Claudia Joanna Theodora Hogg-Blake

Department of Philosophy (+1) 872-212-2709

University of Chicago claudiahoggblake@uchicago.edu
1115 East 58th Street claudiahoggblake.weebly.com
Chicago, IL 60637

Academic Employment

2022-24 Postdoctoral Humanities Teaching Fellow in the Department of Philosophy and in the
College, University of Chicago

Education

2022 PhD, Philosophy, University of Chicago

2014 BA (First Class Honors), Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Oxford

Specialization

AOS Moral Philosophy, Moral Psychology, Animal Ethics

AOC Social & Political Philosophy, 19th Century Philosophy, Medical Ethics

Dissertation

Title Loving Gracie: An Account of Human-Animal Love

Committee Martha Nussbaum (Chair), Agnes Callard, Matthias Haase

Abstract I develop and defend a philosophical account of love that takes seriously, where most
philosophers have not, the possibility of loving a non-human animal. According to my
account, we should understand the love that we have for our friends, romantic partners,
family members, and animal companions, as various iterations of the distinctive form of love
that takes as its object a “somebody” – a locus of subjective experience with whom there is a
possibility of intersubjective “togetherness” – and occurs in the context of a personal
relationship. I characterize such love as “caring attachment” and the relationship in which it
occurs as a (dyadic) affectional bond. I argue that such affectional bonds are possible
between humans and non-human animals, and I illustrate this through a detailed description
of the bond between me and my own dog, Gracie. Thus, the possibility of loving a non-
human animal is explained by the fact that we have something deeply in common – a need
and capacity for affectional bonding.

Work in Progress

Under review “Loving Somebody: Accounting for Human-Animal Love”

Presentations

Feb. 2025 “Living Together: Promoting Companion-Animal Agency Through the Co-
Construction of Daily Life,” conference for the Balzan research project “Animal
Capabilities, Ethics, and Law: New Directions,” University of Chicago Law School
(refereed)
April 2024 “Loving Somebody: Accounting for Human-Animal Love,” 2023-24 Online Seminar,
The Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love (refereed)
Feb. 2024 “Loving Somebody: Accounting for Human-Animal Love,” panel for The Society for
the Philosophy of Sex and Love, APA Central Meeting (refereed)
Fall 2023 “Human-Animal Love,” talk at interdisciplinary research group workshop, The View
from Everywhere: Human Knowledge in the Anthropocene, Washington University, St. Louis
(invited)
May 2023 Comments on Alice Crary and Lori Gruen’s “Animal Crisis – a Call for Animal
Justice,” Annual Spring Weissbourd Symposium, Society of Fellows, University of
Chicago (Invited)
April 2023 “Non-Human Animals and the Philosophy of Love,” Jerry Jackson Lecture in the
Humanities, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Western Carolina University
(Invited)
May 2021 “Love and Attachment,” Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
Oct. 2020 “Love and Personal Relationships,” Theoretical Philosophy Workshop, University of
Chicago
Feb. 2020 “Loving Gracie,” Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
May 2017 Comments on Jaime Edwards’ “‘Everything is as it seems and all is for the best!’ The
Origins of Ideological Belief in Cognitive and Motivated Biases,” Strangers to Ourselves:
Themes from German Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Center for Law, Philosophy &
Human Values, University of Chicago (Invited)

Public Philosophy and Media

Forthcoming, “Loving Dogs,” in conversation with Matt Teichman and Joseph Diller on the Elucidations
2023 Podcast
Feb. 2023 “Loving Your Companion Animal: A Philosopher Reflects on Human-Animal Bonds,” Humane
Heroes Valentine’s Day Talk, The Anti-Cruelty Society
July 2022 “Uchicago Graduate Student Explores the Bond Between Humans and Dogs,” University of
Chicago News (link: UChicago graduate student explores the bond between humans and dogs |
University of Chicago News)
Spring 2022 “PhD Candidate Claudia Hogg-Blake reflects on her brush with electoral politics,” Tableau
Magazine (link: Political philosophy | Tableau (uchicago.edu))

