LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

MODULE 5
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN
TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES

Article 278- 287 of the Labor Code of the Philippines

Prepared by:

Atty. Alyssa Clarizze E. Malaluan

Guest Lecturer
BSU ARASOF- NASUGBU
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

MODULE INTRODUCTION

This module primarily focuses on the concept of strikes

and lockouts; things that may led to such actions and the
rights and obligations of both labor and management during
the existence of such actions.

INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOME

At the end of the module, the student should be able to:

1. Know the concept and nature of strikes and lockouts as

well as foreign involvement in trade union activities;

2. Determine things that may led to such actions;

3. Recognize the rights and obligations of both labor and

management during the existence of strikes and lockouts;
and

4. Determine the involvement of the government during

strikes and lockouts as well as the penalties in case of
violations.
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CHAPTER I
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS

1. Concerted Activities.
The right to engage in concerted activities enjoys the protection of the
Constitution and the Labor Code. Section 3, Article XIII of the K Constitution
commands the State, among other things, to guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. On
the other hand, Article 278(b) of the Labor Code provides that workers shall
have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.
Concerted activities within the contemplation of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Labor Code referred to above are activities that the
workers perform in concert with one another for the purpose of securing better
terms and conditions of employment or for the protection of their collective
interests. They are coercive actions in the form of economic pressure brought
to bear on the owners of business to persuade them to yield to the worker's
demands, whether these be for improved employment benefits or for the
reparation of injuries brought about by harmful acts of the management.
There are three kinds of concerted activities that are more commonly
used by workers, namely: strike-the temporary stoppage of work as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute; picketing – the marching to and fro at the
employer's premises, usually accompanied by a display of placards and other
signs making known the facts in a labor dispute; and-boycott – the concerted
refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a
like refusal (Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586.) However,
only the first two are identified by name in the Labor Code.
Employers have a right to engage in a coercive activity of their own, the
counterpart of strike, which is likewise recognized under Article 278(b) of the
Labor Code. This is known as lockout, which is the temporary refusal of an
employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
Strike and lockout are usually seen as results of labor disputes,
although they could also be the cause of labor disputes other than those that
gave rise to them. But, more than these, they are also modes of labor dispute
settlement. To illustrate: a labor dispute exists, which constitutes a ground for
a strike or lockout, so either the union declares a strike or the employer
declares a lockout, in the hope that the other party would yield to the pressure
of such action; and if the other party does give in and accept the demand or
proposal of the initiator of the action, and the parties reach an agreement, then
the dispute is solved.
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The strike or lockout thus served effectively as a tool for settlement.

Nevertheless, strike and lockout are not preferred modes of labor dispute
settlement according to a declared policy in labor relations. The preferred
modes are collective bargaining and negotiations, conciliation, mediation and
voluntary arbitration. (Article 218[a].)
The value of strike as a weapon of the laboring class has been extolled by
no less than our Supreme Court in the following words:
"Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor
in protecting the rights-of employees to improve the terms and
conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed
countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk
in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor
disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic
crunch continues to enfeeble the already marginalized working class,
the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed
it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can
correct abuse against labor. It remains as the great equalizer. (Bisig
ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC, 226 SCRA
499.)
2. Strike and Lockout.
"Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. "Lockout" means the
temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. (Article 219 [o] and [p].)
Broken down into its essential elements, a strike is characterized by a
work stoppage which is temporary in duration, accomplished through the
concerted action of employees, and caused by an industrial or labor dispute.
The work stoppage lasts, at least in theory, until the dispute which led to
it is settled, or it is enjoined by the proper authority.
An action is concerted if it is done by a group of persons acting in
unison in the pursuit of a common purpose. In its legal context, the group
referred to is a legitimate labor organization composed of employees of the
employer with whom they have a dispute.
The stoppage of work must be the result of an industrial or labor
dispute. A "labor dispute," under Article 219(1), includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. The
labor dispute, however, to be a valid cause of a strike, should be one between
the employees, represented by a legitimate labor organization, and their
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

employer. An inter-union or intra-union dispute, although a labor dispute,

cannot be a ground for a strike. (Article 278[b].)
It should be pointed out, however that the term "strike" includes not only
concerted work stoppages but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts
to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment. and facilities, and similar
activities. (Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employee Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc., 512 SCRA 432.)
A lockout is not a concerted action because an employer, as a rule. acts
alone when it declares a lockout. It is also a temporary stoppage of work, but it
is not done by means of a voluntary withdrawal from work by the employees
but by the employer refusing to provide work to them. Like a strike, a lockout
is also the result of a labor dispute between the employer and the employees.
3. Provisions Common to Strike and Lockout.
Strike and lockout share common requirements for their validity, as well
as common recourses on the part of the proper authorities in dealing with
them.
1) Strike and lockout may be declared only on two grounds: Unfair Labor
Practice, and Collective Bargaining Deadlock. As. stated earlier, the law
specifically prohibits a strike or lockout over an inter-union or intra-union
dispute because this kind of controversy is not with the employer.

A ULP strike or lockout is one brought about by unfair labor practice

committed by the employer or the labor organization, as the case may be. An
economic strike, caused by a deadlock in collective bargaining, is one held to
force wage or other economic concessions from the employer which the latter
is not required by law to grant. Such a deadlock may also lead the employer to
declare a lockout. A notice of strike or lockout in the prescribed form must be
2) filed in the DOLE (specifically in the appropriate regional branch of the
NCMB) at least 30 days before the intended date thereof in cases of collective
deadlock, or at least 15 days from the intended date thereof in cases of unfair
labor practice.

2) A notice of strike may be filed by the duly recognized or certified

collective bargaining agent, or, in its absence, by any legitimate labor
organization in behalf of its members. A notice of lockout may be filed by the
employer. A copy of the said notices is required to be served on the other party
concerned. (Article 278[c]; Section 7, Rule XXII, Book V, Omnibus Rules.)

