Jeremiah Joven B.

Joaquin: Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy 121

Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy:

A Critical Assessment of Two Attempts to Establish a Filipino
Philosophy

Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin

Department of Philosophy
De La Salle University

S ome philosophers here in the Philippines devote their time and effort to
resolve the issue of whether or not there is Filipino Philosophy. This issue
arises for a variety of reasons, one of which is the insistence of some Filipino
scholars to establish a uniquely Filipino frame of mind; i.e. an exclusively
Filipino flavor of thinking.1 Another of these reasons is the desire to give a
firm reaction against the marginalization of Filipino Philosophy caused by
the continuous stream of Western and Eastern Philosophies flooding the
Philippine academe.2 While still another of these reasons is the creation of a
standard for classifying written works, scholarly or otherwise, as works that
fall under the concept of Filipino Philosophy.3 Finally, another of these
reasons is the motive to set a general approach in doing research in
philosophy by a Filipino.4 These reasons, and many others not mentioned
here, may explain why it is of great importance to tackle the question whether
or not there can be something that can be called “Filipino Philosophy”.

Whatever the motivation one may have in trying to attempt at a

plausible answer for the issue at hand, the success of each attempt will be
measured by its adequacy to account for the meaning of the concept “Filipino
Philosophy,” and whether most members of the community of philosophers,
here in the Philippines and abroad, will recognize and accept such conception.
Of course the necessity for the second condition relies on the first. Since if
there is no adequate conception of what Filipino Philosophy means then
there would be nothing for philosophers to recognize and accept. Conversely,
if there is something for the members of the community of philosophers to
recognize and accept, then this would mean that there is an adequate
conception of Filipino Philosophy that is offered. Now, if these two conditions
are fulfilled, then we could affirm, with high probability, that there is a Filipino
Philosophy.
122 DALUMAT

The issue concerning the meaning of the concept “Filipino

Philosophy” is a problem in itself since different Filipino scholars have
different conceptions of what it is. And since there are different conceptions
of what Filipino Philosophy, this situation seems to imply a further problem
of settling the many motivations and persuasions that different Filipino
scholars may have in attempting to establish a Filipino Philosophy. Thus, it
is important to answer a preliminary question, even before we proceed in
considering the possibility of there being a Filipino Philosophy. This question
can be formulated as follows: what question should we start to ask in order
for us to proceed to see whether or not there is a Filipino Philosophy?

Let us see what this question entails. In order for us to understand

what is at stake in the issue that we are tackling, we should first know what
question motivated it. If we can arrive at the question that motivated the
attempts to establish a Filipino Philosophy, then we will understand, albeit
only in a crude sense, why each attempt is different from one another. If we
can see some differences between these attempts at establishing a Filipino
Philosophy, then we could arrive at a general paradigm that, later on, could
be adopted as a framework for assessing any attempt at establishing a Filipino
Philosophy. By focusing my inquiry on that preliminary question that
motivated the attempts at establishing a Filipino Philosophy I could therefore
construct a framework for assessing those attempts.

In this essay, I would like to look at two particular attempts of

developing a preliminary question that paves the way for establishing a
Filipino Philosophy: viz. Rolando Gripaldo’s Historian of Philosophy approach
and Napoleon Mabaquiao’s Strict Discipline approach.5 The former envisages
that the first question that needs to be considered in the discussion of Filipino
Philosophy must be taken from the perspective of a scholar of the history of
philosophy. The latter’s procedure is to take what academic philosophers
deem to be the characterization of their discipline. In effect, while the
former’s question is a question of a historian of philosophy; the latter’s
question is a question of a philosopher. As this essay progresses I will try to
make a critical assessment of the two attempts by first showing the strengths
and weaknesses of their respective attempts, and secondly by stressing that
their attempts, whether successful or not, should already be taken as
contributions to the effort of establishing a Filipino Philosophy.

