The Legacy of the Spanish Conquista in the Andes:

Beliefs, Social Unrest, and Long-Run Economic Development

César Huaroto Francisco A. Gallego

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

August 2021

Abstract*

This paper explores the mechanisms behind the long-term effects of the Mining Mita (a
colonial labor-coercion institution in Peru), which forced Andean indigenous
communities to work on mining during the period between 1573 and the early 19th
century. We find that districts affected by this institution experience significantly more
social unrest and violent conflict from the colonization period to the present. Using the
case of a recent mining boom, we also find that Mita districts benefited less from the
boom and experienced higher mining-related social unrest during this period. We present
evidence suggesting that higher social unrest is correlated with the persistence of beliefs
about identity and democracy. We document that Mita districts: i) are less knowledgeable
about democracy; ii) are more likely to blame colonial rule as the cause of present
economic (under) development; and iii) have higher self-identification with their local
indigenous community (vis-à-vis the country as a whole).

JEL Codes: D74, I38, J15, N26, O10, O43, P14, Z10

*
Email addresses cahuaroto@uc.cl and fgallego@uc.cl. We would like to thank Daron Acemoglu, Miriam
Artiles, Nano Barahona, Melissa Dell, Emilio Depetris-Chauvin, Leopoldo Fergusson, Martin Fiszbein,
Felipe González, Jeanne Lafortune, Marta Reynal-Querol, Marco Tabellini, and Dean Yang, as well as
seminar participants at BCDE 2020, SECHI 2020 and internal seminars at PUC Chile for comments and
suggestions. We thank Kathryn McLellan for editorial help. All errors are our own.
 1. Introduction

The past decades have witnessed a substantial increase in the literature on the historical
roots of economic development. For the most part, results are robust to different contexts,
empirical approaches, and data sources, making it widely recognized that “history
matters” for economic development (e.g., Bisin & Federico, 2021, Nunn, 2020,
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017). However, it is more difficult to find evidence that
shows how and why history matters for current economic development.1 There is also a
growing interest in the literature in understanding the importance of social unrest,2 its
causes, and consequences for development (e.g., see the surveys by Esteban & Ray, 2017;
and Blattman & Miguel, 2010). The statistical correlation between social unrest and
development has been proven robust and present in different contexts, but it has been
harder to determine causality.

The motivation of this paper is to contribute to both dimensions. We revisit the case of
the Mining Mita, a colonial forced-labor institution in the Peruvian Andes created in 1573.
The main feature of the Mita system is that it required 29 provinces in colonial Peru to
send one-seventh of their 18-50 year-old male population to work in either the Potosi or
in the Huancavelica mines every year. The Mita was previously studied by Dell (2010),3
who finds that this institution negatively affected economic welfare in the long run, even
250 years after its abolition. We propose and present evidence consistent with a key
mechanism behind its persistence: the higher likelihood of social unrest.

We find this using three time periods. The first is the late 18th century, when a local leader
(Tupac Amaru II) led the largest indigenous anti-colonial rebellion in Spanish colonial
history. Although the exact numbers are uncertain, casualties are estimated at around
100,000 people, making it the deadliest internal conflict in Peruvian history. Using a
geographical regression discontinuity design (GRD) and evidence from historical
sources, we find that participation in the rebellion is remarkably high in Mita districts. At

1
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2017) argue, for instance: “while there is not much ambiguity that the
type of colonization, or the identity of the colonial power, was consequential for contemporary
development, there is still debate on the exact mechanisms at work.” They also mention that “another open
issue regards the potential interactions of historical events with critical junctures in the process of
development.”
2
The literature also typically uses the term “social conflict.” Here we will use both terms interchangeably.
3
Carpio & Guerrero (2016) and Natividad (2019) also studied long-term effects of the Mining Mita. The
first focused on internal migration as a potential mechanism, and the second on its effects on firms.
the same time, it was pretty low in non-Mita ones, which is notable since both groups are
contiguous in our identification strategy.4

The second period is during the 1980s and 1990s, a period of internal conflict between
guerrilla factions and the Peruvian government, when, according to our estimates, Mita
districts had a double to triple increased likelihood of experiencing a violent event, and
about ten times more per-capita violence than the counterfactual group.

Our third period of analysis occurs during the past two decades when Peru experienced
fast economic growth and the most extended democratic period in its history. In this
particular context, we document that Mita districts are significantly more likely to
experience anti-mining protests. This is a notable feature since the mining sector went
through a boom5 that led the economic growth and is currently responsible for about 60%
of total exports. Notably, we also find that the social unrest against the mining industry
was higher in districts closer to mines. Thus, we find that social unrest has been more
prevalent in Mita areas during the three most relevant episodes of conflict in Peru.

To further explore differences in outcomes during the most recent period, we estimate the
economic impact of the mining boom for Mita and non-Mita areas using panel data on
nighttime luminosity from three decades (the 1990s-2010s) at the district level. We find
that using this measure, the districts affected by Mita benefited less from the mining boom
in the 2000s.

Finally, we provide evidence on beliefs that could help better explain the drivers of the
higher social unrest. First, we find that people in Mita districts have differed from the
general population in their beliefs of the causes of economic development and democracy.
In particular, they select the colonial past as being a fundamental reason for economic
(under)development and show lower levels of knowledge about democracy and its
functioning. Second, we find that people in Mita areas are more likely to report
identifying with local indigenous communities called peasant communities6 compared to

4
As documented in the historical literature, one of the main demands of the rebels was the abolition of the
Mita, while the indigenous persons who opposed to the rebellion feared that, should the rebels lose, they
would be forced to move to the Mita as punishment (Walker, 2014, O’Phelan, 2010).
5
As discussed in the following sections, this boom was driven by external forces (i.e., an increase in the
demand for minerals by China), and by the favorable macroeconomic national conditions.
6
In the last census in 2017, there are more than 6,000 of these communities in Peru, almost all of them
located in the Andean region. According to the literature (e.g., Caballero, 1981; Diez, 2019), they are of
great importance in the Andes, and their origins can be traced even to pre-Incan times. A small but growing
other Peruvians. Consistent with this local identification, significantly more of the
agricultural land in Mita regions is in the hands of indigenous institutions. While we
cannot prove that the causality from Mita on current social unrest is caused only by these
beliefs, our results would be are consistent with the literature highlighting the role of
beliefs as a cultural mechanism of historical persistence (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2021;
Acemoglu & Wolitzky, 2014; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Giuliano & Nunn, 2021).

Our paper contributes to four bodies of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on
the importance of social unrest and conflict on economic development (e.g., Besley &
Reynal-Querol, 2014; Esteban et al., 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2020; Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol, 2005; and the literature reviewed in Esteban & Ray, 2017 and Blattman &
Miguel, 2010). Most of the previous literature has focused on present-day conflicts; thus,
our use of conflicts in different periods of time adds by suggesting a role for historical
persistence. We also emphasize the potential role of conflict as a mechanism to explain
economic development. Second, we expand the growing research on the impact of history
on present-day attitudes, beliefs, and socio-political outcomes (Nunn & Wantchekon,
2011; Becker et al., 2016; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya, 2015; Valencia, 2019; Guiso et al.
2016). Third, we present evidence about the effects of history on today’s beliefs about
democracy, the causes of long-run development, and self-identification with local
communities (compared to the rest of the population). Finally, we contribute to the
literature on the long-run consequences of historical institutions, showing that they affect
the ability to take advantage of economic opportunities such as a mining boom even long
after the institution has ceased to exist. This result relates to the “critical juncture” concept
from Acemoglu et al. (2005), where a historical difference matters in a particular context.
The empirical literature about this type of interaction is very limited.7

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the historical background
and relevant context. In Section 3, we introduce the data and empirical strategy. Section
4 presents estimates of the historical and modern differences in social unrest between
Mita and non-Mita districts. Section 5 does the same with the results of the interaction of

literature is documenting the role of these types of pre-colonial communities in current economic
development in Latin America (Angeles & Elizalde, 2017; Dell, 2012; Elizalde, 2020).
7
Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that the benefits of the Atlantic trade were higher for countries with inclusive
institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2002) also documents, at the country level, that the effects of the industrial
revolution on development were stronger in countries with better institutions. Another related example
comes from Pascali (2017), who finds that the economic boom generated by steamship technology also had
more benefits for countries with more inclusive institutions.
the Mita treatment with the mining boom. In Section 6, we provide evidence on the
persistent effects of the Mita on beliefs and self-identification, which helps to explain the
persistence of social unrest even to the present day. Finally, Section 7 briefly concludes.

2. Historical Background and Context

2.1 The Mining Mita and Colonial Mining8

The Mining Mita institution was created in 1573 by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo during
the Spanish occupation. As previously mentioned, it implied that one-seventh of the adult
males were sent to work in either the Potosi or in the Huancavelica mines every year. It
lasted around 240 years until 1812, shortly before Peru gained its independence from
Spain in 1821.