Honors

2023-25 Balzan Junior Scholar Award

$12,000 scholarship for participation in the Balzan research project, “Animal Capabilities, Ethics, and Law:
New Directions,” connected with Martha Nussbaum’s 2022 Balzan prize. Awarded for my paper proposal
“Living Together: Promoting Companion-Animal Agency Through the Co-Construction of Daily Life.”
 2021-2022 Ames Fund Stipend, University of Chicago
2021-2022 Graduation Fellowship, University of Chicago
2021-2022 Stuart Tave Teaching Fellowship, University of Chicago (declined)
Awarded for course proposal “Personal Love and Personal Relationships.” Declined due to conflict with my
Graduation Fellowship.
2015-2020 Ontario Trillium Scholarship, University of Toronto (declined)
Approximately 15 Trillium Scholarships awarded annually at University of Toronto for best-qualified
international doctoral students
2015-2016 Philosophical Quarterly Bursary, University of St Andrews (declined)
2014 Gibbs Thesis Prize in Politics, University of Oxford
Awarded to the best undergraduate thesis in Politics, for my BA thesis “The Early Marx on Alienation and
Private Property: An Assessment”

Teaching

Lecturer (University of Chicago)

Summer Introduction to the Philosophy of Love (three-week intensive course as part of the University of
2024 Chicago’s Summer Immersion Program for Pre-College Students)
Spring 2024 Philosophy of Pregnancy, Childbirth and Motherhood
Winter 2024 Philosophy of Human-Animal Relationships
Winter 2024 Human Being and Citizen II
Fall 2023 Human Being and Citizen I
Winter 2023 Love and Personhood
Winter 2023 Human Being and Citizen II
Fall 2022 Human Being and Citizen I
Fall 2022 Topics in Animal Ethics
Spring 2020 Loving Animals

Supervision (University of Chicago)

2023-24 BA Thesis in Philosophy, Title TBD, Saira Munshani

2023-24 BA Thesis in Philosophy, Title TBD, Alicia Liu

Model Class (University of Chicago)

Summer “Introduction to the Philosophy of Love” (invited)

2023 “Model Class” session taught as part of The University of Chicago’s “Phoenix Week” for underrepresented
advanced high school students

Class Visit

Spring 2023 Led a class discussion on Barbara Smuts’ paper “Encounters with Animal Minds” for Prof.
Katharine Mershon’s course Animals and Religion at Western Carolina University

Guest Lecture (University of Chicago)

Spring 2021 “Karl Marx on Alienated Labor and Free Human Production,” Guest Lecture for Prof.
Matthew Boyle’s History of Philosophy III: Kant and the 19th Century
 Course Assistant (University of Chicago)

Spring 2021 History of Philosophy III: Kant and the 19th Century (Prof. Matt Boyle)
Winter 2021 Justice at Work (Prof. Ben Laurence)
Fall 2021 Topics in Medical Ethics (Prof. Dan Brudney)
Winter 2020 Justice at Work (Prof. Ben Laurence)
Spring 2019 Self-Creation as a Philosophical and Literary Phenomenon (Prof. Agnes Callard)
Fall 2018 Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology (Prof. Ben Callard)
Spring 2018 Human Rights: Philosophical Foundations (Prof. Ben Laurence)

