introduces us to sudden ideas of the
58 CHAPTER IV

source of which we are ignorant, and to the results of mentation arrived at we know not
how. All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we are
determined to hold fast to the claim that every single mental act performed within us must
be consciously experienced; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection
if we interpolate the unconscious acts that we infer.... The assumption of an unconscious
is moreover, in a further respect a perfectly legitimate one, inasmuch as in postulating it
we do not depart a single step from our customary and accepted way of thinking.... That
another man possesses consciousness is a conclusion drawn by analogy from the
utterances and actions we perceive him to make, and it is drawn in order that this
behavior of his may become intelligible to us.... Now psycho-analysis demands no more
than that we should apply this method of inference to ourselves also.... (Freud,
1915/1958, pp. 166-69)

Neither Hume nor Freud fully appreciates the inconsistency of

recognizing dispositional emotions which are the latent causes of
emotional phenomena with the contention that emotions themselves are
affects or impressions. Hume tiptoes lightly around the difficulty of how
emotions as impressions can be "in a manner, imperceptible" (Hume,
1739/1962, p. 276). Like Hume, Freud holds a Causal Theory: emotions
are affects caused by ideas. "Affects and emotions," he explains,
"correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which
are perceived as feelings" (Freud, 1915/1958, p. 178). Given this view,
a problem arises in understanding unconscious emotions, which Freud
sets out as follows:

It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should
become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness
would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings, and affects are concerned.
But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate,
anger, etc .... (Freud, 1915/1958, p. 171)

Unconscious emotions, on Freud's view are often due to repression,

which "results not only in withholding things from consciousness, but
also in preventing the development of affect and the setting off of
muscular activity" (Freud, 1915/1958, p. 179). There are thus two kinds
of cases to be distinguished in which an emotion may be unconscious in
this way. In the first, the idea causes the affect, but because one is not
conscious of the idea, the affect is misperceived. In cases of the second
kind, one is again not conscious of the idea, but there is no affect to be
perceived since production of it by the idea is also inhibited by
 COMPONENT THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 59

repression. It is because of cases of this second kind that unconscious

emotions constitute a problem for Freud. He wants to say, for example,
that a man may be angry who has angry thoughts, though owing to
repression he is unaware of these thoughts and they do not produce angry
feelings or behavior. Without the production of affects, however, there
can be, for him, no emotion.
For Freud the problem of unconscious emotions remains unresolved.
He finds that, "all that corresponds in that system [namely, the
Unconscious] to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is
prevented from developing." Thus, as a Causal Theorist, he is led to
conclude that, "Strictly speaking, ... there are no unconscious affects as
there are unconscious ideas" (Freud, 1915/1958, p. 178).
Neu, assuming that a necessary condition for an emotion must be a
constituent of it, interprets Freud as holding a Causal Constituent or
Constituent Theory according to which emotions are "psychological states
composed of idea and affect." On this basis, he suggests that, "It should
be clear... how an emotion can be unconscious in virtue of the associated
idea being unconscious" (Neu, 1977, p. 142). This is hardly the case. So
long as affects are taken to be constitutive of emotions, understanding
unconscious emotions in which production of affects is repressed will be
a problem. A Component Theory of dispositional emotions, calm and
unconscious emotions included, cannot be provided because constitutive
emotional phenomena are lacking; to account for dispositional emotions,
it is necessary to tum to a theory according to which emotional
phenomena are caused by, but not constitutive of, emotions.

6. CONCLUSION

The contentions that non-intentional phenomena are constitutive of

emotions and that the intentionality of emotions is derived from that of
related beliefs, which are definitive of Component Theories, give rise to
objections to them which are, I believe, decisive. The causal relations
objection tells against Causal Constituent Theories, but the objections
regarding emotional intentionality and dispositional emotions tell against
any form of the Component Theory. If the structure of emotions is to be
understood, serious consideration must be given to theories which differ
fundamentally from Component Theories on the issues of constitutive
60 CHAPTER IV

phenomena and derived intentionality. Currently, the most prominent

such theories are Evaluative Theories.

NOTES

It is for this reason that Causal Theories are classed as Component Theories,
although, unlike Causal Constituent and Constituent Theories, they do not take beliefs to
be constituents of emotions.
Although Lyons' book Emotion contains statements of a Causal Theory, his
considered view would seem to be a Constituent Theory. However, he is chary of calling
the evaluative component of emotions an evaluative belief.
3 Elsewhere, however, Hume appears to accept the notion of derived intentionality.
In his discussion of pride, for instance, he says:
Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces
it, and the other is produc'd by it. The first idea, therefore represents the
cause, the second the object of the passion. (Hume, 1739/1960, p. 278)
This is not to deny that actions are intentional in the ordinary sense. The point is
that they are not intentional in the special sense which requires representation.
S It is also possible, though paradoxical, to maintain that evaluative beliefs lack
semantic properties or that emotions have semantic properties. These position are
considered and rejected in Chapter V.
6 This is argued in the case of belief by David Armstrong (Armstrong, 1973, Ch. 2).
 CHAPTER V

EV ALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS

1. INTRODUCfION

Evaluative Theories take emotions to be evaluative beliefs or judgments

which may cause emotional phenomena such as affective and bodily
agitation and which may motivate behavior. Historically theories of this
kind have been advocated by Chrysippus and other Stoics, Augustine,
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Brentano. In recent philosophy examples are found
in J.-P. Sartre (1939/1962), C.D. Broad (1954/1971), R.S. Peters (1970),
and Donald Davidson (1976/1980). The most fully developed version of
the Evaluative Theory in current philosophy is that of Robert C. Solomon,
who maintains that, "An emotion is an evaluative (or a 'normative')
judgment, a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about
all other people" (Solomon, 1976, p. 187).
It is difficult to find instances of the Evaluative Theory in
contemporary psychology. This is probably due to the impression that
such a theory would afford at best reduced scope for behavioral and
physiological studies of emotions. Still, a fonn of the Evaluative Theory
is proposed by psychologist William Ward Leeper who writes: "Emotions,
we might say, are the individual's perceptions or representations of what
he regards as the most significant realities of his life" (Leeper, 1970, p.
164).
The rationale behind an Evaluative Theory of the emotions can be
developed most effectively in comparison with Component Theories. The
theories differ in two basic respects. An Evaluative Theory takes
emotions, as evaluative judgments or beliefs, to have intrinsic
intentionality; for Component Theories, the intentionality of emotions is
derived from beliefs to which they are causally or constitutively related.
Also, non-intentional emotional phenomena may be caused by but do not
constitute emotions according to Evaluative Theories; Component
Theories take emotional phenomena to be constitutive of emotions.
Because of these differences Evaluative Theories do not encounter the

61
62 CHAPTER V

difficulties concerning causal relations between emotions and beliefs or

the composition of dispositional emotions which arise for Component
Theories.
Both Evaluative and Component Theories have a cognitive
orientation, explaining the intentionality of emotions in terms of that of
beliefs or judgments. For this reason the theories share the advantage of
providing an account of distinctions between emotions and of their
intentionality and rational justification (see Ch. III, Sect. 1). But also, as
Cognitive Theories, theories of both kinds are open to objections about
semantic properties and about emotional rationality. These, however, are
not the objecOons usually made to the view that emotions are evaluative
judgments.

2. NON-EMOTIONAL EY ALUATIONS

The usual objection to an Evaluative Theory is that emotions cannot be

evaluative beliefs or judgments since the relevant evaluations may be
non-emotional. For example, a man who finds himself in an awkward
situation need experience no embarrassment; he may remain unflustered
and brazen it out (see Bergmann, 1978; and Sachs, 1978).
One line of reply to this objection is to suggest that evaluations
which are emotions are distinguished from those which are not by their
emotionality. However, owing to its circularity, this suggestion fails to
tell us which evaluations are emotions and so provides no answer to the
objection (see Bergmann, 1978; and Sachs, 1978). Sometimes the
circularity of the suggestion is plain. According to Broad,

An emotion is a cognition which has one or more of a certain generic kind of psychical
quality which we will call emotional tone.... [For instance,] to be fearing X is to be
cognizing X fearingly; to be admiring X is to be cognizing X admiringly; and so on.
(Broad, 1954/1971, p. 286)

A similar suggestion is made by Thalberg (1980). In other cases the

circularity is only slightly less apparent. Solomon writes as follows:

Not all evaluative judgments are emotions.... Most such judgments are not "emotional"
 EVALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 63

and are not emotions.... Emotions are self-involved and relatively intense evaluative
judgments. (Solomon, 1976, p. 188)

It is possible for an Evaluative Theorist to make some progress

toward resolving the problem of circularity in the specification of which
evaluations are emotional. An evaluation might be said to be emotional
which is liable to cause emotional phenomena. Thus, a man who takes
himself to be in an untoward situation is embarrassed only if his
evaluation tends, for example, to make him stammer and blush or feel
uncomfortable. This suggestion is not circular despite the reference to the
phenomena in question as emotional. The phenomena are said to be
emotional if caused by an evaluation, as the evaluation is said to be
emotional if it causes the phenomena. Still, both the evaluation and the
resultant phenomena are independently identifiable.
Whether the suggestion that emotional evaluations are those which
cause emotional phenomena succeeds altogether in avoiding the problem
of circularity is not the crucial point here; the trouble is that it does not
answer the original objection. It is not the case that evaluative judgments
generally, or even those which concern one's own situation, always tend
to cause autonomic arousal, somatic feelings, or other phenomena
associated with emotions. And there must be some difference between
cases in which evaluations cause emotional phenomena and other cases.
The theory that emotions are evaluative judgments fails to account for
this difference. If, as seems to be the case, judgments of the same type--
judgments that one is in an awkward situation, for example--sometimes
do and sometimes do not cause emotional phenomena, it is hard to see
how an Evaluative Theory could account for the difference.

3. SEMANTIC PROPERTIES

According to Component Theories, emotions derive their intentionality

from related beliefs. To such theories it was objected that if emotions
took on the cognitive intentionality of the beliefs they should also take on
their semantic properties and have truth values, though evidently emotions
have no such properties. Evaluative Theories take emotions to be beliefs
or judgments. Even more obviously theories of this type are open to a
semantic properties objection.
64 CHAPTER V

Simply stated, the objection is this. Evaluative judgments or beliefs-

-concerning danger, for example, or one's past wrongdoing--have
semantic properties; they are assessable as false or true. Emotions, on the
other hand, do not have semantic properties; fear, for instance, or remorse
cannot be assessed as true or as false. Consequently, it is a mistake to
identify emotions with evaluative beliefs or judgments.
There are two lines of direct response to this objection available to
an Evaluative Theorist. It may be held that emotions have the semantic
properties of truth or falsity or it may be held that evaluative judgments
lack these semantic properties. Each position has its defenders.
Brentano, for example, takes the former position, Solomon, the latter.
I think that the burden of proof lies on those who respond in either
of these ways. The reason is that to claim that emotions have truth
values or that evaluative beliefs do not is paradoxical and involves a
conceptual revision requiring justification. Moreover, in each case the
argument for the semantic claim must be independent of the contention
that emotions are evaluative judgments. Otherwise the semantic claims
will amount to no more than ad hoc moves made to save the Evaluative
Theory from the objection.
Brentano regards emotions as being for or against their objects and
refers to them as "phenomena of love and hate." He does not call them
jUdgments, reserving that tern} for 'factual' judgments. Still it is clear
that he takes emotions to be evaluations. Brentano's account of the
semantic properties of emotions is based on an analogy he believes to
hold between them and ('factual ') judgments. "Just as judgments are
sometimes correct, sometimes incorrect," Brentano maintains, "there is
also such a thing as correctness and incorrectness in the domain of love
and hate" (Brentano, 1874/1973, p. 287). The claimed analogy is
explained in the following passages.

Just as every judgment takes an object to be true or false, in an analogous way every
phenomenon [of love or hate] takes an object to be good or bad. (Brentano, 1874/1973,
p. 199)

One loves or hates correctly provided that one's feelings are adequate to their object--
adequate in the sense of being appropriate, suitable, or fitting. (Brentano, 1889/1969, p.
74)
 EV ALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 65

Thus we can say that love and hate are correct if we love what is good and hate what is
bad, and that love and hate are not correct if we love what is bad and hate what is good.
(Brentano, 1930/1966, p. 22)

Brentano's contention that emotions, like judgments, may be correct

or incorrect involves an equivocation. Correctness for judgments is truth.
For emotions correctness is appropriateness. That emotions may be
appropriate or inappropriate, however, does not mean that they, like
judgments, may be true or false--or that they have any semantic values
at all (see Ch. VI, Sect. 4).
Brentano is right in holding that emotions may be cognitively
appropriate. In this sense the appropriateness of emotions depends on the
likelihood that certain judgments are true. Still, this is no reason to think
that emotions themselves may be true, for the same thing holds for
desires and actions which obviously do not have truth values. l As an
illustration of this point, consider a scenario. Marsha's marriage to John
would obviously be a disaster, but she thinks it would be a good thing.
She wants to marry John and hopes that she will do so. Eventually
Marsha and John are married. Her desire to marry John and her marrying
him are, like her hope that she would marry him, inappropriate in view
of the evident falsity of her belief that marrying John would be a fine
thing. This does not mean that her desire or her marriage is false, no
more does it mean that her hope is so.
lt might be objected that we do speak of false hopes, but that is not
to the point. For one thing, talk about false hopes does involve semantic
assessment but not of hopes. To say that Marsha's hope of marrying
John is false is to say that she is wrong in thinking that she might marry
John. Oearly, however, it is not in that thought that her hope consists.
In the second place, for Brentano the semantic value of Marsha's hope is
supposed to depend on her being right in thinking that marrying John
would be a good thing. But even if she is wrong about that, her hope is
not said to be false. Further, it should be noted that talk about false
hopes is a highly idiomatic and isolated phenomenon. Though we talk
about false hopes, we don't talk about hopes that are true. And we don't
generally talk about other emotions as false or true in a way which
implies semantic assessment. We do talk about true love, for example,
66 CHAPTER V

but no semantic assessment is implied. True love is real love. or more

specifically, great love or love that lasts.
For Solomon emotions are evaluative judgments which constitute our
subjective perspective on the world. Judgments of this kind, he
maintains, cannot "be shown to be 'incorrect' or 'wrong', for such tenns
apply only to descriptive judgments, which claim to 'correspond' to the
'facts,' not to constitutive judgments, which do not 'correspond' to
anything" (Solomon, 1976, p. 197). This contention is illustrated with
respect to anger: "One does not become angry because the comment is
offensive: the comment is offensive by virtue of its being an object for
anger" (Solomon, 1976, p. 196).
Two considerations are provided in support of this subjectivist denial
that truth functional assessment is appropriate to emotional judgments.
The first is that emotions are subjectively 'real' whatever the facts.
According to Solomon, even if I have misunderstood the remark at which
I take offense, even if in fact no remark was made, "for the anger itself,
its object is no less offensive (and the anger no less 'real')" (Solomon,
1976, p. 198). It is certainly true that ifI am angry about an offensive
remark, I take a remark to be offensive, whatever the remark was like and
whether the remark was even made. But this hardly shows that my
judgment that the remark was offensive has no truth value. The same
thing can be said about 'descriptive' beliefs which of course may be true
or false. If I believe that the cat is on the mat, I believe that the cat is on
the mat whether the cat is on the mat and whether there is a cat at all--my
belief is still 'real.'
The second reason given for taking evaluative judgments to be
subjective is this. "There are," according to Solomon, "no fixed standards
of interpretation for any emotions, and so every emotion must be viewed
as constitutional, as an existential decision concerning the way one is to
view his world" (Solomon, 1976, p. 2(0). Solomon is assisted in his
claim by his example. What is offensive is variable to a large extent.
What is dangerous or tragic, on the other hand is relatively detenninate.
There is no plausibility in saying that tigers are dangerous because we are
afraid of them or that a child's death is tragic because his parents grieve.
Even standards of offensiveness, however, are not indefinitely elastic. An
offense must represent a breech of some applicable social standard of
 EVALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 67

propriety. Whether such a standard applies on a given occasion may be

debatable, but this hardly shows that the predicates "incorrect" or "wrong"
do not apply to judgments of offense.
Although he maintains that owing to their subjectivity emotions as
evaluative judgments lack cognitive semantic properties, Solomon is
concerned to uphold their rationality. "Emotions," he says, " may be said
to be rational in precisely the same sense in which all judgments may be
said to be rational" (Solomon, 1976, p. 242). The account of the
rationality of emotional judgments which Solomon gives is surprising.
In this context, he holds that "'rationality' signifies intelligent purposive
activity" (Solomon, 1976, p. 244). "Ultimately," he says, "all emotions
have a common goal--the maximization of self-esteem" (Solomon, 1976,
p. 245). This attribution of conative rationality to emotions is manifestly
implausible, as has often been observed (see Bergmann, 1978; Sachs,
1978; and de Sousa, 1979). The present point, however, is that if
emotions are taken to be judgments, one would naturally expect them to
have cognitive rather than conative rationality, to be assessable as regards
their likelihood of being true instead of their serviceability in attaining a
goal.
Still, Solomon does not want to divorce emotional judgments from
cognitive assessment (Solomon, 1976, pp. 206 and 212) and insists that
"our emotions ... are dependent upon our opinions and beliefs." He
explains:

A change in my beliefs (for example, the refutation of my belief that John stole my car)
entails (not causes) a change in my emotion (my being angry that John stole my car). I
cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me. (Solomon,
1976, p. 187)

As an account of the cognitive rationality of the emotional judgment this

is confused. The refutation of my belief that John stole my car would
show that my belief is false, not that I don't believe that John stole my
car. This difficulty simply reflects the more basic problem with
Solomon's position: emotions can hardly have cognitive rationality if
emotional judgments lack truth values.
68 CHAPTER V

4. RATIONALITY

Emotions have rational properties: they are rationally related to beliefs

and to the motivation of behavior, and they are themselves assessable as
rational or irrational. A boy may be afraid that a dog will bite him
because he believes that Dobermans are vicious; he may be motivated to
climb a tree; but his fear may be irrational if it is clear that the dog has
no teeth. A theory of emotions must explain these rational properties.
For a Cognitive Theory, whether a Component Theory or an
Evaluative Theory, the intentionality of emotions is explained in tenns of
the intentionality of beliefs or judgments. Since they are taken to have
cognitive intentionality, emotions must be supposed to have the rational
properties of beliefs as well. Rational properties, like semantic properties,
are a function of representational direction of fit and conditions of
success.
A cognitive account of emotional rationality is not without initial
plausibility. Like emotions, beliefs are rationally related to other beliefs,
figure in the rational motivation of behavior, and are themselves open to
rational assessment. Unlike emotions, however, beliefs aim at truth and
have mind-to-world direction of fit. There are, consequently, major
differences between the rational properties of emotions and those of
beliefs, and in the light of these differences a cognitive explanation of
emotional rationality is bound to fail.
In accounting for the rational relation of emotions to beliefs, a
Cognitive Theory would have to assign to them a belief-like role in
theoretical and practical reasoning. Emotions obviously have no such
role. Conclusions about what is the case or what it is desirable to do may
follow from the boy's beliefs about the dog but not from his fear of the
dog.
Beliefs enter into the rational explanation of behavior, of course, but
beliefs do not suffice to rationally motivate behavior. According to a
Cognitive Theory, the same would have to be true of emotions. Oearly
this is not the case. Emotions are sufficient for the rational generation of
intentions, given additional beliefs, while beliefs alone are not. If the boy
is afraid that the dog will bite him, he believes that the dog will bite him
and desires that the dog not bite him. If he also believes that if he climbs
a tree the dog will not bite him, he will be rationally motivated to climb
 EV ALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 69

a tree. If the boy merely believes that the dog will bite him, this will not
motivate him to climb a tree, even if he also believes that the dog will
not bite him if he climbs a tree.
Finally, on a cognitive account, the rational assessment of emotions
would have to depend on the likelihood of their truth. Patently,however,
it is not in this that their rationality consists. The boy's beliefs about the
dog may be rational if their truth is indicated by available evidence, but
his fear cannot be true at all. The likelihood of the truth of beliefs is not
even a sufficient condition for the rationality of emotions; considerations
of desirability are necessary as well. If there is no reason to mind being
bitten by a toothless dog, fear of such a dog will be irrational no matter
how great the likelihood that he will bite.

5. DESIRES AND DESIRABILITY JUDGMENTS

I suspect that the failure of Evaluative Theories, and of Cognitive

Theories generally, to account adequately for the semantic and rational
aspects of emotions has gone unnoticed because of confused or
unanalyzed notions of appropriateness or rationality. In any case, once
noticed, this failure can easily appear to constitute an acute problem in
understanding emotions. For, given some common assumptions, there
seems to be no alternative to a cognitive account of emotional
intentionality. Desires are often assimilated to, or held to be concomitant
with, desirability judgments or evaluative beliefs. If either of these
moves is made, there seems to be no real possibility of bringing desires
into an account of the intentionality of emotions. Since desires and
beliefs are the basic forms of intentionality, this means that there is no
alternative to a cognitive approach. Thus, if a satisfactory account of
emotional intentionality is to be developed, the relation between desires
and desirability judgments requires attention.
There is of course a close connection between desires and
desirability judgments. Desirability judgments provide reasons for
desires. It is sometimes suggested that the requirements of rationality
further unite desires and desirability judgments in ways which set them
apart from other judgments or beliefs. Specifically, the idea is that
desires and desirability judgments are not subject to rational constraints
concerning consistency and conjunction or simplification as are other
70 CHAPTER V

judgments or beliefs (see Williams, 1966/1973, Chs. 11 and 12; and de

Sousa, 19742).
In general, it is supposed to be irrational to have two beliefs which
cannot both be true. The rational aim of beliefs is truth, and of two
beliefs which are contrary, one at least must be false. It is suggested that
contrary desires and desirability judgments are not similarly precluded
rationally. In the case of desires, this is clearly false. To have two
desires (other than conditional desires) which cannot both be satisfied is
irrational, for satisfaction is a rational aim of desires.
Wishes are different from desires in this respect. Because they lack
commitment to the possibility of their satisfaction, it need not be
irrational to have contrary wishes which represent states of affairs which
cannot simultaneously obtain. Wishes are rationally constrained by
considerations of desirability, however, and it is irrational to have wishes
which are contrary with respect to the desirability of their being satisfied.
This does not establish an asymmetry in rational requirements for
cognitive and conative representation, where the latter is taken as
including wishes as well as desires. Cognitive representation includes
imaginative representations as well as beliefs. Since they lack
commitment to truth, it is not irrational to have imaginative
representations of states of affairs which cannot simultaneously obtain.
Unlike wishes, imaginative representations are subject to no rational
constraints. Wishes have desirability, though not satisfaction, as a
rational aim, but truth is the sole rational aim relevant to cognitive
representations.
It is also irrational to hold desirability judgments which are contrary.
Like beliefs generally, their rational aim is truth, and of two desirability
judgments which are contrary, one at most can be true. The case of
contrariety between desirability judgments is interesting in two ways.
First, often it may not be clear whether two desirability judgments are
contrary. Whether they are so depends on the respect in which something
is judged desirable. For example, the judgment that it is desirable that we
drink beer would seem to be contrary to the judgment that it is desirable
that we remain sober. This need not be so. If beer drinking is judged
desirable in that it would be fun and sobriety is judged desirable in that
we have work to do, the judgments may both be true. This might seem
to make the contrariety of desirability judgments a function of reasons for
 EV ALUATlVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 71

holding them, but this is not the case. The respect in which something
is judged desirable is part of the content of the judgment. It is the
content of desirability judgments which determines whether both can be
true. Reasons indicate whether either is true, and that is another matter.
A second respect in which the contrariety of desirability judgments
is of interest is this. Desirability judgments which may both be true still
may seem to be contrary. This is the case where it is judged desirable
that we drink beer and it is judged desirable that we stay sober. The
appearance of contrariety, I think, is due to the fact that the desires which
the judgments rationalize are contrary in that they cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. It would be a mistake, however, to read the contrariety
of the desires into the relation between the desirability judgments. That
the desires cannot both be satisfied does not mean that the beliefs cannot
both be true.
If A believes that p and A believes that q, it is rationally required
that A believe that p and q. Also, if A believes that p and q, rationality
requires that A believe that p. It is suggested that similar rational
constraints concerning conjunction and simplification do not hold for
desires and desirability judgments. Again, I think that this is simply
false.
The impression that desires are not subject to rational conjunction
and simplification requirements is due to the kind of cases commonly
considered. It is suggested, for example, that Henry may desire to marry
Mary and desire to marry Anne without being rationally required to desire
to marry Mary and Anne. This, of course, is true, but the reason is not
that desires are not subject to the conjunction requirement. Rather, the
desires which Henry has are contrary, on the assumption of monogamy.
Since rationality precludes holding the contrary desires in the first place,
it is of course not required that they be had in conjunction. Where
desires are compatible as regards their conditions of satisfaction,
conjoinability is a rational requirement. If Henry desires to be rich and
desires to be famous, of course Henry must desire to be rich and famous.
Desires are perfectly parallel to beliefs regarding the conjoinability
requirement. One who believes that p and believes that not-p, is hardly
required rationally to believe that p and not-po
The case is the same with desires and the simplification requirement.
72 CHAPTER V

It is supposed that the requirement does not apply because a man might
want a hammer and some nails without wanting either alone and be
rational for all that. True, but again the reason is not as supposed. The
case is one in which each desire is conditional on the other. The man
wants a hammer if he gets some nails, and he wants some nails if he gets
a hammer. This is why he is not rationally required to want either
hammer or nails alone. In cases not involving mutually conditional
desires, the simplification requirement is operative. If a man wants to be
a good husband and father, of course he must want to be a good husband.
Once more the parallel with beliefs holds. One who believes that p if and
only if q, is not rationally required to believe that p or q alone.
The appearance that desirability judgments are not subject to
conjunction and simplification requirements is also deceptive. My
judgment that it is desirable for me to eat cake may be rationally
compatible with my judgment that it is desirable for me to keep to my
diet. It seems, however, that there can be no rational requirement that I
judge it to be desirable that I eat cake and diet. This is only because it
is not possible that the desires rationalized by the desirability of dieting
and of indulging be satisfied simultaneously. What is desirable is not
restricted to what is possible. Rationality does require the conjoint
desirability judgment. What it rationalizes is not a desire but a wish that
I could eat my cake and have it too, and that may be a wish it is rational
for me to have.
I may rationally judge having a pen and some paper to be desirable
without judging it to be desirable that I have either alone. This, however,
will only be the case where having the pen is judged to be desirable on
the condition that I have the paper and vice versa. Otherwise, in the case
of non-conditional desirability judgments, simplification is rationally
required.
It turns out that not only do considerations of requirements of
rationality not unite desires and desirability judgments, they give us a
reason to separate them. Both desires and desirability beliefs are subject
to semantic rationality conditions, which relate to feasibility of
satisfaction and likelihood of truth, respectively. These rationality
conditions are clearly independent: the likelihood that the belief that it
is desirable that p is true does not establish the feasibility of satisfying the
 EV ALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 73

desire that p; or conversely. Also, unlike beliefs, desires are subject to

non-semantic rationality conditions relating to desirability of satisfaction.
The likelihood that it is desirable that p is a semantic rationality condition
for the belief that it is desirable that p but a non-semantic rationality
condition for the desire that p.
It is a fundamental mistake to assimilate desires to desirability
judgments. The reason is simple: they have opposed representational
directions of fit. Desires represent states of affairs as ones which are to
obtain and are satisfied if they come to obtain and otherwise unsatisfied.
Desirability judgments represent states of affairs as ones which obtain and
are true if they do and otherwise false. With this difference goes another.
Intentions with which we act have the representational structure of
desires, as opposed to that of desirability judgments. Intentions have
world-to-mind direction of fit and mayor may not be successfully carried
out. With their mind-to-world direction of fit, the intentional structure of
desirability judgments could hardly be shared with intentions.
Often it is held that what one judges to be desirable to do one
desires to do. This need not amount to assimilating desires to desirability
judgments. Like the assimilation of desires to desirability judgments,
however, the claim that desires and desirability judgments are
concomitant makes it impossible to account for a whole range of cases of
irrationality in desire, intention, and action, of which the most celebrated
is the case of akrasia. 3 What happens in akrasia and related instances of
conative irrationality is that our desires do not reflect our desirability
judgments; their rational concomitance breaks down.
There are various types of these conatively irrational actions. Akratic
actions are actions which an agent intentionally performs, although he
judges the performance of some available alternative action to be more
desirable that that of the action he performs. St. Peter evidently acted
akratically in three times denying that he knew Jesus, for he thought it
more desirable to affirm his allegiance to him. Still, Peter, like other
akratic agents, presumably thought his action to some extent desirable.
For this reason, it is important to consider cases of other types, in which
there is a more radical break between desires and desirability judgments.
In cases of what I shall call impulsive actions, an agent acts
intentionally without any consideration of the desirability of what he
74 CHAPTER V

does. Had he considered the desirability of his action, he might not have
acted as he did. bnpulsive actions are, I think, quite common.
There are also cases of what we might call perverse actions, in
which an agent intentionally does something which he judges undesirable
to do, without holding any offsetting judgment about the desirability of
what he does. Leontius seems to have acted perversely when he gazed
upon the corpses of the executed.
No doubt a more extensive catalogue of conatively irrational actions
could be devised, but distinguishing cases of these types should suffice
for our purposes. Still, it should be noted that, as there are cases in
which actions may be conatively irrational because the intention acted
upon does not reflect the desirability judgments of the agent, there are
corresponding cases in which desires and intentions not translated into
action fail to match desirability judgments.
In cases of conatively irrational action, an action is performed
intentionally. It follows from the intentional structure of intention that an
action intentionally performed by an agent is an action the agent desires
to perform. Intentions are rational representations of the conative type,
with world-to-mind direction of fit; they represent states of affairs as ones
which are to obtain. This means that intentions are generically desires.
Since intentional actions are actions the agent intends to perform,
intentional actions are actions the agent desires to perform.
It is commonly objected that an agent may intentionally perform an
action which he does not desire to perform but which he has a duty to
perform. It is of course perfectly possible that an agent should desire to
do something because he believes he has a duty to do it, notwithstanding
contrary desires. Given the intentional structure of intending, however,
intentional action could hardly be undesired, if desire is understood in
terms of its definitive representational and rational properties.
Since actions intentionally performed by an agent are actions the
agent desires to perfonn, if desires and desirability judgments are
confiated or held to be concomitant it would follow that what an agent
most desires to do he judges most desirable to do, what he desires to do
he judges desirable to do, what he judges undesirable to do he does not
desire to do, and so on. This would mean that there could be no akratic,
impulsive, or perverse actions. Since there certainly seem to be actions
 EV ALUATIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS 75

of these kinds, we should reject any view which runs desirability

judgments and desires together.
The concomitance of desires and desirability judgments is a
requirement of conative rationality: our desires, intentions, and actions
are irrational if they do not reflect our desirability judgments. No doubt
it is this consideration which motivates the claim that desires and
desirability judgments are concomitant. To transform the normative
requirement into a psychological generalization, however, is simply
unrealistic--a form of hyperrationalism.
There are many and various kinds of non-intentional conditions
which exert a merely causal influence on the rationality of our desires,
intentions, and actions (as well as on other elements of our rational
functioning). Among these conditions are addictions (alcoholism,
'workoholism '), drive states (hunger, satiety), drug-induced states
(intoxication, stimulation), energy levels (fatigue, vigor), moods
(depression, elation), psychological conditions (manias, normality),
psychological stress levels (extreme, moderate), and traits (timidity,
boldness). In each of these cases, the influence of the condition on
rationality is merely causal; the conditions do not give us reasons for our
desires, intentions, and actions. Conditions which make possible rational
functioning tend to recede from attention; those which interfere with it are
salient. Still, causal conditions enhance or impair rational functioning.
Moderate stress or boldness may facilitate rational coping, as extreme
stress and timidity may impair it.
What is of present interest is that certain causal conditions may
account for desiderative irrationality in akratic, impulsive, and perverse
actions. Depression, for example, may influence us to desire and do what
we do not think most desirable to do. When depressed we may lie about
and mope instead of doing important work. Also, intoxication may cause
us to desire and do things without considering desirability or contrary to
what we consider desirable. Thus, when intoxicated we may intentionally
drink more and more, drive faster and faster. To run together desires and
desirability judgments amounts to denying that these non-intentional
conditions have the influence on our behavior which they obviously do
have.
76 CHAPTER V

6. CONCLUSION

Evaluative Theories, even more clearly than other theories which take the
intentionality of emotions to depend on their relation to judgments or
beliefs, encounter problems concerning semantic properties and emotional
rationality. Emotions simply do not have the truth-functional and rational
properties which a Cognitive Theory, of whatever kind, must assign them.
These problems, in my opinion, are intractable. This means that a
satisfactory account of emotions as intentional states must make a radical
break with the predominant cognitive approach. That is the direction in
which I intend to go; and drawing a defInite distinction between desires
and desirability beliefs is an important fIrst step.