There were several factors leading to the creation of the Mita. First was the discovery of
the Huancavelica mercury mine in 1571. This event was critical given the discovery in
1555 of the silver purification method using amalgamation with mercury, which
dramatically reduced the costs of extracting silver in the Andes. Second, this discovery
generated a unique opportunity to exploit what was effectively the largest silver mine in
the world at the time — Potosí — which was discovered in 1545. Third, the geographical
conditions of Potosi made its exploitation difficult. High altitude (around 4,000 meters
above sea level) disabled the use of enslaved people due to their high mortality at that
elevation, which was not a problem for local indigenous people.

In addition to this, the scarcity of wood due to the high altitude needed for foundry
furnaces made silver extraction too expensive using traditional methods of extraction. In
contrast, the amalgamation method with the mercury method and the availability of
mercury from the Huancavelica mine made big-scale extraction of silver from Potosí
possible for the first time. Thus, the Mita system allowed colonizers to benefit from
Huancavelica and Potosi's complementarities.

These characteristics might also explain why only a fraction of the indigenous population
was forced into labor. The intention was to provide only enough labor force for the mines
to be profitable, not to enslave all of the native populations. Note that the Mita was a rare

8
Most of the information in this section is based on the detailed and comprehensive work of Cole (1985),
Bakewell (1984), Tandeter (1983), and Tantalean (2011) on the history of the Mining Mita.
institution in the Spanish colonization, and economic historians have extensively
documented the critical importance of the Potosi and Huancavelica mines as central to
the Spanish colonies' economic and political stability in and the increasing wealth in
Spain during the 16th and 17th centuries. One quote from Viceroy Fernández de Cabrera
well summarizes this point: “Potosí and Huancavelica: The two poles that sustain these
kingdoms and Spain.”9

In terms of Mita assignment, even though we have no information on how the provinces
were selected, it is clear from the maps that distance to the mines was an important factor,
as well as being at a similar altitude; meanwhile, no coastal provinces were chosen.
Additionally, there is evidence that collecting the mitayos (people assigned to the Mita)
was costly; thus, the territories between these two mines also had an understandably
higher probability of being chosen.

In Figure 1, we present a couple of maps showing this. In the left panel, we can observe
the geographic conditions around the Mita areas. For instance, that they are all at higher
altitudes. In the right panel are the boundaries of the former Inca Empire in green since
that impacted which areas were colonized by the Spanish in pink and light blue, we see
the areas subject to the Mining Mita of Huancavelica and Potosi, respectively.

As discussed in Dell (2010), Natividad (2019), and Carpio & Guerrero (2021), these
characteristics make the comparison with non-Mita areas difficult because of
confounding factors such as having no residents (like the tropical rainforest) or few (like
the Chilean and Argentinian Andes) or were coastal. Therefore, we follow Dell (2010)
and only use a small fraction of the Mita catchment area, which provides the unusual
situation of having comparable regions both inside and outside of the Mita area. We
discuss this in further detail in Section 4.

HERE FIGURE 1

9
Cite extracted from Brown (2015), pp. 15.
2.2 The Tupac Amaru II Rebellion (1780-1783)10

The Great Rebellion of Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui Noguera, also called Inca Tupac
Amaru II,11 started on November 4, 1980, when the rebels captured Antonio de Arriaga,
the local colonial administrator (“Corregidor”), who was publicly executed by the
insurgents five days later.12

The rebellion then proceeded in an irregular manner with two decisive moments. The
first was the capture and execution of Jose Gabriel on May 18, 1781. This event limited
the growth of the rebellion since the rebellion lost its leader, and the capture was
unexpected and due to their own military mistake. At the moment of Jose Gabriel's
capture, the rebellion was about to become out of control.

The central branch of the rebellion was continued by close friends and family members
of Jose Gabriel. The most important leader was his cousin, Diego Cristobal, who also
changed his name to Diego Tupac Amaru. He led the revolution for almost two years.
This rebellion also inspired other uprisings. Julio Apaza Catari was the leader of the most
important one in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, who called himself Tupac Katari, who
was executed in November of 1781. The definitive end of all subsequent rebellions is
challenging to determine but is at least related to these leaders’ executions since Spaniards
also executed or exiled their family members to avoid future rebellions.

Although there is controversy around estimating deaths due to these rebellions due to a
lack of documentation, historians have generally estimated around 100,000 casualties.
This number of fatalities is remarkably high considering that the population at the end of
the 18th century in the Peruvian territory was around 2.2 million. For comparison,
estimates on the deaths during the Independence War (1821-24) and the Pacific War
(1879-83) were only around 20,000 each. Moreover, since the rebellion was regional —
mainly in the southern Peruvian Andes — the numbers are even more surprising.

10
Most of the information in this section is based on the detailed and comprehensive work of Walker (2014),
Golte (2016), and O’Phelan (2012).
11
Tupac Amaru I was the name of the last Inca, executed in 1572, by Viceroy Francisco Toledo. Jose
Gabriel claimed that he was his descendant and claimed the title of Inca and took that name. The followers
also took the name to take advantage of the Incan past.
12
Jose Gabriel was the local indigenous leader “cacique” of Tungasuca and Pampamarca.
The reason for this high mortality is that the rebellions relied heavily on local populations
since the rebels never had time to train an army and did not receive support from local
elites or any external colonial states. Also, as historians have argued, Jose Gabriel’s
motives could be regarded as individualistic, and it is most likely that he did not intend
to overthrow the entire colonial state when he started his rebellion.

The context of the rebellion is the years of the implementation of the Borbonic Reforms,
which involved ending privileges of local caciques and increasing taxes for indigenous
communities. In particular, Jose Gabriel was likely motivated by the risk of losing his
cacicazgo due to these reforms; historians have suggested that his original goal was
merely to change those policies. However, the overall population was generally unhappy
with their colonizers, which fueled the rebellions, as did nostalgia for the Incan empire
(Walker, 2014).

However, contrary to what Tupac Amaru and colonial elites loyal to the Spanish crown
(royalists) expected, support for the rebellion was not unanimous. On the contrary, some
caciques and part of the local population supported royalists from the very beginning of
the uprising. A critical factor in understanding this heterogeneity seems to be the Mining
Mita institution. Although one of the most popular demands of the rebels was its abolition,
Jose Gabriel himself was cacique of Tungasuca and Pampamarca, both assigned to the
Mita, which he had previously supported.

Historians have argued that some pre-Spanish rivalries between provinces or individual
differences between caciques might explain differences in support. Still, others say that
it is also plausible that the fear of being assigned to the Mita as punishment for support
the uprising was even more critical.

2.3. Peruvian Internal Conflict (1980-1999)13

The Peruvian Internal Conflict started on May 17, 1980, with the burning of ballot boxes
for the presidential election in a small town in rural Peru. However, unlike the rebellions
previously mentioned, some groups had been preparing for such a conflict for many years,
including the extreme-left terrorist group The Shining Path. This helps to explain its fast
spread throughout Peru. Another factor was that Peru was in the process of returning to

13
Most of the information in this section is based on the previous work of CVR (2004), Degregori (2012),
and Gorriti (2017), who made a detailed compilation of actions and events on this conflict.
a democratic government after 12 years of a military government. This new government
was noticeably unprepared for dealing with the extreme violent strategies of the terrorist
groups, and especially from The Shining Path.

In addition, the state and its institutions were virtually non-existent in most of the rural
countryside, where these guerrillas created “liberated zones,” presenting themselves as
the new authorities, demanding both supplies and fighters from the local population
(peasant communities, local mayors, families). The methods used for this were extremely
violent, including torture, kidnapping, and assassination.

When the police and the army later came to these zones, the terrorists camouflaged
themselves among the locals and threatened death and torture for betrayal. Along with
the fear locals had of the terrorists, many only spoke Quechua, their indigenous language.
This created extreme communication difficulties, and such difficulties have also been
used as proof that the locals were conspiring with the terrorists.

The extreme violence the terrorists used against police and local authorities lead to
reprisal violence against local populations. Thus uninvolved rural peasants were trapped
in a spiral of violence against them that ended only at the end of the 1990s when the
government successfully captured most terrorist leaders. The number of deaths due to this
conflict is estimated to be around 70,000 people, making it the bloodiest event in the
history of the Peruvian Republic.

Note also that historians have documented that at the start of the conflict, the Shining Path
was positively perceived by the local population. This was likely due to historical and
current feelings about being disempowered, colored by a lack of information about the
terroristic nature of the group. Of course, the reprisal violence did not improve local
feelings about the state, thus improving the image of terrorist groups. One factor that we
find important for this paper is that the most affected region was Ayacucho, which was a
highly Mita area, suggesting long-term anti-state sentiments and anger in the local
population.

2.4. Relevant Context: The 2000s Mining Boom and Anti-Mining Protests

During the past three decades, Peru has gone through its most prolonged period of
economic growth. This has been driven by mining, which went from being an almost
irrelevant sector in 1990 to the most important contributor to exports and of foreign direct
investment today.

While previous empirical evidence suggests positive effects of the mining boom for local
communities (Loayza & Rigolini, 2016; Aragon & Rud, 2013), it is notable that mining
is the cause of protests in their local areas. The most prevalent reasons for these protests
are environmental and redistributive complaints (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). It is worth
noting that a significant part of the Peruvian anti-mining protests are led by local peasant
communities and receive extensive support from the rest of the local population. One of
their primary complaints is that mining pollution affects agriculture (Haslam &
Tanimoune, 2016; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). Populations in these areas tend to be
farmers; for example, in the Peruvian Andes, 63% of households depend economically
on agriculture (93% in rural areas), and, on average, 36% of their income comes from
farming (58% in rural areas).

