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This entry focuses on six major questions concerning the rationality and
morality of voting:
1
The Ethics and Rationality of Voting
However, whether voting is rational or not depends on just what voters are
trying to do. Instrumental theories of the rationality of voting hold that it
can be rational to vote when the voter's goal is to influence or change the
outcome of an election, including the “mandate” the winning candidate
receives. (The mandate theory of elections holds that a candidate’s
effectiveness in office, i.e., her ability to get things done, is in part a
function of how large or small a lead she had over her competing
candidates during the election.) In contrast, the expressive theory of voting
holds that voters vote in order to express themselves and their fidelity to
certain groups or ideas.
However, this does not yet show it is rational for Sally to vote for D.
Instead, this depends on how likely it is that her vote will make a
difference. In much the same way, it might be worth $200 million to win
the lottery, but that does not imply it is rational to buy a lottery ticket.
Uv = p[V(D) − V(R)] − C
There is some debate among economists and political scientists over the
precise way to calculate the probability that a vote will be decisive.
Nevertheless, they generally agree that the probability that the modal
individual voter in a typical election will break a tie is small, so small that
the expected benefit (i.e., p[V(D) − V(R)]) of the modal vote for a good
candidate is worth far less than a millionth of a penny (G. Brennan and
Lomasky 1993: 56–7, 119). The most optimistic estimate in the literature
claims that in a presidential election, an American voter could have as
high as a 1 in 10 million chance of breaking a tie, but only if that voter
lives in one of three or four “swing states,” and only if she votes for a
major-party candidate (Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007). Thus, on both of
these popular models, for most voters in most elections, voting for the
purpose of trying to change the outcome is irrational. The expected costs
exceed the expected benefits by many orders of magnitude.
One popular response to the paradox of voting is to posit that voters are
not trying to determine who wins, but instead trying to change the
“mandate” the elected candidate receives. The assumption here is that an
elected official’s efficacy—i.e., her ability to get things done in office—
depends in part on how large of a majority vote she received. If that were
true, I might vote for what I expect to be the winning candidate in order to
increase her mandate, or vote against the expected winner to reduce her
mandate. The virtue of the mandate hypothesis, if it were true, is that it
could explain why it would be rational to vote even in elections where one
candidate enjoys a massive lead coming into the election.
However, the mandate argument faces two major problems. First, even if
we assume that such mandates exist, to know whether voting is rational,
we would need to know how much the nth voter’s vote increases the
marginal effectiveness of her preferred candidate, or reduces the marginal
But this brings us to the second, deeper problem: Political scientists have
done extensive empirical work trying to test whether electoral mandates
exist, and they now roundly reject the mandate hypothesis (Dahl 1990b;
Noel 2010). A winning candidate’s ability to get things done is generally
not affected by how small or large of a margin she wins by.
On these theories, what voters value is not changing the outcome, but
being agents who have participated in causing various outcomes. These
causal theories of voting claim that voting is rational provided the voter
sufficiently cares about being a cause or among the joint causes of the
outcome. Voters vote because they wish to bear the right kind of causal
responsibility for outcomes, even if their individual influence is small.
The expressive theory of voting (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993) holds
that voters vote in order to express themselves. On the expressive theory,
voting is a consumption activity rather than a productive activity; it is
more like reading a book for pleasure than it is like reading a book to
develop a new skill. On this theory, though the act of voting is private,
voters regard voting as an apt way to demonstrate and express their
commitment to their political team. Voting is like wearing a Metallica T-
shirt at a concert or doing the wave at a sports game. Sports fans who paint
their faces the team colors do not generally believe that they, as
individuals, will change the outcome of the game, but instead wish to
demonstrate their commitment to their team. Even when watching games
alone, sports fans cheer and clap for their teams. Perhaps voting is like
this.
Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann 2006; Westen 2008). Voters might
adopt ideologies in order to signal to themselves and others that they are
certain kinds of people. For example, suppose Bob wants to express that
he is a patriot and a tough guy. He thus endorses hawkish military actions,
e.g., that the United States nuke Russia for interfering with Ukraine. It
would be disastrous for Bob were the US to do what he wants. However,
since Bob’s individual vote for a militaristic candidate has little hope of
being decisive, Bob can afford to indulge irrational and misinformed
beliefs about public policy and express those beliefs at the polls.