3) A “cooling off” shall be observed by the parties during the applicable notice
period, and the NCMB shall exert efforts to effect a settlement between them
through conciliation and mediation. The parties are under obligation to
participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the
NCMB. (Article 278[e]; Section 9, Rule XXII, Book V, Omnibus Rules.)
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However, in case of dismissal from employment of duly elected union

officers, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union
is threatened, the 15-day-cooling-off period (in a ULP strike) shall not apply
and the union may take action immediately. (Article 278[c].) This means, under
the Omnibus Rules, that the union may declare a strike immediately after the
strike vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate
regional branch of the NCMB. (Section 7, Rule XXII, Book V, Omnibus Rules.)
Consequently, the union may disregard not only the 15- day cooling-off
period but also the 7-day period that is otherwise required to elapse from the
date of submission of the strike-vote results before it may conduct a strike. In
this situation, the union is allowed to take action immediately, meaning to
declare a strike without waiting for the lapse of the said periods, because its
survival as an organization is at stake. If the rule were otherwise, the strike
could turn out to be a futile exercise.
During the conciliation proceedings, the parties are prohibited from
doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the dispute.
The said proceedings, however, do not operate to render an employer's previous
orders to its employees in connection with their work illegal or unenforceable,
so as to excuse continued noncompliance therewith. The employer may
appropriately penalize such defiance, to the extent of dismissing the erring
employees. (GTE Directories Corporation v. Sanchez, 197 SCRA 452.)
4) A decision to strike must be approved by the majority 4) of all the members of
the union in the collective bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot
in a meeting or referendum called for the purpose. On the other hand, a
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of
Directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership,
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting for the purpose. That decision is valid
for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. (Article 278[f].)

5) The results of the strike or lockout vote must be submitted to the DOLE
(appropriate regional branch of the NCMB) at least seven days before the
intended date of the strike or lockout, subject. to the cooling-off period. (Idem.)
The taking of the strike vote (and, by analogy, the lockout vote) and reporting
the same may be done. during the cooling- off period. (First City Interlink
Corporation v. Confesor, 273 SCRA 124.)

6) The Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume 6) jurisdiction over a

labor dispute and decide it, or certify it to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, if in his opinion it is causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest. An order of assumption
or certification has the effect of enjoining the intended strike or lockout, or, if
one is already taking place, of a return-to-work order whereby the employer
should resume operation and readmit the striking or locked out employees
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
(Article 278[g].)

Regarding the proper basis for deciding to assume jurisdiction, the

Supreme Court has held that assumption on the basis of “obtaining
circumstances" such as "inconveniences in the community" or “work
disruptions in an industry" and not on the determination that the industry
involved is indispensable to the national interest, the standard set by the
legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, because it would be practically allowing the Secretary to
intervene in any labor dispute at his pleasure. Pursuant to that standard, a
match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an "industry
indispensable to the national interest," as it cannot be in the same category as
generating or distributing of energy or those undertaken by banks, hospitals
and export-oriented industries. (PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. Brilliantes, 304
SCRA 747.)

Using the same standard, the Court had earlier also-ruled that the
business of production and publication of telephone directories could not be
described as an industry affecting the national interest. (GTE Directories
Corporation v. Sanchez, 197 SCRA 452.)

In both the PHIMCO and GTE cases, the Supreme Court seem to have
equated the phrase "industry indispensable to the national interest" with such
essential activities as "generation or distribution of energy" or those
undertaken by “banks, hospitals and export-oriented industries," where
strikes and lockouts were prohibited under the original P.D. 823, the labor
relations law that immediately preceded the Labor Code. The indicative list of
vital industries under the said law which, for a certain period, were reflected
in Article 270 of the Labor Code, also included companies engaged in
transportation and communication, those engaged in the production of
essential communities, and schools and colleges. The present law does not
include any such a list.

Consistent with that kind of equation, the Supreme Court has considered
as an industry indispensable to the national interest a company engaged in
the manufacture of food products (Union of Employees v. NLRC, 192 SCRA
414) and an educational institution (Philippine School of Business
Administration v. Noriel, 164 SCRA 402.)

The same standard of determination applies to certification of strike or

lockout disputes to the NLRC because, under Article 278(g), it belongs in the
same class or remedies as assumption of jurisdiction and is subject to the
same qualifying condition as the latter.
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What the Secretary is authorized to assume jurisdiction over is "the

dispute" meaning the labor dispute that is causing or likely to cause a strike,
and, according to prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, that authority
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom,
including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has original jurisdiction. Having
assumed jurisdiction over the main dispute, the Secretary may, upon motion,
consolidate with it pending cases related thereto, such as a complaint for ULP,
a petition to declare the strike illegal, and a petition for injunction, involving
the same parties. (Industrial Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 205
SCRA 59.)

The above ruling appears to have reversed that in the earlier case of
Philippine Airlines v. Secretary of Labor and Employment (193 SCRA 223),
which was to the effect that the Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained the company from taking disciplinary measures against its guilty
employees, saying that all that he could enjoin was the holding of the strikes
but not the company's right to take action against union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts.

This seeming conflict was reconciled by the Court in the case of St.
Scholastica's College v. Torres (210 SCRA 565), where it said that the ruling in
the PAL case was due to the fact that, in the latter case, the question of
illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary for resolution. As
thus reconciled, the prevailing principle is that before the Secretary may take
cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, the
same must be involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to
him for resolution.

In the case of certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC. Section 5(b),
Rule IX of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that "all cases between the
same parties, except when the certification order specifies the issues
submitted for arbitration, that are already filed or may be filed are relevant to
or proper incidents of the certified case, shall be considered subsumed or
absorbed by the certified case and shall be decided by the Commission, sitting
in the appropriate division," the policy and purpose of certification being to
have "a full and complete settlement or adjudication of all labor disputes
between the parties as well as issues that are relevant to or incidents of the
certified issues." (Section 1, Ibid.)