NOTES

Brentano takes desires and conduct, as well as emotions, to have cognitive semantic
properties (see Brentano, 1930/1966, p. 5 and 1874/1973, p. 241). While boldly
consistent, this contention is clearly wrong. As intentional states, desires lack the mind-
to-world direction of fit necessary for truth and falsity; and aside from speech acts, which
have derived intentionality, actions are not intentional since they lack representational
content.
Both Williams and de Sousa are inclined to draw non-cognitivist conclusions about
moral judgments from these considerations. As the ensuing discussion shows, this is a
mistake.
The problem of akrasia does not arise just when it is held, as by Socrates and
Aristotle, that we desire what we judge desirable, but also when, as with Hobbes and
Spinoza, it is held that we judge desirable what we desire. It is not the order of priority
with desires and desirability judgments but their concomitance which makes for the
problem. Curiously, Hobbes and Spinoza fail to deal with akrasia, perhaps because they
feel that, having reversed the order of priority, the problem doesn't arise.
 CHAPTER VI

THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

The theory of emotions which I propose is a Belief-Desire Theory: in

standard cases, emotions are intentional structures of beliefs and desires.
There are also special cases in which imaginative or other belief-like
representations, or desire-like representations such as wishes, rather than
beliefs and desires, are constitutive of emotions. For the sake of
simplicity, however, I will focus for the most part on standard cases,
considering special cases only where necessary. There are, I think, no
clear historical antecedents of this theory. Joel Marks has independently
sketched a Belief-Desire Theory of emotions (Marks, 1982), and it has
been suggested by both Wayne Davis and John Searle that some emotions
can be understood in terms of beliefs and desires (Davis, 1981a; Searle,
1983). Nowhere, however, has this type of theory of emotions been
thoroughly developed and defended. That is what I aim to do.
The Belief-Desire Theory, like Evaluative Theories, takes emotions
themselves to be intentional states which may cause, but are not
constituted by, non-intentional phenomena such as affective and bodily
agitation. Thus theories of both types differ from Component Theories,
which take emotions to have derived intentionality and emotional
phenomena to be constitutive of emotions. For this reason they avoid
problems concerning causal relations between emotions and beliefs or the
composition of dispositional emotions which arise for Component
Theories.
Both Evaluative and Component Theories have a cognitivist
orientation, explaining the intentionality of emotions in terms of that of
beliefs or judgments. The Belief-Desire Theory is fundamentally different
in this respect; emotional intentionality is explained in terms of structures
of beliefs and desires, desires being clearly distinguished from cognitive
representations. Because of this difference, it will be argued, the Belief-
Desire Theory, unlike Cognitivist Theories of either sort, affords a

77
78 CHAPTER VI

plausible account of the place of emotions in a system of rational

representation. To see how this is so, attention must first be given to
certain features of the intentional structures which constitute emotions.

2. INTENTIONAL STRUCfURES

Although desires, as well as beliefs, are basic intentional states, they have
not entered into explanations of the intentionality of emotions. This is
due to the fact that desires generally have been thought to have a
resultant and secondary role in emotions or to be involved or incorporated
in the evaluative beliefs or desirability judgments on which the
intentionality of emotions is supposed to depend.! This view of desires
and beliefs in relation to the intentional structure of emotions is mistaken.
Desires which are constitutive of emotions are not resultant
performative desires. One who is angry over some offense may
consequently desire to retaliate, but again one may not. It is not this
desire which is constitutive of one's anger in any case. Rather it is the
desire not to be so treated. Without that desire, one would not be angry
at all. The resultant desire to retaliate, when one is angry over an
offense, is a performative desire, a desire that one perform an action.
Desires which are constitutive of emotions may be, but often are not,
performative desires. My desire to complete this section this week is a
performative desire and may be constitutive of my gladness over finishing
it or of my disappointment over not doing so. On the other hand, the
desire not to be abused, which is constitutive of anger over an insult, is
an optative desire, a desire that a state of affairs obtain which is not one
of my performing an action.
Desires constitutive of emotions are also not built into related
evaluative beliefs. Evaluative beliefs or desirability judgments provide
reasons for desires. The beliefs which are constitutive of emotions,
however, mayor may not be evaluative beliefs. The evaluative belief
that one has done wrong, together with the desire that one not have done
so, is constitutive of remorse. On the other hand, if I am sorry that your
dog died, the constitutive belief is the nonevaluative belief that your dog
died? There is no temptation to suppose that, if I believe that your dog
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 79

died, I must desire that your dog not have died. There should be no
temptation to conflate the belief that one has done wrong with the desire
that one not have done wrong. It is possible to believe that one has done
wrong without caring about having done wrong; and in any case, basic
rational and semantic differences between desires and beliefs stand in the
way of running them together (see Ch. II, Sects. 2-4 and Ch. Y, Sect. 5).
The feature which is central to the intentional structure of emotions
is that the belief and desire which constitute an emotion concern a
common topic and are semantically interrelated. 3 As an illustration,
consider the case of gladness: when glad that p, A believes that p and A
desires that p. Or, again, consider the case of sorrow: when sorry that p,
A believes that p and A desires that not-po In each case the constitutive
belief and desire concern a common topic. Here I import a notion
employed in theoretical linguistics, but I believe that it is intuitively
obvious. The belief that p and the desire that p concern a common topic-
-whether it is or is to be the case that p --and make convergent comments
about it; the belief that p and the desire that not-p also concern a common
topic, though they make divergent comments about it. Because they
concern a common topic, the beliefs and desires constitutive of emotions
like gladness and sorrow are semantically interrelated. In the case of
gladness, if the belief that p is true, the desire that p is satisfied, and
conversely; in the case of sorrow, if the belief that p is true, the desire
that not-p is unsatisfied, and the other way round.
By way of contrast, suppose that A believes that p and A desires that
q. Here the belief and desire concern no common topic. They are
success-functionally unrelated. And the belief and desire constitute no
emotion that p or that q.
The content of emotions like gladness and sorrow is determined by
what we believe, given what we desire; the emotion and the belief
represent the same state of affairs. When glad that p, we believe that p;
and when sorry that p, we believe that p. Still beliefs alone are not
sufficient to determine emotional content. What we believe in the case
of gladness is in effect that what we desire is the case, and in the case of
sorrow we believe that what we desire is not the case.
The semantic relation between beliefs and desires constituting
emotions like gladness and sorrow may seem symmetrical. When glad,
80 CHAPTER VI

we believe that what we desire is the case and desire that what we believe
be the case; and when sorry, we believe that what we desire is not the
case and desire that what we believe not be the case. Yet, the semantic
relationship is not symmetrical. While desires pursue satisfaction, beliefs
purport to be true. Whether we desire that what we believe be the case
does not determine whether it is the case--whether the belief is true, or
even considered to be true. Whether we believe that what we desire is
the case does determine, at least subjectively, whether the desire is
satisfied. This is why emotional content is the content of the constituent
belief, not of the constituent desire. Emotions are functions of subjective
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and this is determined by beliefs, not
desires.
While they are semantically interrelated, in general, the beliefs and
desires constitutive of emotions are causally and rationally independent.
One need not believe that p to desire that p or desire that p to believe that
p, and one may have good reason to believe that p without having any
reason for desiring that p or have good reason to desire that p without
having any reason for believing that p. Still, there are cases in which
there is causal and rational dependence between the constitutive beliefs
and desires. The irrational perversity of desiring that p because one
believes that p is sufficient to make such cases rare, to say the least.
Cases in which one believes that p because one desires that p are
common enough, however, and they mayor may not exhibit irrationality.
Often believing that p because of a desire that p is irrational and an
instance of self-deception, and the emotion constituted by the belief and
desire is a self-deceptive emotion. In an example of the standard kind,
Alphonse believes that his wife is faithful because he desires that she be
faithful; he is glad that his wife is faithful; and his gladness is a self-
deceptive emotion. Not all cases in which beliefs are causally and
rationally dependent on desires involve self-deception. I may believe that
I am going to England in the summer because I desire to go to England
in the summer; I am glad that I am going to England in the summer.
This is an instance of what we might call a peiformative emotion. The
constitutive desire is a performative desire that I perform an action. The
emotion need not involve irrationality or self-deception. It will not if I
believe that it is feasible for me to go to England in the summer;
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 81

othelWise it will. The difference between irrational self-deceptive

emotions and rational performative emotions can be explained as follows.
Alphonse's desire that his wife be faithful gives him no reason to believe
that she is faithful because the world is not directly responsive to our
desires in such ways. On the other hand, the world may be directly
responsive to our performative desires, so that if I believe that it is
feasible for me to go to England, my desire to go to England does give
me a reason to believe that I will go to England.
The beliefs and desires which constitute emotions mayor may not
be causally active in the production of psychosomatic and behavioral
phenomena. In any case, they are no more causes of emotions than
hydrogen and oxygen are causes of water. The emotion, like the
molecular compound, is not something over and above its elements; it is
a structured combination of its elements. If the desire doesn't cause the
belief, there's nothing left for it to cause, so far as the emotion is
concerned. And if the belief doesn't cause the desire, again, nothing of
the emotion remains for it to cause.
Finally, the belief and desire which are constitutive of an emotion
must be co-occurrent, but there need be no order of temporal priority.
Often, no doubt, one is glad to get what one already desired to have, but
one may also be glad on coming to desire to have what one previously
believed oneself to have. In any case, however, there will be no gladness
unless one has the belief and the desire at the same time.

3. BASIC EMOTIONS

The idea that some emotions are basic and that others are forms or
combinations of these was introduced into philosophical psychology by
the Stoics and has been incorporated, in one foml or another, in many
subsequent theories of emotions. The principles according to which some
emotions are basic and others derived, however, are generally not well
worked out, with the result that lists of basic emotions are very various
and the manner in which others are derived is unexplained.
Understandably, this has led some to scepticism about basic emotions
(see, for example, de Sousa, 1980 and 1982; Ro rty , 1980; Solomon, 1982;
82 CHAPTER VI

Calhoun and Solomon, 1984; and Ortony et al., 1988). The Belief-Desire
Theory provides an account of basic emotions which is, in contrast to
others, straightforward in its principles.
Schematically, the structures of beliefs and desires constitutive of the
basic emotions are as follows:

(1) A believes with certainty that p and A desires that p.

(2) A believes with certainty that p and A desires that not-po
(3) A believes without certainty that p and A desires that p.
(4) A believes without certainty that p and A desires that not-po

These patterns of beliefs and desires are constitutive of the basic emotions
of gladness, sorrow, hope, and fear respectively. The principles which
underlie this classification of basic emotions are semantic and epistemic.
The patterns vary depending on whether it is believed that what is desired
in the case or not and on whether this is believed with or without
certainty.4
Since they concern a common topic, the beliefs and desires which
constitute emotions are semantically or success-functionally interrelated.
The success conditions of the constitutive beliefs and desires may be
either convergent or divergent. In the case of gladness and hope, they are
convergent. If the belief is true, the desire is satisfied. Accordingly, such
emotions may be called convergent emotions. In the case of sorrow and
fear, the success conditions are divergent. If the belief is true, the desire
is unsatisfied. Thus, emotions like these may be called divergent
emotions. 5
In many historical theories, including notably those of Aristotle,
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hume, hedonic states of pleasure and displeasure
or pain are supposed to be accompaniments of emotions or constituents
of emotions related to beliefs, at least in a number of cases. The
semantic character of the structures of beliefs and desires which constitute
emotions enables us to see that all emotions--basic and so derived--are
themselves essentially hedonic states. Convergent emotions are fonns of
pleasure; divergent emotions are fonns of displeasure. One is pleased
when one believes that what one desires is the case, or displeased when
one believes that what one desires is not the case. (The hedonic character
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 83

of emotions is considered further in Chapters VII, VIII, and X.)

In addition to the semantic distinction between convergent and
divergent emotions, basic emotions are distinguished into certainty and
uncertainty emotions in view of epistemic considerations. In the case of
the certainty emotions of gladness and sorrow, it is believed with
certainty that what is desired is, or is not, the case. In the case of the
uncertainty emotions of hope and fear, it is believed without certainty that
what is desired is, or is not, the case. In standard cases, the epistemic
character of the constituent beliefs underlies the distinction between
certainty and uncertainty emotions. Certainty and uncertainty for beliefs
are functions of confidence, which may be understood in terms of the
subjective probability attached to the truth of what is believed. Certainty
beliefs have a subjective probability of 1; the subjective probability of
uncertainty beliefs ranges between 1 and 0, or certainty and
contracertainty. 6
Emotions which have belief-like representations rather than beliefs
as constituents are special cases with respect to the distinction between
certainty and uncertainty emotions. Two classes of these emotions may
be distinguished. Imaginative emotions, of which imaginative
representations are constituents, have already been considered (see Ch. II,
Sect. 5); experiential emotions have perceptual experiences as constituents
and will be considered later (see Ch. VIII, Sect. 6). The
certainty!uncertainty distinction can be extended, in different ways, to
each of these classes of emotions. Experiential emotions are always
certainty emotions; in every case one is certain of having the experience
(though not, of course, of its being veridical). Imaginative representations
are dispositions to believe blocked by lack of evidence. It is possible to
distinguish between dispositions to believe with certainty and dispositions
to believe without certainty. In this way imaginative emotions can be
divided into certainty and uncertainty emotions. By way of example,
consider a case of sorrow and a case of fear. A man may imagine being
told by the doctor that everything possible has been done for his father
and that his death is imminent. The man imagines that his father is dying
and experiences imaginative sorrow. His emotion is imaginative because
of the constitutive imagining that his father is dying. It is an imaginative
certainty emotion because, given the imaginative background, he is
disposed to believe with certainty that his father is dying, a disposition
84 CHAPTER VI

blocked by the imaginative nature of the evidence. On the other hand,

suppose the man imagines being told by the doctor that his father has a
50/50 chance of sUiviving surgery. Again, he imagines that his father is
dying, but the emotion he experiences is fear. His emotion is imaginative
because of the constitutive imagining that his father is dying. It is an
imaginative uncertainty emotion because, given the imaginative
background, he is disposed to believe without certainty that his father is
dying, though the disposition is blocked by the imaginative nature of the
evidence.
There are cases which may lead one to question the contention that
fear is a basic emotion requiring uncertainty. The most notable, perhaps,
is fear of death. Fear of death is common enough, but we are, of course,
certain that we will die. Still, what we are certain about is that we will
die eventually; we are typically uncertain whether we will die next month
or next year. There is thus considerable scope for fear of death with
uncertainty. Where there is no uncertainty, though, there is no room for
fear. Given our certainty, we can hardly fear that we will die eventually.
The case of dread may also lead one to question the uncertainty
requirement. We dread what we confidently expect to happen, but dread
is commonly considered a form of fear. In this case, there are good
reasons for drawing a distinction. There are important differences
between dread and fear. For one thing, dread is confined to the future,
while the content of fear is not similarly restricted. In this respect, the
common but mistaken view that fear is a "forward-looking emotion" may
account for the belief that dread is a form of fear. Even more important
for present purposes, however, is another point Fear and hope are
rationally concomitant emotions. One who fears that p has reason to
hope that not-p, and conversely. What accounts for this fact is that fear
and hope are uncertainty emotions (See Ch. X, Sect. 3). Dread, on the
other hand, stands in no similar rational relationship to hope.
The distinction between emotions in terms of cognitive certainty and
uncertainty is one clearly drawn by Spinoza with respect to hope and fear,
on the one hand, and emotions like confidence, despair, joy, and
disappointment, on the other.

He writes:
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 85

Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure arising from an image of something future
or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant
pain also arising from an image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the
element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something
which we have hoped or feared. (Spinoza, 1677/1955, p. 144)

For Spinoza, however, the distinction between certainty emotions and

uncertainty emotions does not help to define basic emotions, which he
takes to be pleasure, pain, and desire, nor does it have general application
to emotions.
The distinction between certainty emotions and uncertainty emotions
is also introduced by Robert M. Gordon (Gordon, 1980). For Gordon the
distinction does have general application, though it serves to classify
emotions rather than in defining basic emotions. As Gordon draws the
distinction, however, it is based not on the confidence of belief but on
considerations of knowledge: certainty emotions require knowledge;
uncertainty emotions preclude knowledge (Gordon, 1969, 1974, 1980, and
1987\ This way of understanding the distinction leads to trouble.
Consider what happens in Act V of Romeo and Juliet. On hearing
Balthazar's news, Romeo believes that Juliet is dead and of course wishes
will all his heart that she were not dead. His grief consumes him, and he
resolves to join her in death. There follows the tragic scene at the tomb
of the Capulets. According to Gordon, since Juliet was not dead but
sleeping, Romeo could not have grieved that Juliet was dead. Either he
was grieved about something else or he was not grieved at all. This, of
course, makes it very hard to understand the play. Evidently something
has gone wrong in Gordon's account of certainty emotions like grief.
Gordon maintains that certainty emotions require knowledge or true
belief because in attributions of emotions of the form "A emotes that p"
it is implied or presupposed that p. Thus, we cannot say "Romeo is
grieved that Juliet is dead, but Juliet is not dead" without apparent
inconsistency. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with our saying
"Romeo hopes that he will marry Juliet, but he won't marry her."
Attributions of uncertainty emotions of the fom} "A emotes that p" do not
imply or presuppose that p. Uncertainty emotions do not require true
belief or knowledge.
86 CHAPTER VI

It is significant that the implicational asymmetry between attributions

of certainty and uncertainty emotions upon which Gordon seizes exists
only in third-person attributions. It would be no less odd for Romeo
himself to say "I hope that I will marry Juliet, but I won't marry her"
than to say "I am grieved that Juliet is dead, but Juliet is not dead." In
either case there would be oddity of the sort involved in Moore's
Paradox.
Gordon's mistake is taking an implicational feature of certain third-
person attributions of emotions to be a feature of the emotions
themselves. The distinction between what Romeo represents as being the
case and what is the case is one which we can make but Romeo cannot.
That is why the implicational asymmetry does not exist in the first
person. Yet it is what Romeo takes to be the case that determines what
his emotions are. If Romeo believes that he will marry Juliet, his hope
is that he will marry her, whether he will marry her or not. And if
Romeo believes that Juliet is dead, that is what he is grieved about,
whether or not she is dead. Our lives are lived from our own
perspectives; for understanding our emotions that is the perspective which
must be considered. From one's own perspective the distinction between
what is believed and what is true is one which cannot be drawn; what one
believes, one believes to be true. The distinction between what one is
certain about and what one is uncertain about, however is a distinction
which can be easily made. For understanding the structure of emotions,
the latter is the distinction we want. There are no knowledge-requiring
emotions; there are emotions which require certainty.
Gordon also maintains that while either desire-supporting or belief-
supporting reasons can be given for uncertainty emotions, only desire-
supporting reasons can be given for certainty emotions. Asked why I
hope that we get to see the movie, I may reply appropriately "It's
supposed to be very good" or "I think we can get there in time." Asked
why I am sorry we didn't get to see the movie, I may reply appropriately
"It's supposed to be very good" but not "We didn't get there in time."
Gordon takes the supposed knowledge-requiring character of certainty, as
opposed to uncertainty, emotions to underlie this asymmetry in the
appropriateness of reasons (Gordon, 1969, 1974, and 1988). In fact, an
alternative explanation lies ready to hand.
With certainty emotions, when I am glad or sorry that p, it is not for
 THE BEUEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 87

me a question whether p. This explains why, when asked for reasons for
being glad or sorry that p, it is natural for me to give reasons for desiring
that p or that not-p, rather than for believing that p. On the other hand,
with uncertainty emotions, when I hope or fear that p, I am uncertain
whether p; it is for me a question. Thus, it is natural for me to give
reasons for believing that p as well as, or instead of, reasons for desiring
that p or that not-po
The asymmetry in the appropriateness of giving reasons for certainty
and uncertainty emotions which Gordon notes does not mean that there
are no belief-supporting reasons for certainty emotions. It is due to the
conversational pragmatics of the situation--to considerations of what one
takes to be in need of explanation. The belief constituting a certainty
emotion may be called into question or be likely to be questioned. In
that event, giving belief-supporting reasons is clearly in order. Thus, in
response to, or in anticipation of, a challenge, one might well explain, "I
am pleased that I have discovered a cure for cancer, because the drug
worked in all the tests."
Gordon does discern an important feature of uncertainty emotions
like fear and hope:

Deliberative uncertainty is excluded. If the only reason I am not certain whether p or not-
p is that I am undecided which of two or more action alternatives to choose, then I cannot
be said to fear (be afraid) that p. (Gordon, 1987 p. 79)

Gordon also takes certainty emotions to exhibit a corresponding feature:

[In the case of emotions like being sad or being pleased, he holds that) the requisite
certainty appears never to involve deliberative certainty. By deliberative certainty I mean
certainty that depends on one's being decided on a certain course, on having one's mind
set on doing (or not doing) something. (Gordon, 1987, p. 83)

While the relations between certainty and deliberation which interest

Gordon are important, he is mistaken, as Wayne Davis points out (Davis,
1987), in thinking that his thesis about deliberation and certainty applies
symmetrically to certainty and uncertainty emotions. In any case Gordon
gives no explanation of the phenomena which concern him. An
explanation can be given in tenns of conative rationality and the belief-
88 CHAPTER VI

desire structure of basic emotions which accounts for the phenomena and
for the asymmetries Gordon fails to note. Consider certainty emotions
first. One may be glad that p because one has decided to bring it about
that p , since both the emotion and the decision involve the desire that p.
On the other hand, one cannot be sorry that p because one has decided
to bring it about that p, since the emotion involves the desire that not-p
and the decision the desire that p. Now consider uncertainty emotions.
Whether one hopes or fears that p, one must be uncertain whether p, and,
as Gordon observes, this cannot be due solely to one's not having decided
whether to bring it about that p. Where one believes that whether p
depends on one's decision whether p, indecision involves the absence of
an unconditional desire that p or that not-po Without such a desire,
however, one cannot hope or fear that p or that not-po In this way the
phenomena of deliberation and certainty can be understood in tenns of
the belief-desire structure of emotions and requirements of conative
rationality.
The distinction between certainty and uncertainty emotions represents
a significant modification of emotions as hedonic states. All else being
equal, one's pleasure is greater when what one desires to be the case is
believed with certainty to be the case than when it is believed without
certainty to be the case, and one's displeasure is greater when what one
desires not to be the case is believed with certainty to be the case than
when it is believed without certainty to be the case.
Together, semantic and epistemic considerations capture the essential
structural features of emotions as hedonic states and exclusively defme
four classes of emotions: convergent certainty emotions, divergent
certainty emotions, convergent uncertainty emotions, and divergent
uncertainty emotions. The basic emotions gladness, sorrow, hope, and
fear correspond to these four classes as generic emotion types. They are
not individuated by considerations of content but only by their semantic
and epistemic structures. For example, one may be glad that anything is
the case which one believes and desires to be the case, and there are in
principle no limits on what can be believed and desired to be the case. 8
Non-basic emotions falling in any of the four classes have the same
semantic and epistemic structure as the corresponding generic emotion
type but are individuated by content specification. One cannot be grateful
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 89

or proud that just anything is the case, for instance, but only that one has
received a favor or that one enjoys some achievement or advantage.
These emotions, while individuated by considerations of content, have the
structural features which define convergent certainty emotions. One
believes and desires oneself to have received some favor or to have some
achievement or advantage. In view of their structural features, gratitude
and pride are forms of the generic emotion type gladness. This
relationship is evidenced by the fact that attributions of the specific non-
basic emotions imply attributions of the generic basic emotion. If I am
grateful that I have received some favor, I am glad that I have received
it; and if a man is proud that he has some achievement or advantage, he
is glad that he has it. In general, the relation between basic and non-
basic emotions is that between generic emotion types defined by their
semantic and epistemic features and specific emotion types having the
same structural features but further individuated in temlS of their content.
While the differentiation of emotions beyond the basic level is
primarily determined by the specification of content, there are other
factors as well. Some emotions are distinguished by intensity and effect.
Rage and terror, for example, are distinguished from ordinary anger and
fear by the intensity of aversion to offense or threat and the agitational
effect of the emotion. There are also emotions which are distinguished
by their sequential relation to other emotions. Relief, for instance, bears
such a relation to fear: one is relieved that p only if one had feared that
not-po Similarly, disappointment stands in relation to hope: one is
disappointed that p only if one had hoped that not-po

4. SEMANTIC ASSESSMENT

The fact that emotions lack truth values constitutes a serious difficulty for
a cognitive account of emotional intentionality in the case of both
Component and Evaluative Theories. If non-intentional phenomena are
constitutive of emotions, as Component Theorists maintain, it is unclear
why emotions should take on the intentionality of related beliefs, and
how, if they did so, emotions could assume the intentionality of beliefs
without acquiring their semantic properties as well (see Ch. IV., Sect. 4).
If, as Evaluative Theorists contend, emotions are beliefs, they could not
90 CHAPTER VI

but have the semantic values of truth and falsity (see Ch. V, Sect. 3).
The fact that emotions also lack properties like satisfaction would
constitute a serious difficulty for an account of the intentionality of
emotions in terms of that of desires, though no such account has been
developed, probably because of the widespread tendency to confiate
desires with desirability judgments or evaluative beliefs. Explaining the
absence of semantic properties in emotions thus turns out to be a major
problem in understanding the intentionality of emotions, since beliefs and
desires are the basic intentional states in terms of which emotional
intentionality must be explained.
The account of the semantic structure of emotions provided by the
Belief-Desire Theory affords an effective solution to the problem of
semantic assessment, explaining why emotions can have the semantic
values of neither beliefs nor desires. Emotions are structures of beliefs
and desires, according to the Belief-Desire Theory. The beliefs and
desires which constitute emotions have distinctive functional roles and
corresponding semantic values, but this does not mean that emotions have
the functional and semantic properties of their constituents.
Although emotions have neither cognitive nor conative function, it
stands to reason that if an emotion took on the function of the constitutive
belief, it would also take on the function of the constitutive desire; and
conversely. In any event, beliefs have an input-oriented function in
information processing, desires an output-oriented function in motivation.
Because of their directional opposition, the emotion could hardly have
both cognitive and conative functions.
The functional opposition of beliefs and desires constituting emotions
does not mean that their success values must be opposed as well -- that
if the belief is true, the desire must be unsatisfied, and vice versa. Their
success values are opposed in the case of divergent emotions but not in
convergent emotions. Even where the success values for constitutive
beliefs and desires are convergent -- where the desire is satisfied if the
belief is true, and conversely, their success is assessed in different modes
because of their functional difference.
Semantic values for mental representations are functionally defined.
Success is the fulfillment of function, and the mode of success is
determined by the function. Since emotions can have neither cognitive
nor conative function, they can have the semantic properties of neither
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 91

beliefs nor desires; they cannot be true or false, satisfied or unsatisfied.