Many popular arguments for a duty to vote rely upon the idea that
individual votes make a significant difference. For instance, one might
argue that that there is a duty to vote because there is a duty to protect
For instance, one early hypothesis was that voting might be a form of
insurance, meant to to prevent democracy from collapsing (Downs 1957:
257). Following this suggestion, suppose one hypothesizes that citizens
have a duty to vote in order to help prevent democracy from collapsing.
Suppose there is some determinate threshold of votes under which a
democracy becomes unstable and collapses. The problem here is that just
as there is a vanishingly small probability that any individual’s vote would
decide the election, so there is a vanishingly small chance that any vote
would decisively put the number of votes above that threshold.
Alternatively, suppose that as fewer and fewer citizens vote, the
probability of democracy collapsing becomes incrementally higher. If so,
to show there is a duty to vote, one would first need to show that the
marginal expected benefits of the nth vote, in reducing the chance of
democratic collapse, exceed the expected costs (including opportunity
costs).
What if everyone were to stay home and not vote? The results
would be disastrous! Therefore, I (you/she) should vote. (Lomasky
and G. Brennan 2000: 75)
What if everyone were to stay home and not farm? Then we would
all starve to death! Therefore, I (you/she) should each become
farmers. (Lomasky and G. Brennan 2000: 76)
rest of you refrained from doing so, the grass would be probably be fine.
Still, it would seem unfair if the university allowed me to walk on the
grass at will but forbade everyone else from doing so. It seems more
appropriate to impose the duty to keep off the lawn equally on everyone.
Similarly, if the government wants to raise money to provide a public
good, it could just tax a randomly chosen minority of the citizens.
However, it seems more fair or just for everyone (at least above a certain
income threshold) to pay some taxes, to share in the burden of providing
police protection.
We should thus ask: is voting more like the first kind of activity, in which
it is only imperative that enough people do it, or the second kind, in which
it’s imperative that everyone do it? One difference between the two kinds
of activities is what abstention does to others. If I abstain from farming, I
don’t thereby take advantage of or free ride on farmers’ efforts. Rather, I
compensate them for whatever food I eat by buying that food on the
market. In the second set of cases, if I freely walk across the lawn while
everyone else walks around it, or if I enjoy police protection but don’t pay
taxes, it appears I free ride on others’ efforts. They bear an uncompensated
differential burden in maintaining the grass or providing police protection,
and I seem to be taking advantage of them.
A defender of a duty to vote might thus argue that non-voters free ride on
voters. Non-voters benefit from the government that voters provide, but do
not themselves help to provide government.
There are at least a few arguments for a duty to vote that do not depend on
the controversial assumption that individual votes make a difference:
For instance, suppose one argues that citizens should vote because they
ought to exercise civic virtue. One must explain why a duty to exercise
civic virtue specifically implies a duty to vote, rather than a duty just to
perform one of thousands of possible acts of civic virtue. Or, if a citizen
has a duty to to be an agent who helps promote other citizens’ well-being,
it seems this duty could be discharged by volunteering, making art, or
working at a productive job that adds to the social surplus. If a citizen has
a duty to to avoid complicity in injustice, it seems that rather than voting,
she could engage in civil disobedience; write letters to newspaper editors,
pamphlets, or political theory books, donate money; engage in
conscientious abstention; protest; assassinate criminal political leaders; or
do any number of other activities. It's unclear why voting is special or
required.
Most people appear to believe that there is a duty to cast a vote (perhaps
including a blank ballot) rather than abstain (Mackie 2010: 8–9), but this
leaves open whether they believe there is a duty to vote in any particular
way. Some philosophers and political theorists have argued there are
ethical obligations attached to how one chooses to vote. For instance,
many deliberative democrats (see Christiano 2006) believe not only that
every citizen has a duty to vote, but also that they must vote in publicly-
spirited ways, after engaging in various forms of democratic deliberation.
In contrast, some (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993; J. Brennan 2009; J.
Brennan 2011a) argue that while there is no general duty to vote
(abstention is permissible), those citizens who do choose to vote have
duties affecting how they vote. They argue that while it is not wrong to
abstain, it is wrong to vote badly, in some theory-specified sense of
“badly”.