Pedagogical Training and Development

2022 “Forum on Teaching in the Core,” Chicago Center for Teaching and Learning
2021-2022 Reading Group: Teaching Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
Founded and organized bi-weekly pedagogy reading group for graduate students and faculty in the philosophy
department at the University of Chicago.
2022 “Accessibility in Teaching: Effective Practices,” IT Services Academic Technologies, University of
Chicago
2021 “Teaching Here and There: A Panel Discussion for Blended Synchronous Learning,” Chicago
Center for Teaching and Learning
2021 “Fundamentals of Teaching in the Humanities,” Chicago Center for Teaching and Learning
Four-part workshop series on humanities pedagogy.
2021 “Teaching @ Chicago,” Chicago Center for Teaching and Learning
2021 Workshop on Teaching the History of Philosophy (Prof. Matthias Haase), Department of
Philosophy, University of Chicago
2021 “What Comes Next? Learning from Our Pandemic Teaching,” Chicago Center for Teaching
2020 “Pedagogical Considerations for Remote and Hybrid Teaching,” Chicago Center for Teaching
2020 “Creating Inclusive and Accessible Remote Environments,” Chicago Center for Teaching
2020 “Engaging Students in Remote and Hybrid Teaching,” Chicago Center for Teaching
2019 Peer Visitation Program, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
2019 Seminar on Course Design, Chicago Center for Teaching
2019 Peer Visitation Program, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
2018 Workshop on Diversity and Inclusivity in Philosophy Pedagogy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Chicago
2018 Workshop on Philosophy Pedagogy (Prof. Agnes Callard), Department of Philosophy, University
of Chicago
2016 Midwest Faculty Seminar: “Marx’s Capital Today,” Chicago Center for Teaching

Service and Professional Development

2020-2021 Research Assistant for Martha Nussbaum, for her book Justice for Animals (2022), University of
Chicago
2020 Proof-Reader/Editor for Matthias Haase, University of Chicago
2020 Proof-Reader/Editor for Matt Boyle, University of Chicago
2018-2019 Organizer for Women in Philosophy, University of Chicago Philosophy Department
 2018-2019 Graduate Student Representative, University of Chicago Philosophy Department
2017-2019 Organizer for prospective student visiting week, University of Chicago Philosophy
Department
2016 Research Assistant for Ben Laurence, University of Chicago

Graduate Coursework (* denotes audit)

Ethics and Kant’s Ethics (Candace Vogler)

Moral Moral Sainthood (Adam Etison)
Psychology Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Brian Leiter and Michael Forster)
Love, Reasons and Reasoning (Kyla Ebels-Duggan)
Bernard Williams’ Practical Philosophy (Candace Vogler)
Recognition in Ethics (Matthias Hasse)*
Moral Psychology of the Emotions (Agnes Callard)*

Social and Law and Philosophy: Race (Martha Nussbaum and Alex Prescott-Couch)
Political Marx’s Capital (Anton Ford)*
Philosophy Plato’s Statesman (Gabriel Lear)

Mind, Sartrean Meditations (Raoul Moati)

Language, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Jonathan Lear)*
Epistemology Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations” (Jason Bridges)
The Etiology of Belief (Brian Leiter and Michael Forster)

Misc. Pragmatism (Anubav Vasudevan)*

The Problem of Free Will (Ben Callard)
Elementary Logic (Michael Kremer)

References

Martha Nussbaum (Dissertation Committee Chair) Ben Laurence (Teaching Reference)

Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law
and Ethics, University of Chicago
martha_nussbaum@law.uchicago.edu
Agnes Callard (Dissertation Committee Member)
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of
Chicago
agcallard@uchicago.edu
Matthias Haase (Dissertation Committee Member)
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of
Chicago
haase@uchicago.edu
Associate Instructional Professor in the Social
Sciences Collegiate Division and the Division of
Social Sciences, University of Chicago
benlaurence@uchicago.edu
Dan Brudney (Teaching Reference)
Florin Harrison Pugh Professor of Philosophy,
University of Chicago
dbrudney@uchicago.edu
Dissertation Overview
Loving Gracie: An Account of Human-Animal Love