In summary, then, the argument that emotions cannot have the
semantic values of beliefs or desires runs as follows. Emotions could
hardly take on the functional properties of either constitutive beliefs or
desires without assuming the properties of both. Emotions could not have
both cognitive and conative functions, however, because of their
input/output directional opposition. Thus emotions can have neither
cognitive nor conative function. Since semantic values for mental
representations are functionally defined, it also follows that emotions can
have the semantic properties of neither beliefs nor desires.
The Belief-Desire Theory enables us, not only to resolve the
semantic properties problem, but to appreciate why it is so serious for
Cognitive (or Conative) Theories of emotions. Of course, we do not say
that emotions are true or false (satisfied or unsatisfied). That emotions
lack the semantic properties of beliefs (and desires) is, however, not
simply a fact about ordinary language. Were that the case, we could
peruaps invent a vocabulary of cognitive (or conative) semantic
assessment for emotions. Given their intentional structure, emotions,
unlike the beliefs and desires which constitute them, cannot have
cognitive or conative semantic properties.
Although emotions cannot have the semantic values of beliefs or
desires, it remains to be considered whether they might have semantic
values which are a function of the values of constituent beliefs and
desires. It is sometimes claimed that the success value of emotions is
appropriateness. According to Ronald de Sousa, "the success of emotions
[is] 'appropriateness' [as the success of beliefs is truth]" (de Sousa,
1980a, p. 132). Again, he says, "appropriateness is the truth of emotions"
(de Sousa, 1980b, p. 285; see also 1987). Patricia Greenspan also
suggests that "appropriateness is the value of emotions which comes
closest to truth for judgments" (Greenspan, 1980a, p. 236; see also 1988).
Basically the same idea can be found in the writings of Brentano and
Plato.
I think that taking appropriateness to be a semantic value of
emotions represents a confusion of assessments of success and of
rationality. For beliefs, rationality depends entirely on the likelihood of
success in the light of available evidence. Cognitivists take the domains
of cognition and rationality to be coextensive and thus suppose that all
92 CHAPTER VI

rationality assessments are success-functional. That is not the case.

Conative rationality depends on both the feasibility of satisfying desires--
that is, on considerations of success--and on the desirability of what is
desired, which is not a semantic condition. The rationality of emotions
is a function of the rationality of both constitutive beliefs and desires.
For this reason, it cannot be entirely a semantic matter. The rationality
of emotions depends on considerations of desirability as well as success.
The considerations which determine the appropriateness of an
emotion are the considerations which determine its rationality, namely the
likelihood of the truth of the belief and the desirability of what is desired.
Given the semantic interrelation between constitutive beliefs and desires,
the feasibility of the satisfaction of the desire is not an independent
consideration. Appropriateness is an assessment, not of the success, but
of the rationality of emotions.
If appropriateness were a semantic value for emotions and a function
of the semantic values of constitutive beliefs and desires, all divergent
emotions would be inappropriate, and any convergent emotion the
constitutive belief and desire of which were successful would be
appropriate. So long as what is desired is desirable, however, divergent
emotions may be appropriate, even though the constitutive belief and
desire cannot both be successful. Given the desirability of his continued
life, grief at the death of one's brother may be appropriate, even though
one's wish that he were not dead is beyond satisfaction. The success of
constitutive beliefs and desires is not necessary for the appropriateness of
an emotion; neither is it sufficient. If what is desired is undesirable, even
if the belief and desire constitutive of a convergent emotion are
successful, the emotion is inappropriate. Where the misfortunes of others
are undeserved, schadenfreude, or joy at their misfortunes, is
inappropriate, even if the belief that they suffer is true, and the desire that
they suffer is satisfied.
Emotions are not semantically assessable in terms of truth and falsity
or satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of emotions, while related to the semantic values of
constitutive beliefs and desires, is not itself a semantic assessment. Is
there any other semantic value, determined by the semantic values of
constitutive beliefs and desires, which emotions might have? After the
semantic assessment of the belief and desire which constitute an emotion,
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 93

what further semantic assessment could be made with respect to the

emotion? The only answer is that it would be an assessment of the
semantic convergence or divergence of the emotion. Convergence or
divergence is the only success-related property of an emotion which is not
a property of the belief or desire constitutive of it. Convergence and
divergence define the hedonic value of emotions. Convergent emotions
are forms of pleasure and have positive hedonic value; divergent emotions
are forms of displeasure and have negative hedonic value. Hedonic
value, however, is not a semantic assessment of emotions based on the
semantic values of constitutive beliefs and desires. The hedonic value of
an emotion is independent of the success of the belief and desire which
constitute it; rather, it is determined by the possibility of mutual success
for the belief and desire. There could not be, in general, a value of
success for emotions determined by the success values of constitutive
beliefs and desires. The beliefs and desires constituting emotions have
semantic values; the emotions they constitute do not admit of semantic
assessment.

5. RATIONALITY

According to Cognitive Theories, emotions have the intentionality of

beliefs which are causally or constitutively related to them. As the beliefs
represent certain states of affairs, so do the emotions. Beliefs aim at truth
and have mind-to-world direction of fit. This means that they are
success-committed representations of states of affairs as obtaining. As
such, beliefs have a truth-functional role in rational thought and are open
the rational assessment in terms of the likelihood of their truth. If
emotions had the intentionality of beliefs, it seems clear that they would
have the rational properties of beliefs as well.
Similarly, if emotions were supposed to have the intentionality of
desires, it stands to reason that they would also have the rational
properties of desires. Desires aim at satisfaction and have world-to-mind
direction of fit. This means that they are success-committed
representations of states of affairs as ones which are to obtain. On this
account, desires have a satisfaction-oriented role in motivation and are
rationally assessable in terms of the feasibility and desirability of their
satisfaction.
94 CHAPTER VI

Neither a cognitive nor a conative account of emotional rationality

could be correct. The reason is simple: emotions lack the rational
functions of beliefs in infonnation processing and of desires in motivation
and so cannot be open to either cognitive or conative rational assessment
in terms of likelihood of success.
Beliefs and desires are the basic units in rational functioning. If
emotions cannot have the input-oriented role of beliefs or the output-
oriented role of desires, it might seem that, paradoxically, they have a
kind of epiphenomenal status relative to the functional economy of mind.
Explaining the integration of emotions into the economy of mind thus
appears to become a serious problem for a theoretical understanding of
emotions. Neither a belief-based nor a desire-based theory of emotional
rationality affords a plausible solution. It is, I think, a more tractable
problem viewed from the standpoint of the Belief-Desire Theory.
Though not themselves units in thought and motivation, there are
two ways in which emotions are integrated into rational functioning.
First, the beliefs and desires which constitute emotions are functional
units in rational thought and motivation. Second, the semantic structures
of beliefs and desires which are constitutive of emotions are necessary for
the rational motivation of thought and action.
Reasons are given for the beliefs and desires which constitute
emotions, and in this way they relate to rational thought. If Icarus hopes
that he will fly today, he believes without certainty that he will fly today
and desires that he fly today. The belief and desire constitutive of his
hope may be rationally supported by his beliefs that he has new and
improved wings and that flying would raise him above the mass of
mortals. The beliefs and desires constitutive of emotions are further
integrated into rational functioning in that they may provide reasons for
further beliefs or motives for actions. The belief of the hopeful Icarus
that he will fly today will give him reason to believe that he will fly
again tomorrow, if he also believes that if he flies today he can fly again
tomorrow. And Icarus' desire that he fly today will motivate him to flap
his wings very hard, if he believes that doing so will enable him to fly
today.
Though the beliefs and desires which constitute an emotion are
units in rational thought and action, it does not follow that emotions are
so as well. Where reasons have been given for the belief and desire
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 95

constitutive of an emotion, so far as the emotion is concerned, there is

nothing left to give reasons for. And when the constitutive belief or
desire has a role in thought or motivation, there is, so far as the emotion
is concerned, nothing remaining to have a rational function.
Beliefs and desires are both necessary for rational thought or action.
The initiation and focus of rational thought is dependent on desires. And
the rational role of desires in the motivation of action is dependent on
beliefs about the feasibility and desirability of satisfying desires. This
much is clear. What is perhaps not clear is that emotions are necessary
for the rational motivation of thought and action. That beliefs and desires
are necessary does not establish that emotions are so as well. Emotions
are not just sets of beliefs and desires; they are structures of semantically
interrelated beliefs and desires with a common topic. The semantic
structures which constitute emotions are necessary for the rational
motivation of thought and action. Unless we believe that things are or
are not as we desire that they be, or desire that things be or not be as we
believe them to be, we would never be motivated to thought or action.
A being not satisfied or dissatisfied, pleased or displeased, would be a
being without rational motivation. (Emotional motivation is taken up in
detail in Chapter VII.) Emotions, then, are essential to the rational
economy of mind, because without them there would be no motivation
for rational thought and action.
That emotions are essential for rational thought and action does not
mean that they have the functional or semantic properties of cognitive or
conative states. What it means is that beliefs and desires must be
semantically interrelated in ways definitive of emotions for rational
functioning to occur. It is the beliefs and desires which are the units of
rational functioning, and they alone have cognitive and conative semantic
properties.
Beliefs and desires are rationally assessed in terms of the likelihood
of truth or the feasibility and desirability of satisfaction. Emotions are
not open to either cognitive or conative rational assessment since they
lack the relevant functional and semantic properties. Still, emotions are
assessable in terms of rationality or appropriateness, and the assessment
must be a function of the rationality of constituent beliefs and desires.
An emotion is rational or appropriate if and only if the belief and desire
which constitute it are rational. There are thus cognitive and conative
96 CHAPTER VI

dimensions to the rational assessment of emotions. Marsha's hope that

she will marry John may be criticized as irrational if there are compelling
reasons for her not to want to marry him (he's an alcoholic, he's abusive)
or appraised as rational if there are good reasons for her to want to marry
him (he's kind, he's reliable). Marsha's hope may also be rationally
assessed in the light of reasons to think that it is not possible for her to
marry John (he's happily married) or that their marriage is possible (he's
an eligible bachelor). Although emotional rationality is a function of that
of constitutive beliefs and desires, it does not reduce to cognitive or
conative rationality, any more than emotions reduce to beliefs or desires
alone.
Emotions have the property of rationality without representational
direction or conditions of success because their rationality is a function
of the rationality of constitutive beliefs and desires. Emotions cannot
similarly have semantic properties dependent on the semantic properties
of constitutive beliefs and desires. The reason for the asymmetry is that,
while the functional opposition of beliefs and desires precludes the
possibility that the emotions they constitute should have the functionally
defined semantic properties of either, the rational properties of beliefs and
desires constituting emotions are not merely semantic on either hand and
so are not determined by their functional opposition. Since the
satisfaction of the desire and the truth of the belief are interdependent, the
feasibility of satisfying the desire is not a condition independent of the
likelihood of the truth of the belief. Thus the only semantic rationality
condition on the belief-desire structure constituting the emotion is the
likelihood of the truth of the belief. The desirability of satisfying the
desire is an independent condition of rationality, but a non-semantic one.
Emotional rationality is thus a function of the semantic rationality of the
constituent belief and the non-semantic rationality of the constituent
desire.

6. ELEMENTS AND COMPOUNDS

According to the Belief-Desire Theory, emotions are made up of beliefs

and desires. If this is so, a question naturally arises. Why do we have
concepts of emotions, as well as the concepts of belief and desire, in our
repertoire of mental concepts? How can talk about emotions add
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 97

anything to psychological description and explanation that can't be said

in tenns of beliefs and desires?9
One way of answering the question is pragmatic. Eskimos are said
to have a rich vocabulary for describing kinds of snow, and the French
employ many distinctions between amorous affairs. This is quite
understandable, given the interests of an arctic or amorous people.
Similarly, it might be suggested, given the extensive psychological
interests which people generally have, it is understandable that we should
have relatively fine grained resources for representing the recurrent
patterns of belief and desire which constitute emotions. While no doubt
true, an answer of this kind does not take us far enough; something more
substantive needs to be said.
An analogy from chemistry, mentioned earlier, may be of help in
developing the answer. A chemical compound like water is made up of
elements, hydrogen and oxygen. These elements may occur separately
without chemical bonding, as in air. Once the elements are bonded,
however, the compound has properties, detennined by the elements,
which are distinctive of H 20. Similarly, an emotion like sorrow is a
compound constituted of elements, the belief that p and the desire that
not-po The belief and the desire may occur separately without having the
characteristics of the emotion. When the belief and desire occur with a
common topic, however, they fonn a compound with a semantically
interrelated structure which has distinctive emotional properties
detennined by the belief and desire. tO
The distinctive emotional properties detennined by semantically
interrelated beliefs and desires are hedonic, affective, motivational, and
rational. Semantically convergent emotions are fonns of pleasure, and
semantically divergent emotions are fonns of displeasure. Indirectly, the
semantic structure of emotions accounts for their affectivity as well. It
remains to be argued (see Ch. VIII), but I believe that it is because they
are hedonic states that emotions are felt and are feelings. Again, it is the
semantic structure of emotions which underlies their basic motivational
significance. Our motivation to thought or action depends on whether we
believe that things are or are not as we desire that they be, or desire that
things be or not be as we believe them to be; and these patterns of belief
and desire are definitive of emotions. Finally, the appropriateness or
rationality of emotions is a function of the rationality of constitutive
98 CHAPTER VI

beliefs and desires, which in tum is in large part a function of their

semantic structure.
Neither beliefs nor desires, considered separately, have the hedonic,
affective, motivational, or rational properties which characterize the
emotions they constitute. Rather, those properties are determined by the
semantic interrelationship of the beliefs and desires. It is the compound-
like character of emotions, relative to the elementary beliefs and desires
which constitute them, which accounts for the distinctive contribution of
concepts of emotions to our psychological understanding.

7. OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED

Objections may of course be raised to an account of emotions in terms

of beliefs and desires. Both the sufficiency and the necessity of beliefs
and desires for having emotions may be challenged. It is often objected
that in some cases, or even in any case, a belief-desire account leaves out
something which is essential to emotions -- felt or physiological changes
and, perhaps, behavioral tendencies as well. It is also objected that belief
and desire are not necessary for emotions, since there are at least some
cases in which beliefs or desires are absent. Further, it is objected that
it is not possible to account for the differentiation of some emotions or
for certain rational properties of emotions in terms of beliefs and desires.
Finally, the theory might be thought to make much of the work of
behavioral and physiological psychology on emotions irrelevant to the
subject.
I think that these objections can be effectively answered. In most
cases, the points made, to the extent that they are sound, can be
accommodated by the Belief-Desire Theory. In other cases there are
independently motivated methodological grounds for rejecting the points
made by way of objection.
A number of philosophers argue that beliefs and desires associated
with having an emotion do not add up to having an emotion, because
certain emotional phenomena -- most notably physiological changes
which are usually proprioceptively experienced -- are also required.
William Lyons, for example, presents the argument as follows:

The 'bodily motions' part of the emotion [is the] very aspect of emotions which
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 99

distinguishes them from being just beliefs and desires of certain sorts.... It seems
inconceivable to be in an emotional state [that is, a state in which one is emotionally
worked Up]lI and not to have undergone unusual bodily changes of some sort. (Lyons,
1980, pp. 115, 124)

Basically the same objection to the identification of beliefs and desires

with emotions is also made by Jerome Shaffer:

The identification will not work [he claims]. One can hold those beliefs and desires in
a dispassionate and unemotional way. So getting emotionally worked up must involve
more than just beliefs and desires, namely, the physiological/sensational effects of those
beliefs and desires. (Shaffer, 1983, p. 163)

Others using arguments of this kind include Robert M. Gordon, 1980 and
1987; Georges Rey, 1980; John Searle, 1983, Ch. 1; and Michael Stocker,
1987.
This line of objection has understandable appeal. So far as the
position is well-taken, however, the thought can be accommodated by the
Belief-Desire Theory. Still, the contention that non-intentional
phenomena, such as somatic arousal and sensation, are necessary as
constituents of emotions is mistaken. 12
Emotional phenomena, considered as such, are identifiable only as
effects of emotions; considered simply as states of somatic arousal or
sensation, they are various in kind and etiology. Hence, emotions must
be identifiable independently of emotional phenomena. They may obtain
as latent causes of emotional phenomena, even when somatic arousal and
sensation are absent. And, as effects of emotions, the phenomena could
hardly be constituents of emotions. (The argument is developed at greater
length in Chapter IV, Section 5.)
What is appealing in the objection is the thought that when one is
emotionally worked up, somatic arousal and sensation are bound to be
present. This is in effect a claim about what is required for emotional
excitement, and indirectly about emotional intensity (which is discussed
in Chapter VIII, Section 5), not a claim about the nature of emotions at
all. It is thus a claim which is perfectly compatible with the Belief-
Desire Theory.
The argument that something essential is left out by a belief-desire
account in the case of violent emotions like terror or rage is more
100 CHAPTER VI

plausible than the more general objection. Such emotions are marked by
agitation; with regard to them there is no question of calm emotion, and
repression is most unlikely. Terror is a particularly intense fonn of fear,
but even the almost certain belief that p and the strong desire that not-p
appear not to add up to terror. Contrary to appearances, perhaps, I think
that the Belief-Desire Theory does afford an explanation of the intense
and agitating character of terror.
Terror differs from common fear both as regards what is taken to be
at stake and the desperateness of the situation as perceived. In terror one
must very strongly desire that what is feared not take place. Thus, it is
typically threats to life and limb, such as shipwrecks and fires, which
evoke terror, not the threat of rain at campouts or garden parties. Also,
in terror the situation must be appraised as desperate. One must
apprehend the threat as imminent and oneself as in a dubious position to
cope, either by preventing the threatening occurrence or its undesired
consequences. Thus, one might suppose that as the Titanic listed after
striking an iceberg, those remaining on board were filled with terror. It
must have seemed clear that the ship was sinking and that they were
powerless to prevent it or to make an escape. Had there been no obvious
sign that the vessel was about to go down or had the passengers thought
that they could keep the ship afloat by bailing or that they could all take
to the lifeboats, they might have been afraid but would not have been in
a state of terror.
Because of its intensity, terror also differs from ordinary fear in (the
extent of) the stress reactions which it causes. That terror produces
marked agitation of body and mind is a fact of everyday experience. The
psychosomatic effects of extreme threat have also been the subject of
extensive psychological investigation. Four related classes of extreme
stress reactions are distinguished by Lazarus: affective disturbances,
motor-behavioral reaction (tremor, increased muscle tension, speech
disturbances, particular facial expressions), decreased adequacy of
cognitive functioning and skilled performance, and physiological changes
(increased adrenal output and autonomic activity) (Lazarus, 1966).
The intensity of terror is due to the beliefs and desires which
constitute the emotion, and its agitating character is explained in tenns of
its psycho-somatic effects. The Belief-Desire Theory affords a similar
account of rage and other violent emotions. Nothing essential is left out.
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 101

Although John Searle thinks that a belief-desire analysis of emotions

works in some cases, he doubts that belief and desire are necessary in
every case. "With some states," he says, "one cannot get very far with
this sort of analysis" (Searle, 1983, p. 36). Amusement and surprise
might be cited as cases in point. Surprise is included in several classical
philosophical inventories of emotions and is treated as an emotion by a
number of psychologists. Like emotions generally, surprise involves
belief. If A is surprised that p, A must believe that p. Since A may not
care whether p or not-p, however, no desire is required. Of course, where
desire is present, the surprise may be pleasant or unpleasant. This may
be what accounts for the impression that surprise is an emotion. The fact
remains, however, that desire is not necessary for surprise. What is
required, in addition to A's coming to believe that p, is A's previously
having been confident that not-p or at least not having suspected that p.
Surprise is a transition in beliefs, not a structure of beliefs and desires.13
Still, what consideration of surprise shows is not that the Belief-Desire
Theory of emotions is inadequate but rather that surprise is importantly
different from emotions. To insist that even so surprise is an emotion
would only obscure what is of theoretical interest. A theoretical
understanding of emotions is bound to involve a certain amount of
principled conceptual regimentation. (See Ch. I, Sect 2.)
The case of amusement is more interesting. Although surprise is
only sometimes held to be an emotion, the view that amusement is an
emotion is very common. Amusement, however, appears not to consist
in beliefs or desires. On the standard view, amusement is a function of
the perception of incongruity; what we are amused by we see as not
matching our expectations of appropriateness. 14 Oearly we do not have
to desire that something be incongruous to be amused by it, nor again
that it not be incongruous. But also, as John Morreall points out, "we
need not believe that the object amusing us is in fact incongruous--it is
enough to simply look at the object as incongruous" (Morreall, 1983, p.
282). Morreall concludes that since emotions do at least involve beliefs
about their objects, it is a mistake to consider amusement to be an
emotion. While it is true that neither the belief that something is
incongruous nor the desire that it be so is necessary for amusement, I
think that it is a mistake to conclude that it is not an emotion.
Amusement is the enjoyment of the experience of something as
102 CHAPTER VI

incongruous. What is required is the belief-like experience of something

as incongruous, which may be wholly imaginative, and the intrinsic desire
that one have that experience. Understood as the enjoyment of the
experience of incongruity, amusement is an emotion and confonns to the
belief-desire model. (Further consideration is given to enjoyment as an
experiential emotion in Chapter VIII, Section 4.)
Searle also objects to a belief-desire analysis of emotions that "the
analysis is not fine grained enough to distinguish between intentional
states that are importantly different" (Searle, 1983, p. 36). Anger and
grief provide an example of emotions which are importantly different but
which exhibit the same basic intentional structure:

A desires that p and A believes with certainty that not-po

That anger and grief, as divergent certainty emotions or fonns of sorrow,

have this structural similarity does not mean that they (or other related
emotions) cannot be distinguished adequately by the Belief-Desire Theory
of emotions. It is chiefly in the specification of their content that the
related emotions differ. Providing a complete analysis of the content
specifications or of anger and grief is not necessary to show that this is
so; the following points should suffice. First, grief is typically occasioned
by a great and irretrievable loss, such as the death of a loved one, and
tends to be a strong emotion because of our aversion to such loss. One
believes that the loved one is dead and wishes very much that the loved
one were not dead. The range of occasions for anger is much wider, as
wide as the range of offenses, and its intensity is similarly variable. One
believes that an intentional or negligent hann or threat has occurred and
wishes to some extent that it had not occurred. With this point goes
another. Anger is an emotion which tends to be associated with
motivation; grief tends to have a depressive effect. Because anger is
occasioned by an undesired offense, one who is angry has a reason to
blame. Thus, there goes with anger the tendency to punish or rebuke.
The undesired loss which occasions grief is irretrievable. On account of
this, grief is not similarly associated with motivational force. There are
also different expressions and modes of demeanor associated with the
emotions of anger and grief, but it is their content specifications which
primarily distinguish them.
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 103

Robert C. Roberts argues that, "emotions cannot be identified with

any judgments because a rational person has more options with respect
to his emotions than he has with respect to his judgments," and he takes
the same argument to apply to the identification of emotions with beliefs
and desires (Roberts, 1988, p. 198). Roberts' thought is that one may
rationally overcome one's fear, for example, as one cannot rationally
abandon or alter one's belief that there is danger. Suppose that a man is
afraid that he will fall if he climbs a wobbly ladder. It may be rational
for him to quell his fear if climbing the ladder is necessary to save his
child from fire, but it would not be rational for him to give up or change
his belief that there is danger of falling.
Roberts' point that emotions are subject to rational modification in
a way that beliefs or judgments are not is correct, but it is a mistake to
think that this tells against a belief-desire analysis of emotions. In fact,
emotions differ from judgments in this respect precisely because they are
constituted by desires as well as beliefs. The rationality of emotions
depends not just on considerations relating to the truth of the belief but
on considerations relating to the desirability of what is desired. The
rationality of the man's belief that there is danger of falling if he climbs
the ladder is unaffected by the fact that it is necessary that he do so to
save his child, but that consideration may rationally undermine his
aversion to the risk. In this way it may be rational for him to overcome
his fear though not to dismiss his belief that there is danger.
Doubts might be raised about the psychological relevance of the
Belief-Desire Theory with respect to bodily and behavioral phenomena
associated with emotions. Psychological interest in emotions is not, and
should not be, confmed to such phenomena, of course; but they certainly
are of psychological interest. According to the Belief-Desire Theory (and
the Evaluative Theory) bodily and behavioral phenomena are not
constitutive of emotions. It is a mistake, however, to conclude that such
a view of emotions has little or no place for the bodily and behavioral
aspects of emotions, and to contend that such phenomena can only be
accommodated if viewed as constitutive of emotions, as is the case with
Component Theories. Both the Belief-Desire Theory and the Component
Theory hold that bodily and behavioral phenomena are identifiable as
emotional only in relation to their intentional causes; for the former the
104 CHAPTER VI

cause is the emotion, for the latter a belief. The difference is important,
as has been argued (Ch. IV, Sect. 5); but, for present purposes, the
similarity is important, too. On either view, bodily and behavioral
phenomena are available for psychological investigation when considered
in relation to their intentional causes; neither view takes bodily changes
or behavior as relevant to the psychological study of emotional
phenomena when considered simply as responses to environmental
stimuli. This is surely right; reductive behaviorism is widely rejected in
philosophy and psychology, and with good reason.

8. CONCLUSION

The value of a theory is a function of the problems it resolves and the

phenomena it explains. I have argued that, unlike competing Cognitive
Theories, the Belief-Desire Theory of emotions offers a solution of the
basic problems of emotional intentionality and explains how emotions,
though lacking direction of fit and conditions of success, have a place in
a system of rational representation. In what follows, to provide additional
evidence of the value of the Belief-Desire Theory, I will attempt, within
the framework which the theory provides, to further explain the role of
emotions in the economy of mind and the dimensions of emotions.

NOTES

There are exceptions. Robert M. Gordon (1974 and 1987), Georges Rey (1980), and
Jerome A. Shaffer (1983) take belief and desires concerning the same state of affairs,
rather than resultant performative desires, to be required for emotions. All three hold
Component Theories, however; the beliefs and desires are taken to cause emotions, which
essentially involve other elements such as arousal and action tendencies. Also, they all
fail to distinguish between desires and beliefs about whet is desirable, lumping both
together under the heading of cognition, so that the contribution of desires to emotional
intentionality remains unclear.
2 It might be objected that the belief that your dog died is not sufficient to generate
sorrow, even given the desire that your dog not have died, that an evaluative belief to the
effect that it is unfortunate that your dog died is required. There is, I think, little to
recommend this position. If the belief constitutive of my sorrow were the belief that it
is unfortunate that your dog died, then I would be sorry, not that your dog died, but that
it is unfortunate that your dog died. At most, the belief that your dog's death is
 THE BELIEF-DESIRE THEORY OF EMOTIONS 105

unfortunate would be non-constitutive, justifying my desire that your dog not have died;
but then desires need not be justified.
3 Marks holds that, "emotions are belief/desire sets ... characterized by strong desire"
(Marks, 1982, p. 227). This account of what distinguishes beliefs and desires which
constitute emotions is not satisfactory. Belief and strong desire are not sufficient for
emotions unless they form a semantic structure in virtue of a common topic. The belief
that the day is fine and the strong desire for peace on earth, for example, do not make up
any emotion. Strong desire, together with belief, is also not necessary for emotions. If
I am afraid the fish won't bite, I need have no burning desire that the fish bite -- anything
short of indifference will do.
4 Thus it is not necessary to consider separately cases in which, rather than the belief
that p and the desire that not-p, we have the belief that not-p and the desire that p. The
belief-desire structure in each case has the same semantic and epistemic character, namely
one definitive of sorrow. This is a point which applies to each of the basic emotions.
S The semantic convergence and divergence of constituent beliefs and desires is used
to explain the distinction between positive and negative emotions in Chapter X.
6 Concerning fear as an uncertainty emotion, Gordon takes the following position:

S fears (or is afraid, terrified, or worried) that p only if S wishes that not-p
and is neither certain that p nor certain that not-po It is not required that S
believe that p ... (Gordon, 1987, p. 70)

Following Gordon, Davis takes the same position (Davis, 1987). The position seems
clearly mistaken. For uncertainty emotions like fear, it is not enough that S be neither
certain that p nor certain that not-po That might be the case when S does not even
consider whether it is the case that p and so is of course not afraid that p. S must believe
without certainty that p if S fears that p.
7 In The Structure of Emotions (1987), Gordon refers to the two classes of emotions
as factive and epistemic, rather than as certainty and uncertainty, emotions; but the
distinction is the same.
Fear might be thought an exception to the rule that basic emotions are not
individuated by content, since what one fears is some danger. The danger in question,
however, is the possibility that what is desired is not the case. Fear is no exception.
9 I am indebted to Eric Lormand for raising the question in approximately this form.
10 I am grateful to Joel Marks for stressing the importance of the compound-like
character of emotions constituted of beliefs and desires and the aptness of the chemical
analogy. Marks himself, however, favors a "mere mixture" model of emotions in Marks
(1982).
II Lyons equates being in an emotional state and being emotionally "worked up" in
the preceding paragraph on page 124.
12 The contention that non-intentional phenomena are necessary as constituents of
emotions also engenders problems regarding derivative emotional intentionality, as is
argued in Chapter IV, Section 4.
106 CHAPTER VI

J3 Surprise is not simply a transition in beliefs, of course. Additional qualifications

are required. For example, the belief transition in surprise is not volitionally based as is
the case in change of mind, where my belief about what I am going to do changes as a
result of the formation of a new intention. Also, belief transition in surprise must be
sudden; gradual doxastic shifts do not amount to surprise. For present purposes, however,
it is sufficient to note that surprise is a type of belief transition.
14 There are, of course, other views, but the differences do not affect the point under
discussion -- whether the Belief-Desire Theory can plausibly account for the structure of
amusement.
THE ECONOMY OF MIND
 CHAPTER VII

EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR

1. INTRODUCTION

Emotions are bound up with expressive behavior. We scowl in anger,

shed tears of grief, and smile with pleasure. Emotions are also tied to
motivation. Out of fear we may run away, perhaps, or take out insurance.
For prevailing Cognitive Theories, however, the connection between
emotions and expressive or motivated behavior is problematic.
It is widely held in philosophy and psychology that expressive
behavior is constitutive of emotions. Providing a compendium of recent
research in Emotional Expression, Gary Collier states the position simply:
"Emotional expression is an integral part of an emotion ... " (Collier, 1985,
p. 8). This Component Theoretical view of expressive behavior could
hardly be correct. Behavior which may be expressive of emotions is
various in kind and cause; it mayor may not have anything to do with
emotions. Tears mayor may not be an expression of grief; smiles may
or may not be expressions of pleasure. And, of course, emotions need
involve no expressive behavior; one may be pleased or grieved without
smiles or tears.
Expressive behavior need not be held to be constitutive of emotions.
According to Evaluative Theorists, expressive behavior is caused by
evaluative beliefs which characterize emotions.! This view of the
expression of emotions in behavior is also unsatisfactory. Being caused
by a belief characteristic of an emotion does not make behavior an
expression of that emotion. Behavior is an expression of an emotion only
if caused by the emotion, and having a belief characteristic of an emotion
does not amount to having the emotion. A man may believe that he has
been insulted, and his belief may make him scowl. Even so, if the man
does not mind the insUlt, his scowling is not an expression of anger, since
the man is not angry.
On either the Component or the Evaluative Theory, the role of
emotions in motivation is hard to understand. Jerome Shaffer, for

109
110 CHAPTER VII

instance, takes a Component Theoretical view of emotions. An emotion,

he holds, is "a complex of physiological processes and sensations caused
by certain beliefs and desires" (Shaffer, 1983, p. 161). Thus, with regard
to emotional motivation, Shaffer is quite understandably driven to
conclude that:

The emotion itself is superfluous to action. When I act out of or from fear, it is the
beliefs and desires which motivate the action, not the physiological or sensational effects
of those beliefs and desires. (Shaffer, 1983, p. 163)2

If one assimilates emotions to evaluative beliefs, emotional

motivational is no less difficult to understand. Emotions are supposed to
have motivational force simply because they are evaluative beliefs. There
is much that is wrong with this view. For one thing, it is a mistake to
think that evaluative beliefs are in general required for emotions. If I am
sorry that you have lost your job, I need believe no more than that you
have lost your job. To insist that I would not be sorry if I did not take
it to be unfortunate that you lost your job is implausible. If the belief
constitutive of my sorrow were the belief that it is unfortunate that you
lost your job, then I would be sorry, not that you lost your job, but that
it is unfortunate that you lost your job. At most, the belief that it is
unfortunate that you lost your job would be non-constitutive, justifying
my desire that you not have lost your job; but then desires need not be
justified. More basically, even if the evaluative belief is held, it does not
serve to explain the rational motivation of behavior. Suppose that I can
think of a way to help you get your job back. Given this belief, if I am
sorry that you lost your job, I will be motivated to help you regain it, but
not if I merely believe that it is unfortunate that you lost your job. I
might not care about your losing your job.
While Cognitive Theories make the understanding of emotional
expression and motivation problematic, it is, I shall argue, an advantage
of the Belief-Desire Theory that it enables us to provide a believable
account of the relation between emotions and expressive or motivated
behavior.
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 111

2. EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION

Behavior which is an expression of an emotion is not a constituent of the

emotion, nor is it the effect of an evaluative belief; behavior which is an
expression of an emotion requires the emotion as its cause. Behavior
which may be expressive is various in etiology and kind; it mayor may
not have anything to do with an emotion. It is identifiable as expressive
only by reference to an emotion which is its cause.
The necessity of the causal requirement for emotional expression
may be called into question. Wayne Davis, for example, distinguishes
between expressing an emotion and expressions of emotion, contending
that only the latter require emotional causation (Davis, 1988, pp. 286-88).
Where A expresses an emotion, however, A's behavior is an expression
of the emotion. This being the case, causation by the expressed emotion
cannot be necessary for behavior to be an expression of emotion but not
for expressing emotion.
Davis denies the causal requirement for expressing an emotion in
order to allow for cases of insincere expressing in which the expressed
emotion is absent (Davis, 1988, pp. 280-82). Accommodating insincerity
does not require this move. In insincerity behavior which is standardly
caused by an emotion is displayed without the emotion in order to
mislead. A smile, for example, may be contrived in the absence of
pleasure to simulate the expression of pleasure. While indirectly related
to expressing, such cases of insincerity are not cases of expressing an
emotion. "A expressed pleasure, but A was not pleased" is contradictory.
Behavior which is expressive is, as Alan Tormey observes,
expressive of an intentional state (Tormey, 1971, p. 17 ff.). This.
together with the fact that expressive behavior is caused by the state
expressed, accounts for the aboutness of expressive behavior. Expressive
behavior is about what the expressed intentional state is about. When we
are glad about a victory or distressed about a defeat and shout or cry
expressively. the shouting is about the victory and the crying is about the
defeat. It may not be obvious what the shouting or crying is about, of
course, but the question of what it is about is always appropriate.
Behavior which may be expressive may also occur without being
expressive, and it mayor may not be about anything. Distress may cause
one to cry; where it does so, the crying is expressive and about what one
112 CHAPTER vn

is distressed about. Peeling onions may also cause one to cry, however;
and when this is the case, the crying is not expressive, nor does one cry
about anything.
Some have maintained that besides being caused by emotions,
expressive behavior must show or take on the character of the emotion
expressed, though little clarity about this feature of expression has been
achieved (see Sircello, 1972, chs. 8 and 9, for example). It may be that
it is in respect of its aboutness that expressive behavior takes on the
character of the emotion expressed.
In addition to causing expressive behavior like shouting or crying,
emotions may also cause a change in blood pressure or the electrical
conductivity of the skin through autonomic activation. Emotional effects
of the former kind a commonly considered emotional expressions but not
the latter; and while we may shout about something expressively, we are
not thought of as raising our blood pressure about anything. As we shall
see, emotional expression can indeed be distinguished from other
manifestations of emotions, though not by reference to intentional agency
or even control. As for the issue of aboutness, I see no harm in saying
that the autonomic effects of emotions are about what the emotions are
about.
Expressive behavior may articulate or merely indicate what the
expressed emotion is about; it may be representational or non-
representational. Glad that the team won, I may express my gladness by
shouting "They won!" or saying "I'm glad that they won." In such a
case, the emotional expression articulates what the emotion is about. On
the other hand, grieved that a friend has died, I may weep. What the
emotion expressed is about is only indicated by the emotional expression
in cases like this. Expressions of the former kind are representational,
those of the latter non-representational; both kinds of expression are about
what the expressed emotion is about.
In general, being caused by an intentional state does not make the
effect intentional (see Ch. VI, Sect. 4), but the causal requirement does
not mean that behavior expressive of emotions has derived intentionality.
Expressive behavior may be representational or non-representational.
Even where they are representational behavioral expressions do not
depend for intentionality on the emotion expressed, though they do
depend for intentionality on a communicative intention.
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 113

The expression of emotions may be linguistic or non-linguistic.

Representational expressions are typically linguistic, and non-
representational expressions are usually non-linguistic. Still, the
linguistic/non-linguistic distinction does not quite coincide with that
between representational and non-representational expression. I may
express my joy that the team won by shouting "They won!" or simply
"Hurrah!" In the former case linguistic expression is representational; in
the latter case it is not.
According to a prominent theory, the linguistic expression of
emotions is an illocutionary act. This illocutionary interpretation of
linguistic expression is developed most fully by William P. Alston and
John Searle (Alston 1964, 1965, and 1967; Searle, 1969 and 1975).3
Both Alston and Searle agree that in a particular case when a person
expresses his emotion or other psychological state in language he is
performing an illocutionary act, as he would be in giving an order or
making a promise, and that such acts are performed subject to a rule
requiring that the speaker have the relevant psychological state. They
take it to be a mark of rule-governed behavior as opposed to merely
regular behavior that, as Searle puts it, "We generally recognize
deviations as somehow wrong or defective" (Searle, 1969, p. 42; see
Alston, 1965, p. 22).4
Although the illocutionary account is not intended to apply to non-
linguistic expressions of psychological states, it is important to note that,
as Alston recognizes, it has the implication that linguistic and non-
linguistic performances are expressions of psychological states in
"radically different senses [of the term] 'expression'" (Alston, 1965, p.
24). This is because expression in language is construed as being
essentially rule-governed behavior, and it is obvious that non-linguistic
expressions of psychological states are not rule-governed in the way
illocutionary acts are.
I believe that the illocutionary theory of expression is seriously
flawed and the implied bifurcation of linguistic and non-linguistic
expression is unjustified. 5 It is evident that in many cases psychological
expressions in language are not covered by the illocutionary
interpretation. There are no linguistic rules requiring that a man who
complains about his dangerous working conditions have fear or that a
woman who protests female exploitation in pornography be indignant.
114 CHAPTER vn

There are some cases which appear to confonn to the illocutionary

view of linguistic expression. Shouting "Hurrah!" and wailing" Alas!" are
often taken to be "pure linguistic expressions of emotion," having "no
other conventional force except to express emotion" (Unnson, 1968, p.
32). This, however, is not quite accurate. To shout "Hurrah!" is to cheer,
and to wail "Alas!" is to lament. As such these speech acts typically
figure in the expression of enthusiasm or grief, but there is no
requirement that they do so. A claque or hired mourner is expected to
cheer or lament, but it is not expected that he feel or express enthusiasm
or grief.
It is not just that there are counterexamples to the illocutionary
account of linguistic expression; the whole project is misconceived. The
various kinds of speech acts are distinguished and defmed by the
conditions for their perfonnance. Alston and Searle hold that among the
conditions for the perfonnance of many kinds of illocutionary acts is the
requirement that the speaker have a psychological state and that it is in
virtue of this rule that the acts figure in the expression of the state. The
other conditions for the perfonnance of speech acts in which
psychological states are expressed are obviously very diverse. The
operation of a rule of the kind Alston and Searle have in mind is not
enough to mark off a kind of illocutionary act. It would not lead us to
say that stating and promising are illocutionary acts of the same kind, for
example. What is necessary for the individuation of a kind of
illocutionary act is a distinctive set of conditions, and this is lacking for
expression.
A further indication that, even where psychological states are
expressed in speech acts which are supposed to be governed by a rule
requiring that the speaker have the psychological state, the expression is
not itself an illocutionary act is the fact that the expression cannot occur
apart from the perfonnance of the illocutionary act. One cannot, as it
were, peel off the statement or promise, cheering or swearing and leave
even a defective or infelicitous expression. In considering another
putative speech act, that of announcing, Searle notes that, "An
announcement is never just an announcement. It must also be a
statement, order, etc." and concludes that, "Announcing ... is not the name
of an illocutionary act, but of the way in which some illocutionary act is
perfonned" (Searle, 1975, pp. 351-52). A similar conclusion ought to be
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 115

drawn with regard to expression in language. Rather than being an

illocutionary act, expression is something done in the performance of an
illocutionary act--something not unlike non-linguistic expression in basic
respects.
Expressive behavior provides evidence of emotions. Although
behavior may be ambiguous or deceptive, a causal inference from
behavior to emotion is often warranted. In this way scowls provide
evidence of anger, tears of grief, and smiles of pleasure. The evidential
role of expressive behavior is of great adaptive importance to us and to
other social animals; our flourishing, even our survival, depends on our
appreciation of the emotional expressions of each other (see Darwin,
1872/1965 and Ekman, 1973).
A distinction between expressive behavior like crying or shouting
and non-expressive manifestations such as blood pressure or psycho-
galvanic response changes can be made in terms of observability in
ordinary social contexts. This distinction is motivated by the evidential
and social role of expression. Made in this way, however, the distinction
is not hard and fast; conditions of observability vary, and some cases fall
on the borderline--for instance, so-called micromomentary facial
expressions which register only at the level of pre reflectiveawareness and
are clearly present only in frames of motion picture film (see Haggard
and Isaacs, 1966; cited in Collier, 1985, pp. 10-11).
Expressive behavior is sometimes seen as a form of communication
in which we manipulate our behavior in order to convey our feelings (for
example, see Birdwhistell, 1970; cited in Collier, 1985, p. 4). On
reflection, it should be evident that only some, but by no means all,
expressive behavior can be communicative in this sense; our control over
expressive behavior is variable. Some expressive behaviors are
involuntary--blushing or blanching, for instance; many, like weeping or
trembling, are subject to control; and others, such as smiling or scowling,
are open to intentional performance. Often it is difficult to hide one's
emotions. As Freud astutely observes, "If his lips are silent, he chatters
with his fmgertips; betrayal oozes out of every pore" (Freud, 1905/1953,
p. 94; cited in Collier, 1985, p. 46).
In both natural and conventional expressions of emotions, the causal
link between intentional states and expressive behavior may be exploited
in showing how one feels or in deception, though the exploitation works
116 CHAPTER VII

in different ways in the two cases. When conventional behavior is

exhibited with a communicational intention, it depends on a signaling
convention (see Lewis, 1969), and the intention is of the Gricean variety
(see Grice, 1957). Grice, however, contrasts causal and conventional
accounts of speaker meaning and rejects the fonner (Grice, 1957). For
conventional expression which is communicative, the dichotomy is false;
but for the anger which one feels, one would not nonnally display one's
anger in conventional ways, such as shaking one's fist or swearing. In
natural expressions of emotion, only causal regularities, not signaling
conventions, are relied upon in displaying one's emotion with
communicative intent; there are no conventions according to which smiles
are signs of pleasure or tears of grief.
Treatments of expressive behavior often focus on expressions of
emotions, ignoring expressions of other mental states. This focus is
perhaps understandable in view of the more richly varied range of
emotional expression, but it is still far too narrow. Expressions of other
mental states, most notably beliefs and desires, can be understood in
much the same way as expressions of emotions. Like emotional
expressions, expressions of beliefs and desires are caused by the relevant
mental state, are about what the mental state is about, and provide
evidence of the mental state.
There are also important differences between emotional expression
and expression of beliefs and desires. Unlike beliefs and desires (with the
exception of intentions), emotions affect us somatically and result in
expressive behavior. Expressions of beliefs and desires are linguistic or
quasi-linguistic--that is to say, representational; they consist in
articulations of the content of the belief or desire. Canonically, beliefs
are expressed in statement-like speech acts, desires in imperative-like
speech acts, though content need not be propositionally specified.
Expressions of emotions may be linguistic or non-linguistic,
representational or non-representational; often they merely indicate what
the emotion is about. Laughter about a joke is an expression of
amusement, just as lamenting "I'll never see her again" is an expression
of heartbreak. Emotional expressions include facial expressions, tones of
voice, bodily movements and postures; beliefs and desires are not
typically manifest in such modes of behavior.
 EMOTIONAL HERAVIOR 117

What accounts for the more richly varied range of emotional

expression? I believe that it is the hedonic character of emotions. Unlike
beliefs and desires, emotions are states of pleasure or displeasure. (The
hedonic character of emotions is discussed further in Chapters VI, VIII,
and X.) We are cast down in sadness, buoyed up in gladness; and these
attitudinal differences are reflected in our behavior. In fact, as a number
of experimental researchers have found, the hedonic dimension of
emotions is the most basic feature discernible in emotional expression; the
distinction between behavior expressive of positive and negative emotions
is the one most clearly drawn, though behavior expressive of some
particular emotions is also generally recognizable. (The differentiation of
positive and negative emotions with respect to their hedonic properties is
considered in detail in Chapter X.)
Emotional expression and emotional motivation are sometimes run
together (see Sirceilo, 1972 and Solomon, 1976, for example), but there
is a significant distinction to be made. The belief and desire constituting
an emotion that p have a common topic, whether p. Behavior motivated
by the emotion also concerns that topic. For instance, sorry that p, one
may act to bring it about that not-po Behavior which is expressive of an
emotion that p is also about p, but it is not intended to bring it about that
p or that not-po If it is intentional, it is intended only to show or
communicate that one has the emotion that p.7 It is not that expressive
behavior is not goal-directed--clearly it may be; but the motivational
structure of emotional expression is different from emotional motivation.
The desire or intention operative in intentional expression is not the desire
constitutive of the emotion; it is the desire or intention to show or
communicate that one has the emotion. Intentional expressions of
emotions are assessable for rationality, and their rationality depends on
the desirability of what is desired or intended. This rationality assessment
is not germane to the rationality of the emotion expressed, which depends
on that of the constitutive desire. The rationality of the expressed
emotion is one thing, that of an intentional expression of emotion is
another.
118 CHAPTER vn

3. EMOTIONAL MOTIVATION

Physiological and sensational occurrences do not account for emotional

motivation, nor do evaluative beliefs; it is the belief-desire structure of
emotions which accounts for their role in motivation.
In one of Edgar Rice Burroughs' fantasies the little green men of
Mars are supposed to laugh when sad and to cry when glad. There is no
absurdity in this. The link between emotions and expressive behavior is
only causal, and different causal regularities might obtain. Emotional
motivation, on the other hand, is a function of the semantic structure of
emotions. Hume overlooks this difference, supposing the motivational
force of emotions to be merely causal. Thus he ventures this speculation:

If nature had so pleas'd, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as
love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love,
and of happiness to hatred. (Hume 1739/1960, p. 368)

Hume's speculation is absurd.

I want to consider two theses about emotions and motivation, and I
shall argue that the theses are both plausible. If they are true, it follows
that emotions are essentially bound up with rational motivation, that, in
effect, all rational motivation is emotional. This view is, of course,
unorthodox. Emotions are usually supposed to amount to static in the
motivational program. I want to tune out the static and reveal something
of the rational structure of emotional motivation.
The discussion proceeds on the basis of certain tenets about emotions
and intentions. One is that emotions are structures of beliefs and desires
and divide into convergent and divergent and into certainty and
uncertainty emotions. This tenet has been developed and defended at
length (see Ch. VI). The other tenet is that intentions are desires. More
needs to be said about this before going on.
Intentions, on my view, are desires of a kind; they are identical with
perfonnative desires, desires that one perfonn some action. Three related
reasons underlie this identification. First, the distinctive feature of
intentions is that, all else being equal, they issue in action. This is also
the hallmark of perfonnative desires. It is on this sameness of function
that the identification of intentions with perfonnative desires primarily
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 119

rests. In the second place, the success conditions for intentions and
perfonnative desires are the same, that states of affairs be produced which
are in confonnity with representations of what is to be the case. Third,
the rationality conditions for intentions and perfonnative desires are the
same; the intention to do something is rational if and only if the
perfonnative desire to do it is rational. In view of the sameness of their
functional, semantic, and rational properties, an intention and a
perfonnative desire with the same content--that one perform a certain
action--are one and the same mental state; there is no respect in which
they differ.
Frequently it is held that intending is to be understood in terms of
desiring and believing. (For a representative development of this kind of
position, see Audi, 1973 and 1986.) A intends to perform a particular
action at a certain time, it is maintained, if and only if:

(1) A desires that he perform the action at that time;

(2) A desires that he perform the action more than he desires that he perform
any alternative action at that time;

(3) A believes that he will have the ability and opportunity to perform the
action at that time;

(4) A believes, on the basis of (1)-(3), that he will perform the action at that
time.

Those defending this sort of analysis typically take intentions to be

complex mental states of which the desires and beliefs are components;
and, apparently, it is supposed to provide an account of what goes on in
our minds when we have an intention. Both of these contentions could
hardly be true. If intentions consisted in a complex assemblage of
different conative and cognitive elements, they could not have a
motivational function and a detenninate content. And to suppose that all
these beliefs and desires run through one's mind when one has an
intention is unrealistic; it would surely represent the imposition of a
mental overload given the vast array of our intentions.
On closer inspection it turns out that conditions (2) and (3) of the
desire-belief analysis are not necessary conditions for intending--Ieave
alone reflections of the elements of a complex mental state which must
120 CHAPTER vn

be present when we have an intention. They are constraints on the

rationality of intending.
The semantic rationality of intentions or perfonnative desires is
detennined by the feasibility of satisfying the desire or doing what one
intends. Feasibility is a function of cost and possibility, where cost is
understood in tenns of the non-satisfaction of competing desires whose
conditions of satisfaction are incompatible with that of the desire in
question and possibility is understood in tenns of ability and opportunity.
Semantic rationality conditions are success-insuring conditions. In the
case of perfonnative desires or intentions, conditions regarding cost and
possibility insure that, so far as the agent is concerned, the desires or
intentions will issue in action.
Condition (2), which requires that the agent desire to perfonn the
intended action more than any alternative action, is clearly a condition
relating to cost. If the agent had competing perfonnative desires which,
individually or collectively, were as strong or stronger than the desire to
perfonn the intended action, the likelihood of that desire's being satisfied
would be jeopardized; the agent would, in effect, not have definitely
decided to perfonn the intended action. It is possible for the agent to
have an intention, though he has competing desires of equal or greater
strength; but it would be irrational, given the lack of likelihood that the
intention would issue in action. g
Condition (3), which requires that the agent believe that he will have
the ability and opportunity to do what he intends to do, is, of course, a
condition relating to possibility. Lack of ability or opportunity
undennines the possibility of satisfying a perfonnative desire and with it
the semantic rationality of the desire. It is possible to have an intention
which does not meet this condition; but the intention would be one which
it is irrational to have, given the lack of likelihood that it will be carried
out.
The condition that the agent must believe that he will do what he
intends, condition (4), is not necessary for intending, nor is it a rational
constraint on intending. Still, it is a condition that is nonnally met.
Where the conditions relating to desire, cost, and possibility are met, one
has reason to believe that one will do what one intends to do.
Condition (1), which requires that the agent desire to do what he
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 121

intends to do, is the only condition in the desire-belief analysis which is

necessary for intending. That, however, is just because the desire to
perfonn the action is the intention to perfonn the action.
The usual objection to taking intentions with which we act to be
desires is that we may be motivated to act by considerations of duty
alone. There is also a standard reply: Where duty motivates our actions
we desire to do our duty. Typically, at this point, the objector falls back
on the Kantian view of moral motivation. There is much that is wrong
with this view, but the difficulties are well known. For my own part, I
would rather have finner ground on which to stand.
Myles Brand offers five additional objections to the identification of
intentions with desires. The first two are as follows. "First, the strength
of a desire can change over time, but not so for an intention" (Brand,
1984, p. 125). "Second, and related to the first difference, desiring can
be scaled in strength, but not intending" (Brand, 1984, p. 125). A
rational intention is understood as a perfonnative desire to do something
where one desires to do it more than to perfonn any alternative action.
In this way rational intention involves a strength comparison with other
perfonnative desires; rationally, one must want most to do what one
intends to do. It is for this reason that, at least in relative tenns, rational
intentions cannot be scaled for strength or vary in strength; what one
wants most to do, or most strongly desires to do, is, of course, invariable.
Irrational intentions or perfonnative desires might well differ and be
scaled in tenns of strength, since the rational requirement that one want
most to do what one intends to do would not be met. Wants generally
do vary in strength and may be scaled for strength. Thus, there is no
difference which shows that intending is not to be reduced to having
perfonnative desires.
"A third difference is that it is possible for a nonnal person to have
incompatible desires but it is not possible for him to have incompatible
intentions" (Brand, 1984, p. 125). Of course a person cannot have
rational intentions which are incompatible, since he cannot want most to
perfonn each of two actions which cannot both be perfonned; but this in
no way militates against the identification of intentions with perfonnative
desires. Besides, Brand is wrong in thinking that a person can rationally
have incompatible desires which cannot both be satisfied.
122 CHAPTER vn

"A fourth difference between desiring and intending is this. If a person intends to do
something, say B, and if he realizes that Aing is the means to Bing, then he intends to A
.... But it could happen that a person desire to B and realize that Aing is the means to
Bing, and not desire to A. (Brand, 1984, p. 126)

Here Brand overlooks a crucial point regarding the dynamics of

intending: on discovering the means to an intended end, the rational
thing to do may be to abandon the intention; in this way intentions may
be rationally precluded just as desires may be.

There is a fifth difference.... A person can desire to do something himself or he can

desire that someone else do something .... But a person can only intend to do something
himself. (Brand, 1984, p. 126)

In raising thIs objection Brand fails to observe the distinction between

performative and optative desires; intentions are identical with the former,
not the latter. So far as the objections considered go, the identification
stands.
The first and more basic thesis about emotions and motivation for
which I intend to argue is this: Negative emotions are necessary for the
rational generation of intentions. If I believe that p and desire that not-p,
my emotion is negative; I fear or am sorry that p. Given such an
emotion, I may be rationally motivated to bring it about that not-po
Without this divergence between the state of affairs believed to obtain
and the state of affairs desired to obtain, there would be no rational
motivation to action. In this way negative emotions are essentially bound
up with rational motivation.
Negative emotions are motivationally operative in generating
intentions to act. Sorry or afraid that p, if one can think of a means to
bring it about that not-p, one will, all else being equal, be motivated to
pursue that means. The performative desire generated in this way is not
itself constitutive of the sorrow or fear that p. If Lady Godiva is sad to
be unnoticed and it occurs to her that she will be noticed if she rides
naked through the streets, she may come to desire to ride through the
streets naked. This desire is not constitutive of her sadness; the
constitutive desire is the desire to be noticed.
Negative emotions could not have a performative desire as a
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 123

constituent; the two are rationally incompatible. Suppose I have the

perforrnative desire that p. I could not rationally fear or be sorry that p
as well. The negative emotion involves the desire that not-po
It might seem that positive emotions, as well as negative emotions
may be motivationally operative in generating intentions to act. A man
may be proud that he owns a beautiful house, and his pride, it would
appear, may motivate him to keep the house up and make the mortgage
payments. This is a case in which the man is motivated to conserve a
state of affairs about which he is pleased. He realizes that his house may
deteriorate or that the mortgage company may take it. These are things
which he fears. If he did not have these fears, he would not be motivated
to maintain his house or to make the mortgage payments. Properly
speaking, it is the man's fears, not his pride, which motivate the repairs
and payments. So far as his pride that he owns a beautiful house is
concerned, the man is content and lacks an impetus to action.
There is a significant exception to the rule that it is negative
emotions which are necessary for the generation of intentions to act.
Hope that not-p may motivate a person to bring it about that not-p as well
as fear that p. This is because the hope and the fear both involve the
desire that not-p and are rationally concomitant emotions; it is rational to
hope that not-p if and only if it is rational to fear that p (see Ch. X, Sect.
3).
Robert Gordon challenges this contention about the motivational
force of fear that p and hope that not-po He denies that fear that p
motivates one to bring it about that not-p if one can think of a way to do
it. He also denies that fear that p and hope that not-p have the same
motivational force (Gordon, 1973, 1980, and 1988).
Gordon is led to deny that fear that p motivates one to bring it about
that not-p by certain examples. One may fear that a burglar has just
entered the house or be afraid that it will rain. In these cases there is
nothing to do to bring it about that what one fears to be the case is not
the case. According to Gordon this does not mean that one's fear lacks
motivational force; fear motivates "vulnerability avoidance." Afraid that
it will rain, one is motivated to carry an umbrella so as not to get wet;
fearing that a burglar has just entered the house, one is motivated to call
the police or to make an exit so as to avoid harm. Gordon generalizes his
claim about the motivational force of fearing that p as follows:
124 CHAPTER vn

In order to predict how fearing that p will motivate a person to act, we must know ... why
he cares whether p or not-p and, specifically, what reason or reasons he has for wishing
that p or that not-po Now a fully explicit statement of a reason of S's for wishing that
not-p will generally implicate a second wish of S's. Such a statement will have the form
"If p then q .... [S will be motivated to bring it about that his] attitudinal reason for fearing
that p no longer obtains. (Gordon, 1988, pp. 73-74)

Gordon's examples are not such as to render plausible his

vulnerability avoidance claim. There are many cases in which one can
do something to bring it about that what one fears to be the case is not
the case. If Tom is afraid that he will not win the footrace, he may be
motivated to run harder so as to bring it about that he does not lose the
race. Besides, fear does not always have motivational force; there are
cases in which there is nothing fear motivates one to do. Tom may not
be motivated to do anything about losing the race, since he can't run any
faster; and almost certainly he can't do anything to bring it about that he
won't be sad if he loses the race, so that vulnerability avoidance is also
not open to him.
Gordon has mistaken the motivational force of fear that p for that of
the related fear that if p then q. The force of the first is to bring it about
that not-p, that of the latter to bring it about that not if p then q. This is
a mistake which easily goes unnoticed because fears of the kind in
question are typically nested. Gordon conflates desires and desirability
beliefs and so takes desires constituting related fears to be reasons for
fearing. Once the distinction between desiring and desirability beliefs is
recognized, it is clear that what we have is nested fears. If one fears that
a burglar has just entered the house, one naturally fears that if a burglar
has entered the house one will be harmed. Still the mistake of confusing
the two fears is one which must be noticed if we are to appreciate the
motivational force of fear that p, which is to bring it about that not-p, and
to see that the motivational force of fear that p and hope that not-p is the
same.
Gordon takes the motivational force of fear that p and hope that not-
p to be asymmetrical. He writes:

If farmer A is hopeful that it will rain whereas farmer B is not, it would not be surprising
to find certain differences in the ways A and B feel and act If B were to set out pipes
in preparation for irrigating the land, whereas A did not, this could be explained by the
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 125

fact that B is afraid it will not rain whereas A is hopeful that it will. (Gordon, 1973, p.
45)

Where one hopes that p and fears that not-p, often one of the
emotions may preponderate because of less uncertainty in one's belief.
Thus if one is more certain that p than that not-p and desires that p, one
may have high hopes that p and only a slight fear that not-po Still, the
motivational potential of the emotions does not differ in direction. In
each case the motivational thrust is towards bringing it about that p. For
example, Betty has high hopes of winning the beauty contest though she
has a slight fear that she will not. Both the hope and the fear may
motivate her to lose weight in order to win the contest because that is
what she wants.
Gordon holds that hope that p and fear that not-p differ in
motivational force because in each case one acts as though one knew that
what one believes were the case. That is why he thinks that the farmer
who is afraid that it won't rain will irrigate while the farmer who hopes
that it will rain will not. Yet neither fanner does know that it will rain;
each has an uncertainty belief about the weather, and both desire that it
will rain. That, however, is not something they can do anything about.
Gordon's idea is presumably that the one fears that if it doesn't rain the
crops will be ruined while the other hopes that if it doesn't rain the crops
won't be ruined. However, the motivational force of the hope and the
fears remain the same; each may be motivated to irrigate, since what he
desires is that the crops not be ruined.
The second thesis about emotions and motivation is this: Positive
emotions are rationally concomitant with intentions. If I intend to ski on
Mt. Hood, I will nonnally be glad, or at least hope, that I am going to ski
on Mt. Hood. If I have this intention, I desire that I ski on Mt. Hood
and, if rational, believe, with or without uncertainty, that I will have the
ability and opportunity to do so and desire more to ski on Mt. Hood than
to perfonn any alternative action. This provides the rational basis for a
certainty or uncertainty belief that I am going to ski on Mt. Hood. If I
come to have this belief, since I desire to ski on Mt. Hood, I will be glad,
or at least hope, that I am going to do so.
Concomitant positive emotions are perfonnative emotions; they
supervene on the perfonnative desire or intention which is constitutive of
126 CHAPTER vn

them. Thus they go together with intentional action. Positive emotions

which are optative do not involve a constitutive performative desire or
intention and tend to inhibit intentional action. If I am glad that there has
been heavy snowfall on Mt. Hood, there is nothing to be done to bring
about the desired state of affairs.
While negative emotions are motivationally operative in generating
intentions to act, concomitant positive emotions are not. Sorry or afraid
that p, one forms the intention to do something to bring it about that not-
p. Gladness or hope that one is going to do something does not generate
the intention to do it; rather, one has the emotion because one has the
intention to act. The performative desire generated by sorrow or fear is
not constitutive of the emotion; the performative desire on which gladness
or hope supervenes is constitutive of the emotion.
There is a fundamental asymmetry in the motivational potential of
positive and negative emotions. While negative emotions may generate
intentions and so motivate intentional action, positive emotions do not
generate intentions to act. They supervene on or else inhibit intentions
to act.
Hope is an exception to the rule that positive emotions lack the
motivational force of negative emotions. Hope is rationally concomitant
with fear; where one has reason to hope that p, one has reason to fear that
not-p, and conversely. Like fear, hope which is not supervenient on a
performative desire may generate an intention to act.
Cases in which both negative certainty emotions and concomitant
positive certainty emotions are involved appear to present a problem.
Suppose I am sorry there is a hole in my shoe. This may motivate me
to bring it about that there is not a hole in my shoe--to have the shoe
repaired. If I form the intention to do so and am sure that I can, I will
be glad that there is not going to be a hole in my shoe. Now, looking at
the scenario schematically, I am, in the first instance sorry that p, then
glad that not-p, and this seems to make for a problem. The problem is
easily resolved. I am glad that there is no longer going to be a hole in
my shoe, that I am going to get it fixed; I am sorry that there is now a
hole in my shoe, that it is not fixed. We are motivated to change things,
and the temporal factor explains how we can have the negative and
positive certainty emotions involved.
 EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR 127

From the two theses which have been put forward, it follows that as
regards rational motivation emotions are very much a part of the picture.
This view is bound to meet with objections. Perhaps the principal
objection is this: Emotions are irrational or arational forces and so are
antithetical to rational motivation; at the very least, they involve agitation
or upset which interferes with acting rationally. By way of reply,
consider a case of fear. Suppose a man is afraid of the bear. The man's
fear may be entirely rational. The bear may be menacing and, to say the
least, it is undesirable to be mauled by a bear. The man's fear may
rationally motivate him to run from the bear. Of course, his fear may
also have a considerable agitational impact, and this may impede his
efforts to escape from the bear. Even so, the agitational effects of fear
are not to be confused with fear, and it is the man's fear which rationally
motivates his flight.