3. Identification Strategy and Data

a. Identification Strategy

We use the identification strategy proposed by Dell (2010), specifically a Geographic

Regression Discontinuity Design (GRD). The first estimation equation is:

𝑦𝑑𝑏 =∝ +γ𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 + 𝑋𝑑𝑏 ′𝛽 + 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) + 𝜙𝑏 + 𝜖𝑑𝑏 . (1)

Where 𝑦𝑑𝑏 represents the outcome variable in district d along segment b of the boundary
of Mita. 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 is a dummy indicator to indicate if the region belongs to the Mita area
during the colonial period. The matrix 𝑋𝑑𝑏 contains the mean weighted altitude and slope
of the district. The specification also includes boundary’s segments fixed effects 𝜙𝑏 .

The term (𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) controls for the proximity to the border in the same fashion as a
traditional regression discontinuity design (RDD). Nevertheless, we will use only semi-
parametric approximations due to the geographic boundary's multidimensional features
and data size limitations (similar to previous literature). Here we follow the three
measures of distance proposed by Dell (2010): polynomials of the latitude and longitude,
distance to the Potosi mine, and the Mita boundary; we only use the second-order
polynomial version instead of the third-order one preferred by Dell (2010). We follow
 Gelman & Imbens's (2017) recommendation of avoiding using higher-order polynomials
in RD designs. Also, as a robustness analysis, we test linear polynomials and cubic
polynomials. This is in the Online Appendix, and the results remain similar.

We also use the same sample used by Dell (2010), which included all districts within 100
km to the Mita boundary in an area geographically comparable.14 In Figure 2, we can see
the geography of this area, and, as can be observed from the map, the Mita and non-Mita
districts seem identical around the boundary. We present evidence on comparability
around the border in geographic and historical variables in the Online Appendix based on
Dell’s (2010) extensive discussion of the similarities of her chosen area. Note that this
sample includes 289 districts.

HERE FIGURE 2

To test for heterogeneous effects of the Mita to distance to modern mines, we use the
following equation:

𝑦𝑑𝑏 =∝ +γ𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 + 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝜑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝑋𝑑𝑏 ′𝛽 + 𝜌𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) + 𝜙𝑏 + 𝜖𝑑𝑏 .

(3)

The interaction term between being geographically close to a mine and being in a Mita
district is captured by the coefficient 𝛿. We will use two different measures of closeness:
i) a dummy that takes the value of one if the district had any mining output during the
period of analysis, and ii) the hyperbolic logarithm of the distance of the district to the
closest mining district.

Finally, when dealing with panel data regressions to test the Mita's dynamic effects, we
will implement a modified version incorporating interaction effects of the Mita treatment
with proxies for the mining boom (𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡 ), which we present in equation (3) below. In
this version, we include year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 and district fixed effects 𝜇𝑑 and use two-
way clustered errors at the district and year level.

𝑦𝑑𝑡 = γ𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 +

𝜇𝑑 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑑𝑡 (3)

14
Similar to Dell (2010), we also exclude ten districts that make up Cusco City (the only large city in the
area), 7 of them are outside the Mita area. Including them makes most of the found impacts larger.
In this case, the identification assumption is similar to a differences-in-differences
approach, but as we include an interaction of Mita with 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ), we are identifying the
effect using the districts that are on either side of the Mita border. To control for potential
problems with trends in time-series, we include the interaction of the 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) with time-
trend variable 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 and with 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡 .

We also estimate equation (1) at the household level, using data from household surveys.
In this case, we use clustered errors at the district level, and the estimating equation
becomes:

𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑏 =∝ +γ𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑 + 𝑋𝑑𝑏 ′𝛽 + 𝜌𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑 ) + 𝜙𝑏 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑏 . (4)

The identification assumption of our GRDD is that the determinants of our outcome
variables vary smoothly at the Mita border. Thus, Mita effects can be identified by
estimating equations (1) or (2) and correspond to the coefficient .15

b. Data

The data used to implement our GRD comes from the replication files of Dell (2010).16
We define our sample of interest as the districts within 100 km of the Mita boundary's.
We also obtain the control variables used by Dell (2010), specifically the polynomials of
the distance to the Mita boundary, the distance to the Potosí mine, and longitude and
latitude.

We include interaction terms for equations 2 and 3. The interaction with closeness to
modern mining comes from the yearly publication “Mining Atlas” from the Ministry of
Energy and Mining (MINEM), which provides data on all mineral production at the
district level since 2001. We use the Atlas from 2001 to 2018 and define a district as
“mining” if it produced any minerals for any year in this range. We then use ArcGIS to
estimate the distance between the districts' capitals and create the minimum distance to a
mining district for non-mining ones.

15
As discussed in Keele & Titiniuk (2015), this is a limitation of GRD semi-parametric specification
concerning to what would be ideally equivalent to a traditional RDD. In particular, our running variable,
distance to a border, is not completely continuous, since districts’ capitals are never exactly at a border.
16
Available from: https://www.econometricsociety.org/content/supplement-persistent-effects-perus-
mining-mita-0.
For equation 3, we use a different approach since we need data starting in 1992, and
mining production data at the district level is only available from 2001 on. Thus, we use
three variables related to the mining boom: mining GDP and the total exports of gold (in
thousands of troy ounces) and copper (in tons).17 The three variables are used in logs and
standardized to make them comparable. This data was obtained from the Central Bank of
Peru website.18 These three variables are presented in Figure 3.

HERE FIGURE 3

We hand-coded data for the Tupac Amaru II rebellion of 1780-1783 using the work of
Morner & Trelles (1986). They collected data on support for the rebellion of Tupac
Amaru, based on the historical correspondence of the rebels and royalist factions and at
the village level. They labeled a town as a “rebel” if it was mentioned in these documents
that either the local leader, cacique, or the whole town supported the rebellion. We then
took this list of rebel and non-rebel villages and manually looked for them in modern
districts. Thanks to the persistence in the towns’ names in the Peruvian Andes, we were
able to identify nearly all of them

As a robustness check, we use two additional measures of intensity of conflict at the

district level from Walker (2014) and O’Phelan (2012). Walker (2014) provided a list of
places where the body parts of rebels were exhibited after the rebellion was ended.19 This
information was obtained from the official sentences. O’Phelan (2012) listed the places
of origin or where the insurgents resided before the uprising. Even when the accused was
considered not guilty, this may have been due to many of the rebels looking to save their
own life, denying supporting the rebellion and accusing Tupac Amaru of coercing them

17
We use these two commodities since copper is the most valuable mineral for export in Peru (60% of total
mining exports in 2018). Gold, on the other hand, is the most important mineral (in value) in the five
departments where our sample is located (Ayacucho, Arequipa, Apurímac, Cusco, and Puno). We chose to
present exports (in tons) and not export value, in order to avoid mixing mining production with prices to
show an increase specifically in production, not prices.
18
All time-series used are available at: https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/.
19
The motivation for this proxy comes from Walker (2014): “Diego Cristóbal’s sentence ordered that his
body will be quartered and his head taken to the town of Tungasuca, one arm to Lauramarca, the other to
the town of Carabaya, one leg to Paucartambo, the other to Calca, and the rest of his body shall be put on
a pillory on the road to this city’s water tank.” “Authorities displayed the Condori heads and limbs in
Marcapata, distant Azángaro, the Ausangate glacier, and other towns. Ausangate had been a refuge for
rebels; it also constituted a revered, symbolic place for Andean people, a site for pilgrimage. Marcela
Castro’s head was exhibited on a pike in San Sebastián, just outside of Cuzco toward the Vilcanota Valley,
and her other body parts were displayed in Sicuani, Urcos Bridge, Pampamarca, Ocongate.” Finally, on
the aim of the exhibition explained by two members of the colonial army: “Monuments to their excesses
will remain in the areas where Diego Cristóbal and his accomplices displayed their bloodthirsty nature, as
fragments of their cadavers will be distributed there.”
and not actually be uninvolved. This information was obtained from the trial data.20 Then
they repeated the process of looking for these towns in modern districts and identified
nearly all of them.

The data from the Internal Conflict between 1980 and 2000 comes from the database
compiled by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It contains all
the events of the conflict for which there is at least a victim and a witness. From there,
we find direct information on 23,000 deaths and disappearances caused by the conflict.21
Thus, we have the number of deaths and affected population at the district level for each
event recorded in the database.22 Here we created indicators — such as the probability of
violent events and the number of deaths per capita — to measure the intensity of the
conflict on the district level.

Data on mining-related social unrest come from the 166 Ombudsman office monthly
reports, the “Reporte de Conflictos Sociales” from 2004 to 2017. They are available on
their website23 and hand-coded into a dataset by Professor Jose Carlos Orihuela from the
Catholic University of Peru, who generously shared this data with us. The Ombudsman’s
definition of “social conflict” is: “Social conflict is a complex process in which sectors
of society, the state, and firms perceive their positions, interest, objectives, values, beliefs
or necessities as contradictory. This process creates a situation that could derive in
violence.” This dataset includes detailed information on 476 different social conflicts
collected from these reports, 166 of which are anti-mining. We then create district-level
indicators such as the probability of having these types of conflicts at any given moment.