The discretion to assume jurisdiction (or to a certify the dispute to the

NLRC) may be exercised without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given
to any of the parties. (Capitol Medical Center v. Trajano, 461 SCRA 457). An
order of assumption (or certification) is immediately executory, even during
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration therefor. (Baguio Colleges
Foundation v. NLRC, 222 SCRA 288.)
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

7) In the case of strike or lockout in hospitals, clinics and 7) similar medical

institutions, it is the duty of the striking union or the locking-out employer to
provide and maintain an effective skeletal work force of medical and other
health personnel of such numbers and such kinds as are necessary to ensure
the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of the patients, for
the duration of the strike or lockout. The movement and services of such
skeletal work force shall be unhampered and unrestricted. In addition, the
Secretary shall, within 24 hours from knowledge of the occurrence of the
strike or lockout, assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute causing the
same, or certify it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. (Article 278[g].)

8) The President of the Philippines may at any time, intervene and assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute that is causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry which is indispensable to the national interest. (Ibid.)
4. Prohibited Activities.
Article 279 prohibits any labor organization or employer from declaring a
strike or lockout without having first bargained collectively under Title VII of
Book V of the Labor Code, or without first having filed the notice required by
Article 278, or without the necessary strike or lockout vote having been
obtained and reported, or after assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration, or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
Article 279 also prohibits any employer from having a strike- breaker, or
any person from being employed as such. A strike- breaker, under Article
219(r), means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes, through force,
violence, coercion, threat or intimidation, with any peaceful picketing by
employees during any labor controversy affecting wages, hours or conditions of
work or in the exercise of the right of self-organization or collective bargaining.
The same Article likewise prohibits any person engaged in picketing from
committing any act of violence, coercion or intimidation, or obstructing the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstructing public thoroughfares, and an public officer or employee, including
officers and personnel of the Armed Forces and of the Police, or any armed
person, from bringing in, introducing or escorting in any manner any
individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of
the strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police are enjoined to keep
out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts are
occurring therein; but no public officer is prevented from taking any measure
necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or
enforce the law and legal order.
"Strike area” means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or
offices, including the sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer
struck against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit from said
establishment. (Article 219 [s].)
5. Legality of Strike.
A strike while recognized as a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle
for existence and considered as the most effective instrument for protecting the
right of employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment,
must be pursued within legal bounds in order to be valid. The right to strike as
a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or
destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise. (Association of
Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219)
The right to strike, like the right to engage in any other concerted
activities to attain their legitimate objectives, i18 guaranteed by the Labor
Code. It may, however, be forbidden or restricted by law o contract. (Ilaw at
Buklod ng Mangagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 Consequently, it may safely be
stated, as a general proposition, that a strike is valid and enjoys legal
protection if it is not declared or carried out in violation of any legal or
contractual provision that is intended to limit the exercise of the right to such
concerted activity Conversely, it is illegal if declared or conducted in violation of
an applicable law or agreement.
The law on strike is found in Title VIII and a part of Title IX. both of
Book V of the Labor Code. Different articles therein provide. in the order in
which they occur, the only grounds or purposes for which a strike may be
declared; the procedure to be followed before actually conducting a strike;
when a strike may be enjoined; the unlawful means of carrying out a strike;
and where a strike is prohibited by necessary implication. (Articles 278, 279,
291.)
With respect to contract, the parties to a CBA may include therein alno-
strike clause, which forbids resort by employees to a strike as a means of
settlement of a labor dispute.
Thus, a strike is illegal if declared for an unlawful purpose or without
complying with the procedural requirements; or in defiance of an injunction; or
carried out in an-unlawful manner; or declared in violation of a legal
prohibition; or is contrary to an existing agreement.
1) A strike may be validly declared on two grounds, unfair 1) labor practice
and collective bargaining deadlock. If declared on grounds other than these
two, a strike is illegal. (Pangasinan Workers Union v. Aguas, 150 SCRA
429.) Article 278 (b) specifically prohibits a strike over an inter-union or
intra-union dispute because, in this kind of controversy, there is no dispute
with the employer.
As to lawful purpose, therefore, a strike is either an unfair labor practice or
an economic strike. A ULP strike is one provoked by unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. An economic strike is one that is held to force
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wage or other economic concessions from the employer which the latter is not
required by law to grant; it takes place after a deadlock is reached in the
collective bargaining negotiations over the said concessions.
A ULP strike is not rendered illegal by the fact that the allegation of unfair
labor practice committed by the employer turned out to be untrue; the
presumption of legality prevails. (Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
M. Greenfield v. Ramos 326 SCRA 428.) What saves the strike from illegality is
the striking union's belief in good faith, warranted by the circumstances, that
the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice against it or its members,
although in fact no ULP was committed. (Shell Oil Worker's Union v. Shell
Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39 SCRA 289.)
A strike is illegal if declared on trivial, unjust or unreasonable grounds,
which is the case where it was staged at the instance of the union president as
a protest against his supposed dismissal for union activities when the truth
was that he voluntarily resigned (Interwood Employees Association v.
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, 99 SCRA 82);
or where the strike was declared to protest against the rearranging of office
furniture and the changing of seating arrangements done by the management.
(Reliance Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. NLRC 193 SCRA 356.)
A strike over a wage distortion dispute is also illegal, not only because it is
not based on either ULP or collective bargaining deadlock, but also because the
Labor Code itself provides, in Article 124, the procedure for resolving such a
dispute. (Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586.)
A strike for union recognition is illegal where-the question of representation
is pending before the proper forum (Luzon Marine Department v. Roldan. 86
Phil. 507), or if declared by the minority union after losing in a certification
case. (United Restaurant Employees Labor Union v. Torres, 26 SCRA 441.) A
union recognition strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's
union, and not the other contending group, as the employee's collective
bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite
the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition,
and lack of formal certification as the exclusive bargaining representative in the
bargaining unit. (Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v.
NLRC, 305 SCRA 219.)
But where the majority status of the union is not in doubt and, in spite
thereof, the company refuses to entertain the union's bargaining demands, the
strike declared by that union on account of such refusal is not illegal, because
the ground for the strike is not simply a rejected demand for union recognition
but refusal to bargain on the part of the company, which constitutes unfair
labor practice (Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Associations y. CIR,
44 SCRA 350.) As observed earlier, the duty to bargain on the part of the
employer arises where the union has satisfied the jurisdictional preconditions
for bargaining collectively. On the other hand, an ecnomic strike is not
rendered illegal by the fact that the striking union's bargaining demands are
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