The two attempts are similar inasmuch as they take the issue of
whether there is a Filipino Philosophy not by asking whether there is a unique
Filipino way of doing philosophy, i.e. Filipinophilosophy6. Rather, as both
are schooled in the Anglo-American tradition in philosophy, they view that
the issue is whether there is such a thing such that it is both Filipino and a
Philosophy; as to what that may be is the point of divergence between the
two theorists. That is, they view the concept of “Filipino Philosophy” not as
 Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin: Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy 123
a proper noun that denotes a particular entity or subject. They view it, rather,
as a complex word having two components: viz. “Filipino” and “Philosophy”.7
The result of this view is that both theorists are now freed from the burden
of ascertaining the entity denoted by the word “Filipino Philosophy”. That is
to say, they are freed from seeking to give an ostensive definition of the
word itself, since the concept is a conjunction of two predicates: “Filipino”
and “Philosophy”. And since the object now of the inquiry is to determine
the connotation of each predicate, it is the task of the theorists to describe
what counts as a Filipino and as a Philosophy. Furthermore, in saying that
the concept is complex, both theorists can now address a much simpler—or
rather a much theoretically workable—task, which is to ask the first question
that could make it possible to determine whether or not there is in fact
something which is both a Filipino and a Philosophy.

For Gripaldo, the questions he asked were: Who counts as a

Filipino Philosopher? And what is the most adequate approach that could
lead us to make such determination? While for Mabaquaio, the questions
he asked were: How could we say whether a particular work, written or
otherwise, is a work in8 Filipino Philosophy? And why do we consider it as
such? Obviously, the two theorists’ questions have different stresses.

Gripaldo’s questions already presuppose that we have already

determined what counts as a work in Filipino Philosophy; the only task that
is left is to look for an adequate approach that could lead us to determine
and enumerate who the personalities behind those works are. Given that
this is indeed Gripaldo’s point, we could raise a more fundamental question,
viz. What is Filipino Philosophy? This is fundamental because in Gripaldo’s
account, the question, as I see it, is not well highlighted and investigated. He
focused too much attention on individual thinkers having Filipino citizenships.
And he sets this as a necessary condition for his taxonomy. There are two
points that need some clarification here: first, is it really a necessary condition
that individual thinkers, considered to be philosophers, should have Filipino
citizenships in order for them to be considered part of Filipino Philosophy?
This question is a mouthful, but it is important to see what the answer to
this may be; since if we were to answer affirmatively, then what we are saying
is going to be a mere tautology.9 If we were to answer negatively, then this
brings forward the second point: if citizenship is not a necessary condition
for Filipino Philosophy, then why do we have to focus our attention to
individual Filipino thinkers as a terminus ad quo for our establishing a Filipino
Philosophy? I know for a fact that Gripaldo would repudiate this
interpretation of his work. And I also know that he has a deeper reason for
his attempt. However the points that I have arrived at are mere consequences
of what he has written about Filipino Philosophy. But in order to give justice
to his work, I need to go into details. I am afraid, however, that in digging
deeper, I could end up with a graver indictment.
124 DALUMAT

In the preface of his work, Gripaldo (2004b, xi) describes the

traditional or philosophical approach in Filipino Philosophy as the approach
“used by historians of philosophy.” He further points out that “when one
speaks of ‘Filipino philosophy,’ one is able to enumerate individual Filipino
philosophies.” What does this description amounts to? If we look at how
“traditional” historians of philosophy—e.g. Frederick Copleston’s History of
Philosophy or Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy or even
Etienne Gilson’s A History of Christian Philosophy—focus each of their
discussions on the history of philosophy, we would notice that they focus on
individual philosophers or general categories of which they have individual
philosophers as members. Consider Russell’s classification of Ancient Greek
Philosophy. He includes in that list philosophers from Thales to Aristotle.
However, there is a crucial difference between the way Russell classifies
personalities in philosophy and Gripaldo’s classification of so-called Filipino
Philosophers. Russell’s classification is a classification made by a historian of
philosophy looking at the effects of socio-political changes to the landscape
of philosophy. In contradistinction, Gripaldo’s classification is a classification
made by a philosopher looking at the personalities of Philippine history and,
using the categories of philosophy, labels these personalities as philosophers.
But if Gripaldo is really subscribing to the traditional approach of a historian
of philosophy, and since, as we have seen from works of historians of
philosophy, the historian of philosophy looks at certain effects of some
aspects of history to philosophy itself, then Gripaldo’s traditional approach
cannot be said to be an approach of a historian of philosophy. There seems
to be an internal inconsistency of how he describes his approach to Filipino
Philosophy since historians of philosophy are not doing what he is doing.
Gripaldo operates with the assumption that prominent personalities of
Philippine history are already philosophers. This assumption, however, can
certainly be put into question.