4. CONCLUSION

While the account of the links between emotions and behavior provided
by Cognitive Theories is problematic, the Belief-Desire Theory puts in a
position to give a credible account of emotional expression and
motivation. Behavior which is expressive of an emotion is caused by the
emotion, is about what the emotion is about, and provides evidence of the
emotion. And negative emotions are necessary for the rational generation
of intentions, while positive emotions are rationally concomitant with
intentions, so that emotions are essentially bound up with the rational
motivation of action.

NOTES

Solomon is an exception. On his view, effects of emotional judgments are not

expressive. Rather emotional expression is assimilated to emotional motivation. "Quite
the contrary of a Newtonian interplay of compressed forces," he writes, "the emotion is
related to its expression through the 'logic' of an Aristotelian syllogism... (Solomon,
1976, p. 229). The contention that scowls and smiles and expressive behavior generally
are the product of practical reasoning, however, is extremely implausible.
2 Shaffer's is a Causal Theory. Causal Constitutent and Constituent Theorists may
take emotions to have motivational force because of the involvement of an evaluative
128 CHAPTER VII

belief (for example, Lyons, 1980). In that case Component Theories resemble Evaluative
Theories and, as subsequent discussion shows, hardly fare better.
3 Other philosophers who construe expression in language as iIIocutionary include
Bernard Williams (1965) and J. O. Urmson (1968).
4 It is interesting to note that lL. Austin, from whom Searle and Alston derive the
notion of illocutionary acts, is not similarly inclined to say that "expressing" (which he
parenthetically calls an "odious word") is the name of an illocutionary force (Austin,
1962, pp. 104 and 121).
S The argument which follows is developed in greater detail in Green (1979).
Collier notes that three lines of evidence turned up in empirical investigation also
indicate that control and communication are not necessarily for emotional expression:
Spontaneous facial expressions occur in blind individuals who are unable to
pose expressions when asked. They originate from different areas of the brain
and differ structurally from posed expressions of the same emotion. Neither
intention nor the presence of another person is necessary for expressive
behavior to occur. (Collier, 1985, p. 8)
Davis distinguishes between emotional expression and emotional behavior directed
toward a further goal but gives no rationale for the distinction (Davis, 1988, p. 289).
8 To have a performative desire which is not greater than other competing desires is
also to exhibit non-semantic irrationality. The strength of desires rationally depends on
the desirability of what is desired. So having the desire would be to desire what is not
most desirable. Such desires may be akratic.
 CHAPTER VIII

EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY

1. INTRODUCfION

The affectivity of emotions presents us with a problem: how can

emotions be both affective states, which are felt and are feelings, and
have intentionality, which involves representational and rational
properties? This constitutes a problem in the light of the venerable
distinction between feeling and reason as fundamentally different modes
of mentality. Strenuous efforts have been made to revise this dichotomy,
of course; emotions in particular are generally argued to have a foot at
least on the side of reason. Still, the distinction is widely held to separate
somatic sensations from intentional states. 1 On account of this, the
problem of emotional affectivity remains. Emotional affectivity is
typically explained in terms of the relation between emotions and
sensations.

2. EMOTIONS AND SENSATIONS

In view of the evident contrast between sensations which we feel and our
intentional mental states, it has been denied that emotions are essentially
affective. Robert Solomon takes this position:

It is the heart of my argument [he says] that "feelings" and physiology ... do not play an
essential role in the constitution of emotions and cannot be used in even the most
rudimentary account of the defming properties of either emotions in general or particular
emotions. It is my central claim that emotions are defined primarily by their constitutive
judgments, and related to other beliefs, judgments, and our knowledge of the world in a
"formal" way, through judgments. (Solomon, 1980, p. 274)

It is clear that Solomon's rejection of emotional affectivity is based on

the contention that emotions, unlike sensations, have representational and
rational properties. He claims that, "As soon as one distinguishes

129
130 CHAPTER VITI

between the 'feeling' of emotion and its o~iect..., there is no way to

understand ... how emotions intend their objects ... " (Solomon, 1980, pp.
273-74). This he explains as follows:

Feelings do not have "directions." But I am angry "about" something .... Anger is not a
feeling; neither is it a feeling plus anything else (e.g. what it is "about"). (Solomon, 1980,
p.253)

Solomon also observes that,

We often say of our emotions that they are "reasonable" and "unreasonable," "warranted"
and "unwarranted," "justifiable" and "unjustifiable," "legitimate" and "illegitimate,"
"sensible" and "foolish," "self-demeaning" and "enhancing," and even "right" and "wrong."
Yet no such evaluations are appropriate in the realm of headaches and bellyaches, warm
flushes and nausea. (Solomon, 1976, pp. 162-63)

Hume is motivated by the same contrast between sensations and

intentional states to deny emotional intentionality in saying, "When I am
angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have
no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty, or sick,
or more than five foot high" (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 415). Hume takes
this position because of his identification of passions or emotions with
impressions of reflection. Thus, of them, Hume says:

A passion ... contains not any representative quality.... 'Tis impossible... that [aJ passion
can be opps'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason .... (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 415)

Although Solomon and Hume reach opposite conclusions regarding

the affectivity and intentionality of emotions, their reasoning is perfectly
parallel. In effect, both assume that if emotions are affective, they must
be constituted by sensations; and that if emotions are constituted by
sensations, they cannot be intentional. Solomon then argues that since
emotions are intentional, they cannot be affective; Hume that because
emotions are affective, they cannot be intentional. In this way, each
rejects one feature of emotions in order to establish another. Neither
position is tenable and for the same reason: emotions are both affective
and intentional states. They have representational and rational properties,
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 131

and they are felt and are feelings. One feels resentment about being
slighted, proud of one's achievement; and it is one and the same state --
the pride or resentment -- which is intentional and affective.
The usual move made in response to the problem of emotional
affectivity is to adopt some form of the Component Theory. Contrary to
the assumption of those who dismiss the intentionality or the affectivity
of emotions, it is held that emotions can be constituted of sensations and
have intentionality. Emotions are constituted of sensations, according to
the Component Theorist, and this accounts for their affectivity. But
emotions also have intentionality, which is contributed by beliefs to
which they are related. Typically it is this position which is taken even
when emotions are held to be constituted entirely of sensations.
One frequently finds it claimed that 'the Traditional View' of
emotions is that they are simply somatic sensations. This view of
emotions is then quickly dismissed on various grounds, chief among
which is that it entails the denial of emotional intentionality. It turns out,
however, that historical instances of 'the Traditional View' are hard to
find.
The case of Hume comes to mind, of course, and is often cited; but
it is by no means a clear case. Hume does identify emotions with
"simple and uniform impressions" and denies that they have "any
representative quality." Still, for Hume the impressions with which
emotions are identified are not impressions of sensation but impressions
of reflection. This means that they are accompanied or caused by ideas
or judgments, and Hume frequently speaks of the objects of emotions
such as pride. Thus, we find that in identifying emotions with
impressions, Hume is not unequivocal in his denial of the intentionality
of emotions but evidently has some sympathy with a form of the Causal
Theory, according to which, emotions, though identical with sensations,
derive intentionality from the beliefs to which they are causally related.
In other cases it is clear that those who identify emotions with
sensations hold a Causal Theory, rather than simply reducing emotions to
non-intentional phenomena. The bodily feelings with which James
identifies emotions are reactions to our perception of the exciting fact, for
example; Wundt's affective elements are accompanied in every case by
ideational contents; and Freud's affects are directed toward an object in
virtue of their relation to an idea.
132 CHAPTER VITI

In addition to Causal Theories, there are other attempts to explain

emotional affectivity in terms of sensations. Sensations are often held to
constitute part of an emotion when they are suitably related to an
appropriate belief. This is also a version of the Component Theory; as
with Causal Theories, emotions are held to have non-intentional
constituents and to derive intentionality from related beliefs.
Objections have already been raised against Component Theories; in
particular I have argued that the idea that emotions have derived
intentionality should be rejected (see Ch. IV, Sect. 3). Here I want to
focus on the common contention of Component Theories regarding
emotional affectivity: emotions have affective properties in virtue of
being constituted wholly or in part by sensations caused by appropriate
beliefs.
There are two problems with the view of the affectivity of emotions
presented by Component Theorists. The first problem is this. Somatic
sensations may be caused by a belief appropriate to an emotion in the
absence of the emotion. This being the case, the sensations can hardly
constitute the emotion or feelings of the emotion. For example, suppose
a man takes himself to have been insulted but, having the disposition of
a doormat, does not mind. Suppose also that the man's belief somehow
causes him to feel heart palpitations and a tightening of the jaw. These
sensations are not constitutive of anger for the simple reason that, not
minding the verbal abuse, the man is not angry.
The second problem concerns felt location. Somatic sensations are
referred to localized bodily conditions; they are felt in some part or else
all over the body. If emotions were affective states in that they are
constituted of sensations, they would have felt location as well. That,
however, is not the case. Happiness, for example, or hope is not
something one feels all over or in some bodily part.
Component Theories do not succeed in explaining the affectivity of
emotions in terms of sensations. Being the effect of an evaluative belief
does not make a sensation an emotion or a feeling of emotion; and
emotions, unlike sensations, do not have felt location. Still, there is a
way -- though only a rather peripheral way -- in which sensations may
contribute to emotional affectivity. An emotion (not just an evaluative
belief) may cause sensations; and, on that account, the sensations may be
considered feelings of the emotion, just as sensations caused by gout are
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 133

considered feelings of gout. This is a point noted by Ryle, who writes,

"Whether we are attaching sensations to a physiological condition or
feelings to an emotional condition, we are applying a causal hypothesis"
(Ryle, 1949, p. 105). Thus, if upon receiving an insult, a man is angry,
his anger (not just his thought that he has been insulted) may cause him
to feel heart palpitations and a tightening of the jaw; and these sensations
may count as feelings of anger. This contribution of sensations to
emotional affectivity is only peripheral; it explains how emotions may
relate to other affective states but not the affectivity of emotions.
Resultant sensations do not explain how emotions can be feelings, as
opposed to causes of feelings, or how we can feel emotions, as opposed
to their effects. Causal relation to bodily sensations does not generally
confer affectivity on the cause. Stomach aches, which are felt and are
feelings, are standardly caused by a condition of the stomach, such as
excess acidity, but that does not mean that the condition of the stomach
is also an affective state.

3. EMOTIONS AND PERCEPTION

Another approach to explaining emotional affectivity relates emotions and

perception. The primary concern of those who take this approach is to
provide an account of what it is to feel an emotion. According to both
William P. Alston and Howard Kamler, for example, feeling an emotion
is to be analyzed in terms of immediate awareness of having an emotion
(Alston, 1969; Kamler, 1973 and 1985). William D. Gean takes
substantially the same view. He says, "Feeling an emotion is perceiving
the emotion" (Gean, 1979, p. 39).
A perceptual account does not make the affective properties of
emotions dependent on their being constituted of non-intentional somatic
sensations and in this way might seem to offer a resolution to the
problem of emotional affectivity. However, a consideration of the
theoretical possibilities for developing this kind of view reveals that this
is not the case. Basically, there are two ways one might go in developing
a perceptual approach to emotional affectivity. Feeling an emotion might
be modeled on sensory or somatic perception or else on introspective
perception.2 Either way there are serious problems.
The problematic character of an understanding of emotional
134 CHAPTER VIII

affectivity based on sensory or somatic perception is readily apparent. In

these modes of perception what is felt is something located in the
environment or in one's body, not an intentional state at all. Thus one
may feel a rough spot on the surface of a table or feel the pounding of
one's heart. Feeling an emotion can hardly be assimilated to either
sensory or somatic perception. The despair one may feel is not
something like a heartbeat or a rough spot but a mental state with
representational and rational properties.
Modeling feeling an emotion on introspective perception does not
generate such obvious problems, but there are problems nonetheless. For
one thing, introspective perceptions are second-or higher-order mental
representations. One is aware, for example, of having some belief or
desire. If emotional feeling is understood in tenns of introspective
perception, feeling angry that the dog has fouled the carpet will amount
to awareness of one's anger that the dog has fouled the carpet. It is a
mistake to construe emotional feeling in this way. To feel an emotion
like anger is typically to have a first-order representation of some state of
affairs, not a representation of one's emotion. When one feels angry that
the dog has fouled the carpet, what is represented is not one's anger but
the dog's having fouled the carpet.
A second problem is this. Introspective perception is not generally
a mode of feeling. To be aware of having a belief or desire, for example,
is not to feel the belief or desire. It is thus unclear why, for instance,
awareness of one's anger should amount to feeling angry. It might be
suggested that it is because, unlike beliefs and desires, anger and other
emotions are feelings that introspective awareness of them amounts to
feeling the emotion. This suggestion, however, is of no use in an account
of emotional affectivity in terms of introspective perception. Feeling
emotions is explained by reference to the standing of emotions as
feelings. This in tum can hardly be explained in tenns of introspective
perception. Thus the affectivity of emotions goes unexplained on this
account.
Perceptual approaches, it appears fair to conclude, make no effective
contribution to resolving the problem of the affectivity and intentionality
of emotions. Sensory and somatic perceptions may be modes of feeling
but of environmental and bodily conditions, not intentional states.
Introspective perception does take intentional states as its objects, but it
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 135

is a higher-level representation and not a mode of feeling. Either way the

problem remains.

4. HEDONIC STATES

In order to resolve the problem of emotional affectivity, we must explain

how emotions can be both affective and intentional states. This cannot
be done satisfactorily if it is held that the affective properties of emotions
are due to constitutive sensations or related perceptions, while the
intentionality of emotions is contributed by beliefs. The explanation, I
think, is that emotions are hedonic states which are both affective and
intentional.
Pleasure or happiness that p and displeasure or unhappiness that p
are examples of hedonic states. It has been suggested by Wayne Davis
that hedonic states like these can be analyzed in terms of beliefs and
desires (Davis, 1981a and 198Ib). Roughly, the idea is that happiness
that p, for example, can be analyzed in terms of believing that p and
desiring that p, unhappiness that p in terms of believing that p and
desiring that not-po I think that Davis' suggestion is basically correct.
Suppose, for example, that Alfred believes that he has been knighted but
doesn't care about being knighted, or that he wants to be knighted but
doesn't believe that he has been knighted; in neither case will he be
pleased that he has been knighted. If, on the other hand, Alfred both
believes that he has been knighted and desires that he be knighted, he will
then be pleased that he has been knighted.
Taken together, Davis' suggestion about happiness and the Belief-
Desire Theory of emotions yield the thesis that emotions are hedonic
states, forms of happiness or pleasure, unhappiness or displeasure.
According to the Belief-Desire Theory, the basic emotions are gladness,
sorrow, hope, and fear. In joy A desires that p and A believes with
certainty that p; in sorrow A desires that p and A believes with certainty
that not-p; in hope A desires that p and A believes without certainty that
p; in fear, A desires that p and A believes without certainty that not-po
Given the analysis of hedonic states in terms of beliefs and desires, this
means that joy and hope that p are forms of happiness that p; sorrow and
fear are forms of unhappiness that not-po
136 CHAPTER VIII

The thesis that emotions are hedonic states provides a straightforward

account of the central features of emotional affectivity. Pleasure and
happiness are feelings; as hedonic states, so are emotions. Pleasure and
happiness are felt; again, as hedonic states, so are emotions. 3
The intentionality of emotions is also given a plausible explanation
by the thesis that emotions are hedonic states. As structures of beliefs
and desires which have a common topic, emotions are representational
states and have the rational properties of being rationally related to beliefs
and to the motivation of behavior and of being rationally assessable in
terms of appropriateness. 4

5. EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

Emotions admit of degrees of intensity: one may be very proud, for

example, or slightly peeved. And the intensity of emotions may wax and
wane: our fear may grow or we may get over our grief. I think that the
hedonic character of emotions as structures of beliefs and desires enables
us, not only to understand emotional affectivity, but also to account for
degrees and changes in emotional intensity.
The intensity of emotions is usually taken to be a function of the
level of associated agitation and motivational force. Anthony Kenny's
view is representative. He writes:

But if we look for the criterion of the intensity of emotion, we find not one but two
criteria, which may on occasion conflict. The first criterion is the violence of the bodily
changes, of facial expressions, tone of voice, posture, and so forth, which are associated
with the emotion.... But there is another criterion also. We may regard one emotion as
stronger than another if it has a greater influence on voluntary action over a comparatively
long period of time. (Kenny, 1963, p. 35)

The level of associated agitation or motivational force may provide

some indication of emotional intensity, but it does so at best only on
occasion and in a rough and ready way. In any event, it can hardly be
constitutive of the intensity of emotions. It is clear that there are intense
emotions in which motivational force is lacking; there need not even be
a dispositional motivation to do anything. For example, I may be very
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 137

glad to get what I wanted or deeply grieved by an irretrievable loss

without being motivated to do something about it. Agitation is also not
necessary for intense emotions. A person who greatly fears heights or
snakes, for instance, need not be in a state of agitation. It might be
suggested that such a person would at least be agitated when confronted
with a rattlesnake or approaching the edge of a cliff. This may be true,
but, still, even a disposition to agitation is not generally necessary for
intense emotions. Parents may be intensely proud of their children's
achievements without a disposition to agitation; they need not be agitated
even when they reflect on what their children have done.
The level of associated agitation or motivational force does not
determine the intensity of emotions. Rather, emotional intensity is
hedonic; it is a measure of how happy or unhappy one is that something
is the case. If I am oveIjoyed to get what I want, I may not be motivated
to do anything about it, but I must be very happy to get it. And though
one's keen disappointment over some reverse need involve no agitation,
one is bound to be very unhappy about it.
The hedonic intensity of emotions is a function of the strength of the
beliefs and desires which constitute them. 5 In the case of certainty
emotions, the confidence level of the belief is constant, and the intensity
of the emotion varies with the strength of the desire. The greater one's
desire for success, the more intense will be one's disappointment over
failure. In the case of uncertainty emotions, the strength of both beliefs
and desires is variable and with it varies the intensity of the emotion.
The more intense my desire to get something and the more confident I
am that I will get it, the stronger will be my hope that I will get it.
The hedonic account of emotional intensity explains why
motivational force may be an indication of the intensity of an emotion.
If, strongly desiring that p and believing with certainty that not-p, a man
is very sorry that not-p, he may be highly motivated to bring it about that
p. On the other hand, it seems to be simply a fact about our autonomic
lability that intense emotions sometimes produce agitation.
The hedonic character of emotions enables us to appreciate another
important feature of emotional intensity. All else being equal, the more
intense an emotion, the greater will be its impact on one's general
hedonic state--one's happiness or unhappiness. General hedonic impact,
however, is not simply a function of one's happiness or unhappiness
138 CHAPTER VIII

about this or that but of one's happiness or unhappiness about all the
things which occupy one's thoughts. 6
General hedonic impact is especially important for explaining the
dynamics of emotional intensity. Consider, for example, getting over
grief. Suppose that a man's wife dies and that he is deeply grieved.
Grief over the death of a loved one initially tends to contribute to one's
unhappiness in two ways. The first, and more fundamental, way in which
it may do so is this. Many of our desires are focused on one who is
loved, not just the desire that the loved one live. With death comes the
frustration of all these desires. Thus many sorrows are attendant upon the
death of a loved one. These sorrows detennine and reflect the magnitude
of grief, and together they may make a major contribution to general
unhappiness. There is a second way in which grief may have initial
impact on one's general hedonic state. New infonnation concerning what
we strongly care about usually has greater impact than infonnation long
possessed; it may rivet our attention and monopolize our thoughts. And
what we think about, what thoughts we have, is detenninant of our
happiness at a given time. For this reason, unless the man's wife's death
was long expected, he is likely at first to think a great deal about her; and
in this way his grief will also feed his unhappiness.
Corresponding to the ways in which intense grief has initial hedonic
impact, there are two ways in which the intensity of grief and its general
hedonic impact may diminish. The most basic way in which this happens
is through the gradual abandonment of desires frustrated by the loss of a
loved one. In the course of time, we nonnally make adjustments; we
cease to desire what we know we cannot have and come to desire other
things--to be with another person, for example. Eventually, the man may
remarry, ceasing even to wish that his fonner wife had not died. In this
way both his grief and his unhappiness may come to an end. Also, as
time passes and adjustments are made, the man will tend to think less
often about his loss. In this way, too, the general hedonic impact of his
grief will be abated as its intensity decreases.

6. EXPERIENTIAL EMOTIONS

In addition to the propositional attitudes we have considered, hedonic

states include enjoyment and bodily pain and pleasure. A common way
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 139

of dealing with these hedonic states is to assimilate enjoyment to

emotional fonns of pleasure, while classifying bodily pain and pleasure
as sensations. Davis, for example, is one who regards enjoyment and
pain in this way (Davis, 1981 and 1981b). I think that this treatment of
the hedonic states in question is mistaken. What I want to suggest is that
pain and enjoyment (including enjoyment of bodily feelings) are
experiential emotions with an intentional structure which is basically
similar to that of non-experiential emotions like gladness and sorrow. If
this is correct, not only are all emotions hedonic states, but all hedonic
states are emotions.
The trouble with this suggestion is that enjoyment and especially
pain seem to be fundamentally unlike emotions such as gladness and
sorrow. Three apparent differences are especially striking. First of all,
unlike the content of most emotions, what one enjoys is not
propositionally specified, and pain seems to have no content at all. One
may enjoy listening to Mozart, but one never enjoys that something is the
case; and when one is in pain, it seems one is simply in pain. Also, in
the case of pain at least, there is felt location, while emotions are not
assigned location at all. Finally, pain and enjoyment do not exhibit the
range of rational properties that emotions typically do. They are not
assessable for appropriateness nor do they stand in the same rational
relations to beliefs and the motivation of behavior.
These points of difference between experiential and non-experiential
emotions can be explained or explained away. First, however, it is
important to stress the basic structural similarities between enjoyment and
pain, on the one hand, and emotions like gladness and sorrow, on the
other.
The parallel structures of these emotions can be represented
schematically as follows. As regards the experiential emotions of
enjoyment and pain, A has the experience of x, and A has the intrinsic
desire to have or not to have the experience of x, as the case may be.
The belief and desire which constitute a non-experiential emotion like
gladness have a common topic and are semantically interrelated. In
gladness, one believes that p and desires that p; and if the belief is true,
the desire is satisfied, and conversely. The experience and desire which
constitute an experiential emotion like enjoyment do not have a common
topic. In enjoyment, one has the experience of (experiencing) x and the
140 CHAPTER VllI

desire that one have the experience of (experiencing) x. Still, the topics
of the experience and desire overlap. The topic of the experience is the
topic of the experience one desires to have. The topical overlap ensures
that the experience and desire are semantically related. If one has the
veridical experience the desire is satisfied, although the desire may be
satisfied without the experience being veridical. Thus, though the
cognitive and conative constituents of experiential emotions like
enjoyment, unlike those of non-experiential emotions like gladness, do not
have common topic, they do make up a unified semantic structure. In
this central respect, experiential and non-experiential emotions are
basically similar, and it is a mistake to assimilate experiential emotions
to sensations which are supposed to lack intentional structure altogether.
There are three features which taken together distinguish experiential
from non-experiential emotions. First, the cognitive constituent is a
perceptual experience rather than a belief. Perceptual experiences are
belief-like in that, given the perceptual experience of x, one is disposed
to form x-related beliefs; that is, the perceptual experience has a
dispositional character relative to informational representation. No actual
beliefs need be formed, however; and the experience itself lacks content
which is propositional in form. To enjoy a concert or find an injection
painful, one must experience the event; to be glad or sorry that it is
raining, one need only believe that it is raining. Second, the conative
constituent is an intrinsic desire regarding the constitutive experience,
rather than a desire, intrinsic or extrinsic, regarding the state of affairs
represented by the cognitive constituent It is the experience of the
concert or the injection that one desires to have or not to have, and one
desires to have it or not to have it for its own sake. On the other hand,
it is the state of affairs represented by the belief that it is raining which
one desires to obtain or not to obtain, and one may desire this for any
reason. Third, what is enjoyed or painful is the constitutive experience,
rather than a state of affairs represented by a constitutive belief-desire set.
One enjoys or fmds painful the experience of listening to the concert or
of having the injection (or, elliptically, the concert or the injection).
What one is glad or sorry about is that it is raining.
I think that all of the peculiarities of enjoyment and pain which have
been noted can be explained in terms of their distinctive features, while
preserving the basic similarity with emotions like gladness and sorrow.
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 141

Consider first the fact that, unlike these emotions, enjoyment does not
have propositionally specified content. One may be glad that the
orchestra is playing Mozart, but it is the experience of listening to Mozart
being performed which one enjoys. There is a structural explanation for
this difference. In the case of gladness, the constituent belief and desire
have a common topic in view of their propositionally specified
representational contents; one desires that the orchestra play Mozart, and
one believes that the orchestra is playing Mozart. In the case of
enjoyment, however, the constituent perceptual experience and desire do
not have a common topic on account of their propositionally specified
contents. One has the experience of listening to Mozart being performed
and the desire that one have the experience of listening to Mozart being
performed. It is because of this structural feature that enjoyment, unlike
such non-experiential emotions as gladness, does not have content which
is propositionally specified.
The case of pain is more difficult. Enjoyment differs from most
non-experiential emotions in having non-propositionally specified content,
but is like them in being a representational state without felt location.
Pain, on the other hand, appears to be a localized non-representational
bodily sensation. I think that this appearance is deceptive and that pain
and enjoyment have parallel intentional structures. What one enjoys or
finds painful is always the experience of something. In each case, the
experience is perceptual, but the modes of perception are typically
different. The characteristic mode of experience in pain is somatic
perception, and what is experienced is a condition of one's body. In
enjoyment, the perception may be of any mode--feeling, hearing, seeing,
and so on--and what is experienced may be correspondingly diverse.
Relative to other modes of perception, and especially to sight, somatic
perception is very imprecise in its informational content. Often somatic
perception only indicates that something is going on in one's body, but
visual experience often provides a very good idea of what is going on in
the environment.
It is the difference in the precision of the informational content of
pain and enjoyment which leads us to think of the former, unlike the
latter, as a non-representational sensation with felt location. Because of
the informational poverty of bodily experience, what is experienced is
typically not independently identifiable. The best we can do is to say that
142 CHAPTER VIII

it is the experience which is painful, but then it seems that the experience
is the pain. Thus we are left without representational content. Also,
although the experience of pain typically provides only imprecise
information about what the painful condition of the body is, in general it
does indicate where the condition is. For this reason, when the pain and
the painful condition are confiated, the experience comes to be assigned
the bodily location of the condition which is experienced.
The relatively richer informational content of non-somatic experience
typically enables us to specify what we enjoy. There is correspondingly
little temptation to conflate the enjoyable experience with what it is the
experience of or to assign to it the location of what is enjoyed.
On occasion the modes of experience which pain and enjoyment
typically have may be reversed; non-somatic experience may be painful,
and somatic experience may be enjoyed. The change in the informational
content in these cases tends to influence the way in which the pain and
enjoyment are viewed. When we find a bad performance of a concerto
painful, the richer content of the experience leads us to regard the
experience as representational and without location. On the other hand,
if we enjoy sensations produced by a vibrator, the impoverished character
of the experience makes it natural to take it to be localized and non-
representational.
Regardless of the informational content of pain and enjoyment,
however, it is possible to distinguish between the experience and what it
is the experience of. It is just that in the case of somatic experience what
is painful or enjoyed may be specifiable only as some condition of the
body.7 To suppose otherwise is to commit an error like that of
phenomenalism with respect to perception of the external world. Thus we
find reason to agree with an observation which Brentano makes in his
defense of the intentionality of pain and enjoyment:

If we hear a pleasant, mild sound or a shrill one, a harmonious chord or a discord, [he
writes], it will occur to no one to identify the sound with the accompanying feeling of
pleasure or pain. But, likewise, when a cut, a bum, or a tickle arouses a feeling of pain
or pleasure in us, we must maintain in a similar manner the distinction between a physical
phenomenon, which enters in like the object of outer perception, and a mental
phenomenon of feeling, which accompanies its appearance, even though the superficial
observer is rather inclined to confusion here. (Brentano, 1874/1960, pp. 44-5)
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 143

Once we distinguish the representation from what is represented in

painful or enjoyable experience, it is clear that the representation cannot
be ascribed the location of what is represented, even in the case of
somatic experience. To do so is like supposing that a street map of
London must be in the streets of London. The painful or enjoyable
experience is not in the innards; it represents a condition as being in the
innards. (No doubt the event realizing the experience takes place in the
brain, but that is not part of our conception of the experience.)
Besides confusions about the location and representational character
of pain and enjoyment, it is a mistake to take either hedonic state to be
a perceptual experience in whatever mode. The argument I shall present
is concerned with pain, where the mistake is most tempting, but a similar
argument can be given for enjoyment.
First, note that painful experiences, considered as such, do not
constitute a natural kind. It is not the case that painful experiences can
be identified by the conditions which are experienced or by the
phenomenal qualities of the experiences; in themselves these have nothing
interesting in common. All sorts of conditions, from bums to bloating
may be experienced as painful. They cannot even be characterized
generally as conditions of damage or disorder; in many cases no such
conditions are to be found (see Melzack and Wall, 1983). If the presence
of painful experience is itself taken to mean that there is damage or
disorder, the condition no longer serves to individuate the experience.
Also, the range of phenomenal qualities in painful experiences is
remarkably diverse; consider the experiences of having a sore throat, an
electric shock, or a distended bladder. What painful experiences have in
common is simply that they inspire an intrinsic aversion to having them.
Without the aversion, there is no painful experience. Of course, it may
be that the phenomenal qualities of painful experiences inspire the
aversion, but that does not mean that experiences having these qualities
fornl an independently identifiable class.
Aversion is not only necessary for pain but, together with perceptual
experience, constitutive of it. A perceptual experience is illusory if there
is representational failure, if things are not as they are represented as
being. Pains are not subject to representational failure. In the phantom
limb pain of an amputee, the experience of a condition in the amputated
limb is illusory; the pain is not. Pains are not mere perceptual
144 CHAPTER VIII

experiences. They are constituted by intrinsic aversions as well. As is

the case with emotions generally, it is the fact that they are semantically
interrelated cognitive-conative structures which precludes the cognitive
semantic assessment which is appropriate to perceptual experience as such
(see Ch. VI, Sect. 4).
Although enjoyment and pain share the basic representational
character of emotions like gladness and sorrow, they lack the rational
properties of being rationally related to beliefs or assessable for
reasonableness which non-experiential emotions typically have. This is
because the perceptual experiences and intrinsic desires which constitute
enjoyment and pain, unlike the beliefs and desires which generally
constitute non-experiential emotions, also lack these rational properties.
One does not have a reason for having an experience of a condition of
one's body or in the environment; and the experience inspires desire or
aversion for its own sake, not for any extraneous reason. Enjoyment and
pain also differ from non-experiential emotions in their relation to the
rational motivation of behavior. If A is sorry that p, A may be motivated
to bring it about that not-po If A fmds the experience of x painful, A may
be motivated to bring it about that he does not have the experience of x.
Only indirectly, if at all, will A be motivated to bring it about that x does
not occur. Thus, with non-experiential emotions like sorrow, motivation
is directly content-centered; with experiential emotions like pain,
motivation is only indirectly content-centered.

7. OBJECfIONS CONSIDERED

The argument of the Belief-Desire Theory is that emotional structures of

beliefs and desires are hedonic states and as such are felt and are feelings.
In different ways it may be objected that the Belief-Desire Theory leaves
something out and fails to capture emotional affectivity. One way in
which to work out this line of objection is to argue that either belief or
desire is not a hedonic feeling state. We find a classic formulation of this
argument with respect to beliefs or perceptions in the following well-
known passage from William James:

Without the [felt) bodily states following on the perceptions, the latter would be purely
cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 145

bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could
not actually feel afraid or angry. (James, 1884/1984, pp. 128-29)

Of course, James is right to insist that emotions are not "purely cognitive
in fonn"; but it is not the case that what it takes to feel angry or afraid,
in addition to the appropriate cognition, is resultant bodily sensation. The
sensation might result from the cognition without there being any fear or
anger at all. What is required, in addition to the cognition, is an
appropriate desire. If, when one perceives the bear one has the desire not
to be mauled, or when one receives the insult one has the desire not to
be so abused, then one does feel afraid or angry; but, of course, not
otherwise.
Like James, Michael Stocker contends that the affectivity of
emotions cannot be understood in tenns of perceptions or beliefs, but he
also argues that it cannot be understood in tenns of desires. According
to Stocker, "cognitive accounts of the hedonic either omit the relevant
feeling or are circular." If the relevant feeling is not omitted, the desire
must be feeling-laden; and, Stocker claims, "pleasure or enjoyment is the
feeling with which desire must be laden, if satisfying such desire is to be
sufficient for pleasure or enjoyment" (Stocker, 1983, p. 18). Whether
'feeling-laden' or not, the satisfaction of a desire is not sufficient for
pleasure or enjoyment. In addition to the desire, one must believe that
one has, or have the experience of having, what one wants. Thus, as an
objection to the Belief-Desire Theory of emotions, Stocker's argument
fails for the same reason as James'. The claim made by the theory is that
as hedonic states emotions are constituted by a structure of belief and
desire. That neither belief nor desire alone is a hedonic state is beside the
point.
It cannot simply be argued that if neither beliefs nor desires are
hedonic states, structures of beliefs and desires are not hedonic states.
That is a blatant commission of the fallacy of composition. Still, it may
be objected that the Belief-Desire Theory fails to account for the
affectivity of emotions either because emotional belief-desire structures
are not hedonic states or because hedonic states need not have affectivity.
One objection of this kind is that even when one believes one has,
or has the experience of having, what one desires, this does not amount
to pleasure or enjoyment because it need not make one happy. Thus it
146 CHAPTER VIII

is argued that an alcoholic may want to have a drink and have the
experience of having a drink without enjoying drinking or being pleased
that he has a drink. This, however, is not quite right. The alcoholic's
drinking may frustrate other desires. So, on the whole the subjective
satisfaction of the alcoholic's desire to drink may make him unhappy.
Still, this does not mean that he does not enjoy drinking or is not pleased
that he has a drink; he is pleased about or does enjoy having a drink. It
is a mistake to think that if one enjoys or is pleased about something, it
must make him happy. As a rule, the overall hedonic character of life
seems to be mixed.
In the same vein, a second objection is that structures of beliefs and
desires cannot be hedonic states since they lack sensation-like
phenomenal properties which are essential to them. It is plausible to
suppose that in the case of the experiential emotions of enjoyment and
pain, the experience must have phenomenal properties to account for the
intrinsic desire or aversion to the experience. Non-experiential emotions,
however, do not necessarily involve any experience with phenomenal
properties. Grief, for example, may involve only the realization that one
has sustained a loss and an aversion to sustaining the loss.
The idea that emotions as hedonic states must in every case involve
phenomenal properties is due to the assumption that to be hedonic states
emotions must be states which are themselves enjoyed or painful. Even
for experiential emotions, however, this assumption is false. Enjoyment
need not be enjoyed; nor need we enjoy being glad or hopeful. In the
case of the experiential emotion of enjoyment, what is enjoyed is, not
enjoyment, but a perceptual experience; in the case of the non-experiential
emotions of gladness and hope, we are pleased that something is the case.
It is clearly a mistake to suppose that in general emotions as hedonic
states must involve phenomenal properties.
Finally, there is the objection that, while emotional structures of
beliefs and desires are hedonic states, they need not be felt and do not
amount to feelings. Davis argues on this basis that the Belief-Desire
Theory fails to account for emotional affectivity. He presents the case as
follows:

One may believe and desire that p for years, and may even do so while asleep or totally
unconscious; consequently, one may be happy that p for years, even during periods of
 EMOTIONAL AFFECTIVITY 147

sleep or unconsciousness. But we do not have feelings for years; furthermore, it is absurd
to maintain that we might have feelings while unconscious. (Davis, 1985, personal
correspondence)

Davis' claim that affective states must be conscious and occurrent is

plausible for sensations and experiential emotions, which involve
perceptual experience. His position, however, is that affective states in
general are modes of consciousness or experience. This is certainly open
to doubt. Whether a feeling is a conscious state--and so a state one can't
be in when asleep or unconscious--depends on what kind of feeling is in
question. I may feel that the fish will bite or have the feeling that the
fish will bite even when unconscious or asleep. This is an epistemic
feeling; it amounts to believing, perhaps tentatively, that the fish will bite.
I may also feel good about my promotion or have a good feeling about
my promotion when asleep or unconscious. This is a hedonic feeling; it
amounts to being glad that I have been promoted. Hedonic feelings are
essentially conscious states only in the case of experiential emotions; in
the case of non-experiential emotions, they may but need not be
conscious states.

7. CONCLUSION

Explaining how emotions can be both affective and intentional states is

a crucial problem for theories of emotions. Neither feature of emotions
can be dismissed with any plausibility, yet there appears to be a
fundamental tension between them. Attempts at explanation typically
take the intentionality of emotions to be contributed by beliefs and their
affective properties to be due to constitutive sensations or related
perceptions. These accounts of emotional affectivity are unsatisfactory.
A solution to the problem of the affectivity of emotions requires that
emotions be viewed as hedonic states constituted by beliefs and desires.
In this way emotions are seen to be both affective and intentional states,
and the tension between these basic features of emotions is resolved.
This account of the affectivity of emotions also admits of extension to the
experiential emotions of enjoyment and pain, and can be defended
plausibly against objections which may be raised.
148 CHAPTER VITI

NOTES

Though widely accepted, the view that there is a basic difference between bodily
sensations and intentional states is open to challenge. No general challenge will be
mounted here, but it will be argued that pain, which is commonly regarded as
paradigmatically a sensation, is in fact an intentionally structured experiential emotion
(see Sect.5).
2 There is no explicit recognition of these alternatives in the works by Alston,
Kamler, and Gean. My concern, however, is not with the details of their views but with
the theoretical possibilities for a perceptual account of emotional affectivity.
3 That the hedonic character of emotions means that they are affective states is a
contention disputed by Davis. The kind of objection which he raises is considered in
Section 7.
It might be thought that where one is simply happy or unhappy, unlike the case in
which one is happy or unhappy about something, hedonic states are not intentional. This
is not correct. To be happy is to be happier about things than one is unhappy; to be
unhappy is to be unhappier about things than one is happy. The content of summary
happiness or unhappiness is not specified because one is happy or unhappy about all sorts
of things.
S Davis defends this thesis as regards some emotions (Davis, 1981a); the Belief-Desire
Theory enables us to generalize upon it.
6 This is a point on which Davis rightly insists (Davis, 1981a).
D.M. Armstrong makes basically this suggestion regarding pain, which he regards
as a bodily perception (Armstrong, 1962, p. 116f.).
DIMENSIONS OF EMOTIONS
 CHAPTER IX

ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY

1. INTRODUCfION

Actions and emotions have long been supposed to fall on either side of
the distinction between what we do and what happens to us. 1 The
motivation for drawing the active/passive distinction and applying it in
this way is two-fold. We have the sense that what we do is typically in
our control, as what we feel is not. This is reflected in the
appropriateness of commanding a person to perform an action, the
inappropriateness of commanding a person to have an emotion. Also, the
distinction appears to explain why we are generally taken to be
responsible for the actions we perform, as we are not for the emotions we
have, and why we are assessed accordingly.
The distinction between activity and passivity has been expressed
most often in terms of the effects of volitions and the will. Actions are
subject to the will and are the effects of volitions, not so emotions.
Notwithstanding the weight of a tradition extending from the Stoics and
Augustine to Descartes and onward, the very mention of volitions and the
will became anathema to a generation of philosophers, largely owing to
Gilbert Ryle's polemic in The Concept of Mind.
Ryle inveighs against "the Myth of Volitions" as an "extension of the
myth of the ghost in the machine" (Ryle, 1949, p. 63). Understood in
this way volitions tum out to be spiritual causes of bodily events, and all
the problems with Cartesian interactionism present themselves. Ryle also
takes volitions to be mental acts of will. Accordingly, he asks whether
acts of will are themselves supposed to be voluntary or subject to the
will, and in doing so reveals a dilemma. If acts of will are not subject to
the will, they can hardly account for voluntary action; if acts of will are
subject to the will, an infinite regress of such acts is started (Ryle, 1949,
p. 66). These objections to the theory of volitions can be set aside. The
theory need carry no commitment to dualism; it is quite possible to hold
that volitions are realized in the brain. And in the second objection, Ryle

151
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has simply given us reason to deny that volitions are acts, not to deny
that there are volitions.
What remains of Ryle's case against the theory of volitions amounts
to this. Volitions are not empirically identifiable nor can they
legitimately be introduced as theoretical entities. It is Ryle's contention
that we are unable to answer questions about volitions which should be
answerable easily if they were items of our experience. "If we do not
know how to settle simple questions about their frequency, duration or
strength," he remarks, "then it is fair to conclude that [the existence of
volitions] is not asserted on empirical grounds" (Ryle, 1949, p. 65). Ryle
also holds that the theoretical introduction of volitions is blocked by
explanatory failure. He writes:
though volitions were called in to explain our appraisals of actions, this explanation is just
what they fail to provide. If we had no other antecedent ground for applying appraisal-
concepts to the actions of others, we should have no reasons at all for inferring from those
actions to the volitions alleged to give rise to them. (Ryle, 1949, p. 66)

From these considerations, Ryle's conclusion is that we have no reason

to suppose that our actions are the effects of volitions. Unlike the other
objections, this is an argument which must be taken seriously if the
active/passive distinction is to be made in tenns of volitions. Thus, it is
fair to say that this is Ryle's central objection to the volitional theory.
As an alternative to a volitional account, we might attempt to make
out the distinction between what we do and what happens to us in tenns
of the circumstances of the occurrence. Such an approach is favored by
Ryle and others influenced by him, but the idea goes back at least to
Book III of the Nichomachaen Ethics. The circumstance most clearly
detenninant of the distinction, on this view, is the imposition of external
force. In going out to sea, the captain is passive if swept by a stonn; in
the absence of any such circumstance, he is presumably active. The
bearing of other circumstances, such as coercion or the absence of
infonnation, on the distinction between activity and passivity is, of
course, less clear cut. They are usually arrayed more or less closely
around compulsion.
It is hardly deniable that circumstantial considerations are relevant
to the active/passive distinction, but it is clear that this approach fails to
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 153

yield an adequate account of the distinction. For one thing, pointing out
that compulsion and related factors render one passive does not explain
why this is so or how one is active when such influences are absent.
Even more important for our purposes is the fact that an account of the
distinction between activity and passivity which is focused on the
imposition of external force has no application to emotions. As Irving
Thalberg puts it, "When I am said to be transported by joy or buffeted by
despair, nothing analogous to a flood or a gale will be found" (Thalberg,
1984).
The active/passive distinction presents us with a problem. On the
one hand, we have a distinction which is well-motivated and supported
by an important philosophical tradition; on the other hand, we find that
there are difficulties about how the distinction is to be made. The
problem is pressing because the distinction seems to have an important
bearing on our understanding of the nature of actions and emotions. The
solution which I find most plausible is one which turns on the relation of
actions and emotions to desires.

2. DESIRE DEPENDENCE

My idea is that actions are dependent on desires as emotions are not and
that in general the active/passive distinction is to be understood in this
way? If volitions are identified with the desires in question, it is in fact
one interpretation of the traditional way of making the distinction in terms
of volitions and their effects. Still, I think that it has some advantages
over other possible interpretations.
To begin, consider the case of intentional actions. Intentional actions
are actions the agent intends to perform, at least at the time of
performance. The state of affairs which consists in the agent's
performing the action is represented by him as one which is to obtain.
Thus, on a broad conception of desire, intentions are desires of a kind,
and intentional actions are actions the agent desires to perform. Actions
depend causally and rationally on the agent's desires that he perform
them and are identified by reference to those desires.
When I take a walk, I take a walk at the time I do because I desire
to take a walk at that time, and if I did not have the desire I would not
154 CHAPTER IX

take a walk. In this way, actions are causally dependent on the agent's
desire to perform them.
Actions are also rationally dependent on desires. Rationality requires
representation. The representation of states of affairs as ones which
obtain or are to obtain sets the conditions of success for cognition and
conation, and rationality is a function of the likelihood of success. In
general, however, actions are not representational. The action of kicking
a field goal does not represent the kicking of a field goal; it is the
intention to kick the goal which represents the action as one which is to
be performed. The rationality of actions is determined by the intentions
with which they are performed, and intentions are generically desires.
Thus the rationality of going for a field goal depends on that of the desire
to go for a field goal. If the desire is rational, so is the action.
The desire dependence of actions is reflected in the fact that they are
identified by reference to the intentions with which they are performed.
In the normal case, at least, my action in bringing the axe down upon the
log is one of chopping wood only if in so doing it is my intention that I
chop wood. Apart from that intention there is only intentionally
indeterminate bodily movement.
I will argue that emotions are not causally or rationally dependent on
desires that one have them, as actions are dependent on desires that one
perform then, and are not identified by reference to such desires. It will
be useful, however, to consider first the cases of beliefs and desires,
which are also not dependent on desires in the relevant ways.
Beliefs and desires are different from actions in that they are not
causally dependent for their occurrence on desires that we have them. To
have the belief that p or the desire that p when I do, I need not in general
have the desire that I have those beliefs and desires at that time. In fact,
such a desire is typically ineffective in bringing about the belief or desire.
Also, while actions are rationally dependent on desires to perform them,
beliefs and desires could hardly depend for their rationality on desires that
we have them. If someone believes that p because he desires that he
believe that p, we have a case of self-deceptive irrationality. Desiring
that p because one desires to desire that p is hardly less irrational. (Of
this, more later.)
Unlike desire-dependent actions, beliefs and desires are intrinsically
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 155

representational and are identified by reference to their content as the

belief that p or the desire that p. They could hardly be identified by
reference to the desire to have them. My belief or desire that p must
have content independent of any desire that I have them for that desire
itself to have its content, that I believe that p or that I desire that p.
That emotions are not causally or rationally dependent on desires as
actions are can be explained in the light of what has been said about
beliefs and desires since semantic structures of beliefs and desires are
constitutive of them. Emotions are not causally dependent on desires just
as beliefs and desires are not. Certainly one doesn't have to desire to be
sad to be sad. Indeed, emotions are notably resistant to desires that we
have them. Were it otherwise we could be happy all the time. Also, like
beliefs and desires, emotions are not rationally dependent on desires that
we have them. The rationality of emotions depends on that of the beliefs
and desires which constitute them. If it is rational to believe that p and
to desire that not-p, it is rational to be sorry that p. Since the rationality
of the constituent beliefs and desires does not depend on desires that we
have them, neither does the rationality of emotions depend on desires that
we have them.
Like beliefs and desires, emotions are intrinsically intentional and are
identified by reference to the content of the beliefs and desires which
constitute them. Thus, A is glad that p in that A desires that p, and A
believes that p. Though the content of the emotion depends on the
constituent desire in this way, it does not depend on a desire that one
have the emotion. For a desire to be the desire to be glad that p, the
gladness must have its content independent of that desire.
In the cases of actions, beliefs, desires, and emotions, considerations
of desire dependence enable us to draw the line between activity and
passivity where intuitively it seems it should be drawn. There is,
however, a more basic motivation for making the active/passive
distinction in this way. To see this, the causal dimensions of mental
representation must be reviewed.
The success of our perceptual beliefs depends on our being affected
by what we perceive and thus precludes direct dependence on desire. The
success of our performative desires depends on our effecting what we
intend and so requires desire dependence. The success of other cognitive
156 CHAPTER IX

and conative states is not conditioned directly by causal input or output,

but their causal role in reasoning and motivation is similarly directed at
truth or satisfaction and subject to rationally dictated causal constraints.
In this way input- or output-oriented direction of fit is a general
characteristic of beliefs and desires. Thus desire dependence ties in with
our being active, non-dependence on desire with our being acted upon.
These notions, of course, are at the heart of the active/passive distinction.
The input-oriented constraints on the success of beliefs extend to
desires and emotions. The rationality of desires is a function of that of
beliefs concerning the feasibility and desirability of their satisfaction. In
this way desires are also constrained by the state of the environment.
Emotions, too, are subject to similar constraints, since they are constituted
of beliefs and desires.
What we find in considering the causal dimensions of mental
representation is that the functional rationality of our beliefs, desires, and
emotions is constrained by the way the world is. It is for this reason that
these representations are not desire dependent. Dependence on desire
would not ensure that they have the required relation to the environment.
It is in action, which is desire dependent, that representation is output-
oriented.
This result is reinforced by the fact that where there are no cognitive
constraints on mental representation, there may be desire dependence.
Imaginative representations represent states of affairs without any
commitment to truth. There is thus no rational requirement of evidential
backing. On this account, they may, but need not be, desire dependent.
Imagining and supposing are things we often do at will.
The desire dependence of actions ties in with our being causally
effective on the environment, the lack of desire dependence of beliefs,
desires, and emotions with our being causally affected by the
environment. This is what underlies the active/passive distinction
interpreted in tenns of desire dependence.
There are certain respects in which this account of the distinction
requires more development. This will come in further discussion.
Meanwhile, it is already evident that this view of activity and passivity
has advantages over alternative accounts. For one thing, it affords a
plausible explanation of the control and responsibility we have regarding
our actions, as opposed to our passive states. Actions are causally and
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 157

rationally dependent on desires. Beliefs, desires, and emotions on the

other hand, are not desire dependent. In this way, it is typically up to us
to detennine what actions we will perfonn but not what beliefs, desires,
and emotions we will have.
In the second place, we can readily answer Ryle's central objection
to the volitional theory if it is interpreted in tenns of desire dependence.
According to that objection, volitions are not items of our experience nor
can they be introduced legitimately for explanatory purposes. Casting
desires in the role of volitions, the answer is that volitions are items of
our experience. We may be conscious of our desires in that they occupy
our attention and we believe that we have them. Questions about their
frequency, duration, and strength may be easily answerable. Also,
volitions have a legitimate explanatory role. Rather than presupposing
control and responsibility in our actions, our desires help to explain these
features of actions.
Finally, the desire dependence interpretation accounts for the
relevance of external force to our activity or passivity. Compulsion
blocks the effectiveness of our volitions and affects us in ways we do not
desire. The account also has a clear application to emotions. As
structures of beliefs and desires, emotions are taken to be paradigms of
non-desire-dependent states in which we are passive.
Though the volitional theory understood in tenns of desire
dependence has advantages as an account of the active/passive distinction,
it is also evident that it encounters certain difficulties. In the first
instance, I shall concentrate particularly on two of these. The first
concerns slavery to desires. There are cases, notably cases involving
addictions, in which desires can be irresistible. Though the addict's drug
use reflects his desire, it is natural to think that he is not free or active in
what he does. If this is so, desire dependence seems not to insure
activity. The second difficulty concerns deciding to believe. On the
Cartesian view, believing is desire dependent, something we do and in
which we are active. A related problem concerns our activity in having
emotions. According to Sartre and others, we make ourselves have the
emotions we do, so that they are presumably desire dependent. If these
positions are sound, ordinary actions are not alone in being desire
dependent.
Central to the position that we are active in having beliefs and
158 CHAPTER IX

emotions, as I interpret it, is the claim that they are dependent on desires
that we have them. Perhaps the most prominent solution to the problem
about slavery to desires also turns on desires about desires. Thus, these
second-order intentional states require attention.

3. ITERATED BELIEFS AND DESIRES

The appeal to second-order beliefs and desires in dealing with problems

about activity and passivity may seem to be unproblematic in principle.
Daniel Dennett asserts without argument that "the iteration of beliefs and
other intentions is never redundant..." (Dennett, 1978, p. 273). Second-
or higher-order beliefs and desires may not be redundant relative to the
first- or lower-order beliefs and desires they are about. Dennett is right
about that. My belief that I believe that p, for example, is obviously not
equivalent to my belief that p; it stands to the first-order belief as an
introspective representation of it. There are other ways in which
redundancies may arise in the iteration of beliefs and desires, however,
and consideration of them is crucial for the active/passive distinction.
The iterated beliefs and desires which concern us are second-order
beliefs and desires, beliefs about beliefs or desires and desires about
beliefs or desires. We need to make a distinction between two types of
these second-order beliefs and desires. 3 First, there are success-oriented
second-order beliefs and desires, or S-beliefs and S-desires, for short.
These are beliefs that the related first-order beliefs and desires are
successful or desires that they be successful. In the following cases we
have S-beliefs and S-desires:

A believes that he has the true belief that p.

A believes that he has the satisfied desire that p.

A desires that he have the true belief that p.

A desires that he have the satisfied desire that p.

 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 159

In the second place, there are non-success-oriented beliefs and desires, to

be dubbed N-beliefs and N-desires. These beliefs and desires are
indifferent to the success of the related first-order beliefs and desires.
Cases of N-beliefs and N-desires may be obtained by deleting reference
to the success of the first-order representation in the cases of S-beliefs
and S-desires just given.
With respect to the first-order belief or desire that p, an N-belief or
desire focuses on the attitude, on having the belief or desire, rather than
on the content, on what is believed or desired. For instance, I may
believe that I have the desire that p, leave alone whether what I desire
obtains. On the other hand, an S-belief or desire regarding the first-order
belief or desire that p focuses, not only on the attitude, but on the
content as well. I may desire, for example, that I have the belief that p
but also that what I desire to believe be the case. The distinction between
S-beliefs and desires and N-beliefs and desires is easily overlooked
because of the attitude/content ambiguity of "belief' and "desire," which
may be used to refer either to the mental representation or to what is
represented. Still, the distinction is one which must be made in order to
discern the scope for redundancies in the iteration of beliefs and desires.
Beliefs and desires are individuated by their contents and success
conditions, as the belief that p, the desire that q, and so on. A redundant
belief or desire is one which has the same content and success conditions
as the beliefs or desires relative to which it is redundant. Type-wise, they
are the same representation. Redundant representations do no work in the
rational economy of mind. Having the same content and conditions of
success as the representations relative to which they are redundant, they
can have no independent part in cognitive and conative operations which
are success-functional.
N-beliefs and N-desires are not redundant. In each case, the first-and
second-order representations have different success conditions and
contents. The success of the first-order belief or desire that p requires
that it be the case that p. The success of the second-order belief or
desire, which is indifferent to the success of the related first-order
representation that p, does not require that it be the case that p; it requires
only that the first-order attitude be instantiated.
The N-belief that I have a first-order belief or desire is the fonn
160 CHAPTER IX

which intentional self-consciousness takes. The standing ofN-desires that

one have first-order beliefs or desires is more dubious. To desire that one
have a belief regardless of its truth or to desire that one have a desire
regardless of its satisfaction is an indirect form of irrationality. This is
due to the fact that the belief or desire one N-desires that one have would
be irrational, there being, so far as one is concerned, no likelihood of its
success. Still, since its conditions of success are different from those of
the desired first-order representation, the N-desire need not be directly
irrational.
As with N-beliefs and desires, the content and success conditions of
S-beliefs are different from those of the first-order beliefs and desires to
which they are related. The specification of the content of the S-belief
or desire makes reference to the related first-order representation and to
its success. Neither is referred to in the specification of the content of the
first-order representation itself. This gives rise to the impression that, like
N-beliefs and desires, S-beliefs and desires are not redundant. The
impression is deceptive. Further consideration must be given to what
must be the case for S-beliefs and desires to be successful.
S-beliefs and desires have a content which is compound. If A
believes that he has the true belief that p, A believes that he has the belief
that p and that what he believes--namely, that p--is true. If A desires that
he have the true belief that p, A desires that he believe that p and that
what he desires to believe be true. This means that, in each case, the
content of the S-belief or desire is equivalent to that of the N-belief or
desire that A have the belief that p and the first-order belief or desire that
p. The content-individuated S-belief or desire effectively reduces to the
related N-belief or desire and first-order representation. For this reason,
there are in general no non-redundant S-beliefs and desires. S-beliefs are
redundant relative to N-beliefs and first-order beliefs; S-desires are
redundant relative to N-desires and first-order desires. 4 The critical
importance of this redundancy for considerations of activity and passivity
turns out to be substantial. 5
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 161

5. SLAVERY TO DESIRES

In cases of hard core drug addiction, someone is hooked on a drug. His

desire for the drug is irresistible. He has lost control in his drug use and,
no doubt, in much else that he does. Here, it seems, we have desire
dependence with a vengeance, but without the control which marks
activity in general. The problem is how these cases are to be described.
My critical concern is with two approaches to this problem. Both
are couched in terms of the freedom of the agent with respect to an
irresistible desire. Freedom of agency is such an overburdened notion
that I prefer to give it rest. In considering the positions which concern
me, I shall continue to speak of the agent's control over what he does.
The first approach to describing cases involving an irresistible desire
has been particularly influential and is due to Harry Frankfurt.
Frankfurt's contention is that whether an agent has control over what he
does depends on "volitions of the second order." A second-order volition,
for Frankfurt, is a desire that a first-order performative desire be effective,
that it be a desire which issues in action. On this view, the addict's loss
of control is due to the fact that his desire to use the drug is not endorsed
by the second-order desire that it be effective but is contrary to his
second-order volition that it not be so (Frankfurt, 1971).
Despite its initial appeal, this approach runs into a standard
objection. The problem is that dependence on higher-level desires is an
infinitely repeatable relation. If control over first-order desires is a
function of the second-order desire dependence, control over second-order
desires should be a function of third-order desire dependence, and so on
and on (see Watson, 1975).
I think that both the second-order desire dependence thesis and the
standard objection fail for the same reason. The second-or higher-order
desires in question are S-desires, desires that first- or lower-order desires
be satisfied. S-desires, however, are redundant relative to first- or lower-
order desires. Frankfurt's free agent has the desire that p and the S-desire
that he have the desire that p. The S-desire effectively reduces to the N-
desire to have the desire that p and the desire that p. Frankfurt's
conflicted addict has the desire to take drugs and the S-desire that he
have the desire not to take drugs. The S-desire effectively reduces to the
N-desire that he have the desire not to take drugs and the desire not to
162 CHAPTER IX

take drugs. In neither case can the success-indifferent N-desire do the

work Frankfurt expects of the S-desire in the endorsement of the related
first-order desire. Effectively we have to do with first-order desires.
Appealing to higher-order desires is similarly futile.
The second approach to the problem of describing cases involving
irresistible desires appeals not to higher-order desires but to the agent's
evaluative beliefs. Such an approach is taken by Gary Watson. For
Watson, an agent is in control when his performative desires and actions
are those which, all things considered, he thinks it best that he have or
perform. The conflicted addict's problem, on this view, is that he thinks
it best that he not use the drug but using the drug is just what he most
wants to do and does (Watson, 1975).
If an agent's performative desires and actions are contrary to his
considered beliefs about what is desirable, they are, on his own view,
irrational. On the other hand, an agent will regard as rational, so far
forth, those of his desires and actions which accord with his evaluative
beliefs. Thus, on the view under consideration, agent control is a
function of subjective rationality. That one is not in control of what one
does when what he does is not what he thinks it best to do is an
intuitively implausible idea. It has an implication that is even harder to
accept Typically one is not responsible for what is not subject to one's
voluntary control. On the evaluative conception of voluntary control, this
would mean that one is not responsible for actions one does not take to
be those it is most desirable to perform. This, I think, is absurd.
While not acceptable as it stands, the attempt to account for
voluntary control in terms of the agent's beliefs about what is desirable
seems to be on the right track. Having stressed the importance of
dependence on desires for making the active/passive distinction, I must
now stress the responsiveness of desires to reasons. The point to be made
is not that a person has voluntary control over what he does to the extent
that his performative desires answer to his beliefs about what is desirable.
A person may have voluntary control in impulsive, akratic, or perverse
actions in which he acts without considering what is desirable, or acts in
some way contrary to what he considers desirable. In these cases, at least
counter-factually, the agent's desires may be responsive to reason. The
notion of an irresistible desire that we want is that of a performative
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 163

desire which would not respond, whatever internal or external criticism

or persuasion is brought to bear, to considerations of desirability.6 A
desire of this type is such that in having it and acting on it, the agent
lacks voluntary control. When an agent lacks control owing to an
irresistible desire is an empirical question. No doubt it can happen in
cases of drug addiction. This, I think, is how to handle cases of slavery
of desires.