unreasonable and the company is not. in position to grant the same. (Caltex
Philippines Inc. v. Philippine Labor Organizations-Caltex Chapter, 93 Phil.
295.) Otherwise, a lawful means of seeking better conditions of employment
would in effect be outlawed. The demands, if unreasonable, may be rejected;
after all the duty to bargain collectively does not compel a party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession. (Article 263.)
2) In requiring a strike notice and cooling-off period, the 2) avowed intent of the
law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. Thus, under
Article 278(e), it is the duty of the DOLE “to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement." The taking and reporting of a
strike vote are necessary to give assurance that the strike was decided upon
by the majority of the members of the union, unlike in the past where many
disastrous strikes were staged upon the mere insistence of minority groups
within the union. (National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Vejera, 114 SCRA
354.)
Consonant with the said objectives, and due to the fact that strikes affect
public interest, the requirements of strike notice, strike vote and report of the
same, and cooling-off period are mandatory and must be complied with. (First
City Interlink Corporation v. Confesor, 272 SCRA 124.) Non-observance of
these requirements renders a strike illegal, (Reliance Security and Insurance
Company v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 365.)
The mere failure of the striking union to serve a copy of its notice of
strike on the employer, coupled with a declaration of a strike on a day set for a
conciliation conference, made the strike illegal. (Filipino Pipe and Foundry, Inc.
v. NLRC, 318 SCRA 68.) A deficiency of one day from the mandatory seven-day
strike ban (referring to the period following the submission of the strike vote
report) is a fatal defect which renders the strike illegal. (CCBPI Postmix
Workers Union v. NLRC(299 SCRA 410.) Also declared illegal was a strike that
was staged without prior submission of the result of the strike vote. (Samahan
ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 242.)
3) The assumption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of a labor dispute
or his certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration under
Article 278(g) has the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike. When a strike has already taken place, the assumption or
certification order also operates as a return-to-work order. In either case, an
injunction, prohibitory in the first and mandatory in the second, comes into
effect by operation of law. Defiance thereof has dire consequences for the
offenders.
Mention has been made earlier of the executory nature of an order of
assumption or certification, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration thereof or any question regarding its validity. Such an order
being mandatory in character, any defiance thereof is illegal. (Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396.) Such defiance amounts
to violation of an existing injunction.
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

4) Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose 4) is lawful, the
strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
(Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219.)
This is true even where, in addition, all the procedural requirements of the law
have been complied with. This is because, to be valid, a strike must be pursued
within legal bounds. The Constitution itself, in guaranteeing the right to strike,
gives the admonition that it should be "in accordance with law."
In the aforecited AIUP case, the Supreme Court stated that there are
limits for the exercise of the right to strike, among them the prohibited
activities under Article 279, particularly paragraph (e) which says that no
person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation; or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes; or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Indeed, the said acts are the only ones among those prohibited under
Article 279 which can be considered for the purpose of declaring a strike illegal
as to the means employed in conducting the same, since they are the only ones
that pertain to strikers or those engaged in picketing. Picketing usually
accompanies a strike.
However, there can be a strike without any picketing because the latter
is not a part of the definition of the former, or a necessary element thereof.
There can also be picketing without a strike if there is no work stoppage and
the picketing is done by employees during non-working hours.
Illegal acts during a strike are mostly associated with picketing, which
refers to the activity of strikers whereby patrols are placed at or near the place
of employment and these patrols employ placards, speech and other means of
communication to make known the existence of a labor dispute, to persuade
other people to cooperate with the strikers by not dealing with the employer
during the pendency of the strike. The means employed are communication
and persuasion. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary; p.702, citation omitted.)
Other authorities describe picketing as a marching to and fro at or near
the employer's premises, usually accompanied by banners and other signs by
which the strikers make known to the public their dispute with the employer. (I
Teller 320, cited in the Fernandez, Labor Relations Law, p. 294.) It is said that
it has to be a marching or moving picket, because what is being exercised is
the pedestrian's right of passage. an unmoving picket across the employer's
gate or on a street is illegal picketing if it effectively obstructs free ingress to
and egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or obstructs a
public thoroughfare, in violation of Article 279(e). The prohibition in this
paragraph is directed against persons engaged in picketing because it is in the
conduct thereof that the proscribed acts are most likely to happen. The picket
line, more than the bargaining table, is the true arena of labor management
conflicts.
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