The problem with Gripaldo’s preferred approach10 in establishing a

Filipino Philosophy is confusing philosophy for history or history for
philosophy. He states that he intends to make a classification of Filipino
Philosophy in accordance with how traditional historians of philosophy do
theirs. But as I have pointed out, his efforts already assumes that personalities
in Philippine history are already philosophers. This assumption may lead to
detrimental consequences:11 like the question concerning the choice of those
personalities to be included in the classification, or the question whether
there really is a Filipino, or the question concerning what philosophy is, etc.
Although these questions are important points that could be raised against
Gripaldo’s approach of classification, the internal inconsistency of his
approach, as I have given above, is an issue that questions the very use of
his approach in establishing a Filipino Philosophy.
 Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin: Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy 125
Mabaquiao’s questions are more philosophically interesting because
his efforts are direct attempts to answer the question: What is Filipino
Philosophy? This he does by assessing whether a particular work—viz.
Mabini’s Decalogue—is to be considered a work in Filipino Philosophy. To
achieve this end, his investigation led him to envisage a minimum criterion
of what counts as Filipino Philosophy. For him, as with Gripaldo, the term
“Filipino Philosophy” is a conjunction of two predicates: “Filipino” and
“Philosophy”. Logical theory will tell us that a conjunction is a compound
statement having two truth assertions. In order for the conjunction to be
true, the two component assertions should be true as well. In the case of
there being a “Filipino Philosophy” the truth that is being asserted is that
there is such a thing that has both the qualities of being a Filipino and being
a Philosophy.

Mabaquiao (2007, 17-26) claims that we need to fulfill some criteria

in order to ascertain whether a work should be considered as a work in
Filipino Philosophy. As we have said, the truth of the claim that there is a
Filipino Philosophy relies on the truth that there is a Filipino and that there
is a Philosophy. To investigate further the claim that there is a Filipino
Philosophy, Mabaquiao now tries to analyze the two concepts separately
and he also tries to set some plausible account of what it entails for each of
the concepts.

For a work to be considered as Filipino, Mabaquiao explains, there

are four possible markers: first, the topic of the work has something to do
with the Philippines or its people; second, the historical context of the author
should be a Filipino historical context (i.e. the Filipino citizenship of the author
or his predisposition for Filipino sentiments and values); third, the purpose
of the work is to benefit the Philippines or its people; and fourth, the
categories used in the work by the author are categories that are Filipino
(e.g. the language used is Filipino). Fulfillment of at least one of these markers
will enable us to classify a work to be Filipino.

Mabaquiao claims that for a work to be considered as a Philosophy

we should be wary of how the word itself is used. For him, there are two
general uses of the term: the loose and strict senses of using the term
“Philosophy”. He claims that whenever we use the term “Philosophy” in the
loose sense we are in fact using it as synonym for words such as “idea”,
“view”, “opinion”, and “perspective”. He further claims that if we are going
to use the term “Philosophy” only as a synonym for those words, then we
are in the danger of proliferating usages. Consider, he says, if we were to say
that some person X has a philosophy (in the loose sense), then we can say of
him that X has such and such philosophy. But we could further ask is his
philosophy really philosophical? That is, could we consider his philosophy
to be part of philosophy?12 If this were possible, then we can see the confusion
126 DALUMAT

that this use entails. Since X’s philosophy may really be views concerning
something else other than philosophy. That is, X may be using the term
“Philosophy” merely as substitute for the term “view”. So, if X’s philosophy
(or view or idea or perspective or opinion) is claimed to be philosophical, we
need to have basic criteria for us to make such determination. These basic
criteria are found in the strict use of the term “Philosophy”.