Finally, we use nighttime luminosity as a proxy of economic development. This data

comes from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Specifically, we use the DMSP satellite photos24 for the 1992-2012 period and the VIIRS
satellite photos25 for the 2013-2019 period. We make this switch as soon as VIIRS photos

20
All authors use two compilation of historical documents: CDIP (1971) and CDBRETA (1980). Both
included numerous volumes of historical documentation such as letters, sentences, official orders, etc.
21
CVR (2004) specifies that they were only able to get witnesses for 23,000 dead or disappeared but
estimate this total around 70,000. The methodology for this estimation can be seen in Ball et al. (2003), but
Rendon, (2019) revised this number of casualties to 48,000. This data has been previously used by Galdo
(2013), Leon (2012), and Grimard & Laszlo (2014).
22
Available at: https://sites.google.com/a/pucp.pe/informe-final-de-la-cvr--peru/
23
Available at: https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/categorias_de_documentos/reportes/.
24
Available at: https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
25
Available at: https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/viirs/download_dnb_composites.html
are available as they have much higher resolution and are available on a monthly basis,
where the DMSP is only available yearly. For homogeneity, we use only a month per year
(March) when using the VIIRS data.26 We then aggregate the data at the district level by
summing all luminosity values within each district's borders for each year.

The rest of the variables come from various sources. We use the Opinions Questionnaire
of the National Household Survey (ENAHO) from 2018 for the outcomes related to
beliefs about democracy and social self-identification.27 We use the 2006 version of this
survey for opinions about the causes of economic development since this is the last
version that includes these questions. The respondents are randomly selected adults for a
given sampled household.

A notable difference between these two sources is that the first has a larger sample size
of both districts and individuals. Out of the 289 districts of interest, the 2018 survey
contains 193, while the 2006 survey includes only 116. Additionally, the 2018 survey
consists of 3,407 households, while the 2006 survey only 1,696. Therefore, the ENAHO
results are presented at the individual level because it’s not viable to use them at the
district level. Finally, we use the information on land tenure at the district level from the
National Agrarian Census of 2012, compiled by INEI.

Table 1 presents summary statistics and some brief definitions for the outcome variables
included in the paper. Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables used
for the exercises in the Appendix.28

HERE TABLE 1

4. The Persistent Effect of Mita on Social Unrest

This section discusses our main estimates of the effects of Mita on social unrest in
different periods. Table 2 presents our estimates of equation (1). Columns 1, 4, and 7

26
Although most of the literature has used the DMSP data, that is partially due to it being available for a
much longer period of time, both sources have been used as proxies for economic development (Henderson
et al. 2012, 2018; Donaldson & Storeygard, 2016; Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2016; Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou 2013, 2014).
27
All ENAHO surveys can be obtained from: http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/microdatos/.
28
Data on the income and expenditures measures used in Table A.4 and for data, and on the placebo
measures of the “I don’t know” answers in Table A.6 also come from ENAHO 2018. Data on the placebo
measures of the mining boom are from the Central Bank of Peru website.
present coefficients using districts within 100 km of the border; columns 2, 5, and 8 are
the same within 75 km; and 3, 6, and 9 within 50 km.

In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the district's probability of supporting
the Tupac Amarú Rebellion at the end of the 18th century. As we can see, the mean of this
variable for the control group is between 3 to 5 pp., while the estimated effect for Mita is
between 13 and 17 pp. Results in columns 4 to 6 mirror have the same estimates, with the
dependent variably being the probability that the district suffered a violent event at any
time during the internal conflict of 1980-90s. We see significant differences between
groups again: the Mita is between 21 and 43 pp. in contrast, the control group is between
27 and 34 pp. Finally, Columns 7 to 9 present the effects on the probability the district
had an anti-mining protest at any point between 2004 and 2017. Again, the results are
similar; while control districts only have averages of between 3 to 4 pp., the Mita effect
is between 15 to 22 pp. and is statistically significant.

HERE TABLE 2

In terms of robustness exercises, Appendix Table A.2 presents results using two
alternative measures of conflict for each period. For the Tupac Amaru conflict, we use
the probability that the district received a rebel’s body part as punishment for its
participation in the rebellion and the probability that it was the district of origin for rebels.
We find statistically significant but lower magnitude estimates of the Mita impact given
the low number of districts with nonzero outcomes. For the internal conflict of the 1980s
and 1990s, we find similar results using the number of attacks and affected population
per 10,000 people in the district. Finally, we use the probability of having any other
protest for the mining conflicts in the 21st century and how many anti-mining protests
there were per 10,000 population and find similar statistically significant results.

Figure 4 presents the results from a spatial perspective. Notably, we can see that it is not
the case that a particular area is driving the higher levels of social unrest within the Mita
catchment area. All areas are having an impact.

HERE FIGURE 4

Finally, to better understand the mechanism behind the effects, we also estimate a
heterogeneity analysis for the last period to see if anti-mining protests are more likely to
occur close to districts where modern mines are operating. We estimate equation (2) using
the probability of having anti-mining protests as the dependent variable and interact Mita
assignment with a dummy for whether the district is a mining one. We also use the
negative of the hyperbolic logarithm of the distance to the closest mining district as a
continuous proxy for closeness to modern mines.29

HERE TABLE 3

Table 3 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 repeat information from Table 2 to provide
a benchmark for the results in columns 7 and 9. In columns 3 and 4, we present the
interaction with the dummy for having a mine. We see that variable itself does not affect
protests in the control area (if anything, the effect is negative but not statistically
significant). In contrast, the interaction of Mita with closeness to mining significantly
increases the probability of having conflict by between 27 to 37 pp., which is around the
average effect of the Mita. Similarly, we see a similar result using the second proxy, e.g.,
increasing the closeness (in kilometers) by 1% increases the probability of protests by
between 1.4 to 1.8 pp.

At the bottom of the table, we report the average of these proxies for Mita and non-Mita
districts, and both have between 11 to 14 % of their districts are mining ones and are at a
similar distance to the mining districts. In Appendix Table A3, we estimate equation (1)
using these proxies for closeness as the dependent variable. We see no statistical
differences between treated and control groups implying that Mita and non-Mita areas are
balanced in these dimensions.

Thus, this evidence suggests that Mita affects social unrest and conflict in different
historical moments, from colonial times to the recent mining boom. Moreover, no matter
which indicator we use, the differences between Mita and non-Mita districts are
remarkably high. In a sense, Mita areas have been affected disproportionately by the most
relevant conflicts in Peru's history from the colonial period to the present

5. How Social Unrest affects Economic Development: The Mining Boom in Peru

29
According to Burbidge et al. (1988) this allows us to use the logarithmic transformation with data from
districts with zero distance (e.g., the mining ones). We use the negative version for simplicity since a larger
number means being located closer to a mining district.
The evidence we have presented so far shows that Mita areas have more conflicts,
particularly those related to mining during the last two decades. However, as we discussed
before, mining activities were critical drivers of new economic opportunities and growth
in the 1990s and 2000s.30 Thus, in this section, we complement the previous evidence to
see whether the mining boom had different economic effects in Mita and non-Mita areas.

We start this section by presenting the results of estimating equation (1) using nighttime
luminosity as a proxy for economic development between 1992 to 2019 (using the 289
districts included within 100 km from the Mita boundary). We opted to use nighttime
satellite data instead of household surveys31 for two reasons. First, it covers a more
extended period (1992-2019), while surveys are only available since 1997. Second, the
survey sample size changes year by year, adapting to new population censuses, making
comparisons between years less accurate and precise.32

We present the Mita effect estimates in Figure 5 using different geographic functions in
the GRD estimate. We start showing the differences between Mita and non-Mita groups
for every five years from 1992 to 2019. These periods represent different moments of the
mining boom.: “Valley 1” is 1992, “Pre-Boom” is 1997, “Boom Start” is 2002, “Mid
Boom” is 2007, “Boom End” is 2013, and “Valley 2” is 2019.33

Figure 5 presents an interesting dynamic pattern of the (absolute value of the) impact of
the Mita; said impact is more prominent during the boom period and lowers during the
valleys. This particular dynamic suggests that the Mita effect may be correlated with the
fact that some regions are more likely to economically benefit from the mining boom's
new opportunities.

HERE FIGURE 5

In Table 4, we present panel-data estimates of equation (3), particularly the interaction

coefficient between the Mita and the three different proxies for the mining boom. This
equation already includes time- and district-fixed effects, the mining boom's polynomial

30
And even when there might be complaints about pollution, several papers argue that the increase in fiscal
resources dominate the potential adverse effects (Aragón & Rud, 2013; Loayza & Rigolini, 2016).
31
Dell (2010) used the 2001 ENAHO.
32
We do briefly use the ENAHO (2018) data in Appendix Table A5. The coefficients are similar to what
Dell (2010) presented in her original study using the ENAHO 2001 survey.
33
The same figure including all years, is in Appendix Figure A1, and specific coefficients and standard
errors of this figure are in Appendix Table A4.
interaction, and time-trend interactions with Mita and the polynomial. The results suggest
that the interaction is statistically significant. Additionally, the results are robust to using
our two corrections for missing data.