Consequently, picketing, as part of the constitutional freedom of

expression and as a legitimate weapon of labor, is a protected activity if it
consists of inducing workers or third persons through fair persuasion to
withhold dealing with the employer. It does not include molestation or physical
harassment, actual or threatened physical harm and material and fraudulent
representations. In fact, picketing may be a nuisance if it constitutes an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to substantially interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or if it constitutes an unlawful
obstruction to the free passage or use in the customary manner of a street.
(Moreno, op. cit.)
It is settled doctrine that strikers are not allowed to picket innocent
bystanders, or neutral parties, i.e., establishments and persons with no
industrial connection to the labor dispute involved in the strike, such as those
that share common premises or a common passageway with the strike-bound
company and who are adversely affected by the picketing of the strikers. Such
neutral parties are entitled to be insulated from the industrial action so that
the sphere of communication or demonstration may be confined or localized to
the parties to the dispute. The remedy of injunction under the Rules of Court
applies; this is not a labor injunction which the Labor Code prohibits the
regular courts to issue, because there is no labor dispute between the strikers
and the neutral parties. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Union v. Cloribel,
27 SCRA 465; Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers
Union, 108 SCRA 161.)
But where the parties involved in the industrial activity are the labor
disputants themselves, the courts should adopt a hands- off stance because
they have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising
there from, not even where the nature of the business of the strikebound firm
requires close attention, for jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the
demands of emergency. (Associate Labor Unions v. Borromeo, 166 SCRA 99.)
The banners and similar materials used in picketing must not carry
untruthful messages or statements; these are not constitu- tionally protected
free speech that render unlawful the picketing activity.
5) A strike is also illegal if declared in violation of a law that prohibits it, such as
strike by government employees or those embraced by the Civil Service,
including those employed in the different government agencies,
instrumentalities and subdivisions and in government-owned or-controlled
corporations with their own charters.
The prohibition is found in the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Right of Government Employees to Self-organization, which provide, among
other things, as follows: "The terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, and
government-owned or- controlled corporations with original charters, are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof."
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

That provision is in consonance with Article 291 of the Labor Code which
states that the terms and conditions of employment of government employees,
including those of government-owned or controlled corporations (with original
charters) shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The
law and rules of the Civil Service do not allow strikes.
Is such prohibition sanctioned by the Constitution? It should be
remembered that what the constitution guarantees is the right. to strike in
accordance with law. A reasonable interpretation of the phrase "in accordance
with law," in relation to the right to strike is that the said right may be
exercised only when and where the law allows it and in the manner, and upon
compliance with the procedural requirements, prescribed thereby.
Moreover, in the case of SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals
(175 SCRA 686), the Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the record of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution, the intention was to grant to government employees the right to
form unions, but not the right to strike. The Court stated further that since the
rule, both under the Industrial Peace Act and the Labor Code, is that the terms
and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employer. (Citing Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1.)
In the case of Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (281 SCRA 657), the Supreme
Court distinguished between the right of public-school teachers, as employees
covered by the Civil Service Law, to assemble peacefully and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, and absenting themselves from their
schools during regular school days, without proper authority, in order to
participate in a mass protest. The Court said: Had petitioners availed
themselves of their free time – recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -to
dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within
the bounds of the law, no one – not the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Civil Service Commission or even this Court – could have held them
liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it
was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily
disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be held responsible.
The Court also ruled that: "“As regards the right to strike, the Constitution
itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso, in 'accordance with law.' This is a
clear manifestation that the State may, by law, regulate the use of that right, or
even deny certain sectors, such right." The strikers were punished with
suspension 407 and ordered reinstated without back wages.
6) It is well-settled that an economic strike declared in 6) violation of a no-strike
clause in the CBA is illegal. An economic strike, it will be recalled, is one
whose purpose is to force wage or other economic concessions from the
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

employer which he is not required by law to grant. It refers to a strike

grounded on a deadlock in collective bargaining.
Is the rule the same in ULP strike? The Supreme Court has somehow
vacillated on this issue. In the case of Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. CIR (90
SCRA 135), the Court ruled that a no- strike clause in a CBA applies only to an
economic strike, not to a strike based on ULP committed by the employer, even
if it turns out that no ULP was actually committed.
However, in the case of GOP-CCP Workers Union v. CIR (93 SCRA 116)
the Court in effect reversed Philippine Metal Foundries by holding that a
stipulation in the CBA that "in case of unfair labor practice on the part of either
party, there will be no strikes, lockouts or any prejudicial action until the
question or grievance is resolved by the proper court if not settled through a
grievance procedure therein outlined" was valid and binding, and that a strike
held against such an agreement, considered to be an "exclusive arbitration
clause," was illegal. This ruling was reiterated in Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa v. NLRC (198 SCRA 586.)
But, in Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC (219 SCRA 47), the Court, citing
Philippine Metal Foundries, ruled that a no-strike clause in a CBA applies to
economic strikes and not to strikes founded on unfair labor practice.
It has been held in this connection that a no-strike stipulation in a CBA
is a personal undertaking of the contracting union, so that in case of a change
in the bargaining agent while the CBA is subsisting, the same need not be
assumed by the new representative even though the substitutionary doctrine
provided otherwise. This rule finds more urgency today in view of Associated
Trade Unions v. Trajano (164 SCRA 318), where it was held that a CBA that
was concluded after the filing of a petition for certification election may be
rejected and replaced in case the challenger emerges as winner in the election
over the former incumbent agent which entered into the CBA.
6. Consequences of Strike and Lockout.
The stoppage of work that attends a strike or lockout, due to the workers'
concerted withdrawal from work in the case of strike or the employer's refusal
to provide work in the case of lockout is intended to be temporary and does not
automatically sever the employment relationship between the strikers or locked
out employees, on the one hand, and the strike-bound or locking out employer,
on the other. That relationship, or, more precisely, the effects thereof, are
merely suspended for the duration of the strike or lockout. Whether or not
such suspension will become actual termination especially in the case of a
strike, depends on the issue of legality of the strike itself or the acts committed
in furtherance thereof.
Under Article 279, any worker whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with
full back wages. For that matter, one can assume that even where the lockout
is legal, the locked out. employees are entitled to reinstatement after the case is
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