For Mabaquiao, in classifying works as works in Philosophy, we

should use the term “Philosophy” in the strict sense. This we do if we fulfill
three minimum criteria: first, the work is presented, implicitly or explicitly,
in a logical or argumentative manner (i.e. it posits a claim and supports that
claim by giving evidence or justifications); second, the topic (or problem or
issue) that is being discussed in the work is one of the many problems or
issues in philosophy (i.e. it may be an ethical, epistemological, ontological,
or whatnot); and third, the method that is directly or indirectly used in the
work is one of the methods used in philosophy (i.e. it may be analytic,
pragmatic, feminist, dialectic, phenomenological-existential, etc.). For
Mabaquiao each of these criteria should be seen in the work in order for us
to know that the work is a work in Philosophy. That is, the three must be
seen as a conjunction; for it to be true the three components must be there.
In doing this, Mabaquiao draws a fine line between academic disciplines. He
intends to present a demarcation line between philosophy and other
academic disciplines. Since, nothing yet is offered concerning the issue of
Filipino Philosophy, his work is highly commendable.

There are two points of inquiry that I want to put forward with
regard Mabaquiao’s conception of “Filipino Philosophy”:

First, in Mabaquiao’s discussion of the concept “Filipino”, he

suggests that there can be degrees for a work to be considered as Filipino
(cf. 2007, 18-19). As we have seen earlier, Mabaquiao gave four markers for
us to consider. He suggests that if we have a particular work that has only
one of these markers present, we can still consider it as Filipino but only in
a lesser degree as opposed to a work that has all the four markers. But even
if we admit that there are degrees of a work being Filipino, we cannot help
but classify these works together if they have at least one of the markers.
Now, if we consider this idea, then it seems that there is surely only one
minimum requirement for a work to be Filipino; all the others are peripheral.13
We cannot say that the topic is that minimum criterion since it would not be
necessary if the work focuses on the ways and cultures of Filipino tribes we
are speaking as a Filipino. Foreigners talking about Filipinos have Filipinos
as subjects of their discourses. But we cannot say of their publish works that
they are works of Filipinos. Rather, we say that they are works about Filipinos.
But works “about Filipinos” is not the same thing as works of “Filipinos”.
 Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin: Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy 127
We cannot say that the minimum requirement for determining a
work’s Filipinohood, if I may use the term, is its purpose. Even if a particular
work would benefit the whole country, it would not mean that that work is
Filipino. What it entails, rather, is that it is a work for Filipinos. But a work
being for Filipinos does not entail a work as a Filipino. Consider: if I am
laboring for the welfare of criminals, I cannot say that I am a criminal myself,
since I may be doing this in order for me to live. In effect, if a foreigner
makes a work that will benefit Filipinos, we cannot say that that person is
Filipino. What we can only say is that that person’s work is for the Filipino.
So, it cannot be the case that the purpose of the work should be the minimum
requirement for a work to be considered as Filipino.

We are only down to two markers: viz. the historical context and
the categories of the author. These two can be reduced to one. When we
speak of the categories used by the author, we are implying that the author
has a unique historical context where these categories were derived.
Language, as an example by Mabaquiao, presupposes a cultural and historical
situation that a speaker is at. Without a history, the author will not have
those categories. Having ascertained that the markers are reducible—or least
implications of one another—we could say that this is the minimum
requirement that we use in order to judge whether a work is Filipino. What
this implies is not that we are solely concerned with the citizenship of the
author. Mabaquiao, in a conversation we had, denies that citizenship is really
that important. His reason is that citizenship is merely a fiction. A Filipino
may have an American citizenship, but his predispositions are still Filipino.
Being a Filipino amounts to the historical context of the person. Wherever
that is we do not know. But in plain fact, when we see a work that is made by
a Filipino, we immediately call that work as Filipino. It may have the
Philippines for its topic. Or its results may benefit the people of the
Philippines. Whatever the case may be, it is still a work by a Filipino, and
that is all that matters in classifying it as truly Filipino. In effect, we classify
works as Filipino because it is by a Filipino. That a work is on Filipinos is
important to consider. Same with whether the work is for Filipinos. But the
crucial thing that should be considered is whether the work is done by a
Filipino. Only upon such a consideration can we say that such a work is
Filipino.