HERE TABLE 4

Thus, these results suggest that the differences between Mita and non-Mita districts
increase when there are expanded opportunities due to a mining boom. This result is
consistent with our previous argument that Mita regions (with all their economic, social,
and political differences) are not well equipped to benefit from the expanded economic
opportunities generated by the mining boom.

To test the robustness, a placebo exercise is presented in Appendix Table A6, in which
we replace our mining boom proxies with others related to macroeconomic conditions
such as general economic growth, openness to international trade, or expansion of fiscal
capacity.34 We find that none of these interactions have the same effect as our mining
boom proxies, suggesting that the interaction effects are genuinely related to mining.

Additionally, a potential concern with these results is that higher nighttime luminosity
might not be reflecting improvements in economic conditions. Instead, it could be simply
the operation of the mining sector itself. To test the robustness of our results, we re-
estimate our panel data model in Appendix Table A7 but excluding districts with a mine
within. This correction will naturally reduce the magnitude of our point estimates since
this district is the most directly affected, but as can be seen, our main results hold.

6. How Does the Mita Effect Persist? Evidence from Beliefs

This section proposes other dimensions on which the Mita has effects that persist to the
present. Ideally, we would like to have this type of data on beliefs for different moments
in time, such as the data on social unrest, but we only have present data. However, we
consider that this evidence is very suggestive of mechanisms behind Mita persistence.

We take advantage of a unique feature of the National Survey of Households of Peru

(ENAHO). This survey includes a special questionnaire answered by an adult (randomly
selected from the household) on opinions related to democracy, discrimination, trust in

34
We use agricultural GDP, the exports of the main agricultural commodities (cotton, sugar and coffee),
and total public sector expenditures.
institutions, and subjective wellbeing. This feature is critical for our study since, given
the survey’s large sample size, we have information for several geographic areas (while
other opinion surveys, such as Latinobarometer or LAPOP, tend to focus only on large
cities).

Table 5 shows the responses to a question included in the ENAHO 2006 survey where
subjects are asked their opinion regarding the importance of five variables in explaining
economic development: i) colonial history, ii) foreign intervention, iii) bad government,
iv) people’s attitudes, and v) scarcity of natural resources. Answers were from 1 (low
importance) to 4 (very important), although “I don’t know” (IDK) was also an option.35

Columns 1 and 2 present the Mita effects on the share of people who choose IDK for any
of the options. While 15 pp. and 39 pp. of the control group chose IDK for all the options
and at least one, respectively, people in Mita districts are much more likely to choose
IDK. Specifically, around 19 pp. for all options and to 16 pp. in at least one for our favorite
specification.36

In turn, Columns 3 to 7 present the effects on the share of people who select each
dimension as relevant (using answers with values 3 or 4) among people who answer each
question. We interpret this as the percentage of the population that considers that factor
relevant. As can be seen, most of the estimated coefficients are positive, but we only find
statistically significant results for the first: colonial history. We consider it noteworthy
that people affected by a colonial force-labor institution choosing this option as a reason
for current (under)development is quite relevant for the literature on the long-term effects
of history. As far as we know, this is the first time this type of direct self-reported evidence
has been used in this literature.

HERE TABLE 5

In Table 6, we move to study Mita’s effects on beliefs about democracy. People were
asked whether they knew the meaning of “democracy.” As can be seen, people in treated
districts are much less likely to answer affirmatively to this simple question. The
estimates show a decrease of 17 pp., versus an average of 31% for the control group. Next

35
Unfortunately, 2006 was the last year when this question was included in this module.
36
In Appendix Table A8, we present the share that chose IDK for each option; as seen, it affects all of the
options.
are the answers about what people believe are the effects or consequences of democracy,
in columns 2 to 5 (for those who answer yes to the question in column 1). We find that
people in Mita areas are less likely to select the three alternatives that imply a positive
effect of democracy on their wellbeing (i.e., respect people's rights, improve my family's
wellbeing, and being represented), and no differences in the one that could be considered
more mechanical (i.e., electing authorities.) In column 7, we see that, on average, they
also select fewer total effects.

HERE TABLE 6

Thus, the evidence suggests that people living in Mita have attitudes and beliefs that
suggest lower political engagement and commitment to a democratic system.
Additionally, people living in Mita districts are more likely to choose the IDK option
whenever is available in the questions about beliefs: trust in institutions, perceptions
about corruption, discrimination, etc., which could be interpreted as a generalized distrust
of or unease about the political, social, and economic system.37

Finally, we present people's opinions in terms of self-identification in Table 7, where we

present the Mita’s effects on the question: “To which of the following groups do you feel
more identified?”. Here we find that in Mita districts, people are more likely to select
“Peasant Community” and less likely to select the “region, province, or district” of
residence. Although this second choice could be somewhat confusing to interpret, these
three are all sub-national government levels. Therefore, we suggest that they function —
at least in part — as a potential way to identify with either the current political system or
categories that have been created by outsiders with national power, and therefore feel less
“local” especially compared with alternatives that do not have those implications.

What is notable here is that is the respondent is only allowed to choose one answer, which
allows us to identify their strongest identification, and it is clear that these peasant
communities are more critical in Mita districts. The last two columns, 6 and 7, add

37
A potential concern to our previous point is that the impoverishing effects of the Mita system also caused
people to be less educated, to have less information, or to have more time constraints, which would cause
a higher share of “IDK” choices. In Appendix Table A9, we provide evidence that this is not the case. Using
questions from the rest of the survey, we find that for non-political related questions, there is no difference
in the share who selects “IDK” in Mita and non-Mita areas. If anything, people in Mita districts are less
likely to answer IDK to other types of questions.
additional evidence in this regard; more land in these districts is controlled by peasant
communities, based on the 2012 agricultural land census.

HERE TABLE 7

In all, the results in this section suggest the potential existence of more complex
mechanisms of persistence to explain the Mita regime's effects on long-run development.
We hypothesize that this may be related to persistent differences in beliefs and attitudes
between Mita and non-Mita areas, translating into understandings related to economic,
political, and social dimensions. It speaks of the high importance of peasant communities
in these areas and how people identify with them versus the country or the government.
We hypothesize that these behaviors support our previous results on the effects of the
Mita system on social unrest.

7. Concluding Remarks

The search for the determinants of long-run development faces the challenge of pinning
down several economic, political, and social dimensions to explain the mechanisms
behind the effects of the specific determinants. This challenge is even more complicated
by the fact that all these dimensions interact with each other. Our paper revisits the case
of the mining Mita system, an institution of Spanish colonial Peru, which had long-term
effects on economic development (Dell, 2010). We propose social unrest as a major
mechanism for its continuing and persistent impact. Following Dell (2010), we
implemented econometric estimates from a geographic discontinuity design related to the
Mita catchment area. We also study the dynamic reaction of these areas to the expanded
economic opportunities provided by a mining boom in Peru over the 2000s.

There are three time periods we use to document the effects of the Mita system on social
unrest: (i) the late 18th century, when the Great Rebellion of Tupac Amaru II took place;
(ii) the 1980s and 1990s, the period of internal conflict between the communist guerrilla
Shining Path group and the Peruvian government; and (iii) The 2000s and 2010s when
Peru underwent a significant mining boom that leads to local-level protests. We find
significant and economically meaningful differences between Mita and non-Mita districts
for all three periods, with Mita areas being remarkably more affected by social unrest.
For the final period, we also find that these anti-mining protests are more likely to occur
in districts with mining activity and districts closer to mines, but this occurs only in Mita
districts.

In a different econometric exercise, we estimate the impact of the mining boom using
nighttime luminosity as a proxy for economic development. We find that the boom's
positive effect is heterogeneous, being more significant for non-Mita districts, suggesting
the long-run differences in development might also be related to these areas' ability to
take advantage of new economic opportunities. These results provide empirical evidence
on how different reactions to critical junctures explain differences in economic
development.

Next, we provide additional tentative evidence on some of the drivers behind this higher
social unrest. We find that people in Mita areas have said they know less about
democracy, feel less identified with the country vis-à-vis their local peasant community,
and are more likely to select “Colonial Past” as a fundamental cause for economic
(under)development. In conjunction with the evidence on social conflict, these facts are
consistent with the hypothesis of the importance of beliefs as a cultural mechanism of
historical persistence.

To conclude, this study's findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of

institutional shocks’ persistent effects on long-run development. Our results suggest that
specific historical institutional differences, like those related to the mining Mita in
colonial Peru, start divides that lead to significant and permanent effects on social unrest
and identity. We also hope that our results shed some light on how this latent social unrest
is persistent and can interact with critical junctures such as the Peruvian mining boom.
Finally, although the research on the interrelation of culture and institutions on
determining economic development is now well-established in the literature,38 we hope
to help to better understand the interplay of institutions, economic shocks, social unrest,
and beliefs.

