UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 124 – Crim Pro

Omlang Professor Gonzales

People v. Lacson (2003)

G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003
En banc | Callejo, Sr., J.

Topic: Provisional Dismissal

Articles invoked:
Rule 117, Sec. 8 – Provisional dismissal – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)

Parties:
Petitioner: People of the Phil., Secretary of Justice, PNP Dir. Gen., Chief State Respondent: Panfilo M. Lacson
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno, State Prosecutors Peter K. Ong and Ruben A. Zacarias,
2nd Assistant Prosecutor Conrado M. Jamolin, and City Prosecutor of QC Claro
Arellano

Doctrine:

FACTS OF THE CASE

• Subject of this Motion for Reconsideration (MFR) is the Resolution issued by the SC, dated May 28, 2002 (May 28, 2002
Resolution). In the said May 28, 2002 Resolution, the SC declared that the proceedings conducted by the state prosecutors
in this case were null and void. The SC also dismissed all the criminal informations against herein respondent.

Context of the May 28, 2002 Resolution:

o Respondent Lacson and 25 other police officers were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
11 male persons identified as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
o Respondent Lacson then filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of the
witnesses (invoking Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the Const. and the ruling of the SC in Allado v. Diokno). He prayed for:
1. A judicial determination of probable cause and an order directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at the hearing scheduled therefor,
2. The withholding of the warrants of arrest against him until the resolution of his motion.
3. “Other equitable reliefs.”

o The trial court, through Judge Agnir, Jr., granted Respondent Lacson’s motion. Judge Agnir also provisionally
dismissed the criminal cases against respondent, for lack of probable cause.
o 2 years later, 2 new witnesses issued their sworn statements. With this, a panel of State prosecutors was constituted
to investigate the said sworn statements. The said panel then found probable cause to hold the respondent liable for
11 counts of murder, and issued a resolution to this effect.
o Respondent Lacson filed for a TRO against the resolution, but it was denied. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter
declared the resolution and the proceedings conducted by the State prosecutors as null and void. All criminal
informations were also ordered dismissed.
o Petitioners brought the case to the SC. They claim that the new rule re: provisional dismissal (Rule 117, Sec. 8) does
not apply to the case, absent the respondent’s “express consent.” SC declaied that the provisional dismissal of the
case made by Judge Agnir, was with the express consent of the respondent because the respondent himself moved
for the said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. (Review: prayers of the respondent in the said motion. Provisional dismissal was not
included).
• In this MFR, the petitioners contend that:
1. Rule 117, Sec. 8 does not apply to the criminal cases against the respondent (Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689).
2. Contrary to the assertion of the respondent, the time-bar rule in Rule 117, Sec. 8 should not be applied
retroactively (to this case).

ISSUE/S & RATIO/S

 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 124 – Crim Pro
Omlang Professor Gonzales

1. W/N Rule 117, Sec. 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to the criminal cases against the respondent.
– NO

• Requisites of Provisional Dismissal under Rule 117, Sec. 8

1. Express consent of the accused
2. Notice to the offended party

Express Consent
• Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal
consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. A motion for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal. [If the case is provisionally dismissed with the consent of the accused,
such case may be revived only within the periods provided by the new rule, whereas if the provisional dismissal
was without the consent of the accused, the new rule does not apply].
• In the May 28, 2002 Resolution, the Court held that the Respondent’s filing of a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for the examination of the witnesses, served as a motion for provisional dismissal. However, upob
review of the SC under this MFR, the Court now holds that such motion by the respondent did not include any motion
for dismissal. In fact, the respondent’s counsel expressly stated that he did not agree to the provisional dismissal of Judge
Agnir and that he also did not file any motion for reconsideration of Judge Agnir’s order. The respondent’s counsel simply
believed that his client has already been arraigned and that such arraignment was valid. He did not take any further step
as he thought that it might prejudice the interest of his client. It is also evident that the said motion by the respondent only
prayed for the judicial determination of probable cause, the examination of witnesses, and for other “equitable reliefs.”
• From this, it is evident that the provisional dismissal was without the consent of the respondent.
o The consent is important as this bars the accused from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy.

Notice to the offended party

• The new rule requires that the offended party or the heirs of the victims be given adequate notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the case.
• The respondent contends that his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and examination of the witnesses,
should be considered as his motion for provisional dismissal. He claims that when he filed the said motion, the heirs of
the prosecutor would be served a copy, and that the latter would inform the victims. However, such was not the case.
o While the prosecutor was given a copy of the motion, it was impossible to inform the victims who were in
different parts of the country. This is because the motion by the respondent was filed on Mar. 22, 1999, and
the hearing scheduled therein was set at Mar. 22, 1999, or barely five days from the filing. It is impossible
to inform the victims and to require them to be present at the hearing.
o There is no proof that the prosecutor notified the victims/their heirs. Nor is there any proof to prove that they
have been served with copies of Judge Agnir’s resolution.

*Given that the requisites for provisional dismissal were not met, the State is not barred by the time limit provided in
the 2nd paragraph of the rule.
• Again, if the case is provisionally dismissed with the consent of the accused, such case may be revived only within
the periods provided by the new rule, whereas if the provisional dismissal was without the consent of the accused,
the new rule does not apply. In this case, the State can revive or refile the criminal informations or file new
informations for multiple murder against the respondent. The resolution issued by the panel of prosecutors is valid.

2. W/N Rule 117, SEC. 8 should be applied retroactively. – NO

• GEN: Procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
o Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Such retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person because no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. (Tan, Jr. v. CA).

• EXC: If such retroactive application would result in injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or
impair the independence of the Court.

ITCAB
• Note:
• Provisional dismissal of the case: Mar. 29, 1999
• Date of effectivity of the new rule: Dec. 1, 2000
• Action of the panel of prosecutors: Apr. 2001
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 124 – Crim Pro
Omlang Professor Gonzales

• The respondent claims that the new rule should be applied retroactively in this case. He assets that the 2-year time bar
should be reckoned from Mar. 29, 1999. And since the case was not revived until Apr. 2001, the respondent claims that
the two-year period has already lapsed. With this, he claims that the provisional dismissal has already become permanent
and no new information/s may be filed against him.
• Contrary to this, the Court held while the new rule aims to address the inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal
cases, such provisional dismissal does not terminate a criminal case. The rule provides both the accused and the State due
process.
• In this case, the Court held that the time-bar rule should be counted from the time that the new rule took effect (Dec.
2000) and not from the time the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed. The Court stated that should they apply the
new rule retroactively, then the State would have only 1 year and 3 months within which to revive the criminal cases.
Such period is shorted than the 2-year period fixed by the new rule.
• According to the rule, such decision was to prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,
injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit
of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of
the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the
State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
• The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period
because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar.

Ruling
MFR GRANTED. May 28, 2002 Resolution SET ASIDE.