settled or as result of an assumption or certification order, which amounts to a

return-to-work order. But payment of full back wages is quite another issue,
where the lockout does not suffer from illegality. In such case, the employer
declared the lockout within the bounds of law - he has the right under the law
to deprive his employees of work during the lockout – so there is reason to
believe that the "no work, no pay" principle applies.
The rules on legality of a strike, as far as pertinent, also apply to a
lockout, especially with respect to the grounds therefor, and compliance with
the procedural requirements, existing injunction, or agreement (no-lockout
clause).
The same Article provides that mere participation of a worker in a lawful
strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike. On the other hand, any union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
Whether a strike is legal or illegal, a mere member of the striking union
may be declared to have lost his employment status if he committed illegal acts
during the strike. But a union officer may be so declared for merely
participating knowingly in an illegal strike, and also where he committed illegal
acts during the strike, even if it was a legal strike. For this purpose, shop
stewards are considered as union officers. Shop stewards are union officials
who represent the union members in a certain department. They also deserve
dismissal for knowingly joining an illegal strike. (Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant
Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 512 SCRA 437)
The evident reason for such difference in treatment is the fact that union
officers, by accepting union office, assume greater responsibility than mere
union members in complying with the law. In the case of Isalama Machine
Works Corporation v. NLRC (242 SCRA 115), the Supreme Court held that the
union president and leader of the ill-considered strike had a greater liability
than the mere members because he had the responsibility to insure that his
followers respected the law. His dismissal, therefore, was warranted.
Union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect the
law. If instead of doing so the officers urge the members to violate the law and
defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just
penalty for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that
of the members. But in the case of an ordinary striking employee, he cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that
he committed illegal acts during the strike, and the strikers who participated in
the commission of illegal acts must be identified. (Association of Independent
Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219.)
The penalty of dismissal for merely participating in an illegal strike is
limited to leaders. (Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 86.) Mere
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

participation in a lawful strike is not sufficient ground for dismissal of a mere

union member. (PT&T v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 21.) This is true inspite of the fact
that a replacement had been hired by the employer. (Article 279[a].) This
means that the employer struck against is not barred from hiring replacements
for the strikers, but the tenure of the replacements is subject to the right to
reinstatement, after the strike, of the employees that they replaced.
Replacements for non-returning strikers have acquired a right to their
employment. (Talisay Employees v. CIR, 144 SCRA 213.) But the employer is
prohibited from employing, in place of the strikers, any government official or
employee, or any member of the Armed Forces or the police, or any armed
person. (Article 279[d].)
For a union member to suffer the consequences of loss of employment,
he must have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during
the strike, such as assault, infliction of physical injuries, etc. Failing to heed
the order of an office superior not to join the picket line is not such an illegal
act. (International Contain Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 124.)
Mere membership in a union does not ipso facto mean participation in a strike.
Such participation and intransigence to a return-to-work order must be duly
proved to justify immediate dismissal in a national interest case. (Calamba
Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRC, 571 SCRA 505.)
As a rule, the liability for illegal acts committed during a strike is
individual, i.e., it attaches to the person who committed the same. This is a
departure from the rule of vicarious liability discarded with the taking into
effect or the Industrial Peace Act where mere membership in a union served as
basis of liability for acts of individuals done on behalf of the union – a case of
guilt by association. However, the liability becomes collective if the use of force
during the strike was widespread and pervasive, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of union policy (Shell Oil Worker's Union v. Shell
Company of the Philippines, 43 SCRA 224) or the union, through its leader,
authorized or ratified such acts after actual knowledge thereof. (Philippine
Marine Officers' Guild v. Compania Maritima, 22 SCRA 1113.)
In the latter cases, the collective nature of the liability for the violent
acts renders the strike illegal. Still, only the persons clearly identified as having
employed violence are punishable by dismissal. On the other hand, isolated
acts of violence committed by individual members without the sanction of the
union, and minor disorders that mar an otherwise peaceful strike, do not make
the strike illegal.
The strike is illegal, and the striking officers and members of the union
are deemed to have lost their employment status, for having knowingly
participated in an illegal act, where it was declared after the issuance by the
Secretary of an assumption or certification order, which automatically enjoined
the intended strike (De Ocampo v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 652), or had become the
subject of preventive meditation proceedings before the NCMB. (Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment. (193 SCRA 223.)
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

Defiance of a return-to-work order, which is a necessary consequence of,

or is implicit in, an assumption or certification order, may result in forfeiture of
employment. (Sarmiento v. Tuico and Asian Transmission Corporation v.
NLRC, 162 SCRA 676; Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, 208 SCRA 157.)
The Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion
when he ordered the reinstatement of striking union members who refused to
report back for work after he had issued two return-to-work orders. (St.
Scholastica's College v. Torres 210 SCRA 565.)
The Supreme Court gave the reason for that principle in its decisions in
the consolidated cases of Sarmiento and Asian Transmission Corporation (op.
cit.). A return-to-work order, it said, does not so much as confers a right as it
imposes a duty, and while the right may be waived, the duty must be
discharged even against the worker's will. In this situation, returning to work is
not a matter of opinion or voluntariness but of obligation.
That principle, however, is not without exception. In the case of
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Brilliantes (280 SCRA 515), the Court, invoking its
judicial prerogative "to resolve disputes in a way to render to each interested
party the most judicious solution, and in the ultimate scheme, a resolution of a
dispute tending to serve the greater order of society," ruled that the penalty of
suspension (for twelve months in the case of union officers of Philippine
Airlines Employees Association and for eight months in the case of other
members) meted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, was sufficient and
did not impose "the capital punishment of dismissal from office,
nothwithstanding the law's sanction for such a consequence." The reason given
was, although the strike was illegal and there was a defiance of the Secretary's
return-to-work order, PAL itself had not come to court with clean hands
because, in violation of the Secretary's order enjoining the parties to cease and
desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation,
PAL terminated en masse the employment of 183 union officers, and members
of PALEA.
However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances such as those
described in PAL v. Brilliantes, the general rule, as laid down in the cases of
Federation of Free Workers, St. Scholastica's College and others (supra), is that:
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or
certification order is a prohibited act and thus illegal. The union officers and
members, consequently, are deemed to have lost their employment status for
having knowingly participated in an illegal act. Stated differently, from the
moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have
abandoned his job. The loss of employment status results from the employee's
own act an act which is illegal, an act in violation of the law and in defiance of
authority.
Who has the authority to declare loss of employment status? This
question was answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gold City
Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC (245 SCRA 628), where it held that the
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