38
For instance, see: Acemoglu & Robinson (2021); Acemoglu & Wolitzky (2014); Alesina & Giuliano
(2015); Giuliano & Nunn (2021).
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9. Figures and Tables
Figures

Figure 1. The Mining Mita

Panel A. Topography around the Mita Panel B. Areas Assigned to the

Mita

Note: Data of the border limits of the Mita and altitude at pixel level are from the Data Appendix of Dell
(2010). The Huancavelica and Potosi mines are the current municipalities where mines were located. The
borders of Tawantinsuyo are constructed by ourselves using are the current borders of provinces that were
included in 1573 census of Viceroy Toledo.
 Figure 2. Study Area

Note: See notes of Figure 1 for border of the Mita of Potosi and Huancavelica.In the left figure we plot the
289 used in this study in grey. In upper-right we present this same districts distinguishing between treated
(within Mita borders) and control (outside). In bottom-right, we present in black the border of our study
area and in yellow the borders of the Mita that are withing our area of study.
 Figure 3. Peruvian Mining Boom

Note: All variables are de-trended and in natural-logs. All data comes from the Peruvian Central Bank (BCRP) website.
Upper figure presents the National Mining GDP, middle figure presents the national exports of Gold and bottom figure
presents copper exports.
 Figure 4. Differences in Social Unrest in Mita and Non-mita Districts

Note: All panels present the 289 districts that are of study sample. Panel A presents in pink the treated and in light-blue the control groups. Panel B, C and D, present in blue,
dark-yellow and green the districts with at least one event of conflict. The variables are the same used in Table 2. For panel B, the dummy takes value of 1, if they supported
the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. For panel C, takes one if there was at least one violent event during the 1980-2000 internal conflict. For panel C, takes value of 1 if there occurred
at least one anti-mining conflict between 2004 and 2017. See section 3 for more details in data contruction.
Figure 5. The Dynamic Impact of Mining Mita between 1992 and 2019 (selected
years)

Note: The figure presents coefficients and 95% confidence intervals and are obtained from regressions on
district-level night-time luminosity with the Mita treatment presented in Appendix Table A4. Blue
corresponds to GRD regressions using latitude and longitude quadratic polynomials, Red corresponds to
the ones using quadratic distance to Potosi, and Green to quadratic distance to the Mita boundary. Details
in the regressions can be seen in Section 3. Each moment presented corresponds to a year: “Valley 1” to
1992, “Pre-Boom” to 1997, “Boom Start” to 2002, “Mid Boom” to 2008, “Boom End” to 2014 and “Valley
2” to 2019.
 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Treatment, control and interaction variables
Mining Mita (1=yes) 289 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0
Average Elevation (thousand of meters above sea level) 289 3.9 0.5 2.4 4.8
Average Slope gradient 289 8.0 3.8 0.3 17.6
Boundary segment 1 289 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Boundary segment 2 289 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Boundary segment 3 289 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
Dummy if mining district (1=yes) 289 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Hyperbolic log. of distance to closest mining district
(negative) 289 -17.4 6.8 -22.7 0.7
Log. of national mining GDP (1992-2019) 28 10.6 0.4 9.9 11.2
Log. of national gold production (1992-2019) 28 8.3 0.7 6.4 8.8
Log. of national copper production (1992-2019) 28 6.8 0.6 5.9 7.8
Table 2 and 3. Social Unrest Outcomes
Tupac Amarú Rebellion Dummy if evidence of this district
1781-1783 supporting rebellion (100=yes) 289 9.7 29.6 0.0 100.0
Internal Violence 1980- Dummy if there was a terrorist attack in
2000 the district (100=yes) 289 57.1 49.6 0.0 100.0
Anti-mining protests Dummy if there was at least 1 anti-
(2004-2017) mining protest in the district (100=yes) 289 13.1 33.9 0.0 100.0
Table 4. Nighttime luminosity Panel Data
Log. of the sum of nightlight in district-year panel data (1992-
2019) 8092 3.3 2.0 0.7 8.9
Hyperbolic Log. of the sum of NL in district-year panel data
(1992-2019) 8092 4.9 5.2 -0.7 17.0
Table 5. Causes of development
Colonial History 1022 53.5 49.9 0.0 100.0
Foreign Intervention 1078 59.7 49.1 0.0 100.0
Do you think is an
Bad Government 1274 90.4 29.4 0.0 100.0
obstacle to the
People's attitude 1161 67.5 46.8 0.0 100.0
development of the
Scarcity of Natural Resources 1246 48.7 50.0 0.0 100.0
country?
Says "I don't know" to all options 1696 23.9 42.7 0.0 100.0
Says "IDK" to at least one option 1696 42.0 49.4 0.0 100.0
Table 6. Democracy
Do you know what democracy is? (100=yes) 3407 31.3 46.4 0.0 100.0
If you know what Respect people's rights 1067 58.2 49.3 0.0 100.0
democracy is, what do Improving my family's wellbeing 1067 42.5 49.5 0.0 100.0
you think democracy is Electing authorities 1067 22.2 41.6 0.0 100.0
for? (multiple answer Being repre-sented 1067 51.2 50.0 0.0 100.0
question) Nothing at all 1067 4.9 21.5 0.0 100.0
Number of options selected (different from "Nothing") 1067 1.7 1.2 0.0 4.0
Table 7. Self-Identification
To which of the Region, Province or District 2991 44.4 49.7 0.0 100.0
following do you feel Ethnic group 2991 1.8 13.3 0.0 100.0
more identified to? (% Peasant Community 2991 39.5 48.9 0.0 100.0
that choose each Religious Group 2991 13.7 34.4 0.0 100.0
option) Other 2991 0.6 7.5 0.0 100.0
Importance of Peasant Share (%) of agricultural lands in
289 55.2 35.9 0.0 99.7
Communities district
 Table 2. Effect of Mita on Social Unrest
Tupac Amarú II Rebellion Internal Conflict Anti-mining Protests
(1781-1783) (1980-2001) (2004-2017)
Dependent: Prob. of supporting rebellion Prob. of having a violent event Prob. of having protests

< 100 km <75 km < 50 km < 100 km <75 km < 50 km < 100 km <75 km < 50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
17.31*** 15.23** 12.49 20.86** 12.12 9.08 17.66*** 22.79*** 20.44***
Mita
(6.34) (6.92) (8) (10.01) (10.84) (12.09) (6.37) (6.73) (7.71)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.03
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
15.28*** 16.12*** 15.63*** 42.92*** 41.23*** 35.06*** 17.11*** 18.3*** 19.39***
Mita
(3.95) (4.27) (4.35) (6.72) (7.01) (7.64) (4.43) (4.55) (4.72)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.04
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
13.09*** 16.12*** 16.78*** 43.48*** 41.23*** 34.67*** 15.2*** 18.3*** 19.69***
Mita
(3.38) (4.27) (4.42) (6.42) (7.01) (7.86) (3.92) (4.55) (4.56)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.06
Mean of outcome for
3.49 3.90 4.84 26.74 28.57 33.87 3.49 3.90 3.23
non-Mita Districts
Observations are at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects.
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table 3. Heterogeneous Effect of Mita on Social Unrest depending on Closeness to
Mines
Dependent: Prob. of having Anti-mining protests in district
Negative of
Hyperbolic Log. of
X Variable: No Interaction Mining District
Distance to Mining
District
<100 km <50 km <100 km <50 km <100 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
17.66*** 20.44*** 17.29*** 19.23** 17.53*** 19.08**
Mita
(6.37) (7.71) (6.37) (7.75) (6.36) (7.77)
-7.91* -5.74 -0.37* -0.19
X
(4.03) (6.77) (0.22) (0.37)
36.78*** 35.17** 1.8*** 1.69**
Mita*X
(11.25) (14.29) (0.55) (0.69)
R2 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
17.11*** 19.39*** 17.17*** 20.01*** 16.9*** 19.62***
Mita
(4.43) (4.72) (4.43) (4.75) (4.39) (4.68)
-6.2* -2.74 -0.26 -0.01
X
(3.63) (6.05) (0.2) (0.33)
35.46*** 32.59** 1.73*** 1.54**
Mita*X
(11.14) (13.99) (0.54) (0.66)
R2 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
15.2*** 19.69*** 15.04*** 19.95*** 14.77*** 19.63***
Mita
(3.92) (4.56) (3.96) (4.58) (3.93) (4.51)
-3.88 0.89 -0.13 0.12
X
(4) (7.12) (0.21) (0.38)
34.38*** 27.09* 1.69*** 1.38*
Mita*X
(11.38) (15.05) (0.54) (0.71)
R2 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 289 185 289 185 289 185
Average of X
10.84 12.20 -17.42 -17.08
in Mita
Average of X
13.95 11.29 -17.47 -18.35
in Non Mita
Observations are at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a cubic polynomial on
latitude and longitude, geographic controls, and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different
from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table 4. Interaction between the Impact of Mita with the Mining Boom (1992-2019)
Log. of the sum of nightlight in Hyperbolic Log. of the sum of
Dependent variable:
district nightlight in district
<100 km <75 km <50 km <100 km <75 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. -1.74*** -1.55** -1.67** -4.14*** -3.5** -3.91**
Coef.
Mining (0.58) (0.62) (0.68) (1.3) (1.35) (1.48)
GDP R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.77

-0.4** -0.35* -0.38* -0.93** -0.72 -0.83

Log. Gold Coef.
(0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.43) (0.46) (0.5)
Exports
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77