Note that the question of how one ought to vote is distinct from the
question of whether one ought to have the right to vote. The right to vote
licenses a citizen to cast a vote. It requires the state to permit the citizen to
vote and then requires the state to count that vote. This leaves open
whether some ways a voter could vote could be morally wrong, or whether
other ways of voting might be morally obligatory. In parallel, my right of
free association arguably includes the right to join the Ku Klux Klan,
while my right of free speech arguably includes the right to advocate an
unjust war. Still, it would be morally wrong for me to do either of these
things, though doing so is within my rights. Thus, just as someone can,
without contradiction, say, “You have the right to join the KKK or
advocate genocide, but you should not,” so a person can, without
contradiction, say, “You have the right to vote for that candidate, but you
should not.”
Recall that one important theory of voting behavior holds that most
citizens vote not in order to influence the outcome of the election or
influence government policies, but in order to express themselves (G.
Brennan and Lomasky 1993). They vote to signal to themselves and to
others that they are loyal to certain ideas, ideals, or groups. For instance, I
might vote Democrat to signal that I’m compassionate and fair, or
Republican to signal I’m responsible, moral, and tough. If voting is
primarily an expressive act, then perhaps the ethics of voting is an ethics
of expression (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993: 167–198). We can assess
the morality of voting by asking what it says about a voter that she voted
like that:
The idea here is that if it’s wrong (even if it’s within my rights) in general
for me to express sincere racist attitudes, and so it’s wrong for me to
express sincere racist commitments at the polls. Similar remarks apply to
other wrongful attitudes. To the extent it is wrong for me to express
sincere support for illiberal, reckless, or bad ideas, it would also be wrong
for me to vote for candidates who support those ideas.
One might try to argue that voters owe similar duties of care to the
governed. Perhaps voters should vote 1) for what they perceive to be the
best outcomes (consistent with strategic voting) and 2) make such
decisions in a sufficiently informed and rational way. How voters vote has
significant impact on political outcomes, and can help determine matters
of peace and war, life and death, prosperity and poverty. Majority voters
do not just choose for themselves, but for everyone, including dissenting
minorities, children, non-voters, resident aliens, and people in other
countries affected by their decisions. For this reason, voting seems to be a
morally charged activity (Christiano 2006; Brennan 2011a; Beerbohm
2012).
That said, one clear disanalogy between the relationship doctors have with
patients and voters have with the governed is that individual voters have
only a vanishingly small chance of making a difference. The expected
harm of an incompetent individual vote is vanishingly small, while the
expected harm of incompetent individual medical decisions is high.
One major argument for compulsory voting is what we might call the
Demographic or Representativeness Argument (Lijphart 1997; Engelen
2007; Galston 2011; Hill in J. Brennan and Hill 2014: 154–173). The
argument begins by noting that in voluntary voting regimes, citizens who
choose to vote are systematically different from those who choose to
abstain. The rich are more likely to vote than the poor. The old are more
likely to vote than the young. Men are more likely to vote than women. In
many countries, ethnic minorities are less likely to vote than ethnic
majorities. More highly educated people are more likely to vote than less
highly educated people. Married people are more likely to vote than non-
married people. Political partisans are more likely to vote than true
independents (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Evans 2003: 152–6). In short,
under voluntary voting, the electorate—the citizens who actually choose to
vote—are not fully representative of the public at large. The Demographic
Argument holds that since politicians tend to give voters what they want,
in a voluntary voting regime, politicians will tend to advance the interests
of advantaged citizens (who vote disproportionately) over the
disadvantaged (who tend not to vote). Compulsory voting would tend to
ensure that the disadvantaged vote in higher numbers, and would thus tend
to ensure that everyone’s interests are properly represented.
Many people think vote selling is wrong because it would lead to bad or
corrupt voting. But, if that is the problem, then perhaps the permissibility
of vote buying and selling should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Perhaps the rightness or wrongness of individual acts of vote buying and
selling depends entirely on how the vote seller votes (J. Brennan 2011a:
135–160; Brennan and Jaworski 2015: 183–194). Suppose I pay a person
to vote in a good way. For instance, suppose I pay indifferent people to
vote on behalf of women's rights, or for the Correct Theory of Justice,
whatever that might be. Or, suppose I think turnout is too low, and so I pay
a well-informed person to vote her conscience. It is unclear why we
should conclude in either case that I have done something wrong, rather
than conclude that I have done everyone a small public service.