use of the word “may" in Article 279 (“may be declared to have lost his
employment status") means that the employer is granted by the law the option
of declaring such loss cs employment status.
However, such option cannot be exercised by the employer when the
issues concerning the strike, including the legality thereof. are pending
resolution by the Secretary who had assumed jurisdiction over the dispute,
(PAL v. Brillantes, (280 SCRA 515) It has also been held that where the
supposed infractions of the company's rules and regulations arose from the
employee's participation in a strike, the legality of which is an issue pending
resolution by the NLRC upon complaint by the employer, the latter should
desist from conducting its own investigation, making a declaration of illegality
of the union activity, and dismissing outright the union officers involved.
(PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC, 291 SCRA 231.)
7. Payment of Wages During Strike Period.
The general rule is that strikers are not entitled to their wages during the
period of the strike (J.P. Heilbrown Co. v. National Labor Union, 92 Phil. 575),
regardless of whether it is an economic or a ULP strike. (Consolidated Labor
Association v. Marsman and Co., 11 SCRA 589; Cromwell Employees and
Laborers Association v. CLR, 12 SCRA124). This is because of the age-old rule
governing the relation of labor and capital, cited in the Heilbrown decision,
epitomized in "a fair day's wage for a fair day's labor," and also because a strike
involves a voluntary stoppage of work by the workers, and so, as reasoned out
in Cromwell, their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer.
But there are exceptions to the general rule, such as in the following
situations:
1)Involuntary strikers, such as those who mere discriminatorily
dismissed by the employer and whose dismissal caused the strike (The Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association- NATU v. The Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd.., 37 SCRA 244) and those who were practically locked out,
or had no alternative but to declare a strike to render aid and protection to
themselves and their unlawfully dismissed companions, because of the
employer's im- proper and oppressive conduct (Davao Free Workers Front v.
CIR, 60 SCRA 408), are entitled to back wages, the first from the day of their
unlawful discharge, and the second from the day they strike.
2) Strike-duration pay is also due the strikers who offered to return to
work but the employer refused to reinstate them or imposed upon their
reinstatement new conditions that discriminated against them for their union
membership or activities. (Cromwell, 12 SCRA124) In such a case, however,
three conditions must be satisfied, namely, that the strike was legal; the offer
to return to work was unconditional; and the strikers were refused
reinstatement. (Philippine marine Officer's Guild v. Compania Maritima, 22
SCRA 1113.)
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

3) Another possible exception is where, concluded by the parties to settle

the strike dispute, the employer undertakes to pay the strikers their wages
during the strike period in consideration of their ending the strike.
8. Liability for Damages.
When the strike is lawful, both as to purpose, compliance with the legal
requirements, and the means employed in conducting it, neither the union nor
its members may be held liable for any damage that any person may suffer as a
result thereof. Qui jure suo utitur neminem laedit. He who acts in the lawful
exercise of his right injures no one. The resulting damage is damnum absque
injuria.
A labor organization, however, may be held liable for damages if it
declared a strike to attain unlawful ends, or tried to attain legitimate objectives
through unlawful means, i.e., if the strike is illegal. But in order to hold the
union liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents,
there must be proof of actual authorization or ratification of such acts after
actual knowledge thereof. (Philippine Marine Officers' Guild v. Compania
Maritima, 22 SCRA 1113.) Or it must be shown that the conditions for
collective liability are present, that is to say that the strike was conducted with
widespread and pervasive use of violence, consistently and deliberately resorted
to as a matter of policy. (Shell Oil Worker's Union v. Shell Company of the
Philippines, 43 SCRA 224.)
In the case of individual strikers, as earlier adverted to, they are
responsible only for their own illegal acts; the doctrine of “vicarious liability"
has long ceased to apply. For such acts, they may be made liable for damages
they may have caused, aside from suffering loss of employment status.
In order that damages may be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by
the injured party must be presented. Actual or compensatory damages cannot
be presumed, but must be duly proved, and so proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. However, where the illegal strike dragged on for 50 days,
paralyzing the company's operations, there is no room for doubt that some
species of injury was caused to the company. In the absence of competent
proof of the actual damages suffered, the company is entitled to nominal
damages-which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and for any loss suffered. (National Federation of
Labor v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 277.) In this case, the amount of P300,000 was
considered a just and reasonable award under the circumstances.
9. Criminal Liability.
The strikers who committed illegal acts during the strike may also be
criminally prosecuted for such acts. The penalty for violation of any of the
provisions of Article 279, including any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation, or obstruction of the free ingress to and egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruction of public
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