Log. -0.39 -0.39* -0.46* -0.95 -0.98* -1.17*

Coef.
Copper (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.64) (0.52) (0.63)
Exports R2 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77
Clusters N (Districts,
289, 28 239, 28 185, 28 289, 28 239, 28 185, 28
Year)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic
Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction with Mita
Time trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
interaction with Mita
N 8,092 6,692 5,180 8,092 6,692 5,180
Observations are at the district-year level. Two-way clustered by district and year standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table 5. Effect of Mita on Beliefs about the Causes of Economic Development
Do you think is an obstacle to the development of the country?
Foreign Bad Scarcity "IDK" to
Colonial People's “IDK” to all
Dependent: Inter- Govern- of Natural at least one
History attitude options
vention ment Resources option
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
27.71*** 9.07 6.96 10.5 8.23 19.82*** 16.32**
Mita
(9.27) (9.08) (5.48) (8.3) (7.14) (6.29) (6.61)
N 816 861 1,036 932 1,014 1,446 1,446
R2 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.08
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
13.9* 9.6 5.75 -0.28 6.13 19.29*** 15.35***
Mita
(7.53) (6.47) (4.78) (6.1) (6.06) (4.75) (5.3)
N 816 861 1,036 932 1,014 1,446 1,446
R2 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.09
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
11.52 6.98 4.28 -1.28 3.86 23.63*** 20.06***
Mita
(7.63) (6.21) (5.34) (6.69) (5.84) (4.97) (5.25)
N 816 861 1,036 932 1,014 1,446 1,446
R2 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.07
Mean of outcome
for Non-Mita 48.13 50.75 81.56 64.45 45.96 14.88 39.45
Districts
Observations are at the household level with clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. For all regressions there
are 193 clusters. All regressions include districts within 100 km of the Mita boundary and include geographic controls and
boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
 Table 6. Effect of Mita on Beliefs on Democracy

Do you If you know what democracy is, what do you think democracy is for?
know what (multiple answer question)
democracy Improving
Respect Being Number of
is? my Electing Nothing
Dependent: people's repre- options
R: Yes. family's authorities at all
rights sented selected
wellbeing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-17.22** -5.67 -3.24 5.59 -7.77 -3.44 -0.11
Mita
(8.2) (7.09) (5.64) (7.27) (6.71) (2.24) (0.18)
N 3 098 857 857 857 857 857 857
R2 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
-14.36*** -5.64 -11.26*** -0.05 -17.5*** -1.5 -0.34***
Mita
(2.11) (5.27) (4.17) (5.27) (5.03) (2.02) (0.12)
N 3 098 857 857 857 857 857 857
R2 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
-11.81*** -6.99 -14.63*** -2.21 -17.23*** -2.86 -0.41***
Mita
(2.05) (5.09) (4.19) (5.14) (4.94) (2.05) (0.12)
N 3 098 857 857 857 857 857 857
R2 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06
Mean of
outcome for
31.08 57.63 28.24 55.34 46.56 5.73 1.88
Non-Mita
Districts
Observations are at the household level with clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. There are 193 clusters.
All regressions include districts within 100 km from the Mita boundary and include geographic controls and boundary segment
fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table 7. Long-Term Effect of Mita on Self-Identification
Importance of
To which of the following groups do you feel more identified
Peasant
to? (% that choose each option)
Communities
Region,
Ethnic Peasant Religious Share of lands in
Province Other
group Community Group district
or District
< 100 km < 100 km < 100 km < 100 km < 100 km < 100 km < 50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-21.99*** -0.46 19.18** 3.39 -0.13 15.35** 13.55*
Mita
(8.42) (0.74) (7.65) (3.13) (0.4) (7.11) (8.01)
N 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 289 185
R2 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.31
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
-19.64*** -1.12** 21.09*** 0.1 -0.43 15.6*** 18.61***
Mita
(5.12) (0.54) (4.74) (2.38) (0.3) (4.98) (5.37)
N 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 289 185
R2 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.22
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
-17.04*** -0.54 16.95*** 0.98 -0.35 12.01** 15.85***
Mita
(4.88) (0.57) (4.53) (2.44) (0.3) (4.87) (5.04)
N 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 289 185
R2 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.27
Mean of
outcome
for Non- 53.05 1.59 30.37 14.27 0.73 44.10 45.46
Mita
Districts
Regressions in columns (6) to (7) are at the district level with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions in
columns (1) to (5) are at the household level with cluster errors at the district level. All regressions include geographic
controls and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: ***
p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
10. Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A1. The Dynamic Impact of Mining Mita between 1992 and 2019 (all years)