The second point I want to raise is concerning the concept

“Philosophy” and “Filipino Philosophy”. Mabaquiao convincingly argues that
we need to fulfill three basic criteria in order for us to judge whether a work
is philosophical—viz. it is in argumentative form, it concerns itself to some
problem or issue of philosophy, and it uses at least one method of
philosophizing. I have no qualms with this description. However, a unique
problem may arise once we conjoin the term “Filipino” to the concept
“Philosophy”. Usually whenever we combine two elements, each having
128 DALUMAT

unique properties, we have a resultant compound that could have both

elements’ unique properties, or else there could be emergent properties
springing from the combination that were not present before such
combination. It is curious to think along these lines when we think about
Filipino Philosophy. Given Mabaquiao’s description of Filipino Philosophy,
what properties could emerge out of this concoction? Or would some
properties of the element philosophy wane because it is combined with the
element Filipino (or vice-versa)? I think further tinkering should be done
along these lines in order for us to conceive Filipino Philosophy in a different
light. This task however is still out there and beyond the subject of this essay.

As we can see now the theorists’ questions reveal their respective

starting points and objectives in their attempts to establish a Filipino
Philosophy. There are serious objections raised against Gripaldo’s approach;
while there are curious points of inquiry that were presented to Mabaquiao’s
method. Although their starting points are different, both theorists want a
common end, i.e. the establishment of a Filipino Philosophy from the
perspective of logical and analytical precision. The importance of what they’re
doing to reach their ends is something that future scholars, Filipino or not,
should look into. A final curious thought: would it be possible to synthesize
Gripaldo and Mabaquiao? Well, I think it is indeed possible. All we have to
do is to discuss this over a cup of coffee.
 Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin: Gripaldo and Mabaquiao on Filipino Philosophy 129

ENDNOTES

1
I think that this is the reason that motivated Leonardo Mercado and
Florentino Timbreza to do their respective researches in Filipino Philosophy (see
Leonardo Mercado. 1976. Elements of Filipino Philosophy. Tacloban: Divine Word
University Publications; and Florentino Timbreza. 1982. Pilosopiyang Filipino . Manila:
Rex Bookstore).
2
Cf. Rolando Gripaldo. 2004a. Is there a Filipino Philosophy? The
Philosophical Landscape: A Panoramic Introduction to Philosophy . Manila: Philippine
National Philosophical Research Society.
3
Cf. Napoleon Mabaquiao, Jr. 2007. Ang “Tunay na Dekalogo” ni Mabini
bilang isang gawa sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino. Daluyan; Rolando Gripaldo. 2004b. Filipino
Philosophy: Traditional Approach Part 1 Section, 1 . Manila: De La Salle University
Press.
4
Cf. Gripaldo (2004a) and Gripaldo (2004b).
5
The terms “historian of philosophy approach” and “strict discipline
approach” are still in its early formulation and may still be subject for revision. In
Gripaldo’s terminology the label “historian of philosophy approach” is what he calls
the “traditional or philosophical approach” (Gripaldo 2004b). His use of the term
“philosophical” can however be a subject of serious dispute. This I will show later.
6
I ’d like to coin this term to denote those theories that assume that the
concept “Filipino Philosophy” is a proper noun.
7
On the one hand Mabaquiao is explicit about this (see Mabaquiao 2007,
15-27). While, on the other hand, Gripaldo is not. His view was only revealed to me
in a casual conversation.
8
Of course Gripaldo and Mabaquiao are both working on Filipino
Philosophy. Their works are attempts at classifying something as included in
Filipino Philosophy. What that something is, is yet to be known.
9
It is funny to think about it this way: if some foreigner were to come to us
and ask: what is Filipino Philosophy? Using Gripaldo’s suggestion, we would have
answered: it is a philosophy by Filipinos. It is as if we were asked: what is an alarm
clock, and then we answered: it is a clock that alarms.
10
Tomas Rosario states that Gripaldo’s bias is for the traditional approach.
See his foreword of Gripaldo’s work in (Gripaldo. 2001.
Filipino Philosophy: A Critical Bibliography, 1774-1997, 2nd edition. Manila:
De La Salle University Press.)
11
Andrew Gonzalez affirms this intuition by saying that Gripaldo’s
classification is “by necessity controversial”. See ibid.
12
This question reminds me of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument
concerning the defining property of the concept “good.” In his argument Moore
asks us to consider any definition of the good. If the definition is correct, then we
could not ask whether that defining property is good.
13
It is like saying that for a disjunction to be true at least one of its disjuncts
should be true. If we apply that to the concept “Filipino”, as Mabaquiao does, then
we could arrive at only one requirement as the minimum criterion by which we
judge whether a work is truly Filipino. All the rest of the markers will just be add-ons
to this basic requirement.