thoroughfares, committed by any person engaged in picketing is provided in

Article 287. Of course, if the violence, etc. resulted in a more serious offense
under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty provided by the latter, if the offender
is convicted thereunder, shall apply.
In the consolidated cases of Sarmiento and Asian Transmission
Corporation, earlier cited, a question was raised as to whether the criminal
prosecution of certain persons involved in the subject strike could validly be
restrained, pending determination of the legality of the strike. The answer of
the Supreme Court was that while, as a general rule, the prosecution of
criminal offenses is not subject to injunction the suspension of proceedings in
the criminal complaints filed in court was justified on the ground of
prematurity because the acts complained of were connected with the
compulsory arbitration proceedings pending in the NLRC.
Such suspension was deemed to be in pursuance of the policy embodied
in Circular No. 15, Series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, Series of 1986, issued by
the Ministry (now Department) of Justice in connection with the
implementation of B.P. No. 227. These circulars required government
prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the Ministry (now Department) of
Labor (and Employment) and/or the Office of the President "before taking
cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of
the corresponding information of cases arising out of or related to a labor
dispute, including" allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault
upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation, obstructing
of free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the
machines of such factory, or the employer's premises." No such clearance was
obtained in connection with the complaints in the case referred to above.
In the case of People v. Barba (29 SCRA 662), more than a hundred
strikers against Red V. Coconut Products, Ltd. were charged with illegal
detention on the basis of the complaints of two officials of the said company to
the effect that they could not leave the company compound because the
picketing employees blocked the exit from the premises as well as the other
means of egress therefrom. The issue that reached the Supreme Court was
whether there was probable cause that the crime of illegal detention was
committed for the purpose of issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused.
The Court ruled that the detention or deprivation of liberty of the
complainants was not done with criminal intent. It was the outcome of
picketing carried to excess by persons whose objective was not to inflict loss of
freedom on the complainants but to weaken management resistance so that it
would give in to their demands. Such conduct, while no doubt to be deplored,
cannot be made a basis for a finding a probable cause that the crime charged
was committed.
10. Other Concerted Activities.
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

Among the concerted activities that employees may resort to in order to

gain some leverage in pursuing their dispute against their employer, only strike
and picketing are named in the Labor Code. There is, however, a recognition
under Article 278(a) of the right of workers to engage in concerted activities in
general, for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual aid and
protection. These include, among many others, boycott, and such informal
employee actions as sending protest letters to the employer, holding group
meetings to discuss grievances, circulating petitions critical of the conduct of
labor relations, and using the services of the media to publicize the existence of
and the issues concerning a dispute with the employer.
Whether mentioned in the law or not, concerted activities may be
engaged in, and they enjoy legal protection, for as long as they are carried out
within legal bounds. The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the
legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed
therefor. (Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586.)
For a concerted activity to be protected, it is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. A letter of
only a handful of employees complaining against management malpractice is
one such activity. (Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226.)
A slowdown while also a concerted activity, has been declared by the
Supreme Court as "an inherently illegal activity, essentially illegal even in the
absence of no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, statute or
rule." It is a "strike on the installment plan," a willful reduction of work for the
purpose of restricting the employer's production. It is "generally considered as
inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees continue to
work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them, they at
the same time select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of
their own violation or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do
other work; in other words, they work on their own terms." (Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa v. NLRC, op. cit.)
A sit-down strike, also known as sympathetic strike, where the striking
employees have no demands or grievances of their own, but they strike for the
purpose of directly or indirectly assisting others, without direct relation to the
advancement of their own interest, but only to show sympathy for co-
employees dismissed by the employer, is an illegal strike. (G&S Transport
Corporation v. Infants, 533 SCRA 288.)
The union's concerted violation of the employer Hotel's grooming
standards by reporting for work with closely cropped hair or clearly shaven
heads, which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel's
operations, is an unprotected act and should be considered an illegal srike.
(NUWHRAIN-Dusit Nikko Hotel Chapter v. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 598.)
11. Referenda on Reduced Demand/Improved Offer.
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

One of the innovative ideas introduced by R.A. 6715 to the labor dispute
settlement machinery is the system of holding referenda to determine
acceptance by the employees of the employer's increased offer in case of a
strike, and by the employer of the employees' reduced demand in case of a
lockout. This system, which is aimed at expediting the settlement of disputes
through a determination of the will of the majority, within 30 days from the
start of the industrial action, is provided in Article 280, which, before the said
amendatory law became effective in 1989, contained the enumeration of
prohibited activities in connection with a strike or lockout.
Chapter II
ASSISTANCE TO LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
1. Education and Research.
The mandatory activities of labor organizations under the Labor Code are
labor education and research. These are the activities referred to in Article
250[p]; Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja (182 SCRA 710). The rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization include the right to information on the
provisions of the unions's constitution and by laws, the collective bargaining
agreement, the prevailing labor relations system, and all the members' rights
and obligations under existing labor laws, and giving such information is the
duty of every labor organization and its officers.
CHAPTER III
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES
1. Employment Permit.
Article 284 should be read in relation to Article 40, in connection with
the requirement of employment permit for aliens seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes, which is discussed under Title II,
Book I (supra.)
2. Foreign Activities and Assistance.
The restrictions imposed on foreign activities relative to trade union
activities, and foreign assistance to organizations engaged in the same
activities, stem from the need, in view of the public interest involved and the
national security implications, to protect labor related groups from foreign,
and possibly subversive influence. At the same time, these local
organizations cannot be completely cut off from dealings and contacts with
similar organizations abroad, which is why the prohibitions under Articles
284, 285 and 286 are not absolute.
CHAPTER IV
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
1. Penalties
 LABOR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS | MODULE 5

The penalties provided in Article 287 for violation of Article 279

(prohibited activities in connection with strike, lockout and picketing) are
the same as those provided in Article 303 for violation of any provision of
the Labor Code. However, under Article 287(b), in case of violation by an
alien of any of the provisions of Title VIII of Book V, he shall upon the
recommendation of the Secretaries of Labor and Employment and
Defense, be subject to immediate and summary deportation and shall be
permanently barred from reentering the country without the special
permission of the President, while under Article 303, the convicted alien
shall be deported only upon completion of service of sentence.
Insofar as violations of Article 279 or any provisions of the whole
Title on strikes and lockouts are concerned, an alien found guilty thereof
is subject to immediate deportation under Article 287, which is the
specific law thereon. In case of violations of the Code other than those
earlier mentioned, Article 303, which is general in charter, applies and so
the alien convicted of such violation is subject to deportation after service
of the sentence.