Note: The figure presents coefficients and 95% confidence intervals obtained from regressions on district-
level night-time luminosity with the Mita treatment similar to the ones presented in Appendix Table A4,
but using all years from 1992 to 2019. Blue corresponds to GRD regressions using latitude and longitude
quadratic polynomials, Red corresponds to the ones using quadratic distance to Potosi, and Green to
quadratic distance to the Mita boundary. Details in the regressions can be seen in Section 3.
 Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of variables in Appendix Tables
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Table A2. Robustness on Social Unrest Outcomes
Dummy if district received a rebel
289 4.8 21.5 0.0 100.0
Tupac Amarú Rebellion body part as punishment (100=yes)
1781-1783 Dummy if district was the origin of a
289 10.7 31.0 0.0 100.0
rebellion leader (100=yes)
Number of people affected (deaths,
Internal Violence 1980- 284 90.6 227.1 0.0 2157.6
injured, etc.) per 10K pop. in district
2000
Number of deaths per 10K pop. 284 45.9 105.3 0.0 883.7
Dummy if there was at least 1 protest
Anti-mining protests 289 20.8 40.6 0.0 100.0
(any reason) in the district (100=yes)
(2004-2017)
N of anti-mining protests per 10K pop. 289 2.5 9.5 0.0 96.3
Table A3. Nighttime Luminosity at district level per year
1992 289 1.9 1.2 1.4 7.6
1997 289 2.7 1.6 1.6 8.2
Log. of the sum of
2002 289 2.7 1.8 1.4 8.2
nightlight in district in
2008 289 2.9 2.0 1.1 8.3
year:
2014 289 5.2 1.0 2.3 8.7
2019 289 5.6 1.0 3.0 8.9
Table A4. Household Living Standards Outcomes
Log. of Consumption per capita 3098 9.4 0.7 7.0 11.8
Log. of Income per capita 3098 9.5 0.8 6.7 12.0
Log. of Income per capita (excluding non-monetary income) 3096 9.1 1.1 4.3 11.8
Table A5. Placebo measures of Mining Boom
Log. Agricultural GDP 28 9.8 0.3 9.1 10.3
Log. Coffee Exports 28 5.1 0.5 3.9 5.7
Log. Cotton Exports 28 0.7 0.9 -0.8 2.6
Log. Sugar Exports 28 3.9 0.5 2.1 4.7
Log. Petroleum Exports 28 3.3 0.4 2.5 3.9
Log. Public Expenditure 28 10.8 0.8 8.9 11.9
Table A6. Alternative measures of "I don't know" questions non-related to politics
Subjective wellbeing 3021 0.7 8.3 0.0 100.0
Percentage of population
Educational level of mother 3021 7.8 26.9 0.0 100.0
answering "I don't know"
If house had construction license 3061 6.3 24.4 0.0 100.0
to question (100="I don't
If house was designed by a
know") 3061 5.9 23.5 0.0 100.0
professional
Survey was incomplete 4080 4.5 20.7 0.0 100.0
Survey quality measures
Survey was rejected 4080 2.7 16.2 0.0 100.0
Table A7. Answer IDK to causes of economic development
Colonial History 1446 43.6 49.6 0.0 100.0
Do you think is an obstacle
Foreign Intervention 1446 40.5 49.1 0.0 100.0
to the development of the
Bad Government 1446 28.4 45.1 0.0 100.0
country? (100="I don't
People's attitude 1446 35.5 47.9 0.0 100.0
know")
Scarcity of Natural Resources 1446 29.9 45.8 0.0 100.0
 Table A2. Effect of Mita on Social Unrest - Robustness
Anti-mining Protests
Tupac Amarú II Rebellion (1781-1783) Internal Conflict (1980-2001) (2004-2017)
Prob. the district N of terrorist N of affected people Anti-Mining
Prob. the district is a Prob. of having a
Dependent: received a body part attacks per 10,000 per 10,000 pop. in protests per 10,000
rebel origin Protest (any reason)
of a rebel pop. in district district pop. in district
< 100 km <50 km < 100 km < 50 km <100 km < 50 km < 100 km <50 km < 100 km <50 km < 100 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
10.43** 5.65 10.43 1.74 -13.91 37.65** -4.73 14.89* 10.13 3.22 2.89** 2.9*
Mita
(4.92) (5.72) (6.76) (8.19) (24.68) (18.03) (10.61) (7.78) (8.26) (9.89) (1.33) (1.53)
N 289 185 289 185 284 180 284 180 289 185 289 185
R2 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
4.65 5.85 15.1*** 13.13*** 62.4*** 54.36*** 26.6*** 26.59*** 11.77** 12.49* 4.06*** 3.57***
Mita
(3.37) (3.67) (4.5) (5.01) (17.2) (12.04) (7.37) (5) (5.75) (6.55) (1.39) (1.16)
N 289 185 289 185 284 180 284 180 289 185 289 185
R2 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
2.41 5.01 11.31*** 11.19** 80.93*** 50.4*** 37.34*** 24.93*** 11.32** 14.01** 3.72*** 3.35***
Mita
(3.01) (3.26) (4) (5.03) (15.39) (11.55) (6.64) (5.05) (5.32) (6.54) (1.29) (1)
N 289 185 289 185 284 180 284 180 289 185 289 185
R2 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Mean of outcome
for non-Mita 3.49 3.23 5.81 8.06 3.70 4.90 2.90 3.83 12.79 14.52 0.32 0.31
Districts
Observations are at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly
different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A3. Effect of Mita on Closeness to Modern Mining
Negative of Hyperbolic
Dependent: Mining District Log. of Distance to Mining
District
< 100 < 100
<75 km < 50 km <75 km < 50 km
km km
(2) (3) (5) (6)
(1) (4)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.44 -0.2 0.52
Mita
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (1.32) (1.43) (1.51)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.31
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
-0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.22 0.09 0.27
Mita
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.91) (0.98) (1)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.27
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
-0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0 0.09 0.4
Mita
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.94) (0.98) (0.96)
N 289 239 185 289 239 185
R2 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.27
Mean of outcome for
13.95 15.58 11.29 -17.47 -17.21 -18.35
non-Mita Districts
Observations are at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a cubic
polynomial on latitude and longitude, geographic controls, and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients
that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A4. Effect of Mita on Night-time Luminosity by year
Dependent: Log. of the sum of nightlight in district
Year: 1992 1997 2002 2008 2014 2019
< 100 km <50 km < 100 km < 50 km <100 km < 50 km < 100 km <50 km < 100 km <50 km < 100 km <50 km
Sample within:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-0.23 -0.38 -0.09 -0.47 -0.72** -0.96** -0.59 -0.81 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 -0.08
Mita
(0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.4) (0.35) (0.43) (0.39) (0.49) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21)
N 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185
R2 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.23
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
-0.41** -0.48** -0.67*** -0.78*** -1.18*** -1.16*** -1.52*** -1.42*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.28** -0.27**
Mita
(0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.3) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
N 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185
R2 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.23
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
-0.33* -0.49** -0.53** -0.68*** -1.05*** -1.08*** -1.39*** -1.3*** -0.35*** -0.3** -0.21* -0.17
Mita
(0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
N 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185 289 185
R2 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.21
Observations are at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are
significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A5. Long-Term Effect of Mita on Living Standards in 2019
Income per capita
Dependent Consumption per
Income per capita (excluding non-
(in logs.): capita
monetary)
<100 km <50 km <100 km <50 km <100 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-0.21 -0.31 -0.19 -0.23 -0.21 -0.27
Mita
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.3) (0.36)
N 2 536 1 700 2 536 1 700 2 532 1 699
R2 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
-0.24** -0.21* -0.25** -0.23* -0.31** -0.29*
Mita
(0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
N 2 536 1 700 2 536 1 700 2 532 1 699
R2 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
-0.19** -0.21** -0.21* -0.21* -0.27* -0.27*
Mita
(0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
N 2 536 1 700 2 536 1 700 2 532 1 699
R2 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Observations are at the household level. Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. For columns 1, 3,
and 5, there are 193 clusters, and for columns 2, 4, and 6, there are 123. All regressions include geographic controls
and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01,
** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A.6. Placebo Test: Heterogeneous Impact of Mining Mita with Other Macro
Shocks (1992-2019)
Log. of the sum of nightlight in Hyperbolic Log. of the sum of
Dependent: district nightlight in district
<100 km <75 km <50 km <100 km <75 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. Agricultural -0.54 -0.38 -0.5 -1.39 -0.76 -1.38
GDP (0.54) (0.6) (0.65) (1.45) (1.6) (1.77)
Log. Coffee -0.38* -0.32 -0.37 -0.91* -0.66 -0.86
Exports (0.2) (0.22) (0.24) (0.51) (0.55) (0.61)
Log. Cotton 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.05
Exports (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)
-0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.1 -0.1
Log. Sugar Exports
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09)
Log. Petroleum 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.2 -0.04 -0.03
Exports (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.36) (0.29) (0.34)
Log. Public 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.16
Expenditure (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.84) (0.81) (0.83)
Clusters N
289, 28 241, 28 187, 28 289, 28 241, 28 187, 28
(Districts, Year)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Effects
Quadratic
Polynomial
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction with
Mita
Time trend
interaction with Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mita
Observations are at the district-year level. Clustered two-way by district and year standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions include the quadratic polynomial on latitude and longitude interaction, district and year fixed effects.
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A7. Robustness check of Table 4 with sample excluding mining districts
Log. of the sum of nightlight in Hyperbolic Log. of the sum of
Dependent variable:
district nightlight in district
<100 km <75 km <50 km <100 km <75 km <50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-1.26* -1.14 -1.6** -3.17** -2.69* -3.75**
Coef.
Log. Mining GDP (0.64) (0.68) (0.73) (1.43) (1.5) (1.6)
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.77

-0.29 -0.24 -0.35 -0.74 -0.54 -0.8

Coef.
Log. Gold Exports (0.18) (0.2) (0.22) (0.44) (0.48) (0.52)
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77

-0.37* -0.41*** -0.59** -0.98* -1.08*** -1.56***

Log. Copper Coef.
(0.19) (0.14) (0.22) (0.51) (0.37) (0.56)
Exports
R2 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77
Clusters N (Districts, Year) 255, 28 208, 28 163, 28 255, 28 208, 28 163, 28
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Polynomial
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction with Mita
Time trend interaction with
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mita
N 7,140 5,824 4,564 7,140 5,824 4,564
Observations are at the district-year level. Clustered two-way by district and year standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are
significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A8. Effect of Mita on not-knowing about the causes of development
Do you think is an obstacle to the development of the country?
Scarcity of
Colonial Foreign Bad People's
Dependent: Natural
History Intervention Government attitude
Resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
17.59** 15.85** 22.04*** 22.21*** 18.17***
Mita
(7.1) (6.42) (6.26) (7.09) (6.35)
N 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
R2 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.12
Panel B. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Potosí
16.3*** 17.42*** 20.86*** 17.92*** 17.75***
Mita
(5.65) (5.13) (4.86) (5.26) (4.81)
N 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
R2 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.12
Panel C. Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
21.52*** 21.83*** 25.08*** 23.04*** 22.49***
Mita
(5.52) (4.94) (5.06) (5.14) (5.09)
N 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
R2 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.11
Mean of outcome for
35.29 31.14 15.57 26.99 18.69
Non-Mita Districts
Observations are at the household level with clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. For all regressions
there are 193 clusters. All regressions include districts within 100 km of the Mita boundary and include geographic controls
and boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, **
p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 Table A9. Effect of Mita on Beliefs non-political related questions
Says that "Does not know …" Problems for surveys
If house was
Subjective Educational level of If house had Survey was
Dependent: designed by Survey was rejected
Wellbeing mother construction license incomplete
professional
< 100 km < 50 km < 100 km < 50 km < 100 km < 50 km < 100 km < 50 km < 100 km < 50 km < 100 km < 50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
-1.56** -0.3 -1.71 -1.42 -4.72* -3.98 -4.27* -3.71 -0.15 -0.91 -0.5 -0.92
Mita
(0.76) (0.34) (2.26) (2.42) (2.4) (2.58) (2.33) (2.61) (0.92) (1.18) (0.71) (0.59)
N 3,021 1,815 3,021 1,815 3,061 1,807 3,061 1,807 4,080 2,230 4,080 2,230
R2 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00
Panel B. Quadratic polynomial in distance to Potosi
-0.92* -0.73 -3.17** -1.97 -3.51** -3.24** -3.47*** -3.07** -1.89*** -1.35** -0.7 -0.19
Mita
(0.52) (0.55) (1.56) (1.53) (1.36) (1.38) (1.31) (1.37) (0.67) (0.66) (0.44) (0.4)
N 3,021 1,815 3,021 1,815 3,061 1,807 3,061 1,807 4,080 2,230 4,080 2,230
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00
Panel B. Quadratic polynomial in distance to Boundary
-0.7 -0.68 -3.41** -1.83 -2.68** -3.1** -2.69** -2.95** -1.33* -0.94 0.07 -0.13
Mita
(0.5) (0.53) (1.53) (1.59) (1.3) (1.28) (1.26) (1.28) (0.77) (0.7) (0.55) (0.38)
N 3,021 1,815 3,021 1,815 3,061 1,807 3,061 1,807 4,080 2,230 4,080 2,230
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
Mean of outcome
for Non-Mita 0.97 0.81 9.92 8.27 6.30 6.05 6.05 5.72 4.23 2.65 0.92 0.88
Districts
Observations are at the household level. Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. For all regressions there are 193 clusters. All regressions include geographic controls and
boundary segment fixed effects. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by: *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.