5. DECIDING TO BELIEVE

Arguments that beliefs and emotions are desire dependent represent a

challenge to the intuitive plausibility with which the desire dependence
thesis draws the line between activity and passivity. On the Cartesian
view, to believe that p is to assent to the truth of the proposition p, and
assent is subject to the will. In terms of our analysis, this means that
belief is desire dependent. 7 This view would seem to be rooted in an
analogy with verbal assent to a proposition. Verbal assent is certainly
subject to the will. How could mental assent be less so? From the
outset, this analogy should be regarded with suspicion. Verbal assent
hardly amounts to belief. Why should mental assent be different? Still,
much more remains to be said about the voluntarist conception of belief.
For the Cartesian, volition is the pivotal step in the transition from
evidence to assent or belief, as it is in the transition from practical
reasoning to ordinary action. We mayor may not have adequate grounds
for believing or acting; our beliefs and our actions may be rational or
irrational. In any case the mediation of the will is necessary. Neither our
beliefs nor our actions are directly input dependent or stimulus bound.
On the face of it, it cannot be denied that this is a position with a certain
appeal. Even so, there are problems.
An influential line of objection to the voluntarist conception of belief
has been developed by Bernard Williams (Williams, 1970/1973, pp. 149-
50). (Following Williams, similar arguments have been used by David
Wiggins, 1970 and Arthur Danto, 1973, Ch. 6.) Williams' argument
proceeds in two steps. He first argues that, in virtue of certain features
of belief, the idea that A could believe that he believed that p because he
desired to believe that p is incoherent. For Williams, the concept of
164 CHAPTER IX

belief is such that, if A believes that p, A must take his belief that p to be
true, and, in the case of empirical beliefs at least, this means that A must
take his belief that p to be caused by the state of affairs which it
represents. If A believed that he believed that p because he desired that
he believe that p, he could not take his belief that p to be caused by the
state of affairs which it represents and so could not take his belief that p
to be true. Since necessary features of belief would be absent in this
case, Williams draws his first conclusion. Williams next argues that if A
could believe that p because he desired to believe that p, he would
believe that he could do so. This would require that he believe, at least
on some occasions, that he believes that p because he desired to believe
that p. This, by the first step in the argument, is impossible. Thus,
Williams concludes in the second step that A cannot believe that p
because he desires to believe that p.
It is fairly clear that there are difficulties with Williams' argument.
It involves the claim that for every first-order empirical belief, one must
have two second-order beliefs, one regarding its truth, the other its
etiology. This is a very dubious thesis. Williams seems to have taken
representational and rational features of belief to be the contents of
related beliefs. Also, the argument incorporates the idea that to have a
voluntary capacity, one must believe that one has it. This, too, I find
very doubtful. Counter-examples are easy to find. These, however, are
not the objections I mean to press. There is a much more fundamental
point to be made.
Before getting to that point, we should consider the application of
Williams' argument to the Cartesian position. It turns out to be less
sweeping than might be expected. The argument does apply to the case
of irrational belief fonnation, where one wills or desires to believe or
assent to a proposition without having evidence connecting the belief with
the state of affairs it represents. In this case, the etiological belief
Williams requires is absent, and so will be a truth assessment based on
it. The case of rational belief fonnation is different. Here the desire to
believe the proposition is based on evidence of the proposition's truth.
There is room for the second-order beliefs which Williams' argument
requires. At most then, Williams' argument would seem to show that
irrational belief fonnation, as understood by the Cartesian, is impossible--
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 165

a result which might yield a curious comfort to rationalistic seekers after

certainty.
The point which I am most concerned to make in considering the
voluntariness of belief is one which simultaneously undercuts both the
Cartesian position and Williams' objection. The voluntarist's position is
that the rational individual wills or desires to believe or assent to what is
clearly true. The operative desire is the desire to have true beliefs. This,
of course, is a truth-oriented S-desire. Williams argues that it is not
possible that one should believe that p because of the desire, including the
S-desire, that one believe that p. On either hand, we are concerned with
S-desires. S-desires, however, are redundant. The second-order desire
that one have the true belief that p is redundant relative to the N-desire
that one have the belief that p and the first-order desire that p.
The redundance of S-desires has devastating implications for the
voluntarist's view. Since it is redundant relative to the first-order desire
that p, believing that p because of the S-desire to believe that p amounts
to believing that p because one desires that p. This, of course, is
normally a form of self-deception.8 This form of self-deception, then is
precisely what we have in cases of irrational Cartesian belief formation.
Here one believes that p because of the desire that p without adequate
evidence that p. Cases of rational Cartesian belief formation are also self-
deceptive and turn out to be doubly irrational. Here one believes that p
because one desires that p, and one desires that p because one believes
there to be evidence that p. This involves the irrationality of self-
deception in believing that p because one desires that p, but it also
involves the irrational perversity of desiring that p because one believes
there to be evidence that p. So, the redundance of S-desires to believe
that p means that on the Cartesian view all irrational belief formation is
self-deceptive, and rational belief formation is not only self-deceptive but
doubly irrational.
The implications of S-desire redundance are hardly less devastating
for Williams' objection. In arguing that one cannot believe that p
because of the S-desire to believe that p, Williams is in effect arguing
that self-deception which consists in believing that p because one desires
that p is not possible. Ordinarily, believing that p because one desires
that p is of course irrational. It involves believing that p without any
166 CHAPTER IX

reason to believe that p. Believing without reason, however, is not the

same as not believing. Self-deception of the kind Williams' argument
commits him to denying is, I think, common enough.
Truth-indifferent N-desires to have a belief are not redundant, and it
is worth considering whether a voluntarist might construct an account of
belief based on such desires. In this event, there is a problem about
rationality. If we believe that p only because of an N-desire to have the
belief, the belief will be irrational, since for us there will be no likelihood
of its truth. If beliefs were generally based on N-desires in this way,
beliefs would always be irrational. This, then, could hardly be a position
proponents of the Cartesian view would take.
There is another possibility. The N-desire to have the belief that p
may motivate us to inquire whether it is the case that p. Here we have
a more reputable case of believing that p because of the N-desire to
believe that p. Still, what should be noted is that in this case the
operative desire motivates not the belief but the inquiry. The belief itself
is formed subject to rational and causal constraints of evidence. Thus,
this is not a case of direct desire dependence. Actions, however, are
directly desire dependent. For this reason, once again the case for a
voluntarist view of belief fails. Beliefs are not dependent on either S-
desires or N-desires. Hume was right when he said that belief is
"something which depends not on the will."
The view that we are active in having emotions is akin to the
voluntarist conception of belief. It is prominent in Sartre's account of
emotions; he holds that we make ourselves have the emotions we do, so
that they are presumably desire dependent (Sartre, 1939/1962, pp. 44-45).
Sartre is followed in this view by Robert Solomon (Solomon, 1976).
I shall treat the voluntarist view of emotions with dispatch. For one
thing, it is set out by its proponents with very little attention to detail.
More importantly, what has been said about desire dependence and belief
enables us to see readily that a voluntarist view of emotions won't work,
regardless of the details. Practically all emotions theorists, myself
included, hold that having an emotion involves having a belief. Sartre
and Solomon hold that emotions are beliefs or ways of viewing the
world. Either way, it follows that if emotions are desire dependent,
beliefs must be so as well. But beliefs are not desire dependent. More
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 167

could be said about voluntarism and emotions, but for the present perhaps
this will suffice.

6. RESPONSIBILITY

I have suggested that interpreting the active/passive distinction in tenns

of desire dependence helps us to understand the control and responsibility
we typically have regarding our actions, as opposed to our passive states.
This suggestion can lead to difficulties, and I should say something, at
least briefly, to forestall them.
It might be objected to my suggestion that the active/passive
distinction does not coincide with that between what we are and are not
responsible for. There are actions for which we may not be accountable,
and we may be accountable for our beliefs, desires, and emotions. The
best way to meet the objection is to grant it; it is, after all, true. Desire
dependence does not provide a necessary or a sufficient condition for
responsibility. However, this does not mean that it is not useful in
answering questions about responsibility.
The importance of desire dependence in understanding some cases
in which a person may not be responsible for what he does has already
been noted. In cases involving compulsion and related impositions, the
effectiveness of our desires may be blocked. And the addict's desire on
which his drug use is dependent may not be responsive to considerations
of desirability.
Cases in which we may be accountable for our beliefs, desires, and
emotions, which are not directly desire dependent, remain to be
considered. Among these cases are ones in which we may be taken to
task for an absurd belief, a perverse desire, or a grossly inappropriate
emotion. Even here the indirect role of desire dependence is important
for understanding responsibility. What we are responsible for in the cases
I have in mind is the irrationality of a belief, desire, or emotion. This is
a matter of the lack of likelihood of cognitive or conative success and is
due the absence of supporting considerations. The irrationality for which
we may bear responsibility is, I am suggesting, indirectly responsibility
for inattention to available evidence or want of care in inference. And
these are operations which are desire dependent.
168 CHAPTER IX

7. CONQ..,USION

The active/passive distinction has a strong intuitive basis in our sense that
what we do is in our control, as what happens to us is not, and seems
important in its implications for our responsibility. Yet, well-known ways
of marking the distinction are fraught with difficulties. My contention is
that an interpretation of the distinction between activity and passivity in
terms of direct dependence on desires which are responsive to
considerations of desirability is more adequate.

NOTES

It should not be thought that the distinction between doings and happenings is quite
coextensive with that between activity and passivity. Only usually are we fully active in
our doings, as the case of tossing and turning in one's sleep suggests. Such discrepancies
should be explained in an account of the active/passive distinction.
2 Robert Gordon makes the superficially similar suggestion that emotions are not
responsive to evaluations of having them as actions are to evaluations of performing them
and that this helps explain the active/passive distinction (Gordon, 1986b and 1987, Ch.
6). Gordon, however, does not distinguish between desires and beliefs about desirability.
This is a distinction which must be made to understand the importance of desire
dependence. Neither emotions nor actions are directly dependent on beliefs about their
desirabili ty .
3 A similar distinction is drawn by Bernard Williams in the case of second-order
desires about beliefs (Williams, 1970/1973, pp. 149-50).
4 It should be observed that this conclusion applies only to indexical S-desires and
beliefs expressed in the first person. Non-indexical S-beliefs and desires expressed in the
third person are not redundant The former cases, however, are our concern in
considerations of an individual's activity or passivity. Even our actions are not directly
dependent on the desires of others but only on our own desires.
5 Irving Thalberg also argues that problems of free agency can be resolved without
recourse to higher-order desires but does so without the backing of an account of
redundance in iterated desires (Thalberg, 1987b). Robert Gordon does suggest that
redundance may be involved in appeals to iterated desires and recommends that we appeal
instead to desirability judgments (Gordon, 1986a). However, Gordon's failure to
distinguish between desires and desirability judgments undercuts the position he
advocates. Desirability judgments about desires and beliefs are not redundant.
6 I take substantially this suggestion to be made by Wright Neely (Neely, 1974). Like
many others, however, Neely does not separate desirability beliefs from desires, so that
 ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY 169

his position does not stand out as basically different from Frankfurt's. The separation of
desirability beliefs from desires is obviously something on which I mean to insist.
7 Though the distinction is obscured in the Haldane and Ross translation, Descartes
himself distinguishes between volitions and desires, so that this statement of the position
does not accurately represent his view. I think that my criticism of doxastic voluntarism
could be revised to apply to Descartes' own version, but historical criticism is not my
purpose.
8 There is a notable exception to the rule. One may believe, without self-deception
that one will do something because one has the performative desire or intention to do it.
In this case, however, the desire which one has is not the residue of a redundant S-desire
that one believe that one will do something; one simply believes that one will do it.
 CHAPTER X

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

1. INTRODUCfION

We have an intuitive idea that emotions can be distinguished as positive

or negative. Gladness and sadness, love and hate, pride and shame, hope
and fear, for example, seem to fall rather neatly on either side of this
distinction. In philosophy and psychology, however, various criteria are
used in drawing the distinction between positive and negative emotions.
It is suggested, for instance, that positive and negative emotions
respectively involve a favorable or unfavorable assessment of the situation
or else a propensity to approach or avoidance. It is obvious that with the
application of the various criteria proposed the distinction will be drawn
in different places.
Classificatory confusion, however, is not the basic problem about
positive and negative emotions. Were that the case, we could perhaps
pick a criterion or reject the distinction as we like. The basic problem is
that there are two phenomena relating to intuitively distinguished positive
and negative emotions which require explanation, and none of the
standard criteria can provide one which works. The first phenomenon is
particularly important: positive and negative emotions can be opposed in
ways which admit of rational assessment. Consider the case of hope and
fear, for example. Someone who hopes that there will be continued
public funding for abortion cannot also rationally fear that there will be
continued funding, at least where the emotions involve desiring that
public funding continue and desiring that it not do so. Such a case would
be bizarre, of course. On the other hand, there is nothing odd about a
case in which a general hopes that a campaign will be successful and
fears that it will not be; he may do so without irrationality, even though
he believes without certainty that the campaign will be successful and that
it will not be. The second phenomenon is puzzling. It has often been
remarked that negative emotions are more richly differentiated than
positive emotions. The list is long on the side of anger, dread, envy, fear,

171
172 CHAPTER X

grief, hatred, indignation, pity, remorse, and resentment; on the side of

gladness, hope, joy, love, and pleasure, the list is short.

2. DRAWING THE DISTINCTION

There are three primary criteria which philosophers and psychologists

currently employ, singly or in combination, to distinguish positive and
negative emotions. These are the cognitive, behavioral, and experiential
criteria.
The cognitive criterion draws the distinction on the basis of the
character of evaluative beliefs which cause or are constitutive of the
emotions. Positive emotions are related to desirability beliefs, negative
emotions to beliefs that something is undesirable. This criterion is widely
accepted in emotions theory, both in philosophy and psychology. Its
proponents include Arnold (1960), Averill (1980b), Hebb (1980), Lazarus
(1980), Lyons (1980), Plutchik (1980), and Solomon (1976).1
The nature of resultant behavior distinguishes positive and negative
emotions on the behavioral criterion. Two versions of this criterion are
employed, chiefly by psychologists. On the first, the pattern of behavior
resulting from positive emotions involves approach, that resulting from
negative emotions, avoidance. Arnold (1960), Hebb (1980), Izard (1977),
and Plutchik (1980) use the behavioral criterion in this fonn. On the
second version of the behavioral criterion, positive emotions result in
desirable behavior, negative emotions in undesirable behavior. This fonn
of the criterion is employed by Arnold (1960), Averill (1980b), and Izard
(1977).
According to the experiential criterion, the hedonic tone of the
emotional experience enables us to distinguish negative and positive
emotions. Negative emotions are experienced as unpleasant, positive
emotions as pleasant. The employment of this criterion is found in the
psychological theories of Averill (1980b), Izard (1977), and Tomkins
(1962).
These criteria yield a mixed and variable classification of emotions
as positive or negative. To illustrate, consider the case of anger and fear.
On the cognitive criterion, both emotions come out negative. Anger
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 173

involves a belief about offense, fear a belief about danger, and these
beliefs appear to evaluate a situation unfavorably. Anger and fear are
commonly associated with fight and flight, however, and on the
approach/avoidance version of the behavioral criterion they come to be
classified respectively as positive and negative. While the
positive/negative classification of anger and fear is mixed on these
criteria, the remaining criteria produce a classification that i~ variable.
Sometime angry behavior is acceptable or adaptive, sometime it is not;
accordingly, considerations of the desirability of resultant behavior will
class anger as positive or negative. Whether fear is classified as negative
or positive will also vary on the experiential criterion, since, the
experience of the agoraphobe in open spaces may be distressing while
that of thrill-seekers on a rollercoaster may be enjoyable.
The Belief-Desire Theory of emotions affords a criterion for drawing
the positive/negative distinction which is different from those standardly
employed. On behavioral and experiential criteria, positive and negative
emotions are distinguished, not in terms of their intentionality, but by
reference to associated behavioral tendencies or felt qualities. The
distinction is drawn along intentional lines on the cognitive criterion;
positive and negative emotions are distinguished by reference to
evaluative beliefs to which they are causally or constitutively related.
The Belief-Desire Theory also draws the distinction between positive and
negative emotions in terms of their intentionality, but constitutive desires
as well as beliefs are required for the distinction.
On the belief-desire criterion, the distinction between positive and
negative emotions is hedonic. Positive emotions are those in which it is
believed that the condition satisfying the desire obtains. Thus, positive
emotions are ways of being happy or pleased, and the basic positive
emotions are gladness that p and hope that p. Negative emotions are
those in which it is believed that the condition satisfying the desire does
not obtain. So negative emotions are ways of being displeased or
unhappy, the basic negative emotions being sorrow that p and fear that
p.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the hedonic
belief-desire criterion and the experiential criterion. On the experiential
criterion, emotions are distinguished as positive and negative on the basis
174 CHAPTER X

of hedonic tone. Hedonic tone is supposed to be a phenomenal quality

of the emotional experience itself. On the belief-desire criterion,
however, the distinction between positive and negative emotions is made
on the basis of their intentional structure. Emotions are positive or
negative hedonic states in that they are ways of being pleased or
displeased about the state of affairs represented by the emotion.
The merit of using the hedonic belief-desire criterion in drawing the
positive/negative distinction is not simply that its application coincides
most closely with our intuitive way of making the distinction, although
I believe that this is the case. It is rather the fact that the belief-desire
criterion enables us to explain the phenomena of rational emotional
opposition and the asymmetric differentiation of emotions, whereas
standard criteria do not.

3. EMOTIONAL OPPOSITION

Positive and negative emotions may be opposed in ways which make

rational assessment appropriate. Whether on some occasion it is rational
or irrational to hope that p and fear that p, or to hope that p and fear that
not-p is a question which deserves an answer. This is something which
cannot be understood properly in terms of the standard criteria for the
positive/negative distinction.
Use of a behavioral or experiential criterion leads one to regard
emotions as opposed in the way that things which are acid and alkaline
or hot and cold are opposed--that is, as simply being different in some
respect. These properties do not stand in rational relationships, no more
do behavioral tendencies or phenomenal qualities. Representation is
required for rationality, and in all these cases it is lacking. It is no
wonder that Hume, who takes an experiential position and denies that
emotions have representational properties, finds that "the contrariety of
the passions [is] a very curious question" (Hume, 1739/1962, p. 441).
Evaluative beliefs do stand in rational relationships, of course, but
the cognitive criterion still fails to provide an adequate account of rational
opposition between emotions. Obviously emotional opposition cannot be
taken to consist in cognitive opposition. The opposition of beliefs is
truth-functional and is supposed to be invariably irrational; opposed
 PosmVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 175

beliefs cannot both be true, and the rational aim of beliefs is truth.
Emotions, on the other hand, do not have truth values, and opposed
emotions may be rational.
It is more likely to be held that emotional opposition depends on
cognitive opposition, that opposed emotions must involve opposed
evaluative beliefs. The details of this contention are obscure, but it is
clear that it is false. There may be opposed emotions which are irrational
in the absence of related opposed beliefs, and there may be opposed
emotions which are rational in the presence of opposed beliefs.2 The
presence or absence of cognitive opposition is neither necessary nor
sufficient as a detenninant of the rationality or irrationality of emotional
opposition.
There may be opposition between emotions which is irrational in the
case of hope and fear that p. On either hand, however, what is believed
is that p. On the cognitive criterion, this would mean that the emotions
are not opposed at all. Accordingly, cognitivists will insist that opposed
evaluations must be involved: in hope it is believed that it would be a
good thing if p; in fear it is believed that it would be a bad thing if p.
Evaluations of the kind in question, however, are not necessary for hope
or fear. Hope or fear without such beliefs may be rationally deficient, but
it is possible. Where the evaluations are lacking the emotions are still
irrationally opposed.
There may also be opposition between emotions which is rational in
the case of hope that p and fear that not-po On the one hand, however,
it is believed without certainty that p; on the other, it is believed without
certainty that not-po Both beliefs cannot be true; and on the cognitive
criterion, as usually understood, this means that the beliefs, and so the
emotions, are irrationally opposed. Yet, so far from being irrationally
opposed, it is perfectly rational to hope that p and fear that not-po In fact,
it is what we would ordinarily expect.
It is commonly assumed that rationality is confmed to the domain of
cognition. If that were so, understanding emotional opposition as
involving cognitive contrariety or as merely a matter of difference would
be the only theoretical options. Emotional opposition cannot be
understood adequately in these tenns, however, and the assumption is
false. Rationality is not only a cognitive consideration but a conative one
176 CHAPTER X

as well. It is a function of the likelihood of the truth of beliefs and the

satisfaction of desires. A broader success-functional conception of
rationality is necessary for understanding emotional opposition as a
rational phenomenon.
It is also important to grasp another point which is often missed:
that, while representational opposition is semantically defined, the
rationality of representational opposition is a function of semantic
commitment. Certainty beliefs and desires are fully committed to
success--to truth or satisfaction, as the case may be. One cannot believe
with certainty that p and believe with certainty that not-p, or desire that
p and desire that not-p, without irrationality. There are cases, however,
in which full semantic commitment is lacking in cognitive and conative
representation. Uncertainty beliefs lack full commitment to success;
confidence in the truth of what is believed measured in tenns of
subjective probability ranges between 1 and 0, or certainty and
contmcertainty. Imaginative representations are belief-like and wishes are
desire-like; but in neither case is there commitment to success, to truth or
to satisfaction. Cognitive or conative opposition in cases where full
commitment to success is absent need not involve irrationality. In
general, the thesis is that cognitive or conative opposition is irmtional
unless full semantic commitment is lacking; and full commitment is
lacking in both imaginative representations and wishes and in uncertainty
beliefs.
In the cognitive domain, there is room for rational opposition where
semantic commitment is lacking, where imaginative representation is
involved and also in the case of uncertainty beliefs. In the domain of
conation, rational opposition obtains only where wishes come into play.
It is an interesting question why there is no cognitive analogue for
rational opposition between uncertainty beliefs. The degree of belief is
rationally detennined by subjective probability, which is a semantic affair.
There can be more or less semantic commitment to the truth of a belief.
So uncertainty beliefs need not be irrationally opposed. The degree of
desire is rationally detennined by desirability, which is a non-semantic
matter. There is not greater or lesser semantic commitment in the case
of desires. Thus there is irrational opposition between greater and lesser
desires.
A plausible account of opposition between emotions can be given in
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 177

tenns of the hedonic belief-desire criterion for distinguishing positive and

negative emotions. The rationality of opposed emotions is a function of
the rationality of the beliefs and desires which constitute them, which is
detennined in turn by semantic commitment. Emotional opposition
occurs when emotions are respectively positive and negative, concern a
common topic, and are constituted of beliefs or desires which are
opposed; that is to say, when both beliefs cannot be true or both desires
cannot be satisfied.
When a positive and a negative emotion with a common topic are
paired, if the desire is the same on either hand--the desire that p or the
desire that not-p, any opposition is cognitively based. Correspondingly,
if the belief on either hand is the belief that p or the belief that not-p, any
opposition is conatively based. Detennining the rationality of emotional
opposition requires the examination of three kinds of cases, each of which
represents a different mode of opposition between emotions. In the three
cases positive and negative emotions with a common content are paired,
where both emotions are certainty emotions (C/C opposition), both
emotions are uncertainty emotions (UIU opposition), and one emotion is
a certainty emotion and the other an uncertainty emotion (C/U or U/C
opposition). Regarding each mode, both cognitive and conative
opposition must be considered.
Gladness and sorrow are the basic certainty emotions and may be
paired to illustrate the basic fonns of C/C opposition. C/C opposition is
cognitively based in the case of gladness that p and sorrow that not-po
On either had there is the desire that p; the emotions are opposed with
respect to the constitutive certainty beliefs that p and that not-po On this
account, the opposition is irrational unless imaginative representation is
involved. Imaginative representation, unlike belief, lacks cognitive
commitment and is rationally disengaged. Thus C/C opposition in the
cognitive mode need not be irrational. A mother whose child is dying
may imagine him getting well and be imaginatively glad that he is not
going to die. The mother's imaginative gladness is not irrationally
opposed to her sorrow that her son is dying. If she should actually
believe that her child is not going to die, however, the cognitive
opposition of her gladness and sorrow would, of course, be irrational.
C/C opposition is conatively based in the case of gladness that p and
sorrow that p. On either hand there is the certainty belief that p; the
178 CHAPTER X

emotions are opposed with respect to the constitutive desires that p and
that not-po Because of this, the opposition is irrational except where
wishing is involved. Unlike desires, wishes are rationally disengaged
since they do not carry conative commitment. Thus conatively based C/C
opposition is not necessarily irrational. A man leaving his family in time
of war to enlist in the army may want to enlist but also wish that he were
not enlisting. His wishful sorrow that he is enlisting need not be
irrationally opposed to his gladness that he is. The conative opposition
of his emotions, however, would surely be irrational if he should actually
desire that he not enlist.
Hope and fear are the basic uncertainty emotions, and their pairing
may be used to illustrate the basic fonn of UIU opposition. In the case
of hope that p and fear that not-p, the emotions might be expected to
exhibit cognitively based opposition, since on either hand there is the
desire that p. In fact, however, hope and fear are best construed in this
case, not as opposed, but as rationally concomitant emotions.
The special relationship between hope and fear is noted by Spinoza.
The emotions are defined as follows:

Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something
future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an
inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which are in doubt.
(Spinoza, 1677/1955, p. 144)

Spinoza then observes that, "It follows from the definitions of these
emotions that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without
hope" (Spinoza, 1677/1955, p. 162; see also pp. 176-77). For Spinoza,
the key to the special relationship between hope and fear is the
uncertainty that they involve; about that I think he is correct.
Hope that p involves the uncertainty belief that p, fear that not-p the
uncertainty belief that not-po These beliefs could not both be rationally
held if it were stipulated that in each case what is believed is regarded as
more probable than not. Such a stipulation is incompatible with the fact
that what we fear or hope for is often regarded as improbable. In the
beliefs which hope and fear involve, what is believed is regarded as
having some probability. Since it may be the case that there is some
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 179

probability that p and that there is some probability that not-p, hope that
p and fear that not-p are not rationally opposed in the cognitive
dimension. Rather, they are rationally concomitant If there is only some
probability that p, it follows that there is also some probability that not-p;
and conversely. This is not to say, as does Spinoza, that one who hopes
that p will fear that not-p and vice versa, but that he will have a reason
to do so. Thus, if during a dry spell a fanner who hopes that it will rain
also fears that it will not, this is just what we would expect; certainly
there need be no irrational opposition between his emotions.
There is conatively based UIU opposition in the case of hope that p
and fear that p. On either hand there is the uncertainty belief that p; the
opposition arises because of the constitutive desires that p and that not-po
Such opposition is irrational unless wishes are involved. 3 In the case of
a conflicted political candidate who desires to be elected and desires not
to be elected, hope and fear of being elected will, of course, be
irrationally opposed; if the candidate merely wishes that he would, or
would not, be elected, the opposition need not be irrational.
eIU opposition is cognitively based in the case of gladness that p
and fear that not-po There is the desire that p on either hand; the beliefs
are respectively that p and that not-po The first is a certainty belief, the
second an uncertainty belief. The certainty or uncertainty of one's belief
is the certainty or uncertainty which is attached to what one believes.
One cannot rationally be certain that p and uncertain that not-po Thus
gladness that p and fear that not-p are irrationally opposed in the
cognitive dimension unless imaginative representation is involved. Unless
you only imaginatively suppose that you have won the lottery, you cannot
rationally be glad that you have won it and afraid that you have not
There is conatively based C!U opposition in the case of gladness that
p and fear that p. The constitutive desires that p and that not-p are
opposed, and the resultant emotional opposition is irrational unless a wish
is involved. The constitutive beliefs that p and that not-p are also
opposed, however, and the opposition will be irrational unless imaginative
representation is involved. One cannot rationally be glad that one has
been found not guilty and fear that one has been found guilty, unless one
only fantasizes that one has been found guilty or not guilty.
The rationality of the basic modes of emotional opposition in the
180 CHAPTER X

cognitive and conative dimension is summarized in the accompanying

table. (The case of U/C opposition is not included since it is symmetrical
with the case of C/O opposition.)