Certain objections to vote buying and selling appear to prove too much;
these objections lead to conclusions that the objectors are not willing to
support. For instance, one common argument against voting selling is that
paying a person to vote imposes an externality on third parties. However,
so does persuading others to vote or to vote in certain ways (Freiman
2014: 762). If paying you to vote for X is wrong because it imposes a third
party cost, then for the sake of consistency, I should also conclude that
persuading you to vote for X, say, on the basis of a good argument, is
equally problematic.
selfish voters from voting, as their votes are also unusually likely to
undermine the common good (Freiman 2014: 771–772). Further these
arguments appear to leave open that a person could permissibly sell her
vote, provided she does so after deliberating and provided she votes for
the common good. It might be that if vote selling were legal, most or even
all vote sellers would vote in destructive ways, but that does not show that
vote selling is inherently wrong.
Before one even asks whether “one person, one vote” is the right policy,
one needs to determine just who counts as part of the demos. Call this the
boundary problem or the problem of constituting the demos (Goodin 2007:
40). Democracy is the rule of the people. But one fundamental question is
just who constitutes “the people”. This is no small problem. Before one
can judge that a democracy is fair, or adequately responds to citizens’
interests, one needs to know who “counts” and who does not.
There are a number of competing theories here. The “all affected interests”
theory (Dahl 1990a: 64) holds that anyone who is affected by a political
decision or a political institution is part of the demos. The basic argument
is that anyone who is affected by a political decision-making process
should have some say over that process. However, this principle suffers
from multiple problems. It may be incoherent or useless, as we might not
know or be able to know who is affected by a decision until after the
decision is made (Goodin 2007: 52). For example (taken from Goodin
2007: 53), suppose the UK votes on whether to transfer 5% of its GDP to
its former African colonies. We cannot assess whether the members of the
former African colonies are among the affected interests until we know
what the outcome of the vote is. If the vote is yay, then they are affected; if
the vote is nay, then they are not. (See Owen 2012 for a response.) Further,
the “all affected interests” theory would often include non-citizens and
exclude citizens. Sometimes political decisions made in one country have
a significant effect on citizens of another country; sometimes political
decisions made in one country have little or no effect on some of the
citizens of that country.
One solution (Goodin 2007: 55) to this problem (of who counts as an
affected party) is to hold that all people with possibly affected interests
constitute part of the polity. This principle implies, however, that for many
decisions, the demos is smaller than the nation-state, and for others, it is
larger. For instance, when the United States decides whether to elect a
warmongering or pacifist candidate, this affects not only Americans, but a
large percentage of people worldwide.
The commonsense view of the demos, i.e., that the demos includes all and
only adult members of a nation-state, may be hard to defend. Goodin
(2007: 49) proposes that what makes citizens special is that their interests
are interlinked. This may be an accidental feature of arbitrarily-decided
national borders, but once these borders are in place, citizens will find that
their interests tend to more linked together than with citizens of other
polities. But whether this is true is also highly contingent.
issues that are deeply important to the few might continually lose out to
issues of only minor interest to the many (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010).
Relatedly, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem holds that under the right conditions,
provided the average voter is reliable, as more and more voters are added
to a collective decision, the probability that the democracy will make the
right choice approaches 1 (List and Goodin 2001). However, assuming the
theorem applies to real-life democratic decisions, whether the theorem
supports or condemns democracy depends on how reliable voters are. If
voters do systematically worse than chance (e.g., Althaus 2003; Caplan
2007), then the theorem instead implies that large democracies almost
always make the wrong choice.
Under this scheme, no one has any presumptive right to vote. Instead,
everyone has, by default, equal eligibility to be selected to become a voter.
Before the enfranchisement lottery takes place, candidates would proceed
with their campaigns as they do in democracy. However, they campaign
without knowing which citizens in particular will eventually acquire the
right to vote. Immediately before the election, a random but representative
subset of citizens is then selected by lottery. These citizens are not
automatically granted the right to vote. Instead, the chosen citizens merely
acquire permission to earn the right to vote. To earn this right, they must
then participate in some sort of competence-building exercise, such as
studying party platforms or meeting in a deliberative forum with one
another. In practice this system might suffer corruption or abuse, but,
epistocrats respond, so does democracy in practice. For epistocrats, the
question is which system works better, i.e., produces the best or most
substantively just outcomes, all things considered.
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