The possibility of loving a non-human animal, and dogs in particular, is well documented. And yet, the
dominant view in recent Anglo-American philosophical accounts of love is that human-animal love is
not possible. This denial of the experience and testimony of vast amounts of people is, as I explain in Chapter 1
(“Loving Dogs: A Puzzle for the Philosophy of Love”), puzzling. In response to this puzzle, I develop – drawing
heavily on my own relationship with my dog, Gracie – a novel account of love that not only acknowledges the
possibility of loving a non-human animal, but argues, further, that understanding this possibility is in fact crucial
to a proper understanding of the nature of love.
The claim that one cannot love a non-human animal such as a dog follows from the influential view (e.g.,
David Velleman, Bennett Helm, Niko Kolodny) that love should be understood as occurring, distinctively, between
“persons”, where to be a “person” is to possess the rational capacity for evaluative self-reflection – a capacity
which is meant to set us apart from the other animals. Such “person-focused” accounts of love would in fact deny
the possibility not only of loving non-human animals but also – an implication that is not often made explicit –
infants and some severely cognitively disabled humans. In Chapter 2 (“Love and Rational Nature: A Critique of
Some Prominent Views”), I argue that these uncomfortable conclusions about love’s possible objects point to a
deeper problem with person-focused accounts: their impoverished account of who we can love owes to an
impoverished account of how we love. I argue that we do not in fact love other people solely qua persons, as creatures
who can either succeed or fail at living in accordance with their reflectively held values, but also qua animals, as
subject to various forms of physical and emotional thriving and suffering – many of which bear no direct relation
to their personhood. Such love takes as its object what I call a “somebody”. This notion of a somebody, broader
than that of a “person”, demarcates a distinctive kind of love, of central importance in our lives, that differs from
any attitude we might have toward a mere thing (contra e.g., Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf).
A “somebody” can be distinguished as a possible object of this distinctive kind of love in virtue of two
defining features. First, to be somebody is to be a locus of subjective experience, and thus to have a sake of one’s
own, making one a possible object of a distinctive kind of care. Second, in all but the most marginal cases, to be a
somebody is to be capable of intersubjective interaction with another somebody. In Chapter 3 (“Between Hearts:
Love and Relationships”), I argue that love should be understood as a feature of a relationship marked by a history
of interaction – that this kind of love is unintelligible outside of such a relationship. More specifically, the relevant
kinds of relationships are marked by a history of “togetherness” – moments of interaction marked not only by a
mutual recognition of each other as a somebody but also by a mutual openness, receptivity and attunement to one
another as such. Such relationships are also marked by the relatively stabled attitudes of the participants to one
another – and indeed, as such an attitude, love can be understood as a feature of such a relationship. Importantly,
neither the interactions nor the attitudes of such a relationship need be symmetrical in order for the relationship
to be of the relevant kind. I demonstrate this with respect to, for example, my interactions with my (much younger)
little sister.
In Chapter 4 (“Love as Caring Attachment”), I further characterize such relationships as affectional bonds,
in which the participants experience mutual enjoyment and affection in one another’s presence, seek at least some
frequency of togetherness with one another, miss one another during times of separation, delight in reunion, and
would experience a form of grief in the face of permanent loss or separation. We might refer to the attitudes of
each individual toward the other, within such a relationship, as attachment, understood as a felt need to be together
with the other. Love, I argue, is a form of attachment. More specifically, it should be understood as “caring
attachment.” Love involves having a felt need to be together with the beloved while also caring for the beloved
for her own sake and experiencing her as a limit to one’s own will. In characterizing love as caring attachment, I mean
to point out two things. First, that within the notion of attachment itself, as I am here using it, there is already
implicit some notion of care for the beloved for her own sake – a kind of immediate, in-the-moment care that
might be expressed in various forms of affection, and that, insofar as there is genuine togetherness, is sensitive and
responsive to the other as an independent being and a limit to one’s will. Second, insofar as one (is the kind of
being who) has also a more reflective orientation toward one’s beloved, such care will also take the form of, for
example, taking her interests into account, reflectively, in one’s deliberations, and reflectively thinking of her as an
end in herself, as precious and irreplaceable, etc.
The possibility of loving a non-human animal might be explained, then, by our having something –
something very central to our experience of love – deeply in common. That is, the need and capacity for affectional
bonding. In Chapter 5 (“Loving Gracie”), I give a detailed description of the affectional bond between me and my
dog, Gracie, within the framework provided by chapters 3 and 4. Having defined love as caring attachment, and
having allowed for asymmetries in affectional bonds, I leave it an open question whether Gracie’s attachment to
me constitutes love. I suggest that it can be understood as a genuinely caring attachment – though somewhat
different in kind to mine – but that the possibility of my loving her does not hang on this. However exactly we
choose to characterize her side of the affectional bond, what I get back from her is enough to make sense of my
love for her.