The Rationality of Emotional Opposition

Mode of Opposition Cognitive Rationality Conative Rationality

CtC Cognitive No, unless an Yes

(glad that p and imaginative
sony that not-p) representation
is involved

CtC Conative Yes No, unless a wish

(glad that p and is involved
sony that p)

U/U Cognitive Yes Yes

(hope that p and
fear that not-p)

U/U Conative Yes No, unless a wish

(hope that p and is involved
fear that p)

C/U Cognitive No, unless an Yes

(glad that p and imaginative
afraid that not-p) representation
is involved

C/U Conative No, unless an No, unless a wish

(glad that p and imaginative is involved
afraid that p) representation
is involved
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 181

What the emotional opposition table shows is that opposition may be

either cognitive or conative and that rational cognitive opposition is
possible only where either imaginative representation or uncertainty is
involved, conative opposition only where wishes are involved. It is the
semantic commitment of constitutive cognitive and conative
representations which determines whether emotional opposition is rational
or irrational.

4. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF EMOTIONS

In his Outlines of Psychology, Wundt writes as follows:

Obviously language has provided a much greater variety of names for unpleasurable
emotions than for pleasurable. In fact, observation renders it probable that unpleasurable
emotions exhibit a greater variety of forms of occurrence and that their different forms
are really more numerous. (Wundt, 1896/1897, p. 180; cited in Averill, 1980b, p. 8)

Wundt's claim, given his experiential perspective, is that negative

emotions are more richly differentiated than positive emotions. In the
Outlines experimental evidence is not provided for the claim, and it has
been challenged--for example, by Titchener (Titchener, 1910, p. 492;
cited by Averill, 1980b, p. 8). Subsequent experimental investigations
have tended to confirm the pattern of emotional differentiation noted by
Wundt, however, and, in one form or another, his claim is accepted by
a number of emotions theorists.
One source of support for the hypothesis that there is richer
differentiation among negative than positive emotions is the systematic
study of common terms used in describing emotions. Averill has
constructed a Semantic Atlas of Emotional Concepts containing 558
familiar terms regarded by subjects as referring to emotional states
(Averill, 1975). The Atlas is taken to constitute a representative sample
of emotional concepts in the English language. When asked to rate the
emotional states referred to by the terms in the Atlas on an evaluative
scale (awful-nice, ugly-beautiful, bad-good, and sour-sweet), 62% of the
terms were rated negatively, 38% positively. On the basis of this and
further psycholinguistic investigations, Averill concludes that, "The data
presented thus far strongly suggests that the preponderance of negative
182 CHAPTER X

tenns is unique to emotional concepts and not characteristic of language

in general" (Averill, 1980b, p. 12).
The hypothesis that the differentiation of negative and positive
emotions is asymmetrical also finds support in experimental studies of
nonverbal behavior associated with emotions. Cross-cultural studies of
facial expression indicate that associated with several emotions are
patterns of facial behavior which are universally recognizable with a high
degree of reliability. According to Izard, "The early work of Darwin
(1872, 1877) and the more recent work of Ekman et al. (1972) and Izard
(1971) has shown that certain emotions ... have the same expressions and
experiential qualities in widely different cultures from virtually every
continent of the globe, including isolated preliterate cultures having
virtually no contact with Western Civilization" (Izard, 1977, pp. 5-6).
Izard takes the emotions in question to include interest, joy, surprise,
distress, disgust, anger, shame, and fear. Ekman and his colleagues are
slightly more conservative. In their opinion, "There seems little basis for
disputing the evidence that for at least five emotion categories there are
facial behaviors specific to each emotion and that these relationships are
invariant across cultures" (Ekman et al., 1982, p. 142). The list of
emotions given by Ekman's group overlaps Izard's in including
happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger, and disgust; but they are
skeptical about interest and shame, which Izard's list includes.
Although they may be associated with recognizable facial
expressions, there are theoretical reasons for excluding interest and
surprise from a list of emotions (see Ch. VI, Sect. 6). There are also
theoretical reasons for including pain (see Ch. VIII, Sect. 5), although
Ekman and his associates hold pain to be "a state not considered to be an
emotion but one associated with a discriminable facial appearance"
(Ekman, ed., 1982, p. 42). However, the most important point to be
made about the findings of Ekman and Izard is that the adjusted list of
emotions associated with universally recognizable facial expressions
contains only one positive emotion--happiness or joy; all the rest--anger,
disgust, distress or sadness, fear, and shame--are negative.
Robert Rosenthal and his associates have extended the investigation
of nonverbal emotional behavior to include not only facial expressions but
bodily movement and posture, randomly spliced speech, content-filtered
speech, and combinations of these. Their Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 183

(PONS) is designed to measure nonverbal sensitivity in the recognition

of emotions from nonverbal clues presented in two-second auditory or
visual segments (Rosenthal et aI., 1979). Subjects choose from two
emotionally loaded labels the one which best describes the scene just
heard or seen. When presented with scene descriptions respectively
suggesting a positive and a negative emotion (for example, "talking about
one's wedding" and "talking about one's divorce"), subjects make
accurate discriminations with a high degree of reliability. The accuracy
rate for discrimination is also high when subjects are presented with scene
descriptions suggesting different negative emotions (for instance,
"criticizing someone for being late" and "talking about the death of a
friend"). However, when the emotions suggested by the scene
descriptions were both positive ("expressing gratitude" and "expressing
motherly love," for example), accurate discriminations are made with little
reliability. As I interpret these findings, they also provide support for the
hypothesis that negative emotions are more richly differentiated than
positive.
That the differentiation of positive and negative emotions should
exhibit marked asymmetry is curious; certainly it is something which calls
for explanation. With one notable exception, however, theorists who
have recognized the asymmetry have let it go unexplained. The exception
I have in mind is Averill. In "On the Paucity of Positive Emotions," he
systematically addresses this problem about emotional differentiation
(Averill, 1980b). Averill recognizes several criteria for distinguishing
positive and negative emotions. Behavioral consequences, however,
constitute the most important criterion on his view. For Averill, positive
emotions lead to desirable behavior, negative emotions to undesirable
behavior. Accordingly, he explains the paucity of positive emotions in
this way:

[Emotional behavior is] regarded as uncharacteristic of the individual, .. .is irrational,

intuitive, impUlsive, etc.... This means... that a person may not be held fully responsible
for the outcome of an emotional response.... Unlike crimes of passion, which are legion,
good deeds of passion are rare, not necessarily because evil is more prevalent than
goodness. Rather, it is because responses with positive outcomes are not typically
described as emotional, for that would imply a diminished responsibility on the part of
the individual for his behavior. (Averill, 1980b, pp. 24-25)
184 CHAPTER X

Averill's explanation of the relatively rich differentiation of negative

emotions is open to serious objection. Obviously his characterization of
emotional behavior can be called into question (see Ch. VII). There are,
however, three further points to be raised. First, Averill's hypothesis that
we tend to disclaim responsibility for undesirable but not for desirable
behavior by putting it down to an emotion would at most account for
more frequent attributions of negative emotions than positive emotions.
That there is any such difference in frequency of attribution is doubtful.
In the light of psycholinguistic findings, Averill himself observes that,
"there appears to be little relationship between how positive (or negative)
an emotional concept is considered to be and how frequently it is used in
ordinary language" (Averill, 1980b, pp. 12-13). In any case, what is to
be explained is not the frequency of attribution but the differentiation of
negative and positive emotions. On this Averill's hypothesis has no
bearing. Second, Averill's attributional hypothesis would in fact make
the use of any positive emotion concepts problematic. Why (except,
perhaps, out of false modesty) would we want to disclaim responsibility
for our desirable deeds? Third, not only does Averill's hypothesis not
explain the paucity of positive emotions, the behavioral criterion for
distinguishing positive from negative emotions which it embodies requires
that the phenomenon be denied. On such a variable criterion the same
emotions--anger, fear, pride, shame, and so on--may be positive or
negative, depending on the desirability of resultant behavior. If each
emotion may be either negative or positive, negative emotions could
hardly be more richly differentiated than positive emotions.
I will argue that the hedonic account of the positive/negative
distinction which the Belief-Desire Theory of emotions makes possible
does provide a plausible explanation of the asymmetry in their
differentiation. First, however, it is important to note that the theory
enables us to see that the puzzle about emotional differentiation is more
complex than has been recognized. The Belief-Desire Theory divides
emotions not only into positive and negative but also into certainty and
uncertainty emotions. The four classes of emotions which are determined
by these distinctions are forms of the basic emotions gladness, sorrow,
hope, and fear. When a representative range of emotions is divided into
the four classes, as in the accompanying table, the complexity of the
pattern of emotional differentiation emerges.
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 185

The Pattern of Emotional Differentiation

Cenainty Uncertainty

Positive amusement hope

delight
enjoyment
gladness
gratitude
happiness
joy
love
pleasure
pride
relief

Negative anger fear

contempt fright
despair terror
disappointment
displeasure
dread
embarrassment
envy
grief
hatred
indignation
pain
pity
rage
regret
remorse
resentment
sadness
shame
sorrow
unhappiness

Negative emotions are indeed more richly differentiated than positive

emotions, but certainty emotions are much more richly differentiated than
uncertainty emotions. In fact, hope is the only positive uncertainty
186 CHAPTER X

emotion; and the negative uncertainty emotions of fright and terror are
forms of fear differentiated basically, not in terms of content, but by
intensity. This means that there are two puzzling questions about the
differentiation of emotions. Why are negative certainty emotions, or
forms of sorrow, more richly differentiated than positive certainty
emotions, or forms of gladness? And why are certainty emotions
differentiated beyond the basic forms, gladness and sorrow, while
uncertainty emotions, hope and fear, are not?
It is reasonable to assume that negative certainty emotions are more
richly differentiated than positive certainty emotions, conceptually and in
recognizable facial, postural, and vocal behavior, because of pragmatic
considerations of adaptation and salience. There are in this way two
related features of negative as opposed to positive certainty emotions
which account for their relatively rich differentiation--their motivational
potential and their social significance.
Negative certainty emotions are those in which it is believed that the
condition satisfying the desire does not obtain. Positive certainty
emotions are those in which it is believed that the condition satisfying the
desire does obtain. This means that there is, all else being equal, an
asymmetry in the motivational potential of negative and positive certainty
emotions. In the fonner, one believes that p but desires that not-p; if one
believes it to be feasible, one is motivated to bring it about that not-po
In the latter, one believes that p and desires that p; one is not motivated
to bring it about that p, since one believes it to be the case that p--unless
the constitutive desire is itself an intention. Of course, in either case,
given some further desire, one may be motivated to act in various ways
(see 01. VII). Thus, in the description and explanation of behavior, it is
important to have more richly differentiated concepts for negative than for
positive certainty emotions.
In addition to their asymmetrical motivational potential, negative
certainty emotions can be seen as having special significance as warning
signals. Like warning lights on an instrument panel, negative certainty
emotions can be taken to indicate that something is wrong. Not only do
we need an indication when something is wrong, we need an indication
of what kind of thing has gone wrong--just in case there is something we
can do about it. On the other hand, if everything is okay, we don't need
to know just what is okay. Thus, the importance of the signal functions
 PosmVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 187

of negative certainty emotions may also account for their relatively fine-
grained differentiation.
In order to be useful in solving the problem about the differentiation
of negative certainty emotions, the signal function hypothesis requires
qualification. Negative certainty emotions can hardly be supposed to
indicate to us that something is wrong--that things aren't going the way
we want them to go. We must have that belief to have the negative
certainty emotion, so the emotion does not provide that infonnation.
While negative certainty emotions can't have a warning light function for
us, their recognition can have such a function for others. This is the
important point. What we want to explain is the fine differentiation of
negative certainty emotions in verbal description and non-verbal
expression--that is to say, in communication.
It is notable that of the positive certainty emotions, there are some
which are socially significant in that they relate, to a considerable extent
at least, to our relations or dealings with others. These include gratitude,
love, and pride. Many of the more numerous negative certainty emotions
are socially significant in this way. Anger, contempt, embarrassment,
envy, grief, hatred, indignation, pity, remorse, resentment, and shame are
among these emotions. The maintenance of satisfactory relations and
dealings with others is essential for us and for many other mammalian
species. When something goes wrong in those dealings and relationships,
it is a matter of adaptive importance that this be recognized. It can
hardly be coincidental that the developed facial musculature and vocal
capacities (not to mention language) necessary for the differential
recognition of these emotions are found primarily in social animals,
especially in the primates and in man. In this way, the warning light
hypothesis enables us to appreciate the social significance of the relatively
great differentiation of negative certainty emotions.
The rational concomitance which obtains between uncertainty
emotions is what accounts for the fact that they, unlike certainty
emotions, are not significantly differentiated beyond the basic level.
Rational concomitance is, after all, the corollary of the epistimic
uncertainty which distinguishes hope and fear from certainty emotions.
Because of their rational concomitance, negative uncertainty emotions
cannot in general have greater motivational potential and social
significance than positive uncertainty emotions and so come to be more
188 CHAPTER X

richly differentiated. Not only are non-basic negative uncertainty

emotions not differentiated without corresponding positive fonns,
however; there is no significant differentiation of corresponding and
opposed uncertainty emotions beyond the basic level. Such opposed
uncertainty emotions would have a common content, as is the case with
opposed certainty emotions which are differentiated above the basic
fonns. Still, unlike opposed certainty emotions such as pride and shame,
opposed non-basic uncertainty emotions would not differ in their rational
properties. They would not be rationally distinct but concomitant Since
opposed non-basic uncertainty emotions would differ neither in content
nor in rational properties, there is no basis for differentiating them. Thus,
because of rational concomitance, there is no differentiation of uncertainty
emotions beyond the basic cases of hope and fear.

5. CONCLUSION

The distinction between positive and negative emotions presents more

than a taxonomical problem; it raises issues which are crucial for a theory
of emotions. The phenomenon of emotional opposition raises the issue
of the rationality of emotions, and that of emotional differentiation, the
issue of their motivational and social significance. These are issues
which cannot be resolved with a behavioral/experiential or cognitive
approach. In their resolution, the Belief-Desire Theory of the intentional
structure of emotions is, I believe, quite successful.

NOTES

While Solomon characterizes emotional evaluations--and hence emotions, on his

view--as positive and negative, he rejects a distinction between' good' and 'bad' emotions
(Solomon, 1976).
2 Greenspan argues correctly that Cognitive Theories cannot account for rational
emotional opposition in the latter case. The account which she suggests, however, is
unsatisfactory. She takes emotions to be opposed as pro and con attitudes; but on the
usual interpretation, such attitudes can at most be different, not rationally opposed. (See
Greenspan, 1980a and 1988.)
 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS 189

It might be objected that wishes cannot be involved in UIU opposition, as may be

the case with opposition between certainty emotions, since the non-satisfaction of wishes
is regarded as certain, while there is supposed to be some probability of satisfaction for
desires in uncertainty emotions. Wishes do not require the belief that they cannot be
satisfied, however; it may be the case that the likelihood of satisfaction is simply not
brought into consideration. For instance, one may wish to see an old friend again without
giving a thought to the chances of there being a reunion. Or, again, one may realize that
the chances are vanishingly small.
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Williams, Bernard (1965). Morality and the Emotions. London: Bedford College.
Williams, Bernard (1966/1973). "Consistency and Realism" in Problems of the Self, pp.
187-206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Bernard (1970/1973). "Deciding to Believe" in Problems of the Self, pp. 136-
51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, I.R.S. (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wundt, Wilhelm (1896-1897). Outlines of Psychology. Leipzig: Englemann.
 GLOSSARY

Definitions of technical tenns employed are given here together with reference to the page
on which they are introduced in the text.

Akratic actions are actions which an agent intentionally perfonns, although he judges the
perfonnance of some available alternative action to be more desirable than that of the
action he performs (p. 61).

The behavioral criterion distinguishes between positive and negative emotions on the
basis of resultant behavior, which is taken to involve approach or avoidance or to be
desirable or undesirable (p. 145).

The belief-desire criterion distinguishes between positive and negative emotions as forms
of pleasure and displeasure constituted of beliefs and desires, the success conditions
of which are convergent and divergent, respectively (146).

The Belief Desire Theory takes emotions to be intentional structures of semantically

interrelated beliefs or belief-like states and desires of desire-like states with a common
representational topic (p. 65).

Causal Constituent Theories hold that beliefs are both causes and constituents of emotions
and that other constituents of emotions include non-intentional phenomena (p. 36).

Causal Theories hold that beliefs are causes, but not constituents, of emotions, and that
emotions themselves are constituted of non-intentional phenomena (p. 36).

Certainty emotions are emotions in which it is believed with a subjective probability of

1 that what is desired is, or is not, the case (p. 70).

The cognitive criterion draws the distinction between positive and negative emotions on
the basis of the character of evaluative beliefs causing or constituting the emotions,
which are taken to be desirability beliefs in the case of positive emotions,
undesirability beliefs in the case of negative emotions (p. 145).

Cognitive Theories take emotions to be intentional states in virtue of their causal or

constitutive relation to beliefs (p. 25).

Component Theories conceive of emotions as deriving their intentionality from beliefs to

which they are causally or constitutively related and as constituted wholly or in part
by emotional phenomena such as affective and bodily agitation (p. 25).

197
198 GLOSSARY

The condition of success for beliefs and desires is that the state of affairs represented
as one which obtains or as one which is to obtain does obtain (p. 14).

Constituent Theories maintain that beliefs are constituents, but not causes, of emotions
and that non-intentional phenomena, of which the beliefs are causes, are among the
other constituents of emotions (p. 36).

Convergent emotions are emotions in which the constitutive belief and desire are such that
if the belief is true, the desire is, satisfied, and conversely (p. 69).

Delusive fears are fears which involve patently irrational beliefs (p. 30).

The direction offit for beliefs and desires is the functional relation they bear to the world.
Beliefs have an input-oriented informational role in perception and inference, aiming
at representing the way the world is. Desires have an output-oriented functional role
in motivation, aiming at making the world the way it is represented (p. 13).

Divergent emotions are emotions in which the constitutive belief and desire are such that
if the belief is true, the desire is unsatisfied, and conversely (p. 69).

Evaluative Theories take emotions to be evaluative beliefs or judgments which may cause
emotional phenomena such as affective and bodily agitation and which may motivate
behavior (p. 25).

The experiential criterion distinguishes between positive and negative emotions in terms
of the hedonic tone of the emotional experience, holding the former to be experienced
as pleasant, the latter as unpleasant (p. 145).

Experiential emotions, which include enjoyment and pain, are emotions constituted be the
experience of x and the intrinsic desire to have, or not to have, the experience of x (p.
127).

Imaginative emotions are emotions which involve belief-like imaginative representations,

rather than beliefs (p. 22).

Imaginative representations are belief-like representations of states of affairs which,

owing to the absence of evidence, lack commitment to success and success-related
rational properties (p. 19).

Impulsive actions are actions in which the agent acts intentionally without any
consideration of the desirability of what he does (p. 62).
 GLOSSARY 199

Non-success-oriented second-order beliefs and desires (N-beliefs and N-desires) are

second-order beliefs and desires which are indifferent to the success of the related first-
order beliefs and desires (p. 134).

Optative desires are desires that some state of affairs obtain which does not consist in
one's performing an action (p. 16).

Performative desires are desires that some state of affairs obtain which consists in one's
performing an action (p. 16).

Performative emotions are emotions in which the conative constituent is a performative

desire (p. 68).

Perverse actions are actions in which an agent intentionally does something which he
judges undesirable to do, without holding any offsetting jUdgment about the desirability
of what he does (p. 62).

The representational content of a belief or desire is the state of affairs represented as one
which obtains or one which is to obtain (p. 13).

Self-deceptive emotions are emotions in which the cognitive constituent is a self-deceptive

belief, a belief which is based on the constitutive desire (p. 68).

Semantic assessment for beliefs and desires is assessment of their success, assessment
made in terms of truth for beliefs and satisfaction for desires (p. 14).

Success-oriented second-order beliefs and desires (S-beliefs and S-desires) are second-
order beliefs that the related first-order beliefs and desires are successful or desires that
they be successful (p. 134).

Uncertainty emotions are emotions in which it is believed with a subjective probability

greater than 0 and less than 1 that what is desired is, or is not, the case (p. 70).

Wishes are desire-like representations of states of affairs which, because of the absence
of feasibility, lack commitment to success and success-related rational properties (p.
19).

Wishful emotions are emotions in which the conative constituent is a wish (p. 22).
 INDEX

aboutness of expressive behavior 112 conceptual coherence 2 ff.

activity / passivity 151 ff. conditions of success 27
akrasia 73 constitutive phenomena 44 ff.
akratic actions 73 f. conventional expressions 115 f.
Alston, William P. 44, 113, 128, convergent emotions 82
133 ff., 148
amusement 101 f. Danto, Arthur 163 ff.
anger 102 f. Darwin, Charles 115, 182
Anscombe, G.E.M. 17 Davidson, Donald 47, 61
Aquinas, Thomas 43 Davis, Wayne xv, 77, 87, 105, 111 f.,
Aristotle 43, 76, 82 Jl28, 135, 139, 146, 147
Armstrong, D.M. 60, 148 deciding to believe 163 ff.
Arnold, Magda B. 43, 45, 172 Deigh, John xv
Audi, Robert 119 ff. delusive fears 36
Augustine 61, 151 Dennett, Daniel C. 3 f., 9 f., 11
Austin, J.L. 128 desire dependence 153 ff.
Averill, James 43,45, 172, 181, 183 f. de Sousa, Ronald B. 43,45, 69, 76, 81,
91 f.
basic emotions 81 ff. Descartes, Rene 43, 151, 169
belief - desire criterion 173 differentiation of emotions 181 ff.
Belief - Desire Theory xii f., 77 ff. direction of fit 16
behavioral criterion 172 dispositional emotions 53 ff.
Birdwhistell, R.L. 115 dirvegent emotions 82
Bogdan, R.J. xv, 7 dread 84
Brand, Miles 121 f.
Brentano, Franz 15, 61, 64 ff., 76, Ekman, Paul 115, 182
142 ff. elem(~nts and compounds 96 ff.
Broad, CD. 61 emotional affectivity 129 ff.
emotional behavior 109 ff.
Calhoun, Cheshire 82 emotional expression 111 ff.
Causal Constituent Theory 45 ff. emotional intensity 136 ff.
causal relations 46 ff. emotional intentionality 26 ff., 82 ff.
Causal theory 45 ff. emotional motivation 117 ff.
certainty emotions 82 ff. emotional opposition 174 ff.
Churchland, Paul M. 6 f. emotional rationality 93 ff.
cognitive criterion 172 emotions and belief 31 ff.
Cognitive Theory 31 ff., 62 ff. emotions and perception 133 ff.
Collier, Gary 109, 115, 128 emotions and sensations 129 ff.
Component Theory xii f., 31 f., 43 ff., enjoyment 139 ff.
61 f., 131 ff. Evaluative Theory xii f., 31 ff., 61 ff.
conative irrationality 73 ff.

201
202 INDEX

fear 82 Lormand, Eric xv, 34, 105

fear of death 84 Lyons, William xv, 43, 45, 46, 53 f.,
Fodor, J.A. 20 ff. 60, 98 f., 105 f., 128, 172
Foot, Philippa xv
Frankfort, Harry 161 f. Marks, Joel xv, 77, 105
Freud, Sigmund 33,43,57 ff., 115, 131 Martin Mike 41
functional eliminativism 8 f. Meldin, A.I. 44
functional reductionism 7 f. Melzack, R., and Wall, P. 143
moods 34 f.
Gean, William D. 133 f., 148 Morreall, John xv, 101
gladness 79
Gordon, Robert M. 43, 44, 47, 85 ff., Neely, Wright 168
99, 103, 104, 123 ff., 168 Nelkin, Norton xv
Green,O.H. 11 n., 47, 128 n. negative emotions 122 ff.
Greenspan, Patricia S. 35 f., 42-44, Nev, Jerome 43,44,48
91 f., 189 non-success-oriented beliefs 158
Grice, H.P. 116 f. non-success-oriented desires 159
grief 102 f.
"objectless emotions" 33 f.
Hebb, D.O. 10, 172 optative desires 20
hedonic states 135 f. Ortony, Andrew 43, 45
Hobbes, Thomas 61, 76, 82
hope 82 Pascal, Blaise 28-29
performative desires 20
imaginative emotions 23 f., 36, 83 ff. performative emotions 80
imaginative experiential emotions 27 f. perverse actions 74
imaginative representations 23 f. Peters, R.S. 61
impUlsive actions 73 Pitcher, George 44
instrumentalism 9 f. Plato 52 f.
iterated beliefs and desires 158 ff. Plutchik, Robert 43, 172
Izard, Charles E. 43, 172, 182 positive emotions 123 f., 171 ff.
propositional content 38 ff.
James, William 43, 131, 144 f. Pylyshyn, Zenon 7

Kamler, Howard 133 f., 148 rage 99 f.

Kenny, Anthony xv, 43, 44, 136 f. rationality 93 ff.
rationality of belief 18
Lazzrus, Richard S. 43, 45, 46, 53 f., rationality of desire 18
100, 172 representational content 16
Leeper, W.W. 61 responsibility 167 f.
Leighton, Stephen xv Rey, Georges 99, 104
Lewis, David 116 Roberts, Robert C. 103 f.
logical behaviorism 58 Rorty, Amelie O. 2 f., 81
 INDEX 203

Rosenthal, Robert 183 f. Taylor, Gabrielle 43

Ryle, Gilbert 133, 151 f. terror 100 f.
Thalberg, Irving xv, 43, 44, 47 ff., 62,
Sachs, David 62 153, 168
Sartre, l-P. 61, 166 Tichener, E.B. 181
Searle, John 16 ff., 51, 77, 99-101, Tomkins, Sylvan 172
113 ff., 128 Tormey, Alan 111
self-deceptive emotions 80 Trigg, Roger 43
semantic assessment 18, 89 ff. type-t)pe identify theory 5 f.
Shaffer, Jerome 99, 104, 109, 127 uncertainty emotions 83 ff.
Sircello, Guy 112, 115 Urmson, J.o. 114, 128
Socrates 76 n.
Solomon, Robert C. 50, 61, 66 ff., 76, Walton, Kendall 35 ff., 41
117,127,129 f., 166, 172, 189 Watson, Gary 162
sorrow 82 Wiggins, David 163 ff.
Spinoza, Benedict 61,76,82,84 f., 178 Williams, Bernard xv, 69, 76, 104,
Stich, Stephen 9 163 ff., 168
Stocker, Michael xv, 99, 145 Wilson, J.R.S. 43-45
Stoics 61, 151 wishes 28 f.
success-oriented beliefs 158 wishful emotions 27 f.
success-oriented desires 158 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 11
surprise 101 f., 105 n Wundt, Wilhelm 43, 131, 181
 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor:
KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona

Board of Consulting Editors:

Jonathan Bennett, Allan Gibbard, Robert Stalnaker, and Robert G. Turnbull

I. JAY F. ROSENBERG, Linguistic RepresenratlOn, 1'::1 1'+.

2. WILFRID SELLARS, Essays in Philosophy and Its History, 1974.
3. DICKINSON S. MILLER, Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare. Selected
Essays and Chapters from Six Decades. Edited with an Introduction by Lloyd D.
Easton, 1975.
4. KEITH LEHRER (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics. Essays in Honor of R. M.
Chisholm. 1975.
5. CARL GINET, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 1975.
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10. GEORGE SCHLESINGER, Religion and Scientific Method, 1977.
11. YIRMIAHU YOVEL (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Papers presented
at the first Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974, 1978.
12. JOSEPH C. PITT, The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions,
1978.
13. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN and JAEGWON KIM, Values and Morals. Essays in
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14. MICHAEL J. LOUX, Subsrance anamrrzbute. A Study in Ontology, 1978.
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16. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. Essays in the
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18. JAMES W. CORNMAN, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, 1980.
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32. MICHAEL J. WHITE, Agency and Integrality, 1985.
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52. JESUS EZQUERRO and JESUS M. LARRAZABAL (eds.), Cognition,
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53. O.H. GREEN, The Emotions. A Philosophical Theory. 1992